37

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 160621
November 10, 2003

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, directing the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to
the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the aforementioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against CJ Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
Held:

1. Yes. The second impeachment complaint is barred under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution. The initiation takes place by the act of filing the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least 1/3 of the members of
the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another may not be filed against the same official within a one-
year period. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against CJ Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with 7 associate justices of this Court on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
 Fuentebella on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2. No. The judicial power is not only a power but also a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." There are two species of political questions:
(1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature. The court
did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turned justiciable
issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

“Truly political questions are beyond the power of judicial review.”

 38

Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB

38 SCRA 429 | G.R. No. L-23127
April 29, 1971

Facts: Plaintiff, Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, obtained a loan for P450 from PNB dated July 19, 1939,
maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. As of November 27, 1969, the balance of
the loan was P1,294. On July 13 1959, 15 years after the maturity of the loan, PNB instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the remaining unpaid loan balance.

On August 10, 1959, plaintiff countered with a suit against both defendants alleging that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, 15 years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB
contended that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945,
when Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative
act extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.

The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or not the period of effectivity of E.O. No. 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law
before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription.

Held: Yes. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.”

The prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged
void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Due to the judicial recognition that
moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers,
prescription did not run during the 8-year period that E.O. No. 32 and R.A. No. 342 were in force. From
July 19, 1944 to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by PNB, the
time consumed is 6 days short of 15 years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10,
1945, the effectivity of E.O. No. 32, to May 18, 1953, covering 8 years, 2 months and 8 days.

Therefore, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was
time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

“Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute, there is an operative fact with attached
legal consequences which cannot justly be ignored.”
 39

Salazar vs. Achacoso

183 SCRA 145 | G.R. No. 81510
March 14, 1990

Facts: On October 31, 1987, petitioner, Hortencia Salazar, was charged by complainant, Rosalie Tesoro,
for not returning the latter’s PECC card. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez sent a telegram to the petitioner directing the latter to appear before him at the POEA Anti
Illegal Recruitment Unit on account of a case filed against her. On the same day, having ascertained that
the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
Achacoso, the administrator of POEA, issued Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205.

Serving the said order on January 26, 1988, the team was voluntarily allowed entry by Mrs. Flora Salazar
who informed them that Hannalie Dance Studio, operated by petitioner, was accredited with Moreman
Develpment (Phil.). However, she was unable to show any credentials. The team confiscated assorted
costumes duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

On January 26, 1988, petitioner filed a letter to POEA requesting for the immediate return of the
personal properties seized at her residences on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner.

On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition. On even
date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her.

Issue: Whether or not the POEA or Secretary of Labor can issue warrants of arrest and seizure under
Article 38 of the Labor code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

Held: No. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987
Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception
is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

Therefore, Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared unconstitutional and null and void. The
respondents are to return all materials seized.

“Only judges may issue warrants of arrest and search.”

 40

League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056
August 24, 2010

Facts: On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject
16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection
clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the
respondents' first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split
vote, denied the respondents' second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008
Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without
any exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November
2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December
2009. Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly
reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the 16 Cityhood laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:

1. Yes. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no . . . city shall be created
. . . except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." The
Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation
of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption
contrary to the express language of the Constitution. In other words, Congress exceeded and
abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for violating the
Constitution.
2. Yes. The classification criterion — mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress — is
not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities. This violates the requirement that a valid classification
must not be limited to existing conditions only. In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into
cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision
found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Note: This decision has been overruled in the another decision pertaining to the same case.
 League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056
February 15, 2011

Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of
Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the
constitutionality of the 16 laws, each converting the municipality covered into a component city, and
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. The cityhood
laws concern the following municipalities: (1) Batac, Ilocos Norte; (2)El Salvador, Misamis Oriental; (3)
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte; (4) Borongan, Eastern Samar; (5) Lamitan, Basilan; (6) Catbalogan,
Samar; (7) Bogo, Cebu; (8) Tandag, Surigao del Sur; (9) Bayugan, Agusan del Sur; (10) Carcar, Cebu; (11)
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental; (12) Tayabas, Quezon; (13) Tabuk, Kalinga; (14) Baybay, Leyte; (15) Mati,
Davao Oriental; and (16) Naga, Cebu.

The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. Petitioners also complain about
the purported reduction of their “just share” in the IRA.

The Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws. On
November 18, 2008 the cityhood laws were struck down as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10
and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. The tenor of the ponencias is that the exemption
clauses were not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 particularly Section 450, as amended by
R.A. No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001. Further, it was also ruled that the Cityhood Laws
infringed on the “just share” that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from the
national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them. On December 21, 2009, the cityhood laws
were declared to be constitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Cityhood laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:

1. No. The 16 Cityhood Laws do not violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X, and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The enactment of R.A. No. 9009 increased the financial requirement
which was simply intended to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become
component cities. The three requirements for a municipality to become a city are: (1) the
financial requirement which increased from P20M to P100M from locally generated funds
excluding the internal revenue share from the government; (2) the population requirement
which is still 150,000; and (3) the land area requirement which is still 100 sq. km. Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered
 by the new and higher income requirement. The exemption clauses found in the individual
Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities
from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

2. No. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided
that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. The
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. It is an undeniable fact that some cities remain
viable as component cities of their respective provinces even though they no longer meet the
financial requirement. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 was merely to stop the
mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and address the apprehension
that before long the country will be a country of cities with no municipalities. Moreover,
petitioners are entitled to a “just share,” not a specific amount. The feared reduction proved to
be false when, after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased.
In enacting the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities disadvantaged by the
abrupt increase in the income requirement, acknowledging the “privilege” already given to
those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were
undeniably in the same footing or “class” as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely
recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities
of their respective provinces.

“To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.”

---

Additional Notes:

Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of
the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses
plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention
of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution
must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body
by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in
no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality
of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.