CASE DOCTRINES IN LABOR LAW REVIEW

Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy, 575 SCRA 262 , December 23, 2008
Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; While in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the
burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.—While in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the
burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal. The records do not show that petitioner was dismissed from the
service. They in fact show that despite petitioner’s absence from July 2001 to March 2002 which, by her
own admission, exceeded her approved leave, she was still considered a member of the Forest Hills faculty
which retained her in its payroll.
Same; Labor Standards; Holiday Pay; The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his regular rate if he
is required to work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to his regular rate on holidays
applies even if he does not work.—Respecting petitioner’s claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills contends that
petitioner failed to prove that she actually worked during specific holidays. Article 94 of the Labor Code
provides, however, that (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except
in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may
require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent
to twice his regular rate[.] The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his regular rate if he is required to
work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to his [Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy,
575 SCRA 262(2008)]

People vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 664, July 11, 1986

Labor; Recruitment and placement; Interpretation; Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, interpreted; Presumption that
the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever two or more persons are
involved; Number of persons, not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers.—As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or
entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to
whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the “canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.” The number of persons dealt
with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected
in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words
“shall be deemed” create that presumption.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words “shall be deemed” in Art. 13(b) of P.D. 442, meaning of.—In the instant
case, the word “shall be deemed” should by the same token be given the force of a disputable presumption
or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.

C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol, Jr., 533 SCRA 424 , September 14, 2007
Labor Law; Labor Code, Judgment; Appeals; A judgment debtor who acquiesces of and voluntarily complies
with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.

Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment; Definition of Recruitment and Placement; The conduct of preparatory
interviews is a recruitment activity.—Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether for profit or
not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the basis of this
definition—and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray—the conduct of preparatory interviews is a
recruitment activity.
Same; Same; Same; It is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders
the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.—The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the
interviews is of no moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be “for profit or
not.” Notably, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the
recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.

Same; Appeals; Due Process; The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity afforded a
party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense; What is vital is not the opportunity
to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard.—The claim of denial of due process
on the part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The essence of due process lies in the reasonable
opportunity afforded a party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense. What is vital
is not the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard. In this case,
C.F. Sharp was given ample opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence in support of its version of the
material occurrences, and to controvert Rizal’s allegation and the Inspection Report. It submitted its position
paper with supporting affidavits and documents, and additionally pleaded its causes on appeal before the
Secretary of Labor. Under the circumstances, a claim of denial of due process on C.F. Sharp’s part is
completely unavailing.
Same; Same; Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the labor officials’ findings rest.—C.F. Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual
veracity and probative value of the evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp may well be
reminded that it is not our function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the evidence adduced by the
parties. Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does
not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials’ findings rest.
Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the
CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. It is only when the findings
of the labor agencies and the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will review the records to
determine which findings should be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary facts. Where
the CA affirms the labor agencies on review and there is no showing whatsoever that said findings are
patently erroneous, this Court is bound by the said findings. [C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs.
Espanol, Jr., 533 SCRA 424(2007)]

Santiago vs. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., 527 SCRA 165 , July 10, 2007
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationships; Seafarers; Considering that petitioner was not able to
depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence and no
employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.—There is no question that the parties
entered into an employment contract on 3 February 1998, whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent
to render services on board “MSV Seaspread” for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for nine (9)
months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to
Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire,
the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between
the parties.
Same; Same; Distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer employee relationship; Even before the start of any employer-employee
relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights
and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.—A
distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of
the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the
date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause,
as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the
point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with
the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which
may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the
seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Same; Same; Seafarers; Neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from
being deployed without a valid reason; Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation
to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.—While the POEA
Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning agent nor the employer can
simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason. Respondent’s act of preventing
petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding “MSV Seaspread” constitutes a breach of contract,
giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its
obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.

Same; Same; Same; The fact that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules are
silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded
from claiming the same.—We take exception to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that damages are not
recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules are silent as
to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from
claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or
cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend
a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy
him.

Same; Same; Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent, the Court rules that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has jurisdiction over
petitioner’s complaint.—Despite the absence of an employer employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of
labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that: Sec.10.Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied] Since the present petition involves the employment contract
entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the
NLRC.
Same; Same; Seafarers; Respondent liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine
(9) months’ worth of salary as provided in the contract, petitioner is not entitled to overtime pay.—
Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth
of salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the contract
indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether
or not he rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was “prevented without valid reason from
rendering regular much less overtime service,” the fact remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will
perform overtime work had he been allowed to board the vessel. The amount of US$286.00 stipulated in
the contract will be paid only if and when the employee rendered overtime work. This has been the tenor
of our rulings in the case of Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 258 SCRA 643 (1996), where we discussed the matter in this light: The contract provision
means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when
overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime. work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could
be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In
short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must
first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship
or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the
extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time
would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable,
forcing petitioner to institute the suit below; Award of attorney’s fees is thus warranted.—The Court also
holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and expenses of litigation.
Attorney’s fees are recoverable when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur
expenses to protect his interest. We note that respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief
that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several
persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time and again, this Court has upheld management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and
not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under
valid agreements. Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing
petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorney’s fees is thus warranted.
Same; Same; Seafarers; Nature of Employment; Seafarers are considered contractual employees and
cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor Code.—We likewise do not see respondent’s
failure to deploy petitioner as an act designed to prevent the latter from attaining the status of a regular
employee. Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular
employee, regardless of his previous contracts of employment with respondent. In Millares v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 385 SCRA 306 (2002), the Court ruled that seafarers are considered contractual
employees and cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when
the contract expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual
basis.

Ambraque International Placement & Services vs. NLRC, 157 SCRA 431, January 28, 1988
Labor; NLRC; Overseas Employment; Illegal Dismissal; Dismissal of worker that he allegedly exhibited
disagreeable conduct when he was abroad, is a sweeping statement and without any elaboration by the
employer; Absence of details surrounding the charge of disagreeable conduct of the worker casts veracity
on the charge.—The allegation that the private respondent exhibited disagreeable conduct when he was
abroad thus paving the way for his dismissal is a sweeping statement. The allegation is not even
accompanied by any elaboration on the matter. If the said allegation were true, then the petitioner would
have discussed in detail the circumstances surrounding such disagreeable conduct in order to support its
stand. The absence of such vital information casts suspicion on the veracity of the allegation of the
petitioner. As observed by the Solicitor General, the telex messages relied upon by the petitioner do not
establish that the private respondent was dismissed from his employment for just cause. Both telex
messages are general statements. There is no record that the principal gave additional information on the
dismissal. At the most, the second telex message implies that the previous employment experience of the
private respondent in Saudi Arabia causes problems to the principal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Recruitment agency, jointly and solidarity liable with its principal to the worker
corresponding to the entire remuneration covered by the employment contract.—Finally, the petitioner
recruitment agency should be jointly and solidarity liable with its principal as far as this case is concerned.
Pursuant to Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Regulations of the Labor Code, a recruitment agency
can be sued solidarity with its principal.

Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 757 , September 16, 1996
Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Petitioners act prematurely when they immediately bring a
petition for certiorari without having filed any motion for reconsideration with the respondent agency.

Same; Same; Same; A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in cases where
a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown to have been
committed by the respondent Commission, and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions or
resolutions of the respondent NLRC does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence.—But
even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be overlooked, the instant petition nevertheless suffers from
serious substantive flaws. The petition assails the Resolution of the respondent Commission as lacking
factual and legal bases to support the same. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will
lie only in cases where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly
shown to have been committed by the respondent Commission, and this Court’s jurisdiction to review
decisions or resolutions of the respondent NLRC does not include a correction of its evaluation of the
evidence. Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the
respondent NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are generally accorded not only great respect but
even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is able to clearly demonstrate that
respondent Commission had arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to
such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated.
Labor Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Claims of overseas workers
against their foreign employers should not be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts
usually apply to other complainants who have more facility in obtaining the required evidence to prove their
demands.—First, a word about the evidence supporting the findings of the POEA Administrator. We have
held that claims of overseas workers against their foreign employers should not be subjected to the rules
of evidence and procedure that courts usually apply to other complainants who have more facility in
obtaining the required evidence to prove their demands. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides
that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Same; Same; Insanity; The mental disorder of a Filipino overseas contract worker became evident when
he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok
airport’s immigration area on his own, there being no sane and sufficient reason for him to want to while
away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with its native tongue, with nothing to do
and no source of income, and after having been absent from kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an
entire year.—The circumstances prior to and surrounding his death, however, provide substantial evidence
of the existence of such mental defect or disorder. Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to
join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport’s
immigration area on his own. We can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract
worker or seaman to want to while away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with
its native tongue, with nothing to do and no source of income, and after having been absent from kith and
kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year. Nor can we find any plausible reason for him to be wielding
a knife and scaring away passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no longer
in full possession of his sanity. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient in themselves to produce a
firm conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was no longer in full control of his senses when he
left his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more than substantial evidence is required.

Same; Same; Same; Where an overseas contract worker attacked a Thai policeman when he was no longer
in complete control of his mental faculties, the provisions of the Standard Format Contract of Employment
exempting the employer from liability does not apply.—The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court
agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his
mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exempting the
employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from
mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his
reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the
policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part.

Same; Same; Same; The failure of a foreign employer to observe some precautionary measures and in
allowing an overseas worker with mental disorder to travel home alone render it liable for the death of said
worker.—Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s mental condition,
petitioners “should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman
to travel home alone,” and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, “the
obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the contracted period
as (petitioners are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the
contract of employment.”

Same; Same; Even if the termination of the employment contract is duly effected in a foreign country, still
the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that the worker is duly repatriated to the point of hiring
subsists.—Petitioner’s reliance on De Jesus is misplaced, as the death and burial benefits being claimed
in this case are not payable by the Employees’ Compensation Commission and chargeable against the
State Insurance Fund. These claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the
local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this country, i.e.,
the point of hire. Though the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the
responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring
subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly
provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accidental death,
dismemberment and disability of overseas workers: “Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage.—The
minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on
and off the job, for the duration of the worker’s contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of
the contract of employment; provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less
than one year.” (Italics supplied)

Same; Same; The foreign employer may not be obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a
returning employee but it cannot deny that it is expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return
of said worker.—The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion
for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the
safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its
employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home
alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry
practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their
usefulness. [Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 757(1996)]

De Jesus vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 530 SCRA 489 , August 17, 2007
Labor Law; Appeals; Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination—firm is the doctrine that this
Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases.—It is a settled rule that under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised before this Court. Judicial review by this
Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor
tribunal has based its determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies
with greater force in labor cases. However, factual issues may be considered and resolved when the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals, as in this case.
Same; Disease; The rule is that an ailment contracted by a worker even prior to his employment, does not
detract from the compensability of the disease.—The evidence shows that De Jesus previously suffered
from ulcer but he ticked “NO” in his medical history. De Jesus, therefore, committed misrepresentation.
Nonetheless, he passed the pre-employment medical examination, was reported fit to work, and was
suffered to work on board M/V Author for more than two (2) months, until his repatriation on June 19, 1997.
The rule is that an ailment contracted even prior to his employment, does not detract from the
compensability of the disease. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits incident thereto. It is enough
that the employment had contributed, even in a small measure, to the development of the disease.
Same; Same; A worker’s misrepresentation cannot be made the basis by his employer for the denial of his
claims under the contract where he passed the required pre-medical examination and was declared fit to
work.—In OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 449 SCRA 525 (2005), this Court, in granting similar
claims, held: Labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Despite his misrepresentation, Arbit underwent
and passed the required pre-medical examination, was declared fit to work, and was suffered to work by
petitioner. Upon repatriation, he complied with the required post-employment medical examination. Under
the beneficent provisions of the Contract, it is enough that the work has contributed, even in a small degree,
to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death. Strict proof of causation is not required.
De Jesus’ misrepresentation cannot, therefore, be made basis by POMI for the denial of his claims under
the contract.

Same; Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause.—Settled is the rule that in
termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and
valid cause. The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the
employee’s defense. In this case, no convincing proof was offered to prove POMI’s allegation. All that we
have is its self-serving assertion that De Jesus violated his employment contract. There is no proof that the
prescribed disciplinary procedure was followed. We, therefore, agree with the Labor Arbiter’s finding that
POMI utterly failed to establish its claim of valid dismissal. Accordingly, the NLRC and Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the said finding. [De Jesus vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 530 SCRA
489(2007)]

Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. vs. NLRC, 333 SCRA 236 , June 08, 2000
Remedial Law; Certiorari; The filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the
institution of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to well-recognized exceptions; Certiorari cannot be
resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners’ own omission to file the required
motion for reconsideration.

Labor Law; Death Benefits; Under the contract, compensability of the illness or death of seamen need not
depend on whether the illness was work connected or not; It is sufficient that the illness occurred during the
term of the employment contract.—It will be noted that the claim for sickness and permanent disability
benefits of the private respondent arose from the stipulations on the standard format contract of
employment between him and petitioner Seagull per Circular No. 2, Series of 1984 of POEA. This circular
was intended for all parties involved in the employment of Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going
vessel. Significantly, under the contract, compensability of the illness or death of seamen need not depend
on whether the illness was work connected or not. It is sufficient that the illness occurred during the term of
the employment contract. It will also be recalled that petitioners admitted that private respondent’s work as
a radio officer exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather, which could trigger a heart
attack or heart failure.

Same; Same; It is not necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in
perfect health at the time he contracted the disease; If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee’s
death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant,
and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease.—Even assuming that
the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of
compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to
recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the
disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the
employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes
the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee’s death for which compensation is
sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said
death, independently of any pre-existing disease. [Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. vs. NLRC,
333 SCRA 236(2000)]

Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation vs. Sta. Rita, 515 SCRA 157 , February 08, 2007
Labor Law; Seamen; The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to
his heirs for death compensation benefits, but if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of
employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits.—The death of a seaman during the
term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is
established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.
However, if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not
entitled to the death benefits enumerated above. [Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation vs.
Sta. Rita, 515 SCRA 157(2007)]

People vs. Turda, 233 SCRA 702, July 06, 1994

Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment; Words and Phrases; Recruitment, defined.—Article 13, par. (b), of the same
Code defines recruitment as “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.”
Same; Same; Conspiracy; The appellant, his wife, and Manera were conspirators in the illegal recruitment
business by contributing acts in pursuance of the financial success of their joint venture for their mutual
benefit.—A review of the testimonies of complainants leads us to no other conclusion than that appellant,
his wife, and Manera were conspirators in the illegal recruitment business by contributing acts in pursuance
of the financial success of their joint venture for their mutual benefit. All the complainants have testified that
in every recruitment transaction, appellant was always present with the other accused. With respect to the
recruitment of Rosales and Shirley Cabalu, both testified that the three (3) accused went to their house to
induce them to apply for overseas work for a fee, and that appellant was likewise around when the amount
of P70,000.00 was quoted by the other accused as the recruitment service fee. For her part, complainant
Celina Andan categorically testified that appellant and his wife were together when the latter was paid the
downpayment in check for her trip to Canada. Celina further asserted that the Turdas were always together
in their recruitment transactions; in fact, all the complainants confirmed that appellant even drove them to
the airport for the supposed trip abroad not only once but thrice.
Same; Same; Evidence; A self-serving negative evidence cannot prevail over positive identification.—
Appellant’s explanation that his reason for driving the complainants to the airport was because he himself
was also scheduled to leave for abroad, is weak and uncorroborated. It is a self-serving negative evidence
which cannot prevail over his positive identification by the complaining witnesses as one of those who
actively participated in recruiting them. Besides, how could he be driving his Volkswagen to the airport if he
himself was leaving for abroad, unless he was ready to abandon his car after taking off?
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that said
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance.—
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that said court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which do not obtain in the present
case. There is no doubt that the acts of appellant and his wife conclusively established a common criminal
design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through coordinated moves. Such acts constitute
enlisting, contracting or procuring workers or promising them overseas employment under Art. 13, par. (b),
of the Labor Code. Since appellant did not have the license or authority to recruit and yet recruited at least
three (3) persons, he is guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment under Art. 38, penalized under Art. 39, of the
Labor Code.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Ex Post Facto Laws; P.D. 2018, which increased the
penalty for illegal recruitment constitutive of economic sabotage, to life imprisonment, took effect on 28 July
1986.—We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in imposing upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment because this was imposed by a new law not in force when the offense was
allegedly committed. P.D. No. 2018 has increased the penalty to life imprisonment if the illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage. As defined in Art. 38, as amended, illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage if undertaken by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph of Art. 38. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2018, promulgated
on 26 January 1986, has provided for its immediate effectivity. It was published on 10 February 1986 in
Vol. 82, No. 6, Page 922, of the Official Gazette. Hence, when appellant committed the acts of illegal
recruitment from August 1986 to September 1987, the amendments to the law, which took effect on 28 July
1986, were already in force and effect.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Where some other crimes or felonies are committed in the
process of illegal recruitment, conviction under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other
statutes.—The rule is settled that the recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the
necessary recruiting permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however, where
some other crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the Labor Code does not
preclude punishment under other statutes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Not all acts which constitute estafa necessarily establish illegal
recruitment, for estafa is wider in scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment activities.—
Applying the foregoing principle, not all acts which constitute estafa necessarily establish illegal recruitment,
for estafa is wider in scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment activities. More
importantly, the element of damage, which is essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment;
and, while estafa is malum in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum. [People vs. Turda, 233 SCRA
702(1994)]

Prieto vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 226 SCRA 232 , September 10, 1993
Labor Law; Appeal; Factual findings of administrative bodies are as a rule binding on the Court unless they
come under the established exceptions.—The factual findings of administrative bodies are as a rule binding
on this Court, but this is true only when they do not come under the established exceptions. One of these
is where the findings of the POEA and the NLRC are contrary to each other, as in this case, and there is a
necessity to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to the established facts.
Same; The claims of our overseas workers should be received with sympathy and allowed if warranted
conformably to the constitutional mandate for the protection of the working class.—The private respondents
point to the petitioners’ allegation in their complaint that they were mere assistant cooks and argue that this
belies their representation that they did not apply for these positions. The argument has no merit. The
petitioners were not assisted by lawyers when they filed their complaint and must have had in mind the
positions stipulated in the second contract. In the amended complaint, this statement was rectified. At any
rate, the slight error must not be taken against the petitioners. As we held in Cuadra v. NLRC, “our overseas
workers are mostly ordinary laborers not conversant with legal principles and with the manner they can
assert and protect rights. They have no compatriot lawyers to consult and no labor unions to support them
in the foreign land. x x x The claims of our overseas workers should therefore be received with sympathy
and allowed, if warranted, conformably to the constitutional mandate for the protection of the working class.”
Same; Same; Where the employer-employee relationship has been established, the burden of proof in
termination cases lies with the employer.—Where the employer-employee relationship has been
established, the burden of proof in termination cases lies with the employer. This burden was not discharged
by the private respondents.

Same; Labor Code; A private employment agency can be sued jointly and severally with the principal or
foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of employment.—
Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code defines the duties and obligations of a
duly licensed placement and recruitment agency. Section 2(e) requires a private employment agency to
assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker.
Section 10(a)(2) provides that a private employment agency can be sued jointly and severally with the
principal or foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of
employment.
Same; Same; Same; Book II, Rule II, Section 1(f) (3) of the New Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment, promulgated by the Governing Board of the POEA substantially reiterates Rule II
of Book II, Section 1(d) (3) of 1985 POEA Rules.—Book II, Rule II, Section I(f) (3) of the new Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment promulgated by the Governing Board of the POEA
substantially reiterates Rule II of Book II, Section 1(d) (3) of 1985 POEA Rules, which governs this case. It
provides that a private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all
claims and liabilities that may arise in connection with the implementation of the contracts including but not
limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and repatriation. There is no doubt that,
under the facts established in this case, AR and Sons is jointly and solidarily liable with overseas employer
SAM for the claims of the petitioners.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319 , August 05, 1996
Same; Same; Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good.—Thus, police power concerns
government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it
follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Same; Same; The Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.—A
thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us
to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance
were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
Same; Same; The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the
issuance of Department Order No. 3.—Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against
the deployment of performing artists to “high-risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive
recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment
to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists
abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous
individuals and agencies.

Same; Same; Apart from the State’s police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend
the fullest protection to our overseas workers.—In any event, apart from the State’s police power, the
Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic
constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18.
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare. More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first
paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

Same; Same; Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.—Obviously, protection
to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions
of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or
overseas.

Same; Same; A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees.—A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights
are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable
wrong.

Same; Same; No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state.—
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly
when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of
the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

Same; Same; So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such
deprivation exists.—Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require previously
licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had
undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed
that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause.
So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation
exists.

Same; Same; The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as
such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject
of the particular legislation.—The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it
is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that
all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We
have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification
for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation
to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns
all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee. [JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260
SCRA 319(1996)]

Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721 , December 05, 1994
Conflict of Laws; As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.

Same; Same; Actions; Words and Phrases; “Borrowing Statute,” Explained; One form of “borrowing
statutes” provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in
the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.—However, the characterization of a statute
into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing
statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply
the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts 183 [1975]).
While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws
of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run
against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of
action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
Same; Same; Same; Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been repealed or amended by the
Civil Code.—Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article
2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or
contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, 104 [7th ed.]).
Same; Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s
public policy.—In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy
(Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
Labor Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Prescription; Article 291 of the Labor Code applies to money
claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those arising from application of foreign laws
providing for greater employee benefits.—Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive
period for filing “actions to enforce any cause of action under said law.” On the other hand, Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims arising from
employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer employee
relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining
agreement. The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under said
Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants
in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims “arising from the employer’s violation of the
employee’s right,” as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.

Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; “Speedy disposition of cases” is a relative term, a
flexible concept consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case.—It is true that
the constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings
but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, as
held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), “speedy disposition of cases” is a relative term.
Just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial” accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings,
“speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the cases took seven years to be disposed of in the administrative level there
is no violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases where the cases are not of the run-
of-the-mill variety, involve a total of 1,767 claimants hired on various dates, with claims totalling more than
US$65 million.—The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in
the administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition
of the cases of complainants. The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767
claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985. The
claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group
in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalled more than US$65 million.

Same; Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s
public policy.—In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy
(Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

Labor Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Prescription; Article 291 of the Labor Code applies to money
claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those arising from application of foreign laws
providing for greater employee benefits.—Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive
period for filing “actions to enforce any cause of action under said law.” On the other hand, Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims arising from
employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer- employee
relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining
agreement. The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable under said
Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants
in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims “arising from the employer’s violation of the
employee’s right,” as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
Nitto Enterprises vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 248 SCRA 654 , September 29, 1995
Labor Law; Apprenticeship Agreements; Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the
proposed apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.—In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
“care maker/molder.” On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and
submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed
only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and
Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. Based on the evidence
before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship
agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Prior approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition
sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

Same; Same; Where the apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect, the worker hired as apprentice
should be considered as a regular employee.—Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between
petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program
duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as
a delivery boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Same; Dismissals; Due Process; The twin requirements of due process, substantive and procedural, must
be complied with before valid dismissal exists, otherwise the dismissal becomes void.—There is an
abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and
procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. Without which, the dismissal becomes
void. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This
simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his
defense including legal representation. [Nitto Enterprises vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 248
SCRA 654(1995)].

Note: The above list of cases was obtained from NLRC Commissioner Rendoque's lecture.