Leon Sibal vs Valdez et al.

Facts:
Leon Sibal alleged that defendant Mawal, deputy sheriff of Tarlac, by virtue of a
writ of execution issued before CFI of Pampanga, attached and sold to Defendant
Valdez the sugar cane planted by Leon Sibal and his tenants on seven parcels of land.
That within one year from the attachment and sale, Leon Sibal offered to redeem
the sugarcane and tendered the amount sufficient to cover the price paid and the
interest thereon and any assessment or taxes which he paid after the purchase, and that
Valdez refused to accept the money and return the sugarcane to Leon Sibal.
As a second cause of action, Leon Sibal alleged that Valdez was attempting to
harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels mentioned in the the first cause
of action; that he harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of the seven
parcels and in another described in the second cause of action.
Leon SIbal prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against Valdez
and restrain them from distributing the possession of the parcels of land herein
described; from taking possession of or harvesting the sugarcane in question; and
from taking possession or harvesting of the palay in the said parcels of land.
The court after hearing the parties issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor
of Leon Sibal, against Valdez.
In his answer, Valdez denied the allegation and claimed that, among others, the
sugarcane in question was in the nature of a personal property and was not subject to
redemption. He also claimed that by reason of preliminary injunction he was unable to
gather the sugarcane, sugarcane shoots and palay in the said parcel of land and thus
suffered losses and in addition thereto suffered damages.
After trial, the court rendered a decision against the plaintiff and in favor of the
defendants, holding that the sugarcane in question was personal property and as such
was not subject to redemption, among others.

Issue:
WON the sugarcane in question is personal or real property?

Ratio:
It is contended that the sugarcane in question comes under the classification of
real property as “ungathered products” in par 2 of Art 334 of the Civil Code. The
court in deciding cited Manresa which appears that under Spanish law, pending fruits
and ungathered products may be sold as personal property and that in ejectment cases
of agricultural tenants, the lessee is entitled to gather the products corresponding to
the agricultural year because the fruits do not go with the land, furthermore, the
Spanish mortagage law provides that the mortgage of a piece of land does not include
the fruits and products existing thereon, unless provided for in the contract.
The SC of Louisiana also mirrored the same rule in various cases decided by it
saying that “ a crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable.
It belongs to the lessee and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not.”
The above rule announced by Spanish SC and Louisiana SC is followed
practically by state of the Union.
It is a settled doctrine that in connection with the attachment of property and
execution of judgment is that, growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are
considered personal property. It was said that a valid sale may be made of a thing,
which though not yet in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the
natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence. Things of this
nature are said to have a potential existence. The thing must however be specific and
identified.
It is clear from the provisions of Act no. 1508 (Chattel Mortgage law) that it was
enacted on the assumption that “growing crops” are personal property. This
consideration tends to support that par 2 of Art 334 of the Civil Code has been
modified by Sec 450 of Act 190 and Act 1508 in the sense that “ungathered products”
as mentioned in the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words,
the phrase personal property should be understood to include ungathered products.
The court thus conclude that par 2 of Art 334 of the Civil COde has been
modified by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No 1508, in the
sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the
Chattel Mortgage Law, “ungathered products” have the nature of personal property.

Decision:
Judgment appealed from is modified. The plaintiff and his sureties Cenon de la Cruz,
Juan Sangalang and Marcos Sibal are hereby ordered to pay to the defendant jointly
and severally the sum of P 8,900.80
RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO
G.R. No. 142595 (15 October 2003)

FACTS:
Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Miscellaneous Sales Application)
with the Bureau of Lands covering a 415 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio
8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the Salunayan Creek in Katingawan,
Midsayap alleging that he had, since 1968, been occupying the land whereon he built
a residential house and introduced other improvements.

Petitioner filed a protest, claiming preferential right over the land. However, on an
ocular inspection, the Bureau found that the subject land was outside the commerce of
man and thus, denied both the respondent’s application and the petitioner’s protest.

Petitioner thereafter filed an ejectment case against the respondent. The ejectment
case ended through a judgment based on a compromise between the parties.

Subsequently, respondent filed another MSA involving a portion of the same lot
subject of his first MSA, covering an area of 334 square meters which the petitioner
once again protested against. The DENR Regional Executive Director declared that
the land is suitable for residential purposes and in the light of the conflicting interest
of the parties, ordered that the land be sold at public auction.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order but was denied by the
OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII. Respondent filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order. Petitioner then moved for the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied
respondent’s petition. The CA on the other hand, reversed and set aside the decision
of the CA and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of the respondent. Petitioner
contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the respondent’s petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Director
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is
classified as outside the commerce of man

RULING:
(a) Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal
(i.e. through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through
a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court)

In resolving respondent’s second MSA and petitioner’s protest thereto, the DENR
Regional Executive Director, after considering the conflicting interest of the
parties, found it equitable to resolve the same by directing the sale of the subject
land at public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land
Act," provides the procedure for the disposition of lands of the public domain
which are open to disposition or concession and intended to be used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural.

With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 on June 18, 1952, however, an
exception to the foregoing procedure was created by authorizing disposition of
lands of the public domain by private sale, instead of bidding, provided that: (1)
the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified therein and (2) the area
applied for is not more than 1,000 square meters.

Given the provisions of R.A. 730, and the DENR Regional Executive Director’s
finding that the subject land was "suitable for residential purposes," it was
incumbent upon him to determine whether the provisions of R.A. 730 were
applicable to respondent’s MSA.

The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the

Public Land Act upon a finding that it was more "equitable" in light of the
"conflicting interest" of the parties. The Director’s reliance on equity as basis for
his action was misplaced, however. It is well-settled that "equity follows the law."
Described as "justice outside legality," it is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or legal pronouncements. Where pertinent positive
rules are present, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments
based only on equity.

A reading of R.A. 730 (or of the Public Land Act for that matter) shows nothing
therein to support the Director’s contention that the pendency of a protest is a bar
to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA. Indeed, that Section 1 of R.A. 730 gives
a qualified applicant preference to purchase alienable public land suitable for
residential purposes implies that there may be more than one party interested in
purchasing it.

What is more, under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, it is the duty of the
Director of the Lands Management Bureau (formerly the Director of Lands) to
determine whether the material facts set forth in an MSA are true.

Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the
Director of the Lands Management Bureau to, after due hearing, verify whether
the grounds of a protest or objection to an MSA are well founded, and, if so, to
cancel the MSA.

There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process
respondent’s MSA, and to ascertain, particularly in light of petitioner’s protest,
whether respondent was qualified to purchase the subject land at a private sale
pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.

In fine, by abdicating his duty to process respondent’s MSA and summarily

ordering, without factual or legal basis, that the subject land be disposed of via
 oral bidding pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land Act, the Director acted
with patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Director’s commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however, mean
that respondent automatically has the better right to the subject land. As mandated
by law, the Director must process respondent’s MSA, conduct an investigation,
and determine whether the material facts set forth therein are true to bring it
within the coverage of R.A. 730.

(b) As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up
bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession
and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October
22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the
right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article
461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and
502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is
property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that
a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable
character.

This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondent’s first MSA, the
District Engineer having certified that the government may need the subject land
for future expansion, and the office of the Municipal Mayor having certified that it
was needed by the municipal government for future public improvements.
Consequently, it was only after the same offices subsequently certified that the
subject land was suitable for residential purposes and no longer needed by the
municipal government that it became alienable and disposable.

With respect to petitioner’s invocation of the principle of accession under either

Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code,
the same does not apply to vest her with ownership over subject land. When the
present Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950, the foregoing rule was
abandoned in favor of the present Article 461.

Both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the
Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land
became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National
 Irrigation Administration. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the
opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion.

Finally, while the Court noted that petitioner offered to purchase the subject land
from the government, she did so through an informal letter dated August 9, 1989
instead of the prescribed form. By such move, she is deemed to have
acknowledged that the subject land is public land, for it would be absurd for her to
have applied for its purchase if she believed it was hers. She is thus stopped from
claiming otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

ANECO REALTY AND DEV’T CORPORATION v. LANDEX DEV’T
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 165952 (28 July 2008)

FACTS:
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of
land in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into
thirty-nine (39) lots. It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to Aneco and the remaining
seventeen (17) lots to Landex.

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of
its lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction
with the RTC in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints
seeking to demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million
pesos in damages.

Landex filed its Answer alleging, among others, that Aneco was not deprived access
to its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco has
its own entrance to its property along Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San
Francisco del Monte Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered
inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also claimed
that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express
stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project.

The RTC rendered a Decision granting the complaint for injunction. Landex moved
for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for execution of Aneco and issued an
order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and dismissing the complaint
of Aneco. Aneco appealed to the CA which rendered a Decision affirming the RTC
order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its
own property.

RULING:
The Court agreed with the RTC and the CA that the complaint for injunction against
Landex should be dismissed for lack of merit. What is involved is an undue
interference on the property rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on his own
property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to restrain a
landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.

Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land
or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence
flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his
property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a
clear legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an
essential attribute of ownership.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court
when affirmed by the CA are accorded great weight and respect. The records showed
that Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex
from fencing its own property.

Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because
it knew at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots,
from FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI
manifested that it was no longer interested in pursuing its own subdivision project. If
Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own
provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct
subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and
the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.