THE SECOND WAY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

The second way (secunda via)1 a posteriori quia demonstration of the existence of God
in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 starts from our experience of an order of per se essentially
subordinated efficient causes2 among the sensible things of this world (e.g., a soccer player

1
Studies on the Second Way: R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, La deuxième preuve de l’existence de Dieu proposée
par Saint Thomas, “Doctor Communis,” 7 (1954), pp. 28-40 ; R. LAUER, The Notion of Efficient Cause in the
“Secunda Via,” “The Thomist,” 38 (1974), pp. 754-767 ; J. R. T. LAMONT, An Argument for an Uncaused Cause,
“The Thomist,” 59 (1995), pp. 261-277 ; R. L. CARTWRIGHT, The Second Way, “Mediaeval Philosophy and
Theology,” 5 (1996), pp. 189-204.
2
An efficient cause is the primary principle or origin of an action which makes something simply to be, or to be in a
certain way. Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that “the intrinsic causes found in corporeal creatures require the
action of an external agent. Since matter and form are two distinct principles by themselves, they cannot bring about
the formation of a thing; they need an external cause that has to put them together. Besides, experience shows that a
corporeal being only acquires a new substantial or accidental form by virtue of an actual extrinsic principle whose
precise role is to make matter acquire a new form.
“From this point of view, the efficient cause is by nature prior to the material and formal causes. The latter
cannot exert their causal influence on one another without the prior influence of the efficient cause. Therefore, the
study of matter and form alone is not sufficient; it should naturally lead to a consideration of the efficient cause.
“In corporeal beings, the efficient cause always acts by altering some (secondary) matter so as to educe a new
form from it. Hence, it can also be called a moving cause (causa movens). ‘The efficient cause is the cause of the
causality of matter and form, since by its motion or movement it makes the matter receive the form, and makes the
form inhere in matter’(In V Metaphysicorum, lect. 3). In the case of created causes, the agent always requires a
potency upon which it exerts its activity, or, in other words, a subject on which it acts in order to obtain a new effect.
God alone causes without any need for a pre-existing reality, since He produces the totality of the effect.”(T.
ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 201-202.
Distinctive Characteristics of Efficient Causality. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo give us some the features of the
efficient cause: “a) Unlike the material and formal causes, the efficient cause is a principle extrinsic to the effect…
“b) The efficient cause imparts to the subject the perfection which makes it an effect of the agent, a perfection
which the agent must actually have. A teacher, for instance, is the efficient cause of the knowledge of the student,
because he imparts to the student a portion of his own actual knowledge.
“In this respect, the efficient cause is always an exemplary cause, since no one can give another a perfection
which he does not have. Thus, only an actual being can impart actuality to an effect, and it can only do so to the
extent that it is itself actual (every agent acts insofar as it is in act).
“c) The effect always pre-exists in its cause in some way. The perfection transmitted may be found in the cause
either in a more eminent manner or at least in the same degree. A man, for instance, can engender another man. To
warm another body, the warming body must have a higher temperature.
“Consequently, when an agent acts, it always produces something like itself. The likeness does not refer to any
perfection whatsoever, but precisely to that perfection by virtue of which the agent acts in the given instance. Fire,
for instance, does not warm insofar as it is actually luminous, but insofar as it is actually hot. Producing an effect
means imparting to matter a form which is like that possessed by the cause. Since this form may be possessed in
either of two ways, either naturally or intellectually, the likeness of the effect may refer to either. A colt is like the
horse with respect to the form which is possessed by both in a natural way. A cathedral, however, is not like the
architect, but like the model which the architect conceived in his mind.
“Furthermore, the principle by virtue of which something acts in producing an effect is its form, and not its
matter, since it is by virtue of the form that it is actual. This is true both in the case of the substance and of the
accident: 1) The specific actions of a substance stem from its substantial form and from its consequent operative
powers. If man can think and will, this is because he has a spiritual soul, which is endowed with intelligence and
will. 2) Acquired perfections in the sphere of activity stem from operative habits. Thus, only a person who has the

1
moves his foot to hit the soccer ball which moves the ball ten meters in front of him); the
conclusion will be the affirmation of the existence of God as the Uncaused First Efficient Cause:
“The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find
there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in
which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself, for so it would be prior to itself, which is
impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient
causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is
the cause of the ultimate cause whether the intermediate cause be several or one only. Now to
take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore if there be no first cause among
efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes
it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes, all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is
necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”3

The starting point for the secunda via is the experience that we have of an order of per se
essentially subordinated efficient causes among the sensible things that we see around us (e.g.,
an author uses a fountain pen to write down his thoughts on a blank sheet of paper), essentially
subordinated per se efficient causes, causes being ordered per se whenever the virtue of the first
cause influences the ultimate effect produced through the intermediary causes. Here the causal
influx of the first cause reaches to the ultimate effect by means of other causes. Let us give an
example of a subordinated per se order of efficient causes: Harry is playing tennis. In this case,
Harry’s expertise moves his right hand, and his right hand moves the tennis racket, and the tennis
racket moves the tennis ball to the other end of the tennis court, which is the ultimate effect. In
this series of causes the causal influx of Harry’s expertise influences the ultimate effect, the
moving of the tennis ball to the other end of the tennis court, by means of other causes like his
hands and his tennis racket. The Angelic Doctor explains: “…two things may be considered in
every agent, namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts. Thus fire by its heat
makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent depends upon the power of the higher
agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves
that power, or applies it to action. Thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect,
although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that
form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently, the action of the lower agent must not only
proceed from the lower agent through the agent’s own power, but also through the power of all
the higher agents, for it acts by the power of them all. Now just as the lowest agent is found to be
immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of
the effect; because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the
power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the

knowledge and skill of the architect can design houses.”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp.
202-203).
3
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.: “Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis
sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa
efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis
efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et
medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si
non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis
efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae, quod
patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.”

2
power of the supreme agent is found to produce its effect of itself, as though it were the
immediate cause.”4

As regards the difference between the prima via ex parte motus and the secunda via ex
ratione causae efficientis, Renard observes that “there are essential differences which place each
proof under a distinct formality. The first way considers the passivity of beings, their becoming
as they are moved; it considers motion. The formal aspect of the second way, on the contrary, is
activity. This proof studies a limited being in so far as it is a cause, that is, in so far as by its
action it is the efficient cause of another.”5 Concerning the difference in starting points between
the first way and the second way, Gerard Smith writes: “It is the activity, the operation, of causes
which is the datum of the second way: causes causing. The datum of the first way was beings-
being-moved; the datum of the second way is beings-moving-something else. A vast difference
is here. Beings-being-moved are patients. Beings-moving-something else are agents. Agents are
acting. Patients are acted upon. Patients are becoming something; they are in fieri. Agents are
causing something else to become something; they are in agere.”6

The secunda via deals with essential or per se subordinated efficient causes, not per
accidens ordered causes where the causal influx does not reach down to the ultimate effect, but
only to the proximate effect.7 That the proximate effect manages in turn to cause some other

4
Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 70.
5
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1952, p. 37.
6
G. SMITH, Natural Theology, Macmillan, New York, 1951, p. 118.
7
Per Se Essentially Subordinated Series of Efficient Causes and Per Accidens Accidentally Subordinated Series of
Efficient Causes. Contrasting an essential efficient causal series from an accidental efficient causal series, Aquinas
states in the second article of the forty sixth question of the Prima Pars: “In efficient causes it is impossible to
proceed to infinity per se – thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain
effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not
impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely
multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental; as an artificer acts by
means of many hammer accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one
particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to
be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man.”(Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 46, a. 2, ad 7).
Commenting on the difference between a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes and a per
accidens accidentally subordinated series of efficient causes, Dougherty observes the following: “An effect can be
related to a series of efficient causes in either an essential or accidental way. Let us consider first the meaning of an
essential, efficient causal series. An effect can be produced by a series of primary and secondary causes in what is
called an essentially (per se) subordinate series of proper causes. There are certain definite attributes of this series: 1.
The secondary causes cannot act except as members of the series notwithstanding their own natures which are the
principles of their own movement ; 2. Each member of the series influences the total effect ; 3. Each member of the
series has a true causality proper to its nature; 4. There must be a first in the series which is independent and the
others are dependent upon it.
“If there were no first cause in the essential series there would be no effect. The secondary or intermediary causes
cannot by themselves produce the effect, since intermediary causes produce not only by their own nature but as
influenced or moved by the first cause. If all causes were only intermediate there would be in the series no sufficient
reason for the effect. The primary cause is the universal source of the causal series terminating in the effect of the
series.
“…An accidental, efficient, causal series is a series in which the causal influence of the primary and every
secondary member does not reach to the last effect but only the proximate effect. For example: a chicken lays an egg
which is hatched into another chicken, which lays an egg hatched into another chicken, and so on. Any one member
of the series can be dropped without effecting the last result so long as the members are cojoined. The following

3
effect is not due to the causal influx of the first cause in such a series. The latter effect is
obviously outside the influence of the first cause in this type of causal series (the per accidens
series). Here is an example of a per accidens series of ordered causes: A camper lights a primed
torch in the woods with his flaming torch. The fact that the torch that was lit is then used to light
another primed torch and yet another can only be outside the influx of the efficient causality of
the original flaming torch that lit the first primed torch. In this series of one torch lighting
another, the influence of the first cause extends only to the proximate effect (the first primed
torch lit) but not to the last or ultimate effect (the last primed torch lit). Since the last primed
torch lit is outside the influence of the first cause this series of causes is ordered only
accidentally, for what is beyond the virtue of a cause is by accident (per accidens).

In the per se ordered series of efficient causes, on the other hand, the influx of the first
cause extends to the production of the ultimate effect through the instrumentality of the
intermediate causes.

Distinguishing between a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes and a

per accidens accidentally subordinated series of efficient causes, Grenier writes: “Essentially
subordinated efficient causes are causes which are subordinated to one another in virtue of their
causality in such manner that the causality of the inferior cause actually depends on the causality
of the superior; v.g., when a bat sets a ball in motion because it is set in motion by the hand, and
the hand by another cause.

“Accidentally subordinated efficient causes are causes which are subordinated to one
another not because of their causality, but because of some other nexus; v.g., if in his work an
artificer successively uses several hammers because he breaks one after the other, these hammers
are subordinated to one another not because of their causality, but in time. Similarly, a son who
engenders is an efficient cause subordinated to his father, not essentially subordinated, i.e.,
because of causality, but accidentally, in virtue of his origin.”8

While all the causes involved in our per se series are efficient causes, each one of them is
of a different nature or species. In our per se essentially subordinated and simultaneous series of
causes “si tratta di causalità di ordine diverse: la volontà comanda il braccio in un modo diverso
da come il braccio muove il bastone e questo sposta la pietra. Questo ci permette di capire che
Dio non è il primo anello di una catena, ma ciò che sostiene l’intera catena.9 Parlare di causalità
divina, dunque è compatibile con la difesa della trascendenza di Dio, poiché Egli non agisce nel
mondo come una causa fisica.”10 Smith writes: “Clearly the members of such a series must differ

attributes describe such a series: 1. Its causality is necessarily univocal. In other words all the members cause in the
same way. Every hen produces an egg. There is no hierarchy of causes, namely, a superior primary cause and
inferior secondary causes as in the case of the essential series ; 2. The members need only be cojoined in the series ;
3. There need not be a first in number in the accidental series. The series as accidental need not be terminated from a
primary cause since multiplication of its members is accidental. It is theoretically infinite – the potential infinite or
indefinite. There is no limit to the possible number of eggs and chickens as antecedents to this last effected egg. It is
called an accidental series because the multiplication of its members is accidental.”(K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics,
Graymoor Press, Peekskill, NY, 1965, pp. 152-154).
8
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 270.
9
Cf. J. DE FINANCE, En balbutiant l’indicibile, Gregorian University Press, Rome, 1992, p. 19.
10
M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA, La ricerca di Dio. Trattato di teologia filosofica, EDUSC, Rome, 2011, p. 103.

4
in nature; no one is like any other in nature. If the members did not differ in nature one from the
other, the sameness of their nature would destroy the necessity of a plurality. If two members of
a per se series were alike, one of them could do what the other does, and so there would be no
need for one of them. For example, light one candle; with the lit candle light another; the first
candle, which is like the second, was unnecessary to the lighting of the second. No need of a
series there. Causes, however, which are all operating together are so related to their effect that if
you pull one of them away from the complex, the rest effect nothing. For example, sun, soil,
vine, water are so related to grapes.”11

“Since there are many causes in a per se series, the essential determinant of their
operation, though present in the totality of their agency, is not present in all in the same way.
This is to say that the causes in a per se series must differ in kind, else there would be no need
for there being many: of two like causes, one could do what the other does. Their individual
difference in kind, however, leaves intact their same essential determination as a total agent. A
man driving a nail with a hammer – these are different causes, because they are many. Yet they
all act from the propria virtus of one, the principal agent; each one’s proper power as an
instrument participates in the power proper to the principal cause.”12

Now, it is impossible for a thing to be its own efficient cause, for then it would have had
to exist before it existed in order to efficiently cause itself to exist, which is absurd, a violation of
the principle of non-contradiction. Finite beings are not the efficient causes of themselves: non
est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius. Gilson observes that “if we consider
sensible things, which are the only possible point of departure for a proof of the existence of
God, we observe in them an order of efficient causes. But we never find, nor can we find, a being
that is its own efficient cause. Since a cause is necessarily prior to its effect, a being would have
to be prior to itself in order to be its own efficient cause, which is impossible.”13 Neither is the
Infinite Being causa sui. Non est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius. God is not
Causa Sui (as the rationalists Descartes and Spinoza erroneously maintained) but is rather the
Uncaused Cause. “Severing the principle of causality from experience, and considering it as an a
priori principle which applies to being (ens) as such, led some rationalist philosophers to apply
the principle of causality indiscriminately both to creatures and to the Creator. Hence they
considered God as ‘the Cause of Himself’(Causa sui), rather than as the ‘Uncaused Cause.’
Accepting the same assumptions, other philosophers (like Hegel) ended up subordinating the
First Cause to its effects (God to creatures) and claimed that God would not be God if he did not
produce the world.”14 “The error of Rationalism in this matter is that of identifying cause with
ratio: ‘we must look for the cause, that is, the reason of any given reality (Spinoza, Ethica, I,
prop. 11, aliter).”15 “…la nozione di ente in quanto ente non implica né l’essere causato né il
causare. Essa significa semplicemente ciò che è. La nozione di ente, dunque, è prioritaria
rispetto a quella di causa, e di conseguenza il principio che esprime la non contradditorietà
dell’ente è anche prioritario rispetto a quello di causalità.

11
G. SMITH, op. cit., p. 117.
12
G. SMITH, op. cit., p. 96.
13
É. GILSON, Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, a translation of Le thomisme, sixth and final edition,
by Lawrence K. Shook and Armand Maurer, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 2002, p. 62.
14
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
15
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 183.

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 “L’essere causato non è proprio dell’ente in quanto tale, poiché altrimenti tutta la realtà
sarebbe causata,16 anche quella divina, e non ci sarebbe una causa incausata. Ora, ciò è
impossibile, poiché esigerebbe un processo all’infinito – una causa esigerebbe un’altra, e questa
a sua volta un’altra, ecc. – il che non si può ammettere, poiché tutto sarebbe infondato. Ci deve
essere dunque qualcosa che non sia causato da un altro, ma neanche da se stesso: la prima Causa
incausata, Dio. D’altra parte, la pienezza dell’essere della Causa prima si oppone in modo
radicale ad essere causata, poiché l’effetto è per forza imperfetto e insufficiente a se stesso.

“Il sistema razionalistico invece, per la sua identificazione di causa e ratio, sostiene che
Dio è causa sui, causa di se stesso, e non invece l’Incausato. Partendo dagli stessi presupposti,
altri autori, come ad esempio Hegel, hanno finito per subordinare in qualche modo la Causa
prima ai suoi effetti, affermando che Dio non sarebbe Dio se non producesse il mondo.
L’equivoco razionalista su questo argomento sembra dipendere dalla sua identificazione di causa
e ratio, e dalla conseguente affermazione: «ad ogni realtà bisogna assegnare una causa, cioè una
ragione».17 In realtà, si dovrebbe dire che Dio dà ragione di se stesso, ma non è causa di se
stesso, non è causa sui.”18

There is then a reference to the impossibility of an infinite regress in a per se essentially

subordinated series of efficient causes.19 An infinite regress would mean no first efficient cause.
But if there would be no first efficient cause then there could be no ultimate effect because there
would be no causal influx which produced the effect. “In all ordered efficient causes, the first is
the cause of the intermediate cause, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause.
But, when you suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first
cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress among
efficient causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, all the other causes, which are intermediate,
will be suppressed. But this is manifestly false.”20 Grenier writes: “If there is regress into infinity
in essentially subordinated causes, there is no first cause. But there must be a first cause in a
series of essentially subordinated causes; for the first is the cause of the intermediary, and the
intermediary, whether one or many, is the cause of the last. To disallow the first cause is to
disallow intermediary causes and effects. Therefore regress into infinity in essentially
subordinated causes is impossible.”21

Miguel Pérez de Laborda observes the following regarding the impossibility of an infinite
regress in a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes: “Non è possibile che si dia
un processo all’infinito nel secondo tipo di serie (cause essenziali e simultanee). In questo
secondo caso, quindi, ci deve essere un inizio nella serie delle cause. Come una catena di ferro
non può restare salda se non c’è un primo anello che non sia ben ancorato nel soffitto, così una
pietra mossa non può dipendere da infinite azioni simultanee, poiché dovrebbero essere tutte
quante attualmente esistenti. Nel loro causare (sostenere o muovere), gli anelli o i motori
intermedi dipendono da un motore o un anello precedente, che a sua volta non dipende da un

16
Cfr. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 52.
17
B. SPINOZA, Ethica, prop. 11, aliter.
18
L. CLAVELL and M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 313-314.
19
Cf. P. CAROSI, La serie infinita di cause efficienti subordinate, “Divus Thomas,” 46 (1943), pp. 29-77, 159-175
20
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13, no. 33.
21
H. GRENIER, op. cit., p. 271.

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altro. E, secondo san Tommaso, questa prima causa (Motore immobile, Causa incausata, Essere
necessario) è Dio.

“Possiamo ora comprendere che Tommaso non sta cercando un motore immobile o una
causa incausata che abbia mosso o causato nel passato, ma adesso non continui più ad esercitare
il suo influsso causale. Il Dio di cui Tommaso è alla ricerca, non agisce nel mondo come il piede
che ha dato un calcio ad una palla, ma poi non deve più intervenire perché essa cada rotolando
per il pendio della montagna; una volta ricevuta la spinta iniziale, la palla si rende autonoma, e si
muove ormai per una causa (la forza gravitazionale) diversa dal calcio iniziale. Ciò che sta
cercando Tommaso è invece una causa che nel presente (simultaneamente all’effetto) sia la fonte
continua dell’essere, del cambiare e della capacità di causare degli effetti. Non una causa
dell’inizio dell’essere, ma dell’essere attualmente.”22

Renard explains why an infinite series of per se essentially subordinated and

simultaneous series of causes is impossible because contradictory, writing: “The proof for the
existence of God depends upon the truth of the following statement: in a series of per se
essentially subordinated efficient causes in which each member has an influx here and now upon
the ‘to be’ of the next cause, and in turn, in the same manner depends on the preceding cause, an
infinite number of causes is impossible because contradictory. We must conclude, therefore, to
the existence of a first uncaused cause.

“…in a series of per se essentially subordinated and simultaneous series of causes, the
influx of the first cause looks to the ‘to be’ (that is to say, it has an influx on the ‘to be’) of all the
intermediate members, reaching even to the last effect. The reason is that the intermediate causes
are actuated here and now by the first cause. If, then, there were no first cause, these
intermediary causes would not be able to act. Now in an infinite series there is no first cause and,
therefore, no sufficient reason for the actuation of the intermediate cause, no causing of the last
effect, and therefore no effect. This is contradictory, since the effect is there: it exists. Therefore,
the series cannot be infinite.”23

Ángel Luis González writes the following concerning the impossibility of an infinite
regress in a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes: “Una serie infinita di cause
essenzialmente subordinate nella loro causalità non spiegherebbe la realtà dell’effetto. Infatti, se
ciò che è in questione è la realtà della causalità, è necessaria una prima causa, dato che, per il
punto di partenza, le cause causano in atto in quanto dipendono, ovvero sono causate da altre
cause. Se si elimina la prima, si eliminano tutte le altre; così come se si eliminano quelle
intermedie o l’ultima si rende inesplicabile l’effetto; senza prima causa, non vi saranno né le
cause intermedie, né l’effetto, né nulla, in quanto le cause essenzialmente subordinate non
causano se non ricevono la forza per causare. È necessario, allora, arrivare ad una prima causa
incausata.”24

22
M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., p. 102.
23
H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
24
Á. L. GONZÁLEZ, Filosofia di Dio, Le Monnier, Florence, 1988, pp. 101-102.

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 The conclusion of second way is the affirmation that an Uncaused First Efficient Cause
(God) exists.25 The ultimate application of efficient causality in the secunda via, which leads to

25
The Causality of the First Efficient Cause (God) and the Causality of Secondary Efficient Causes (Creatures):
Explaining the limits of created causality and how, in the final analysis, secondary causes (creatures) have need of
a First Cause, God, Who is the cause of the act of being (esse), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write:
“‘Becoming’ and Forms Constitute the Proper Object of the Efficient Causality of Creatures. The action of a
created agent is the cause of the coming into being (‘fieri’) of the effect; however, it does not produce the being of
the effect as such. It effectively brings about the production of a new reality, (in the case of generation and
corruption) or the acquisition of a new mode of being by an already existing being (in accidental changes).
However, once the action of the natural agent ceases, the effect remains in its being, which reveals the effect’s
actual independence with respect to the cause which produced it. When an architect builds a house, for instance, he
imparts a new accidental form to already existing materials, making them suitable for dwelling. In this way, he
effectively brings about the construction of the building or its coming into being (becoming). Once the construction
activity is finished, however, the house preserves its being by virtue of certain principles which no longer depend on
the builder in any way. The same thing happens in the case of a new animal begoten by its progenitors.
“The proper terminus of created causality, in the processes of generation and corruption, is the form, which is the
primary act of a corporeal substance. In the case of accidental changes, the terminus is a new accident of the
substance. The proper effect of the causality of creatures is always the eduction of a form. We can see this clearly if
we recall that a substance is a cause to the extent that it really influences its effect, or, in other words, to the extent
that the latter cannot exist if the former is suppressed. It is obvious, however, that what disappears when a created
efficient cause is removed is the process of ‘in-forming’ some matter or the production of a new form, which is
where the influence of the agent of itself ends. The very reality of the effect, which continues in its own being, is not
eliminated.
“Consequently, the created agent is not the sole or the absolute cause of its effect; rather, it is the cause of the
production of the effect. Generation, which is the most profound type of causality in material things, has to be
considered as a via in esse or as the way by which an effect comes to be, namely, by receiving a new substantial
form. Consequently, ‘when the action of the agent in generation is removed, the transition from potency to act,
which is the coming into being (fieri) of the begotten, ceases, but the form itself, through which the begotten has the
act of being, does not cease. Hence, when the action of the agent in generation ceases, the being of the things
produced persists, but not their becoming (De Potentia Dei, q. 5, a. 1, c.).
“Creatures are Particular Causes of Their Effects. The finitude of created causes becomes even more manifest as
we take into account the way in which they act:
“a) Natural agents always act by transforming something. Both in the case of accidental changes and the
production of a new being, creatures act by merely altering an already existing reality.
“b) Hence, in their activity, created causes presuppose a preexisting object. If they are bringing about an
accidental change, they need an actually existing subject that will be affected by this modification. If they are
generating a new substance, they also need prime matter from which they can educe the new substantial form, while
divesting it of the form it previously had. Fire engenders fire in another material substance; plants grow from seeds,
with the help of some other elements provided to them by their material surroundings. Animals beget their offspring
by means of their own bodies.
“c) The efficient causality of finite beings is limited by their own active capacity and by the conditions of the
subject on which they act. It is evident that one cannot produce more perfection than what he himself possesses (no
one can transmit knowledge which he does not have or generate a substantial form different from his own). Besides,
the efficient power of a cause is restricted by the potentiality of the matter which it transforms or influences. No
matter how intelligent a scientist may be, he can never transmit more knowledge than what his students are able to
grasp. Similarly, the skill of a sculptor is hampered by the poor quality of the marble be carves.
“d) Consequently, the act of being of their effects is not the immediate and proper effect of the causality of
creatures. The causality of a creature cannot account for the effect in its totality; it can do so only for some of its
perfections, which the efficient cause is able to impart, and the subject, because of its conditions, is able to receive.
Consequently, no created cause produces the total being of its effect. Even in the case of generation, it does not
produce being from absolute non-being (from nothingness); rather, it produces this thing from something which was
not this thing. This is how a new plant grows from seed.

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 “What the created cause immediately and directly influences is the effect’s manner of being, (as a substance or as
an accident), rather than its act of being. Strictly speaking, its causal influence ends in the form. A horse, for
instance, is the immediate cause, not of the colt’s being (its having the act of being), but of its being a colt.
“This does not mean that the created cause does not influence the being of the effect (otherwise it would not
really be a cause). It truly does, but in an indirect and mediate fashion, that is, through the form, which is its proper
effect. No creature can be a cause of being as such, since its activity always presupposes something which already is
or has the act of being (esse). Created agents ‘are not the cause of the act of being as such, but of being this – of
being a man, or being white, for example. The act of being, as such, presupposes nothing, since nothing can preexist
that is outside being as such. Through the activity of creatures, this being or a manner of being of this thing is
produced; for out of a preexistent being, this new being or a new manner of being of it comes about’(Summa Contra
Gentiles, II, 21).
“Hence, it must be said that in relation to the act of being, created causes are always particular causes; in other
words, they attain their effect not insofar as it is being but only insofar as it is a particular kind of being. Besides,
everything acts to the extent that it is actual, and since creatures possess a limited act of being (they are not pure act
of being), they necessarily have to cause limited effects in the ontological order.
“Created Causality Requires a First Cause Which is the Cause of the Act of Being. Summarizing the conclusions
of the two preceding sections, we can say that the efficient causality of creatures is not sufficient to explain the being
of an effect. We have underlined the fact that it extends only to the latter’s ‘coming into being’ or becoming.
“At the same time, we have also emphasized that the created cause is a real cause. Hence, to say ‘a created thing
causes a new substance’ is perfectly valid. Even though the form is the end of the act of generation, the effect is a
new substance. But it is also evident that this new substance proceeds not only from the active power of the agent,
but also from the preexistent passive potency of matter (ex materia).
“Therefore, all causality of creatures necessarily demands the act of being that is presupposed. The cause of this
act of being (esse) is God, the Subsistent Esse, the First and Universal cause, in contrast to which other beings are
merely secondary causes. Only divine causality can have esse as its proper object.
“God has the act of being as the proper object of His causality, both in terms of creation and the conservation of
all things in being. Creation is the act of giving the act of being (esse) to creatures out of nothing. In God, creation is
an act co-eternal and one with Himself (ab aeterno), but from man’s point of view, creation is carried out in time.
The duration in time of that divine act is known as conservation, which is not really distinct from the act of creation.
As a consequence, if God had not created, nothing would exist; seen from the angle of conservation (which is the
same as creation), everything would fall into nothingness if God would not maintain in being what He had created.
“To give the act of being ex nihilo is exclusive of God, for only God is the Subsisting Act of Being, as well as the
only universal and omnipotent Cause. Let us consider this briefly:
“a) He is the Subsisting Act of Being and Being by essence. Only the Absolute and Unlimited Being, the Fullness
of Being, can have the act of being of creatures as its proper effect. In contrast, a particular manner of being, with a
finite and participated esse, lacks the power to reach anything which transcends that restricted mode of being.
“b) He is omnipotent. We have already seen that creatures presuppose some substratum on which they act. To the
extent that this substratum is more or less distant from the act which it is to acquire, a more or less powerful efficient
cause is required to actualize the potency. For instance, to make a piece of iron red-hot, a thermal power greater than
what suffices to set fire to a piece of wood is needed, since the latter, compared to iron, is in much more proximate
potency to ignition. Since the act of being does not presuppose anything, an infinite power is needed to cause it. It is
not simply a matter of bridging a great gap between act and potency, but of overcoming the infinite chasm between
nothingness and being. Omnipotence is an attribute of God alone, since He alone is Pure Act which is not restricted
by any essence.
“c) He is the only universal cause. The act of being is the most universal effect, since it embraces all the
perfections of the universe in terms of extension and intensity. It includes the perfections of all beings (extension)
and all the degrees of perfection (intensity). Hence, no particular cause immediately affects the act of being; rather,
esse is the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, namely, God, who has all perfections in their fullness.
“God alone, then, is ‘the agent who gives being (per modum dantis esse), and not merely one that moves the agent
or alters (per modum moventis et alternantis)’(In IV Metaphysic., lect. 3).
“This does not mean that God creates continuously out of nothing. It means rather that in His creative act, God
created all being – whether actual or possible. This act gave rise not only to those beings God created at the
beginnning of time, but also to those that would come to be through natural and artificial changes in the course of
time”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 234-239).

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 Characteristics of the Causality of the First Cause (God):
Explaining the characteristics of the causality of the First Cause (God), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: “The
terms First Cause (God) and secondary causes (creatures) are equivalent to others which are also often used: cause
of being (esse) and cause of becoming (fieri); universal cause and particular cause; transcendental cause and
predicamental cause.
“The cause of the act of being is the first cause since it is presupposed by any other cause, just as being is
prerequisite to every other effect. It is an absolutely universal cause since it embraces each and every created
perfection, whereas particular agents only influence a certain type of effect. It is a transcendent cause for the same
reason, since its proper effect, being, transcends all the categories; in contrast, predicamental causes only produce
determinate modes of being.
“In contrast to secondary causes, the First Cause can be defined by the following characteristics: a) It is the cause
of the species as such, whereas secondary causes only transmit them. A man, for instance, cannot be the cause of
human nature as such, or of all the perfections belonging to it, ‘for he would then be the cause of every man, and,
consequently, of himself, which is impossible. But this individual man is the cause, properly speaking, of that
individual man. Now, this man exists because human nature is present in this matter. So, this man is not the cause of
man, except in the sense that he is the cause of a human form that comes to be in this matter. This means being the
principle of generation of an individual man…Now, there must be some proper agent cause of the human species
itself ; …This cause is God’(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 65).
“b) It is also the cause of matter, whereas creatures only give rise to successive changes of the form. As we have
seen, in the production of any new effect, creatures presuppose a prior subject, which in the case of generation is
matter. Matter, which is the ultimate substratum of all substantial changes, is the proper effect of the causality of the
supreme cause.
“c) It is the most universal cause, in contrast to creatures, which are only particular causes. Acting, by way of
transforming, all secondary causes produce a type of particular effects, which necessarily presuppose the action of a
universal cause. Just as soldiers would achieve nothing for the final victory of the army without the overall plan
foreseen by the general and without the weapons and ammunition provided by him, no creature could exist or act,
and consequently produce its proper effects, without the influence of the First Cause, which confers the act of being
both on the cause and on the subject which is transformed.
“d) It is a cause by essence, whereas creatures are only causes by participation. Something has a perfection by
essence when it possesses it in all its fullness. In contrast, the perfection is only participated if the subject possesses
it only in a partial and limited way. Since everything acts insofar as it is actual, only that which is Pure Act or
Subsisting Act of Being can act and cause by essence. Any creature, however, which necessarily has the act of being
restricted by its essence, can only cause by participation, that is, by virtue of having received the act of being and in
accordance with the degree it is possessed.
“Consequently, God alone has causal power in an unlimited way, and for this reason He alone can produce
things from nothing (create them) by giving them their act of being. Creatures only possess a finite and determinate
causal capacity proportionate to their degree of participation in the act of being. Besides, for their proper effects,
they presuppose divine creative action which gives the act of being to those effects.
“Creatures produce their proper effects, which are only ‘determinations of being,’ insofar as they are conserved
by God. ‘That which is some kind of thing by essence is the proper cause of what is such by participation. Thus, fire
is the cause of all things that are enkindled. Now, God alone is Being by essence, while other beings are such by
participation, since in God alone is Esse identical with His essence. Therefore, the act of being (esse) of every
existing thing is the proper effect of God. And so, everything that brings something into actual being does so
because it acts through God’s power’(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 66)(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 239-241).
The Relationship Between the First Efficient Cause (God) and Secondary Efficient Causes (Creatures):
Illustrating the relationship between the First Efficient Cause (God) and secondary efficient causes (creatures),
Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: “The being and the causality of creatures are, as we have seen, based totally on
God who is the First Cause and the Cause by essence. This entails a relationship of total subordination, and not
merely of parallel concurrence in which God’s power and that of creatures would combine to produce a single
effect. To illustrate the relationship between God’s efficient causality and that of creatures, we can recall the
relationship between the principal cause and an instrumental cause, instead of that between two partial causes which
are extrinsically united to attain a single result (as two horses joining forces to pull a carriage). Just as a paint brush
would be unable of itself to finish a painting, a creature would be devoid of its being and its power to act if it were to
be deprived of its dependence on God.

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 “Nonetheless, some clarification has to be made regarding this matter: a) A created instrumental cause is truly
dependent on the agent only with respect to the action of the instrument, whereas the creature is also subject to God
with regard to its own act of being.
“b) A creature possesses a substantial form and certain active powers which truly affect it in a permanent way;
these are the root of its activity, to such an extent that in natural activity, the actions of secondary causes are
proportionate to their causes. In an instrument, however, in addition to the form it has, by which it can produce its
own non-instrumental effects, there is also a new power present in a transient manner, capable of producing an
effect disproportionate to the instrumental cause. Hence, in the stricter sense, creatures are called instruments when
they are used by God to produce effects which exceed their own capacities, especially in the realm of grace. They
are called secondary causes when they act in the natural order.
“Three consequences can be drawn from the total subordination of secondary causes to the First Cause: a)
Compared with the secondary cause, the First Cause has a greater influence on the reality of the effect.
Analogously, a painting is more correctly attributed to the artist than to the paint brush or palette which he used. ‘In
the case of ordered agent causes, the subsequent causes act through the power of the first cause. Now, in the order of
agent causes, God is the first cause…thus, all lower agent causes act through His power. The principal cause of an
action is that by whose power the action is done, rather than that which acts; thus, the action springs more strictly
from the principal agent than from the instrument. Therefore, compared with secondary agent causes, God is a more
principal cause of every action’(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 67).
“b) Both the First Cause and secondary causes are total causes of the effect in their own respective order, since
the effect is entirely produced by each of them, and not partly by one and partly by another. ‘The same effect is not
attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural
agent; rather, the effect is totally produced by both, in different ways, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to
the instrument and likewise wholly attributed to the principal cause’(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 70).
“As we have seen, the proper and adequate effect of a secondary cause is the form (substantial or accidental), and
creatures receive a particular degree of participation in the act of being through the form. The immediate proper
effect of God, however, is the act of being of all things, and through the act of being, His own power influences all
the perfections of creatures. The all-encompassing character of divine causality arises from the special nature of esse
as the act of all acts and the perfection of all pefections of a created substance. ‘Since any creature as well as
everything in it shares in its act of being…every being, in its entirely, must come from the first and perfect cause’(In
II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2).
“Therefore, divine Providence embraces everything which exists in the universe. It includes not only the
universal species but also each individual, not only the necessary or predetermined activity of inferior beings but
also the free operations of spiritual creatures. It extends not only to the most decisive actions of free creatures (those
which alter the course of mankind’s history) but also to their seemingly unimportant daily activities, since both
kinds of actions share in the actuality of the esse of the person doing them. This act of being is the immediate effect
of divine efficient causality.
“c) The subordination of secondary causes to God does not diminish the causal efficacy of creatures; rather it
provides the basis for the efficacy of their activity. God’s action increases and intensifies the efficacy of subordinate
causes as they progressively get more closely linked with God, since a greater causal dependence entails a greater
participation in the source of operative power. This is somewhat like the case of a student who faithfully follows the
instructions of the professor guiding him in his studies, or that of the apprentice who conscientiously does what the
accomplished artist tells him. They experience greater efficacy in their activity.
“Secondary causes have an efficacy of their own, but obviously they have their power by virtue of their
dependence on higher causes. A military officer, for instance, has authority over his subordinates because of the
power invested in him by higher officers of the army; the chisel transforms the marble because of the motion
imparted to it by the artist.
“Hence, ‘the power of a lower agent depends on the power of the superior agent, insofar as the superior agent
gives this power to the lower agent whereby it may act, or preserves it, or even applies it to the action’(Summa
Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 70). Since God not only confers operative power on secondary causes but also maintains
them in their being, and applies them to their effects, their efficacy is multiplied as they become more submissive to
divine action.
“The great significance of this profound reality can be seen in practical activity, especially in the sphere of
human freedom. Submission to God’s law does not in the least diminish the quality of men’s actions. On the
contrary, it invigorates them and confers on them an efficacy that surpasses natural standards”(T. ALVIRA, L.
CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 241-244).

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the affirmation of the existence of God as the Uncaused First Efficient Cause, is that of
transcendental metaphysical efficient causality, which is analogical, not univocal. “L’obiettivo
della metafisica qui, non è tanto descrivere come avviene l’una o l’altra modalità del processo
causale, ma di individuare l’origine ultima di ogni causalità. Se una causa finita rinvia ad un’altra
causa finita, l’espediente di differire indefinitivamente la serie delle cause causate si rivela
infondato, in quanto le cause causate saranno, singolarmente e nel loro insieme, qualitativamente
non autosufficienti da un punto di vista ontologico, e per tanto necessiteranno di un fondamento.
L’origine radicale dei processi causali può risiedere soltanto in un essere incausato che sia
principio assoluto dell’essere finito e della sua causalità: Dio.

“…L’Essere-Causa prima al quale ci riferiamo, e che la religione chiama Dio, causa in

modo ontologicamente diverso rispetto al modo di causare delle cause causate. In altri termini,
non si può equiparare il causare di Dio con il causare del finito, così come non si può equiparare
il suo Essere infinito con l’essere finito e causato, senza perciò annullare l’analogia.

“Quest’ultima osservazione è imprescindibile per comprendere correttamente in cosa

consistono le vie tomiste. Con la prima via si accede a Dio come Atto puro, origine di tutto il
reale dinamico, ma trascendente rispetto ad esso. L’attualità assoluta di Dio lo distingue
infinitamente dall’essere finito e dinamico che implica potenzialità. Dio, come Causa incausata,
al quale giunge la seconda via, non è un elemento – il più importante – di un ingranaggio, ma un
essere trascendente rispetto a tutto il causato, sia perché il suo essere è, da un punto di vista
ontologico, infinitamente distante dal causato, sia perché il suo causare è frutto della sua libertà,
e non conseguenza di una necessità. Le vie tomiste non parlano di un Dio che è parte di un
sistema nel quale sarebbe inglobato come culmine dello stesso, ma di un essere trascendente ed
assoluto, origine ultima di tutto il finito.”26

Regarding analogical, transcendental metaphysical efficient causality, Sanguineti writes:

“Esiste anche un principio di causalità metafisica, non limitato alla serie – forse indefinita – di
cause ed effetti sensibili, un principio che consente di porre validamente le domande causali più
profonde: perché esiste il mondo? perché la realtà è contingente? perché le cose sono mutevoli?
perché esiste ciò che è finito? Tali domande sorgono spontaneamente quando non vediamo nel
mondo, nel finito, nel contingente e nel mutabile la spiegazione della loro esistenza. Alla
domanda causale «perché esiste l’aqua?» si potrà rispondere col ricorso ai processi chimici che
portano alla formazione della struttura fisica acqua. Ma è anche valida la domanda: perché esiste
il cosmo, con tutte le sue leggi? dal momento che non esiste nel cosmo alcun aspetto che renda
necessaria la sua esistenza. Se ogni evento del cosmo è causato e causa, esso è sempre una causa
causata. Il principio del cosmo, invece, dovrebbe essere una causa incausata – causa dell’essere
finito – e un essere necessario in modo assoluto. Di conseguenza, non potrà essere un principio
immanente al cosmo. È questa la base delle argomentazioni cosmologiche che portano
all’affermazione dell’esistenza di Dio come principio creatore del cosmo.

“Il principio di causalità metafisica non è così ovvio nella conoscenza ordinaria, in
quanto richiede una particolare riflessione sulla contingenza, caratteristica essenziale che
riguarda tutte le dimensioni dell’essere materiale circostante e anche noi stessi. Non possiamo,
tuttavia, dilungarci su questo tema. Il principio si potrebbe formulare in questi termini: Ciò che
26
L. ROMERA, L’uomo e il mistero di Dio, EDUSC, Rome, 2008, pp. 168-169.

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nel suo insieme è mutevole, contingente, causato e finito, richiede una causa non mutevole,
necessaria, incausata e infinita.

“Forse si obietterà che questo principio ha un’unica applicazione e un’unica risposta:

Dio. Tuttavia esso è sostenuto dal principio di causalità fisica. Nel mondo materiale tutto è
causato ed è mosso. Quindi la mente è naturalmente condotta ad affermare il passaggio ad una
causalità prima e trascendentale, radice di tutta la natura nel suo dinamismo e nella sua
mutabilità.”27

Regarding analogical, transcendental metaphysical efficient causality in the secunda via,

González writes: “Nell’approfondimento della riflessione intorno alle cause seconde (cause
soltanto del fieri, del divenire) si può e si deve passare dalla causalità predicamentale a quella
trascendentale. Mentre le cause seconde spiegano il fieri dell’effetto, la causa incausata dà
ragione dell’essere della causa, dell’attività causale e dello stesso effetto. Pertanto, se una causa
esiste, è necessario riferirsi ad una Causa Prima che la fa essere: causa dell’essere delle cose e di
ogni effetto creato. Come si vede, è questo il passagio decisivo e metafisicamente più profondo
presente in tutte le vie: esso ci porta dall’ente all’essere e dall’essere all’Essere.”28

27
J. J. SANGUINETI, Introduzione alla gnoseologia, Le Monnier, Florence, 2003, pp. 188-189.
28
Á. L. GONZÁLEZ, op. cit., p. 103.

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