Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Ruling:
RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.[54] Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.[55] The
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to
the other branches of government.[56]
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence.[57] The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a
proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. [58]
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. The mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. The law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by
violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions
make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [78]
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. [79]
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[80] When the issue concerns a public right, it is
sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.[81]
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed
or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.[82] The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayers suit.[83]
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[84]
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,[85] but the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule
of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.[86]
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its
own, and of the other LGUs.[87]
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements
of the law authorizing intervention,[88] such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties.
The Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi where technicalities of
procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading
to the consummation of the contract. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted
Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of
Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. the effectivity of the
policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for reasonable safeguards. The complete and effective exercise
of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the
same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the
broader[130] right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative
duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse
in not effecting such policy.
The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the
peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which
includes continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda
and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process. Clearly,
E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate continuing
consultations, contrary to respondents position that plebiscite is more than sufficient
consultation
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the
BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government
under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific
powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea
that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international
law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the
Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with
a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of
transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The nature of the associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely
in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of association
in international law, and the MOA-AD by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR placed itself
in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the
use of the term associative in the MOA-AD.
In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept
of association, specifically the following: the BJEs capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJEs participation in meetings
and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJEs right to participate in Philippine official missions
bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining
to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles
the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on
any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept
of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims
to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-ADs provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,[154] namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require
an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation
pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that
might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the
Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making
power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: The BJE is free
to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that
such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines x x x. Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power.
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
Even if the UN DRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) were considered as
part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold
the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government
units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No.
3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution
of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an
exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-
AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar
provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the
respondents action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the
MOA-AD and its annexes.
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is
in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even
if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest
order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for
feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public
rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples
right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure
for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the
specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive
secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
IN SUM, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between
the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through
an undue influence or interference with that process.
The UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to
grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in
that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to
the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding
on the Philippines under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
CHREA vs CHR
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the
strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank
and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of
the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification
that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
Ruling:
As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of respondent may be
constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, plainly entitled "Constitutional Commissions," identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation
of the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights. Thus,
the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional
commissions for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly
pertaining to it to support its claim of fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution expressly and
unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the
Office of the Ombudsman. Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR)
evidently does not contain the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces
only the second sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations.
The ConCom had intended to grant to the respondent the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations automatically and regularly released, but nothing more. While it may be conceded that the
automatic and regular release of approved annual appropriations is an aspect of fiscal autonomy, it is just
one of many others.
Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. It also means
freedom for outside control.
Fiscal Autonomy shall mean independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside control
and is characterized by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere automatic and
regular release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such power in a very real sense,
the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons, after
the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy encompasses, among others, budget preparation and
implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of
receipts. Fiscal autonomy means more than just the automatic and regular release of approved
appropriation, and also encompasses, among other things: (1) budget preparation and implementation;
(2) flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations; and (3) use of savings and disposition of
receipts.
The 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of
having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds
from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary,
constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
Francisco vs HR
Facts:
1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee
on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”
Ruling:
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions
There is a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is
a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. Standing is a special
concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether
such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." On the other hand, the question as to "real
party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the
'party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights
of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as
taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he
is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court. It
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
When dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were
before the court.
The Philippine Bar Association invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance. There being no
doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out,
i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001
Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has
been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court
to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court
to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment
are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming
that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional
infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures
would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would
such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only
place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress
before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be
sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
Political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it
is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely,
other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to
be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if
the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy. In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked
as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule
V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication
may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as
there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it
is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article
XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House
of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives,
acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and
make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the
filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified
complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to
begin.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power
to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, Manila Prince
Hotel (MPH) and the Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad (RB). MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share while
RB’s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the
winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid and invoked the
Filipino First Policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
But GSIS refused to accept said offer. In turn MPH filed a petition for TRO against GSIS to avoid the
perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. TRO was granted.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:
1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement
of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.
Ruling:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action.
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice
to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
As regards our national patrimony. The term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated
with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of
the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos. The word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after
it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
“Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending
of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates
of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino.
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article
7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec
8 (1), Article 8.
Ruling:
The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To
construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless
the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents’ interpretation that Section
13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the
Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other
office or position in the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents’ reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the Constitution
inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII
is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective
public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible “for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.” Surely, to say that the phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution” found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1)
of Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-
President to become a member of the Cabinet, 15 and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-
Presidency where the President shall not have been chosen or fails to qualify. 16 Such absurd consequence
can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1)
of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the
exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-à-vis Section
13, Article VII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
The term “primary” used to describe “functions” refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or
principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. 33 The additional
duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official’s primary functions. If the
functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the
purview of “any other office” prohibited by the Constitution.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held that “in cases where there is
no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged
the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the
services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. 47 Any
per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due
to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except
in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not
considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing
amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same
time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution
was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
Ruling:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of
a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy
in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature.
In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
Kilosbayan vs Guingona
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will
establish a national network system that will in turn expand PCSO’s source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was
awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that:
1. PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian
firm Berjaya Group Berhad);
2. PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries “in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity”;
3. The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the
law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed
to set up such;
4. PGMC’s articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it
to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst.
Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a
piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as
evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease
Ruling:
PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for
that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed
foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of
Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and
lottery is one of them — are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign
Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.
The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, 29 this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are
concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained," 30 or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." 31 In De La Llana vs.
Alba, 32 this Court declared:
In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, 33 reiterated in Basco vs.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation,34 this Court stated:
Objections to taxpayers' suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the
cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them, this Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of these petitions.
and in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,35 it
declared:
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before
us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of
them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of. [Ex ParteLevitt, 303 US 633]. And even if, strictly
speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public. The Court dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties and ruled
that the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We
have since then applied this exception in many other cases. (Emphasis supplied)
In Daza vs. Singson, 36 this Court once more said:
. . . For another, we have early as in the Emergency Powers Cases that where serious
constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently
followed by the Court, as in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [21 SCRA 774] . . .
The Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America has also expressed its discretionary power
to liberalize the rule on locus standi. In United States vs. Federal Power Commission and Virginia Rea
Association vs. Federal Power Commission,37 it held:
We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view, however, preclude a single
opinion of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarification of this
complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any
event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to
set out the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases.
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and
even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute
actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or
orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the
constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress; 38 (b)
Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed
members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions; 39 (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations
Act; 40 (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections; 41 (d) R.A. No. 1869 (the charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public
policy, and order; 42 and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National
Police. 43
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking the
validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by
R.A. No. 3452; 44 (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution
and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976; 45(c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of
land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan; 46 (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of
Investments of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its
plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha
only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas; 47 (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of
Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power Corporation from
indirect tax and duties; 48 (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the
ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the
petitioner substantial cross-examination; 49 (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of
P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products; 50 (h) resolutions of the Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of
the number of elective members of Sanggunians; 51 and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor
affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City.52
In the 1975 case of Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 53 this Court, despite its unequivocal ruling that
the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to pass upon the
issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no less in De Guia vs.
COMELEC 54 where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear to have locus standi, a
standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering
the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters
affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution
by respondent."
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being
of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to
raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of.
Tolentino vs COMELEC
Facts:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under
revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
Ruling:
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that
the issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest
order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and
the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this
posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the
jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case
of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in
their opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its
jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of
Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those
of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied
upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but
comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr.
Jose P. Laurel — declared that “the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.”
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a
political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress
in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for
ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this
precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil.
818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957)
and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and
employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the
party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for
the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of
Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of
inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues
therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part
of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours
(Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants
such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said
that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending
the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of
all powers of government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men,
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-
making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates
the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the
extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter
should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme.
Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually,
what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of
1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power
from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly
as in the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government
born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or
of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d’etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the
convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the
remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez
refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only
because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by
authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally
beyond the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be
co-extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have
any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows
that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds.
The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of
the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable
that in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it
is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil
that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or
the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor,
for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property
without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare
war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a
convict or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and
the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less
exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention
be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing
Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the
rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question
must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of government
established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is
naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and
wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 134, reading:
… (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to
say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as
it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is
the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism
by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not
to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly,
by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
“judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not
the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not “the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty … the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians
… their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce … aggression on the authority of their
Constitution.” In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding
years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the previous
confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution
of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted
after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the
sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of
December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very
nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of
our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion
to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that
it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise
would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what is logically their
function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no
power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and
3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established
to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the
conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these
questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional
system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of
the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just
quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the
government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on
the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in
Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the
other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by
any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention,
even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated,
it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case.
It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the
Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court
are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and “upon principle, reason and authority,” per Justice
Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to
resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of
the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1
of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and
form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the
Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal
statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that
he is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter
of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition
is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people
for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent,
Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course
of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question
raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power of the
Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed
in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well
as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this
juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to
adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments
affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly
provides, that the amendment therein proposed “shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will
be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section
or on other portions of the entire Constitution.” In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this
case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the
members of the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed
to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone
that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said
proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded
them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people
is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose
cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the
Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant
search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases
of the existing social and governmental institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related
to the well-being and economic security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well as those
concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony, as an
alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of
enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas
and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion
and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even
in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in
this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the
Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the
imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a
larger measure than when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the
Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by
interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down
any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the
point of being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court
would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there
are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety,
since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only
of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle
and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is
warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional
innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing constitution is not
beyond the ambit of the Convention’s authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of
views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its
constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which
respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the
Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court
considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammeled and unrestrained
in the performance of its constitutionally assigned mission in the manner and form it may conceive best,
and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only
when and to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a
clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional
law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative
but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the
acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention
stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into
being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already
quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and
the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and
its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that
even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of
Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took
care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in
changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the
people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and
which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives,
fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and
those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution
worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation
and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance
than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and
deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed
earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon
themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution.
Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated
or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are
supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be
adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and
hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original
constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people
themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so
incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to
claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as
their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the
scope and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court
propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the
power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention
is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power
can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present
case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be.
Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to
this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for
obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being
nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more
appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can
be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article
XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition
and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single “election” or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be
submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite
being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is
not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the
respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. It says distinctly that either
Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose “may propose
amendments to this Constitution,” thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or
the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that “such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,” thus leaving no room for doubt as to how
many “elections” or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says “an election” which
means only one.
2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As
already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making
itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the
Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but
comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic
policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. It is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any
country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the
original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when
a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated
whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before
casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits
of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to
them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive
at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter,
as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution
to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other
considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may
already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen
under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in
the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has
reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have
any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say
whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of
the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the
Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every
part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a
voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things,
where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals
to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in
Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or “election” wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference
they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible
frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification
of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in
the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, “no proper
submission”.
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention.
Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen
years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution
which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the
fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that
in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the
constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent
acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should
only be one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose.
We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from
but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
Sanidad vs COMELEC
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related
decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses
that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new
interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections
to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,
1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
Ruling:
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office
after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in
1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only
when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath
office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for
the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate
his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required
10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality
of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by
the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than
the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to
give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino
and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the
said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the
president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of
the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there
being intimidation and fraud.
Ruling:
And, now, here are my views on the reliefs sought by the parties.
In L-36165, it is clear that we should not issue the writ of mandamus prayed for against Gil J. Puyat and
Jose Roy, President and President Pro Tempore respectively of the Senate, it being settled in our
jurisdiction, based upon the theory of separation of powers, that the judiciary will not issue such writ to the
head of a co-equal department, like the aforementioned officers of the Senate.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, as well as in cases L-36142, L-
36164, L-36236 and L-36283, my vote is that the petitions therein should be given due course, there being
more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or
majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is
still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to
the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935
Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Perhaps others would feel that my position in these cases overlooks what they might consider to be the
demands of “judicial statesmanship,” whatever may be the meaning of such phrase. I am aware of this
possibility, if not probability; but “judicial statesmanship,” though consistent with Rule of Law, cannot
prevail over the latter. Among consistent ends or consistent values, there always is a hierarchy, a rule of
priority.
We must realize that the New Society has many achievements which would have been very difficult, if not
impossible, to accomplish under the old dispensation. But, in and for the judiciary, statesmanship should
not prevail over the Rule of Law. Indeed, the primacy of the law or of the Rule of Law and faithful adherence
thereto are basic, fundamental and essential parts of statesmanship itself.
Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court’s Resolution
As earlier stated, after the submittal by the members of the Court of their individual opinions and/or
concurrences as appended hereto, the writer will now make, with the concurrence of his colleagues, a
resume or summary of the votes cast by each of them.
It should be stated that by virtue of the various approaches and views expressed during the deliberations,
it was agreed to synthesize the basic issues at bar in broad general terms in five questions for purposes of
taking the votes. It was further agreed of course that each member of the Court would expound in his
individual opinion and/or concurrence his own approach to the stated issues and deal with them and state
(or not) his opinion thereon singly or jointly and with such priority, qualifications and modifications as he
may deem proper, as well as discuss thereon other related issues which he may consider vital and relevant
to the cases at bar.
The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein involved are the following:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people?
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? and
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in their
respect opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo
qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court
may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the
affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in negative, the Court
may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been
complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue
is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.”
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. 87
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly
ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning
and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes
therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the
fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the
majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the
usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if
not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief
that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political
aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect,
the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.”
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there
has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines,
of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states
that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently
of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be
accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for
application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the
mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.” 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of
martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.” 89
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so
voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the
basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an
therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable.” 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny
respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote
thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando
and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.