Tomas de Vera was the owner of two parcels of land in Tondo, Manila.
In 1961, de Vera sold the lands to
Double Sale
ADDISON V. FELIX (August 03, 1918)
FACTS:
Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to Defendant spouses Felix and Tioco located in LucenaCity.
Respondents paid 3K for the purchase price and promised to pay the remaining by installment. The
contract provides that the purchasers may rescind the contract within one year after the issuance of title
on their name.
The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey designaton and delivery of the land but only 2 parcels were
designated and 2/3 of it was in possession of a Juan Villafuerte.
The other parcels were not surveyed and designated by Addison.
Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the first installment but the latter contends that there
was no delivery and as such, they are entitled to get back the 3K purchase price they gave upon the
execution of the contract.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid delivery.
HELD:
The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold. With respect to two of the parcels of land,
he was not even able to show them to the purchaser; and as regards the other two, more than two-thirds
of their area was in the hostile and adverse possession of a third person.
It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may
produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing
sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer
upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control.
When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser
by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient.
But if there is an impediment, delivery cannot be deemed effected.
Sostenes Campillo vs Court of Appeals
129 SCRA 513 – Civil Law – Law on Sales – Contract of Sale – Efficacy – Need to Register Sale in the Registry
of Deeds – PD 1529
Simplicio Santos. Santos however did not register the sale in the Registry of Deeds, which means that the
land was still under de Vera’s name.
On the other hand, de Vera was indebted to Sostenes Campillo. Campillo obtained a favorable judgment
for sum of money against de Vera. De Vera’s 3 parcels of land, including those sold to Santos, were levied
in 1962 in favor of Campillo. Campillo acquired the land and he was able to have the lands be registered
under his name.
ISSUE: Who has better right over the property: Santos who first bought it withouto registering it or
Campillo who subsequently purchased it at a public auction and have it registered under his name?
HELD: Campillo has the right over the said properties. It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real
estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes
legally effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Santos purchase of the two
parcels of land may be valid but it is not enforceable against third persons for he failed to have it
registered.
Campillo is a purchaser in good faith as he was not aware of any previous sale for Santos never caused the
annotation of the sale.
Section 51, PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides as follows:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. – An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may
use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no
deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument except a will purporting to convey or affect registered
land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
“The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
The purchaser (Campillo) in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and
interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein.
This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is
sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.
LEONARDO v. MARAVILLA
GR No. 143369 November 27, 2002
FACTS:
Mariano Torres, predecessor-in-interest of respondents, owns a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 2355
(34515). The said land was sold by Mariano to Eusebio Roxas but the latter was not able to register the
same due to a legal dispute between Mariano and a certain Francisco Fernandez. Mariano eventually won
that case in 1972.
Petitioner now buys the lot from Eusebio Roxas and asked that it be registered under his name. He was not
able to do so because the Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title (ODCT) was still in the hands of
respondents and that the Register of Deeds made an affidavit that the original copy of TCT No. 2355
(34515) could not be retrieved or located in their office. Petitioner files an adverse claim. On May 1993, the
Register of Deeds found the original TCT of the land and annotated thereon the adverse claim filed by
petitioner on May 20, 1993.
Petitioner claims that he is the lawful owner of said land having purchased it from Eusebio Roxas and
having protected his rights through the annotation of adverse claim when the register of Deeds found the
Original TCT. Respondents counter that the action has been barred by prescription and laches, it being filed
only 21 years from the time the right of action has commenced. Petitioner claims that his action is an
accion reivindicatoria which prescribes in 30 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s action is barred by prescription and laches.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner’s action is actually an action for specific performance. It is a fundamental principle
that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but by delivery. The delivery of a thing constitutes a
necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of
a contract. The execution of the contract is only a presumptive, not conclusive delivery which can be
rebutted by evidence to the contrary, as when there is failure on the part of the vendee to take material
possession of the land subject of the sale in the concept of a purchaser-owner.
Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not pass by mere
stipulation but only by delivery, and the execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient
delivery where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third persons, it becomes
incontestable that even if included in the contract, the ownership of the property in dispute did not pass.
Clearly, the case filed by petitioner was an action for specific performance of a written contract of sale
which, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, prescribes in 10 years from the accrual of the right of
action. the annotation on May 20, 1993 of the November 13, 1972 affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No.
2355 (34515) afforded no protection to petitioner for the same reason that said belated assertion of his
alleged right over the property is barred by prescription and laches.
Moreover, the affidavit of adverse claim registered by petitioner in 1972 was ineffective. The law enforced
at the time petitioner filed an adverse claim was Section 110 of Act 496, also known as the Land
Registration Act.
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's assertion that the prescriptive period should commence to run
only on May 18, 1993 when the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2355 (34515) was retrieved
by the Register of Deeds. The loss of the original title will not prevent petitioner’s pursuit to enforce his
right. Otherwise stated, the recovery of the original title or the reconstitution thereof is not the only means
by which petitioner could protect his right. Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code - "[t]he prescription of
actions is interrupted when they are filed in court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor." Petitioner therefore
may pursue either judicial or extrajudicial means manifesting his interest in the questioned property in
order to interrupt the prescriptive period.
Certainly, petitioner’s action filed on September 6, 1993 is barred by the 10 year prescriptive period from
the accrual of his alleged right of action on September 29, 1972. In the same vein, said action is barred by
laches having allowed 21 years to lapse before enforcing his alleged right. Laches is defined as failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert
it.
ROMEO PAYLAGO v. INES PASTRANA JARABE, GR No. L-20046, 1968-03-27
Facts:
The entire lot involved in this suit was originally covered by Homestead Patent issued on
1920... and later under OCT... of the Registry of Deeds of Mindoro,... in the name of Anselmo Lacatan.
On 1948, after the death of Anselmo Lacatan, TCT... was issued in the name of his two sons and heirs, Vidal
and Florentino Lacatan. Vidal Lacatan died on
1953, Vidal Lacatan's heirs... in favor of the spouses Romeo Paylago and Rosario Dimaandal, plaintiffs...
over a portion of the entire lot
1953, Florentino Lacatan also died, leaving as his heirs, his widow and three children,... the said children of
Florentino Lacatan likewise executed a deed of sale... in... favor of the same vendees over another portion
of the same lot
1954, by virtue of the registration of the two deeds of sale... a new TCT... covering the total area... hectares
was issued in favor of... the Paylago spouses.
A... subsequent subdivision survey... disclosed that... one half hectare... of the total area purchased by...
plaintiffs... was being occupied by defendant-respondent.
Hence, the action to recover possession and ownership of the said portion.
said portion of land was purchased by Hilario Jarabe, late husband of defendant... from one Apolonio
Lacatan, which... sale is evidenced by an unregistered deed of sale... that Apolonio Lacatan, in turn, bought
the same in 1936 from Anselmo Lacatan, the original registered owner
After trial, the lower court held that plaintiffs... were not purchasers in good faith... and... rendered
judgment in favor of defendant
Issues:
Who has a better right in case of double sale of real property, the registered buyer or the prior but
unregistered purchaser?
Ruling:
as between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, in good faith, has a preferred
right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is... in the actual possession of the
immovable property
Article 1544, providing that if the same innovable property should have been sold to different vendees,
"the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of
property."
There is no question that the sales made in favor of plaintiffs-petitioners were registered while the alleged
sale executed in favor of defendant-respondent was not. Applying the foregoing principle of law to the
instant case, it is now contended by... plaintiffs-petitioners that their certificate of title must prevail over
defendant-respondent
Both Courts below found that petitioners knew beforehand that the parcel of land in question was owned
by defendant-respondent.
coupled with their knowledge that defendant-respondent purchased the same from Apolonio Lacatan,
plaintiffs-petitioners should have inquired and made an investigation as to the possible defects of the title
of the Lacatan heirs over the entire lot sold to them,... granting that the latter's certificate of title was
clear. This, they failed to do. They cannot now claim complete ignorance of defendant-respondent's claim
over the property.
"a purchaser... who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigation as to
possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and investigation, cannot claim
that he is a purchaser in good faith and had acquired a valid title thereto." (Sampilo... v. Court of Appeals
To be entitled to the priority, the second vendee must not only show prior recording of his deed... of
conveyance or possession of the property sold, but must, above all, have acted in good faith, that is to say,
without knowledge of the existence of another alienation by his vendor to a stranger
Short of this qualifying circumstance, the mantle of legal protection and the consequential guarantee of
indefeasibility of title to the registered property will not in any... way shelter the recording purchaser
against known and just claims of a prior though unregistered buyer. Verily, it is now settled jurisprudence
that knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchaser makes him a
purchaser in bad... faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his title acquired by virtue of the later
instrument of conveyance which was registered in the Registry of Deeds
The registration of the later instrument creates no right as against the first purchaser.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAZARO MANGAWANG, ET AL.,G.R. No. L-18861 June
30, 1964
FACTS:
Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent overa parcel of
land. Pending action on his application, cadastral proceedings were instituted by thegovernment wherein
Amposta filed an answer praying for the adjudication of the same land in his favor.In 1920, the cadastral
court rendered decision awarding the land to Amposta. Since no advice on thismatter was given either to
the Bureau of Lands or to the Governor General, the latter issued in favor ofAmposta a Homestead Patent
covering the same land, and an Original Certificate of Title No. 100 issuedto him. In 1922, the cadastral
court issued a decree of registration of the land in favor of Ampostapursuant to the decision rendered in
the cadastral case, and an Original Certificate of Title No. 2668 wasissued to him covering the same
property. In1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos Camachosurrendering to him Original Certificate of
Title No. 100, and because of this transfer said title wascancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 5506
was issued in the name of Camacho. In 1946, SantosCamacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho as
a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 248was issued to the latter. In 1948, Bonifacio Camacho
mortgaged the land to the Rehabilitation FinanceCorporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines),
and having failed to pay the loan as agreedupon the land was sold at public auction to said bank as the
highest bidder. The period of redemptionhaving elapsed without Camacho being able to redeem the
property, a final deed of sale was executedin favor of the bank, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6961
was issued in its name. Meanwhile, in1947, Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and
Arsenio Mangawang for the sum ofP2,000.00, the vendees executing a mortgage on the land to secure the
payment of the balance. Havingpaid the balance of the purchase price, and an absolute deed of sale was
executed in their favor. Inconnection with this transaction, Amposta surrendered to the vendees the title
that was issued to him inthe cadastral case, which was later substituted by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1098 issued in thename of the vendees. The Mangawang brothers took possession thereof, and upon
learning of thistransfer, the DBP, which as already stated became the owner of the property, commenced
the presentaction against them in the Court of First Instance of Bataan to recover its possession and The lien, established in Sec.4 of Rule 74 of the Old and Revised Rules of Court, in case of summary
damages. Thecourt rendered decision awarding the land to the Mangawang brothers. Hence, this appeal. settlement of a decedent’s estate, is effective only for a period of 2 yrs. After the 2 yr period, such
becomes “functus oficio” and it may be cancelled at the instance of the transferee of the land involved.
ISSUE: W/N the Mangawang brothers have better right over the subject property.

HELD:Since both purchasers apparently have acted in good faith the Court cannot but conclude thatthe
sale made by Amposta to Santos Camacho is the valid one considering that when Amposta sold thesame
land to the Mangawang brothers he had nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered tothem is one
issued covering the same property. In legal contemplation, therefore, Amposta sold aproperty he no longer
owned, and hence the transaction is legally ineffective. On the other hand, thecase can also be treated as
one of double sale, where a person sells the same land to two differentpersons who are unaware of the
flaw that lies in its title, and where the law adjudicates the property tothe purchaser who first registers the
transaction in his name in the registry of property. In applying thisprinciple, the Court cannot conclude that
the title should likewise be adjudicated to appellant whose
predecessor-in-interest acquired and registered the property much ahead in point of time than
theappellees. Verily, the title acquired by the latter is invalid and ineffective, contrary to the finding of
thecourt a quo.
PURA CARREON VS RUFO AGCAOILI
FACTS:
Sps. Bonifacio and Celerina Carreon purchased the land subject of this case. When Bonifacio died, Celerina
adjudicated to herself the land declaring herself as the sole heiress of her husband for which a transfer
certificate was issued in her name on Sept 28, 1946 with an annotation that it was subject to Sec. 4 Rule 74
of the RoC. She then borrowed money from the PNB secured by a REM on ½ of the land. To pay for the
loan, ½ was sold to Rufo Agcaoili hence a new TCT was issued in his name. In Feb 1955, the children of
Celerina sought to have a deed of sale executed by their mother be declared as one of mortgage and to
recover the ½ tract of land. The court ruled in favor of Agcaoli hence this appeal. It was alleged that
Agcaoili was a buyer in bad faith and that a trust relationship existed.
ISSUE: Whether Agcaoli was a buyer in good faith
HELD: YES!
There is no clear proof the Agcaoli knew of any flaw in the title of Celerina. The mere fact of being a
townmate is not a sufficient basis to conclude that he knew she had children. It was shown that he rarely
came home since he was an enlisted man in the Phil. Constabulary hence he cannot be expected to know
the relatives and children of this vendor. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear and
sufficient evidence. If fraud was committed, such was perpetrated by Celerina. Agcaoli is only charged with
notice of the burdens which are noted on the face of the title and nothing more.
In this case, more than 2 yrs had elapsed, from Sept. 28, 1946 to Sept. 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in
favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered.
CARUMBA v. CA
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L.
Vendor: Spouses Amado Canuto & Nemesia Ibasco
Vendee: (1) Spouses Amado Carumba & Benita Canuto; (2) Santiago Balbuena
Point: Case exception to the rule that in the case of a double sale, registration in good faith prevails over
possession.
Facts:
1. Subject land: a parcel of “partly residential, partly coconut” land (with periphery area of 359.09
square meters) in Camarines Sur
2. April 12, 1955 – VENDOR sold subject land to VENDEE1 by virtue of a "Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land with Covenants of Warranty" for the sum of P350.00. The deed of sale was
never registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, and the Notary, Mr.
Vicente Malaya, was not then an authorized notary public in the place.
3. January 21, 1957 – a complaint for sum of money was filed by VENDEE2 against the VENDOR
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Iriga, Camarines Sur. Such complaint ripened into a civil
case of which a decision was later on rendered dated April 15, 1957 in favour of VENDEE2
against the VENDOR.
4. Oct 1, 1968 -- the ex-officio Sheriff of Camarines Sur issued a "Definite Deed of Sale of the
property in favour of VENDEE2. Such instrument of sale was registered before the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur. The aforesaid property was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of VENDEE2.
CFI: Ruled in favour of VENDEE1. The court, based on its findings, declared VENDEE1 the owner of the
property under a consummated sale because after the execution of the sale, they immediately took
possession of the land planting thereon bananas, coffee and other vegetables thereon. Also held as void
the the execution levy made by the sheriff and nullified the sale in favour of VENDEE2.
CA: Reversed CFI and ruled in favour of VENDEE2. There having been a double sale of the land, VENDEE2’s
title was superior to that of VENDEE1 under Article 1544 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, since the
execution sale had been properly registered in good faith and the sale to VENDEE1 was not recorded.
Issue/s:
1. Who is the real owner of the land?
Held + Rationale:
1. VENDEE1 is the real owner.
Article 1544 finds no application in the case at bar, even if VENDEE2, the later vendee, was ignorant of the
prior sale made by his judgment debtor in favor of VENDEE1.
Under Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff's
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in
the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
While the time of the levy does not clearly appear, it could not have been made prior to 15 April 1957,
when the decision against the former owners of the land was rendered in favor of Balbuena. But the deed
of sale in favor of Canuto had been executed two years before, on 12 April 1955, and while only embodied
in a private document, the same, coupled with the fact that the buyer (VENDEE1) had taken possession of
the unregistered land sold, sufficed to vest ownership on the said buyer. When the levy was made by the
Sheriff, therefore, the judgment debtor no longer had dominical interest nor any real right over the land
that could pass to the purchaser at the execution sale. Hence VENDEE2 must yield to VENDEE1.
SPS Santiago v CA (full)
Tan v CA (full)
IGNACIO CARDENTE VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SPOUSES RUPERTO RUBIN AND
PRIMITIVA C. RUBIN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
This is a simple case of a double sale of an immovable property. The trial court decided[1]in favor of the
first vendee although the sale was by a private document. The then Intermediate Appellate Court reversed
and set aside the decision[2] of the lower court. The public respondent appellate court ruled in favor of the
second buyers, who registered their deed of sale. Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari.
The facts of the case are as simple as the central issue.
Sometime in 1956, Francisca Cardente, for and on behalf of her grandson, petitioner Ignacio Cardente, who
was then a minor, and now married to his co-petitioner, purchased from Isidro Palanay one hectare of
land.
The property purchased is a part of a 9.2656-hectare parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(O.C.T., for short) No. P-1380 in Palanay's name.
Immediately after the purchase, the Cardentes took possession of the land and planted various crops and
trees thereon.
They have been in continuous possession ever since, adverse to the whole world. Unfortunately, however,
the private document evidencing the sale of the one-hectare lot to petitioner Ignacio Cardente was lost
and never found despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the same.
Some four years later, on August 18, 1960, Isidro Palanay sold the entire property covered by O.C.T. No. P-
1380, including the one-hectare portion already sold to Cardente, this time to the private respondents,
Ruperto Rubin and his wife.
The deed of sale was registered and a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T., for short) No. 1173,
was issued in favor of the Rubin spouses.
Notwithstanding the second sale, or because of it, Isidro Palanay, with the written conforme of his wife,
Josepha de Palanay, on December 9, 1972, executed a public document in favor of petitioner Ignacio
Cardente confirming the sale to him (Cardente) in 1956 of the one hectare portion.
The deed of confirmation likewise states that the subsequent vendee, respondent Ruperto Rubin, was
informed by Palanay of the first sale of the one-hectare portion to Cardente.
On February 18, 1977, the house of the petitioners was burned. As a consequence thereof, they lodged a
complaint for arson with the P.C.-Integrated National Police at Malaybalay, Bukidnon, against Ruperto
Rubin, whom they suspected of having committed the crime.
Apparently, in retaliation, on March 31, 1977, seventeen long years after their purchase, the private
respondents filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Bukidnon for quieting of title with
damages, against the petitioners, claiming ownership over the whole property previously covered by O.C.T.
No. P-1380, now registered in their names under T.C.T. No. 1173.
On July 9, 1979, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Rubins and ordered them to "reconvey the
one hectare in question to defendant (Cardente) at the expense of the latter."[3]
The Rubin spouses appealed to the respondent court, which rendered the decision under review. The
assailed decision decreed: xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and judgment is rendered (1) declaring
plaintiffs the absolute owners of subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1173; (2)
ordering the defendants to vacate the one-hectare portion in controversy, and to restore plaintiffs in
possession thereof; (3) quieting the title of plaintiffs over the one (1) hectare portion of land in
controversy; and (4) ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
xxx xxx xxx
Now before us, the petitioners impute bad faith on the private respondents when the latter purchased the
entire property and when they subsequently registered their title thereto. By reason of such bad faith, the
petitioners' claim that insofar as the controverted one-hectare parcel of land is concerned the private
respondents' title thereto is null and void.[5]
We agree with the petitioners. We grant the petition.
Admittedly, this case involves a double sale. While the private respondents allegedly bought from Isidro
Palanay on August 18, 1960 the entire property comprising 9.2656 hectares and covered by O.C.T. No. P-
1380, the petitioners, on the other hand, lay claim to one hectare thereof which they undeniably
purchased from the same vendor earlier, in 1956. The conflict, therefore, falls under, and can be resolved
by, Article 1544 of the CivilCode which sets the rules on double sales.
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
It is undisputed that the private respondents, the second vendees, registered the sale in their favor
whereas the petitioners, the first buyers, did not. But mere registration of thesale is not enough. Good
faith must concur with the registration. Bad faith renders theregistration nothing but an exercise in
futility. The law and jurisprudence are very clear on this score.[6]
The heart of the problem is whether or not the private respondents acted in good faith when they
registered the deed of sale dated August 18, 1960 more than six months later,on March 7,
1961. Inextricably, the inquiry must be directed on the knowledge, or lack of it, of the previous sale of the
one-hectare portion on the part of the second buyers at the time of registration. The trial court found that
the second vendees had such knowledge.
It is true that good faith is always presumed while bad faith must be proven by the party alleging it. [7] In
this case, however, viewed in the light of the circumstances obtaining, we have no doubt that the private
respondents' presumed good faith has been sufficiently overcome and their bad faith amply established.
The "Confirmation Of A Deed Of Absolute Sale Of A Portion Of A Registered Agricultural Land" executed by
the late Ignacio Palanay on December 9, 1972 and which was exhibited in the trial court below, admitted
the sale of the one hectare portion to the petitioners sometime in 1956. The same deed likewise explicitly
stated that the "fact of the previoussale, was well known and acknowledged by Mr. Ruperto Rubin (the
private respondent)."[8]These recitals were further buttressed by Concepcion Salubo, a daughter of Isidro
Palanay, who testified that she knew of the previous sale of the one-hectare portion to petitioner Ignacio
Cardente and that private respondent Ruperto Rubin was properly informed of the said sale.[9] On this
regard, no ill-motive had been attributed to the vendor Isidro Palanay and to his
daughter Concepcion Salubo for testifying the way they did -- against the private respondents. They were
disinterested persons who stood to gain nothing except, perhaps, the satisfaction of setting the record
straight, or, in the words of the seller, "for the purpose of giving efficacy to the Deed of Sale I made to
Ignacio Cardente which was made in a private document x x x."[10]
Further, the notorious and continuous possession and full enjoyment by petitioners of the disputed one-
hectare property long (four years) before the private respondents purchased the same from Palanay
bolsters the petitioners' position. That possession would have been enough to arouse the suspicion of the
private respondents as to the ownership of the entire area which they were about to purchase. Their
failure to inquire and to investigate the basis of the petitioners' actual occupation of the land forming a
substantial part of what they were buying militates against their posited lack of knowledge of the
first sale. "A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor."[11] We have warned time and again that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of
persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.[12]
The private respondents' avowals that they had never known of the prior sale until the issues were joined
at the trial court, for, before that, they merely tolerated the continued presence of the original occupants,
Francisca and Eugenia Cardente, and Ignacio, in the premises, out of simple pity for the two old
women,[13] is too pat to be believed. For if these were so, the reason why the private respondents'
continued to tolerate the occupation by the petitioners of the contested property even after the demise of
the two old women escapes us. Rubin's allegation that this was because they were still in good terms with
the petitioners[14] is too lame an excuse to deserve even a scant consideration. The private respondents'
total lack of action against the actual occupants of a good portion of the land described in their torrens title
can only be construed as acceptance on their part of the existence of the prior sale and their resignation to
the fact that they did not own the one-hectare portion occupied by the petitioners. Present these facts,
the foisted ignorance of the respondents as to the first sale is an empty pretense. Their seventeen years of
inaction and silence eloquently depict a realization of lack of right.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 19, 1985 and the Resolution dated January 10, 1986 of the
former Intermediate Appellate Court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated July 9,
1979 of the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon in Civil Case No. 860, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Carbonell v CA