Laurel vs.
Garcia transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the
Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties
given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by
the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is
property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of
men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit
that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of
public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables,
the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There
is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is
the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not
tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell
them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary
merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who
can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo
FACTS:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., operates a sawmill. However, the land
upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person.
On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the
machinery used by it. Some of the machines were placed and mounted
on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill
company and the owner of the land there appeared the following
provision:
1
That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements
and buildings introduced and erected by the lessee shall pass to the
exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to
pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; also, in the event
the lessee should leave or abandon the land leased before the time
herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings shall likewise pass
to the ownership of the lessor as though the time agreed upon had
expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are
not included in the improvements which will pass to the lessor on the
expiration or abandonment of the land leased.
In another action, wherein Davao Saw Mill was the defendant, a
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against
the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and
the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the
sheriff.
Davao Saw Mill has on a number of occasions treated the machinery as
personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third
persons. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from the
original mortgages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machinery in dispute is a personal property.
RULING:
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According
to the Code, real property consists of —
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the
soil;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any
industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly
adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.
Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and appellees the last
mentioned paragraph.
While not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels
by the appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the
property the character determined by the parties.
It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by
the owner of any building or land for use in connection therewith, but
intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land by the
latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment
of the lease.
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized
when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not
when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only
a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
“Machinery, vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenements for the industrial or works that they may carry on in
any building or upon any land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works.”
Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized
when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such
result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the placing of
machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having
only a temporary right.
2
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority july 2002
FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to
be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares
of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD:
No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The
592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a
joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority nov 2003
Facts:
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of
Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included
the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty
percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA “to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,” and “to
develop, improve, acquire, x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands.” On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA “the parcels of land
so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project. On April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. On April 25,
1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
3
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.
Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s July 9,
2002 decision which declared the amended JVA null and void ab initio
were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the
Court as follows:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be
reversed.
Held:
No.Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed
the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the
instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of
Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this
petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September
16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the
Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus,
Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the
attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA. Amari
has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to
have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to
construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In
short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical
improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the
subject of the Amended JVA.
PEA cannot claim that it is “similarly situated” as the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to
sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military
reservations is incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of
the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are
not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable
lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire
4
these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the
government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not
private lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and
transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
Facts:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
original registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite
which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his
predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and
continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his
great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of
the sons became the administrator of the properties which the son of
the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the
one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be
alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of
Republic v Hebierto.
Issue:
Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
Held:
No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to
dissect them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec.
14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b)
vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites,
while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the
other.
It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be
registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is
Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case
where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original
registration. Thus:
The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied
when at the time of the application, the land is already classified as
alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of
the right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the
fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.
The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil
Code.
5
It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce
of men and the patrimonial property of the State can be subject to
acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion
when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and
only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there
is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be
such.
Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a
positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and
disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired
through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was
1948. No other substantive evidence was presented.
Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Valdez was the owner of a parcel of land where Fabella consructed a
house without any color of title whatsoever. Valdez orally asked
Fabella several times to vacate the property but the latter stubbornly
refused.
The parties were not able to settle the dispute amicably, which lead to
the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer by Valdez against Fabella.
The MTC ruled in favor of Valdez, which was affirmed by the RTC. The
CA, on the other hand, reversed the decision. It held that Valdez failed
to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that
they had given Fabella the right to occupy the premises or that they
had tolerated the possession of the same, which is a requirement in
unlawful detainer cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a
case for unlawful detainer.
Held:
No, the allegations of the complaint did not clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession which
is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy.
The allegations in the complaint did not contain any fact that would
substantiate the claim of Valdez that they permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by Fabella. The complaint contained only
bare allegations that Fabella without any color of title whatsoever
occupied the land by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving Valdez the possession thereof. Nothing had been said on
how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties.
The evidence revealed that the possession of Fabella was illegal from
the start and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that Fabella started to occupy the lot and then built a
house thereon without the permission and consent of Valdez and
before them, their mother.
6
Clearly, Fabella's entry into the land was without the knowledge of the
owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which
is forcible entry. Tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry.
There was nothing said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started. There was also no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of Valdez to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer was fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause
for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case.
De Gallego vs. Land Authority
FACTS
The petitioner herein, a registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
the province of Rizal, seeks thecancellation of certain conditions
involving the conveyance of said land in question which was said to
have been acquired by the Government for residential purposes with
the principal objective of distributing the sameto the landless and
thereby allow more people to have their own homes. Petitioner insists
that the primary intention of the restriction against transfers or
conveyances of the property except to the landless and except by
hereditary succession in order to insure that more people shall own
residential homes, has been lost by thetransformation of the property
from residential to commercial since the landless who may want to
establishtheir residential homes can no longer afford to pay the
commercial price of this commercial property and thussaid restriction
should be eliminated to allow the aforementioned property to
contribute to the economicdevelopment of the country.Petitioner, wife
of former Ambassador Manuel Gallego, was not a landless individual,
nor was shelandless at the time when the said property was acquired
by her, the fact being that the restriction refers only to voluntary
conveyances and did not comprehend sales by public auction, as in the
particular case, where thepetitioner came to own the property as the
highest bidder in a foreclosure sale by reason of a mortgage thereon.
ISSUE
Whether said conditions have lost any sound basis in that while the
subject parcel of land was originally aresidential lot, the classification of
the property had been changed to that of commercial.
HELD
NO.
The conditions are found or provided in Section 17 and 18 of Land
Registration Order No. R-3under the subject "Rules and Regulations
Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate,"approved
November 15, 1951 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Said conditions, having been imposed pursuant to an
Administrative Order which has the force and effect of the law, are
therefore binding upon any person who acquires title to the same, it
appearing that said Conditions are annotated asencumbrances on the
back of the Certificate of Title of the land. Moreover, said Conditions
are not contrary tolaw, morals, customs, or public policy. In fact, these
Conditions had been imposed in order to implement moreeffectively
the main purpose of the constitutional provision which is to break up
landed estates into reasonably small portions and to discourage the
concentration of excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few
individuals,(Republic vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461) Incidentally, the New
Constitution of 1973 provided a modification of theoriginal provision in
the 1935 Constitution, thus: "The National Assembly may authorize,
upon payment of justcompensation, the expropriation of private lands
to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
deserving citizens.Therefore, it was only proper for the Court to hold
the subject Conditions to remain as they were