G.R. No.

115044 September 1, 1994

HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila;

and THE CITY OF MANILA, Petitioners, v. HON. FELIPE G.
PACQUING, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila; and
ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

Office of the City Legal Officer for petitioners. chanroble s virtual law lib rary

Cayanga, Zuñiga & Angel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules

of Court to set aside the Orders dated March 28, 1994, April 11,
1994 and April 20, 1994 of Judge Felipe G. Pacquing, presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Manila, issued in
Civil Case No. 88-45660. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The Order dated March 28, 1994 granted the motion of private
respondent to compel petitioner Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue a
permit or license in favor of private respondent pursuant to
Ordinance No. 7065 upon compliance by private respondent with
all the requirements set thereunder. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

The Order dated April 11, 1994 denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners of the Order dated May 28,
1994. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The Order dated April 20, 1994 reiterated the order of March 28,
1994, directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue to private
respondent the necessary permit or license pursuant to Ordinance
No. 7065.

I
chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

On September 7, 1971, the Municipal Board of Manila passed

Ordinance No. 7065 pursuant to Section 18(jj) of the Revised
Charter of Manila, granting private respondent a franchise to
operate a jai-alai in the city. The ordinance is reproduced as
follows;

AN ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE MAYOR TO ALLOW AND

PERMIT THE ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION TO
ESTABLISH, MAINTAIN AND OPERATE A JAI-ALAI IN THE CITY OF
MANILA, UNDER CERTAIN TERMS AND CONDITIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, that:

libra ry
chanrobles vi rtua l law

Sec. 1. The Mayor is authorized, as he is hereby authorized to

allow and permit the Associated Development Corporation to
establish, maintain and operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila,
under the following terms and conditions and such other terms
and conditions as he (the Mayor) may prescribe for good reasons
of general interest: chanroble s virtual law lib rary

a. That the construction, establishment and maintenance of the

jai-alai shall be at a place permissible under existing zoning
ordinance of Manila; chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

b. That the games to be played daily shall commence not earlier

than 5:00 in the afternoon; chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

c. That the City of Manila will receive a share of 2 1/2% on the

annual gross receipts on all wagers or bets, 1/2% of which will
accrue to the Games and Amusement Board as now provided by
law; cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

d. That the corporation will, in addition, pay to the city an annual

license fee of P3,000.00 and a daily permit fee of P200.00; chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

e. That the corporation will, to insure its faithful compliance of all

the terms and conditions under this ordinance, put up a
performance bond from a surety acceptable to the city, in the
amount of at least P30,000.00. chanroblesv irtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Sec. 2. The Mayor and the City Treasurer or their duly authorized
representatives are hereby empowered to inspect at all times
during regular business hours the books, records and accounts of
the establishment, as well as to prescribe the manner in which
the books and financial statements of the entrepreneur shall be
kept. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Sec. 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval. chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
Enacted originally by the Municipal Board on September 7, 1971;
vetoed by the Mayor on September 27, 1971; modified and
amended by the Municipal Board at its regular session today,
October 12, 1971. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor, on 13 November 1971.

Thereafter, private respondent took steps preparatory to the

establishment of the jai-alai at Ermita, Manila. Private respondent
retained the services of an architectural firm from Hongkong to
design the fronton and contracted with a local firm for the
construction of the building. chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

On August 20, 1975, after the declaration of Martial Law,

President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree
No. 771 revoking the powers of the local government to grant
permits or licenses and canceling all existing franchises to
operate jai-alais. chan rob lesvi rtu alawlibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Less than two months after P.D. No. 771 was issued, the
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation, an enterprise
controlled by Alfredo Romualdez, a brother-in-law of President
Marcos, was granted a franchise to operate a jai-alai within the
Greater Manila Area under P.D. No. 810. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

However, after the EDSA Resolution, President Corazon C. Aquino

issued Executive Order No. 169, repealing P.D. No. 810. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

On May 5, 1988, private respondent sought the resumption of its

business operations under its franchise issued under Ordinance
No. 7065. Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez denied private respondent's
request, as well as its motion for reconsideration. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

On August 2, 1988, private respondent filed a petition

for mandamus and specific performance with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 40, Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
45660. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

In a decision dated September 9, 1989, Judge Augusto E. Villarin

of Branch 40 held that Ordinance No. 7065 created a binding
contract between the City of Manila and private respondent and
that the City Mayor had no discretion but "to grant the necessary
permit or license allowing it to operate and maintain a jai-alai in
the City of Manila pursuant to Ordinance No. 7065." chanrobl es virt ual law li bra ry

The trial court noted:

A careful reading, however, of Ordinance No. 7065 will readily

show that the discretion, if any, allowed respondent Mayor, under
the Ordinance, will be exercisable only after the permit, which he
is mandated to issue, has been issued and the jai-alai fronton is
already operational. The Ordinance stipulates that the Mayor is
authorized "to allow and permit petitioner to establish, maintain
and operate a jai-alai in the City of
Manila ," under the five conditions enumerated in subparagraphs
"a" to "e" of Section 1 of the Ordinance. But a simple reading of
these "terms and conditions" patently shows that subparagraphs
"b" to "e" are clearly conditions that will only come into play after
the jai-alai fronton has been put up or established; while the
condition under sub-paragraph "a" appears to have been
complied with satisfactorily by the petitioner, since no objection
at all has been made by respondents to the proposed site for the
jai-alai fronton, that is, the 25,000 sq. m. land area behind the
present Harrison Plaza Complex located at Ermita, Manila. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

It is therefore, quite evident to this Court that no discretion is left

to the respondent Mayor to allow or not petitioner "to establish,
maintain and operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila." The Court is
satisfied that the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 65, have been
met.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Moreover, it is well-settled that the grant of a franchise, when

accepted and acted upon by the grantee, creates a contract. And,
going by contract law, under the undisputed circumstances in this
case, respondent Mayor, in behalf of the City, is obliged to
comply with what is required of him under the Ordinance. At the
very least, the enactment and approval of Ordinance No. 7065 on
November 13, 1971, created a bilateral contract between
petitioner and respondents. Petitioner has commenced the
performance of its obligation under the contract, but was
prevented by events over which it has no control from completely
fulfilling what was called for on its part to establish, operate and
maintain a jai-alai in the City of Manila (Rollo, pp. 39-40).

The trial court disposed as follows;

WHEREFORE, the petitioner is GRANTED and respondent City of
Manila, is ordered to immediately issue to petitioner, the
permit/license required under Ordinance No. 7065 (Rollo, p. 40).

Mayor Lopez appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (CA

G.R. No. 16477 SP) but on February 9, 1989, he filed a Notice of
Withdrawal of Appeal. chan roble svi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

On May 5, 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution,

the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

For the reasons stated in the NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF

APPEAL which was filed on February 9, 1989 by respondents
appellants thru counsel let their appeal from the Decision dated
September 9, 1989 and Order dated August 25, 1988, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 88-45660 be as it
is hereby considered WITHDRAWN (Rollo, p. 126).

With the withdrawal of the appeal, the judgment in Civil Case No.
45560 became final and executory and was entered in the Book
of Entries of Judgment of the Court of Appeals on May 26, 1989
and in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
on October 27, 1992. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

In 1991, the City of Manila filed an action to annul the franchise

of private respondent with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-58913. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

In said complaint, the City of Manila claimed that private

respondent had abandoned its franchise granted under Ordinance
No. 7065 and that said ordinance had been repealed by P.D. Nos.
771 and 810. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Judge William Bayhon of Branch 23 noted that the issue of

abandonment was squarely raised and resolved in Civil Case No.
88-45660, while the issue of the repeal of Ordinance No. 7065
could have been pleaded but was not by the City of Manila as a
defense in Civil Case No. 88-45660. According to him, the city
had waived such a defense. To make matters worse, the city was
in estoppel to raise said issue since it had been issuing permits
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 88-45660 and collecting
the corresponding fees. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
Civil Case No. 91-58913, questioning the effectivity of the
franchise granted private respondent under Ordinance No. 7065,
was therefore dismissed on December 21, 1991. No appeal was
taken from said dismissal of the case. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The City of Manila filed with this Court another case for
declaratory judgment to nullify the franchise to operate a jai-alai
under Ordinance No. 7065 (G.R. No. 101768). The petition was
dismissed in a resolution dated October 3, 1991 "for lack of
jurisdiction." chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

It may be of interest to note that three Manila councilors also

filed an action to compel Mayor Lopez to cancel the permit and
license he issued in favor of private petitioner pursuant to
Ordinance No. 7065 (Maceda v. Lopez, Civil Case No. 91-58930,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Manila). In his answer to said
petition, Mayor Lopez pointed out that in issuing the permit and
license, he was just acting in obedience to the final judgment in
Civil Case No. 88-45660. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Judge Enrico A. Laxamana, presiding judge of Branch 37, made

the following observations:

The license was issued by Mayor Lopez in obedience to a final

order of a court of justice. For him to refuse to issue the license
would place him in danger of being cited in contempt of court.
And for him now to revoke or cancel such license or permit
definitely would place a greater risk and danger of being cited in
contempt of court? (Rollo, p. 184).

II
cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

As a preliminary issue, private respondent urged the dismissal of

the petition on the grounds that it was in violation of Circular No.
28-91, prohibiting forum shopping, and Revised Circular No. 1-
88, requiring the inclusion in the petition of a verified statement
of the dates when notice of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, was received, when a motion for reconsideration,
if any, was filed, and when the notice of the denial thereof was
received.chan roblesv irtualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Private respondent averred that the certification submitted by

petitioners did not disclose (1) that the trial court had rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 88- 45660 on September 9, 1988
holding that Ordinance No. 7065 was in full force and effect; (2)
that said decision had become final and executory after the
petitioners withdrew their appeal therefrom; (3) that petitioners
had also filed Civil Case No. 91-58913, questioning the effectivity
of Ordinance No. 7065, which was dismissed. Likewise, they
alleged that the affidavit did not state the material dates
necessary for the Court to determine the timelines of the filing of
the petition (Rollo, pp. 108-110). chanroble svirtualawl ibraryc hanro bl es virt ual law li bra ry

The certification submitted in compliance with Circular No. 28-91

stated that the petitioner in said petition "has not commenced a
similar action in any court or administrative body against said
respondents nor is there any pending cases of the same nature
and parties in any court or administrative body." Rightly, there
was no case filed nor was there any case pending wherein the
question of whether the decision in Civil Case No. 88-45660 can
be executed by motion is raised. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law libra ry

The affidavit on the material dates submitted by petitioners

attested to the dates when petitioners received the three orders
of respondent judge being questioned in the petition
for certiorari. These are the dates material for reckoning the
timelines of the filing of the petition to nullify said orders. As far
as the issue of the proper mode for executing the decision is
concerned, the dates given in the affidavit are sufficient for the
Court to determine whether the petition was filed within a
reasonable time contemplated in Rule 65. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

There is, therefore, no violation of Circular No. 28-91 and Revised

Circular No. 1-88 to speak of. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

On their part, petitioners alleged that the decision in Civil Case

No. 88-45660, which is being implemented by the three orders in
question, is null and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court
that rendered it. They posited their claim on the theory that
Ordinance No. 7065 had been canceled by P.D. No. 771 in 1975
and that the trial court had traduced the law when it made it
appear in its decision that Ordinance No. 7065 was still in full
force and effect (Rollo, pp. 10-13). chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Petitioners failed to appreciate the distinction between a void and
an erroneous judgment and between jurisdiction and the exercise
of jurisdiction. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law li brary

Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise thereof

(Lamagan v. De La Cruz, 40 SCRA 101 [1971]). The authority to
decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein, is what
makes up jurisdiction. The fact that the decision is erroneous
does not divest the court that rendered it of the jurisdiction
conferred by law to try the case (Quiason, Philippine Courts and
their Jurisdictions, p. 199 [1993 ed.]). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular

case, or the jurisdiction over the subject matter, it does not
depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of its
power (Century Insurance Co. v. Fuentes, 2 SCRA 1168
[1961]).chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

In the case at bench, there is no question that the Regional Trial

Court has the competence to hear and decide Civil Case No. 88-
45660, a special civil action for mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. There is also no quarrel that said court
has jurisdiction over an action for specific performance under
Section 19(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1990 (Lapitan
v. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479 [1968]). Assuming arguendo that the
Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the said civil
case, the principle of estoppel will operate to bar petitioners from
raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in the instant
case (Tijam v. Sibonghanay, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irtua l law lib ra ry

Having jurisdiction over the civil case, whatever error may be

attributed to the trial court, is simply one of judgment, not of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment cannot be corrected
by certiorari but by appeal (Robles v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780 [1990]; De Castro v. Delta
Motor Sales Corporation, 57 SCRA 344 [1978]; Galang v.
Endencia, 73 Phil. 391 [1941]). In fact, Mayor Lopez availed of
such a remedy when he appealed the decision in Civil Case No.
88-45660 to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. No. 16477-SP). chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

The issue on the cancellation of Ordinance No. 7065 by President

Marcos could have been raised as a special defense in Civil Case
No. 88-54660 but was not. The Revised Rules of Court frown at
the piecemeal presentation of issues, and jurisprudence bars from
subsequent litigation between the same parties matters that
could have been raised in a previous case (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 39, Sec. 49[b]; Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 72
[1968]).chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The City of Manila should have pursued in the appellate courts its
appeal questioning the dismissal of Civil Case No. 91-58913,
where the trial court ruled that Mayor Lopez and the city could no
longer claim that Ordinance No. 7065 had been canceled by
President Marcos because they failed to raise this issue in Civil
Case No 88-54660. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

At any rate, the unilateral cancellation of the franchise, which has

the status of a contract, without notice, hearing and justifiable
cause is intolerable in any system where the Rule of Law prevails
(Poses v. Toledo Transportation Co., 62 Phil. 297 [1935]); Manila
Electric Co., v. Public Utility commissioners, 30 Phil. 387
[1915]).chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

As a fall-back, petitioners claimed that assuming arguendo that

the judgment in Civil Case No. 88-45660 dated September 9,
1986 is valid, its execution by mere motion on March 11, 1994 is
irregular. Citing Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, they contended that the decision must be enforced by
action, not motion (Rollo, pp. 13-14). chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Petitioners erroneously counted the five-year period under

Section 6 of Rule 39 from the date of the decision. Said Rule
provides:

Execution by Motion or by Independent Action. A judgment may

be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such time and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

It must be remembered that Mayor Lopez appealed the decision

in Civil Case No. 88-45660 to the Court of Appeals, that he filed
the motion to withdraw the appeal on February 9, 1989, and that
the Court of Appeals approved the withdrawal of the appeals only
on May 5, 1989. The entries of judgment were made on May 26,
1989 in the Court of Appeals, and on October 27, 1992 in the
Regional Trial Court. The motion to compel the City Mayor to
issue the permit or license pursuant to Ordinance No. 7065, was
filed on March 14, 1994, or well within the five-year period
whether such period is counted from May 5, 1989, May 26, 1989
or October 27, 1992. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Petitioners hypothesized that the withdrawal of an appeal

operates as if no appeal was taken at all and that the five-year
period should be counted from January 24, 1989, the fifteenth
day from the service of a copy of the decision on Mayor Lopez.
Petitioners anchored their theory on Section 9, Rule 40 and
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court (Rollo, pp. 15-
16).chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

We find nothing in said Rules to support petitioners' posture. chanroble svi rtualaw lib raryc han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

Sec. 9 of Rule 40, in pertinent part, provides:

. . . If the appeal is withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to

prosecute, the judgment shall be deemed revived and shall
forthwith be remanded to the justice of the peace or municipal
court for execution.

Rule 40 governed the procedure for appeals from the inferior

courts to the Court of First Instance before they became courts of
record. A provision on the revival of the judgment was necessary
because at those times the decisions appealed from were
automatically vacated and trials de novo had to be conducted by
the Court of First Instance. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Sec. 2 of Rule 50, which governs the dismissal of an appeal by

the Court of Appeals, in pertinent part, provides:

Upon the receipt of such certification [of the Clerk of Court that
the appeal has been dismissed] in the lower court the case shall
stand there as though no appeal had ever been taken, and the
judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional
costs allowed by the appellate court upon dismissing the appeal.

The phrase "the case shall stand there as if no appeal has been
taken" refers to the manner of how the judgment may be
enforced as can be gleaned from the phrase following it that "the
judgment of said court may be enforced with the additional costs
allowed by the appellate court . . ." In other words, the judgment
shall be executed in accordance with its original disposition, no
modifications thereof having been ordered by the Court of
Appeals.chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Certainly, said Rule has nothing to do with the five-year period

for enforcing a judgment by motion, which is governed by Section
6 of Rule 39. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Mayor Lim's vow to clean the city of vices, like gambling, is

commendable. But in the process, he should bear in mind that
there are forms of gambling, and jai-alai is one them, that
Congress has deigned to allow. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibrary

The pronouncement of Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Mayor Pablo

Magtales v. Pryce Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 111097. July
20, 1994, apropos the operation of a gambling casino in Cagayan
de Oro by the Philippine Amusement and Games Inc., is cogent to
the instant case, thus:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is

not illegal perse. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much
less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve
the merits of conflicting theories. (Garcia v. Executive Secretary,
204 SCRA 516, quoting Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., 379-380) That is the prerogative of the political departments.
It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but
may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government (Decision, p. 8).
It was Mayor Lopez himself who assessed the benefits that will
accrue to the city with the operation of the jai-alai. Explaining his
motion to withdraw the appeal from the decision in Civil Case No.
88-45660, he said:

The beneficient effects to the appellant City of Manila, especially

during this critical period in our national economy, are manifold
and undeniable. The franchise operation shall be a great boost
toward generating much needed revenues for the City coffers
estimated at P100,000.00 a day by way of franchise fees alone,
not to mention other municipal taxes and regulatory fees. Millions
of pesos in real estate taxes on the improvements would be
realizable. Employment opportunities to little less than five
hundred people in the main building and hundreds of others in
the off track fronton shall also be created. These is also the fact
that the jai-alai building, together with all the equipment therein,
with an aggregate estimated cost of P100 million shall belong to
the city upon termination of the franchise terms (Rollo, p. 127).

Considerations of equity and fair play militate against the

petition.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

The Office of the Mayor of the City of Manila issued on January

19, 1990, January 21, 1991 and May 25, 1992 business permits
in favor of private respondent to operate a jai-alai fronton and
collected the corresponding license and regulatory fees (Rollo, pp.
151-153; 175-177; 178-198). Private respondent has spent close
to P100,000,000.00 to finish the construction of the jai-alai
building and fronton. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The petition was brought under "Rule 42, Section 1 in relation to

R.A. No. 5440, to declare null and void ab initio for want of
jurisdiction, the Decision and Orders dated March 28, 1994, April
11, 1994 and April 20, 1994 issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40" (Rollo, p. 2). chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Said Rule and law refer to appeals to the Supreme Court from the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court. Clearly, they do not involved
the review of orders of the Regional Trial Court rendered after the
decision of the trial court has become final and executory. Such a
review must be taken under
Rule 65, which can be given due course only when there is a
showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 67, Section 1; Planter's Products v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 563 [1991]). We find no abuse of discretion, much less lack
of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ. concur. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary

Cruz, J., is on leave.