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Why Do People Like Natural? Instrumental and Ideational

Bases for the Naturalness Preference1

Meng Li2 Gretchen B. Chapman

Department of Health and Department of Psychology
Behavioral Sciences, Rutgers University
University of Colorado Denver

Naturalness preference refers to the tendency to prefer natural things to otherwise

equivalent unnatural alternatives. Previous research suggests that the naturalness
preference is largely due to ideational reasons (moral or aesthetic appeals), rather
than instrumental reasons (inferred functional superiority), because the natural and
unnatural alternatives were specified as identical. The current studies showed that
people do not always believe that natural and unnatural alternatives can be identical.
Responses that in previous studies would have been interpreted as ideational-based
naturalness preference were correlated with beliefs in instrumental advantages of
natural products. We propose that instrumental and ideational reasons are closely
connected, and instrumental beliefs may contribute to the “natural is better” heu-
ristic. The financial consequence of naturalness preference was also demonstrated.

Americans are increasingly enthusiastic about natural products in recent

decades. It is almost impossible to take a trip to the grocery store without
noticing labels like “all natural,” “organic,” or “non-GMO” (genetically
modified organism). Sales of organic food in the United States increased at a
rate of 20% or more annually between 1990 and 2002 (Dimitri & Greene,
2002), and similar growth rates have been observed in some European coun-
tries and Japan (Kortbech-Olesen, 2002). The appeal of natural foods has
also been demonstrated in several studies, where participants viewed natural
beverages as more attractive (Carlisle & Shafir, 2005) and showed substantial
preference for natural foods and medicine over unnatural alternatives (Rozin
et al., 2004; Spranca, 1992). Similarly, people view damage caused by
humans as worse than that caused by nature (Baron, 1993; Baron & Ritov,
1993; Kahneman & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, & Grant,
1993). More direct evidence of the liking of natural is the quick positive
emotions evoked in participants by the term “natural” (Rozin, Fischler, &
Shields-Argeles, unpublished data).
1
This research was supported by NSF grant SBE-0624098 awarded to the second author.
Study 1 was presented at the 2008 Annual Conference for the Society of Psychological Science,
Chicago, IL. We thank Chuanxi Xu for help on response coding in Study 3.
2
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Meng Li, Department of
Health and Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, 1201 5th Street, Suite 280G,
P.O. Box 173364, CB 188, Denver, CO 80217-3364. E-mail: meng.li@ucdenver.edu

2859

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2012, 42, 12, pp. 2859–2878.

© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00964.x
2860 LI AND CHAPMAN

This preference for natural things influences not just hypothetical choices,
but also real-world decisions. In a study conducted by Baron, Holzman, and
Schulkin (1998), obstetricians and gynecologists who showed preference for
naturally occurring over identical man-made hormones in a hypothetical
choice also held more negative attitudes toward hormone replacement
therapy—an “unnatural” intervention whose overall benefits outweigh risks,
according to available medical evidence at the time of the study. Similarly,
preference for natural medicine versus a chemically identical synthesized
medicine was negatively associated with attitudes and behaviors toward
the influenza vaccine (Dibonaventura & Chapman, 2008), another overall
beneficial, but unnatural product.
Why do people prefer natural entities? Two distinct bases for such “natu-
ralness preference” were offered by Rozin and colleagues (Rozin, 2005;
Rozin et al., 2004): instrumental reasons (due to functional superiority of
natural products, such as effectiveness, safety, taste, or environmental ben-
efits) and ideational reasons (due to moral or aesthetic superiority of the
natural: that natural is prior to human intervention, or simply feels “right”).
The authors proposed that a substantial proportion of natural preference has
ideational bases. In their experiments (Rozin et al., 2004), ideational reasons
were inferred if participants preferred a natural product over its unnatural
alternative even though the options were specified to be identical in cost,
taste, healthfulness, and chemical composition (thus presumably excluding
instrumental reasons to prefer the natural). Indeed, the majority of partici-
pants did show a persisting naturalness preference under such conditions,
which was interpreted as evidence for ideational reasons behind the natural-
ness preference.
The above studies clearly demonstrate a pervasive naturalness preference.
However, the conclusion that the majority of participants must therefore
prefer natural for ideational rather than instrumental reasons is questionable.
One alternative possibility was that participants did not believe that the two
options were truly chemically identical (also acknowledged by Rozin et al.,
2004). If so, it is conceivable that participants may prefer the natural option
because of some inferred instrumental advantage of the natural.
Few studies have investigated this issue. In the only such study (Spranca,
1992, cited by Rozin et al., 2004), two drinking waters, one from a natural
spring and another made by adding/deducting minerals from distilled water,
were stated to be chemically identical, and the majority of participants
believed the statement. Belief in chemical identity was also unrelated to
participants’ preferences. Subsequent studies on the naturalness preference
(e.g., Rozin et al., 2004) largely assumed that participants accepted the iden-
tity of alternatives if told so. However, Spranca’s (1992) findings could be
restricted to the water scenario: Chemical identity may be easier to believe
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2861

about waters than about more complex products. Indeed, water may be the
least complex substance about which natural and unnatural alternatives are
both available. Thus, investigators who assume participants believed that
natural and unnatural options in other studies were indeed identical as
described may have oversimplified the reasons behind the naturalness
preference.
We suspect that people may be reluctant to believe natural and unnatural
products can be identical in terms of their instrumental utility. Several studies
(Rozin, 2005, 2006; Rozin, Fischler, & Shields-Argeles, 2009) revealed that
people’s perception of the naturalness of an entity is more influenced by its
processing history than by its content, and perceived naturalness is reduced
by contact with unnatural entities and by chemical transformation, especially
with additives. Because any processing or contact with other entities may
increase potential risk through contagion, it is likely that concerns about risk
could exert an important influence on people’s preference for natural prod-
ucts. In fact, advertisements for natural merchandise usually emphasize their
avoidance of potentially risky processing and chemical additives.
Instead of assuming ideational reasons as the main source of naturalness
preference, we propose that ideational and instrumental reasons are both
important, and closely connected with each other, with the possibility of either
category of reasons originating from the other. Specifically, we want to stress
the possibility that instrumental reasons form prior to ideational reasons. The
idea that natural items are healthier, tastier, more effective, or better for the
environment may have permeated people’s belief systems to a great degree,
leading to a heuristic that “natural is better,” and thus, a preference for natural
options even when there is no evidence that they are better than unnatural
alternatives. It may appear as if such preference is purely ideational, given the
absence of real instrumental advantage in certain situations, while the true
reason may lie in the assumed instrumental benefits of natural products.
Although purely ideational reasons may exist in naturalness preference, we
hypothesize that part of the ostensible “ideational” naturalness preference is
associated with beliefs in instrumental benefits of natural products.
To test such hypotheses, we need to clarify several questions: First, do
people believe that natural and unnatural products are identical in hypotheti-
cal scenarios? Second, is suspicion about claimed identity related to what was
previously inferred to be ideationally based naturalness preference? Third,
are stronger beliefs that natural is instrumentally superior correlated with the
seemingly ideationally based naturalness preference? Studies 1 and 2 answer
the first two questions using hypothetical scenarios about specific natural and
unnatural entities. Study 3 addresses the last question by examining general
beliefs about instrumental advantages of natural products, and Study 4
shows the potential financial impact of the naturalness preference.
2862 LI AND CHAPMAN

Study 1

Study 1 investigated naturalness preference in two domains: food supple-

ments and health hazards. We constructed two hypothetical scenarios. The
first scenario was about natural or chemically synthesized vitamins, a domain
where naturalness preference has been demonstrated before (Rozin et al.,
2004). The second scenario was about a health hazard. Previous findings
suggest that harm is perceived as worse when it is caused by human action
than when it is caused by nature (Baron, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1993), which
led us to predict that people would prefer a health risk posed by a natural
hazard to one posed by an unnatural hazard, even if the stated negative
consequences were equated. These two scenarios afford a comparison of
naturalness preference for gains—things that bring benefits, such as food/
medicine, and for losses—things that pose risks, such as health hazards.
Critically, we examined whether people would believe that natural and
unnatural alternatives are instrumentally identical if they are told so. Since
risk is a prominent attribute of health hazards and may be of primary
concern for decisions about them, we measured belief in the stated equiva-
lence of risk between natural and unnatural health hazards. We expect that
the majority of participants would not believe that natural and unnatural
health hazards posed equal risk even when they were told so; we also expect
greater perceived risk in unnatural compared with natural health hazard to
correlate with preference for the natural hazard.

Methods

In fall 2007, 447 Rutgers University undergraduate students participated

in an Internet study in partial fulfillment of a course assignment. Two sce-
narios were presented to each participant, with each scenario describing a
natural and an unnatural alternative. Scenario 1 described two brands of
vitamin C pills that were either “made from extracts of natural plants rich in
vitamin C, like lemon and hot pepper” or “made in the laboratory, by
synthesizing vitamin C from other chemicals.” Vitamin C was stated to be the
only ingredient in the two brands of pills (implying chemical identity), both
of which were said to be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion and cost the same.
Scenario 2 presented two similar cities as potential locations to live.
Both cities were said to pose a 5% risk of severe allergy due to the same
molecule called “DHA”; however, in City A, DHA was contained “in the
pollen of a special type of tree growing near City A,” but in City B, DHA
was contained “in the chemical residual of emissions from a plastic factory
that was once located near City B but moved away 10 years ago.” We also
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2863

made it explicit that all other aspects of the two cities were equal: “The two
cities are very similar in safety, living expenses, culture, etc. Even the envi-
ronmental status of the two cities is identical: There is no difference in the
quality of air, water, soil, etc. And people living in the two cities are similar
in their level of health and enjoyment of their environment.” Importantly,
we equated the potential risk of the health hazards by stating that “The
pollen of these trees causes no other health problems” in City A, and “The
chemical residual causes no other health problems, because there are only
small traces of it” in City B.
Preference between the natural and unnatural alternatives were measured
following the description of each scenario, on a 7-point scale from strongly
prefer option X (natural vitamin C/city with natural DHA, rating of 3) to
strongly prefer option Y (unnatural vitamin C/city with unnatural DHA,
rating of -3), with 0 indicating no preference. Subsequently, participants
were reminded of the two statements stating “no other health problems” in
the descriptions of City A and City B, respectively, and for each statement,
the participants were asked “How confident were you about this statement
when you indicated your preference between the two cities?” Responses were
recorded on a 10-point scale from 1 “not confident at all” to 10 “very
confident.” The order of the two confidence questions was counterbalanced
among participants.

Results

Naturalness Preference. The responses in the two scenarios revealed a

strong, consistent preference for the natural alternatives. As presented in
Table 1, preference ratings in the vitamin C scenario were significantly above
zero, M = 1.54, SD = 1.45, t(447) = 22.35, p < .001, d = 1.06, indicating a pref-
erence for natural vitamin C. Similarly, preference ratings in the allergen
scenario indicated a preference for the allergen from a natural source (tree
pollen), M = 1.12, SD = 1.62, t(447) = 14.60, p < .001, d = .69. Preference
ratings in the two scenarios were correlated, r = .24, p < .001. Frequency
distribution of ratings indicated the presence of naturalness preference in
the majority of the participants: Among all 447 participants, 338 (or 75.6%)
and 299 (or 66.9%) gave ratings above the indifference point (indicating a
preference for the natural option) in the vitamin C and allergen scenarios,
respectively.

Differential Confidence About the “No-Other-Risk” Statement. Despite

the two similar statements that there were “no other health problems” caused
by the tree pollen or by the chemical residual, the participants showed lower
confidence in the statement about the chemical residual (M = 5.45,
2864 LI AND CHAPMAN

Table 1

Preference for the Natural Option and Its Correlation with Beliefs in
Statements About Identity and Risk of the Natural and Unnatural Alternatives

Preference r (belief r (differential

Scenario for natural d in identity) risk perception)
Study 1 Vitamin C 1.54 (1.45)** 1.09
Allergen 1.12 (1.62)** .69 .39**
Study 2 Vitamin C 1.93 (1.59)** 1.21 .24* .45*
Note. Naturalness preference was measured on a 7-point scale (-3 to 3) in both
studies, with positive values indicating favorable preference for the natural option.
Cells were left empty where data are not collected. *p < .05. **p < .01.

SD = 2.75) compared with that about the tree pollen (M = 7.51, SD = 2.11),
t(446) = 15.63, p < .001, d = .74, suggesting greater perceived risk for an
unnatural compared with a natural health hazard. We also found that greater
difference in confidence between the two statements (in the direction of
lower confidence about chemical residues) correlated with preference for the
city where allergen was from the tree pollen, r = .39, p < .001 (see Table 1).
Frequency of confidence ratings revealed that 58.8% of the participants
indicated greater confidence in the “no-other-risk” statement about the tree
pollen, 28.6% of the participants showed equal confidence in the two state-
ments, and only 12.5% of the participants indicated greater confidence in the
same statement about the chemical residual. Among the 128 participants
who showed equal confidence in the two statements, preference rating
was still significantly above the indifference point, although the extent of
preference dropped by almost half from that among all participants, M = .70,
SD = 1.69, t(127) = 4.67, p < .001, d = .41. Preference rating frequency
indicates that about half (n = 65) of these participants who indicated
equal confidence preferred the natural option (preference above zero), 25%
(n = 32) showed no preference, and 24.2% (n = 31) preferred the unnatural
option.

Discussion

Responses to hypothetical scenarios concerning vitamin C and an allergen

demonstrated a strong, consistent preference for the natural, relative to an
equivalent unnatural alternative in gain and loss domains. Contrary to
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2865

findings in Spranca’s (1992) studies, the majority of the participants in our

study did not accept the specified condition that natural and unnatural
allergens posed equal risk. Greater perceived risk (lower confidence in the
no-other-risk statement) about the unnatural allergen compared with the
natural allergen was correlated with preference for the natural allergen.
These results suggest an important instrumental reason for naturalness
preference—perceived risk. For some participants, the differential perceived
risk about natural and unnatural entities seems to override conditions speci-
fied in hypothetical scenarios, and leads to preference for the natural option.
With an assumption that the conditions in the scenario were fully accepted by
the participants, previous research would have classified such preference as
due to ideational reasons.
Granted, it is possible that some participants’ naturalness preference
originated from ideational reasons, and they subsequently recruited
instrumental reasons, for example, that natural and unnatural products are
not identical, to justify their preference, because instrumental reasons
sound more “rational.” However, it is as likely that instrumental reasons
led to ideational reasons for the naturalness preference, and it cannot
be assumed that the naturalness preference originates with ideational
reasons.
Some participants did indicate equal perceived risk for natural and
unnatural allergens and still preferred the natural option in the allergen
scenario; this could be interpreted as that these participants preferred the
natural option solely for ideational reasons (alternative explanations are
offered next). However, only 65 participants fell into this category, which is
21.7% of the 299 who preferred the city with the natural allergen. Thus, even
if the inference for ideational reasons is valid, we could only make such
inference for a small portion of our participants. An alternative interpreta-
tion for such “ideational-based” preference is that the carriers of the
allergen—pollen and chemical residual—were not viewed as chemically and
functionally identical even when their associated risks were believed as equal,
and there may be other instrumental attributes about the carriers that
affected people’s preference beyond perceived risk. This limitation in the
allergen scenario was addressed in the next study.
There are other limitations of Study 1. For example, the confidence
measure was only used in the allergen scenario concerning loss and was
limited to risk. Therefore, the findings on the participants’ concerns about
risk may not apply in the gain domain, where the most prominent features of
entities are positive attributes, instead of risk. Another limitation is the
restricted representation of the general population by college students. To
address these limitations, we conducted a follow-up study using a national
sample.
2866 LI AND CHAPMAN

Study 2

The results in Study 1 lend support to our hypothesis that people are
reluctant to believe that natural and unnatural alternatives are identical, even
when they are told so, and such disbelief contributes to naturalness prefer-
ence. To complement the findings about risk beliefs in the loss domain, Study
2 used a modified version of the vitamin scenario adapted from Study 1.
Instead of implying chemical identity, we explicitly stated that two brands of
vitamin C pills (one from natural source and one manufactured) were chemi-
cally identical. Thus, we eliminated confounds from carriers or other ingre-
dients. To increase validity, we included two measures of confidence in
claimed identity of the options, one about chemical identity and one about
risk, and used different response formats in these two measures. The study
was conducted among a national sample. We expect the participants to show
skepticism in the statement that the natural and unnatural vitamin pills are
chemically identical, as in Study 1, and that such suspicion would be corre-
lated with preference for the natural vitamin C.

Methods

In June 2008, 499 participants (age 18–89, M = 46.42, SD = 17.95) were

recruited from a commercial survey company (Survey Sampling Interna-
tional) from various regions of the United States. The vitamin scenario from
Study 1 was used to measure naturalness preference, with some modifica-
tions. Instead of saying that vitamin C was the only ingredient in the two
brands of vitamin pills, we used a more explicit statement to indicate identity:
“Scientific tests also prove that they are chemically identical.” After indicat-
ing preference between the two vitamin brands as in Study 1, the participants
were asked two questions about belief in the stated identity of the options on
the same webpage. First, they responded yes or no to the question “Are you
confident that the two brands of vitamin C pills are chemically identical?”;
then, they indicated their confidence that the “vitamin C pills pose no risk
(including unknown risk)” for each brand of vitamin C on a scale from 1 (not
confident at all) to 10 ( perfectly confident).

Results

Consistent with the findings from Study 1, preference for the natural
vitamin C was significantly above zero, the no-preference point, M = 1.93,
SD = 1.59, t(498) = 27.04, p < .001, d = 1.21 (see Table 1). Among all 499
participants, 383 (or 76.8%) showed a preference for the natural vitamin C.
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2867

Also consistent with Study 1, despite scientific test results mentioned in the
scenario, the majority of the participants (65%) responded no to the question
asking their confidence about the chemical identity of natural and unnatural
vitamin C pills. The participants were also less confident that the synthesized
vitamin C pills posed no risk (M = 5.33, SD = 2.50) than they were about
natural vitamin C pills (M = 7.53, SD = 2.14), t(498) = 17.12, p < .001,
d = .77, indicating greater perceived risk in synthesized vitamin C pills. In
addition, as shown in Table 1, preference for the natural vitamin pills corre-
lated with suspicion about chemical identity, as well as with lower confidence
about the no-risk statement for unnatural versus natural vitamin C pills,
r = .24 and r = .45, respectively, ps < .001.
We then limited the analysis to the 93 participants who responded yes in
the question about belief in claimed chemical identity and also indicated
equal confidence in the no-risk statements for the two brands of vitamins,
and thus presumably accepted the identity of the two options. Mean natu-
ralness preference among these participants was significantly above zero,
although reduced to less than half of that among all participants, M = .87,
SD = 1.65, t(92) = 27.04, p < .001, d = .53. When these participants were cat-
egorized based on whether their preference rating was above, equal to, or
below zero, the indifference point, however, only 40.9% (n = 38) preferred
natural vitamin C pills, while 51.6% (n = 48) showed no preference, and 7.5%
(n = 7) preferred unnatural vitamin C pills.

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the results from Study 1 in the general population and
in the gain domain. People preferred vitamin C pills made from natural
ingredients to those synthesized in the lab. Consistent with Study 1, most
participants in Study 2 did not believe that the natural and synthesized pills
were chemically identical, although the scenario stated scientific tests as
evidence that they were, and the participants suspected of greater risk for
synthesized pills. Both types of suspicion were correlated with preference for
the natural vitamin, again suggesting that what would usually have been
categorized as ideational-based naturalness preference—because the condi-
tions in the scenario indicate no instrumental advantage in choosing the
natural and the participants were assumed to accept the conditions in the
scenario—is at least partly attributable to beliefs about instrumental aspects
of the products.
Study 2 also showed that these suspicious thoughts do not fully explain
people’s preference for the natural: The mean preference rating among
people who thought the natural and synthesized vitamin C pills were chemi-
cally identical and posed equal risks was still significantly above zero, indi-
2868 LI AND CHAPMAN

cating a preference for natural over the unnatural vitamins (albeit somewhat
weaker than mean preference among all participants). However, consistent
with Study 1, we only found a small fraction of participants who believed in
the identity of natural and unnatural options in chemical composition and
risk and still demonstrated a naturalness preference (n = 38, or 10% of the 383
participants who showed naturalness preference).
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that a substantial proportion of
naturalness preference may be due to instrumental reasons, whereas purely
ideational-based preference may be inferred among only a small proportion
of the participants. We do not exclude, however, the possibility that one type
of reason originates from the other.
One common limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is that the hypothetical sce-
narios concerned specific items, such as vitamin C pills and allergens. Given
that beliefs in specific natural and unnatural entities may vary, people’s
beliefs about natural products in general need to be investigated. Another
limitation in Studies 1 and 2, as well as in previous research (Rozin, 2005;
Rozin et al., 2004; Spranca, 1992), is the neglect of an important potential
factor in naturalness preference: Many people may prefer natural options
because they think natural products are more environmentally friendly. Note
that environmental impact is an instrumental reason for naturalness prefer-
ence (Rozin, 2005; Rozin et al., 2004), as it provides actual benefits to the
individual indirectly through the environment. We addressed these limita-
tions in Study 3.

Study 3

Instrumental and ideational reasons for the naturalness preference might

not be as conceptually distinct as they appear. As we proposed earlier, when
the belief that natural items are superior in functional aspects is held long
enough, a “natural is better” heuristic could form and lead to preference for
natural goods independent of evidence for real advantages. Such a heuristic
could conceivably prevent people from believing that a natural entity can be
identical to an unnatural alternative, instead of being materially different and
functionally superior. Such a heuristic would lead to preference for the
natural option based on beliefs in instrumental benefits. Alternatively, the
heuristic may transcend to a moral or aesthetic level, where natural is
perceived as more appealing regardless of its material or function (truly
ideational).
To examine the relationship between instrumental and ideational reasons
behind naturalness bias, we measured the participants’ general beliefs about
instrumental advantages of natural food products, including advantages to
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2869

the consumers themselves (taste, safety, healthfulness) and to the environ-

ment (environmental impact). We also measured suspicion about “unseen
differences” between natural and unnatural products in general, as well as
naturalness preference when functional or material differences (including
unseen differences) do not exist. If instrumental and ideational reasons are
related, stronger beliefs in instrumental advantages should correlate with
greater suspicion that there are “unseen differences” between natural and
unnatural products, and with naturalness preference regardless of instrumen-
tal advantages (ideational-based preference).
In addition, we included an open-ended question on why the respondent
preferred natural products despite lack of real benefits, and we limited this
question to those who demonstrate what may be inferred as “ideational-
based” naturalness preference. Although we agree with Rozin et al. (2004)
that such free responses may not reflect the real reasons behind the partici-
pants’ preferences, as they may selectively indicate reasons they think are
convincing, we collected these free responses to gain information on the
participants’ thought processes.

Methods

In spring 2009, 243 Rutgers University undergraduate students partici-

pated in an Internet study in partial fulfillment of a course assignment. The
participants rated their agreement to four functional advantages of natural
products, that “Compared with unnatural food products, natural food
products are” (1) “tastier,” (2) “safer,” (3) “healthier,” and (4) “better for
the environment.” The four attributes were displayed in random order,
and ratings were recorded on a 7-piont scale, from 1 “strongly disagree” to 4
“neither agree nor disagree” to 7 “strongly agree.”
Next, on a separate webpage, the participants rated their agreement to
two additional statements on the same 7-point scale. The first measured
suspicion about unseen differences: “Suppose a natural food product and its
unnatural alternative DO NOT DIFFER on taste, safety, healthfulness, and
environmental impact (or other measurable qualities). I still think there must
be some material differences that make the natural product better, although
we may not be able to detect it.” The second statement measured preference
for natural products independent of material and functional advantages:
“Even if there is no material difference (same chemical structure, same DNA)
between them, and they do not differ on taste, safety, healthfulness, and
environmental impact (or other measurable qualities), I still prefer the
natural product.”
We programmed the survey so that the participants who had an above-
midpoint rating to the second statement, that is, those who showed natural-
2870 LI AND CHAPMAN

ness preference independent of material and functional advantages, were

asked to write down their reasons for why they prefer the natural given
the conditions specified in the statement. Responses could be up to 150
characters.

Results

As expected, mean agreement ratings on the four functional advantages

of natural food products were all above 4, the midpoint of the 7-point scale,
M = 4.49 (SD = 1.44) for taste, M = 5.55 (SD = 1.23) for safety, M = 6.09
(SD = 1.18) for healthfulness, M = 5.59 (SD = 1.30) for environmental
impact; t(242) = 5.34, 19.66, 27.66, and 19.15, respectively; p < .001 for all,
suggesting there are general beliefs that natural food products are better than
unnatural alternatives in these instrumental dimensions. For ease of further
analysis, we computed the overall instrumental belief by taking the mean of
the four instrumental advantage beliefs for each participant. The mean
overall instrumental belief was 5.43 (SD = .96).
Consistent with the results from Studies 1 and 2, agreement to the state-
ment that “there must be some material differences that make the natural
product better” even if there are no measurable differences was significantly
above the indifference point on the 7-point scale, M = 4.69, SD = 1.69,
t(242) = 6.33, p < .001, suggesting a general suspicion about “unseen differ-
ences” between natural and unnatural products. Among the 243 participants,
about 64% (n = 156) indicated some level of agreement to this statement
(with ratings above the midpoint). Agreement to this “unseen difference”
statement correlated with the overall instrumental belief, r = .23, p < .001
(correlations with each of the four instrumental advantage beliefs were
also significant and positive).
Also consistent with our prediction, the participants’ mean agreement
that they would prefer natural products “even if there is no material differ-
ence” and “even if they do not differ on taste, safety, healthfulness, and
environmental impact (or other measurable qualities)” was significantly
above the midpoint of the 7-point scale, M = 4.68 (SD = 1.75), t(242) = 6.06,
p < .001. When ratings were dichotomized, 56% (n = 135) showed some
agreement (rating above midpoint of the scale). However, a critical finding is
that agreement to this statement, which usually would be taken as evidence
for “ideational-based” naturalness preference, was significantly correlated
with the overall instrumental belief, r = .34, p < .001 (correlations with the
ratings on each of the four individual instrumental advantage beliefs were
also significant and positive). Figure 1 shows the mean overall instrumental
beliefs for the participants who indicated above-midpoint agreement to
the preference statement (and thus, showing an ostensible “ideational”
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2871

Figure 1. Mean overall agreement on statements about instrumental advantage of natural

products among the participants who showed ostensible “ideational” preference and those
who did not in Study 3. Ratings were on a 7-point scale from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly
agree.” Error bars: ⫾1 standard errors.

preference) and those who did not. Agreement to this statement was also
highly correlated with agreement to the suspicion on “unseen differences,”
r = .67, p < .001.
There were 135 participants who indicated sustained preference to natural
products even when material and functional differences do not exist and,
therefore, were asked about their reasons for such preference in the open-
ended question. Responses were coded by two independent coders using a
simple criterion: whether they mentioned each of the four attributes that were
explicitly excluded in the question as an advantage of natural products (taste,
safety, healthfulness, and environmental friendliness). This simple criterion
was adopted to avoid subjective interpretation of whether reasons listed in
the responses were instrumental or ideational reasons. Interrater reliability
was reasonably high, Cronbach’s a = .80, .83, .94, and .85, for the four
attributes, respectively. Disagreements between raters were solved through
discussion, and both raters agreed with the final coding. Among the 135
responses, 32 (or 23.7%) mentioned at least one of the four functional advan-
tages that were explicitly excluded in the question. The participants who
mentioned these instrumental advantages of natural options and those who
did not were comparable in all the other measures in the study, including
instrumental beliefs, agreement to “unseen differences,” and preference for
natural products. The remaining responses ranged from suspicion about
potential material and functional differences, reports for influence from
“culture” or the media (e.g., “It has just been advertised everywhere that
2872 LI AND CHAPMAN

natural is better, so I feel that this ongoing message in my head tells me that
natural is better even if everything about the two is the same”), to claims in
line with Rozin’s (2005; Rozin et al., 2004) definition of ideational reasons
(e.g., “Natural products are directly from the earth,” “natural things are
created by God for us,” “it just seems better”).

Discussion

The results from Study 3 support the idea that instrumental and idea-
tional reasons in naturalness preference are closely connected. The overall
favorable beliefs about natural products in terms of instrumental advantage
are consistent with instrumental reasons in naturalness preference. However,
these beliefs were also positively correlated with suspicion about unseen
material differences between natural and unnatural products even if there is
no detectable functional advantage, and with sustained preference to the
natural even if there is no detectable or undetectable functional advantage
(no instrumental superiority at all) in natural products. Thus, beliefs in
instrumental advantages of natural products could manifest in the preference
for natural products even under situations where such beliefs do not apply.
Responses to the open-ended question on reasons for naturalness prefer-
ence were consistent with our theorizing. About a quarter of the participants
who answered this question doubted that natural and unnatural products can
be identical, listing instrumental reasons that were explicitly excluded in the
question. There were also references to a “rule of thumb” cultured by media
messages or social norms. Some purely ideational reasons were also listed.
Despite potential post hoc rationalization involved in these free responses,
they seem to suggest a mix of instrumental and ideational reasons among the
participants who preferred natural for what might have been identified as
ideational reasons per se, as their preference persisted when instrumental
reasons were specified to be nonexistent.

Study 4

Study 4 was conducted to illustrate an important real-life consequence of

preference for natural products—cost. Casual observation in grocery stores
and online shopping websites tend to show higher prices for products marked
as “natural” or “organic.” We used an example of natural products (organic
coffee) to examine whether people are willing to pay more for natural
products versus unnatural alternatives.
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2873

Method

In spring 2009, 266 Rutgers University undergraduates participated in an

Internet survey in partial fulfillment of a course assignment. They were
presented with information about a multiregion coffee blend, which contains
100% organic Ethiopian beans that constitute 30% of the blend (this 30%
specification was designed for purposes of an unrelated study, and results
concerning this manipulation are not presented here). The participants indi-
cated how much they were willing to pay for 1 lb of this multiregion coffee
blend, given that 1 lb of nonorganic blend costs $10. Price options were
provided as ranging from “<$10” to “$10,” “10.50,” and so on, with $.50
increases up to “$20” and “>$20.”

Results and Discussion

The participants were willing to pay more for the organic coffee than for
an equivalent nonorganic coffee, with 82% of the participants indicating
prices higher than $10, and a median price at $13.50. A chi-square test
confirmed that more participants indicated a willingness-to-pay price above
$10, compared with prices equal or below $10, c2 (1, N = 266) = 108.65,
p < .001. Clearly, holding a preference for natural products has real-life
consequences in terms of cost. Perhaps a little worrisome is the fact that such
preferences could be sustained even without clear instrumental advantages of
natural products, as has been shown in the previous three studies. If “natural
is better” is a heuristic that people hold and apply to most situations where
they encounter a choice between natural and a comparable unnatural
product, it is very likely that people will spend more on products that do not
necessarily provide tangible benefits, just because they are “natural.”

General Discussion

Our studies demonstrate an important role of instrumental reasons in

naturalness preference, and suggest that instrumental and ideational bases
for naturalness preference are more connected than previously thought. We
focused on three questions: First, do people believe that natural and unnatu-
ral products are identical in hypothetical scenarios? Second, is naturalness
preference in part due to people’s disbelief that the natural and unnatural
alternatives can be identical? Third, does a seemingly ideational preference
for the natural have any relationship to general beliefs about the instrumental
advantages of natural products?
2874 LI AND CHAPMAN

In Studies 1 and 2, the majority of the participants indicated that they did
not believe the scenario statement, which cited scientific tests and authorities
as evidence to prove that the natural and unnatural alternatives were chemi-
cally identical and posed the same risk. The participants in Study 3 were
similarly skeptical. This sizable disbelief in the stated identity of alternatives
was largely ignored in previous research, which tacitly assumed full accep-
tance of whatever information was presented, possibly leading to an overly
strong conclusion that ideational, rather than instrumental, reasons play a
dominant role in naturalness preference. In contrast, we found a consistent
correlation between disbelief in the claimed identity of the two options and
preference for the natural, suggesting that at least part of what was originally
deemed as ideational-based naturalness preference is in fact due to suspected
differences between the options.
Study 3 demonstrated positive beliefs about instrumental advantages of
natural food products in general, as well as a correlation between such beliefs
and preference for the natural even when instrumental advantages of the
natural were specified to be nonexistent. When natural things are favored
without actual advantage, it would appear as if the preference is due to
ideational reasons. By demonstrating that such seemingly ideational prefer-
ence is stronger for those with stronger instrumental beliefs, we reveal the
close connection between such seemingly ideational preference and beliefs in
instrumental advantage of the natural.
Where do people obtain their favorable instrumental beliefs about natural
things? People may have acquired their beliefs about natural products from
multiple social sources, as indicated by the open-ended responses in Study 3,
such as media reports and advertisement, where messages in favor of natural
products are abundant. Or they can acquire such beliefs from personal expe-
rience or scientific evidence. For example, people could experience that
natural running (e.g., running across a field) is more enjoyable than artificial
running on a treadmill, and learn from scientific evidence that breast-feeding
is better than baby formula (Section on Breastfeeding, 2005). We propose
that the accumulated instrumental beliefs may lead to a “natural is better”
heuristic, which can be overextended to situations where a natural option
offers no more benefits than an unnatural one. Note that it does not mean
that people will always choose the natural option whenever it is available
(they will not when the cost of doing so is too great, e.g., most people will not
stay in the “natural” heat instead of an “unnaturally” air-conditioned room
in the summer). It just means that people will choose natural over unnatural
options when they are equivalent, or when there is no overwhelming evidence
to the superiority of the unnatural option.
An alternative explanation to the observed relationship between instru-
mental beliefs and naturalness preference is that the participants may have
 WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE NATURAL? 2875

preferred natural options for inherently ideational reasons, and were simply
bolstering such preference by believing that natural products are instrumen-
tally superior. In the domain of vegetarianism, Rozin, Markwith, and Stoess
(1997) showed that compared with people who became vegetarians for health
reasons (instrumental), those who became vegetarians for moral reasons
(ideational) cited more nonmoral and nonhealth reasons for vegetarianism.
Although the causal direction from ideational to instrumental bases may
exist among some participants, we do not think it is the only story. We argue
that instrumental and ideational reasons are much more intermingled than
previously thought.
The heuristic that “natural is better” is especially influential in the natural
product market, because often when consumers choose between natural and
non-natural options—such as organic versus commercially farmed produce—
they cannot directly observe instrumental differences between the two, but
may have reasons to believe differences exist. And, even when two products are
“chemically identical” from the point of view of a chemist, they may be seen as
different because of their processing history. Indeed, research indicates that
consumers of organic food (a major category of natural products) tend to
think there are certain intrinsic (quality or safety) properties of organic
products (Vindigni, Janssen, & Jager, 2002), either observable or unobserv-
able. Giannakas (2002) noted that organic products are “credence goods”
(Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970), meaning that producers know whether
the product is organic, but organic characteristics are not detectable by
consumers. Thus, believing that there are undetectable advantages of natural
products is not an unfamiliar aspect of consumer decision making. Judgments
made on the basis of believed but undetectable characteristics are consistent
with the psychological essentialism theory (Medin & Ortony, 1989), which
maintains that people hold a commonsense assumption that things have
essences that are responsible for their surface features, and make them what
they are. For example, a tadpole and a frog are perceived as the same animal
because there is an essence of the animal “frog” that maintains identity despite
the different appearances through the developmental stages. People are able to
grasp such essences without scientific understanding of genetics. It is possible
that what makes natural things natural in people’s minds is an “essence” that
distinguishes them from human-made things, even if they cannot point out the
exact nature of this essence. In other words, they may have an “essence
placeholder” (Medin & Ortony, 1989), for example, believing that there are
people who really know or could figure out what the essence is.
Our results indicate that instrumental beliefs play a critical role in the
naturalness preference. The question of whether this preference is rational,
however, needs discussion. If we adopt a consequentialist definition of ratio-
nality, a purely ideational naturalness preference is clearly irrational because
2876 LI AND CHAPMAN

such preference is independent of the benefits associated with the preferred

natural option. An instrumental naturalness preference is not so clearly
irrational, because the decision maker believes that the natural option is
superior, and the preference is consistent with beliefs. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to determine the accuracy of beliefs about natural prod-
ucts’ instrumental advantages, we would like to point out that the assumed
benefits of natural products are at least debatable. For example, recent
reviews have found a striking lack of scientific evidence for the presumed
health benefits of consuming organic versus conventionally produced food in
humans (Dangour et al., 2009; Williams, 2002). Similarly, the environmental
benefit of organic farming is complicated by the issue of cost. Nobel Peace
Laureate Norman Borlaug, whose introduction of genetically modified
wheat varieties significantly increased food supply in developing countries,
noted that organic farming may require more forest to be transformed into
farmland to sustain the same global population (Borlaug, 2007). The higher
cost in production is also transparent in the higher market price of organic
goods.
Despite these issues with organic products, people’s naturalness prefer-
ence proves resilient. Indeed, the participants in Study 4 were willing to pay
significantly more for organic relative to nonorganic coffee. The thriving
market of expensive organic products is also consistent with such resilient
naturalness preference.
A clearer understanding of the reasons underlying the naturalness pref-
erence should inform attempts to make people more rational in their choices
between natural and unnatural products. Our findings suggest that the pref-
erence for natural things may be less about specific properties of the product
at hand, but rather, influenced by beliefs about natural products in
general—in their presumed functional superiority, such as taste, effective-
ness, safety, and environmental friendliness of natural products. To cultivate
accurate beliefs about the natural in the public, more scientific studies on the
health and environmental impact of natural products are needed, along with
the impartial dissemination of such information in the media. It is only when
people are equipped with accurate knowledge and reasonable beliefs that
rational decisions will begin to replace the overzealous and sometimes irra-
tional pursuit for the natural.

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