LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (Article VI)
Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition
Section 1
 R.A. No. 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum)
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
I. — General Provisions
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and
Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people
through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or
reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It
may be of two classes, namely:
c.1.
to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition
to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative
on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition
and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to
be determined by and submitted to the Commission on
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan,
and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City
or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may
be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and
referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country,
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. —
(a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the
purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters
as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;
and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance
passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province
or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at
least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or
city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided,
however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1)
legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each
barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality
shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at
least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality,
of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is
deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of
the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election
shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a
scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
II. — National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The
Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or
referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the
Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers
of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not
later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission
of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. —
(a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a
majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the
Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment,
approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days
following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by
the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved
by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed
repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days
following the completion of publication of the proposition and the
certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought
to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the
votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the
Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the
subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which
are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be
subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative
with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The
petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of
the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the
legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as
the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of
Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have
precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the
findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
days from notice thereof.
III. — Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. —
(a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of
autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and
cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or
local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption,
enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body
within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their
duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power
of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body
concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1).
The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative
shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of
autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities,
sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect
the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his
designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the
proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous
region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature
stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on
Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned
shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures
has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat
of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the
Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the
proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days
from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days
in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative
shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall
be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is
approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action
thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the
proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. —
(a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once
a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within
the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body
shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be
cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire,
apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any
proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of
initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed,
modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within
six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended,
modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3)
years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members:
Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one
(1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the
registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the
Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities,
forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in
case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said
referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent
or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
IV. — Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The
Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby
empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the
cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against
the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current
year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions
thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved: August 4, 1989
Section 5
 R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System)
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System
Act."
Section 2. Declaration of party. The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
(a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which
they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct
of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders
and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising
the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging
to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election
purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any
party, organization, or coalition already registered with the
Commission need not register anew. However, such party,
organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than
ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register
as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list
system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers
of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the
petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall,
not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of
national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which
have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under
the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for
posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-
list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered
party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who
have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list
shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding
election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives
who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-
five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2)
votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of
Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for
the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the
house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party,
sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not
be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list
system shall be held in May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign
for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list
system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them
according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list
representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the
list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or
coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected
for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months
before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for
party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by
the next representative from the list of nominees in the order
submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or
coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit
additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List
Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and
emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the
implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular
appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year
1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings
and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on
the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain
valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
 Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
ofMandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong andSan Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:
(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one
subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2
subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district
of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section
Issue:
WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one
city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section
5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on
the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it
was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
 Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec October 6, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering
the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete
the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5,
Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty
(20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is
filled up at all times.
Issue:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers
is mandatory.
Ruling:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same
declared therein a policy to promote “proportional representation” in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
“additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA
7941).
 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied
with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners
elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list
elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the
availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of
law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The
facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that
they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations” . It is however, incumbent upon
the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
“marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid
desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the
inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study
of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of
the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some
guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded
in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.
 BANAT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
Facts:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the
party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a
party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-
list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it
garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to
the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if
garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must
garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed
20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a
new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of
this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
Issues:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
Ruling:
1. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5
seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted
for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x
(0.20) =
Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
2. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not
exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
3. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of
the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there
are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”
4. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners
2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”.
This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the
seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of
the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this
case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the
second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for
the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-
lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not
be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the
party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more
than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and
additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats
shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in
rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
5. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow
major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
“party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution
in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
6. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure
that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
 Sen. Benigno Aquino v. Commission on Elections
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the
province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act
No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district
in a province.
Ruling
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city
to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative,
there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
 Bai Sandra Sema v. Commission on Elections, July 16,
2008
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district
ofMaguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a
plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato
City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 07-0407 “maintaining the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of
Maguindanao.”
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato
City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10,
2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question
as “Shariff Kabunsan Province with Cotabato City”.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City” prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902
and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for
that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution
and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province?
Ruling:
Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of
Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out
of existing ones.Congress exercises these powers through a law the
Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local
legislative bodies. The “power of redistricting xxx is traditionally
regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws”, and is
thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415
(1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of
the superior legislative body which created it. Congress is a
national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress
itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that every province shall
have a legislative district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of
legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly
provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
only “within its territorial jurisdiction.” (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion
legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot
prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly
has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it
cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly,
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
 COMELEC en banc v. AKB et. al. April 2, 2013
Section 6
 Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 300
Facts:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high
school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in
Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during
1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos
was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter
in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections.
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition
for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.
Ruling:
Yes.
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her
own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought
them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because
the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and
not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
 Aquino v. Comelec 248 SCRA 400
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
(remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City.
In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of
the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman
of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a
petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as acandidate for congressman which under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period
not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry
on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days.
The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May.
Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910
votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved
the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino
ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and
June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether or not “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually
connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the
position in the electoral district.
2. Whether or not it is proven that Aquino has established domicile
of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the
district he was running in.
Ruling:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as
synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions
but also under the 1987 Constitution. It is the place “where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election lawr equirements, this
defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he
was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should
prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one
year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks
election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election
indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His
birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his
COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district.
Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of
his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his
stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro
Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to
Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the
case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on
Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
 Co v. HRET 199 SCRA 692
Facts:
In the case of Co vs. Electoral Tribunal[1] the major issue was whether
Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen in contemplation of
Section 6, Article VI in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the
1987 Constitution.
Records show that Ong Te, the grandfather of Jose Ong, Jr., arrived
in the Philippines in 1895. He established his residence in
Laoang, Samar. As such, he was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the Spanish colonial administration.
Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr.’s father, was born in China in 1905. In
1915, he was brought by Ong Te to Samar where he grew up. He was
baptized into Christianity. He married a natural-born Filipina, Agripina
Lao. He also established his residence in Laoang, Samar. In 15
February 1954, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization. He was declared a Filipino citizen on 28
April 1955; the declaration was made final and executory on 15 May
1957. He took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a corresponding
certificate of Naturalization.
Jose Ong, Jr. was then a minor, nine years of age, and still finishing
his elementary education in Samar when his father took his
oath. After completing his elementary education, he went to Manila to
complete his higher education and eventually found employment
there. He, however, frequently went home to Samar where he grew
up.
In 1971, his elder brother was elected a delegate of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Emil’s status as a natural-born citizen was
challenged. The Convention, however, declared Emil as a natural-
born Filipino.
In 1984 and 1986, Jose Jr. registered and voted in Samar. He ran and
won in the 1987 elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar. His opponents protested his election to the post on
the grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The
Court affirmed the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal declaring Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong Jr. is a Filipino Citizen?
Ruling:
Yes.
Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines natural-born citizens
as “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship,” as
well as “those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.”
Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was interpreted by the Court as
applying to those who elected Filipino citizenship not only after 2
February 1987 but also to those who elected citizenship before that
date. It was intended to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of natural-born citizen while one born of Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship, whereby under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born
citizen.
The Court’s based its resolution of the issue by tracing Jose Ong, Jr.
citizenship to his mother who was a natural-born Filipina. What is
material to the case is whether he elected Filipino citizenship when he
reached the age of majority as provided for by Section 1 (4) Article IV
of the 1935 Constitution which was the operative law when he was
born. Under the 1987 Constitution, natural-born status can only be
accorded to individuals who elected citizenship upon reaching
majority. In the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for Ong, Jr. to
formally or in writing elect citizenship when he came of age as he was
already a citizen since he was nine by virtue of his mother being a
natural-born citizen and his father a naturalized Filipino.
Furthermore, election can be both formal and informal. In In
Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) it was held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage when one comes of age constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. The rule in the Mallare case was
applied whereby Jose Ong’s exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises were considered positive acts of
electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
voting during election, running for public office, and other categorical
acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice.
These, according to the court, cannot be less binding than the filing of
a sworn statement or formal declaration.
Section 7
 Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779
Facts:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative
district of Lanao del Sur during the1987 congressional elections.
Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of t h e H o u s e e x c l u d e d t h e
name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR
u n d e r A r t I X o f S e c 6 7 o f t h e Omnibus Election Code.
Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume
performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the
Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat
in the Congress.
Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman
because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present
constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members
of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. H o l d i n g a n y o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y m e n t i n t h e g
overnment or ant subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly
behavior.
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral
tribunal in an election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office
Issue:
Whether or not Dimaporo can still be considered as a member
of Congress even after he has filed for another government position?
Ruling:
No.
In the constitution there is a newchapter on the accou
n t a b i l i t y o f p u b l i c o f f i c e r s . I n t h e 1 9 3 5 Constitution, it
was provided that public office is a public trust. Public
officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and
integrity.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the
one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend
to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and
therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or
abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should
therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service.
Section 11
 Jimenez v. Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876
Facts:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by
way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a
privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the
lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged
communication?
Ruling:
No, the publication in question is a not privileged communication.
The Constitution provides that:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in
this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the
acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said
letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor,
the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
 People v. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689
Facts:
Accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on
6 counts is pending appeal.
He filed a Motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
He argues that the sovereign electorate of the 1st District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
the functions of a Congressman.
Issue:
Does re-election to a public office gives priority to any other right or
interest, including the police power of the State.
Ruling:
The privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government – executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public
mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself,
frees the official from the common restrains of general law. Privilege
has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives, the later customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history
of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
A Congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity form arrest. He was subject to the same general laws
governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal. x x x For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2) , Article VI of the
Constitution. However, the accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11,
Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
 Antero Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
Facts
PETITIONER
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the senate floor. The following
excerpts are the ones in question:
"x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I
am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x."
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on
the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. Accordingly,
Pobre asked that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
RESPONDENT
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she
made were covered by the constitutional provision
on parliamentary immunity being part of a speech she delivered in
the discharge of her duty as member
o f c o n g r e s s o r i t s committee. She claims to have made those
comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of
the judicial and bar council for the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article ," Section 11 which
states that:
“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is
in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any committee thereof.”
Issue:

W hether or not Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
can be charged for her comments on the judiciary?
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of
Senator Defensor-Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has
gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct for the
statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. The court is not hesitant to impose some form of
disciplinary sanctions on her but the factual and legal circumstances
of this cases however deter the court from doing so even without any
sign of remorse from her. The petition is dismissed.
Section 13
 Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133, 143-145
Facts
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as
amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing
section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the
AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for
the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797
was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the
wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were
an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino
issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a
valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that
RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it
tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The
veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
Issue:
Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General
Appropriatons Act?
Ruling:
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions
is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the
Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its
exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He
or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill,
including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the
Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid
inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the President
was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.
Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-
called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his
part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill
represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof
automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935
Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have
acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in
force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the
Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in
such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
 3 ways how a bill becomes a law:
No, Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene
1. When the President signs it in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art.
2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote VI) of the Constitution.
of all the members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days In the case at bar, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body
after it shall have been presented to him. under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he
is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in
Section 14 litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before
the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself
 Puyat v. De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under
the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest –
Facts: which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A
mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently
questioned by Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not
properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before
the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI
from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by
SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 ’79) to have the
parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to
anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being
cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for
Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said
SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner
of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect
granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question
the Commissioner’s action.

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI,

may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII
(now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution.

Ruling: