Jerome T.

Arado ISSUE: WON the clean bill of health

issued to a seafarer after a PEME is
Legal Technique & Logic conclusive that illnesses subsequently
Case Digest incurred are acquired during the seafarers
employment.
(1) NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT INC.
and/or NYK SHIP MANAGEMENT HK., RULING : No, for respondent to thus
LTD vs NLRC claim that the issuance of a clean bill of health to
a seafarer after a PEME means that his illness
G.R. No. 161104 was acquired during the seafarers employment is
a non sequitor. We do not agree with the
September 27, 2006
respondents claim that by the issuance of a clean
bill of health to Roberto, made by the physicians
FACTS : By a contract forged on
selected/accredited by the petitioners, it
January 21, 1999, petitioner NYK Ship
necessarily follows that the illness for which her
Management (HK) Ltd., through its local
husband died was acquired during his
manning agent-co-petitioner NYK-Fil Ship
employment as a fisherman for the petitioners.
Management, Inc., hired Lauro A. Hernandez
The pre-employment medical examination
(respondent) as a boatswain on board the vessel
conducted on Roberto could not have divulged
S.S. LNG FLORA for a period of eight months.
the disease for which he died, considering the
Before the contract was executed, respondent
fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory.
was made to undergo the routine Pre-
The disease of GFR, which is an indicator of
employment Medical Examination (PEME) and
chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal
was found to be fit to work by the attending
function test. In pre-employment examination,
physician, Dr. Clarissa M. Mendoza. On January
the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally
28, 1999, respondent boarded the above-named
included measures only the creatinine, the
vessel and commenced to perform his duty as
presence of which cannot conclusively indicate
boatswain.
chronic renal failure. Gau Sheng Phils., Inc v.
Joaquin, G.R. No. 144665, September 8, 2004,
Twenty-five days later or on February
437 SCRA 608, 620-621.
22, 1999, while the vessel was approaching
Davao City, respondent requested for medical
attention due to high fever and pains at his left
hip bone socket. Respondent also underwent
MRI or magnetic resonance imaging of the
thoracic and lumbosacral spine which showed
negative results. By Decision of October 18,
2001, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent
was entitled to disability benefits, equivalent to
half of Grade 9 as found by the company-
designated physician, Dr. Tiong Sam N. Lim.
The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
(2) PACIENCIA REYES vs.ISMAELA RULING : Yes, we have already ruled in
DIMAGIBA Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the
presentation and probate of a will are
G.R. No. L-23638 requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testator's, expressed
October 12, 1967 wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and
right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence
of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will
to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and
FACTS: On January 19, 1955, Ismaela
imprisonment prescribed for its violation
Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to
Court of First Instance a petition for the probate allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext
of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling
Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or
annexed to the petition. The will instituted the not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and
the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the
deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and
in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes
and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano,
Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed
Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the
decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.
Grounds advanced for the opposition were
forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix,
estoppel by laches of the proponent and
revocation of the will by two deeds of
conveyance of the major portion of the estate
made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in
1943 and 1944. After trial on the formulated
issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of
June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine
and properly executed; but deferred resolution
on the questions of estoppel and revocation. On
July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that
proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate
of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the
right to raise the issue of implied revocation at
the opportune time.

ISSUE: WON the order of the Court of origin

dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel
invoked by oppositors-appellants had become
final
(3) SANIDAD VS SANIDAD ISSUE: WON the amendments as to the
proposal and the ratification of the
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 Constitution is a political one, or a non-
justiciable issue.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E.
RULING : No, the Court cannot accept the view
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory
calling for a national referendum on October 16,
of non-justiciability, that the question of the
1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")
President’s authority to propose amendments
to resolve, among other things, the issues of
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for
martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the
submission of the proposals to the people
powers of such replacement, the period of its
ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A
existence, the length of the period for tile
clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not
exercise by the President of his present powers.
that the people themselves, by their sovereign
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the act, provided for the authority and procedure for
President issued another related decree, the amending process when they ratified the
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by therefore, that constitutional provision has been
declaring the provisions of presidential Decree followed or not is indisputably a proper subject
No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
course who exercise no power of judicial
Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. On review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the
September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and people themselves vested that power, a power
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, which includes the competence to determine
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with whether the constitutional norms for
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the amendments have been observed or not. And,
Commission on Elections from holding and this inquiry must be done a priori not a
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and
October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar ratification by the people.
as they propose amendments to the Constitution.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed
the comment for respondent Commission on
Elections. The Solicitor General principally
maintains that petitioners have no standing to
sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of
the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization. Petitioners contend
that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis
(4) MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs NELIA P.D. No. 464 from assailing the 1986 assessment of the
A. BARLIS, Municipal Assessor for its failure to appeal
therefrom.
Facts: MERALCO filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, the petitioner was not the taxpayer for the
From 1968 to 1972, petitioner MERALCO, purpose of an assessment under the Real Property Tax
engaged in the distribution of electricity, erected four (4) Code; and, no assessment was made by the respondent,
power generating plants in Sucat, Muntinlupa. To equip and only collection letters were sent to it; hence, Section
the power plants, various machineries and equipment 30 of the said Code had no application. The petitioner also
were purchased both locally and abroad. When the Real alleged thatits petition stated a sufficient cause of action for
Property Tax Code took effect on June 1, 1974, prohibition against the petitioner.
MERALCO filed its tax declarations covering the Sucat
power plants, including the buildings thereon as well as Issue:
themachineries and equipment. In 1978, MERALCO sold
all the power-generating plants including the landsite to the WON, respondent’s letters are notices of assessment
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a corporation envisaged in Section 27 of P.D. No. 464.
fully owned and controlled by the Philippine government.
In 1985, the Municipal Assessor of Muntinlupa, Ruling: No. Respondent did not issue any notice
discovered that MERALCO, forthe period beginning of assessment because statutorily, he is not the
January 1, 1976 to December 29, 1978, misdeclared proper officer obliged to do so. Consequently
and/or failed to declare for taxation purposes a number of
then, Sections 30 and 64 of P.D. No. 464 had no
real properties. Hence, demanded payment of real
property taxes and reiterated its warning that its properties application in the case before the trial court. The
may be sold at public auction if it failed topay the taxes petitioners action for prohibition was not
due. MERALCO filedbefore the RTC Makati applied for premature. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in
TRO to enjoin the Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa rendering judgment granting the petition for
from enforcing the warrants of garnishment. Petitioner certiorari of the respondent. Moreover, the
alleged, inter alia, that it had paid the real property taxes petitioner, in its petition for prohibition before
on its properties from 1975 to 1978 in full, based on the
the court a quo, denied liability for the taxes
assessed value thereof. RTC issued aTRO. The Municipal
Treasurer filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following claimed by the respondent, asserting that if at
grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction, since under Sec. 64 of all, it is the NAPOCOR, as the present owner of
the Real Property Tax Code, courts are prohibited from the machineries/equipment, that should be held
entertaining any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed liable for such taxes. The petitioner had further
thereunder until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, alleged that the assessment and collection of the
the tax assessed against him; and (b) lack of cause of said taxes had already prescribed.
action, by reason of MERALCO’s failure to question the
notice of assessment issued to it by the Municipality of
Muntinlupa before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that
since MERALCO was not the present owner or possessor
of the properties in question, it was not the taxpayer
contemplated under Section 64 of the Tax Code.
CA ruling: Declared the assailed order―void and without
life in law, having been issued without jurisdiction, on
a petition that further does not state a sufficient
cause of action, filed by a party who
had not exhausted available administrative remedies.
The CA ruled that MERALCO was the taxpayer liable for
the taxes due, and that it was barred under Section 64 of
(5) Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. v. withholding tax liabilities shall be disqualified to
Commissioner of Internal Revenue avail of the tax amnesty. In this case, AIA was
G.R. No. 179115 not being assessed as withholding agent that
Facts: failed to withhold or remit the deficiency VAT
On August 25, 2004, Asia International and excise tax but as a taxpayer who is directly
Auctioneers, Inc. (“AIA” for brevity), a liable for the said taxes. Moreover, RA 9480
corporation operating within the Subic Special does not exclude from its coverage taxpayers
Economic Zone and is engaged in the operating within special economic zones. Hence,
importation and selling of used motor vehicles AIA is qualified to avail of the Tax Amnesty
and heavy equipment, was assessed by the under RA 9480.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“CIR”) for
deficiency Value Added Tax and Excise Tax in
the amounts of P 102,535,520.00 and
P4,334,715.00, respectively, or a total amount of
P 106,870,235.00, inclusive of penalties and
interest, for auction sales conducted on February
5, 6, 7, and 8, 2004.AIA claimed that it filed a
timely protest letter through registered mail on
August 30, 2004 and submitted additional
supporting documents on September 24, 2004
and November 22, 2004. CIR’s failure to act on
the protest prompted AIA to file a petition for
review before the Court of Tax Appeals on June
20, 2005. However, the CIR filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
since AIA’s failure to file its protest within the
30-day reglamentary period rendered the
assessment final and executory. After trial, the
Court of Tax Appeals First Division ruled that
there was no sufficient evidence to prove the
receipt of the protest letter by the CIR. AIA filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied;
hence, this petition for review. On January 30,
2008, AIA filed a Manifestation and Motion
with Leave of the Honorable Court to Defer or
Suspend Further Proceedings since it availed of
the Tax Amnesty Program under Republic Act
9480, known as the Tax Amnesty Act of
2007. On February 5, 2008, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue issued a Certification of
Qualification stating that AIA “has availed and
qualified for Tax Amnesty for Taxable Year
2005 and Prior Years” pursuant to RA 9480.

Issue:
Is AIA disqualified from availing itself of the
Tax Amnesty under Section 8 (a) of RA 9480?

Held:
No. Under Section 8 (a) of the RA 9480
withholding agents with respect to their
(6) People vs Royo As to AAA's behavior after the sexual assault,
the Court was of the view that her failure to
Facts: escape despite an opportunity to do so and to
AAA was 20-years old and worked as a immediately seek help thereafter should not be
housemaid in a house located at Quezon City. interpreted as consent; that these circumstances,
She came to know Rivera y Royo on September by themselves, did not necessarily negate rape or
taint her credibility; and that there was no code
28, 2004 because he was also working thereat as
a security guard. She told Rivera about a of conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a
misunderstanding with a co-worker. Rivera then rape victim to the sexual assault.
offered to help her look for another job. Around
10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29,
2004, AAA went with Rivera believing that the
latter will bring her to his parent's house in
Quiapo. Rivera brought her to Ilang Ilang Motel
located along Quezon Boulevard. AAA asked
Rivera if that was his parent's house, to which he
replied "Yes."
Rivera shoved her inside, pushed her towards
the bed, forced her to remove her clothes. He
went on top of her, shoved her penis into her
underwear and inserted the same into her vagina.
She struggled to push Rivera but the latter held
her hands tightly. She shouted for help, but
nobody heard her.
Rivera stayed on top of AAA for about ten (10)
minutes. Thereafter, they went to her cousin's
house in Antipolo City. She reported the
incident to the police authorities and Rivera was
apprehended.

Issue: Whether or not there is consent?

Whether or not the crime of rape is committed?

Ruling:

No consent. Rape is committed. Rivera

y Royo, other than his bare assertions, failed to
adduce convincing proof showing the existence
of a romantic relationship. It likewise agreed
with the RTC in stating that even assuming they
were lovers, the relationship did not give him the
license to sexually assault AAA. The Court
further pointed out that the gravamen of the
offense of rape was sexual congress with a
woman by force and without consent.
(7) PEOPLE VS. GACOTT, JR.
G.R. NO. 116049
JULY 13, 1995
(APPEAL TO EMOTION)
FACTS:
Respondent judge was sanctioned with a
reprimand and a fine of P10,000 for gross
ignorance of law when he ordered the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 11529. Respondent judge
did not even bother to read the text of the cited
letter of intent; otherwise, he would have readily
acknowledged the validity of the argument
advanced by the prosecution.
RULING
Yes. Only cases involving the dismissal
of judges of lower courts are specifically
required to be decided by the Court en banc, it is
only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension of more than one year or a fine of P
10,000 or both that administrative matter may be
decided in division.
Circular No. 2-89
A decision or resolution of a Division of the
Court, when concurred in by a majority of its
members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three of such members, is a decision
or resolution of the Supreme Court
The second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII
which reads:
“The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon”
The word “en banc” was relied upon by the
respondent for he argues that it is only the full
court, not a division thereof, that can
administratively punish him.
In the deliberations Justice Concepcion
in pointing out to its counterpart in the 1973
constitution, referred to the “court” without
qualification. That it necessarily means the
Court en banc. It was only decided to state “en
banc” because all internal procedural and
administrative matters, as well as ceremonial
functions, are always decided by or conducted in
the Court en banc.
Two situations arises:(first clause): “The
Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower
courts,..”
- is a declaration of the grant of that
disciplinary power to, and the determination
of the procedure in the exercise thereof, by
the Court en banc.
(second clause) : the Court en banc can
order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon”
- Evidently the administrative case must
be deliberated upon decided by the full
court itself. In lieu with the Bar matter
No. 209.
But, to require the entire Court to deliberate
upon and participate in all administrative matters
or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable
or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require the action of the Court
en banc.
 This would subvert the constitutional
injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic
plan to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court
of the lower courts, and the very purpose of
authorizing of three, five or seven members.
8) MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE
MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, 30 June 2008
(FALLACY AD HOMINEM)
FACTS:
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-
complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of ―demeaning,
humilating, and berating‖ him during a hearing
of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue
Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for
the plaintiff. During the
proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the
latter’s law school. When Mane answered that
he came from Manuel L. Quezon University
(MLQU), Belentold him: ―Then you’re not
from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me
because there is a saying and I know this, not all
law students are created equal, not all
law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being
that we all are created equal in His form and
substance.
constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING:
The Court held that an alumnus of a
particular law school has no monopoly of
knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations which the Court administers,
taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the
Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be
competent to discharge his functions and duties
as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective
of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge
to determine the fitness or competence of a
lawyer primarily on his alma mater is clearly an
engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and
not the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt
that his integrity and dignity were
being ―assaulted,‖ he acted properly when he
directed complainant to explain why he should
not be cited for contempt. He went out of
bounds, however, when he engaged on a
supercilious legal and personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that
even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves
in a manner befitting gentlemen and high
officers of the court.

Belen further lambasted Mane and

lectured him on the latter’s person, seemingly
disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the
OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belen’s
insulting remarks were unwarranted and
inexcusable and recommended a reprimand
of Belen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statements and

actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing
(9) FRUEHAUF ELECTRONICS
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
v. TECHNOLOGY ELECTRONICS
ASSEMBLY AND MANAGEMENT
PACIFIC CORPORATION
November 23, 2016
GR NO. 204197
(Fallacy of Equivocation)
Facts:
In 1978, Fruehauf Electronics
Philippines Corp. (Fruehauf) leased several
parcels of land in Pasig City to Signetics
Filipinas Corporation (Signetics) for a period of
25 years. Signetics constructed a semiconductor
assembly factory on the land on its own account.
In 1983, Signetics ceased its operations
after the Board of Investments (BOI) withdrew
the investment incentives granted to electronic
industries based in Metro Manila.
In 1986, Team Holdings Limited (THL)
bought Signetics. THL later changed its name to
Technology Electronics Assembly and
Management Pacific Corp. (TEAM).
In March 1987, Fruehauf filed an
unlawful detainer case against TEAM. In an
effort to amicably settle the dispute, both parties
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
on June 9, 1988. Under the MOA, TEAM
undertook to pay Fruehauf 14.7 million pesos as
unpaid rent (for the period of December 1986 to
June 1988). They also entered a 15-year lease
contract (expiring on June 9, 2003) that was
renewable for another 25 years upon mutual
agreement. The contract included an arbitration
agreement:
17.ARBITRATION
In the event of any
dispute or disagreement
between the parties hereto
involving the interpretation or
implementation of any provision
of this Contract of Lease, the
dispute or disagreement shall be
referred to arbitration by a three
(3) member arbitration
committee, one member to be
appointed by the LESSOR,
another member to be appointed
by the LESSEE, and the third
member to be appointed by
these two members. The
arbitration shall be conducted in
accordance with the Arbitration
Law (R.A. No. 876)
The contract also authorized TEAM to sublease
the property. TEAM subleased the property to
Capitol Publishing House (Capitol) on
December 2, 1996 after notifying Fruehauf.
On May 2003, TEAM informed Fruehauf that it
would not be renewing the lease.
On May 31, 2003, the sublease between TEAM
and Capitol expired. However, Capitol only
vacated the premises on March 5, 2005. In the
meantime, the master lease between TEAM and
Fruehauf expired on June 9, 2003.
On March 9, 2004, Fruehauf instituted SP Proc.
No. 11449 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for "Submission of an Existing
Controversy for Arbitration." It alleged: (1) that
when the lease expired, the property suffered
from damage that required extensive renovation;
(2) that when the lease expired, TEAM failed to
turn over the premises and pay rent; and (3) that
TEAM did not restore the property to its original
condition as required in the contract.
Accordingly, the parties are obliged to submit
the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the
stipulation in the lease contract.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the
parties to comply with the arbitration clause of
the contract.
Issues:
1. What are the remedies or the modes of
appeal against an unfavorable arbitral
award?
2. What are the available remedies from an
RTC decision confirming, vacating,
modifying, or correcting an arbitral
award?
Ruling:
1) The right to an appeal is neither a
natural right nor an indispensable
component of due process; it is a mere
statutory privilege that cannot be
invoked in the absence of an enabling
statute. Neither the Arbitration Law nor
the ADR Law allows a losing party to
appeal from the arbitral award. The
statutory absence of an appeal
mechanism reflects the State's policy of
upholding the autonomy of arbitration
proceedings and their corresponding
arbitral awards.
This Court recognized this when we
enacted the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolutionin 2009:
Rule 2.1. General policies. - It is the policy
of the State to actively promote the use of
various modes of ADR and to respect party
autonomy or the freedom of the parties to
make their own arrangements in the
resolution of disputes with the greatest
cooperation of and the least intervention
from the courts.
The Court shall exercise the power of
judicial review as provided by these Special
ADR Rules. Courts shall intervene only in
the cases allowed by law or these Special
ADR Rules.
Rule 19.7. No appeal or certiorari on the
merits of an arbitral award. - An agreement
to refer a dispute to arbitration shall mean
that the arbitral award shall be final and
binding. Consequently, a party to an
arbitration is precluded from filing an
appeal or a petition for certiorari
questioning the merits of an arbitral
award.
As a rule, the award of an arbitrator
cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment
either as to the law or as to the facts. Courts
are without power to amend or overrule
merely because of disagreement with matters
of law or facts determined by the arbitrators.
They will not review the findings of law and fact
contained in an award, and will not undertake
to substitute their judgment for that of the
arbitrators, since any other rule would make an
award the commencement, not the end, of
litigation. Errors of law and fact, or an erroneous
decision of matters submitted to the judgment of
the arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an
award fairly and honestly made. Judicial
review of an arbitration is, thus, more limited
than judicial review of a trial.115
Nonetheless, an arbitral award is not
absolute. Rule 19.10 of the Special ADR Rules -
by referring to Section 24 of the Arbitration Law
and Article 34 of the 1985 United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law - recognizes the very
limited exceptions to the autonomy of arbitral
awards:
Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on
arbitration in the Philippines. - As a general
rule, the court can only vacate or set aside the
decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear
showing that the award suffers from any of the
infirmities or grounds for vacating an arbitral
award under Section 24 of Republic Act No.
876 or under Rule 34 of the Model Law in a
domestic arbitration, or for setting aside an
award in an international arbitration under
Article 34 of the Model Law, or for such other
grounds provided under these Special Rules.
If the Regional Trial Court is asked to
set aside an arbitral award in a domestic or
international arbitration on any ground other
than those provided in the Special ADR
Rules, the court shall entertain such ground for
the setting aside or non-recognition of the
arbitral award only if the same amounts to a
violation of public policy.
The court shall not set aside or vacate the
award of the arbitral tribunal merely on the
ground that the arbitral tribunal committed
errors of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, as
the court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the arbitral tribunal.
The grounds for vacating a domestic arbitral
award under Section 24 of the Arbitration Law
contemplate the following scenarios:

(a) when the award is procured by corruption,

fraud, or other undue means; or

(b) there was evident partiality or corruption

in the arbitrators or any of them; or

(c) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct

that materially prejudiced the rights of any
party; or

(d) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or

so imperfectly executed them, that a
mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted to them was not
made.117

The award may also be vacated if an

arbitrator who was disqualified to act
willfully refrained from disclosing his
disqualification to the parties.

2)
Under the Arbitration Law, the mode of
appeal was via petition for review on certiorari:

Section 29. Appeals. - An appeal may be

taken from an order made in a proceeding
under this Act, or from judgment entered
upon an award
through certiorari proceedings, but such
appeals shall be limited to questions of
law. The proceedings upon such appeal,
including the judgment thereon shall be
governed by the Rules of Court in so far as
they are applicable.
(10) PEOPLE VS RACHO
JAN 17, 2018
G.R. NO. 225642
(FALLACY OF IGNORANCE/ NON
SEQUITUR)
Facts:
Prosecution:
AAA was watching a beauty contest
with her aunt. The contest was being held at a
basketball court where a make-shift stage was
put up. The only lights available were those
coming from the vehicles around.
She had the urge to urinate so she went
to the comfort room beside the cooperative
building near the basketball court. Between the
cooperative building and the basketball court
were several trees. She was not able to reach the
comfort room because Amarela was already
waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly
pulled her towards the day care center. She was
shocked and was no match to the strength of
Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the
day care center. He punched her in the abdomen
which rendered her weak. Then Amarela
undressed her. She tried to resist him but he was
stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt
numb. He placed himself on top of her and
inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a
push and pull movement. She shouted for help
and then three (3) men came to her rescue so
Amarela fled.
The three (3) persons brought her to a
hut. But they closed the hut and had bad
intentions with her. So she fled and hid in a
neighboring house. When she saw that the
persons were no longer around, she proceeded
on her way home. She went to the house of
Godo Dumandan who brought her first to the
Racho residence because Dumandan thought her
aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed behind
So Neneng Racho asked her son Racho to bring
her to her aunt's house instead.
AAA then said that Racho brought her
to a shanty along the way against her will. She
was told to lie down. When she refused, Racho
boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She
resisted by kicking him but he succeeded in
undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and
placed himself on top of AAA. Racho then
inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. After
consummating the act, Racho left her. So AAA
went home alone.
When she reached home, her parents
were already asleep. She went inside her room
and cried. The following morning, she decided
to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her
decision until eventually, AAA told her mother
about what happened to her. She told her eldest
brother first who got very angry.
They reported the matter to the police and
eventually Amarela and Racho were arrested.
Defense of Amarela :
Amarela confirmed the fact that on
February 10, 2009, he attended the fiesta
celebrations in Maligatong, , Davao City. He
said he met private complainant, AAA, at the
cooperative building at around 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon. AAA asked him if he knew a
person by the name of Eric Dumandan who was
allegedly her boyfriend. After a while, Eric
Dumandan passed by and so he told him that
AAA was looking for him. Then he left.
Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his
friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt
dizzy and fell down from the bench. So Sanchez
brought him to the house of his elder brother
Joey in Tawan-tawan. He did not know what
happened next because he slept and woke up at
six o'clock in the morning.
Defense of Racho :
Racho confirmed that he went with
AAA to bring her home but denied raping her:
Racho, testified that he was at the house
of his mother on February 10, 2009. At around
10:00 o'clock in the evening, AAA arrived with
Godo Dumandan. AAA was asking for help
while crying because she was allegedly raped by
three persons in the pineapple plantation.
His mother advised her to just take a
bath and change clothes and sleep at his
brother's house. But AAA wanted to go home.
Since he was the only one who was not drunk,
Racho was instructed by his mother to
accompany AAA in going to her aunt's house.
10:00 o'clock in the evening and then he went to
sleep.
The following day, she was surprised
when Racho was arrested allegedly for raping
AAA.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of AAA, the
victim, is credible?

When they reached Caniamo, AAA did Ruling:

not want to be brought to her aunt's house
because she knows the latter would just scold
her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their
house at Ventura. Since Ventura was far, Racho
did not go with her and instead went back home.
When asked about the charge of rape
against him, Racho said he could not have done
that because his hand is impaired while showing
a long scar on his left arm. This was a result
allegedly of a hacking incident. He offered a
Medical Certificate which indicates that Racho
was confined in the said hospital from
September 21, 2008 up to October 1, 2008 after
an operation on his left forearm. He said that his
left arm was placed in a plaster cast but that he
removed the cast after three (3) months. He said
that even after he removed the cast, his arm was
still painful and he could not move it around.
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the
testimony of AAA is not credible under the
following circumstances: 1) the version of her
story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs
from her testimony in court; 2) AAA could not
have easily identified Amarela because the
crime scene is dark and she only saw him for the
first time; 3) her testimony lacks material details
on how she was brought under the stage against
her will; 4) the medico legal findings do not
corroborate physical injuries and are any signs
of forced entry.

Racho said he was surprised when

policemen came to his house on February 11,
2009 and invited him to the police station
because there was a complaint for rape against
him.

Anita Racho testified that she was at

home in the evening of February 10, 2009
together with her husband and sons Bobby and
Racho. Godo Dumandan arrived together with
AAA who was allegedly raped by three (3) men.
AAA appeared madly and wet so she advised
her to take a bath and not to go home anymore
since it was late. AAA insisted on going home,
so she asked her son Racho to accompany her.
Racho at first refused pointing to his elder
brother Bobby to accompany her. He eventually
brought AAA home. He came back at around