Critique of Kant On Being and Existence

CRITIQUE OF KANT ON BEING AND EXISTENCE
Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.
Explaining the fundamental and essential difference between the realist categories of
Aristotle and the transcendental idealist a priori categories of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as
described in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Celestine Bittle writes:
“The difference is fundamental and essential. The Kantian categories are a priori mental forms,
absolutely independent of, and anterior to, all experience and the knowledge derived from
experience. The Aristotelian categories are supposed to classify our knowledge of reality as it
exists outside the mind and as it is acquired through experience.
“The Kantian categories have value only for the mind and its subjective operations. They
merely bring the sense-intuitions or phenomena into a scheme of unity and give them necessity
and universality. Since, however, the sense-intuitions or phenomena contain only knowledge
which is purely subjective in character and does not reach to the noumena or things-in-
themselves, the categories cannot tell us anything about the noumenal reality which lies outside
and beyond the mind. Hence, the Kantian categories are not supreme classes of universal ideas
and modes of being, but classes of judgment-forms and modes of mental relations. These
categories give us no information about the objective content of the predicates or of the modes of
being present in the things-in-themselves.
“Kant calls these mental forms ‘categories,’ but the term is a misnomer. The notion of
‘category’ was clearly defined by Aristotle, and the term thereby acquired a definite technical
meaning. This meaning had been accepted in the sense given by Aristotle for a period of two
thousand years and as such became fixed and traditional in the history of philosophy. For Kant,
then, to use the term ‘category’ in the way he did, amounted to a distortion and falsification of
philosophic language. This was unwarranted and unjustifiable, because the new meaning
attached to the term ‘category’ was bound to produce a confusion of ideas. Aristotle and Kant
simply do not mean the same thing when they speak of ‘categories.’ As such, therefore, Kant’s
categories must be rejected as arbitrary. In no way can they be considered a satisfactory
substitute for the categories of Aristotle.”1
Kant on Being and Existence
For Kant’s position on existence in his critical period, we find that in the Critique of Pure
Reason, although “the ‘positing’ of existence is always referred back to the fact or the givenness
of experience by sensible affection; the principle of reference is carried back to the ‘I’ as
objectifying principle in two moments or acts (if they can be called thus): the act of making
present (the Ich denke überhaupt), and the subsequent objectifying function (the the application
of the categories).”2 Throughout his three main Critiques of the critical period, the Critique of
Pure Reason (1781, second edition 1787), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the
1
C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 233-234.
2
C. FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphysics, “International Philosophical
Quarterly,” 6 (1966), p. 396.
1
Critique of Judgment (1790), existence, for Kant, is described as an a priori category of the
mind: “Kant in the critical writings conceives existence as an a priori category of the mind, a
second instance of the modality opposed to nonbeing and situated between possibility-
impossibility and necessity-contingency. Thus existence was related to space and time, as in
Crusius’s exposition, with the difference that the relation was a priori or transcendental (Critique
of Pure Reason, A 80, B 105). Unlike Hume, for whom existence, like substance and causality, is
a subjective operation or ‘idea,’ of the imagination derived from experience, Kant relates
existence to the operation of the pure intellect as a category.”3
As to Kant’s position concerning being (Sein), he maintains that it does not have the
character of a real predicate or determination but is rather purely identical to a “positing”
(position). In A 572, B 620 of Kritik der reinen Vernunft, we read the following passage: “Being
is obviously not a real predicate, or a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a
thing. It is merely the position of a thing or of a certain determination in itself.” Cornelio Fabro
observes that when the philosopher of Königsberg asserts that being (Sein) is not a real predicate,
it means “that it does not contain in itself any ‘content’ or determination that in any way belongs
to the subject. It is the same as saying that ‘being’ is empty, or even, and perhaps better (because
Kant is not yet Hegel), that being is signifying but not significant.”4 Fabro explains that, for
Kant, “being is exhausted as it were, in the act of positing or ‘presentation.’ Being as
presentation is thus an act of ‘presentification’ that can be called a projecting of the ego towards
the world and being is neither the ‘I’ nor the world strictly. Being does not have content, is not a
real predicate, but it is, in the end, given by the same self-actuation of the transcendental
subjectivity in view of the constitution of an object acccording to the threefold modality of
possibility, reality and necessity; and herein is expressed the articulation but also the internal
division of being itself.”5 “Kant is, thus, wholly taken up with the foundation of objectivity as
content and leaves in darkness the ground itself that is being as the ‘making itself present’ of
reality as act and actuality. What results in this fashion, that is, as concerns the content, is that
possible and real do not at all differ. Both (object and content), we read, must have exactly the
same content. Therefore, to the concept that expresses simply the possibility nothing further can
be added by the fact that I think its object as given absolutely (by the expression, ‘It is.’). Thus
the real contains nothing more than the merely possible. Consequently, the essential problem is
only and always that of the ‘content’ and of ‘the manner of conceiving’ the content.”6
For Kant, possibility and actuality are merely two different modes of positing: possibility
would signify only the positing of the representation of a thing relative to our concept, and in
general, to the human mind’s capacity for thinking, whereas actuality would signify the positing
of a thing in itself (apart from this concept). Fabro observes that, for Kant, the “predication of
reality adds nothing and takes nothing away but ‘posits’ only what is found (in the concept).”7
Fabro notes that, For Kant, “if I, therefore, think a thing, by means of whatever and however
many predicates one wishes (and even with a complete determination), when when I add further,
3
C. FABRO, Existence, 1967, p. 722.
4
C. FABRO, The Transcendentality of Ens-Esse and the Ground of Metaphysics, “International Philosophical
Quarterly,” 6 (1966), p. 392.
5
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 400.
6
C. FABRO, op. cit., pp. 392-393.
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2
‘This being is,’ in reality I add absolutely nothing to the thing. Otherwise it would not be the
same thing that I have thought in my concept, but there would exist something more and I would
not be able to say that the object of my concept really exists.”8 Throughout the three Critiques,
Fabro explains that “the basis of the Kantian position of being remained intact, that is, in its
twofold meaning of ‘copula’ and ‘position,’ of logical relationship between S and P in the
proposition, and of synthetic relationship of transcendental subjectivity in respect to sensible
affection.”9 “What is lacking in Kant […], is any attempt at a further grounding, or reduction, of
existence itself to a real content, namely, to an act or actuality more profound and constitutive of
the existing thing. […] In conclusion: for Kant existence is not a real predicate, either in its
logical usage as ‘copula,’ since it is only the relationship of S and P, or in its real usage of
positing (in space and time), since such being implies no new predicate or content but only the
reference to experience by the transcendental apperception (Ich denke überhaupt).”10
Gilson’s Critique of Kant on Existence
For Kant, existence is not the fact of being in reality, the external aspect of the act of
being (esse); rather, for the philosopher of Königsberg, existence is an assertoric modality of
judgment, an assertive category of modality of the understanding. Describing, and providing a
critique, of Kant’s transcendental idealist teaching on existence as a modality of judgment,
Étienne Gilson writes in his Being and Some Philosophers (1952 second edition), that, for Kant,
“existence is not given to us in space, since even space is an a priori form of our own sensibility.
The very exteriority of material things is thus internal to the mind, and, when we speak of a
given reality, we are wrong, because what is given to us in sensible intuition, inasmuch as it is
only given, is not yet a reality. Let us strip reality of what it owes to the categories of the
understanding and to the forms of sensibility, and what is left will be an I know not what, neither
intelligible nor even perceivable, since it will be out of both space and time. In short, it will be an
x, an unknown quantity.
“Such is existence in the final philosophy of Kant. All we can do about it is either to feel
it or else to affirm it, and, if we affirm it, its affirmation must in no way add anything to the
notion of what it affirms. Even in the Critique of Pure Reason it remains true to say that
existence can be added to or subtracted from the concept of any object without altering it in the
least. Now, among the various functions of judgment, there is one which exhibits this remarkable
character, that it in no way affects the very contents of our judgments. It is the function of
modality. The various modalities of judgment answer the various values which the mind ascribes
to its copula, according as it posits an affirmation (or negation) as problematical (possibility),
assertive (reality), or apodictical (necessity). There are thus three categories of modality; six, if
their contraries are added to them. The category which answers to existence is obviously the
second one, the assertive category, whose proper function it is to assert reality.
“But in what exactly does ‘reality’ consist? In such a doctrine it is bound to be both given
in sensible intuition and known by understanding. Unless it be given in sensible intuition, it
cannot be known by understanding, while, on the other hand, where thought does not agree with
8
Ibid.
9
10
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sensible intuition, there still may be thinking, but no knowledge. It can therefore be posited as a
postulate: ‘What agrees with the material conditions of experience (that is, of sensation), is real.’
Existence then appears where the assertive judgment, ‘x is,’ happens to posit as real such an
object of thought as answers to a sensible intuition, that is, a ‘given.’ Thus, the Critique of Pure
Reason has kept faith with the main conclusion of the dissertation of 1763: Existence is not the
what which I posit, but the how I posit it. Moreover, though essence has now become what is
conceived of being through the a priori forms of understanding, it still does not involve
existence, so that, following an old law which has by now grown familiar to us, existence can be
but a ‘mode’ of the essence, namely, something which pertains to it without altering ‘what’ it is.
Thirdly, since existence can be grasped only in a reality which is the work of the mind (since
both the a priori forms of sensibility and the a priori categories of the understanding cooperate
in its making), existence can no longer be a mode of essence itself, but a modality of judgment.
“Kant himself has summed up his doctrine of existence in the three following postulates:
(1) ‘That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and conception) of experience is
possible’; it is possible because, in such cases, the two conditions that are required for eventual
assertions of existence are both hypothetically fulfilled. (2) ‘That which coheres with the
material conditions of experience (sensation) is real’; it is real, because, in such cases, the two
conditions required by Postulate I happen to be actually fulfilled. (3) ‘That whose coherence with
the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary’; it is
necessary because judgment determines that, in this case, the universal conditions required for
reality are actually fulfilled. But, whatever the modality of our judgments, whose a priori
conditions here replace the intrinsic necessity of the late essences, it still respects the existential
neutrality which had always belonged to essences. In critical idealism, the categories of modality
fall heir to the privileges of the Scotist ‘modes’ of being; they determine it without changing it.
Only, what had once been a privilege of being has now become a privilege of thought: ‘The
categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not in the least determine the object,
or enlarge the conception to which they are annexed as predicates, but only express its relation to
the faculty of cognition.’11
“If it is so, where nothing is given, there is no knowledge; yet that which is given is an x
that is not even existence, but is that to which existence is ascribed by the assertive modality of
judgment. Of that x, taken in itself, we know nothing, save only that it is. And how could we
know it? Inasmuch as it is known, or even simply perceived, what is either perceived or known is
its phenomenon, that is, its appearance through the a priori conditions that are required for both
its intellectual knowledge and its sensory perception. In short, ‘all those properties which
constitute the intuition of a material thing belong solely to its appearance.’ Whereupon Kant
adds: ‘For the existence of the thing which appears is not thereby suppressed, as it is in straight
idealism, but it is thereby shown that, through sense, we absolutely cannot know that thing such
as it is in itself.’12 Since what is true of sense is still more true of the understanding, there must
be existence in order that there be knowledge, but the fact that reality exists, though a necessary
condition, does not enter our scientific knowledge of reality. Which was indeed perfectly true,
for, if there is such a thing as a knowledge of existence, it cannot be physical, but a metaphysical,
11
I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, II, 4 (The Postulates of Empirical Thought), ed. cit.,
p. 161.
12
I. KANT, Prolegomena, Transcendentale Hauptfrage, I Teil, Amm. II.
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one. Science as such has no use for existence. By consigning it to the unknowable realm of the
‘thing in iself,’ Kant has maintained it as a necessary condition for real knowledge, but he has
also made it that fundamental condition for knowledge of which nothing is or can be known.
Never, not even in his Opus Posthumum, has Kant consented to suppress that ‘thing in itself’
which divides critical idealism from staight idealism. Never, not even in his Critique of Practical
Reason, has Kant consented to posit the ‘thing in itself’ as something that is ‘known.’ Practical
reason may well teach us something concerning what the ‘thing in itself’ postulates, but such
postulates entail no ‘knowledge’ of what it is. The knowledge of what a thing is inasmuch as it is
not known is a flat contradiction in Kant’s doctrine. Existence, then, is an x which Kant never
eliminates because he never completely betrays Hume, and that x remains an x because Kant
never completely betrays Wolff.
“Kant could indeed do it on the strength of his own initial bold stroke: ‘Understanding
does not derive its a priori laws from nature, it prescribes them to it.’13 But, then, if what is at
stake is the very ‘possibility of nature,’ and if nature is what understanding makes it to be, why
should understanding not prescribe existence? Because, Kant says, that would be idealism. But,
if idealism is true, why not idealism? Everything points to the fact that, in spite of its precarious
revival under the influence of Hume, existence is not there to stay. Kant could still afford to
maintain it, because what he was building up was a Critique of human knowledge, which, to
him, was one with ‘scientific’ knowledge. Now, obviously, where there is nothing to be known,
there can be no knowledge at all, but, if both physics itself and its Critique are well founded in
taking existence for granted, a metaphysics of that Critique has no right to do so. That common
root from which sensibility and understanding both spring, and of which Kant says that it exists,
but that we don’t know what it is, should at last be dug out and brought to light. In short, if it is
not to remain like a foreign body arbitrarily inserted in the intelligible world of understanding,
existence has either to be flatly denied, or else to be deduced a priori like all the rest. In point of
fact, both choices have been made by post-Kantian philosophers. Kantism has thus normally
resulted in either phenomenalism or straight idealism…”14
Tyn’s Critique of Kant on Being and Existence
Tomas Tyn, O.P. critiques Kant on being and existence in his Metafisica della sostanza
as follows: “La questione dell’essere. Il soggetto viene interamente sottratto al mondo degli
oggetti, delle cose. Ma che dire dell’essere delle cose? In che rapporto stanno la cosa e il suo
essere? Anzitutto l’essere delle cose, la loro realtà, è il loro in sé che non potrà mai essere fatto
oggetto di conoscenza, ciò che la cosa è in sé ci rimane ignoto, possiamo solo sapere ciò che essa
è per noi nel suo apparire, nel suo essere fenomeno. Più che di cose bisogna dunque limitarsi a
parlare dei concetti delle cose. Ora, secondo Kant l’essere non è una cosa che appartiene al
mondo delle cose, né puo essere predicato di un soggetto, bensì è la posizione pura e semplice di
esso e delle sue determinazioni.15
“Logicamente considerando le cose, l’essere non è predicato, ma copula del giudizio,

dimodoché esso esprime non già un concetto dotato di un oggetto (come lo sono sia il soggetto
13
Ibid., II Teil, Wie is Natur selbst möglich?
14
É. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 129-132.
15
Cfr. Kr.d.r.V., Tranz. Dialektik, II, Buch, III Hauptst., Abschn. 4; A 598-599 B 626-627, pp. 533-534.
5
che il predicato), ma semplicemente il rapporto di un concetto-predicato all’altro concetto-
soggetto. Se uno volesse aggirare l’ostacolo formulando l’essere a modo di un predicato, dicendo
cioè che il soggetto è esistente senza aggiungere altro, non otterrebbe nulla di fatto, perché dire
così non significa aggiungere qualcosa al soggetto, ma porre semplicemente il soggetto con tutti i
suoi predicati relativamente al suo concetto.
“Si noti bene questo: l’essere non è un che di assoluto, ma la relazione del predicato al
soggetto ulteriormente relazionata alla concettualità del soggetto conoscente. In tal modo
l’aggiunta dell’essere non cambia nulla nei concetti degli oggetti assoluti (soggetto e predicati)
né può farlo perché altrimenti il concetto non sarebbe più adeguato al suo oggetto. L’essere non
aggiunge nulla all’oggetto perché è pura relazione tra oggetti e non una loro proprietà, né
aggiunge qualcosa al concetto è pura relazione dell’oggetto al concetto e non un contenuto
concettuale. Così «il reale non contiene in sé nulla di più che il possibile» (und so enthält das
Wirkliche nichts mehr als das bloss Mögliche).16
“Tutto ciò viene esemplificato con il famoso esempio dei cento talleri che sono sempre
cento e nulla di più sia nella realtà che nel concetto. I primi, quelli reali, esprimono l’oggetto e la
sua posizione, gli altri, i possibili, il concetto; e l’oggetto non può contenere più di quanto non
contenga il concetto, se no il concetto non sarebbe in grado di esprimere tutto l’oggetto.
Evidentemente anche Kant ammette che con la realtà dei cento talleri è cambiato qualche cosa
nel possesso di essi, ma sostiene che nulla è cambiato nei cento talleri medesimi, giacché il loro
essere è del tutto estraneo al loro concetto e quindi sintetico rispetto a esso. Ciò vale
universalmente, dato che l’essere non è una proprietà dell’oggetto, esso non può nemmeno
costituire un contenuto del concetto e quindi in nessun concetto, nemmeno in quello di Dio,
l’essere può trovarsi analiticamente contenuto.
“È chiaro che tutta questa antimetafisica dell’essere che lo riduce a pura relazione e alla
semplice posizione del soggetto con i suoi predicati in rapporto al conoscente, posizione che non
è un qualcosa né del soggetto né del predicato, ma un semplice rapportarsi dell’uno e dell’altro al
concetto, affonda le sue radici nella svolta soggettivistica. L’«è» del giudizio è una pura funzione
logica priva di ogni significato metafisico. Al contrario, là dove i concetti non sono considerati
come pure forme a priori, bensì come segni del reale, anche il loro rapporto indicherà un
rapporto reale e quindi non un rapporto tra oggetti di concetti, ma un rapporto tra oggetti reali
rappresentato in un rapporto concettuale.
“Ebbene l’«è» del giudizio, nella prospettiva realistica, non solo non si limiterà alla
semplice relazione tra oggetti, ma rivelerà la realtà stessa degli oggetti in assoluto, la cui
16
Qui Kant considera solo l’essenza, ed è allora evidente che un’essenza possibile o reale che sia è sempre
quell’essenza. Ma non si accorge che il reale aggiunge al possibile l’esistenza, in forza della quale una data essenza
esiste; altrimenti non esiste. Ora, che una cosa esista o non esista non è evidentemente lo stesso. Alle fine anche
Kant riconosce di preferire d’avere in tasca cento talleri piuttosto che limitarsi a pensarli. Ma allora doveva
domandarsi perché preferisco averli in tasca se non perché questi hanno l’essere mentre gli altri non ce l’hanno?
Kant è incapace di considerare l’essere per se stesso. Ci si chiede allora con quale faccia egli ha preteso fondare una
metafisica rigorosa dopo che – a suo dire – sino ad allora i tentativi in tal senso erano stati vani, quando l’oggetto
della metafisica è precisamente l’essere dell’ente. Infatti Kant, come nota giustamente l’Autore, anziché fondare
finalmente la metafisica come scienza, ha finito col distruggerla. Come infatti si può pretendere la fondazione di una
scienza da uno che non capisce neppure qual è il suo oggetto? (N.d.C.).
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reciproca appartenenza non potrebbe essere reale se non fossero reali anche essi stessi. Nel
contempo tuttavia l’«è» del giudizio manifesta anche la trascendenza dell’essere rispetto agli
oggetti in questione, giacché entrambi sono e sono l’uno (predicato) nell’altro (soggetto), eppure
l’uno non è l’altro, sicché l’essere che li accomuna non è assorbito né dall’uno né dall’altro, ma
diversamente partecipato in entrambi.
“In tal modo l’essere, almeno nella sua partecipazione, è una proprietà appartenente alla
cosa e il concetto che rappresenta la cosa come esistente contiene una nota concettuale aggiunta
al contenuto del concetto che pensa solo il possibile. Tale aggiunta è sintetica là dove l’essenza,
la possibilità della cosa non esprime tutto l’essere; sarà invece analitica in quel concetto in cui
l’essenza coincide adeguatamente con l’essere stesso. Certo, pensare l’essenza che contiene in sé
l’esistenza come esistente non permette di concludere alla sua esistenza reale, perché in tal caso
l’essere è posto come reale perché pensato e non viceversa è pensato perché riscontrato nella
realtà stessa delle cose.
“Non c’è dunque bisogno di riccorrere al soggettivismo per confutare la pretesa prova
ontologica dell’esistenza di Dio, anzi, molto realisticamente, proprio perché il pensiero dipende
dall’essere e non viceversa, non basta pensarlo per affermarlo legittimamente. Ma ciò non toglie
per nulla che l’essere sia qualcosa nell’essenza, non certo, e qui Kant ha ragione, come un
predicato tra tanti, bensì come il predicato supremo che fonda sia il soggetto sia l’appartenenza a
esso di tutti i suoi altri predicati. Ma il fatto che l’essere sia il presupposto della reale
appartenenza dei predicati al soggetto, non significa che esso non sia predicato affatto, significa
solo che è il primo e il sommo dei predicati (actus ultimus entis).
“Ovviamente più che alla sostanza, l’essere compete prima di tutto all’essenza in vista
della costituzione della sostanza come di un sussistente reale. Certo, l’essere non modifica
l’essenza sul piano del suo semplice essere-essenza, sul piano del contenuto, ma la modifica
profondissimamente sul piano del modo di essere facendola passare dalla pura possibilità alla
realtà attuale. L’essere dunque non è proprietà dell’essenza finita come un contenuto di essa, ma
è proprietas proprietatum, come atto ultimo e perfetto di essa stessa e di tutto ciò che essa
contiene.
“Di nuovo si può constatare la radicalità della negazione della partecipazione ontologica
in Kant. Vi è solo un insieme di contenuti concettuali assoluti, l’essere non cambia nulla in essi,
perché non è un contenuto, ma una relazione che, essendo ugualmente pensabile tra qualsivoglia
tipo di contenuti concettuali del soggetto e del predicato, non può risultare che assolutamente
univoca. Non solo, ma Kant si fa qui precursore dell’irrazionalismo esistenzialistico. Infatti, solo
gli oggetti sono pensabili, ma l’essere non è un oggetto né contenuto di un oggetto, bensì pura
relazione estranea all’oggetto e alle sue proprietà, estranea proprio perché condizione stessa
dell’appartenenza delle proprietà al soggetto, e quindi l’essere non sarà pensabile come tale.
Presupposto di ogni realtà, l’essere non è reale, presupposto di ogni pensiero, l’essere non è né
può essere pensato.”17
17
T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza, Fede & Cultura, Verona, 2009, pp. 377-380.
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Answer to Kant: What is Being (Ens)?
Being (Latin: ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est).18 Being (ens) is that which has
the act of being (esse).19 The notion of being (ens) is not a simple notion, but implies a
composition of a subject (that ‘something’ which is and is the real subject to which the act of
being belongs), and an act (the very act of being or esse of that ‘something’). A cat, a dog, a rock
are all beings (entia). They are all ‘things’ or ‘realities.’ However, strictly speaking, being (ens)
does not have the same meaning as reality or ‘thing’ (res), for while the term res or ‘thing’
expresses the quiddity or essence (essentia) of the being (ens),20 being (ens) is derived from the
act of being (esse)21 (dicitur res secundum quod habet quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens
vero secundum quod habet esse22).
Being (ens) is the present participle of the verb ‘to be’ (Latin: esse) and we say that being
(ens) signifies a thing in so much as it is, somewhat in the same way that a ‘swimmer’ designates
a person who swims, or a ‘painter,’ someone who paints, or a ‘student,’ designating someone
who studies. Ens “è un participio presente del verbo essere, come ‘vivente’ lo è di vivere e
‘sapiente’ di sapere. Diciamo anche che l’amante è colui che ama, lo studente è colui che studia
e il governante colui che governa. Il participio (‘amante’, studente’) si può dunque indicare
anche per mezzo di espressioni come ‘colui che…’ In questo modo s’esprimono le due
dimensioni intrinseche al participio: qualcuno che svolge un’azione.
“Allo stesso modo, ciò che è, è chiamato ente (anche se si potrebbe dire che ciò che esiste
è esistente, di fatto questo termine è stato poco usato in metafisica). L’espressione ‘ente’
equivale pertanto a ‘cio che è’: significa la cosa che è, in quanto possiede l’essere. Tale
espressione esprime perciò una nozione composta, che include un qualcosa (il soggetto
dell’essere, che è sempre qualcosa dotata di un’essenza determinata) e il suo essere (ciò che fa
che il soggetto esista). Per iniziare a capire la distinzione tra queste due dimensioni (il soggetto o
sostanza, e il suo essere) basta pensare alla differenza tra queste due questioni: che cosa sono i
dinosauri (questione dell’essenza di qualcosa) e se esistono dinosauri (questione
dell’esistenza).”23
“In metafisica denominano ‘ente’ tutto ciò che realizza l’essere, l’atto di essere. ‘Ente’ o
‘essente’ sono infatti il participio presente del verbo ‘essere,’ come ‘cantante’ è il participio
presente del verbo ‘cantare,’ e ‘attaccante’ del verbo ‘attaccare.’
“Esiste tuttavia una differenza fondamentale fra gli esempi proposti e la realtà dell’ente.
Una distinzione importante, che la mera grammatica non capta. Un cantante di professione,
anche quando non canta, continua a essere un cantante, e continua a essere molte altre cose
ancora: una donna, un uomo, un padre o una madre di famiglia, un amico di certe altre persone, e
così via. E qualcosa di simile si può dire dell’attaccante anche quando non sta effettivamente
18
Cf. In I Phys., lect. 3, n. 21 ; In Boeth. De Hebd., lect. 2, n. 24.
19
Cf. In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
20
Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, c.
21
Cf. In IV Metaphy., lect. 2, no. 553.
22
In II Sent., q. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
23
M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA and L. CLAVELL, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, p. 24.
8
svolgendo un’azione di attacco sul campo di calcio. Invece, senza l’essere, l’ente non ci sarebbe
proprio, ricadrebbe nel nulla. Possiamo cominciare a intravedere ciò per il fatto che l’essere è
l’atto radicale, intimissimo e costitutivo al quale si appoggia ogni altra perfezione, o dal quale
deriva, senza che egli riposi a sua volta su di un altro atto previo. In questo senso, l’essere è l’atto
primario di qualsiasi altro atto e perfezione.”24
“Grammaticalmente, «ens» è un «participio», participio presente attivo. È il participio

presente del verbo latino esse, come essente è il participio presente attivo dell’infinito essere – la
parola «ente» procede direttamente dalla forma latina ens.
“«Ens» è dunque un participio. Ora, la forma «participiale» si chiama «participio» perché

prende parte di due elementi, cioè partecipa alla natura del nome e alla natura del verbo: ha un
aspetto di sostantivo e un aspetto di azione. Per esempio, quando diciamo «lo studente», siamo
abituati a pensare ad una persona, un uomo, che viene indicato muovendo dalla sua attività di
studiare: «l’uomo che si dedica allo studio»; in realtà però, nel participio non si dice se il
soggetto sia uomo o meno. Il soggetto resta allora in sé indeterminato, viene indicato soltanto
dalla prospettiva, «dal punto di vista», dell’azione che svolge: «cantante» è «colui che canta».
Non so chi è, non so cosa è, so soltanto una cosa: che canta.
“Bisogna però notare che in latino il termine è più forte, molto più forte: il participio
«studens», per esempio, indica non soltanto una persona la cui attività abituale è di studiare,
bensì il soggetto che adesso-sta-studiando. Così, ens indica un soggetto che sta-essendo, indica il
soggetto nell’esercizio stesso dell’attività di cui si parla. Come «camminante» è colui che sta-
camminando, così «ente» è colui che sta-essendo.”25
“Il participio significa in primo luogo un soggetto o natura e poi (connotativamente)

l’essere-atto di questo soggetto o natura. Nell’ente (id quod est) ‘ciò-che’ (id quod) significa la
‘cosa,’ mentre il verbo ‘è’ (est) significa l’atto (esse). Perciò, con la nozione di ens si esprime
innanzitutto e principalmente la ‘cosa’ e poi e conseguentemente l’essere. Se ‘ente’ significasse
principalmente l’essere – come significa la cosa che ha atto di essere – allora senza dubbio
significherebbe che qualcosa è. Ma non significa principalmente la composizione che è implicita
quando dico ‘è,’ ma la consignifica in quanto significa la cosa-che-ha-essere. ‘Ente’ significa
direttamente il soggetto che esiste; ma siccome partecipa del verbo, ‘significa anche’ (‘in
obliquo’, in modo secondario, consignifica) l’essere (esse).”26
Being (ens) is not a simple notion but implies a composition of a subject and an act:
“The notion of being (ens) is not a ‘simple’ notion; it implies the composition of a subject (id
quod) and an act (est). Two elements are involved in this notion: ‘something’ which is and the
very act of being (esse) of that thing. That ‘something’ plays the role of a subject, that is, the
particular reality to which the esse belongs (as the subject of the act of laughing is the person
who laughs).
24
T. MELENDO, Metafisica del concreto, Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 2005, pp. 53-54.
25
C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, p. 37.
26
J. VILLAGRASA, Metafisica II, APRA, Rome, 2009, p. 11.
9
“Nevertheless, the two elements constitute a unity: one element (ens) implies the
presence of the other element. When we say ‘being’ (ens) we refer implicitly to its esse even
though we do not yet form the judgment ‘it is’ or that ‘something is.’ Likewise, when we hear
the verb ‘is’ alone, we either assume its subject, or we discover the absence of a subject of the
act.
“We can sum this up as follows: 1) Being (ens) signifies principally the thing which is:
being (ens) designates it insofar as it has the act of being (esse); 2) Consequently, being (ens)
signifies concomitantly the esse of that thing, because a thing can only be if it possesses the act
of being (esse); 3) Therefore, being (ens) refers to something that exists in reality.”27
Metaphysics is about the science of real beings with their respective acts of being, the act
of being (esse) being the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections28; it is not about
an analysis of the most general notion of being (ens generalissimum), as many of the rationalist
and essentialist-inspired manuals of ‘ontology’ published over the course of hundreds of years
would have us believe. “A merely abstract and generic notion of being (ens) would exist in the
minds of philosophers who would deal with metaphysical realities as though they were logical
concepts. Thus, according to Scotus and Suárez, we first know individual existent beings through
our intelligence, and then we abstract their ‘common nature,’ thereby obtaining their essence.
Finally, we arrive at a supreme genus, which is most abstract and separate from experience, and
this is supposed to be being (ens). This was the notion of being (ens), whose content was no
longer real being, but the most general idea of being, inherited by rationalism. This explains why
metaphysics, as rationalism understood it, was prejudically tagged as a science that has nothing
to do with experience and the real world.”29
Concerning Francisco Suárez’s essentialism, the Thomist Joseph M. De Torre writes:

“According to Suárez, the concept of being is the product of an abstraction, whereby the mind
separates the essence from the existence: this is the meaning of ens as a noun, whereas ens as a
participle corresponds to the act of existing. In the latter case, the concept of being is analogical,
and here Suárez agrees with St. Thomas; but in the former case it is univocal, and here Suárez
joins Duns Scotus. However, ens as a noun corresponds to the real essence, i.e., essence as non-
contradictory, or capable of existing in act, and that is the object of metaphysics, which Suárez
defines as ‘the science which looks at being as being, or in so far as it abstracts from matter as to
its being.’
“Consequently, it seems that, for Suárez, metaphysics is to reality what the abstract is to
the concrete. Being is conceived as essence. His conclusions could not be more opposed to those
of St. Thomas himself, although they could well be endorsed by most of the Thomists mentioned
earlier. His formalism or essentialism is much more thoroughgoing and consistent than even that
of Duns Scotus, and he definitely shifts the emphasis from God to man by focusing on the
concept of being (an idea in the human mind) rather than on reality as such outside man and
transcending him.
27
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 18-19.
28
Cf. De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
29
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 30.
10
“Transition to Rationalism. ‘Essence’, for Suárez, is whatever can be conceived by the
human mind as an objective or logical (non-contradictory) possibility (as distinct from St.
Thomas’ real potentiality for being), and ‘subsistence’ is the ultimate determination of the
essence, which makes it capable of receiving existence.30
“Existence is thus one of the modes or states of the essence: possible (of reason) or actual
(existent). And so, in the actual existent there is no real distinction of essence and existence.
…Due to the abstractive or essentialist approach of his metaphysics Suárez had a profound
impact on the Cartesian rationalists.31 One can appreciate Pope Leo XIII’s recommendation in
his historic Encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879) on the restoration of Thomism (reiterated by all
popes ever since), to go to the primary sources, namely to the works of St. Thomas himself,
rather than to his commentators.”32
Concerning the anti-realist, essentialist conception of being by the rationalist Wolff, De

Torre observes the following: “Just as Spinoza had done, Wolff criticized Descartes for not
having defined the basic notions with enough precision, and turned to Suárez, whom he held in
unqualified esteem.33 Thus he amalgamated the essentialistic metaphysics of both Suárez and
Leibniz, following the Cartesian method of clear and distinct ideas with Spinozian rigor.
“For Wolff, the possible is identical with the thinkable (in Greek: noumenon), i.e., with
whatever human reason can think of as non-contradictory. The principle of contradiction is thus
conceived as a principle of thinking, and only by derivation a principle of being.34 Moreover, the
possible is identical with being (ens), which is simply ‘whatever can exist, and therefore that to
which existence is not repugnant,’35 which is the same as the essence pure and simple: ‘Essence
is the first thing we conceive about being…Without it, being cannot be.’36 ‘Activity follows the
essence.’37
“Thus the following equation is established: being = essence = possibility = the thinkable.
This is a far cry from the metaphysics of the act of being (esse). But it is the only metaphysics
known by subsequent philosophers, beginning with the empiricists and Kant,38 and somehow
adopted by not a few Scholastics ever since.39”40
Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write in their Metaphysics: “It would be incorrect to
consider being as a vague and indeterminate attribute which would belong to all things as their
30
Cf. C. FABRO, Introducción al tomismo, Rialp, Madrid, 1967, pp. 95-97.
31
Cf. E. GILSON, op. cit., pp. 96-120.
32
J. M. DE TORRE, The Humanism of Modern Philosophy, Southeast Asian Science Foundation, Manila, 1989, pp.
41-42.
33
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 157; E. GILSON and T. LANGAN, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, Random
House, New York, 1964, p. 173.
34
For realistic metaphysics it is the other way round.
35
C. WOLFF, Ontologia, n. 134.
36
C. WOLFF, op. cit., n. 144.
37
C. WOLFF, op. cit., n. 169.
38
Cf. E. GILSON, op. cit., pp. 112-121.
39
Cf. J. E. GURR, S.J., The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900, Marquette
University Press, Milwaukee, 1959.
40
J. M. DE TORRE, op. cit., p. 74.
11
least perfection. Some philosophers understood being as the poorest concept, as that which is left
after having set aside all the characteristics which differentiate things from one another. For
them, it would be the most abstract and empty notion, one which can be applied to everything
(maximum extension), because it has practically no content (minimum comprehension), and
indicates no more than the bare minimum that all things have in order to be real.
“This manner of looking at being is a logical approach rather than a metaphysical one,
and it impedes any understanding of esse as the act of things, possessed in a different way in
each one of them, and in the most perfect manner in God.
“This logical way of considering being was explicitly devised by rationalist philosophers,
particularly, Wolff and Leibniz. But even Scotus and Suárez had earlier regarded being (ens) as
the most indeterminate concept whose content is identified with the ‘possible essence.’ Thus,
they made being (ens) and essence identical, and regarded the essence as a neutral element with
respect to the act of being (esse), thus reducing essence to a simple ‘possibility of being.’
Pursuing this line of thought, Wolff defined being as ‘that which can exist, that is, that whose
existence is not contradictory (Wolff, Ontologia, 1736 ed., n. 134). He therefore divided being
(ens) into possible and actual; the primacy of being belongs to possible being, for actual being is
no more than the former’s ‘being put into act.’41
“One of the main deficiencies inherent in this position is the following: thought absorbs
or assimilates being (ens), since this extremely indeterminate notion of being exists only in the
human mind, as a result of logical abstraction. Therefore, it would not be a real being but a
conceptual being. In rationalism, ‘possibility’ is understood as the ‘non-contradictory’ character
of a notion, that is, ‘the possibility of being thought of or intellectually conceived.’”42
“To consider esse as existence is a logical consequence of identifying being (ens) with
possible essence, separated from the act of being. There arise two worlds, so to speak: the ideal
world made up of abstract essences or pure thought, and the world of realities enjoying factual
existence. The latter is no more than a copy of the former, since it does not add anything to the
ontological make-up of things. As Kant said, the notion of 100 real guilders does not in any way
differ from the notion of 100 merely possible guilders.43
“The distinction between ideal and abstract essence on one hand, and the real existence
on the other, has given rise to serious repercussions in many important philosophical questions.
In the domain of knowledge especially, this has led to the radical separation of human
intelligence from the senses: essence would be the object of pure thought, whereas factual
existence would constitute the object grasped by the senses (this gave rise to the equally wrong
extreme positions of rationalism and empiricism or positivism; in the case of Leibniz, it gave rise
to the opposition between ‘logical truths’ and ‘factual truths’).
41
This division of being (ens) into ‘possible’ and ‘actual’ became widespread. It is still accepted by some
contemporary Thomist philosophers of ‘essentialist’ tendencies.
42
43
Cf. I. KANT, ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ B 628/A 600.
12
“Another consequence of this view is the attempt to prove the existence of the First
Cause starting from the idea of God (ontologism): God would be the only essence which
includes existence among its attributes, and therefore, God should exist. This ‘proof’ ends up
with a God which exists only in the mind.”44
Essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, while act of being (esse) is
that which makes a thing to be. Every finite being (ens) has a real distinction between essence
(essentia) and act of being (esse) as two metaphysical co-principles.45 With God, the Infinite
Being, on the other hand, essentia and esse are identified. God’s Essence is Esse.46
When we say that “God is Being” and that “man is a being”, being here is predicated of
their subjects analogically, not equivocally nor univocally. “Aristotle discovered the analogical
nature of being. Before him, being was considered univocally, as taught by Parmenides. Aristotle
explained that being is predicated of different subjects in various ways, but always in reference
to a principal meaning. If being (ens) were to be understood in a univocal manner, then all reality
would be deemed to be in the same manner, which would lead to monism. Everything would be
seen as identically one, and therefore, there would be no difference between God and creatures
(pantheism). Taking into account the analogical notion of being (ens), however, we can speak
about God and creatures as beings, maintaining at the same time the infinite distance between
them. By way of analogy, created being leads us to the knowledge of the divine Being and its
perfections. That is why this question is of utmost importance for metaphysics and theology.”47
44
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
45
“Being is a real and intelligible principle, and the knowledge of its reality cannot be separated from the knowledge
of its intelligibility. This dissociation has been carried out in formalistic scholasticism which speaks of ‘the
distinction between essence and existence,’ instead of the genuinely metaphysical theory of the real composition of
essence and act of being. The former distinction is made between between actual existence, considered as mere
facticity, and the essence considered merely as possible. Essence and existence are, then, no more than two different
states of mind with respect to the same thing considered respectively as a possibility, and as actually existing.
Existence, in this case, does no more than add the concrete and irrational character of the fact to the abstract and
intelligible notes of the essence. Some scholastics even ended up speaking about a distinction between the esse
essentiae, and the esse actualis existentiae, which corresponds to a merely logical starting point (as a reply to the
question ‘what is a thing’ – quid est – and ‘if a thing is’ – an est – ), but this is a starting point without any
metaphysical dimension.
“The real distinction between essence and act of being is not to be identified with the couple to be thought – to
really be. The authentic real composition of essentia – esse is not the formal nexus of two modes of a being, but
rather the structuring of two real co-principles which make up the primary reality of being.
“This composition is the transcendental structure of reality, which occurs in all finite beings inasmuch as they are
beings. This composition of essence and act of being (esse) is real: they are really distinct metaphysical principles
which constitute the radical unum which is being. It is necessary to admit this composition as real (and not only
‘cum fundamento in re’), because finite things are, but they are not the act of being (esse), they do not exhaust being
(esse) either in intensity or in extension. They are, but without being being (esse): they have being (esse), they
participate in being (esse). The participating principle (the potency: essence) cannot be really identified with that
which is participated (the act: being – esse). If essence and esse were identified, the real principle of limitation
(imperfection) would be the same as the real principle of perfection, which would violate the principle of non-
contradiction. There would be no proper explanation for the real existence of finite beings: we would be denying
either their reality or their finiteness”(A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 116-117).
46
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4.
47
13
Explaining how being (ens) is analogical, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: “We have
already seen that being (ens) is predicated of various subjects in an analogical manner. …we
shall strive to see in what sense being (ens)…is analogically attributed to reality, and how this
analogy is based on the act of being (esse) which beings share in different degrees.
“One and the same term is analogically attributed to two realities whenever it is
attributed to each of them in a way which is partially the same and partially different. This is
what happens in the case of being (ens). This term is attributed to everything which is, but it does
not apply to everything in the same way. As in the case in any other predication, the ultimate
basis of analogy lies in the very same realities to which the analogical term refers: they are partly
the same and partly different. Hence, being (ens) is attributed to God and to creatures
analogically, because there is a certain similarilty between creatures and the Creator, but it goes
with a dissimilarity which is equally clear: God and creatures are (similarity), but God is by
essence, whereas creatures are only by participation (dissimilarity). Even within the realm of the
categories, being (ens) is attributed analogically to substance and to accidents. They both are and
can, therefore, be called beings (similarity); the substance, however, is by itself, whereas the
accidents are in something else, namely, in a substance (dissimilarity).
“The basis of the analogical predication of the notion of being (ens) is the act of being
(esse), since anything can be called being (ens) to the very extent that it has esse. Esse is
possessed either by essence or by participation, by the substance itself or in the substance,
actually or only potentially, and in the case of creatures, always as something received from God,
who is the Subsisting Esse. Whatever the relation each thing has to esse, it can, to that extent, be
called a being (ens): above all the substance, which has esse in se, and then quantity, quality,
relation and other accidents.”48
Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo affirm that the metaphysical foundation of analogy lies in
the way esse is found in each being (ens): God is act of being (esse) fully and by essence,
whereas creatures have the act of being by participation, in varying degrees of intensity and
levels of composition (of act and potency, substance and accidents, etc).49
Being (ens) is analogical by an analogy of proper proportionality50 and an intrinsic

analogy of attribution.51 Both Cornelio Fabro52 and Bernard Montagnes53 are in favor of the use
48
49
Cf. T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 139.
50
“A concept is predicated with an analogy of proportionality when several subjects possess a common perfection in
ways that are not exactly but only proportionately the same. There is but a certain similarity in the way the subjects
share in the perfection. The perfection of ‘man,’ for example, is found univocally in all individual men; but the
perfection of ‘intelligence’ is not found in an adult in the same way as it is found in a child; the same is true when
we compare the intelligence of a cultured person with that of a savage, or the intelligence of an angel with that of
man, or the intelligence of God with that of His creatures. In each of these cases, the same perfection (intelligence)
is found in a manner adequate (proportional) to the nature and special characteristics of the subject (cf. De Veritate,
q. 2, a 11; In Metaph., lect. 8).
“…Proportionality is used in philosophy to describe the different manners of being of things. For example, like
every inanimate being, every living being is one, but with a oneness that is far superior to that of inanimate beings.
The perfections of creatures, compared with the perfections of God, can be cited as another example. In spite of the
infinite distance separating God from His creatures, we can still attribute to Him perfections that we find in the
created order (wisdom, being, beauty, etc.), provided we do so proportionally, adapting them to His infinity (cf. De
14
Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9). Hence, we say: divine knowledge is to God as human knowledge is to man, but in an
incomparably superior way”(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, pp. 64-65).
51
“The Analogy of Attribution. The analogy of proportionality is founded on the analogy of attribution. With the
former, we compare structural similarities (isomorphisms) between different kinds of beings. Similarities of this
sort, however, can sometimes be reduced to a single principle from which they really proceed. This principle can
either be an efficient, final or exemplary cause; or at least a subject whom we attribute properly and principally the
perfection that is found in the many.
“The analogy of proportionality only compares different proportions, abstracting from the possible dependence of
one proportion on another (e.g., in the case of God and creatures, the analogy of proportionality expresses only the
eminently superior degree in which God possesses the perfections we find in creatures). The analogy of attribution
goes one step further, for it points to one of the terms of comparison as principle of the rest (hence, we say that God
is the cause and principle of created perfections). It is as though, when comparing the photographs, drawings and
paintings of a person, we refer all of them to a primary subject or final term – the concrete individual represented by
these pictures.
“Therefore, a perfection is predicated with analogy of attribution if, among several subjects of a common
perfection, there is one which possesses the perfection in all its fullness, while the rest possess it by participation or
in a derived fashion. We distinguish these perfections in two steps: First, we see that something is predicated of
many individuals in several senses. ‘Good,’ for example, is predicated analogically of the means to an end, actions,
things, persons, creatures and God. Then, we detect an order between these different senses. ‘Good’ is said of the
means, for example, inasmuch as the latter helps us reach the end; hence, the end is good in a more primary way
than the means (which we describe as a useful good). This order of dependence has its ultimate principle in God
who is Good by essence (cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, SEI, Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526).
“St. Thomas Aquinas explains: ‘If a name can be predicated of many analogically, it is because of the relation of
the many to one subject (per respectum ad unum). This subject must, therefore, be implied in the notion of all the
rest…It follows that the name should be predicated principally (per prius) of the former and secondarily (per
posterius) of the latter, following an order determined by the degree to which all the other subjects approach that one
subject. For example, ‘healthy,’ which is said of animals, is also applied to a medicine insofar as that medicine is
able to cause health in animals; it is also applied to describe urine, inasmuch as urine is the sign of the animal’s
health’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 6).
“The analogy of proportionality is, therefore, essentially characterized by the following properties: a) There is
always an ad unum – a central and primary meaning upon which all the rest depend. In the example of St. Thomas
Aquinas, the principal meaning of healthy (viz., physical health) is what determines its other meanings when
predicated of medicine, the climate, or urine. The derived meanings always imply the principal meaning; hence, a
healthy climate is climate that is conducive to health.
“b) The analogical concept is predicated per prius of the subject of the principal meaning. This subject is called
the principal analogate. Of the other subjects (called secondary analogates), the concept is predicated per posterius.
This analogy is called analogy of attribution because it involves the predication of a concept primarily to the
principal analogate, and its subsequent attribution to the other subjects by derivation.
“The analogy of attribution can be extrinsic or intrinsic. It is extrinsic when only the principal analogate properly
and formally possesses the analogical perfection; the rest have it in an extrinsic and improper manner. This is the
case with the concept of health, for climate and medicine are said to be healthy only in an improper way – not
because they have health, but because they are external causes of physical health.
“More important because of its application to metaphysics is the intrinsic analogy of attribution. Here, the
analogical concept is properly predicated not only of the principal but also of the secondary analogates because the
former really causes the presence of the perfection of the latter. For example, in ‘the substance is’ vis-à-vis ‘the
accident is,’ being is principally attributed to the substance; but it is properly predicated of the accident by derivation
since the accident receives being by inhering in a substance. Another example: ‘something is in potency’ vis-à-vis
something is in act’: being is said primarily of act, and per posterius of potency (cf. In IV Metaph., lect. 1). Another
example: ‘creatures are’ vis-à-vis God is: being is said principally of God, since He is being by essence; however, it
is properly predicated of creatures inasmuch as they receive being from God (creatures are beings by participation).
Still another example: God is Truth by essence, the origin of all truth; human judgments, though also properly called
true when they reflect reality, are only so by participation, for all truth found in creatures is a participated likeness of
the highest Truth.
15
of both analogy of proper proportionality and the intrinsic analogy of attribution as regards the
analogy of being (ens).
Answer to Kant: What is Being as Being (Ens qua Ens)?
In the science of metaphysics we learn that while the material object of metaphysics is
being (ens), that is, all things, all reality, its formal object is being as being (ens qua ens).
Explaining what the material object and the formal object of a science are, Henry J. Koren
writes: “In every science we must distinguish the material and formal object. By the material
object of a science is meant the things which are considered in that science, and by the formal
object is meant that aspect under which the material object is considered.54 For instance, the
human body is the material object of medical science, and health is its formal object. One and the
same material object may be considered from several points of view or by several sciences. For
example, water is considered by the chemist, the physicist, the physician, the philosopher, the
brewer, and the sailor, but each of them considers it from a different point of view. Hence
sciences will be distinguished according to their point of view or formal object.55”56
Metaphysics’ material object (that is, its subject matter or field of inquiry) is being. Its
formal object (or the particular point of view or aspect in which the subject matter or field of
inquiry is studied) is being as being (ens qua ens, ens inquantum est ens). Now, sciences are
“The basis of intrinsic analogy of attribution is causality. Intrinsic analogy of attribution is a logical consequence
of the relations of causality among beings. It is based on the imperfect likeness of the effect to its proper cause.
Some remarks on this point:
“a) Since one cannot give what one does not have, at least some perfections of the efficient cause will necessarily
be reflected in its proper effects. The efficient cause is, therefore, also an exemplary cause of its proper effects. It
follows that by studying the latter, we can, using the analogy of attribution, arrive at some knowledge of the former.
It is in this way that we arrive at an analogical knowledge of the nature of God on the basis of the manifold
perfections we find in creatures (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 2).
“b) Consequently, analogy of attribution implies both similarity and dissimilarity. The analogical concept is
predicated per prius of the cause, and per posterius of the effects. It is partly attributed to the effects inasmuch as
they are similar to the cause; but it is partly not attributed to them since they are also unlike the cause. Hence, the
universe is, at one and the same time, like God and unlike Him.
“c) The foundation of the analogy of attribution is not an abstract idea but a real cause, the cause of the
participated likenesses of the perfection in the secondary analogates. For example, if being is common to God and
the world, it is not because the abstract notion of being is found in both of them, but because the being of the world
points to the Being of God as its principle and cause. It would be an error to establish the foundation of this
analogical community of being on the most abstract concept of being-in-general (esse commune), which is
necessarily univocal.
“d) The ontological priority of the principal analogate does not always mean gnoseological priority, for
sometimes it is only through their effects that we can acquire a knowledge of the causes. This is the case with our
knowledge of God, the principal analogate of being. Though first in the ontological order, God comes after creatures
in the noetical order since it is the latter that we first know and apply names to. In the order of knowledge, therefore,
the meaning of our notions of being, goodness and truth applies primarily to creatures”(J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit.,
pp. 65-69).
52
Cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, S.E.I., Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526.
53
Cf. B. MONTAGNES, La doctrine de l’ analogie de l’être d’après St. Thomas d’Aquin, Louvain, 1963.
54
Strictly speaking, we should distinguish the so-called formal objects “quod” and “quo.” The formal object “quod”
is the material object taken under a certain aspect; the formal object “quo” is precisely that aspect under which the
material object is considered.
55
In I analytica posteriora, lect. 39.
56
H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1955, p. 7.
16
formally constituted in their special character, and differentiated from one another, by reason of
their formal object.57 By taking the material object and the formal object of metaphysics together
we obtain the definition of metaphysics as the science of being as being.58
What does ‘as being’ mean in ‘being as being’ (ens qua ens), when we state that
metaphysics is the science of being as being? That is, what is the formal object of metaphysics?
Not ens generalissimum, as was taught for centuries in many of the essentialist manuals of
scholastic philosophy, since though metaphysics does indeed study ens generalissimum,
metaphysics does not focus upon notions or abstract concepts but rather upon real beings, beings
that are. Ens generalissimum, therefore, cannot be the formal object of metaphysics, the
philosophical science which studies all reality. Metaphysics is not logic, nor is metaphysics a
transcendental idealist phenomenology of essences.
Also, it is not ‘as being’ (qua ens) in the sense of ‘being (ens) in reference to substance.’
“‘Ente in quanto ente’ in senso aristotelico significa l’ente in riferimento alla sostanza, perché o è
sostanza, o accidente della sostanza o causa della sostanza, o privazione della sostanza, e così
via”59; “la metafisica aristotelica interpreta ‘in quanto ente’ come ‘in quanto dice rapporto alla
sostanza.”60 Villagrasa observes in the second volume of his Metafisica (2009) that “in Tommaso
la sostanza perde centralità, perché all’essenza viena attribuita una posizione di potenza nei
confronti dell’actus essendi, perfezione prima di ogni ente.”61 “La considerazione formale del
subiectum della metafisica è espressa nella ripetizione ‘in quanto ente.’ La metafisica tomistica
interpreta ‘in quanto ente’ come ‘in quanto partecipa all’esse,’ perché qualcosa si dice ente per il
suo essere62”63
In his La metafisica di san Tommaso e i suoi interpreti (2002), Battista Mondin contrasts
the old teaching of the Stagirite, which is a metaphysics centered upon substance, with the new
teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, which is a metaphysics centered upon the act of being [esse], of
being as being as meaning being [ens] as being, of being [ens] in reference to the act of being
[esse as actus essendi], of being [ens] as having the act of being [esse as actus essendi], the act of
being (esse) being the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections): “L’oggetto della
metafisica «è l’ente in quanto ente e tutto ciò che gli appartiene necessariamente»64
“Se ci si ferma a questi testi si ha l’impressione che S. Tommaso concepisca l’oggetto

della metafisica allo stesso modo di Aristotele. Ma non è così: la loro coincidenza riguarda
soltanto l’oggetto materiale, non l’oggetto formale della metafisica. L’oggetto materiale è lo
57
“By the formal object of a science is understood that by reason of which and in the light of which the material
object is studied or examined. It is the formal object of a science which not only gives that science its unity but at
the same time also distinguishes it from every other field of inquiry”(R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt
and Co., New York, 1959, p. 12).
58
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, book IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21.
59
J. VILLAGRASA, Metafisica II, APRA, Rome, 2009, p. 28.
60
J. VILLAGRASA, op. cit., p. 259.
61
62
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, sc 3: «Nomen entis ab esse imponitur». In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1: «Nomen autem entis ab
actu essendi sumitur».
63
J. VILLAGRASA, op. cit., pp. 258-259.
64
In libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Proem.
17
stesso sia per Aristotele sia per Tommaso: è l’ente. Apparentemente è lo stesso oggetto formale:
l’ente in quanto ente. Ma sul modo di intendere la reduplicativa in quanto ente l’Aquinate si
allontana decisamente da Aristotele. Per lo Stagirita ciò che costituisce l’ente in quanto tale è –
come abbiamo visto – la sostanza, perché essa sola possiede l’entità (l’essere) in modo
autonomo. E così tutta l’indagine metafisica di Aristotele cammina in direzione della sostanza: la
sua metafisica è essenzialmente usiologia.
“Invece per S. Tommaso c’è una realtà che precede la stessa sostanza: è l’essere. Il
Dottore Angelico vede con estrema chiarezza ciò che era appena affiorato all’intuito di
Parmenide che cioè nell’essere sta la radice di ogni realtà, l’attualità di ogni atto, il centro di ogni
perfezione.”65
In his Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di san Tommaso d’Aquino (second edition,
2000) Mondin writes: “Come Aristotele anche San Tommaso assegna alla metafisica, quale suo
oggetto formale, «lo studio dell’ente in quanto ente e di ciò che gli compete necessariamente»(In
IV Met., lect. 1, nn. 529-530). Questo accordo sulla definizione formale della metafisica non
deve trarre in inganno: non deve cioè essere scambiato come un accordo sostanziale, di fondo e
di contenuti, tra la metafisica aristotelica e quella tomistica; perché si tratta in effetti
semplicemente di un accordo su una definizione preliminare, che implica un accordo di indirizzo
e non di contenuti. In realtà, proprio sui contenuti e sugli obiettivi ultimi della metafisica San
Tommaso si allontana da Aristotele per costruire quel grandioso edificio metafisico che è la sua
filosofia dell’essere. Sia per Aristotele sia per San Tommaso la metafisica è studio dell’ente in
quanto ente, cioè studio dell’ente in quanto portatore e custode dell’atto d’essere; ma mentre per
lo Stagirita l’atto d’essere è la forma, per l’Aquinate l’atto d’essere (actus essendi) è l’actualitas
omnium actum, la perfectio omnium perfectionum. Così l’ente di San Tommaso diviene
necessariamente un ente più ricco di attualità e di perfezione dell’ente aristotelico; ma allo stesso
tempo, in quanto ente partecipato e composto, denuncia una carenza ontologica maggiore di
quella denunciata dall’ente aristotelico. E, mentre Aristotele si preoccupa di chiarire soltanto le
strutture interne dell’ente e lo fa egregiamente individuando tra i suoi elementi costitutivi
fondamentali la materia e la forma, l’atto e la potenza, la sostanza e gli accidenti, San Tommaso
si preoccupa sopratutto di chiarire i rapporti tra l’ente e l’essere e muovendo dagli aspetti della
caducità dell’ente oggetto della nostra esperienza (la partecipazione, la gradazione e la
composizione) può risalire fino all’esse ipsum, l’essere sussistente, che è essere per essenza,
assolutamente semplice, massimo nell’ordine dell’esseità o della entità (entitas).”66
The metaphysics of the Angelic Doctor is therefore a metaphysics of reality, of real

beings, which are because of esse as actus essendi, not an essentialist-rationalist logic which
centers upon abstract concepts or notions. Villagrasa observes: “‘Ente in quanto ente’
significa…l’ente in quanto è reale, per opposizione all’irreale, che ‘presente-solo-alla-coscienza’
che lo oggettiva è ‘oggetto puro.’ In questo contesto, l’esistenza è interpretata come trans-
oggettualità, come l’essere extra-cogitationes o, per dirla con l’espressione tomista, l’essere
extra animam.67 Questa interpretazione cerca di evitare la riduzione moderna di ente a
65
B. MONDIN, La metafisica di S. Tommaso e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 193-194.
66
B. MONDIN, Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di san Tommaso d’Aquino, ESD, Bologna, 2000, p. 241.
67
«Ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum»(In V Metaph., lect. 9, n. 5).
18
oggetto…La metafisica non ha per oggetto la ratio entis o l’idea entis, tanto meno il nomen
entis…la metafisica…è un discorso sul reale (res)…”68
Pérez de Laborda writes concerning the material object and formal object of metaphysics:
“Essa studia tutta la realtà; dall’altra, la sua prospettiva di studio non è limitata: si considera
l’ente proprio in quanto ente, cioè non in quanto è tale o tal altro, ma semplicemente in quanto
è.”69 Villagrasa contrasts the Angelic Doctor’s metaphysics of the act of being (esse as actus
essendi) with the Stagirite’s metaphysics of substance, writing: “Ci sono «quattro punti di
capitale importanza in cui san Tommaso modifica e rinnova la metafisica usiologica di
Aristotele: il concetto intensivo dell’essere; l’identificazione dell’essere con l’actualitas omnium
actuum; la distinzione reale tra esse ed essenza negli enti; la qualifica di Dio come causa
efficiente [ed esemplare] oltre che come causa finale del cosmo».70 L’interpretazione tomista
dell’ente alla luce dell’esse ut actus (essendi), nel contesto di una metafisica creazionista, offre
una nuova luce alla formula aristotelica “ente in quanto ente.” La considerazione dell’ente in
quanto ente, secondo Tommaso d’Aquino, fu una conquista raggiunta nell’ultima tappa del
filosofare, quando alcuni si innalzarono alla considerazione della «causa delle cose, non in
quanto sono di questo tipo o così, ma in quanto sono enti».71”72
Metaphysics, therefore, is about the science of real beings with their respective acts of
being, the act of being (esse) being the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections73;
it is not about an analysis of the most general notion of being (ens generalissimum), as many of
the rationalist and essentialist-inspired manuals of ontology published over the course of
hundreds of years would have us believe. Though it does include treatment of notions,
metaphysics is not focused on notions but rather on reality, on real beings. Melendo writes:
“Nulla di più alieno dalla verità del concepire la metafisica, così come si è fatto per secoli, come
l’analisi della nozione generalissima dell’ente (ens generalissimum); una riflessione meramente
concettuale, in parte aliena, parallela e previa alla comprensione delle realtà concrete e
particolari che compongono il cosmo. Uno studio, di conseguenza, i cui risultati potrebbero
applicarsi a tutto, a forza di non includervi alcun contenuto proprio.
“Il tema della metafisica invece è tutto l’opposto: non è affatto una nozione, ma la realtà
come è in sé. Perciò, quando le si dà l’appellativo di ente, tale vocabolo indica una conoscenza
pregna di contenuto; un sapere nel quale, in forma del tutto peculiare e in certo modo dialettica,
si ingloba tutto ciò che nell’universo esiste. E che richiama in modo primario, come dicevamo
nell’Introduzione, ciò che c’è di più elevato in questo insieme: la persona (umana, angelica e
divina).
“Di conseguenza, quando penso o dico ‘ente’ nel modo dovuto, comprendendo realmente
ciò che faccio, non solo non escludo il soggetto umano, con tutti i suoi problemi vitali ed
esistenziali, ma lo indico con assoluta priorità rispetto a ciò che gli è inferiore. Tuttavia, com’è
68
J. VILLAGRASA, op. cit., pp. 29, 31.
69
M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA and L. CLAVELL, op. cit., p. 23.
70
B. MONDIN, La metafisica di S. Tommaso e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 186-187.
71
«Aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum
secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia»(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 44, a. 2).
72
73
Cf. De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
19
logico, anche l’universo impersonale viene incluso nell’affermazione di ente…e nella sua totale
integrità: considerando tanto i suoi aspetti più comuni quanto le sue più specifiche differenze.
Come afferma Cardona, appoggiandosi a Tommaso d’Aquino, ‘il concetto di ‘ente’ non è il più
vuoto e astratto, ma il più pregnante e concreto: «unde omnia alia includuntur in ente unite et
distincte, sicut in principio [= per cui tutte le altre cose sono incluse nell’ente in modo unito e
distinto, in quanto è il loro principio]»(In Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3).’74
“L’idea che andrà facendosi sempre più chiara a mano a mano che avanziamo nella
nostra analisi, è che la conoscenza metafisica si elabora alla luce dell’atto di essere; e quest’atto,
l’essere, è contemporaneamente principio di universalità e principio di singolarità: per il suo
essere ogni ente è in relazione con tutti gli altri che compongono l’universo – perché tutti sono –.
E l’essere è, in fin dei conti, ciò che fa che questa realtà sia questa, e quella sia quella, nella sua
ultima e definitiva concretezza.
“Tutti gli enti sono: l’essere è principio di universalità; e tutto ciò che c’è in ogni ente
(anche gli aspetti che lo caratterizzano, distinguendolo da qualsiasi altra realtà) è: l’essere è il
principio radicale di singolarizzazione.”75
“Stiamo capendo meglio ciò che implica la metafisica come sapere dell’ente in quanto
ente: è la disciplina che considera tutto quello che è nella stretta misura in cui possiede ed
esercita l’atto di essere.
“Insomma la metafisica studia tutto: realtà inanimate, piante, animali, persone e, al

vertice, Dio stesso. Tutto: ciò che è semplice e ciò che è composto, ciò che è necessario e ciò che
è contingente, ciò che è naturale e ciò che è artificiale…e perfino, in modo derivato e improprio,
i semplici esseri finiti, pensati o immaginati. E, allo stesso tempo, i diversi aspetti o componenti
di ciascuna di queste realtà: il loro intimo nucleo costitutivo – ousía o sostanza, secondo la
terminologia classica – e le loro proprietà o attributi accidentali, perfino i più periferici o
passeggeri.
“Tutto, insisto. Ma tutte le cose, nell’esatta proporzione in cui gli compete l’essere,
perché si tratta di esaminarle, tutte e ciascuna, in quanto sono. Pertanto, e qui sta la chiave, il
filosofo le contempla e analizza senza annullare la diversità che, proprio in quanto ente,
riguarda e arricchisce ciò che esiste.
“La metafisica non misura tutte le realtà alla stessa stregua; non ci offre un mondo
monocromatico, diluito e senza contorni. Infatti considera tutto come ente e, di conseguenza,
secondo il suo calibro ontologico e d’accordo con la modalità che l’essere ha in ciascun oggetto.
La metafisica è scienza del reale, così com’è. Non lo studia, pertanto, così come si trova nel
pensiero (in quanto pensato), e neppure nella misura e nella proporzione con cui risulta
manipolabile, utile, di profitto o piacevole. Ma solo in quanto è.”76
74
C. CARDONA, Para recristianizar la inteligencia, in “Divus Tomas,” 1990, nn. 1-2, p. 15.
75
T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
76
T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
20
“Ciò che è proprio e discriminante di tutta la metafisica è considerare la realtà, nel suo
insieme o in dettaglio, alla luce dell’atto di essere. Questo si può fare, dicevo, in modo
universale, secondo i principi e le relazioni presenti – diversificati e singolarizzati – tutto ciò che
esiste per il fatto che esiste; o in maniera più determinata, analizzando la configurazione concreta
che l’essere e i principi e le relazioni che a esso si riferiscono adottano in una propria e specifica
realtà. Ciò che determina il sapere metafisico è il fatto d’illuminare con la chiarezza abbagliante
che emana dall’atto di essere.
“Proprio questo si vuole affermare quando si dice che la metafisica studia l’ente in
quanto ente. Quest’ultima espressione equivale, come abbiamo già detto, a ‘in quanto possiede
essere.’ Ente è ciò-che-è, ciò-che-ha-essere (quod est, quod habet esse, secondo i latini).”77
Answer to Kant on Existence: What is the Act of Being (Esse as Actus Essendi) and
What is Existence (Existentia)?
The principal element of being (ens, which is “that which is” or “that which has esse”78)
is its act of being (esse). If essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, the act
of being (esse) is that which makes a thing to be.
Explaining certain features of the act of being (esse) as act, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo
state: “a) Above all, esse is an act, that is, a perfection of all reality. The term ‘act’ is used in
metaphysics to designate any perfection or property of a thing; therefore, it is not to be used
exclusively to refer to actions or operations (the act of seeing or walking, for instance). In this
sense, a white rose is a flower that has whiteness as an act which gives the rose a specific
perfection. Similarly, that ‘is’ which is applied to things indicates a perfection as real as the
perfection of ‘life’ in living things. In the case of esse, however, we are obviously dealing with a
special perfection.
“b) Esse is a ‘universal’ act, that is, it belongs to all things. Esse is not exclusive to some
particular kind of reality, since without esse, there would be nothing at all. Whenever we talk
about anything, we have to acknowledge, first of all, that it is: the bird ‘is,’ gold ‘is,’ the clouds
‘are.’
“c) Esse is also a ‘total’ act: it encompasses all that a thing is. While other acts only
refer to some part or aspects of being, esse is a perfection which includes everything that a thing
has, without any exception. Thus, the ‘act of reading’ does not express the entirety of the
perfection of the person reading, but esse is the act of each and of all the parts of a thing. If a tree
‘is,’ then the whole tree ‘is,’ with all its aspects and parts – its color, shape, life and growth – in
short, everything in it shares in its esse. Thus, esse encompasses the totality of a thing.
“Esse is a ‘constituent’ act, and the most radical or basic of all perfections because it is
that by which things ‘are.’ As essence is that which makes a thing to be this or that (chair, lion,
man), esse is that which makes things to be. This can be seen from various angles:
77
T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 56.
78
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 22: “Amplius. Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse” ; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 26,
a. 4: “…ens simpliciter est quod habet esse…”(Leon. 6.190).
21
“(i) Esse is the most common of all acts. What makes all things to be cannot reside in
their principles of diversity (their essence), but precisely in that act whereby they are all alike,
namely, the act of being.
“(ii) Esse is by nature prior to any other act. Any action or property presupposes a
subsisting subject in which it inheres, but esse is presupposed by all actions and all subjects, for
without it, nothing would be. Hence esse is not an act derived from what things are; rather it is
precisely what makes them to be.
“(iii) We have to conclude, by exclusion, that esse is the constituent act. No physical or
biological property of beings – their energy, molecular or atomic structure – can make things be,
since all of these characteristics, in order to produce their effects, must, first of all, be.
“In short, esse is the first and innermost act of a being which confers on the subject, from
within, all of its perfections. By analogy, just as the soul is the ‘form’ of the body by giving life
to it, esse intrinsically actualizes every single thing. The soul is the principle of life, but esse is
the principle of entity or reality of all things.”79
Explaining how the act of being (esse) is an act which encompasses all perfections, how
it is an act in the fullest sense, and how, in the final analysis, the act of being (esse) is the
ultimate act of a being (ens), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write that “the multiplicity of creatures
reveals the existence of diverse perfections. But, at the same time, it also reveals a perfection
which is common to all beings, namely esse. Esse transcends any other perfection, since it is
present in an analogous manner in each one of them. Every act presupposes and reveals esse,
although it does so in different ways: life, a color, a virtue, and an action all share in the act of
being in different degrees.
“This common sharing in the act of being and the accompanying diversity in the way it is
possessed and revealed, are an expression of the fact that all creatures are composed of an act
(esse), which eminently encompasses all their perfections, and a potency (essence), which limits
esse to a determinate degree.
“‘Esse’ (the actus essendi) is an act which encompasses all perfections. Just as every
man possesses a substantial form (act on the level of essence), which makes him a man, all
things have an act (esse) by which they are all beings. If the human substantial form were to exist
isolated from individual men, it would contain to the fullest possible degree all the perfections
which individual men have in a limited manner, in terms of number and intensity. If it is, in fact,
found to be restricted, this is due to the potency which receives it and limits it. Similarly, the act
of being of creatures, which is an image of the divine esse, is found to be restricted by a potency
(the essence) which limits the former’s degree of perfection.
“There is, however, an important difference between esse and the other perfections of a
being (the substantial and accidental forms). If any other act were to exist separated from every
potency, it would have the perfection belonging to its own mode of being (a ‘subsistent
humanity’ would be man in his fullness), but would not possess any of the further perfections
79
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 20-22
22
which belong solely to other species. In contrast, the act of being, of itself, encompasses the
perfections, not only of a particular species, but of all real and possible ones.
“‘Esse’ is an act in the fullest sense. It can be seen then, that the act of being is an act in
the full and proper sense, since it does not of itself include any limitation. The other acts, in
contrast, are particular ways of being and, therefore, only potency with respect to the act of
being. In this sense, they have being, not absolutely, but only in a specific way. Hence, it can be
said that they limit esse as a potency limits its act.80
“Since esse possesses most fully the characteristics of act, it can subsist independently of
any potency. Thus, we are able to understand how God can be designated metaphysically as pure
Act of Being, who possesses fully and simply all perfections present among creatures. This pure
Act of Being infinitely surpasses the entire perfection of the whole universe.
“In the final analysis, esse can be fittingly described as the ultimate act of a being (ens),
since all things and each of their perfections or acts are nothing but modes of being or forms
which possess, in a limited way (by participation), the radical act, without which, nothing would
be.
“‘Esse’ is the act of all other acts of a being, since it actualizes any other perfection,
making it be. Human activity, for instance, which is ‘second act,’ has its basis in operative
powers, which constitute ‘first act’ in the accidental order. Along with other accidental
perfections, these powers receive their actuality from the substantial form, which is the first act
of the essence. The entire perfection of the essence, however, stems in turn from esse, which is
therefore quite fittingly called the ultimate act and the act of all the acts of a being (ens).”81
Pérez de Laborda writes concerning the act of being (esse) as the actuality of all acts and
the perfection of all perfections: “San Tommaso afferma che l’atto di essere è un atto ultimo, in
quanto tutte le cose desiderano l’essere,82 ed è l’atto più perfetto, in quanto pone in atto tutte le
perfezioni.83 È dunque atto di tutti gli atti, poiché li attualizza tutti, li fa essere: nessuna delle
forme (essenziali e accidentali) possono attualizzare le rispettive potenze, se non esiste la
sostanza. Ed essa sussiste in virtù dell’essere che ha ricevuto. L’essere, pertanto, è atto rispetto a
tutte le realtà sostanziali, ma anche rispetto a tutte le loro forme (che possono anche chiamarsi
atti).
80
John Duns Scotus gave a formalist slant to metaphysics, thereby destroying the Thomistic doctrine of esse as act.
The same trend was followed by Suarez, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant; these philosophers considered esse not as act,
but as effect (being in act): from esse ut actus to esse actu. Hartmann held the same view…When Heidegger
reproached Western metaphysics for having lost sight of being, he was in fact referring to the kind of metaphysics
which he had known, namely, the formalist type. It is quite well known that Heidegger had a scant knowledge of the
metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas; he had a greater familiarity with Scotus’ metaphysics.
81
82
«L’atto ultimo è l’essere: essendo infatti ogni movimento un passagio dalla potenza all’atto, ultimo atto è ciò a cui
tende ogni moto; e poiché il moto naturale tende a ciò che è naturalmente desiderato, è necessario che l’atto ultimo
sia ciò che tutte le cose desiderano, e questo è l’essere»(Compendium, I, 11).
83
«Fra tutte le cose l’essere è la più perfetta, poiché verso tutte sta in rapporto di atto. Nulla infatti ha l’attualità se
non in quanto esiste: perciò l’essere stesso è l’attualità di tutte le cose, anche delle stesse forme. Quindi esso non sta
in rapporto alle altre cose come il ricevente al ricevuto, ma piuttosto come il ricevuto al ricevente»(Summa
Theologiae, I, a. 4, a. 1, ad 3).
23
“L’essere è inoltre perfezione di ogni perfezione. Senza l’essere della sostanza, ogni sua
perfezione resta una pura possibilità, un’idea astratta non realizzata nella realtà. Tutte le
perfezioni, dunque, perché siano reali, presuppongono l’essere. Ma l’essere è, come abbiamo
annunciato, una perfezione ben diversa a tutte le altre, una perfezione di un ordine che non è
formale.84 Essendo di un ordine diverso, non è una perfezione che si possa aggiungere alle altre
perfezioni, come se fosse una determinazione formale in più. Non è una tra le perfezioni
possedute, ma ciò che rende possibile l’avere delle perfezioni. Possiamo dire, con san Tommaso,
che l’essere è una perfezione intima e profonda,85 che si manifesta nelle molteplici perfezioni di
una realtà. È inoltre una perfezione ricevuta: infatti, è proprio dell’ente creato non
semplicemente essere, ma aver l’essere e averlo ricevuto per partecipazione.”86
In De Potentia Dei, St. Thomas writes: “The act of being (esse) is the most perfect of
all…the act of being (esse)…is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all
perfections”(“esse est inter omnia perfectissimum…esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et
propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum”).87 In Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3
Aquinas states of the act of being (esse): “The act of being (esse) is the most perfect of all things,
for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality
except so far as it is. Hence the act of being (esse) is that which actuates all things, even their
forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as
the received to the receiver”(Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia
ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est: unde ipsum esse est actualitas
omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad
receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens).”88
Étienne Gilson points out that Aquinas’s teaching of the positing of the act of being
(esse) above form “was nothing less than a revolution. He had precisely to achieve the
dissociation of the two notions of form and act. This is precisely what he has done and what
probably remains, even today, the greatest contribution ever made by any single man to the
science of being.”89 Therefore, continues Gilson, “supreme in their own order, substantial forms
remain the prime acts of their substances, but, though there be no form of the form, there is an
act of the form. In other words, the form is such an act as still remains in potency to another act,
namely, the act of being (esse).”90
As supreme and ultimate act in order of substance or essence, the form makes a thing to
be what it will be if it is to be, but supreme and ultimate as it is, form cannot make this thing to
be a being. This is the case, since there is needed from another order an act which is still more
supreme and still more ultimate: the act of being (esse): “The act of being (esse) itself is the
highest act in which all things are capable of participating, but the act of being (esse) itself does
84
«Non si deve pensare che quando si attribuisce ad una cosa l’essere le si aggiunge una qualche cosa che le sia
propria in modo più formale, determinandola, così come l’atto fa con la potenza: l’essere è tale da essere diverso
essenzialmente da ciò cui viene aggiunto per determinarlo»(De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9).
85
Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 8, a. 1.
86
M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA and L. CLAVELL, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
87
De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
88
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.
89
É. GILSON, op.cit., p. 174.
90
Ibid.
24
not participate in anything (“ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus,
ipsum autem nihil participat).”91
Of the fundamental and primary doctrine of the act of being (esse) that is at the heart of
the metaphysics of the Angelic Doctor, Gilson states: “This doctrine is situated at the center of
Thomism…To say that esse is related as an act, even to the form itself – ad ipsam etiam formam
comparatur esse ut actus – is to assert the radical primacy of esse over essence…Understood in
this way, the act of being (esse) is put at the heart, or, if one prefers, at the very root of reality. It
is therefore the principle of the principles of reality.”92
The Act of Being (Esse as Actus Essendi) is Not Identical With Existence (Existentia)
The metaphysical or ontological principle of intensive act of being (esse as actus essendi,
esse in the strong and proper sense, the actuality of all acts and perfection of all perfections) is
not identical with, cannot be reduced to, existence (existentia). Existence (existentia) as result or
the fact of being93 is merely the external aspect of the act of being (esse), the result of a being
(ens) having the act of being (esse as actus essendi) by participation. Alvira, Clavell and
Melendo state: “Existence (existentia) designates no more than the external aspect of the act of
being (esse) – it is an effect, so to speak, of the act of being (esse). Since a being (ens) has the act
of being (esse), it is really there, brought out of nothingness, and it exists. To exist, therefore, is a
consequence of having the act of being (esse).”94 “Esse expresses an act, whereas ‘to exist’
simply indicates that a thing is factually there. When we assert that a thing exists, we want to say
that it is real, that it is not ‘nothing,’ that ‘it is there.’ Esse, however, signifies something more
interior, not the mere fact of being there in reality, but rather the innermost perfection of a thing,
and the source of all its other perfections.”95
91
Q. D. De Anima, a. 6, ad 2.
92
E. GILSON, Le Thomisme, fifth edition, Vrin, Paris, 1947, p. 50.
93
Battista Mondin explains that St. Thomas Aquinas does indeed utilize the term existentia in his works (e.g., the
term is utilized often enough in the Commentary on the Sentences, Summa Contra Gentiles, De Veritate, and the
Commentary on the Metaphysics). However, Mondin notes that the Angelic Doctor does not assign to existentia the
strong, intensive meaning of actus essendi, but rather assigns to it the weak and common meaning of ‘fact of reality’
of some thing, of its pertaining to the real world and not to an imaginary world or to a world of ideas: “Dai testi
citati (Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 29, no. 3655, 3651; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 82; De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3;
In VII Metaphy., lect. 17, no. 1658) risulta che S. Tommaso usa indubbiamente il termine ‘existentia,’ ma non gli
assegna il senso forte, intensivo di ‘actus essendi,’ bensì il senso debole e comune di ‘realtà di fatto’ di qualche cosa,
della sua appartenenza al mondo reale e non a quello immaginario o al mondo delle idee”(B. MONDIN, La
metafisica di S. Tommaso d’Aquino e i suoi interpreti, ESD, Bologna, 2002, pp. 218-219).
94
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 25. The Spanish original: “El existir designa sólo la cara o
aspecto más exterior del ser, como una consequencia suya: porque el ente tiene ser, está ahí realmente, fuera de la
nada, y existe. Existir es como un resultado de tener el ser”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafisica,
EUNSA, Pamplona, 1982, p. 34). The Italian translation: “L’esistere mostra soltanto il volto o l’aspetto più esterno
dell’essere, il suo effetto: poiché l’ente ha l’essere, sta lì realmente fuori del nulla, quindi esiste. L’esistere è la
conseguenza del possedere l’essere”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafisica, Le Monnier, Florence,
1987, p. 21).
95
Ibid. The Spanish original: “…ser expresa un acto, mientras existir indica sólo que una cosa se da «de hecho». Al
afirmar que una cosa «existe», queremos decir que es real, que no es la nada, que «está ahí»; ser, en cambio,
significa algo más interior, no el mero hecho de estar en la realidad, sino la perfección más íntima de una cosa y la
raíz de sus restantes perfecciones.” The Italian translation: “…l’essere esprime un atto, mentre l’esistere indica
soltanto che qualcosa si dà «di fatto». Quando affermiamo che una cosa «esiste», vogliamo dire che è reale, che non
25
Concerning the difference between act of being (actus essendi)/esse ut actus and esse in
actu/existence (existentia) Christian Ferraro writes: “Se badiamo alla terminologia, san
Tommaso si mostra molto libero e l’esse è da lui indicato in diversi modi. Si può trovare, per
esempio, ipsum esse, la formula più frequente – ch’è accompagnata da «subsistens» quando
indica Dio. Seppur meno volte, si può trovare anche actus essendi, cioè «atto di essere»; di
valore simile è l’espressione esse ut actus, che vuol dire «l’essere come atto», cioè l’essere inteso
come un atto. Bisogna distinguere quest’ultima espressione da esse (in) actu: questa significa
piuttosto l’attualità che ottiene l’essenza per via dell’esse (ut actus) partecipato, e si dice sia della
sfera sostanziale che di quella accidentale, come vedremo più avanti; l’esse in actu, talvolta, nel
senso più debole possibile, può anche significare il semplice «stare in atto», ch’è una espressione
più affine al termine «existentia».96 L’esse però è atto in senso forte e non va confuso con il mero
fatto di esistere…L’esse non è il mero fatto di «trovarsi nella realtà», dell’«essere ‘situato’ fuori
del nulla». Il fatto di esistere è oggetto di constatazione, di esperienza, anche se eventualmente
l’esistenza di una determinata realtà può essere oggetto di dimostrazione. La existentia è un fatto
e, come tale, non ha «gradi», non è una perfezione intensiva, come invece è l’esse. La existentia
non è un principio ontologico, ma un semplice fatto, in ogni caso una risultante, e non certo un
costitutivo, ed essendo una risultante è constatabile. L’esse invece non è assolutamente oggetto
diretto di constatazione empirica, poiché è principio costitutivo dell’ens, l’atto profondo, l’atto
attuante ogni atto, l’atto primo-primissimo e intimissimo.”97
Millan Puelles on Fabro Concerning the Difference Between Existentia and Esse as
Actus Essendi
Concerning the difference between existence (existentia) and esse as actus essendi in the
metaphysical thought of Fabro, Antonio Millan Puelles writes that Fabro maintained that
“existence forms part of the act of being, and that the act of being cannot be reduced to
existence…He [Fabro] paid more – in fact, incomparably greater – attention to the distinction
between existence and the act of being. Now, this is not without foundation.
“In the very philosophical tradition that developed on the basis of the teachings of Saint
Thomas, esse had come to be reduced to existence, the latter term having been taken precisely
with the connotation of something that is ‘inessential’ to an entity by virtue of the fact that the
latter is identified with essence, in the sense of a possible quiddity.
“Esse, understood as the actus essendi – which Saint Thomas has regarded as the
primordial and innermost core of every entity – was, in the final analysis, reduced to the status of
something incidental in the eyes of a significant and numerous group of people participating in
that tradition.
è il nulla, che «sta lì»; l’essere, invece, significa qualcosa di più interiore: non il semplice fatto del darsi in realtà, ma
la perfezione più intima di una cosa, radice delle restanti sue perfezioni.”
96
Certi autori son caduti in gravi errori per aver sostituito alla terminologia di san Tommaso, che parla di
composizione fra essentia et esse o, più precisamente, di id quod est et suum esse, un’altra, secondo cui ci sarebbe
composizione fra essentia et existentia e, peggio ancora, fra esse essentiae et esse existentiae…
97
C. FERRARO, op. cit., pp. 184-185.
26
“One must agree with Fabro in rejecting the reductionistic interpretation of esse as
existence, which is already operative at the level of the thesis of the real distinction between
essentia and esse, and one must do so because of the overwhelming documentary evidence
produced by Fabro himself in his taking recourse to Saint Thomas’s own texts, and not on the
basis of mere lucubrations more or less conjectural in character.
“Suffice it to say that it is impossible to translate esse as ‘existence’ when one is

considering the gradations of being, a realization that does not however imply that it would be
valid to take them as if they were gradations of essence, since that which can be participated in
secundum magis et minus (in terms of the more or less) is not essence, but being.
“Existence is part of the act of being but the act of being cannot be reduced to existence.
“Thanks to Fabro (and in opposition to a long line of eminent interpreters of Saint

Thomas’s thought) we have come clearly to see that the reduction of esse to existence is
inadmissible always, not just so far as the real distinction between essence and esse is
concerned.”98
98
A. MILLAN PUELLES, The Theory of the Pure Object, Heidelberg, 1996, pp. 319-325.
27

Critique of Kant On Being and Existence

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CRITIQUE OF KANT ON BEING AND EXISTENCE

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

Kant on Being and Existence

Gilson’s Critique of Kant on Existence

Tyn’s Critique of Kant on Being and Existence

“Logicamente considerando le cose, l’essere non è predicato, ma copula del giudizio,

“Grammaticalmente, «ens» è un «participio», participio presente attivo. È il participio

“«Ens» è dunque un participio. Ora, la forma «participiale» si chiama «participio» perché

“Il participio significa in primo luogo un soggetto o natura e poi (connotativamente)

Concerning Francisco Suárez’s essentialism, the Thomist Joseph M. De Torre writes:

Concerning the anti-realist, essentialist conception of being by the rationalist Wolff, De

Being (ens) is analogical by an analogy of proper proportionality50 and an intrinsic

Answer to Kant: What is Being as Being (Ens qua Ens)?

“Se ci si ferma a questi testi si ha l’impressione che S. Tommaso concepisca l’oggetto

The metaphysics of the Angelic Doctor is therefore a metaphysics of reality, of real

“Insomma la metafisica studia tutto: realtà inanimate, piante, animali, persone e, al

“Suffice it to say that it is impossible to translate esse as ‘existence’ when one is

“Thanks to Fabro (and in opposition to a long line of eminent interpreters of Saint

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