1
JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña
G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 –Political Law-Citizenship
FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of
Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting
a certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commission
that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the evidence
presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a
legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President
Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having
been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent
is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates
for obtaining the highest number of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine
Citizenship cannot be presumed.
HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost
his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63
these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
Law of the foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other
modes of losing Philippine citizenship.
The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of
citizens is iniminical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law”
has no retroactive effect.
The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is
hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC,
FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen
despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of
the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the
basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
“qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not
of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a
Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
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Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative... are
evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having respondent, Jose Ong,... Jr.
died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his second district of Northern Samar.
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--- on the following grounds:
respondent’s father.
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as Samar
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation Samar.
that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal Issues:
filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.
whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that abuse of discretion.
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
ON THE ISSUE OF
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code. Ruling:

ANTONIO Y. CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's
GR Nos. 92191-92, 1991-07-30 grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China.

Facts: To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected

citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
a decision of the was his mother a... natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
(HRET).
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
citizen and a resident of
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
Northern Samar expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we
apply the In Re Mallare rule.
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
On
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
was held. cannot be... less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during

election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations... of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing
is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when... he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would
also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected
citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age,
his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its
benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had... already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."
Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago et al.,
G.R. No. L-83882
January 24,1989
Facts:
Petitioner Willie Yu is a Portuguese National who acquired Philippine
citizenship by naturalization on February 10,1978. Despite his
naturalization, he applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese
Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.
Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on July
20, 1986. Being a naturalized Filipino, he signed commercial documents
stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of an
appropriate Philippine consul. He was then detained by the CID for
obtaining a foreign passport while having a Filipino citizenship. Yu then
filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November
1988 referred the case to the Court en Banc. The Court en Banc denied
the petition. He then filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for
restraining order but it was denied. After denial, he filed a motion for
clarification with prayer for restraining order. On December 7,1988, the
temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued. The respondent filed a
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motion to lift the said TRO, contending that Yu was in full knowledge and
Legal capacity when he applied for Philippine citizenship through
naturalization he consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the
oath taken which states to renounce “absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty” and pledged to maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or
restrictions once solemnizing said oath and its succeeding consequences
should they be violated.
Issue:
Was the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship?
Ruling:
Yes, considering the facts stated, the court ruled that the Petitioner’s acts
constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship through
naturalization. Express naturalization means renunciation made known
distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is implied. After acquiring
Philippine citizenship, with full knowledge, he resumed his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
and representing himself as a Portuguese in official and commercial
documents. The court found that such acts are grossly inconsistent with
the maintenance of his Philippine citizenship.
LABO v COMELEC
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival,
Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as
Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make
him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and
Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married
an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship
is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in
the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was
not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his
act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian
passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship,
he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of
Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack
of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not
tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have
voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city.
Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto
proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s
disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number
of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.
FRIVALDO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
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Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon
and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with
the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect
himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this
being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section
1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid
repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws
of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL
R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon
until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he
was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995,

the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the
Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the
following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor
of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the
petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment
of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the
said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening,
there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee — should
occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the
herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the
highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".
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Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino
citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or
hold the governorship of Sorsogon – NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and
legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!
Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying
Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in
G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was
disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any
of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for
the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains that
he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs.
COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, just that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-
acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number
of votes in the 1995 elections, he—not Lee —should be proclaimed.
Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
==========================================================
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government
Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has

been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect
up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason
of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to
resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his
unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and
political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he
having given ' up his U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and
should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration
as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date
as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding
that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority
and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the
way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection,
defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court
has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign
will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would
give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
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majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with
his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the
effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to
show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995
elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec
that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his
consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any
elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate
from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the
ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled
against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes
harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the
larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he
sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about
his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he
returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The
people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an
oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-
assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his
consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native
Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and
love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court
of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After
all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the
most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly
insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved

land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law
which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and
above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most
certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.
ANGAT v REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until
he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. On
11 March 1996, he filed before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a
petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, RepublicAct No. 965 and Republic Act No.
2630. The case was thereafter set for initial hearing.
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The
motion was initially denied by the trial judge but after a motion for
reconsideration, it was granted. The petitioner was ordered to take his
oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. 8171. After taking his oath of
allegiance, the trial court issued an order repatriating petitioner and
declaring him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Republic ActNo.
8171. The Bureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel his alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen.
On 19 March 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) asserting that the
petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of
jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee
on Naturalization consistently withAdministrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"),
dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had
tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing
agency of R.A 8171. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the
petition.
Petitioner appealed contending that the RTC seriously erred in dismissing
the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285,
absent a provision on Retroactive Application.
ISSUES:
7
WON Court erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to
AO 285, absent a provision on Retroactive Application
HELD:
No. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05
June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for
repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who
lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on
Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created
pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975,
as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04
June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was
deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of
27 March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission
on Elections, 9 the Court observed that the aforedatedmemorandum of
President Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on
Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court
elaborated:
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal
of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal
may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made
because then President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy
furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D.
725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect.
In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On
the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless
it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws
are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."
Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; hence, when
petitioner filed his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on
Naturalizationconstituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was
in place.Administrative Order 285, promulgated on 22 August 1996
relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory
issuance.
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's
petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not

with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04
October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor
could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.
It should also be noteworthy that the was one for repatriation, and it was
thusincorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and
R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost
their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the
United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition,
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court,
and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in
the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship
was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection
with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To,
or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Bengson who was then running for reelection.
8
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,

acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
VALLES v COMELEC
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only
as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran
for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones
9
Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte....
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco
was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both
candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest
number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the
ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and
a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office
in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore,
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from
the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath
that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully
10
complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
GALLEGO vs. VERA
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the CFI of Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s
election to the office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the
election of Dec. 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence
qualification.

Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed
as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities
in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog, Leyte, but lost. In
June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the
Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his
loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in Sept.
1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in
the election for assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940, He
obtained and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of
Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had resided in the
said municipality for 1.5 yrs.
The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the
time he was elected mayor there on the grounds that:
1. He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon
2. He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen
3. He obtained a residence cert from the municipality of
Malaybalay
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and
acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
HELD:
No. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay
as an employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence
certificate there for 1940. The decision of the CA is reversed.
RATIO:
In the definition of “residence” in the election law under the 1935
Constitution, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there
must concur:
1. Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality
2. An intention to remain there
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period
of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in
Malaybalay indefinitely because:
1. When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always
returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in
1937
2. His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the
financial drawback caused by his loss in the election
3. He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him
11
4. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the
land in the plantation offered to him by the government
5. He visited his family no less than three times despite the great
distance between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon
The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to:
“exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with
the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.”
And the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before,
and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class
municipality.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission On elections and Cirilo Roy
Montejo
G.R. No. 119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor. The private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo,
a candidate in the same position, filled a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
lacked one year of the constitutional requirement for residency and
prayed for an order declaring the disqualification and cancelation of the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. Petitioner changed the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate. The Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that deadline for the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
already lapsed. Petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Manila. The Second
Division of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13
came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3)
cancelling her original Certificate Candidacy. The COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration declaring her not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Leyte. the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections but
then reversed itself by issuing another resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains
the highest number of votes. Based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers, petitioner claimed that she was the
winner of the elections.

Issues:
1. Whether the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995
elections.
2. Whether the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code
for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
Decision:
The resolutions were set aside and the respondent COMELEC was
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
1. Yes, the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte. Residence implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place it needs physical presence of the person to consider
the place as his or her residence. A person can only have a one domicile,
unless if he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice while in terms of residence it is normal for an individual
to have different residences in various places. The word residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. The petitioner lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos because petitioner was obliged, under
Article 110 of the Civil Code, to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. Petitioner obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. No, the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code
for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. With the
enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction
to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.
3. The HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction
over the question.
Romualdez v. RTC etal, Sept. 14, 1993
Facts:
Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy
Romualdez and a niece of Imelda Marcos. In 1980, he established his
12
residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the days of
People Power, relatives of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for
their personal safety, fled the country. One of them are the Romuladezes
– they left the country and sought asylum in the United States.
However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the
U.S. or else they’ll be deported. Upon receipt of the information,
Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay his return to his
residence in Leyte and immediately registered himself as a voter.
In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude
petitioner from the list of the voters alleging that the latter is a U.S.
resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter. However,
the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the
petition to the RTC, the appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and
disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte despite his sudden departure to the U.S?
Ruling:
The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter
because he is still considered a resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power
Revolution must have caused great fear to the Romualdezes, and as
having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is
understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described
as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment of residence’.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political
right; a bounden duty of every citizen enabling them to participate in the
government process to ensure the will of the people.
AKBAYAN v COMELEC
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth
movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May
2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December
27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a
special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged
grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register
and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic
Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days
before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that
under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its
residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts
including voters registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the
clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters
registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular
election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures
like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The
State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities
could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to
the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be
reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration,
COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially
create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the
additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again,
verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then
they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and
distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been
overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration.
In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the
allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere
in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from
an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact
that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also,
AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an
extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which
is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights.
Ceniza v. Comelec, 96 Scra 763 (1980)
CASE DIGEST
FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC
adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in
chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly
urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities
(whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The
City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a
chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added
Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections,
13
Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or
Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51
and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of
voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind
the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue
City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically
known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered
voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of
Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the
province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue
never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB
885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as
the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the
provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise
of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification
amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy
of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is
of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement
that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary
of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the
approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into
being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and
therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which
came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component
cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon
substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it
is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city
has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically situated.
Cities with smaller income need thecontinued support of the
provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the
voters in the election of provincialofficials in some instances.
 14

elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are
allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The
practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for
provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another
component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither
the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

MACALINTAL v COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of

the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the
validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad

can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes
an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes
and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to

physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-
absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his
domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as
a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of
Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners
in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way
would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The
canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential