Agriculture and Food Security in the WTO:

Situation, Issues and Interests of Myanmar

Draft report for the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

June 2017

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 2
II. AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN MYANMAR ............................................................................. 2
1. Overall situation ................................................................................................................................ 2
2. Objectives of Myanmar in the agricultural sector ............................................................................ 6
3. Food security and self-sufficiency ..................................................................................................... 7
4. Food reserves in Myanmar ............................................................................................................... 8
5. Trade in agriculture and fishery products ......................................................................................... 9
III. AGRICULTURE IN ASEAN AND OTHER TRADE-RELATED AGREEMENTS .......................................... 11
1. Trade in food and agriculture within ASEAN .................................................................................. 11
2. Institutional framework in the agricultural sector.......................................................................... 12
IV. OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN AGRICULTURE ....................................................... 12
1. What happened in worldwide agricultural trade since 2008? ....................................................... 12
2. State-of-play of the agriculture talks .............................................................................................. 14
3. Specific situation in the agricultural talks ....................................................................................... 14
4. The way forward to Buenos Aires ................................................................................................... 15
V. how can trade measures strenghten agriculture in Myanmar ........................................................... 16
Tariff barriers in ASEAN+6 countries and beyond .................................................................................. 16
Import duties .......................................................................................................................................... 16
Domestic support.................................................................................................................................... 17
Trade facilitation ..................................................................................................................................... 17
Non-tariff barriers ................................................................................................................................... 17
VI. PRINCIPLES TO FOLLOW IN THE AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE DDA ............................... 17
VII. MEASURES TO CONSIDER IN THE RUN UP TO MC11 ...................................................................... 20
VIII. NEXT STEPS ..................................................................................................................................... 23
ANNEX ON DATA ......................................................................................................................................... 25
 I. INTRODUCTION

From 11 to 14 December 2017, the Eleventh Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), known as MC11 as it is known, will take place in Buenos Aires. As every time, the event marks a
milestone – whether successful or not – in the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Round. Since
2001, the trade talks continue but do not progress sufficiently to conclude the Round. Topics such as
agriculture, market access for non-agricultural products, services and other “minor” issues all play a
crucial role. For a least-developed country (LDC) such as Myanmar, multilateralism remains fundamental
in preserving an inclusive global trading system. The economic powerhouses of this world as well as
emerging markets are engaged for more than a decade in preferential trade agreements, which is slowly
but steadily changing the rules of the game. Aside from ASEAN-related endeavours, Myanmar stays
outside of those de facto discriminatory processes.

So how can Myanmar position itself to guarantee that its trade interests are taken into account at the
MC11? What are the different tracks that it could undertake to satisfy its needs in terms of agricultural
development and food security? How can agricultural trade contribute to enhance food security in the
country and what measures could be implemented top satisfy its needs?

The objective of this paper is to analyse the current situation of agriculture and food security in
Myanmar and on that basis, elaborate some recommendations on positions to follow regarding the
WTO trade negotiations in agriculture and regional negotiations too. The objective is to provide an
innovative analysis which takes into account the reality of the current negotiation process while taking
into account the fact that Myanmar belongs to different groupings in the WTO and elsewhere.

This draft report will serve as a basis for future discussions between the relevant officials of the
Government of Myanmar and IDEAS Centre. It establishes a state-of-play of the WTO talks and of the
situation in agricultural trade within Myanmar. Statistical sources are taken from FAO, ITC, UNCTAD,
World Bank and WTO.

II. AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN MYANMAR

1. OVERALL SITUATION

Since 2011, Myanmar has entered into a comprehensive and challenging exercise to reform its
economy, including its agricultural sector. As one of the largest country in Southeast Asia, endowed with
abundant natural resources, considerable potential in increasing its productivity in agriculture and a
geostrategic location between two of the world’s most dynamic economies (China and India), Myanmar
finds itself in a good position to recover its traditional role as a regional trading hub and key supplier of
agricultural goods in the region and beyond. After decades of relative isolation, agriculture obviously
continues to play a fundamental role in the country’s economy.

While private and public investment in infrastructure, exports of gas and minerals, a developing garment
industry and an increasingly important tourism industry all play an increasingly larger role in the
economic growth of Myanmar, agriculture continues to account for a substantial share in the country’s
economic dynamics. In 2015, the primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishery) accounted for 30% of
the GDP in 2015, from around 57% in 2000. Economic development is still contingent upon the

2
performance of the agricultural sector, which in turn depends to a large extent on favourable climatic
conditions (e.g. passage of devastating cyclones have a tremendous impact on the country’s economic
prospects in general).

Data on employment in agriculture varies significantly from one source to another, but it can be inferred
from them that between 62% and 70% of the labour force in 2015 was involved in the primary sector.
An overwhelming majority of producers are subsistence farmers. The average size of holdings is at 2.55
hectares, which is larger than all of its neighbouring countries. Arable land is mainly used for rice
cultivation which accounts for roughly half of all planted area. Despite impressive economic growth over
the last decade, rural development lags behind. Rural communities – which made up 65% of the
population in 2015 – account for most of the country’s poor, with around 70% of the rural population
living under the poverty line.

Furthermore, the pronounced volatility in agricultural production (due mostly to unstable prices and
natural catastrophes) remains a great challenge for preserving a stable economy and improving
livelihoods of the population. Agriculture is therefore central to poverty reduction and hunger
eradication.

As of today, agricultural production in Myanmar continues to be largely carried out at subsistence levels,
characterised by low productivity and with farmers using traditional techniques. In the years preceding
2011, the Government’s agricultural policy was mainly focusing on rice production and exports of
unprocessed goods. Since then, the Government has been fully engaged in reforming the agriculture
sector and aims at strengthening food security through boosting productivity, targeting an increase of
extension services, facilitating access to financial services, removing internal barriers across supply
chains and smoothing internal market mechanisms to respond more adequately to domestic demand.

Table 1: General info on Myanmar’s agriculture and food security

1990 2000 2014
General info
Population, total (mln) 42.1 48.5 53.7
Population, rural (mln) 31.8 35.3 35.3
Govt expenditure on agriculture (% total outlays) 10.3 6.3
Area harvested (mln ha) 14 22 30
Water resources (1 000 m3/person/year) 28 24 22
Employment in agriculture (%) 69.7 62.7 61.2
Agr value added per worker (constant US$) N/A N/A N/A
GDP per capita (US$, PPP) 464 1’001 4’882
Agriculture, value added (% GDP) 57 57 27.8
Hunger dimensions
Dietary energy supply (kcal/pc/day) 1’694 1’902 2’629
Average dietary energy supply adequacy (%) 77 84 113
Dietary en supp, cereals/roots/tubers (%) 69 68 52
Prevalence of undernourishment (%) 62.6 52.4 14.2
Cereal import dependency ratio (%) -5.1 -3.1 2.9
Underweight, children under-5 (%) 28.8 30.1 22.6
Improved water source (% pop) 55.6 66.9 85.7
Food supply
Food production value, (2004-2006 mln I$) 5’462 9’244 16’517

3
 1990 2000 2014
Food exports (mln US$) 184 354 1’584
Food imports (mln US$) 75 227 898
Production indices (2004-06=100)
Net food 43 73 130
Net crops 43 71 121
Cereals 49 76 105
Vegetable oils 36 54 141
Roots and tubers 30 53 179
Fruit and vegetables 48 80 120
Sugar 27 76 130
Livestock 25 50 192
Milk 53 62 172
Meat 21 47 193
Fish 33 53 208
Net trade (mln US$)
Cereals 62 11 -24
Fruits and vegetables 88 252 1’345
Meat 0 0 -16
Dairy products N/A N/A N/A
Fish 13 183 208
Source: FAO

Myanmar’s agricultural resources consist primarily of 12.8 million hectares of cultivated land, of which
around 76% is devoted to rice. Rice is the primary commodity and source of income for the majority of
farmers as well as the most consumed staple product. The rest of the land is dedicated to other food
and industrial crops. Food crops consist mainly of maize, various pulses and oilseeds (black gram, green
gram, pigeon peas, sesame, sunflower, groundnuts, etc.), sugar cane, potatoes and various fruits. Cash
crops are rapidly expanding, in particular sugar cane, cotton and rubber1.

The fishery sector is also an important source of income and food security in the country. Freshwater
and marine fisheries provide employment to over 3 million people. Fish is a major source of protein in
the domestic diet. Production has risen by more than 140% between 2005 and 2015 and total fisheries
production reached 4.7 million tonnes in 2013. Regarding the livestock sector and dairy production,
growth tends to be much faster than for crops, increasing nearly twice from 2005 to 2015 (around 1.98
million tons in 2015). Chicken, pork and beef are the major meat products, followed by duck. Milk
production has also increased substantially over the last years.

1 Rubber is actually treated as a forestry product. It is not considered as an agricultural product in international trade terms.

4
 Figure 1: Top 20 crops produced in Myanmar in 2014
30,000,000

25,000,000

20,000,000
Tonnes

15,000,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

Several challenges need to be addressed to improve the productivity of the agricultural sector and to
release its full potential as a contributor to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. These
include: low level of technology; insecurity and lack of tenure for smallholders; limited access to credit;
high input costs and difficult access to modern seed varieties and fertilizers; lack of, or limited
infrastructure, in particular irrigation; vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters and
deficiency of planning thereof; low labour productivity; poor social conditions linked to malnutrition,
health, safe drinking water and sanitation in rural areas; high levels of illiteracy in rural areas, etc.

Figure 2: Top 20 items in terms of agricultural production value in Myanmar in 2014

8,000,000
7,000,000
1000 international $

6,000,000
5,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
0

5
2. OBJECTIVES OF MYANMAR IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

With agriculture playing a crucial role in the economy and in the livelihood of a majority of Myanmar’s
population, the Government has undertaken a number of reform initiatives over the last few years
which recognise the importance of the agricultural sector. At the core of these reform initiatives lies one
overarching objective of Myanmar’s Government in agricultural policy: increasing crop production by,
inter alia, maintaining a positive annual growth rate of value-added for agriculture and achieving
production and productivity targets for rice.2 Furthermore, these different initiatives have identified
various priority areas summarised hereunder: 3

 Ensuring food security through increased and inclusive agricultural growth via a strong emphasis on
production, utilisation of high-yielding and good quality seeds and assisting farmers to get a fair
price on their produce;
 Building up a competitive agriculture comparable to that of more developed neighbouring
countries by, inter alia, lowering production costs, increasing high quality crop production,
developing and strengthening markets;
 Establishing a level of rural technological knowledge and technical know-how similar to the one of
neighbouring countries through training and extension services targeting farmers on advanced
agricultural techniques;
 Encouraging transformation from conventional to mechanised agriculture, production of crops
appropriate to climate and extension of irrigated area;
 Increasing the productivity of rural agriculture-based small and medium-sized enterprises;
 Undertaking renovation and maintenance works on old irrigation, pumping and underground water
systems;
 Improving domestic and export market access as well as market information infrastructures;
 Enhancing research and development as well as applied research for sustainable agricultural
development;
 Encouraging local and international investment in agriculture sector for the development of
advanced agricultural technology and commercial agricultural production;
 Justifying and amending existing agricultural laws and regulations in line with current economic
situation.

With respect to trade-related aspects of Myanmar’s agricultural policy, the Government is pursuing
improved market access on its export front and does not seek to open up further domestic markets to
foreign competition. The means to obtain more market access abroad is basically done through two
main channels: the first one is through the support to multilateral negotiating efforts in the Doha Round
of the WTO and the second is through regional integration efforts, including preferential trade
agreements with ASEAN partners, as well as ASEAN+6 countries and South Asian countries. The various
trade measures applied by the Government are described in the part below on trade in agriculture.

2 Average yield per acre of 83.2 baskets (one basket corresponds to 46 pounds) and total production of 1,602 million baskets.
3 The priority areas are taken from the following governmental papers: Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development Action Plan
(2011); Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (2013); National Comprehensive Development Plan (2013); Rural
Development Strategic Framework (2014).

6
3. FOOD SECURITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Despite self-sufficiency in rice – Myanmar’s most important staple product – the country is plagued by
food insecurity. With around a quarter of the total population falling below the national poverty line,
many households are strongly affected by vagaries of the weather and volatile prices of staple products.,
On average, poor households spend more than 70% of their income on food. In addition, nearly one
third of rural households need to borrow money at some point during the year in order to purchase
food. In addition, up to half of rural households reported in 2012 that they spend at least two months
per year without adequate food supplies. The prevalence of undernourishment amongst the general
population is at 14.2% and about one child out of three suffers from chronic malnutrition.

Notwithstanding successes in reducing undernourishment over the last two decades (proportion of
undernourished in total population declined from 62% in 1991 to around 14% in 2015), the country still
has many challenges lying ahead to guarantee that its population can be durably shielded from food
insecurity hazards.

Myanmar is one the most affected country in the world by natural disasters, supposedly amongst the
top three according to the WFP. The country is highly vulnerable to natural disasters such as cyclones,
subsequent floods and landslides. Rising inequality, landlessness and deterioration of common
resources have eroded the coping capacity of food-insecure people. Limited access for the poor to
education and health services and low levels of investment in public infrastructure further perpetuate
food insecurity and malnutrition.

Undernutrition rates remains thus a top public health concern. Micronutrient deficiencies are
widespread due to a lack of diverse diet. Infant and child mortality rates are amongst the highest in the
world with an estimated 50 deaths per 1000 live births. Two out of three children aged 6-23 months do
not have access to timely, appropriate, nutritionally adequate and safe complementary food.
Furthermore, 19% of households continued to consume less than the minimum dietary energy
requirement while 17.2% had inadequate dietary diversity.

The role of trade in assisting the population in accessing food remains unclear. Informal trade plays a
major role in bordering areas and cannot be properly quantified. Self-sufficiency in rice has become a
long-lasting reality in the country for more than a decade. Myanmar paddy rice production reached
26.42 million tonnes in 2014, an increase of 6.6% since 2004. In 2014, Myanmar was the seventh largest
producer of paddy rice in the world. The relative increase in rice production, in an increasingly open
market and at a time when the price of rice has been rising, has been critically important in reducing
poverty in Myanmar and tackling food security. Productivity gains in rice have bene registered over the
last years and this trend is set to continue. Myanmar has usually been a net exporter of rice, with net
exports of 319’621 tonnes (USD 119.9 million) in 2016.

Rice is undoubtedly the number one food commodity in Myanmar, with its rural and urban population
eating rice and rice-derived products on a daily basis. Other staples such as maize, potatoes and also
cassava play a role in complementing rice although the latter is not consumed much as a necessity food
outside rural areas. Fish is the most important source of protein with meat consumed at least five times
less (on average, fish is consumed three to four times a week). The average consumption of vegetables
and pulses is considered as just sufficient, while consumption of fruits is below recommended levels.
Intake of fat and oil – while crucial in any diet as a source of energy and important for the absorption of

7
vital vitamins – remains too low, with just about more than half of the population consuming sufficient
amounts of fat and oil. Dietary diversity remains thus a great challenge.

Other major factors that play a role in food insecurity are related to:

 Unequal access to land, with around 12% of households not having access to any land, a
imbalanced distribution of land (14% of landholders own just less than half of total farmed land);
 Small land plots with almost half of households with not enough land to feed a family of five;
 Remoteness from market due to long distances from market outlets and poor transportation
system and infrastructure, with only one out of seven villages benefitting from easily accessible
market centres;
 Unstable food prices because of prohibitive costs of farming inputs (fuel and fertilizers), global
price volatility, no minimum farm-gate price guaranteed by cooperatives or authorities, monopoly
situation due to one-way trade direction from traders;

As stated before, guaranteeing food security is a key objective of the Myanmar Government. The issue is
that the main focus is on increasing production and productivity, so the food security policy does not
really take into account the other numerous factors responsible for food insecurity. The Government
can nonetheless play a fundamental role in ensuring that its population can have access to food stocks in
times of crisis (either climatic or economic), in particular in the most remote and poorest areas of the
country, which suffer evidently the most from food insecurity.

4. FOOD RESERVES IN MYANMAR

Food stockholding or stockpiling is carried in two different ways in Myanmar. The focus is solely on rice
and no other staples are so far included into those schemes:

 In early 2012, the Government of Myanmar set up the National Rice Reserves Supervisory
Committee (NRRSC). The NRRSC basically purchases rice on a tender-based system in the various
states and regions of the country and either sell it to domestic consumers at market price, donate
rice to areas affected by natural disasters or export surpluses when the NRRSC deems it necessary.
The system helps stabilising rice prices as it engages farmers into some forms of contract farming or
because it buys large amount of rice whenever there is a drop in rice price due to either natural
shocks or price slumps abroad. For instance, in 2014, the NRRSC announced that it would purchase
up to 100’000 tonnes of rice to offset the import restrictions imposed by China which lowered the
price in a dramatic fashion. The NRRSC therefore works like buffer stocks to address price
instability.

 Established in 2012, the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) is a regional ASEAN
stockholding programme which includes also China, Japan and Korea. The objective is to create
stockpiled emergency reserves of rice, either in form of cash or rice, to be used as emergency
humanitarian relief in the aftermath of a disaster, but not to counter the effects of extreme price
volatility. The initial earmarked stock is 787’000 tonnes of rice. Myanmar has earmarked within the
APTERR 14’000 tonnes and like other members, it owns and controls its stocks. Rice release is only
possible when a national reserve is unable to cope with extreme shocks and it is based on the
request of a country which faces an emergency rice shortage. Furthermore, rice deliveries under
the APTERR are not subject to export restrictions. The APTERR is a food aid instrument and does

8
 not aim at abating price volatility effects. Its big advantage of is the regional risk-sharing aspect of
stockholding. Regional reserves lower substantially fiscal costs associated with holding stocks and it
also strengthens regional cooperation.

Both schemes can play an important role in ensuring that farmers benefit from stable prices. The only
issue is that they are covering only one single product. As of 2016, there does not seem to be any other
food stockpiling programmes aiming at stabilising market prices through, for instance, procuring rice at
farm-gate prices, engaging farmers into contract farming, using forward/advance payments to farmers,
and distributing seeds and fertilizer to farmers in normal times.

5. TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND FISHERY PRODUCTS

The share of trade in agricultural and fishery products has decreased over the last ten years, from 18.3%
of total exports in 2005 to 15.4% in 2015. The relative (but not absolute) decline of exports In
agricultural goods reflects the sector’s dwindling importance in the country’s GDP growth over the last
years, especially compared to increased trade in raw minerals and gas. In 2015, exports of agricultural
and fishery products amounted to USD 2.06 billion (15.45% of total exports, while imports were valued
at USD 2.91 billion (13.04 % of total imports).

In 2015, the main export markets were India (42.9% of total export market share), followed by China
(8.4%), the European Union (7.5%), Thailand (7.3%), Japan (5.5%), Malaysia (4.2%) and the United Arab
Emirates (3.3%). Exports within ASEAN corresponded to 17.2% of total market share and 77.7% for
countries part of RCEP. The same year, imports of agricultural products came mainly from Thailand
(40.0% of total import share), Indonesia (12.8%), China (10.9%), India (9.9%), Malaysia (8.0%), Singapore
(4.7%) and Australia (3.3%). Intra-ASEAN imports corresponded to 68.0% of total market share and intra-
RCEP 90.7%. The data underlines the fact that regional markets are fundamentally crucial for Myanmar.
See the Annex on data for more information on exports and imports of agricultural and fishery products.

Myanmar’s main agricultural export items in 2015 were by far pulses (black gram, green gram, pigeon
peas, chickpeas, lentils etc.) representing more than half of total primary exports (58%) in terms of
value. The second most important export item was fishery products (around 18%), followed by cereals
(mostly rice, 6.8%), fresh sugar cane, livestock, sesame seeds and other oilseeds such as groundnuts,
vegetables (onions) and then fruits (bananas). On agricultural and fishery imports, palm oil topped the
chart in 2015, followed by sugar, processed food products (food preparations for infants, sauces,
noodles, etc.) and then beverages (non-alcoholic and alcoholic). Imports of raw agricultural products are
therefore mostly constituted of fruits, seeds and cereals.

Since 2005, the structure of import tariffs has remained essentially the same. The average applied tariff
of agricultural products (excluding fishery products) in 2015 was 8.6%. The gap between average bound
tariffs and average applied MFN tariff remains rather high (around 110%), but tariff dispersion is
comparable to other LDCs in the region (between 0% and 40% in 2015). For an LDC, Myanmar has a very
open tariff regime and does not apply prohibitive tariffs such as in neighbouring nations like India, China
and Thailand or in developed economies.

Certain products such as tobacco (30% MFN tariff), alcoholic beverages (between 30% and 40% MFN
tariff) and sugar and chocolate confectionaries (20% MFN tariff) are usually protected more than the
average. All imported agricultural goods are subject to a commercial tax (equivalent to a VAT) of 5%
(except for tobacco and alcohol products).

9
 All tariff lines in agricultural goods are bound and Myanmar applies only ad valorem duties and no tariff-
rate quotas. Furthermore, agricultural goods are subject to both import and export licensing
requirements, except concerning the latter, inter alia, oranges, grapes, apples, and wheat, in accordance
with the

In terms of commercial crop production, emphasis is put on products in which Myanmar currently
possesses a comparative advantage. Pulses are exported in very large quantities to mostly India while
rice’s major markets are the EU and West Africa. Aside from pulses, most of the goods exported
undergo a slight transformation process (milled rice, frozen and prepared fish).

Table 2: Average applied tariff of exported agricultural and fishery products (that represent more than
2% of total AG exports)
Average applied tariff that Myanmar faces4
Product at 4
European United
digit Thailand China UAE Japan Korea India
Union States
0713 Pulses 0% 0% 4.7% 0% 135% 1.3% 0% 0.6%
0303 Frozen fish 0% 0% 5% 1.74% 6% 0% 0% 0.1%
0306 Crustaceans 0% 0% 0% 0% 7.7% 0% 0% 0.4%
1006 Rice 0% 35% 0% 121% 513% 3.2% 0% 4.3%
1212 Fresh sugar
0% 0% 5% 2.4% 1.5% 0% 0% 0%
cane
0102 Live bovine
0% 0% 0% 0% 9.5% 0% 0% 0.2%
animals

It can be inferred from Table 3 and the data in the Annex that Myanmar does not face high tariff barriers
in its main export markets aside from Korea and Japan (where basically fish products are exported, and
they usually face no tariffs [see Annex for details]). Duty rates tend also not to be constraining in
potential export markets too (except again for Japan and Korea, despite the ASEAN FTA). The
preferences that Myanmar benefits from through ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs generally provide a lot of
opportunities, despite the application of sensitive product lists from China and Thailand, which both
continue to impose substantial tariffs on rice, sugarcane and maize too.

Outside of the Asian continent, tariff barriers are scarce for virtually all agricultural and fishery products
exported by Myanmar. The issue in those markets are the fact that the national production benefits of
substantial domestic support, thus distorting market prices and engendering discriminatory effects on
the products supported (see the Annex to check what Myanmar export products benefit from subsidies
in other countries). The major obstacles that agricultural exports might face in those markets arise
mostly from non-tariff barriers (NTBs), in particular sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS, such as
food safety standards) and also technical barriers to trade (TBT), labelling requirements and conformity
assessment procedures). Food safety standards tend to be too restrictive and Myanmar exporters are
not well equipped at this stage to comply with the best international practices, except for its rice
products.

4
The average applied tariff is displayed here as many goods tabled here at 6 or 8 digits have different duties. In
some cases, a tariff-rate quota or a specific duty is also applied; therefore the equivalent ad valorem tariff is
displayed here.

10
Informal border-trade occurs both from surplus and deficit areas to neighbouring India, Thailand and
China. However, little is known about the importance of this cross-border trade and its impact on the
actual food availability and price dynamics. Trade facilitation measures play undoubtedly a role in
formalising this trade and helping authorities to have a better overview of what occurs at the border
trade level. Burdensome customs procedures increase transport costs and delivery times, therefore
pushing small scale exporters to engage into informal trade.

III. AGRICULTURE IN ASEAN AND OTHER TRADE-RELATED AGREEMENTS

Agriculture is one of the key engines of ASEAN countries’ economic growth. Indeed, agriculture remains
a powerhouse for the production and supply of important food items. It is home to two of the world’s
largest rice exporters (Thailand and Vietnam) and has amongst it the top three exporting countries for
pineapples, bananas, mango, sugar crops, coffee, cashew nuts and cassava. It is the top producer and
exporter of palm oil, coconut and rubber and a major producer and exporter of seafood. Strong value
chains with countries across the globe have been established in many ASEAN States. The development
of the agricultural sector consequently remains one of the most important areas of intra-ASEAN
cooperation.

1. TRADE IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE WITHIN ASEAN

The GDP share of the agricultural sector in the ASEAN economy has been declining in the past few years
(from 12.7% in 2008 to 11.0% in 2015). In 2015, the share of agriculture in the GDP of the three ASEAN
LDCs was more than three times higher than that in the other ASEAN countries. The same year,
agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted for approximately 25% of total ASEAN employment, which is
a figure that is on a continuous downward trend, due mostly to urbanisation and the growing
importance of the services sector.

In 2015, exports by ASEAN countries of agricultural goods and fishery products made up a share
equalling around 10.5% of total exports (USD 123.8 billion). Intra-ASEAN imports and exports accounted
both for around a quarter of the total share (mirroring closely the same percentage for all merchandise
goods), a figure that has been relatively the same for more than a decade. From 2005 to 2015, total
ASEAN exports of agricultural products increased by USD 75.4 billion, or 222.3%. That is to say, the
growth in exports of agricultural goods from the ASEAN region has been significant.

Trade in agricultural goods for the three ASEAN LDCs mostly takes place through preferential market
access, i.e. either through the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), the ASEAN+1 FTAs, unilateral
preference schemes such as the EU’s Everything but Arms initiative or other GSP schemes. In 2015,
46.9% of Myanmar’s total agricultural trade5 (imports and exports) took place within ASEAN countries,
with an intra-ASEAN import and export share of 68.0% and 17.2% respectively. If we look at the figures
of the parties to the negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP or
ASEAN+6), the intra-RCEP agricultural trade share for Myanmar in the same year was 85.3%, with an
import and export share of 90.7% and 77.7% respectively. India takes the lion share as 43.4% of total
exports of agricultural goods and fishery products are shipped there.

Under AFTA and ASEAN+1 FTAs, agriculture continues to be considered as a sensitive sector by all
parties. For instance, under the ATIGA, only 11.9% of the agricultural products are covered by the tariff

5 The figures in this paragraph include trade in fishery products.

11
liberalisation scheme (100% for fishery products though). The ASEAN+1 FTA partners also maintain
considerable exceptions in agricultural products, mirroring to a relative extent the coverage of
agricultural goods under the ATIGA.

Under the RCEP, it is expected that agricultural goods will continue to be exempted from most tariff
reduction plans. The same list of sensitive and highly sensitive goods to be found in the ASEAN+1 FTAs is
most likely to be repeated. After 18 rounds of negotiations, the focus seems to be clearly on non-tariff
barriers and comprehensive disciplines on investment, competition, SMEs, intellectual property rights,
e-commerce, etc. here There is a clear will on the part of many of the participants to put a certain
emphasis on further liberalising processed food products. Crucial products like rice or sugar are not
expected to be liberalised because countries such as China, Japan or Korea are adamant about
protecting their sector.

2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

ASEAN cooperation in the agriculture sector dates back to as early as 1968, with cooperation in food
production and supply. Currently, the specific areas under the ASEAN cooperation in food, agriculture
and forestry includes food security, food handling, crops, livestock, fisheries, agricultural training and
extension, agricultural cooperatives, forestry and joint cooperation in agriculture and forest products
promotion schemes. The basic objective of this ASEAN cooperation is to formulate and implement
regional activities to enhance the international competitiveness of ASEAN’s food, agriculture and
forestry products as well as to further strengthen their food security arrangement and joint positions in
international fora.

ASEAN has implemented numerous cooperation projects in the food, agriculture and forestry sectors,
which cover a wide spectrum of activities ranging from an exchange of information, crop production,
post-harvest and handling, training and extension, research and development, as well as trade
promotion in the areas of crops, livestock, fisheries, and forestry.

In order to respond to globalisation, ASEAN cooperation in food, agriculture and forestry is now more
focused on the enhancement of food, agricultural and forestry products competitiveness in
international markets, while sustaining domestic agricultural production. Harmonisation of quality and
standards, assurance of food safety, and standardisation of trade certification are amongst the priorities
being addressed, building upon the experience of some Member States and on existing international
standards.

ASEAN has established in 2016 the Food Safety Regulatory Framework, which is a key component in the
creation of a single ASEAN market and product base to enable efficient regional trade in food products.
It consists of a coordinated regulatory regime with Mutual Recognition agreements to ensure the safety
and quality of products across the supply chain, i.e., from good agricultural practices to common food
control requirements, conformity assessment and food labelling practices. This is a crucial issue for
Myanmar as it needs to guarantee that its food products meet the various SPS and TBT requirements to
be exported in the region and beyond

IV. OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN AGRICULTURE

1. WHAT HAPPENED IN WORLDWIDE AGRICULTURAL TRADE SINCE 2008?

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2008 was a landmark year for the WTO, although not for good reasons. Multilateral negotiations on
nearly all subjects halted because of profound diverging positions between the different groupings
involved in the talks. Since the relaunch of the consultations on the agriculture negotiations after the
Ninth Ministerial Conference of Bali in 2013 (MC9), WTO Members have continuously highlighted the
crucial importance of agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA or Doha Round). It is clear that
a positive outcome in agriculture is a precondition for advances in the other two pillars of the DDA, i.e.
non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services.

Despite a relatively successful 10th WTO Ministerial Conference of Nairobi in December 2015 (MC10) –
thanks to decisions on eliminating export subsidies to agriculture and specific measures in favour of
LDCs, the negotiations did not receive a major impulse. Indeed the member states were unable to agree
on how to conclude the DDA. Under the current circumstances, there is a general agreement that an
overall satisfactory resolution of the issues in agricultural trade may well be out of reach. However, all
Members agreed that agriculture remains the pillar that has to be addressed, if the DDA is supposed to
be finished successfully and that small but economically significant steps in the right direction are
essential to ensure a fruitful follow up to MC11.

While there is no consensus on what those small and significant steps are, there seems to be a general
acceptance that some result in domestic support is essential and that any decision should address the
development issues of the LDCs. WTO Members all agree that the MC10 Decision on export subsidies
was the first tangible success in the agricultural negotiations since the launch of the Doha Round and
that this should be a guide for the next stage. Moreover, the Ministers have given a clear mandate on
the priority issues to be addressed in agriculture: (i) a permanent solution to the issue of food stocks for
food security; (ii) a special safeguard measure in agriculture and (3) the cotton issue.

Progress in the talks in agriculture is essential to ensure that the multilateral system is alive. All
participants will have to be realistic and will have to contribute to achieve this goal. Given the
irreconcilable positions of the WTO member states, it might be useful to reconfirm some basic principles
and then to have some concrete incremental steps (decisions) that show that WTO is serious in
attempting to address the real issues that do exist in agricultural trade. Doing this would reu2qire to
have some progress in domestic support by building on the decisions taken in Nairobi. WTO members
cannot afford to confirm President Trump’s believe that bilateralism is the only pragmatic way to
progress by failing to have any decision in Buenos Aires. Going back to where the negotiations have
been suspended, i.e. the revised text of the 2008 modalities is not an option, neither is ignoring what
has already been achieved. What is needed is a new approach that takes into account the objectives
pursued since Doha and to adapt the negotiations to changes which have taken place in the meantime.
Indeed, a number of factors are determining how agricultural trade is and will be shaped in the coming
decades. The following elements have a strong impact on how discussions towards MC11 negotiations
might be shaped:

 There is a general tendency towards supply constraints in agricultural products after a long period
of oversupply. Although agricultural prices have come back from their peaks, it is expected that the
longer term trend of agricultural commodity prices is stagnant;
 Whatever the future prices, the price volatility of agricultural products has been growing and might
well be a constant factor of agricultural trade in the next decades;
 The evolution of a situation of demand constraint to a situation of supply constraint in international
agricultural markets has given high prominence to the issue of food security and access to food
products in time of international shortages;

13
 Generally speaking, developing countries have benefitted from both market access improvements
with lower applied tariffs in export markets and increased preferential access. For most LDCs, the
major issue in agriculture is not market access, but distorted prices and output due to high
domestic support in many countries and in an increasing number of countries;
 Over the last decade, there has been a substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic support
(amber box support) in agriculture in developed countries, with “box shifting” to permitted support
(green box support) reaching trade-distorting levels too. In addition, trade-distorting support
(whether permitted or not under WTO) has been increasing in large developing countries such as
China or India;
 Export subsidies are being consistently phased out by the overwhelming majority of WTO Members
and their total elimination was agreed at MC10 (with transitional periods for a few Members);
 Non-trade concerns play an increasingly important role in the negotiations, such as food security,
rural development, environmental concerns, cultural landscapes, biodiversity, etc.;
 Trade in agricultural products is progressively undertaken through regional and global value chains,
which in turn render trade patterns more complex and underline the need for reducing further non-
tariff barriers.

2. STATE-OF-PLAY OF THE AGRICULTURE TALKS

Since MC10, a number of formal and informal meetings of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and
the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture) (CoA-SS) have been held, where Members have
had the opportunity to make various submissions on diverse issues in the three pillars. WTO Members
written submissions have largely focused on information such as trade flows, gaps between applied and
bound rates, trends and data in overall domestic support by the largest economies, effects of export
restrictions, etc.

In 2016, WTO Members explored different approaches for the reduction of tariffs in agricultural
products and, in parallel, various options to reduce domestic support. No, formal, concrete proposal has
been tabled and discussions continue without a proper impetus. No permanent solution has been found
with respect to the public stockholding issue, with Members refusing to get into it because India
(spearheading the initiative) is not ready to make concessions. Developed countries refuse to agree to
meaningful cuts in domestic support and tariffs without a similar commitment from the key emerging
economies. Developing countries, on the other hand, claim that DDA is a development round where
developed countries need to do more in order to rebalance the global trade system and thereby provide
an opportunity for further growth to developing countries. This political debate continues to dominate
discussions at the WTO and prevents Members from reaching a consensus that might lead to a
conclusion of the agricultural talks of the Doha Round.

3. SPECIFIC SITUATION IN THE AGRICULTURAL TALKS

Domestic support

There is a general consensus that domestic support needs to be addressed in any Ministerial Decision at
the MC-11. However, there is no agreement at all on what can be done in this field. Talks on domestic
support have not progressed since 2008 and there is little hope that a meaningful breakthrough is
possible. What has to be found are some concrete measures, small, but goal oriented which address the
major issues that divide the member states on this issue. The major issue blocking the negotiations is
the balance of commitments.

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Developed countries are not willing to take substantial commitments to their domestic support unless
the emerging countries, which have turned into major subsidisers, take commitments too. The
developing countries, and the emerging countries in particular, consider that the developed countries
have obtained too many concessions to support their agriculture and that they need to be able to
develop their agriculture to feed their population. Food security – and what instruments can be used to
assure that security – has become a major issue in the negotiation. Realistically it has to be admitted
that this basic controversy will not be solved by MC-11. The Rev.4 modalities are dead for the developed
members and developing countries will not give up what they believe has been agreed upon. A different
and more gradual approach has to be found that allows to come to a consensus without giving up the
legitimate objectives all member share i.e. that more stringent disciplines are needed to avoid that
market share in agriculture depends on the means of the treasuries and not the comparative advantage
of the member states. At the same time, an approach has to be found that respects the mandate of the
Ministers which has given as priority the search of disciplines in domestic support, a permanent solution
to the stockpiling issue, a special safeguard mechanism and a solution to the cotton problem.

Regarding the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), the subject is of great importance to the G33 and
India in particular. While India believes that a binding decision is crucial to consider any package as
balanced in Buenos Aires (just like in Nairobi at MC10 in 2015), developed countries refuse to engage as
long as the topic is covered in isolation and not through a meaningful package of agricultural measures.
Such fundamental divergences might not be overcome until the end of the year. Moreover, the SSM is a
dividing topic amongst developing countries. Developing economies with a competitive agricultural
sector find it difficult to accept a SSM as it would allow other developing countries – including emerging
economies – to impose restrictions on their agricultural exports. Solutions would nonetheless seem
possible, especially as the SSM focuses on triggering safeguards against the extreme volatility of food
products.

Concerning market access, no serious discussions have taken place since Nairobi and it is not realistic
to foresee any breakthrough there in the coming months. Regarding export competition, it remains
unclear if Members want to strengthen or add new disciplines to the Ministerial Decision taken in
Nairobi at MC10. No discussions about this have taken place.

4. THE WAY FORWARD TO BUENOS AIRES

Realistically speaking, we cannot, unfortunately, expect any major breakthrough in agriculture at the
MC-11. At the same time, all members agree that something has to be delivered. A consensus might be
possible on the following basis:
 A first priority is to improve the notification of domestic support, and perhaps agreement on the
definition of overall trade-distorting subsidies (OTDS);
 Any deal has to respect the interests of both exporting and importing counties;
 All Members have to be able to address the food security issues of their populations, provided it
does not trigger situations of potential discrimination for other Members;
 Agriculture plays a very special role in the economic, social and regional development of all WTO
Members, which have to be able to attain the non-economic objectives of agriculture though WTO-
conform instruments that take into account the specific conditions of each Member;
 Measures taken by any Member in the pursuit of non-economic objectives should not be
detrimental to other Members.

15
As agriculture in general – and in particular public stockholding for food security purposes and the SSM
– has become, the litmus test of willingness of t WTO Members to address the major DDA issues, MC11
needs to deliver concrete results in these fields so as to ensure that progress in the other fields is also
possible. Members such as Myanmar which have a major interest both in agriculture and in the
inclusive multilateral system may consider proposing a new approach hand-to-hand with its ASEAN,
LDC and other like-minded allies. The general idea is to concentrate on the main issues WTO Members
face in agricultural trade and this in full respect of the principles defined by the Ministers’ mandate.

This could be done by defining the principles that will have to be followed to come to a consensus
agreement on those issues and by outlining some possible small, but concrete steps towards the
achievement of those principles. Agreement on such an approach by a critical mass of Members in the
near future would allow to draft a credible text outlining these principles in autumn and in time to be
submitted to the Ministers in Buenos Aires.

V. HOW CAN TRADE MEASURES STRENGHTEN AGRICULTURE IN MYANMAR

Myanmar’s Government has set a clear objective to strengthen food security and improving productivity
in agriculture. Domestic agricultural production is aimed at both providing food supplies to the
Myanmar population and raising income of farmers with productive cash crops. In order to fulfil such
objective while complying with regional and multilateral obligations, a certain number of trade
measures can be drawn up.

TARIFF BARRIERS IN ASEAN+6 COUNTRIES AND BEYOND

Myanmar needs to identify how the current RCEP negotiations can help eliminate the tariffs applied on
agricultural products of interests to them. For instance:
 China applies a prohibitive tariff quota on rice and maize (50% out-of-quota tariff, filled consistently
at 100% since China’s accession to the WTO);
 Indonesia applies a specific tariff of USD 42.3/tonne on rice;
 Korea applies an ad valorem tariff on some pulses that vary from 3% to 27%;

As an LDC, Myanmar has interests in developing a common approach with the other ASEAN LDCs to seek
for obtaining a full duty-free quota-free (DFQF) scheme for LDCs within the RCEP. Substantial reductions
for ASEAN LDCs in the major tariff barriers they face in those negotiations should be attempted. If a full
DFQF scheme within RCEP is too ambitious, then Myanmar and the other ASEAN LDCs could seek to
obtain DFQF on a limited list of product of export interest to them.

Outside the RCEP, a few of the current agricultural exports face tariffs:
 Saudi Arabia applies an ad valorem tariff of 5% on frozen fish;
 Chinese Taipei applies an ad valorem tariff of 5% on green gram, 12% on sesame seeds, 20% on
some crustaceans.

Myanmar could continue working with the LDC Group at the WTO and support them in finding a
solution on US DFQF market access, especially as Myanmar the US unilateral preference schemes does
not cover many agricultural and non-agricultural goods of interests to Myanmar.

IMPORT DUTIES

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Myanmar tends to impose low tariffs on the majority of agricultural and fish products it imports (usually
0% to 5%). This reflects the liberalisation policy that Myanmar has undertaken over the last years.
Myanmar may nonetheless have a few defensive interests in its negotiations at the regional and global
level, in particular for certain products to which it wishes to increase production. Myanmar may want to
use the negotiations to analyse whether remaining tariffs are still useful for the achievement of its
development goal.

It would be crucial for the Government to identify whether food products essential to the food security
of the country should continue facing tariffs when imported and to what extent a tariff reduction could
potentially replace domestic production of a staple product (definitely not a favoured solution). Any
tariff reduction can also show parties to the RCEP that Myanmar is eventually ready to make
concessions even though it benefits from its LDC status.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT

Data shows that a number of Myanmar agricultural exports need to compete with trade-distorting
subsidies abroad. China, for instance, provides support to its rice and maize producers. Vietnam
supports its production of maize and rice too, as does the US for milled rice, sugar and maize. Canada,
Brazil and the US grant subsidies to its producers of dry beans. Domestic support in those countries have
indubitably a negative effect on world market prices and affect adversely small and large scale farmers
in Myanmar. The only proper way to deal with this issue is through multilateralism, i.e. the WTO. A
multilateral approach to deal, inter alia, with this issue is articulated below.

TRADE FACILITATION

Myanmar, like all LDCs, stands to benefit from trade facilitation measure. Cumbersome domestic
customs procedures and governance problems at the border increase transport costs and delivery
times. Myanmar needs to identify how domestic border measures can be adapted to ease agricultural
exports and imports of food products.

NON-TARIFF BARRIERS

There is a crucial need to identify precisely the various non-tariff barrier impediments that agricultural
exports face in the region, in particular to Thailand, China and India. It is clear that food safety standards
in neighbouring countries have prevented exports of agricultural products. Many Myanmar producers
have difficulties in complying with standard requirements, etc. Moreover, licensing requirements tend
to be particularly burdensome and add cost. Such requirements might be simplified or adapted to small
and middle scale farmers.

VI. PRINCIPLES TO FOLLOW IN THE AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE DDA

It is believed that Myanmar, maybe together with its LDC colleagues in the ASEAN, has an interest to
become pro-active in the agricultural negotiations by submitting a communication which is balanced,
realistic and which might lead to some consensus decision by MC-11. This would ensure that the
interests of Myanmar are on the table and that Myanmar is recognized as a player in the negotiations.

An approach to such a communication could include:

 The reaffirmation of some principles which should be followed in the agricultural negotiations;

17
 Some concrete, yet limited measures to agree at MC11 within a comprehensive approach to food
security in net food importing lower income countries.

There are seven major principles that can lead WTO Members on the path towards a general consensus
in the field of trade in agriculture and food security. These principles do not have to be set in stone; they
can guide countries, such as Myanmar, to a build-up of mutual trust and understanding with Members
that hold diverging views.

1. ANY MEMBER HAS THE RIGHT TO PURSUE NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES TO DEVELOP ITS
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Such right should be acceptable to all WTO Members as it is already largely covered in the preamble of
the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). In addition this right was implicitly recognised in the AoA through
the creation of unlimited and non-distortive “green box” support. However, experience with this
solution has shown shortcomings.

Indeed, the current domestic support system (green box, blue box, amber box, de minimis and
development box) allows WTO Members that have the resources (mostly developed and emerging
countries) to distribute subsidies to their farmers in view of achieving or not non-economic objectives.
Subsidies act as a domestic shield against foreign competition. This basically undermines the
comparative advantage one economy can have over another in a perfectly level playing field and can
negatively the development of poorer developing countries.

Furthermore, many products that are exported by heavily (and legally) subsidised farmers influence:
 International markets by depressing the prices of agricultural goods and by driving out of the
market competitors from countries that do not benefit from such subsidies. Indeed, some such
domestic support (whether green, blue, amber yellow or de minimis) may be considered as de facto
export subsidies as potentially any supported production can be exported. A typical case is the very
high domestic support that cotton growers receive in the EU, which allows them to export the
majority of their production to the international market;
 The development of the agricultural sector in low-income economies (and thus their food security),
where subsistence farmers cannot compete against the aforementioned subsidised farmers.

The present system consequently engenders a de facto unequal situation by first allowing resourceful
WTO Members to subsidise abusively their producers in order to attain their legitimate non-economic,
multi-functional, objectives of agriculture. Second, it leaves poorer developing countries that do not
have the required resources, in a state where they are from achieving their own non-economic
objectives such as food security, rural development, cultural landscape, biodiversity and other regional
and social issues.

 The system has to acknowledge this inequality of treatment and attempt to find a solution that
allows all Members to defend their basic agricultural sector for any non-economic motive.

2. THE PURSUIT OF NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES BY ANY MEMBER CANNOT BE DETRIMENTAL TO

ANY OTHER MEMBER

The right to pursue non-economic objectives in any agricultural policy is not unlimited. Those objectives
cannot be pursued by putting a cost or burden on other Members. The AoA wanted to solve this issue

18
by defining least distorting subsidies, which certainly was progress. However, the massive shift of
subsidies from one box to another – i.e. amber to green – and the simultaneous use of permitted
support coupled with properly trade-distorting support have both negatively affected international
market prices. Also, the concentration of permitted support (green box and/or de minimis) on a few
products has made it difficult for more competitive producers in the market.

 WTO Members have to acknowledge that the current multilateral trade rules are not strong enough
to protect poorer developing economies from the adverse effects of richer economies subsidising
their agriculture. While fundamentally changing the system is not a feasible option, poorer
developing countries have to be given adequate instruments to defend their internal market as well
as their exports from countries that use legal but trade-distortive subsidise.

3. ANY NFDIC HAS THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT THE POPULATION HAS
PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL ACCESS TO STAPLE PRODUCTS

Many NFIDCs have large unutilised/underutilised agricultural potential both in terms of land and
manpower. Their food security policy needs necessarily has as its prime element the increase of
productivity and production of their agricultural sector. This, however, does not mean that a food self-
sufficiency policy should be followed; it has been empirically shown that food security cannot be
efficiently achieved through self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, any country should have the right to promote
the production of staple products by (i) limiting the risks that small farmers and consumers face through
special measures which control price volatility; (ii) stockpiling of basic food products at prices of market
predictions at the time of sowing; and (iii) having access to finances to ensure that they can import the
staple products in time of scarcity in international markets.

 The multilateral legal system should recognize the right of any NFIDCs to take special measures to
encourage the local production of their staple food crops (up to a limited number of products) as
long as those staple food crops are not exported.

4. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS HAVE EQUIVALENT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Agricultural exporters have an interest that food-importing countries keep their markets as open as
possible. Food importing countries need guarantees that they can import their staple food products in
times of scarcity. Export bans and restrictions have discouraged other member countries from keeping
their markets open. It is therefore in the interest of both exporting and importing member countries to
strengthen the disciplines on export restrictions.

 Strengthened disciplines are required to ensure an adequate distribution of food availabilities in

times of scarcity.

5. AGRICULTURAL RULES, AS ANY OTHER RULES, SHOULD FULLY REFLECT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
NAIROBI DECISION THAT THE DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS OF LDCs SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY.

Ministers agreed at MC10 that development should remain at the centre of the WTO negotiations. Small
but significant steps with a development focus might help to show that WTO Members are serious
about reforming agricultural trade. This might be possible for LDCs, but not necessarily applicable to all
Members.

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 Some measures to be agreed upon at the next Ministerial Conference should concentrate on
addressing the urgent issues that LDCs face, ensuring that they can continue developing their
agricultural production.

6. THE SHORT TERM MEASURES NEED TO ADDRESS THE THREE ISSUES THE MINISTERS HAVE
REQUIRED TO BE ADDRESSED IN PRIORITY IN AGRICULTURE, I.E. PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING FOR
FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES, THE SSM AND COTTON SUBSIDIES

There is considerable disagreement on how these three issues can be addressed by the WTO. There,
however, exists a consensus that they should be addressed. Continuing to discuss those issues on the
basis of the past approach seems to be fruitless. A new approach is needed. A partial solution to these
issues might be possible if WTO Members agree on a food security focused approach for NFIDCs and
LDCs. This could be done by defining what they need to develop their agriculture in an efficient way and
by limiting clearly the scope of application of the measures required:

 Stockpiling for food security purposes may allow finding a solution for them by (i) embedding food
stockholding into an overall food security policy and (ii) limiting its application to staple foods and
products which are not exported;
 In the context of food security and the need to develop agricultural production and productivity in
NFIDCs and LDCs, the SSM might be allowed as a means to reduce the effects of price volatility of
agricultural products for both producers and consumers, while fully respecting the evolution of
prices on the global market;
 Limiting export restriction measures to those importing countries that are the most affected by
those measures, i.e. NFIDCs and LDCs, may allow stricter disciplines that are not realistic if they
were to be applied to all importing countries.

 Food security should be used to identify consensus-oriented first steps to address the issues of
stockholding and the SSM, which are considered by many WTO members as blocking progress in
the overall DDA negotiations.

7. ALL WTO MEMBERS HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR ABILITIES TO FIND
SOLUTIONS THAT ARE ABLE TO ADVANCE THE DDA NEGOTIATIONS

LDCs have to play their part in finding solutions to the issues negotiated. They have to show their
attachment to multilateral rules by accepting to take obligations. Their commitments should be adapted
to the development needs of their agricultural sector. There are many WTO commitments those
countries may want to take to promote their agricultural development covering goods, services, TRIMs
and intellectual property rights.

 LDCs should submit a list of commitments they are willing and able to undertake in return for those
special measures in their favour.

VII. MEASURES TO CONSIDER IN THE RUN UP TO MC11

In light of the foregoing, the following actions might be considered for MC11. LDCs have a great
underutilized agricultural potential. Their main objective is to increase their agricultural production
through the increase of the productivity of their small farmers. To allow small farmers to develop their
agricultural production according to their comparative advantage, it is essential:

20
 To guarantee them some stability in the prices of staple food products;
 To assure that they have access to foreign markets on a fair basis;
 To ensure that they have access to staple products in times of scarcity at affordable prices.

The purpose of the following measures is to:

 Adapt the AoA to take into account the evolution of the world market and to ensure an enabling
environment for resource-rich developing countries to develop their agricultural potential
according to their comparative advantage;
 Ensure that industrial crops on which small farmers depend for the revenue to feed their families
have a level playing field on the international market;
 Guarantee that the local staple food production is not hampered by subsidised imports from
abroad;
 Protect farmers from undue risks due to the price volatility of staple food;
 Ensure that consumers have access to the required staple food in times of scarcity.

The approach taken is one of incremental steps towards an international environment conducive to the
development of agricultural production in LDCs, to allow them to take full taking advantage of their
comparative advantage in sustainable agricultural production. It is proposed to build upon the decision
taken in Nairobi with the following five measures.

1. SIMPLIFICATION AND STRENGTHENING OF THE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT

Negotiations in agriculture have been hampered by the delay in, and sometimes absence of,
notifications of domestic support in agriculture. The AoA has made a valuable attempt to minimise the
impact on trade of domestic support by creating a classification of support measures. However,
experience has shown that a massive switch of support to minimally distorting measures, whether green
box or de minimis, has had as a consequence that those measures have become distorting given their
amounts. Moreover, the notifications are complicated. As the reduction of domestic support seems to
be out of reach, it is proposed to strengthen and simplify the notification procedures in the following
way:

 Members are required to notify all current domestic support under the overall measure of OTDS.
There is an OTDS definition in Rev.4 but Members may need to agree on it;
 Members are required to notify OTDS for the major staple products of the net food importing
poorer developing countries as well as for products for which exports account for a specific
percentage of total agricultural production;
 The Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture will publish the list of all Members that are one year
late in notifications (developed countries), 18 months for developing countries and 24 months for
NFIDCs and LDCs;
 NFIDCs and LDCs are exempted from this discipline for all products that they do not export.

2. BUILDING ON THE RESULTS OF EXPORT DISCIPLINES ADOPTED IN NAIROBI

Domestic support favouring exported products have a similar distorting effect on international markets
as do export subsidies. To avoid disguised export subsidies, it is proposed to search for disciplines

21
preventing domestic support from being used to circumvent provisions elaborated for export support,
with special attention to the interests of the NFIDCs and LDCs. The following disciplines might be
considered:

 OTDS for products which exports account for a specific percentage of total agricultural production.
The ODTS would be frozen at current levels;
 WTO Members would contribute to an international fund, to be managed by the World Bank, a
percentage of the OTDS they provide to major export crops ,to be distributed according to NFIDCs
and LDCs for assistance to their farmers on the international market and to be used to assist
farmers;
 NFIDCs and LDCs would be allowed to levy special tariffs on their imports of major staples in
proportion to the amount of the OTDS granted by the exporting countries to those products; this
could be in the form of a special levy to be imposed without further conditions.

3. SPECIAL MEASURES TO PROMOTE FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

To meet the mandate given to WTO Members by their Ministers in Nairobi, the following measures
might be envisaged:

 Any food acquisition programme for stockholding that promises farmers at the time of planting
food crops a fixed price according to the international market price forecast at harvesting time will
not be considered as a subsidy;
 Provided that the acquisition of food crops does not exceed a specific percentage of local
production and that the acquisition programme is limited to staple products and small farmers, any
price support will only be calculated according to the amount of food bought;
 Specific disciplines will have to be elaborated to prevent food stocks from being used to subsidise
exports of staple food;
 NFIDCs and LDCs that do not have the administrative capacity to set up insurance schemes for
farmers (just as they exist in many developed and developing economies) will have the right to
minimise annual variations of staple product prices for farmers and consumers by limiting their
volatility on the international market to x% per year for staple food products through:
o Imposing a SSM if and when prices in the international market are lower than x % compared
to the average import price the year before;
o Subsidising the internal price (using the World Bank Fund mentioned above) if the consumer
price exceed x% compared to the previous year.

4. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS

 All countries accept the obligation of excluding LDCs and NFIDCs and food aid deliveries from any
temporary export ban. LDCs and NFIDCS are exempted from this discipline;
 All countries reimburse LDCs and NFIDCs for the export taxes that they might impose for food
security reasons in the amount of LDCs’ and NFIDCs’ imports from the country imposing the export
taxes;
 Any export restriction will be notified to the CoA within 90 days and its duration will be limited to a
maximum of one year. If a Member does not notify an export restriction within 90 days, it is
deemed to be an actionable protectionist measure. If an export restriction is notified within 90

22
 days, the CoA may object to the notified measure through a decision taken by a three-fourths
majority of its Members.

5. CONTRIBUTION OF NFIDCs AND LDCs TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF MC11

There is general agreement among WTO Members that LDCs should not be required to take new
obligations as a result of the DDA. NFIDCs are, however, aware that exemptions are marginalising them.
Therefore they want to work in favour of development-friendly rules that are in line with their
development needs rather than to have exemptions to general rules that are not conducive to their
development.

Considering that:
 NFIDCs and LDCs are conscious that their first priority is the development of the productivity and
value added created by their farm populations and in particular small farmers;
 NFIDCs and LDCs realise that the predictability and security of the regulatory environment is of
great importance for providing the necessary incentives for farm investment, both domestic and
foreign;
 NFIDCs and LDCs require technology transfers and investments in their agricultural sector;
 International commitments provide the security and predictability for actors in the market;
 NFIDCs and LDCs are dependent on an inclusive and fair multilateral trading system and are willing
to contribute to its maintenance;
 NFIDCs and LDCs are aware that all WTO Members, each according to their capabilities, should
participate in the effort for a successful conclusion of these negotiations and have an obligation to
contribute to the success of MC11 in Buenos Aires and ultimately of the DDA.

NFIDCs and LDCs – to which Myanmar belongs to – are therefore willing to consider contributing on a
voluntary basis to the success of the 11th Ministerial Conference by offering concessions
commensurate to their capabilities, provided this approach leads to tangible results for their
agricultural development.

VIII. NEXT STEPS

The proposed approach does not intend to be a proposal giving ready-to-use solutions to Myanmar and
its allies. It is more a menu of options, giving Members possible measures that will ultimately pave the
way for a conclusion of the talks in agriculture. Many of the measures proposed need to be worked out
substantially to see whether they are feasible and how they can be implemented.

A great amount of information and input from the government of Myanmar is still required in order to
draw up proper recommendations to follow with respect to a coherent and sustainable trade policy at
both the regional and multilateral level.

The following is a suggestion of what the next steps could be on both regional and multilateral levels:

Regional approach Multilateral approach

1. The first step is to verify whether information in the 1. The very first step would be to discuss with the
paper is up to date and what other information is relevant Myanmar authorities whether the concept
required to provide informed advice of proposed measures seems acceptable to them
2. The second step is to write down concrete 2. The second step would be to give the mandate to

23
 recommendations with a proper timeline, taking analyse the practicality of the various approaches
into account the agricultural sensitivities of the outlined
other ASEAN LDCs
3. The third step is to figure out whether the 3. The third step would be to agree on those measures
recommendations and proposed measures are that seem the most promising to obtain a consensus
acceptable in principle to the Myanmar Government decision and concentrate the discussions on them
4. The fourth step is to figure out whether the 4. The fourth step would be to advocate the use of the
recommendations and proposed measures can fit measures at the domestic and regional level, and
into the regional context, in particular with ASEAN then with like-minded groupings, such as the LDC
LDCs, i.e. Lao PDR and Myanmar Group, ACP Group and African group
5. The fifth step is to ensure coherence of the regional 5. The fifth step would be to decide concretely on how
approach with international commitments of the measures can be transformed into a proper
Myanmar in ASEAN agreements and other coherent submission by Myanmar and its partners
agreements (WTO, bilateral, etc.) (with Myanmar perhaps spearheading the process)
6. The last step is to draft a summary of policy measures to be adopted at both regional and multilateral level
that will ensure that trade-related aspects of agriculture and food security are fostering development in the
country

24
 ANNEX ON DATA

Table 3: Top 30 export items of Myanmar with export market, applied tariff and domestic support

Countries which
Ranking Export market of
Exported Share in total provide domestic
in total Product Myanmar (share and
Product Label value in 2015 agricultural support to the
export Code average applied
(USD '000) exports, 2015 product or related
share tariff)
products

CHN 39.7%, THA 26.7%,

IND 7.6%, JPN 6.5%, EU
TOTAL PRODUCTS 13,340,478 N/A 6.5%, KOR 3.8%, MYS N/A
1.3%, IDN 1.2%, USA
1.1%
IND 43.1%, CHN 8.3%,
EU 7.5%, THA 7.3%, JPN
2,061,242 15.45% of total
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY PRODUCTS 5.5%, MYS 4.2%, ARE N/A
exports 3.2%, KOR 2.6%, US
2.4%, SAU 2.1%
IND 71.6% (0), VNM
Dried, shelled beans of species "Vigna mungo
5.2% (0), IDN 4% (0),
3 '071331 [L.] Hepper or Vigna radiata [L.] Wilczek", 746,219 36.2% BRA, CAN, USA
THA 3.2% (0), MYS
whether ...
3.1%(0), CHN 2.9% (0)
Dried, shelled pigeon peas "Cajanus cajan",
7 '071360 231,511 11.2% IND 99% (0) BRA, CAN, USA
whether or not skinned or split
Frozen shrimps and prawns, even smoked, JPN 54.8% (0), HKG
17 '030617 whether in shell or not, incl. shrimps and 88,867 4.3% 15.2% (0), CHN 10.2%
prawns in ... (0), US 8.4% (0)
Dried, shelled beans "Vigna and Phaseolus", IND 73.1% (0), JPN 9.6%
20 '071339 whether or not skinned or split (excluding 85,692 4.2% (0), SGP 2.9% (0), TWN BRA, CAN, USA
beans ... 2.5% (5)
MYS 42.1% (0), IND
Dried, shelled leguminous vegetables,
22.5% (0), CAN 11.5%
22 '071390 whether or not skinned or split (excluding 76,798 3.7% BRA, CAN, USA
(0), SGP 9.7% (0), KUW
peas, chickpeas, ...
4.6% (0)
CHN 39.6% (35), EU CHN, VNM, THA, JPN,
Semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or
23 '100630 76,677 3.7% 38.4% (0), CMR 9.8% (5), USA, CRI, EU, KOR,
not polished or glazed
IDN 7.5% (42.30 $/Ton) MEX, TWN
EU 39.5% (0), MYS
17.4% (0), US 16.7% (0),
25 '030389 Frozen fish, n.e.s. 68,787 3.3%
SAU 9.1% (5), IND 5.1%
(0)
Sugar cane, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried,
30 '121293 53,185 2.6% CHN 99.8% (0)
whether or not ground
USA, EU, AUS, CHE,
ARG, MEX, VNM, KOR,
33 '010229 Live cattle (excluding pure-bred for breeding) 49,462 2.4% THA 99.7% (0) JPN, ISR, UKR, RUS,
JOR, CAN NOR, ISL,
SAU, TWN
EU 94.8% (0), SGP 2.1% CHN, VNM, THA, JPN,
34 '100640 Broken rice 48,028 2.3% (0), IDN 2.1% (42.30 USA, CRI, EU, KOR,
$/Ton) MEX, TWN
US 38.1% (4), AUS 17.5%
Frozen crabs, even smoked, whether in shell (0), MYS 11.6% (0), JPN
40 '030614 or not, incl. crabs in shell, cooked by 39,123 1.9% 7.7% (0), HKG 5.2% (0),
steaming ... TWN 4.3% (20), KOR
3.4% (3)
JPN 50% (0), TWN 24.4%
43 '120740 Sesamum seeds, whether or not broken 35,812 1.7% (12), CHN 17.5% (0), THA USA
5.6% (0)
Nuts and other seeds, incl. mixtures, KOR 95.3% (0), HKG
44 '200819 34,988 1.7%
prepared or preserved (excluding prepared 2.7% (0)

25
 Countries which
Ranking Export market of
Exported Share in total provide domestic
in total Product Myanmar (share and
Product Label value in 2015 agricultural support to the
export Code average applied
(USD '000) exports, 2015 product or related
share tariff)
products

or preserved ...
IND 60.8% (0), CHN
Dried, shelled kidney beans "Phaseolus
65 '071333 18,616 0.9% 15.3% (0), EU 9.9% (0), BRA, CAN, USA
vulgaris", whether or not skinned or split
MYS 3.3% (0)
Flours, meals and pellets of fish or
THA 82.2% (0), CHN
66 '230120 crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic 18,572 0.9%
15.5% (0)
invertebrates, ...
Fresh or dried areca nuts, whether or not
68 '080280 16,970 0.8% IND 96.2% (0)
shelled or peeled
KOR 39.1% (27), IND
Dried, shelled cow peas "Vigna unguiculata",
74 '071335 14,416 0.7% 25.9% (0), LKA 20.8% BRA, CAN, USA
whether or not skinned or split
(4.45), IDN 4.3% (0)
Frozen catfish "Pangasius spp., Silurus spp., SAU 93.1% (5), SGP 3.9%
77 '030324 13,639 0.7%
Clarias spp., Ictalurus spp." (0)
Frozen carp "Cyprinus carpio, Carassius
EU 57.3% (0), SAU 31.5%
78 '030325 carassius, Ctenopharyngodon idellus, 13,539 0.7%
(5), CAN 4% (0)
Hypophthalmichthys ...
CHN 87.5% (Q: 7200000
CHN, EU, VNM, USA,
tons; IQT : 1%; OQT :
80 '100590 Maize (excluding seed for sowing) 13,265 0.6% MEX, BRA, ISR, RUS,
50%), THA 7.3% (0), PHL
CAN, CHE, TWN
3.7% (5)
Dried peaches, pears, papaws "papayas",
CHN 88.8% (0), MYS
82 '081340 tamarinds and other edible fruits (excluding 12,690 0.6%
9.4% (0)
nuts, ...
Dried, shelled chickpeas "garbanzos", IND 82.7% (0), KOR 5.3%
84 '071320 12,323 0.6%
whether or not skinned or split (0)
Crabs, even smoked, whether in shell or not, CHN 67.2% (0), THA
85 '030624 12,256 0.6%
live, fresh, chilled, dried, salted or in brine, ... 30.7% (0)
IND 87.7% (5), MYS 3.5%
86 '091030 Turmeric "curcuma" 11,948 0.6%
(0)
88 '080390 Fresh or dried bananas (excluding plantains) 11,763 0.6% CHN 99.9% (0) USA, EU
Groundnuts, shelled, whether or not broken
92 '120242 (excluding seed for sowing, roasted or 10,549 0.5% THA 98.7% (0) CHN, TWN
otherwise ...
THA 59% (0), MYS 30.8%
93 '070310 Fresh or chilled onions and shallots 10,531 0.5% USA, KOR, ISR
(0), SGP 10.2% (0)
USA, EU, AUS, CHE,
ARG, MEX, VNM, KOR,
Live buffalo (excluding pure-bred for
94 '010239 10,451 0.5% THA 100% (0) JPN, ISR, UKR, RUS,
breeding)
JOR, CAN NOR, ISL,
SAU, TWN
THA 96.4% (0), SGP 1.9%
95 '030289 Fresh or chilled fish, n.e.s. 10,308 0.5%
(0)
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits, whether or IND 59.9% (30), EU
96 '120799 not broken (excluding edible nuts, olives, 10,211 0.5% 30.9% (0), KOR 8.1%
soya ... (6.7)
Source: ITC

26
 Figure 3: Export markets of Myanmar in trade in agriculture and fishery products, 2015 (USD thousand
and % of total export market share)

328,449 India
49,893 15.9% China
2.4%
54,558 European Union
2.6% Thailand
884,152
67,204
42.9% Japan
3.3%
86,338 Malaysia
4.2% United Arab Emirates
112,958 Korea, Republic of
5.5% 151,044
United States of America
7.3%
154,175 172,371 Rest of the world
7.5% 8.4%

Table 4: Top 30 import items in Myanmar with import origin and applied tariff
Ranking Imported
Ranking Share in
in total value in
in total Product total Import origin and average applied tariff by
AG Product Label 2015
import Code agricultural Myanmar
import (USD
share imports
share '000)

CHN 42.2%, THA 18.4%, SGP 11.0%, JPN 4.8%, IND

3.8%, MYS 3.5%, KOR 3.0%, IDN 2.8%, EU 2.7%, VNM
TOTAL PRODUCTS 22,341,426 N/A
1.7%
AVE APPLIED TARIFF OF NON-AG PRODUCTS OF 5.1

VNM (26.4%), EU (21.1%), THA (11.3%), CHN (6.6%),

13.04% of
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY PRODUCTS 2,913,694 MYS (5.2%);
total imports
AVE APPLIED TARIFF OF AG PRODUCTS OF 8.6

Palm oil and its fractions, whether or

5 1 '151190 not refined (excluding chemically 511,895 2.29% IDN 69% (0), MYS 25.8% (0), THA 5.2 (0)
modified and crude)
Cane or beet sugar and chemically
6 2 '170199 pure sucrose, in solid form (excluding 489,873 2.19% IND 52% (0.5), THA 30.6% (0), BRA 16.1% (0.5)
cane and beet sugar ...
THA 46.9% (1.7), SGP 16.9% (1.7), CHN 13.3% (0), MYS
14 3 '210690 Food preparations, n.e.s. 234,124 1.05%
11.4% (1.7)
Non-alcoholic beverages (excluding
20 4 '220290 water, fruit or vegetable juices and 159,288 0.71% THA 90.4% (2.5), SGP 5.8% (2.5)
milk)
24 5 '220300 Beer made from malt 137,019 0.61% THA 81.3% (0), CHN 18.4% (20)
Malt extract; food preparations of
32 6 '190190 106,022 0.47% SGP 46.4% (0), THA 44.2% (0), MYS 6.6% (0)
flour, groats, meal, starch or malt

27
 Ranking Imported
Ranking Share in
in total value in
in total Product total Import origin and average applied tariff by
AG Product Label 2015
import Code agricultural Myanmar
import (USD
share imports
share '000)

extract, not containing ...

Wheat and meslin (excluding seed for
38 7 '100199 91,030 0.41% AUS 89.2% (0), USA 5.8% (0), MDA 4.7% (0)
sowing, and durum wheat)
Oilcake and other solid residues,
USA 34.5% (1.5) BRA 24.4% (1.5), IND 18.7% (1.5), PRY
44 8 '230400 whether or not ground or in the form 77,023 0.34%
8.8% (1.5), MYS 8.7% (0)
of pellets, resulting ...
Preparations for sauces and prepared
61 9 '210390 sauces; mixed condiments and 58,732 0.26% THA 67.7% (5), CHN 27.3% (0)
seasonings (excluding soya ...
62 10 '220830 Whiskies 57,814 0.26% THA 83.1% (0), SGP 11.3% (0), EU 5.6% (40)
Extracts, essences and concentrates, THA 44.8% (5), MYS 26% (5), BRA 16% (15), IND 8.9%
65 11 '210111 53,456 0.24%
of coffee (7.5)
67 12 '080810 Fresh apples 51,850 0.23% CHN 98.8% (15)
Preparations of a kind used in animal
THA 38.8% (4.6), EU 25.7% (4.6), CHN 10.2% (0), ARG
74 13 '230990 feeding (excluding dog or cat food put 46,055 0.21%
9.3% (4.6), CAN 6.3% (4.6)
up for retail ...
Preparations with a basis of extracts,
83 14 '210112 essences or concentrates of coffee or 43,662 0.20% THA 88.6% (0), MYS 7.8% (0), CHN 3.2% (0)
with a basis of ...
Feathers used for stuffing and down,
CHN 59.6% (5), TWN 17.1% (5), KOR 14.1% (5), USA
111 15 '050510 not further worked than cleaned, 31,779 0.14%
6.7% (5)
disinfected or treated ...
Fresh or dried mandarins incl.
tangerines and satsumas,
114 16 '080520 30,814 0.14% CHN 99.4% (15)
clementines, wilkings and similar
citrus ...
Waters, incl. mineral and aerated,
129 17 '220210 with added sugar, sweetener or 27,713 0.12% THA 82.2% (5), MYS 14.7% (5), CHN 2% (10)
flavour, for direct consumption ...
Bread, pastry, cakes, biscuits and
166 18 '190590 other bakers' wares, whether or not 21,780 0.10% THA 61% (2.8), MYS 16.1% (2.8), CHN 14.5% (13.9)
containing cocoa; communion ...
Pasta, cooked or otherwise prepared
167 19 '190230 21,682 0.10% THA 79.8% (1.3), CHN 10.1% (15), KOR 7.3% (15)
(excluding stuffed)
171 20 '190510 Crispbread 21,429 0.10% THA 100% (0)
172 21 '120810 Soya bean flour and meal 21,084 0.09% USA 98.2% (5)
Milk and cream in solid forms, of a fat
175 22 '040221 content by weight of > 1,5%, 20,220 0.09% NZL 74.4% (3), THA 13.9% (0), EU 6.5% (3)
unsweetened
Fresh or dried areca nuts, whether or
192 23 '080280 18,573 0.08% THA 72.2% (0), IDN 22.9% (0), SGP 4.9% (0)
not shelled or peeled
Wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified
215 24 '220421 wines, and grape must whose 16,964 0.08% THA 75.9% (3), EU 11% (30), SGP 5.2% (3), AUS 4.1% (3)
fermentation has been arrested ...
233 25 '110710 Malt (excluding roasted) 15,801 0.07% CHN 82.2% (0), AUS 9.9% (5), EU 7.9% (5)
IDN 36.5% (0), MYS 31.4% (0), THA 22.3% (0), OMN
237 26 '190531 Sweet biscuits 15,694 0.07%
4.2% (15)
Sunflower seeds, whether or not
244 27 '120600 15,455 0.07% CHN 98.3% (0)
broken
Human hair, unworked, whether or
254 28 '050100 not washed or scoured; waste of 14,810 0.07% IND 99.7% (4)
human hair
Dried peaches, pears, papaws
264 29 '081340 14,101 0.06% THA 99.9% (0)
"papayas", tamarinds and other

28
 Ranking Imported
Ranking Share in
in total value in
in total Product total Import origin and average applied tariff by
AG Product Label 2015
import Code agricultural Myanmar
import (USD
share imports
share '000)

edible fruits (excluding nuts, ...

Black fermented tea and partly
269 30 '090230 fermented tea, whether or not 13,943 0.06% CHN 97.6% (0)
flavoured, in immediate packings ...
Source and note: ITC; in the import origin, data from Vietnam was unavailable at the time for the year 2015

Figure 4: Origin of Myanmar’s imports in trade in agriculture and fishery products, 2015 (USD
thousand and % of total import share)
175,292
83,571 42,611
1.5% 6.0%
95,771 2.9%
3.3%
Thailand
138,124
4.7% Indonesia
China

1,165,039 India
233,792
40.0% Malaysia
8.0%
Singapore
289,332 Australia
9.9%
European Union
United Arab Emirates
318,267
10.9% 371,895 Rest of the world
12.8%

Table 5: Myanmar’s trade in agricultural and fishery products

2005 2015
Exported Import Value of Total Exported Import Value of total Total
Partner Export Import Export Import
value in value in total trade trade value in value in trade in USD trade
share share share share
USD ‘000 USD ‘000 in USD ‘000 share USD ‘000 USD ‘000 ‘000 share
Brunei 1,458 0.2% 0 0.0% 1,458 0.1% 244 0.0% 0 0.0% 244 0.0%
Myanmar 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Indonesia 8,598 1.2% 19,013 4.2% 27,611 2.4% 39,119 1.9% 374,895 12.9% 414,014 8.3%
Lao PDR 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Malaysia 68,984 9.9% 98,588 21.7% 167,572 14.6% 85,308 4.1% 233,792 8.0% 319,100 6.4%
Philippines 1,255 0.2% 54 0.0% 1,309 0.1% 10,813 0.5% 9,864 0.3% 20,677 0.4%
Singapore 36,776 5.3% 74,426 16.4% 111,202 9.7% 26,902 1.3% 138,124 4.7% 165,026 3.3%
Thailand 91,176 13.1% 172,085 37.9% 263,261 22.9% 149,944 7.3% 1,185,044 40.7% 1,334,988 26.8%
Viet Nam 8,218 1.2% 388 0.1% 8,606 0.7% 42,010 2.0% 39,513 1.4% 81,523 1.6%

Intra-
216,465 31.2% 364,554 80.3% 581,019 50.6% 354,340 17.2% 1,981,232 68.0% 2,335,572 46.9%
ASEAN

29
Australia 9,571 1.4% 22,168 4.9% 31,739 2.8% 14,797 0.7% 95,711 3.3% 110,508 2.2%
China 26,895 3.9% 47,639 10.5% 74,534 6.5% 172,350 8.4% 318,267 10.9% 490,617 9.9%
India 209,687 30.2% 7,038 1.6% 216,725 18.9% 892,396 43.3% 209,332 7.2% 1,101,728 22.1%
Japan 85,611 12.3% 77 0.0% 85,688 7.5% 112,948 5.5% 1,544 0.1% 114,492 2.3%
Korea,
10,031 1.4% 538 0.1% 10,569 0.9% 53,988 2.6% 18,998 0.7% 72,986 1.5%
Rep. of
New
0 0.0% 1,796 0.4% 1,796 0.2% 552 0.0% 18,390 0.6% 18,942 0.4%
Zealand

Intra-
558,260 80.4% 443,810 97.8% 1,002,070 87.2% 1,601,371 77.7% 2,643,474 90.7% 4,244,845 85.3%
RCEP

European
26,945 3.9% 4,760 1.0% 31,705 2.8% 154,093 7.5% 39,493 1.4% 193,586 3.9%
Union
Chinese
12,873 1.9% 332 0.1% 13,205 1.1% 17,629 0.9% 1,863 0.1% 19,492 0.4%
Taipei
United
Arab 10,605 1.5% 118 0.0% 10,723 0.9% 67,204 3.3% 42,611 1.5% 109,815 2.2%
Emirates
United
0 0.0% 569 0.1% 569 0.0% 49,884 2.4% 38,032 1.3% 87,916 1.8%
States
Rest of the
86,008 12.4% 4,231 0.9% 90,239 7.9% 171,761 8.3% 148,221 5.1% 319,982 6.4%
world

Extra-
136,431 19.6% 10,010 2.2% 146,441 12.8% 460,571 22.3% 270,220 9.3% 730,791 14.7%
ASEAN

World 694,691 100.0% 453,820 100.0% 1,148,511 100.0% 2,061,942 100.0% 2,913,694 100.0% 4,975,636 100.0%

Note: Data includes agriculture and fishery products from HS 01 to HS 24. Other agricultural goods outside of these chapters are not included
(cotton, silk, raw hides, dextrin, casein, etc.)

30