PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v.
On 11 April 2002, the BOC filed a civil case for collection of
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, GR No. 195876, 2016-12-05
Facts:
On 16 April 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8180,[4] otherwise
known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996" took effect. It provides, among others, for the
reduction of the tariff duty on imported crude oil from ten
percent (10%) to three percent (3%).
Prior to its effectivity, petitioner's importation of
1,979,674.85 U.S. barrels of Arab Light Crude Oil, thru the Ex
MT Lanistels, arrived on 7 April 1996 nine (9) days earlier
than the effectivity of the liberalization provision
More than four (4) years later or on 1 August 2000, petitioner
received a demand letter[5] dated 27 July 2000 from the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), through the District Collector of
Batangas, assessing it to pay the deficiency customs duties in
the amount of P120,162,991.00
Petitioner protested the assessment on 14 August 2000
Seeking clarification as to what course of action the BOC is
taking, and reiterating its position that the respondent's
demand letters dated 29 October 2001 and 27 July 2000
have no legal basis, petitioner sent a letter to the Director of
Legal Service of the BOC on 3 December 2001 for said
purpose.
sum of money against petitioner, together with Caltex
Philippines, Inc. as co-party therein, docketed as Civil Case
No. 02103239, before Branch XXV, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), of the City of Manila.
Consequently, on 27 May 2002, petitioner filed with the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a Petition for Review, raffled to
the Former First Division (CTA in Division)
CTA in Division ruled to dismiss the Petition for Review on
C.T.A. Case No. 6485 for lack of merit and accordingly
ordered petitioner to pay the entire amount of
P936,899,883.90 (P936M)
CTA Former En Banc affirmed the CTA in Division's ruling
pertaining to the implied abandonment caused by
petitioner's failure to file the Import Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration within the 30-day period, and transfer
of ownership by operation of law to the government of the
subject shipment in accordance with Sections 1801 and
1802, in relation to Section 13.01, of the TCCP... judicial no
Issues:
that the subject Memorandum dated 2 February 2001 was
neither identified nor offered in evidence by respondent
during the entire proceedings before the CTA in Division.
CTA likewise cannot motu proprio justify the existence of Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not
fraud committed by petitioner by applying the rules on be required to review documents' not previously scrutinized
judicial notice. by the trial court.

Ruling: evidence

Unless any of the party formally offered in evidence said
Memorandum, and accordingly, admitted by the court a
quo, it cannot be considered as among the legal and factual
bases in resolving the controversy presented before it.
it would also be an error for the CTA in Division to even take
judicial notice of the subject Memorandum being merely a
part of the BOC Records submitted before the court a quo,
without the same being identified by a witness, offered in
and admitted as evidence, and effectively, depriving
petitioner, first and foremost, an opportunity to object
thereto. Hence, the subject Memorandum should not have
been considered by the CTA in Division in its disposition.
The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the
formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing
to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained
that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after
a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would ''condone
an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court
order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and
derail the speedy administration of justice."

Principles:

evidence

A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to

rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose
or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility.
Ocampo v People (2015)
PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 194129 June 15, 2015
Facts:
On May 27, 2000, petitioner assaulted and use personal
violence upon Mario De Luna. Petitioner fired his service
firearm against the victim hitting the latter on the chest and
other parts of the body. The wounds were the direct and
immediate cause of his death. Petitioner pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. He admitted to having shot the victim to
death, but claimed to have done so in self-defense. In
support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that
the shooting incident was precipitated by the victim’s
unprovoked knife attack upon accused-appellant. The
Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner of homicide and
upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner, but modified some of the monetary damages
awarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Settled is the rule that for self-defense to prosper, the
following requisites must be met:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the attack; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
engaged in self-defense.
In this case, petitioner has failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the first element of self-defense. There
was no showing of attack or assault that had placed
petitioner’s life in imminent or actual danger. Petitioner’s
tale of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence,
specifically the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the
victim’s body. Where the physical evidence on record runs
counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the
physical evidence must be upheld.
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court
finds that the means employed by petitioner was grossly
disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful
aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in
his chest and different parts of his body. Indeed, the Advance
Information prepared by the investigator of the case reveals
that there was no mention of either a stabbing incident that
happened or a knife that was recovered from the crime
scene. Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show
the intent of petitioner to kill and not merely to prevent or
repel an attack.
Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

(SOURCE: PALS 2016, Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin

and the students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE RULLEPA
G.R. No. 131516, March 5, 2003.
Facts:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-
appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May, her
mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and
SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the
following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table
for dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only
three and a half years old, told her, “Mama, si Kuya Ronnie
lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.”
“Kuya Ronnie” is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the
Buenafes’ house boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May
at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant
did those things to her, to which she answered many times.
Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and
Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept
and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was
out with Gloria’s husband Col. Buenafe, she waited until their
arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant
out on an errand and informed her husband about their
daughter’s plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May
who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria
verified from him whether what Cyra May had told them was
true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only
once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days
earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-
appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the
following morning to bring accused-appellant to Camp
Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him, on
account of which he was detained. Gloria’s sworn statement
was then taken.
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May
declared at the witness stand: “Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe
ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga” thus causing her pain and
drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did
these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief
of the Biological Science Branch of the. Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up
with her report dated November 21, 1995.
In her explanation, the abrasions, on the labia minora could
have been caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect
penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the
injuries.
The defense’s sole witness was accused-appellant, he denied
having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra May’s
genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he
used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had
difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused
to answer Gloria’s queries if her husband Buenafe, whom he
usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house,
was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He
suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint.
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City
RTC rendered judgment finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y
GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is
accordingly sentenced to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the
amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Hence, this case was elevated for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not appearance of the victim is
admissible as object evidence in the absence of any proof?
Ruling:
Yes. Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding
the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases,
this Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna,
established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 “years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden, of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as
to the age of the victim.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person’s
appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the
court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides: SECTION 1. Object as
evidence.—Objects as evidence are those addressed to the
senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court. “To be sure,” one author writes, “this practice of
inspection by the court of objects, things or persons relevant
to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial
procedure.” The author proceeds to quote from another
authority: “Nothing is older or commoner in the
administration of law in all countries than the submission to
the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of
objects which furnish evidence. The view of the land by the
jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where mayhem
was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant,
in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of
seals, the examination of writings, to determine whether
they are (‘)blemished,(‘) the implements with which a crime
was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy
proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations
of what may be found abundantly in our own legal records
and textbooks for seven centuries past.”
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not
merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused
had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman
is below twelve years of age. As shown in the previous
discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is true with
respect to the second element.
The victim’s age is relevant in rape cases since it may
constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,29 provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
x x x.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x.
Furthermore, the victim’s age may constitute a qualifying
circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death
sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
x x x.
2. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years
old.
x x x.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the
sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases, this
Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna,
established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 1 30 o f the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 “years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden, of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna
case held that the therein accused-appellant could only be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document,
such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to
prove her age. x x x.
x x x.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial
court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there
is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only
testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE’s
age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was
three years old at the time of the commission of the crime).
xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost
two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old.
However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she
was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied
that she was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the
date she was born, she could not answer.
The process by which the trier of facts judges a person’s age
from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial
notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and
expediency for it would certainly be superfluous,
inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to
require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already
known to courts. As Tundag puts it, it “is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them.” Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing judicial
notice are found, is entitled “What Need Not Be Proved.”
When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person
to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of
such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the
evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person.
Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial
notice, the object of which is to do away with the
presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the
Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person’s
appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the
court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence.—Objects as evidence are
those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object
is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to,
examined or viewed by the court.
“To be sure,” one author writes, “this practice of inspection
by the court of objects, things or persons relevant to the fact
in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure.” The
author proceeds to quote from another authority:
“Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law
in all countries than the submission to the senses of the
tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish
evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of
a wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the
person of one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his age,
the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of
writings, to determine whether they are (‘)blemished,(‘) the
implements with which a crime was committed or of a
person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of
another, are few illustrations of what may be found
abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven
centuries past.” (Emphasis supplied.)
A person’s appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of
infancy, or of being under the age of consent to intercourse),
is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may
properly observe the person brought before it. Experience
teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an
index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked
extremes of old age and youth. In every case such evidence
should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each
case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance
of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a
contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically
overcautious. Consequently, the jury or the court trying an
issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in
court by observation of such persons. The formal offer of the
person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and
cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent
to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person
as an exhibit is properly refused.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility
of a person’s appearance in determining his or her age. As to
the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape
cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again
reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with
respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c)
above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation
and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily
determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of
the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative’s
testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved,
the person’s appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses
probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater
and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth,
the victim’s mere physical appearance is not enough to
gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be
upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated.
Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged
but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim’s
age in the present case spells the difference between life and
death.47
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim’s
certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in
evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that
she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra
May’s testimony goes:
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three
years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve
years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victim’s age from her appearance. No
reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element
of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is
present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is
another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature
three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an
underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight
and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by
itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra
May was below seven years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of
reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY
of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. FE ROA GIMENEZ, GR No. 174673, 2016-01-11
Facts:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint[6] for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and
Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan.[7] "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-
gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as
dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence
attesting to the positions held, business interests, income,
and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.[9] The
Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier,
Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG.[10] Witnesses testified
on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by
the Gimenez Spouses.
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion
to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel's testimony.[12] The Republic
then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence."[13] Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the
Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal
offer of evidence."
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension
of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006, within which to
file [its] formal offer of evidence."[15] This Motion was
granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same
date.
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15
days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal
Offer of Evidence.[17] This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006.[18]
Following... this, no additional Motion for extension was
filed by the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated
extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence.[19] Thus, it
declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence.
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence dated May 30, 2006.[22] He argued that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence
to support its cause of action.[23] Fe Roa Gimenez filed a
Motion... to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of
failure to prosecute.[24] Through her own Motion to
Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez's demurrer to
evidence.[25]
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez's filing of the Motion to
Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to
Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006,
the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's Motion for
Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses' Motion
to Dismiss.
The court also noted that the documentary evidence
presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true
copies.31 However, the persons who certified the
documents as copies of the original were not presented.32
Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.33 The
dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
November 3, 2006 before this court.
Issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying
petitioner's Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the
basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right
to due process.
Ruling:
The evidence presented by petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.
nature and classification of the documents should have been
ruled upon.
Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant
to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible
when a document is presented to prove its existence or
condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real,
evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the
documents is allowed
Testimonial evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is
called to testify."[84] Documentary and object evidence, on
the other hand, are offered "after the presentation of a...
party's testimonial evidence."[85] Offer of documentary or
object evidence is generally done orally unless permission is
given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.[86]
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that
evidence must be formally offered to be considered by the
court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination
of the case.[87] "Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of... time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it."
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the
constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties must be
given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted
against them and take the necessary actions to secure their
case.[89] Hence, any... document or object that was marked
for identification is not evidence unless it was "formally
offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity
to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to
prove or identify it."... this court is of the belief that it is but
only just that the Rules be... relaxed and petitioner be
allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan's Resolutions should be reversed.
Principles:evidence Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

RAPE
PEOPLE v. MISA III
G.R. No. 212336 July 15, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On the 18th day of October 2004 at about 12:00 p.m. in the
City of Talisay, Cebu, the accused, with deliberate intent, and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there have
carnal knowledge with one AAA, a minor, 8 years of age,
without the consent and against the will of the latter. The
Information was later on amended changing AAA's age to
eleven years old. AAA testified that she and BBB, her
younger sister, were walking back to school after taking their
lunch at home, appellant called out to the sisters. Appellant
told them that he would tell AAA's fortune by reading her
palm. He then grabbed AAA' s hand and examined her palm.
He told AAA that any person who would court her will die.
When AAA asked why that was so, appellant ignored the
question and told her to shut up. Appellant then handed AAA
twenty pesos and BBB five pesos. After handing BBB the
money, the appellant then told her to go to class and
threatened to hit her forcefully on the head if she disobeyed.
Out of fear, BBB obeyed. Appellant then grabbed AAA's hand
and dragged her to the back portion of the school
compound. There being a lot of children, the appellant hailed
a trisikad and forced AAA to board with him. They
disembarked near a farm lot. Appellant dragged AAA to an
area where several banana trees grew. Appellant thereafter
ordered AAA to lie down on the ground. He undressed her
and proceeded to take liberties on her person. He took off
her underwear and licked her vagina. Appellant then
removed his pants and had carnal knowledge with AAA
making her bleed. Throughout the ordeal appellant held a
sharp pointed object to coerce her into submission. After
appellant was done, he left AAA in the middle of the banana
farm. BBB corroborated AAA' s testimony up to the point
where she was ordered by the appellant to enter her
classroom. Dr. Poca, the representative of the hospital
where AAA was examined, verified the contents of the
Medical Certificate where it was found that AAA was
"DEFINITE FOR SEXUAL ABUSE" due to the victim's swollen
genital area, abrasions and semen found thereat. Appellant
denied knowing AAA and raping her. He alleged that he could
not have been the perpetrator because on the day of the
supposed incident he was working as a conductor plying the
Tabunok-Carcar route and that he did not match the
cartographic sketch of the alleged rapist.
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
statutory rape. CA affirmed and modified the judgment to
simple rape since the minority of the victim was not proven.
Hence this appeal.
RELEVANT TOPIC:
1. How is rape committed
2. Minority as a qualifying circumstance in rape
RULING:
Firstly, a person commits rape when he sexually assaults
another who does not consent or is incapable of giving
consent to a sexual act.The crime of rape is defined and
punished under Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. It provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is
committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
Secondly, for a successful prosecution for the crime of
statutory rape there are two elements which must be
proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the
time of the incident and (2) carnal knowledge by the
assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an
accused may be found guilty of statutory rape.
This Court has held that for minority to be considered as an
element of a crime or a qualifying circumstance in the crime
of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but
it must also be established with moral certainty. Under Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence, it is inferred that the victim's
birth certificate is the best evidence of her age. We are
guided by the guidelines set in People v. Pruna in
appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an
aggravating or qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age
of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to
the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.
Absent AAA's certificate of live birth and other means by
which her age as alleged in the Information could have
been ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained
to agree with the CA and deem the crime committed as
simple rape. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
VERDICT: GUILTY; SIMPLE RAPE
G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioner, v. MONARK
EQUIPMENT CORP., Respondent.
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy
equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark)
for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental
Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five
(5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP
in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by
invoices as well as Documents and acknowledgment receipts
received and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely,
Jorge Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on
January 29, 2001, respectively. The latter failed to pay rental
fees for the use of five (5) pieces of heavy equipment as
stated in their Rental Equipment Contract, as started in the
agreement and so, SUIT FOR SUM MONEY was filed against
MCMP.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses,
Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account
Manager.
Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of
the Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was
given to MCMP. He further testified that Monark's copy had
been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy
proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of
the Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP
objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove
the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no
diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably,
MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract
notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce
the same.
The lower court ruled in favor of Monark, on appeal, CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not the presentation of the secondary
evidence should not be allowed.
Ruling: The petition has been denied by the SC. The Best
Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of
the original document whenever its contents are the subject
of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court which provides:"Section 3. Original document must
be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(Emphasis supplied)"
CAB, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are
present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the
testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the
possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts
were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such
testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been
repeatedly held by this Court, "findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left
to the trial court."12 Hence, the Court will respect the
evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.
CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD. vs. TRAVELER KIDS, INC.
G.R. No. 200065 | September 24, 2014 | J. Mendoza (Mads)
FACTS:
The two parties entered into an agreement, wherein they
agreed that Respondent TKI would import the shoes and
sandals made by Petitioner CSFL from its China factory. It
was their arrangement that TKI would pay 30% of the
purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and
the balance of 70% by way of telegraphic transfer, 30 days
from the date of delivery of the goods.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase
orders and the shipments made by CSFL. In 2004, however,
TKI started to default in its payments while making partial
payments once in a while. As of July 10, 2005, the total
unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to U.S. $325,451.39,
exclusive of the interest accruing thereto. In addition, CSFL
also manufactured $92,000.00 worth of children's shoes and
sandals pursuant to the design and specifications of TKI in its
purchase orders.
After demands were left unheeded, a complaint for
collection of sum of money and damages against TKI was
brought beforethe RTC. After the presentation of its last
witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits seeking the
admission of, among others, the sales invoices and order
slips earlier objected to when they were identified during
trial by TKI. The latter objected to the admission of the
documents offered, contending thatseveral of the sales
invoices and order slips should not be admitted because
they were merely photocopies. TKI also objected to the
admission of documents by which CSFL sought to prove its
claim for attorney’s fees.
RTC: admitted all the exhibits offered by CFSL because such
were well-taken and in order, it also denied TKI’s MR on the
matter because the duplicate originals of the invoices were
already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL’s
officer and principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu (Chiu).
Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition
for certiorari with prayer for TRI and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the CA in which it reiterated its argument
regarding the inadmissibility of the photocopied evidence
and the erroneous inclusion of those documents proving
entitlement to attorney’s fees which matter was not raised
during the pre-trial.
As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC
continued the proceedings and directed TKI to present
evidence. However, TKI refused due to its pending petition
with the CA. Because of its refusal, the RTC considered TKI’s
right to adduce countervailing evidence as waived and
ordered CSFLto submit its memorandum.
CA: Partially granted as to Exhibits “D” to “GG-1” and “HH”
which could not be admitted because they were merely
photocpies. It stated that Chiu’s testimony merely
established the existence or due execution of the original
invoices. CSFL, however, did not present the original
invoices, only the photocopies. The evidence on attorney’s
fees was granted.
ISSUE: WON the exhibits should be admitted – Yes
HELD:
CSFL basically argues that the excluded documents are
admissible in evidence because it was duly established
during the trial that the said documents were duplicate
originals, and not mere photocopies, considering that they
were prepared at the same time as the originals.
On the other hand, TKI counters that CSFL’s claim that the
photocopied documents were duplicate originals was just a
unilateral and self-serving statement without any
supportive evidence. After a review of the RTC and the CA
records, which were ordered elevated, the Court is ofthe
considered view that the CA erred in not admitting the
invoices and order slips denominated as Exhibits "D" to "GG-
1" and "HH" to "KK-1," which were duplicate originals based
on Section 4(b), Rule 130 ROC.
In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals
and Associated Bank, it was stressed that duplicate originals
were admissible as evidence.
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able
to satisfactorily explain that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and
"HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoicesand
order slips, and not mere photocopies. She testified as
follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q The documents that you have brought today, to what
records do they belong?
A Those originals are from our company because one copy
was sent to the customer and one we keep in our company,
Sir.
Q When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a
particular transaction Miss Witness, how many copies do you
prepare for that invoice? How many copies of the invoice will
you prepare?
A Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our
office sir.
Q And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones
that were retained to you inyour office, the copies you
brought to court?
A Yes sir.
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show
that Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared
two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving
one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court
combed through her testimony and found nothing that
would indicate that the documentsoffered were mere
photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her
statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals
as they were prepared at the same time. The Court sees no
reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted
as part of the testimony of Chiu.
The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found
that, contrary to the assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals
were produced in court and compared with their
photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. After
the admission of CSFL’s exhibits as evidence, TKI should have
let trial proceed in due course instead of immediately
resorting to certiorari, by presenting its own testimonial and
documentary evidence and in case of an unfavorable
decision, appeal the same in accordance with law. After all,
the RTC stated that, granting that the questioned exhibits
were not admissible, "there still remained enough evidence
to substantiate plaintiff’s claim on which the Court can
validly render judgment upon application of the pertinent
law and/or jurisprudence."
In the case of Johnson Lee v. People of the Philippines. it was
written:
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction
over the cases filed by the public respondent against the
petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the
photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by
the RTC in the exercise of its "jurisdiction. Even if erroneous,
the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of
the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the
conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said
evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court.1âwphi1 Unless grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have
been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial
court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The
remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the
photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to
adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to
appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court.
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
only questions of law may be properly raised.