C.
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-18630 Dec. 17, 1966
Facts:
From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI
SANTOS, both being of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of
marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For
one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting pregnant.
As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines,
Inc. In her state of unemployment Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and
because Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed
to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and
pay her for support and damages.
Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action.
Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the case, stating that
no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but
a cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco
appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry
her.
Held:
No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the
idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without
exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all relationship
upon finding that the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable
for a breach of promise to marry.
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code
Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the
example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a
tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of
legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for one
whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is
incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction.
BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97336
February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a
medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and
promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his
love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilou’s
parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him,
which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and
even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the
barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was already married
to someone living in Bacolod.
 Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but
asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and
passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.
Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on
whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
transaction was itself procured by fraud.

This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-

delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil
Code).

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty
and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was
not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise
to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and
so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said
that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil
Abanag v. Mabute

EXCEPTIONS:

BEATRIZ P. WASSMERvs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZNo. L-20089. December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and
Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her
moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for D. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS
breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because
even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still ACCION IN REM VERSO, ART 22
suffered frustration and public humiliation.
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
ISSUE:

Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?

RULING:

The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an
actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already
spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of
damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the
plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses
incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the
plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.
F. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
RELIEF AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ART. 27

Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449 (1988)

Facts:

A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because the
president, herein petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College neglected his duty to
inform the student on the result of a case against the student which has, as its punishment, the
removal of awards or citations of the student. Said case was the extension of loans to students,
which the president contends to be against the school rules and regulations, and which the
student innocently performed in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club
and in accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said
constitution was presented and approved by the president. The student appealed to the
Director of the Bureau of Public Schools after being denied for reconsideration by the
president, where upon investigation, it was found out that the student acted in good faith and
that her awards be reinstituted. The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action and
even e-mailed the director to reverse his decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain
student and without honors and her award as Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the
scholastic records weeks after the receipt by the president of the decision and after the
graduation.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. The president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard of the
student’s rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty without just
cause, rendering him liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the
student and the student’s parents went through a painful ordeal brought about by such
neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 are but proper.

G. CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, ARTS. 29,30,31

PADILLA, et al. v COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented
Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3,
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall
and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes
and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise
Contentions:
1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a
consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil
liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be
imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced
in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said
amount

Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident charge.
premeditation. RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the
Roy Padilla, et al accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal concerned.
of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a
to which the market stall was a nuisance per se criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy charged is impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions are when the offended party expressly
two (72) hours to vacate the market premise waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising
from the act as a crime.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. That the same
costs of this proceedings. punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and,
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime
petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of
constituted some petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot
when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief recover damages under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is
Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an CANCIO V. ISIP
acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil
action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is
the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. Considering moreover the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
SANTOS vs. PIZARRO
 Frias vs Flora San Diego-Sison
GR No. 155223, April 4, 2007
FACTS:
Bobie Rose Frias owns a house and lot acquired from Island Masters Reality and Development
Corporation (IMRDC) through a Deed of Sale and covered by transfer certificate of title (TCT) in
the name of IRMDC.
Frias, as the First Party, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison as the Second Party, entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) over the property with the following terms and conditions:
“xxx for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000,000.00 receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months from the date of the execution of this
contract xxx to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase xxx at a price of
P6,400,000.00 xxx another six months within which to pay the remaining balance of
P3.4 million.
2. xxx
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first six months from the six
months from the execution of this contract, no interest shall be charged by the SECOND
PARTY on the P3million however, in the event that on the sixth month the SECOND
PARTY would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has
a period of another six months within which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos provided
that the said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last six months only.
Under this circumstance, the amount of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be
treated as a loan and the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage
which can be enforced in accordance with law.”
Frias received from San Diego-Sison P2million cash and P1million post-dated check dated
February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale. Frias then gave the TCT in
the name of IRMDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between Frias and IRMDC.
San Diego-Sison decided not to purchase the property and informed Frias through a letter
reminding of the agreement that the amount of P2Million be considered as a loan payable
within 6 months. However, Frias failed to pay San Diego-Sison who later filed a complaint for
sum of money with preliminary attachment. Also, San Diego-Sison averred that Frias tried to
deprive her of the security for the loan when Frias made a false report of the loss of her
owner’s copy of the TCT and be issued a new owner’s duplicate copy of said title.
The trial court ordered Frias to pay San Diego-Sison the sum of P2million plus interest at the
rate of 32% per annum beginning December 7, 1991 due to the compounded interest
stipulated in the MOA. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the
rate of interest from 32% to 25% effective June 7, 1991 when the interest rate prevailing in
1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum and that the P2Million was considered as a loan in
June 1991.
Frias argued that the interest rate was contrary to the MOA because it provided that if San
Diego-Sison would decide not to purchase the property, Frias has the period of another
six months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the last six months only.
ISSUES:
 Whether the compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months only as
stipulated in the contract.
 Whether CA committed error in awarding 25% interest per annum on the 2million peso
loan even beyond the second 6 months stipulated period.
 Whether San Diego-Sison is entitled to moral damages.
HELD:
 The Court said that the phrase “for the last six months only” should be taken in the
context of the entire agreement. It agreed with CA’s interpretation of the phrase:
“Their agreement speaks of two periods of six months each. The first six- month period was
given to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase
defendant-appellant’s (petitioner’s) property. The second six-month period was given to
defendant-appellant to pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not
to buy the subject property in which case interest will be charged “for the last six months only”,
referring to the second six-month period. This means that no interest will be charged for the
first six-month period while appellee was making up her mind whether to buy the property, but
only for the second period of six months after appellee had decided not to buy the
property. This is the meaning of the phrase “for the last six months only”. Certainly, there is
nothing in their agreement that suggests that interest will be charged for six months only even
if it takes defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.”
 H. VIOLATION OF RIGHTS, ART 32
Having considered it as a loan, the monetary interest for the last six months continued to
accrue until actual payment of the loaned amount. MHP Garments, Inc. vs, CA

The court further explained why interest must be paid:

“ The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus,
until principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the
debtor continues to use such principal amount. It has been held that for a debtor to continue in
possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after maturity of the
loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust enrichment on the part
of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.”

 The Court found no error in awarding 25% interest per annum on the P2Million loan
even beyond the six months stipulated period. “The general rule is that if the terms of
an agreement are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail. It is further required that the
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.” Besides, Frias
and San Diego-Sison agreed and as stipulated in the contract that the loaned amount
shall earn compounded bank interests.

Yes. The court agreed with “the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioner’s act of
trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the
title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa
contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.” Xxx
“Petitioner’s actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her loan were it not
for respondent’s timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral damages is in order
I. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS, ART.33
Reyes vs. Sempio-Diy and Malicsi
(FULLTEXT)
225 Phil. 167
PATAJO, J.:
This is a direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila dated July 30, 1985 dismissing upon motion of the defendant Civil Case
No. 357-MN.
In Criminal Case No. 23633 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, Cristina
Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein
was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was
represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the
information and was sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty,
the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the
accused. Neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action
for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the
Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by
Cristina Malicsi which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing
against honor. Said case is Civil Case No. 357-MN.
At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private prosecutor in the
criminal case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said case she did not reserve the right to
file a separate action for damages. She further admitted that the appearance of said private
prosecutor was for the purpose of proving damages against the accused. After said admission
made by plaintiff, the parties agreed to have the Court rule on the question of whether or not
plaintiff by her being represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case and her failing to
make a reservation in said case to file a separate action was barred from filing a separate civil
action for damages against the accused Cristina Malicsi.
On said issue, the Court a quo ruled in favor of the defendants, relying principally upon Roa vs.
dela Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, and dismissed the case. It said:
"There is no question that in defamation cases (such as the present) as in cases of fraud and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party, and such action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence (Art. 33, New Civil
Code). In such cases, the injured party need not make a reservation in the criminal case for the
filing of the civil action for damages, for the Civil Code already grants or reserves to him that
right, so that his failure to reserve such right in the criminal case does not bar him from filing a
separate civil action for damages (Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113; Garcia v. Flerido, 52 SCRA
420). This is true even if Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
Revised Rules of Court (the rule applicable herein) required a reservation in the criminal case,
because the Civil Code does not require such reservation, and the Rules of Court, being merely
procedural, can not amend the Civil Code which is substantive in nature (Mendoza v. Arrieta
and Garcia v. Flerido, supra).
There is, however, an exception to the above rule; namely, when the offended party actually
intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the
purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived his right to file a
separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a reservation therefor; thus, if the court
did not enter a judgment for civil liability against the accused in the criminal case because the
offended party failed to submit evidence of damages therein and he did not file any motion for
reconsideration or did not appeal from said judgment, the judgment becomes res judicata, and
an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code cannot be brought by said
offended party anymore (Roa v. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; Azucena v. Potenciano, 5 SCRA 468)."
We, however, believe that there are demonstrable material differences between the facts in
the Roa case and the present case which would make the decision in the Roa case inapplicable
in the present case as precedent. In the Roa case there was a full-blown hearing where a
private prosecutor participated actively and there could, therefore, be no question that the
aggrieved party's participation through the private prosecutor in said case clearly indicated her
intention to have her claim for damages litigated in the criminal action against the accused. It
was only after the trial of the case on the merits that a decision was rendered finding the
accused guilty of slight slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00 but making no award
of damages in favor of the aggrieved party. The reason for the Court's not making any award of
damages is because of the failure of the aggrieved party to submit evidence to support her
claim for damages. The Court said that by such failure she had only herself or her counsel to
blame. Neither did she file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court nor appeal
therefrom to rectify the Court's failure to award damages in her favor. The decision of the
Court had, therefore, become final and any action to be filed by her for damages arising from
the same criminal act of the accused would already be barred on ground of res judicata.
In the present case, however, while it is true that petitioner, the aggrieved party in the criminal
case against private respondent Cristina Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against honor, was
represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the unexpected plea
of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 prevented
petitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil
action. More in point, therefore, is the case of Meneses vs. Luat, 12 SCRA 454, and it is the to file a separate civil action.
ruling in the said case rather than the Roa case which is controlling in the present case. Like in
the present case in the Meneses case the aggrieved party was also represented by a private Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not
prosecutor, but the case did not proceed to trial as the accused upon arraignment pleaded foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil
guilty. Distinguishing said case from Roa vs. dela Cruz, the Court said: Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for
"The issue now before us is whether or not the rule laid down in the Roa case should govern damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such
this one. We are of the opinion that there is a demonstrable material difference between the reservation is not necessary, the provision of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding. Mendoza vs.
circumstances of the two cases. In the first not only was the offended party represented by a Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, where this Court, quoting from Garcia vs. Flerido, 52 SCRA 420, said:
private prosecutor in the criminal action but the action went through trial on the merits. In fact "x x x Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34
it was the private prosecutor who actually handled the case. He therefore had sufficient of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were
opportunity to claim and prove damages, for which purpose alone, according to the decision of drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is
this Court, has active intervention was allowed. For if that had not been the purpose, or if the now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
offended party had reserved the right to file a separate civil action, such intervention would not unauthorized amendment of substantive flaw, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do
have been justified. not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
"In the instant case the criminal action against defendant Luat did not proceed to trial, as he ordering respondent Court to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 357-MN, with costs
pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance of private counsel in representation of against private respondents.
the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as could only import an intention
to press a claim for damages in the same action. It is as reasonable to indulge the possibility SO ORDERED.
that the private prosecutors appeared precisely to be able to make a seasonable reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action which, even if unnecessary at the time would
nevertheless have been the prudent and practical thing to do for the purpose of better Yakult Philippines vs. CA
protecting the interest of their clients. But as matters turned out, the accused pleaded guilty
upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced. Thereafter there was no chance to enter YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,
such a reservation in their record. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the
"We do not believe that plaintiffs' substantive right to claim damages should necessarily be RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.
foreclosed by the fact--at best equivocal as to its purpose--that private prosecutors entered
their appearance at the very inception of the proceeding, which was then cut short at that Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.
stage. It cannot be said with any reasonable certainty that plaintiffs had thereby committed
themselves to the submission of their action for damages in that action. The rule laid down in David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.
Roa vs. De la Cruz, supra, does not govern this case. The ends of justice will be better served if
plaintiffs are given their day in court." (pp. 457-458) Ponente: GANCAYCO
Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat, We find and so hold that the mere appearance
of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not FACTS:
necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import
an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon injuries. Later, a complaint for damages was filed by respondent represented by his father,
arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court. Trial court rendered decision awarding damages
present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record
to respondents. Petitioners’ appealed on the thesis that the civil action for damages for injuries
arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed
independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended
that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil
action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made. The appeal was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed, before presentation
of evidence by the prosecution, would prosper even if there was no reservation to file a
separate civil action.
HELD:
YES. Petition was denied. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The
purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering
damages twice for the same act or omission.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution
presents its evidence.
Procedural laws have retroactive application.
Casupanan vs. Laroya
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and
driven by petitioner Casupanan, figured in an accident. This prompted the filing of two cases
before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac: 1st – a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property filed by respondent against Casapunan; 2nd – a civil case arising from a
quasi-delict filed by the petitioners against the respondent. The civil case was filed pending
preliminary investigation on the criminal case. Respondent as defendant in the civil case filed a
motion to dismiss on ground of forum shopping due pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion for dismissal on basis of forum shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that a separate civil action may be instituted separately and
independently from the criminal case. MCTC denied the motion. Thereafter, petitioners filed a
petition for Certiorari before Capas RTC to assail MCTC’s Order, however the RTC dismissed the
same for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
HELD:
YES. The right of the accused to file a separate civil action for quasi-delict is akin to the right of
the offended party to file an independent civil action pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 111. Under
the said rule, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the
crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
the other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement
or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a
separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second,
the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in
the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the
criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law,
access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Petitioners is proper.
J. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, ART. 36
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised in his affirmative
defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an administrative case is pending before
the Office of Land Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent over the
property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner argue that the
administrative case was determinative of private respondents right toe eject petitioner from
the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial action until after
its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioner’s affirmative
defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private Respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying that the
Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismissed and the Office of the
Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of
prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES INVOLVING THE
LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL COURT OF
MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4 SCRA 510 (1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No.
10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question comes into play generally in a situation where
civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal
action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the
criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the possibility of the
Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which will terminate or suspend Private
Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner, the SC gave the lower court and advise. This advise
became the which became the basis for deciding the case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken
is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence dictate such move. To
allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner’s right of
possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the
parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a
sheer exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to
the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action
are settled the second action should be stayed. (at page 622)
Pasig vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 125646/ Sept. 10, 1999 /Ynares-Santiago, J./LOCGOV-Plebiscites/MBDELACRUZ
NATURE Certiorari and Prohibiton PETITIONERS
City of Pasig; Municipality of Cainta, RIzal
RESPONDENTS
COMELEC
SUMMARY
. 2nd Petition: The COMELEC dismissed the Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the
2 petitions question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the
resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Cainta and Pasig. G.R. No. 125646
involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed
Barangay Napico. Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Cainta
claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.
DOCTRINE.
1. Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta
and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. 2. A requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
FACTS.
Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother
Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct
barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Pasig similarly
issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscites
were scheduled accordingly.
Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the plebiscites scheduled, and filed TWO Petitions with the
COMELEC. In both Petitions, Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.
Cainta claimed the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject
of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
1st petition: COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held
in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the
two municipalities. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
plebiscite where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of
the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
ISSUES & RATIO
. 1.WON the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should
be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments?
YES.
The plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta by the Antipolo RTC. In the same
vein, the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be
annulled and set aside.
Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites
for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
SC: in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42- in the interest of good order, we can very well
suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or
linked to the first.
Pasig claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are
within its territory yet portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case
pending before the Antipolo RTC.
WON the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Cainta or Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico.
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and
unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
The SC did not agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the
proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been
rendered moot and academic.
The issues raised by Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the
plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are
still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
Tan v. COMELEC: Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new
province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as
already moot and academic.
DECISION
.
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED.
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED
Umali vs. IAC
264 Phil. 1070
PADILLA, J.:
This petition seeks the review on certiorari of the decision* dated 23 September 1982 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, affirming the Orders dated 29 April 1982
and 24 June 1982 issued in Criminal Case No. 1423-I by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Zambales, Branch II (now Regional Trial Court, (RTC), Iba, Zambales, Branch LXIX).** The
respondent court's decision ruled that the question raised in Civil Case No. 8769 pending
before the CFI of Quezon, Branch VIII (now RTC, Quezon, Branch LVII) re: annulment/rescission
of the sale[1] is not prejudicial to the issues involved in said CR No. 1423-I as to warrant the
suspension of proceedings in said criminal case.
The facts material to the present case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"x x x Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation, hereinafter referred
to simply as OROSEA. Sometime on September 4, 1979, the petitioners, as officers of OROSEA,
purchased from the spouses Honorio and Solina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of
Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay, Province of Quezon, covered by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the
name of spouses Edano, for the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four installments, as follows:
1st Installment and downpayment - September 28, 1979 P225,000.00
2nd Installment - March 31, 1980 271,500.00
3rd Installment - September 30, 1980 270,000.00
4th Installment - March 31, 1981 270,000.00
issuing for this purpose four checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The first
check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment.
By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale was
executed by the vendors, inspite of the fact that the purchase price has not yet been fully
paid. Thus, TCT No. (T-36471) was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title was issued in
the name of OROSEA. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine
Veterans Bank using this property as security.
When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners asked, for two times, defer-
ment of its presentation for payment, the first to June 30, 1980, and the second to July 31,
1980. In the first deferment petitioners issued a check that matured on June 30, 1980 to
replace the check that matured on March 31, 1980. On the second deferment petitioners
issued another check dated July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30, 1980. This
second renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of
funds. So were the checks postdated September 30, 1980 and March 31, 1981. They were also
dishonored upon their presentment for lack of funds. As a consequence of the dishonor of
these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. The
information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on September 4, 1981 but
petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but this was postponed upon
motion of petitioners.
On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against
the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the annulment/rescission of the
Contract of Sale executed on September 4, 1979 by and between OROSEA and the Edano
spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for which the petitioners
issued the checks, subject of Criminal Case No. 1423-I.
Criminal Case No. 1423-I was again set for arraignment on November 5, 1980. This was post-
poned. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to quash Criminal Case No.
1423-I, on ground of improper venue, but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it
could be resolved. The arraignment was again set for January 4, 1982 which was again
postponed; then to February 5, 1982, again postponed; then to March 23, 1982. However,
before March 23, 1982, petitioners filed, in Criminal Case No. 1423-I, a 'Motion To Suspend
Arraignment and Further Proceedings,' with a 'Supplemental Motion To Suspend
Proceedings'. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the motion to
suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the motion."[2]
Acting on the "Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings," the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Branch II, in said CR Case No. 1423-I in its order dated 29 April 1982[3]
denied the same for lack of merit; and the motion for reconsideration of said order was
likewise denied in the Order dated 24 June 1982.[4]
A petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 14504, was then filed by
herein petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals. The appellate court, resolving the
said petition, rendered the now assailed decision dated 23 September 1982 affirming the
questioned orders of the trial court and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals ruled that, inasmuch as the issues in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I are completely
different from each other, and that the resolution of one is not necessary for the resolution of
the other, the issue involved in CV No. 8769 is not a prejudicial question vis-a-vis the issue in CR
No. 1423-I so as to warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the latter case, until the
termination of the civil case. In its resolution dated 3 February 1983, the Court of Appeals also
denied for lack of merit the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Issue:
whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as to require
a suspension of proceedings in the latter case, until the civil case is disposed of.
Ruling:
We find no merit in the petition.
In arguing that the principle of prejudicial question applies in the case at bar, petitioners
contend that, since in CV No. 8769 they seek to annul the deed of sale executed in their favor
by the private respondents, on the grounds that the latter committed fraud in misrepresenting
that the land they sold to petitioners is free from all liens and encumbrances, and that it is not
tenanted, when in truth and in fact, as petitioners later discovered, the land is covered by the
land reform program and that vast portions thereof are timber land, hence, allegedly
indisposable public land, therefore, according to petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the
resolution of which will determine whether or not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No.
1423-I. They further argue that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 8769 annuls the subject
deed of sale, then, their obligation to pay private respondents under the said deed would be
extinguished, resulting in the dismissal of CR No. 1423-I.
Petitioners, therefore, in CV No. 8969, in seeking the annulment of the deed of sale on the
ground of fraud or misrepresentation, are in effect saying that said deed is voidable, vitiated
consent being one of the grounds mentioned in Article 1390[5] of the Civil Code for voiding or
annulling contracts. Indeed the well-settled rule is that a contract where consent is vitiated is
voidable.[6]
It can not be denied, however, that at the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were
committed, the deed of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding upon the
parties thereto, including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial
question to exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[7]
Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan
CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution
of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-
accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2)
cases.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue in CR No. 1423-I is whether or not the
petitioners could be found guilty under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[8] or under Article 315, No. 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code.[9]

More specifically, what private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is that the checks
issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment to
the drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay
private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to subsist. And because
petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners are answerable under the law
for the consequences of their said acts. And even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally adjudged to
the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled, such declaration would be of no
material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused in CR
No. 1423-I.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated 23 September 1982 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is hereby AFFIRMED.
 IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce
Javier. With said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second
marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with
certain Julia Hernandez, thereafter.
Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of
Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding
for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
HELD:
Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial
question. Respondent cannot be permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which
the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would necessarily be determinative of the civil case. Consequently, the defense must involve
an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential
elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—
usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining
a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova, 22 SCRA 731(1968):
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as]
only competent courts have such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is
deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented
single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on
the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully
invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law
have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly
obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently
defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial
proper in the criminal case.
The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent
marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first. The exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41
of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
Beltran vs. People
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in
order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question
to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing
motion. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. Vs. Lichauco
FACTS: Petitioners are Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) and its President and Chief Executive
Officer Michael De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch
of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was
to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-
owned consortium (subsequently organized as PASI). Petitioners filed an action against the new
DOTC Secretary Lichauco for allegedly having awarded the orbital slot to an unknown awardee.
The first cause of action, for injunction, sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153º
East Longitude should be enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot
to PASI. The second cause of action, for declaration of nullity of award, averred that the award
to the unknown bidder is null and void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority.
ISSUE:Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in this case?
HELD: NO.
The Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of
action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation.
These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but
merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are
for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing
more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of
action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner
impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself,
the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains
in this case.
Omicitin vs. CA and Lagos
Facts:
Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag, Phils., filed a complaint of estafa against
Lagos due to the latter’s refusal, despite repeated demands, to return the 2 company vehicles
entrusted to him while he was still the president of the firm. Lagos moved for the suspension of
the criminal proceedings due to the existence of a prejudicial question in view of a pending
case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed by the latter against Omictin,
Saag Pte. (S) Ltd., Ng, Yeo and Tan. The case before the SEC stemmed from the appointments of
Tan as President Ad Interim and Omictin as Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils.,
Incorporated. Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore.
Lagos was appointed Area Sales Manager in the Philippines where he was authorized to
organize a local joint venture corporation known as Saag, Phils., with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the
majority stockholder and Lagos was appointed as one of the directors. Due to intra-corporate
disputes, 2 of the directors resigned and divested their shares in Saag Corporation. Lagos
resigned as president while retaining his post as director. He later requested Executive Director
Yeo to call for a board meeting because in their joint venture agreement (JVA) between Saag
Phils. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. it was agreed that should the controlling interest in the latter
company be acquired by any other person or entity without his prior consent, he has the option
to either require the other stockholders to purchase his shares or terminate the JVA and
dissolve Saag Phils., Inc. No meeting was made, instead Tan was appointed as president ad
interim and Omictin as operations manager ad interim. Thus, the SEC case.
SC: Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine
the guilt or innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa. One of the elements of estafa with abuse
of confidence under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC is a demand made by the offended party
to the offender. Logically, under the circumstances since the alleged offended party is Saag
Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the
authority of the person making such demand on the company’s behalf. Lagos is challenging
petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case. If the supposed authority
of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the
prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Whether the criminal case should be suspended pending the outcome of the civil case
Ruling:
No. The civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. The civil case
for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. The
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met.
Further, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not intimately related to the issue in the
criminal case for parricide. The relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment
of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether
the accused killed the victim. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in
the civil case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. Even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

Magestrado vs. People and Librojo

The criminal proceedings should be suspended until the final resolution of the civil case when:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.

Facts:
Before the MeTC of Quezon City, a criminal case for perjury was filed against Francisco
Magestrado. Francisco then filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question alleging that the civil cases for recovery of a sum of money for cancellation of
mortgage, delivery of title and damages both pending before the RTC of Quezon City must be
resolved first. His motion was denied by the MeTC. His petitions for certiorari filed with the RTC
and the CA were dismissed.
Issue: