Constitutional Law I

Part One: The Philippine Constitution

Part Two: Concept of the State

Part Three: Doctrine of State Immunity

Part Four: Fundamental State Principles and Policies

Part Five: Separation of Powers

Part Six: Delegation of Powers

Part Seven: Legislative Department

Part Eight: Powers of Congress

Part Nine: Executive Department

Part Ten: Powers of the President

Part Eleven: Judiciary Department

Part Twelve: Constitutional Commissions

Part Thirteen: Accountability of Public Officers

 The Philippine Constitution; Amendments and Revision

Francisco v. House of Representatives G.R No. 160261 November 10, 2003

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive 194 SCRA 317 February 22, 1991
Secretary
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS G.R No. 122156 February 3, 1997
Imbong v. COMELEC 35 SCRA 28 September 11, 1970
Gonzales v. COMELEC 21 SCRA 774 December 19, 1980
Tolentino v. COMELEC 41 SCRA 702 October 16, 1971
Sanidad v. COMELEC 73 SCRA 333 January 29, 1990
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC G.R No. 127325 March 19, 1997
Lambino v. COMELEC G.R No.174153 October 25, 2006
Lambino v. COMELEC G.R No.174153 November 21, 2006
 Francisco v House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003

Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the
Court for violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and, committing high
crimes. The House of Committee on Justice subsequently dismissed said complaint on
October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance. The next day, or on October 23, 2003,
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., and Felix William B. Fuentebella, filed another
verified impeachment complaint with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the
members and personnel of the judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said
fund for various infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other
equipment. Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of the
bar, members of the House of Representatives and private individuals, asserting their
rights, among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. Petitioners contended that the filing
of second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice was barred under Article XI,
Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the 2nd impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.

Held:
Yes. From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae
briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action on said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House
of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3(5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period. Petitioners, as taxpayers, had sufficient standing to file the petitions to prevent
disbursement of public funds amounting to millions of pesos for an illegal act. The
petitions were justiciable or ripe for adjudication because there was an actual
controversy involving rights that are legally demandable. Whether the issues present a
political question, the Supreme Court held that only questions that are truly political
questions are beyond judicial review.
 Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317
February 22, 1991

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then
President Corazon Aquino, allowing appointive officials to hold not more than two
positions in government and government corporations, on the ground that the
Constitution prohibits members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 284 is constitutional?

Held:
No. Before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the practice of holding multiple
positions led to abuses by public officials who took advantage of this self-enrichment. It
was the intent of the framers of the Constitution to impose a strict prohibition on the
President and the Cabinet with respect to holding of other offices. This prohibition covers
both public and private employment. While other appointive officials are allowed to hold
other offices when allowed by law of by the primary functions of their positions, Members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when authorized by the
Constitution. Otherwise, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter
prohibition does not apply to positions held without additional compensation in an ex
officio capacities provided by law and required by the primary function of their office.
There positions are not other offices but are an imposition of additional duties. The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the primary
functions of the office. Since the ex officio position is part of the principal office, the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation. These services are
already paid for by the compensation attached in the principal office.
 Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS
G.R. No. 122156
February 3, 1997

Facts:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, that the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.
Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective
mantle of the Constitution. The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 10 of Par 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is not self-
executing.

Held:
No. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way
as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style.
But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self- executing nature
of constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for
a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation.
 Imbong v COMELEC
35 SCRA 28
September 11, 1970

Facts:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates
from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No.
4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320
delegates with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24,
1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res
Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law,
while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

Issues:
Whether or not the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention
and set the parameters of such convention; Whether or not the provisions of R.A. 6132 are
constitutional?

Held:
(1) The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent
assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in
Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the
Congress in exercise of its legislative power. (2) The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of
R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not
constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely
obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of
delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any
public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1
of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially
intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional
guarantees invoked by the petitioners
 Gonzales v COMELEC
21 SCRA 774
December 19, 1980

Facts:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was
provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the
general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as
there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more
interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues
involving the plebiscite. Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted
by Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA
4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that
said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a
political question.
2. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general
election.

Held:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.
Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the
contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of
sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes
amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as
Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is
not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such
act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be
held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision
of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is
a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate
its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections.
 Tolentino v COMELEC
41 SCRA 774
October 16, 1971

Facts:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention submitted a proposed amendment to the
1935 Constitution lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years old, so as to enable
younger people to participate in the ratification of the proposed Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition must be granted.

Held:
No. A piecemeal amendment is not allowed since the 1935 Constitution spoke
only of “an election” and because the people were not given the proper frame of
reference on why they should vote for the amendment. The proposal could not be
correlated to the other proposed amendments to the Constitution so that there would be
a proper frame of reference as to allow the electorate to vote wisely on the matter. No
one knows that changes in the fundamental principle of the constitution the convention
will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing
whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or
not later on the convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into, The root of the difficulty in other
words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial
changes, if not radical ones, almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not
given any idea? Clearly there is improper submission.
 Sanidad v COMELEC
73 SCRA 702
January 29, 1990

Facts:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was
enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which
consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite
for the rati�cation of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989
which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No.
2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766
and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167 which provides:
"Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his
view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that
this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression
for no justi�able reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance.
The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues,
including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may
be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.
 Defensor-Santiago v COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325
19 March 1997

Facts:
A petition was filed before the Comelec to amend the Constitution to lift the term
limits of elective officials by way of initiative, asking that the Comelec fix the time and
dates for the gathering of signatures all over the country and to publish the same.

Issue:
Whether or not constitutional amendments can be don through initiative.

Held:
No. R.A 6735, the enabling law on initiative and referendum, does not provide for
the implementation of the constitutional provision on initiative and referendum. The law
contains subtitles for national and local initiative but us eerily silent on constitutional
initiative. R.A. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be “empowering” the Comelec
“to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.” While R.A. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for
the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Upon the other hand, as to
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions the word “Constitution” in Section 2. (b) defines “initiative
on the Constitution” and include it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in
Section 3; (c) speaks of “plebiscite” as the process by which the propositions, in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people., (d) reiterated
the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;
and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was,
therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important of the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliation blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying reluctant lip service. It logically follows
the Comelec cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No 6735. Under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative
on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein. The Delfin petition does not contain signature to the required number of
voters. Delfina himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive together signatures.
 Lambino v COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
25 October 2006

Facts:
Lambinoet. al. sought to propose amendments to the Constitution by People’s
initiative through RA 6735. The sheet used to gather signatures from the people
contained only the questions “Do you approve of the Amendment of Articles VI and VII of
the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of the government from the present bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government. In order to achieve
greater efficiency, and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions?” The
signature sheet further provides a table wherein the personal data of the person signing
shall be indicated. Subsequently, Lambinoet. al. filed with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
to ratify their proposal. They have in fact gathered signatures of >12% of all registered
voters with each district represented by 3% at leats (6,327,952 voters). COMELEC
invoked Santiago v. COMELEC and denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Lambino petition did comply with Art. XVII, Sec 2 of the
Constitution.

Held:
No. First, for the amendment to be “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition”, two elements must be complied with: (1) the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal (no agent or representative can sign on their
behalf); (2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The deliberations in the 1986
Constitutional Commission show that the framers mean to adopt the American
Jurisprudence on the matter which in particular reveals that the intention is that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and the
people must sign the petition containing such full text. The said elements are present
only if the foregoing has been shown. In the Lambino petition, the proposed changes
were not incorporated with or attached to the signature sheets. Second, American
Jurisprudence outlaws logrolling-when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated
subject matter in the same petition. In the Lambino petition, the proposed changes
include a provision empowering the interim Parliament to convene and propose
amendments, revisions, to the Constitution, which the Court finds as logrolling. Lastly, a
shift from a bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system constitute
beyond doubt a revision. It is clear the Constitution only sanctions “amendment” and not
revisions thereto by people’s initiative. From the foregoing, it is plain that even RA 6735
is valid, Lambino’s initiative will still fail. There is no need to revisit the ruling in Santiago
v. COMELEC as the outcome of this case will not be changed thereby.
 Lambino v COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
21 November 2006

G.R. No. 174153 (Lambino vs. COMELEC) and G.R. No. 174299 (Binay vs.
COMELEC) - The Court resolved by a unanimous vote to deny with finality for utter lack
of merit the Motion to Inhibit dated November 16, 2006 filed by counsel for intervenor
Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., praying that Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban and Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio inhibit themselves from the instant
petitions based on the grounds cited in the motion.

The Court further resolved to note the:

a. Letter dated November 9, 2006 of Atty. Alan Paguia questioning the Court’s
ruling on these cases
b. 1st Indorsement dated November 14, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban,
referring three copies of the message to the Supreme Court Justices of the
Philippine Misereor Partnership, Inc., stating their appreciation of the decision
rendered in these cases
c. Aforesaid message to the Supreme Court Justices
d. 1st Indorsement dated November 16, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban, referring the letter dated November 3, 2006 of BenignoCapulong
relative to the decision rendered in these cases
e. 1st indorsement dated November 16, 2006 of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
referring the letter (with enclosure) dated November 2, 2006 of Assistant Sec Ma.
LourdsVarona, Office of the President, transmitting a copy of the e-mail to the
decision in these cases
f. Ex-parte manifestation filed by counsel for intervenor-oppositor Senate of the
Philippines

Acting on the following motions for reconsideration of the decision of October 25,
2006, the Court Resolved, by the same 8-7 vote, to DENY WITH FINALITYthe said
motions for reconsideration, as the basic issued raised therein have been duly passed
upon by this Court and no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal
of the questioned decision.
 Concept of the State
Territory
Magallona v. Ermita 665 SCRA 476
Arigo v. Swift G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
PCA case N 2013-19, “In the Matter of
the South China Sea Arbitration”
Between the Republic of the Philippines
and the People’s Republic of China

Government
Edu v. Ericta G.R. No. 32069 October 24, 1970
Philippine Virginia Tobacco 65 SCRA 416
Administration v. Court of Industrial
Relations
Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No 143377 February 20, 2001
Association of Philippine Coconut G.R. No. 110526 February 10 1998
Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
Authority
Government of the Philippines v. Monte 35 SCRA 738
de Piedad
Cabanas v Pilapil 58 SCRA 94
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil. 113
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines G.R. No. 73748 May 22,1986
v. Aquino
Republic v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 104768 July 21,2003

Sovereignty
Laurel v. Misa 77 Phil 856
People v. Perfecto 43 Phil. 887
Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA
77
Vilas Vs City Of Manila 229 US 345
Peralta Vs director of prisoners 75 PHIL 285
Ruffy VS. Chief of staff 75 PHIL 875
Alcantara V Director Of Prisoners 75 PHIL 749
 Magallona v. Ermita
665 SCRA 476

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens
the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions. The petitioners further contended that RA 9522’s treatment of
the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss go large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of substance fisherman.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9522 is constitutional.

Held:
Yes. RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and
continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine territory. The Court also
validated as not inconsistent with the Philippine claim of sovereignty the use if the
Framework of Regime of Islands to determine the maritime zone of the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal. It added that the country’s statutory claim over
Sabah under RA 5446 is retained because RA 9522 does not repeal RA 5446. Finally,
the Court declared that UNLCOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters, because under current norms of
international law, the right of innocent passage is recognized over archipelagic waters or
internal waters, however they may be denominated.
 Arigo v. Swift
G.R. No. 206510
16 September 2014

Facts:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On
January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea,
the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet
Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press
statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a
meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets
over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario
that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef
caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished
removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef. Petitioners filed a
petition for writ of kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a temporary environmental
protection order. Respondents alleged that the determination of the extent of
responsibility of the US government regarding the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests
exclusively with the executive branch.

Issue:
Whether or not US government is liable for the damages on the Tubbataha
Reefs.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into
our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which
Articles 30 and 31 may apply, even if the flag State of the offending warship is a non-
party to the UNCLOS, such as United States. Non-membership in UNCLOS does not
mean that the United States will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is expected that the US will bear
international responsibility under Article 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
 PCA case N 2013-19, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration” Between
the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China
(Summary)

The July 2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case of the
Philippines versus China on outstanding legal disputes in the South China Sea was a
watershed in the ongoing dispute over the waterway’s status. Although the verdicts weighed
heavily against China’s claim to historical waters in the SCS, the Court’s decision will hardly
be the last word on the subject, given Beijing’s rejection of the ruling and the growing
importance of the waterway to both China as well as Southeast Asia and US policy in East
Asia. In the wake of the decision, a cooling-off period would be ideal, but there are several
variables which may or may not permit a reduction in tensions to take hold. The summer of
2016 witnessed an unusually high degree of political and legal activity focussed on the status
of the South China Sea (SCS). The waterway continues to be a source of regional discord
between China and its southern neighbours, with a resolution remaining evasive. The
catalyst which brought the SCS under further international scrutiny, however, was the long-
awaited ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in regards to a
case brought by the government of the Philippines to the PCA in January 2013. The then-
government of Benigno Aquino III in Manila sought a clarification from the Court on the legal
status of waters in the South China Sea disputed between China and the Philippines. More
specifically, the Philippine government argued that China’s maritime claims in the SCS, in
the form of a ‘nine-dashed line’ which encompassed the majority of the sea, lacked a legal
basis, clashed with the Philippines’ own 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and was interfering with maritime commerce.

The government of China refused to participate in the PCA arbitration, arguing that
the Court was acting out of its jurisdiction, and that bilateral negotiations were the optimal
method of settling the dispute. Beijing also censured the Philippines for bad faith in going
outside of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC),signed
between China and ASEAN in 2002, and instead attempting to internationalize the conflict.
China also reiterated its support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, while
expressing the view that UNCLOS should not be used as a blunt instrument to deny
countries their sovereign territory or to engage in a soft containment strategy. The PCA ruled
in October 2015 that the court did have the mandate to pursue many of the requests made
by the Philippines,2 including central arguments over the status of disputed features in the
South China Sea, and whether these features were capable of generating their own EEZs,
whether Philippine fishing vessels were being unlawfully prevented from operating in parts of
the disputed zones, and whether Chinese vessels and activities in the SCS were also a
hazard to the local environment. After that decision, Beijing continued to reject the validity of
the PCA case, while re-affirming that the South China Sea represented Chinese historical
waters and that the country’s activities within the nine-dashed line were legal and justified.
Moreover, according to Beijing, the Court was confusing the question of SCS exploitation
rights with questions of sovereignty, asserting that the latter point was well outside of the
PCA’s mandate. After confirming that it would not recognise any ruling by the Court, the
Chinese government released a position paper in December 2014 outlining its historical
claims to the SCS and the invalidity of Manila’s legal actions.
 Edu v. Ericta
G.R. No. 32069
24 October 1970

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner who assails the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
respondent judge the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the
enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and
prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such
enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer,
would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be
decided "once and for all."

Issue:
Whether or not the Reflector Law is constitutional.
Held:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public
safety and order. Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the
validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to
the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which
took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what
was set forth in the Act. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two
other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may
over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must
be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
 Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court of Industrial Relations
65 SCRA 416

Facts:
On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with
respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the
overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and
the amount allegedly due them. There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses
of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue:
Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and
is exempt from CA No. 444.

Held:
It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its
people and promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded
role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the
general welfare. The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and
ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering
the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of modern society
have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete." The
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.
 Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No 143377
20 February 2001

Facts:
On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued in favor of
Rafael Galvez, over four parcels of land - Lot 1 with 6,571 square meters; Lot 2, with
16,777 square meters; Lot 3 with 1,583 square meters and Lot 4, with 508 square
meters. On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of
Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and ErlindaBalatbat in a deed of sale
which was inscribed as Entry No. 9115 OCT No.0-381 on August 10, 1960. August 16,
1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company.
On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of
First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an order declaring OCT No.
0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union issued in the name of
Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. On October 28, 1963,
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4. In the
meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued by
the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied. The Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment, certifying that its decision dated August 14, 973
became final and executory on October 23, 1973. Twenty four long years, thereafter, on
January 14, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated January 11,
1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in
L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La
Union despite receipt of the writ of execution. On April 21, 1999, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before
the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San Fernando, La
Union)

Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival
of judgment herein.

Held:
No. It was held that the Bases Conversion Development Authority, created under
RA 7227, performs functions which are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of
economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal
for enhancement, in general, do not make BCDA equivalent to Government. Other
corporations, such SSS, GSIS, NIA, although performing function aimed at promoting
public interest and public welfare, are not invested with government attributes. With the
transfer to BCDA of Camp Wallace, the government no longer had a right or interest to
protect; the real party in interest to recover the proper is, thus, the BCDA, not the
Republic of the Philippine.
 Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority
G.R. No. 110526
10 February 1998
Facts:
The Philippine Coconut Authority issued a resolution declaring that it will no
longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license
or permit as a condition for engaging in such business. Petitioner assails the resolution
beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and seeks to comply said administrative agency
to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the coconut
industry.

Issue:
Whether or not PCA rans in conflict against the very nature of its creation.

Held:
In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the
PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing
system. There can be no quarrel with the elimination of "unnecessary red tape." That is
within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape. Its success in
doing so will be applauded. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective
regulations.” Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle.Although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy,it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. This is clear from the following
provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent, state: Sec. 6.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands. Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Emphasis added). At all events, any
change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The
regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative
agency to dismantle it. Indeed, petitioner charges the PCA of seeking to render moot a
case filed by some of its members questioning the grant of licenses to certain parties by
adopting the resolution in question. It is alleged that members of petitioner complained to
the court that the PCA had authorized the establishment and operation of new plants in
areas which were already crowded, in violation of its Administrative Order No. 002,
series of 1991. In response, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining the PCA from issuing licenses to the private respondent in that
case. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless nerves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to
promote the general welfare.
 Government of the Philippines v. Monte de Piedad
35 SCRA 738

Facts:
Certain contributions and donations were made for the relief victims of an
earthquake during the Spanish regime. Some of the amounts were never distributed but
were deposited with the respondent bank, Monte de Piedad. The government filed an
action for recovery of said amounts but this was opposed on the ground that it was not
the correct party to institute the proceedings and that it amounted to taking of property
without due process return the money was wiped out by the change of sovereignty.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition must be granted.

Held:
Yes. The government has the right to institute the suit for the State as
parenspartriae in representation of the beneficiaries, the heirs of the victims and
legitimate claimants. It is clear that there is a total abrogation of the former political
relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region and that all laws theretofore in force
which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the
substituted sovereign, lose their force. But it is equally settled in the same public law that
the great body of municipal law which regulates or changed by the new ruler. Applying
this principle to the case at bar, it is clear that the laws governing donations is not
political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the
right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable
institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting “provident institutions, savings banks,
etc.” all of which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such
institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general
supervisions of the Insular Treasurer. Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippines
Islands the prerogative of the crown of Spain devolved upon the US. This power still
remains with them except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal
Government. The Sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The
State as a sovereign is the parenspatriae. This prerogative parenspatriae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in
the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people and the
destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
 Cabanas v Pilapil
58 SCRA 94

Facts:
Cabanas and Pilapil had an acknowledge natural childe. Pilapil took a life
insurance policy which stipulated that in case of his death, the indemnity be given in
favor of the child to be administered by his brother. Pilapil died and Cabanas instituted
an action to administer the property pursuant to Article 320 of the New Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the administration should be given to Cabanas.

Held:
Yes. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is
buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parenspatriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here,
that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother.
Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parenspatriae, cannot remain insensible to the
validity of her plea. In a recent case,there is this quotation from an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parenspatriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It
reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it
does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
The administration must be given to the mother because the constitutional provision on
the strengthening of the family and in consonance with the doctrine of parenspatriae
where the state, in this instance, the Court shall be the guardian of disadvantaged
individual.
 Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh
75 Phil. 113

Facts:
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and
continue the proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under
the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation of the Philippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings
and judgements of the courts of the said governments. He also argued that the said
governments during the Japanese occupation were notde facto governments.

Issue:
Whether or not the proclamation of Gen. McArthur rendered null and void all
judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation

Held:
No. The word “processes” in the proclamation that “all laws, regulations and
processes” of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation
of the country are “null and void and without legal effect” may not be construed to
embrace judicial processes because to adopt such construction great inconvenience and
public hardship would result and great public interest would be endangered and
sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled,
accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and
criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have already
disappeared.
 Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino
G.R. No. 73748
22 May 1986

Facts:
The legitimacy of the government of the Corazon Aquino was questioned
considering that Marcos was the one proclaimed by the BatasangPambansa as the
winner in the 1986 snap elections.

Issue:
Whether or not the Aquino government is valid.

Held:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further
held that: (1) the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country; (2) it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law
a de jure government; and (3) the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy
go the new government.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 104768
21 July 2003
Facts:
The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of
alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Ramas and his
alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture against
Ramas, but the same was amended to implead Dimaano as co-defendant. After so
many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private
respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino
case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that they are
"subordinates" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended
complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Dimaano. It
remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence warrants and also referred the case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for
review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas
as he was not a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1,
which created PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not make him a
"subordinate" as this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed
close association with former President Marcos. The Court disagreed with the
petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before the
completion of the presentation of petitioner's evidence. According to the Court, the
petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements
and extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to
blame for failure to complete presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the subject items. The search warrant
did not particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of these items was therefore,
void, and unless these items are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized them.
 Laurel v. Misa
77 Phil 856

Facts:
Anastacio Laurel is a Filipino citizen who was arrested in Camarines Sur in May,
1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his
active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in
September, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since
then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. He now,
demands his release from Bilibid Prison, mainly asserting that Commonwealth Act No.
682, creating People's Court, specially section 19, under which he is detained as a
political prisoner, is unconstitutional and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspended
and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands.

Held:
The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance
to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is
presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty
cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per
se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended.
Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is
no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What
happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the
Republic of the Philippines.
 People v. Perfecto
43 Phil. 887

Facts:
About August 20, 1920 Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine
Senate discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony by
witnesses in the investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. On
September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto
published an article criticizing the Senate and its members in general. As a result, he
was charged guilty of violating Article 256 of the Penal Code by the CFI of Manila.
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that said Article is no longer in force.

Issue:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty.

Held:
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the
sovereign. On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to
the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in
so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. Article 256 was enacted by
the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the
King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or
a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with
bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. It was crowded out by implication as
soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
 Macariola v. Asuncion
114 SCRA 77

Facts:
Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for
partition. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola. On June 8, 1863
respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. On
October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he
approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.
On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition
under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his
wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,
BernarditaMacariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.” Macariola alleged that
Asuncion violated, among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14
of the Code of Commerce.

Issue:
Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property
in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?

Held:
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment
of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The
Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In the case at bar,
when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot
in question was no longer subject of litigation.
Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent’s order date
October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had
long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.ArcadioGalapon who earlier
purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010. Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to
respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not
during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a
change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or
not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign
 Vilas v. City Of Manila
229 US 345

Facts:
Petitioners are creditors of the City of Manila before the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief,
holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate identity from the
previous one and is not liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.

Issue:
Whether or not the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city
incurred prior to its cession to the United States

Held:
YES. The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was
destroyed by a mere change of sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral
force. The city, acting as a corporation has two kinds of power: governmental and public.
In view of the dual character, there is no public reason for the presumption of their total
dissolution as a consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The cession
did not operate as an extinction of corporations. the present city, in legal sense, the
successor of the old. As such is entitled to the property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation and therefore is liable subject to all its liabilities.
 Peralta v. Director of Prisoners
75 PHIL 285

Facts:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to
life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of
the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the
contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which
is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford
fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

Issues:
Whether or not the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid? Is the sentence of
life imprisonment valid? By principle of postliminium, did the punitive sentence cease to
be valid from the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?

Held:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in
the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered,
likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of
the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands,
as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion
must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
 Ruffy v. Chief of staff
75 PHIL 875
August 20, 1946

Facts:
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned
at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to
Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a
guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and
fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority
vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus
allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense
was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

Held:
The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of
War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and
a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them
even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be
dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.
 Alcantara v. Director of Prisoners
75 PHIL 749
November 29, 1945

Facts:
Petitioner AnicetoAlcantara was convicted by Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
of the crime of the illegal discharge of firearms with less physical injuries. Upon appeal,
Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence where petitioner
questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that the said court was only a
creation of the so called Republic of Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgement rendered by Court of Appeals is valid

Held:
YES. In Co Kim Cham v Valdez, the court ruled that the so-called Republic
established during the Japanese Regime were governments de facto organized by
belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good
and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a
political complexion. The sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political
complexion since it is punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth and the
Revised Penal Code.
Therefore the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur as modified by
the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon is deemed valid and enforceable.
 Doctrine of State Immunity

Basis
Republic v Villasor 54 SCRA 83

Test
Republic v. Feliciano 148 SCRA 424
Sanders v. Veridiano 162 SCRA 88
Tam v. Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302
Veterans Manpower and Protective 214 SCRA 286
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Vinzons-CHato v. Fortune Tobacco G.R. No. 141309 December 23, 2008
Corporation
Suit Against Government Agencies
Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan 110 SCRA 460
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union 195 SCRA 692
v. Judge Firme
Air Transportation Office v. Spouses G.R No. 159402 February 23, 2011
Ramos
National Electrification Administration v. G.R No. 154200 July 24, 2007
Morales
National Irrigation Administration v. Court G.R. No. 129169 November 17, 1999
of Appeals

Unincorporated
Philippine National Railways v. 217 SCRA 401
Intermediate Appellate Court
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing 1 SCRA 340
Employees’ Association
Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals 217 SCRA 298
Veterans Manpower and Protective 214 SCRA 286
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs 18 SCRA 1120
Arrastre Service
Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court 167 SCRA 28
of Appeals

Suit Against Public Officers

Department of Health v. Philippine G.R. No. 182358 February 20, 2013
Pharmawealth
Sanders v. Veridiano 162 SCRA 88
Shauf v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 90314 November 27, 1990
Wylie v. Rarang G.R. 74135 May 28, 1992
Republi v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 142476 March 20, 2001
U.S. v. Reyes G.R. No. 79253 March 1, 1993
Republic v. Sandoval G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993
Lansang v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 102667 February 23 2000
 Department of Health Secretary v. G.R. No.169304 March 13, 2007
Philippine Pharmawealth

Other States
Minucher v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
Arigo v. Swift G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
Convention on Privileges and Immunities G.R No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
of the United Nations, et al., v. Aquino
Lasco v. UNRFNRE G.R. Nos. Febuary 23 , 1995
109095-109107
Southeast Asia Fisheries Development 21 SCRA 580
Center v. NLRC
SEAFDEC v. Acosta G.R. Nos.97468- September 2, 1993
70
Callado v. Internation Rice Research 244 SCRA 210
Institute
International Catholic Migration G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990
Commission v. Calleja

Express Consent
Republic v. Feliciano 148 SCRA 424
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693
Amigable v. Cuenca 43 SCRA 460
EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar G.R. No. 131544 March 16, 2001
Santiago v. Republic 87 SCRA 294
Merritt v. Government of the Philippines 34 Phil. 311
Islands
Republic v. Purisima 78 SCRA 470

Implied Consent
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping G.R. No. L-6060 September 30 1950
Lim v. Brownell 107 Phil 345
United States v. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
United States v. Guinto 182 SCRA 644
JUSMAG Phil v. NLRC G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994
Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon G.R. No. 154705 June 26, 2003
Republic v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 142476 March 20, 2001

Scope of Consent; Suibilityvs Liability

Republic v. Villasor 54 SCRA 83
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC 227 SCRA 693
Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan 83 SCRA 595
National Housing Authority v. Heirs of G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003
Quivelondo
Larkins v. NLRC G.R. No. 92432 February 23, 1995
Lockheed Detective and Watchman G.R. No. 185918 April 18 2012
Agency, Inc., v. University of the
Philippines
University of the Philippines v. Dizon G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. 130 SCRA 56
Fernandez
City of Caloocan v. Allarde G.R. No. 107271 September 10, 2003
Municipality of Makati v. Court of 190 SCRA 206
Appeals
Pacific Products v. Ong 181 SCRA 536
National Irrigation Administration v. Court G.R. No. 129169 November 17, 1999
of Appeals
 Republic v.Villasor
54 SCRA 84
November 28, 1973

Facts:
A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic of the
Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of
respondent corporation. After the decision became final and executory, respondent
judge issued an order directing the sheriff to execute the said decision, and the
corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued.

Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks especially
the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank received such notice. As
certified by the AFP Comptroller, these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public
funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and civilian personnel.

The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges the

validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory
and subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP
in pursuance thereof.

Issue:
May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against public
funds?

Held:
No. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by private parties, there
is corollary that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the
consent to be sued has been previously granted and the state‘s liability has been
adjudged.

Thus in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San Diego, such a well-
settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee. The universal rule that
where the state gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant‘s action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific object is appropriated by law.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Feliciano
G.R. NO. 70853
March 12, 1987

Facts:
Petitioner seeks to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which
dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. Feliciano filed
a complaint with Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with
an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property
in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale followed by a Deed of
Absolute Sale; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of
Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an
informacionposesoriathat upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession
of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in
July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands. President Ramon
Magsaysay thereafter issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes,
under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority,
started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question,
while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the
private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question and
that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.

Issue:
Whether or not the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of
land?

Held:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may
be invoked by the courts suasponteat any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity,
being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed
instrictissimijuris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body. Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed out
by the Solicitor General, that the informacionposesoriaregistered in the Office of the
Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted"
possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office
by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was
authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in
case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the
authenticity and validity of the "informacionposesoria" relied upon by respondent
Feliciano.
 Sanders v.Veridiano II
162 SCRA 88
June 10, 1988

Facts:
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both
employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the US Naval
Station (NAVSTA). They were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion
and to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended the
reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus back wages.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic Naval

Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the
recommendation and asked for its rejection. Moreau, even before the start of the
grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change
of the private respondent‘s status and requested concurrence therewith.

Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the letters contained
libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and had caused them mental
anguish, and prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights. They make it clear that petitioners were being sued in
their personal capacity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed
by the petitioner and was denied.

Issue:
Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they are being sued for damages?

Held:
Yes. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel including the private respondents and had a hand in their
employment, work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The act
of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by him as the immediate superior of
Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special
department of NAVSTA.
 Tan v. Director of Forestry
125 SCRA 302
October 7, 1983

Facts:
The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certain
tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land was located within the
former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland. Petitioner
submitted his application in due form along with nine other applicants. Thereafter,
President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to
draft a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for
Olongapo and that the bids received for the issuance of timber license be rejected. The
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources sustained the recommendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if the
area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, the area was
awarded to petitioner, WenceslaoVinzons Tan. Ravago Commercial Company and
Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of
Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which
later on, declared the license issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as null and void.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the
instant case before the court a quo. Petitioner claims that the respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid
and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the
equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property
without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether the case would proper

HELD:
No. Petitioner not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also
failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State
immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
Respondents, in revoking the petitioner's timber license, were acting within the scope of
their authority. Petitioner contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an
application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations
may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression".
But, piercing the shard of his contention, petitioner's action is just an attempt to
circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle
of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion
of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property,
rights and interest of the State. Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner
would result in the government losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This
being the case, petitioner’s action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to
be sued.
 Veterans Manpower and Protective Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91359
September 25, 1992

Facts:
A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act on the request by petitioner
seeking to set aside the findings of PADPAO expelling it from PADPAO and considering
its application for renewal of its license even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO. A Motion to Dismiss was filed invoking that it is a suit against the State which
had not given its consent.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the action taken by the petitioners is a suit against the State.
2. Whether or not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are liable in their private capacities.
3. Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as an implied consent
of the State to be sued

Held:
(1) Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities
of the State exercising the governmental function of regulating the organization and
operation of private detective watchmen or security guard agencies. Even if its action
prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State
did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for the purpose.
(2) No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account
in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice,
gross negligence or bad faith, no recovery may be held against them in their private
capacities.
(3) No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an implied consent by the
State to be sued because it was intended to professionalize the industry and to
standardized the salaries of the security guards. It is merely incidental to the purpose
of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the organization and operation of private security
agencies.

The State is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be sued when it enters
into a contract. However, it does not apply where the contact relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.
 Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
GR. No. 141309
December 23, 2008

Facts:
On June 10, 1993, legislative Republic Act No. 7654 which classified cigarette
brands “Champion”, “Hope” and “More” of Fortune Tobacco Corporation as local brands
that are subject to 20-45% until petitioner Internal Revenue Commissioner have
reclassified above mentioned brands as locally manufactured bearing foreign brand and
therefore subject to 55% tax.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, then elevated to
the Court of Tax Appeals which ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective and unenforceable
which was affirmed by Court of Appeals and finally by this court for falling short on
requirements necessary for valid issuance. Respondent then filed for complaint for
damages since it violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of the law and equal protection of the laws.

Issue:
Whether and not Commission of Internal Revenue is liable for damages

Held:
No. The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Considering bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on said
provision, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a
cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action since it is enough that the complaint avers a
violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
 Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan
110 SCRA 460
December 18, 1981

Facts:
During the height of the infamous typhoon Kading, the NPC, acting through its
plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or caused to be opened simultaneously
all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam. The many unfortunate victims of the man-
caused flood filed with the respondent court eleven complaints for damages against the
NPC and Benjamin Chavez.

NPC filed separate answers to each of the eleven complaints and invoked in
each answer a special and affirmative defense that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it
is performing a purely governmental function. Hence, it cannot be sued without the
express consent of the State. The respondent court dismissed the case on the grounds
that said defendant performs a purely governmental function in the operation of the
Angat Dam and cannot therefore be sued for damages in the instant cases in connection
therewith.

Issue: Was the NPC performing a governmental function with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam?

Held:
Yes. However, it is not necessary to determine whether NPC performs a
governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam.
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money
in it and has allowed itself to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As a
government owned and controlled corporation, it has personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can
sue and be sued in any court is without qualification on the cause of action as the one
instituted by the petitioners.
 Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme
195 SCRA 692
April 8, 1991

Facts:
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeep, a gravel
and sand truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which
was driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeep including
Banina, Sr. died. The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages against the
owner and driver of the passenger jeep. However, the aforesaid defendant filed a third
party complaint against the petitioner and the driver of the dump truck of the petitioner.
Thereafter, respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular
employee Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed
its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non suability
of the state, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver
of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause.

On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and
defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs. The complaint against the driver and the owner of the
passenger jeep was dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a
new trial. However, respondent judge issued another order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the municipality is liable for the tort committed by its employee?

Held:
No. The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver
acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. It
has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the state merely gives the
claimants the right to show the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity
when the injury was inflicted or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by
law. Failing this, the claimants cannot recover.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he
was on his way to Naguilan River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of the
municipal street. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Hence, though the death may be
imposed on the municipality, there is no duty to pay the monetary compensation.
 Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos
G.R. No. 159402
February 23, 2011

Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land
registered under Transfer title Certificate of Baguio City land records was being used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of Loakan Airport being operated by Air
Transportation Office. Respondents agreed to convey affected Deed of Sale to Air
Transportation Office in the amount of P778,150 but failed to pay. Spouses then filed an
action for collection where the Regional Trial Court ordered to pay the amount and
damages despite Air Transportation Office’s contention that Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction without the existence of a consent.

Issue:
Whether or not Air Transportation Office can be sued

Held:
Yes. As an agency that engages in functions pertaining to a private entity, it is
not immune from suit. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects
for which the entity was organized. Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the juridical
character of Air Transportation Office as an agency of the government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function therefore had no claim to the state’s immunity
from suit.

Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be invoked to defeat a valid claim for

compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s property.
 National Electrification Administration v. Morales
G.R. No. 154200
July 24, 2007

Facts:
Danilo Morales and 105 other employees of the NEA filed a class suit against
their employer for payment allowances purportedly authorized under RA No. 6758. The
RTC granted the petition. Upon Motion, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution and a Notice
of Garnishment was issued against the funds of NEA with DBP. NEA filed a Motion to
Quash writs, claiming that the garnished public funds are exempt from execution. RTC
denied the motion to quash but held in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Execution. Morales, et al. filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied
it.

Morales, et al. filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Execution, pointing out that
the reason cited RTC Order for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution
no longer exists given that DBM already denied NEAs request for funding. The same
was denied. The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion for an Order to Implement
Writ of Execution. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA which was granted,
directing the Implementation of the Writ of Execution. CA held that, being a GOCC,
petitioner NEA may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.
Thus, this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ordering the
implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of the National Electrification
Administration

Held:
Yes. Respondents cannot proceed against the funds of petitioners because the
RTC Decision sought to be satisfied is not a judgment for a specific sum of money
susceptible of execution by garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring petitioners to
settle the claims of respondents in accordance with existing regulations of the COA.
NEA is a GOCC, a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, with
capacity to sue and be sued. As such, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be
garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it. However,
before execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of the judgment award
must first be filed with the COA. Under CA No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D.
No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all
debts and claims of any sort due from or owing the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the
implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide,
subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court. All told, the
RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the
parties recourse to the processes of the COA. It may be that the tenor of the
Indorsement issued by COA already spells doom for respondents’ claims; but it is not for
this Court to pre-empt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it.
 National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals
214 SCRA 35
September 18, 1992

Facts:
National Irrigation Administration constructed an irrigation canal on the property
of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which passed through the private respondents'
landholdings as said irrigation canal traverses the Cinco- Cinco Creek which abuts said
landholding. The irrigation canal has two (2) outlets which provide private respondents'
landholdings with water coming from said canal and at the same time serve to drain the
excess water of said landholdings.c
Private respondents filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages
against petitioners NIA and/or the Administrator of the National Irrigation Administration
alleging that the two (2) outlets constructed on both sides of the irrigation canal were not
provided with gates to regulate the flow of water from the canal to their landholdings
which resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing the former to sustain
damages consisting in the destruction of the planted palay crops and also prevented
them from planting on their landholdings.
Court ruled in favor of respondents ordering petitioner to pay damages. Not satisfied with
said decision, petitioners elevated the matter to the appellate court which rendered a
decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. It is petitioners' position that the respondent appellate court
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court because NIA is immune from suit for
quasi-delict or tort and assuming NIA could be sued, it is not liable for tort since it did not
act through a special agent as required under paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners contention was merituous

Held:
No. As correctly ruled by the court below, the NIA "is not immune from suit, by
virtue of the express provision of P.D. No. 552."A reading of Section 2, sub-paragraph (f)
of P.D. No. 552, amending Republic Act No. 3601 shows the granting to NIA the power
"to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Paragraph 4 of said law also provide
that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether
contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the
instant case considering that private respondents' action is based on damages caused
by the negligence of petitioners. This Court had previously held that "the National
Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate
body performing proprietary functions" as it has its own assets and liabilities as well as
its own corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.
 Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court
217 SCRA 401
January 22, 1993

Facts:
WinifredoTupang, husband of Rosario Tupang, boarded Train 516 of the
Philippine National Railways at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound
for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur,
for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila.
Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo ]fell off the train
resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other
passengers. Instead, the train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at
Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities
of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of
Tupang. As shown by the autopsy report, WinifredoTupang died of cardio-respiratory
failure due to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury. Upon complaint filed
by the deceased’s widow, Rosario, CFI Rizal held the PNR liable for damages for breach
of contract of carriage and ordered it to pay the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of
Winifredo, plus P20,000 for loss of his earning capacity, and the further sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000 as attorney’s fees, and cost. On appeal, the
Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the
utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the amount
adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay the Rosario Tupang an additional
sum of P5,000 as exemplary damages. Moving for reconsideration of the above
decision, the PNR raised as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The
motion was denied. Hence the petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Tupang.

Held:
PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage. PNR failed to overthrow such presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence, inasmuch as PNR does not deny, (1)
that the train boarded by the deceased WinifredoTupang was so overcrowded that he
and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the
coaches of the train, (2) that the train did not even slow down when it approached the
Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, and (3) that neither did the train stop,
despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at
Iyam Bridge. While PNR failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it
appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted
to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly
and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling
off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR
from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral
damages.
 Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Association
1 SCRA 340
January 28, 1961

Facts:
Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case against herein petitioners
Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, and Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that
Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with,
or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the
complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self- organization, and by
discriminating in regard to hiring and tenure of their employment in order to discourage
them from pursuing their union activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador and
Ledesma denied the charges, and contended that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued.

Issue:
Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?

Held:
No. As a government office, without any juridical capacity, it cannot be sued. The
Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the government; it operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing needs of the
government. It is primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its appropriations are
provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations.

Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing would actually be a
suit, action or proceeding against the government itself. The government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection.
 Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals
217 SCRA 298
January 21, 1993

Facts:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at
the Port of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to
BagingBuhay Trading (BagingBuhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading
no. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. BagongBuhay paid the
duties and taxes
due in the amount of P11,350.00.

The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment

upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon
under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-examination, it
turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously
declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the
government.

Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the
questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales
were released to BagongBuhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were
missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards
were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demands
that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it
actually lost

Issue:
Whether the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards
actually lost by the private respondent

Held:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's
claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that
the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for
which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been
converted technically into a suit against the state.

On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its
consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any
separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from
suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty,
namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental
function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private
respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.
 Veterans Manpower and Detective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91359
September 25, 1992

Facts:
A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act on the request by petitioner
seeking to set aside the findings of PADPAO expelling it from PADPAO and considering
its application for renewal of its license even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO. A Motion to Dismiss was filed invoking that it is a suit against the State which
had not given its consent.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the action taken by the petitioners is a suit against the State.
(2) Whether or not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are liable in their private capacities.
(3) Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as an implied consent of
the State to be sued

Held:
1. Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA being
instrumentalities of the State exercising the governmental function of regulating
the organization and operation of private detective watchmen or security guard
agencies. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not
be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary
funds for the purpose.
2. No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to
account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties,
without malice, gross negligence or bad faith, no recovery may be held against
them in their private capacities.
3. No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an implied consent by the
State to be sued because it was intended to professionalize the industry and to
standardized the salaries of the security guards. It is merely incidental to the
purpose of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the organization and operation of
private security agencies.

The State is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be sued when it enters
into a contract. However, it does not apply where the contact relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.
 Mobil Philippines, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service
18 SCRA 1120
December 17, 1966

Facts:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil
Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later delivered to the broker of the consignee three
cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. filed suit in the CFI against
the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered cases plus other damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not
being a person under the law, defendants cannot be sued. After the plaintiff opposed the
motion, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs
Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable.

Issue:
Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be sued?

Held:
No. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national
government in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative
mandate and a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from
suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of the
government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges,
fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre is a necessary incident. Although said
arrastre function is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not
necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its
governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity
granted as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
 Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals
167 SCRA 28
November 8, 1988

Facts:
Ernest Simke went to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law.
While walking towards the viewing deck or the terrace to get a better view of the
incoming passengers, he slipped over an elevation about four inches high, and he fell on
his back and broke his thigh bone.

He filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with the CFI of Rizal
against the Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered to
administer, operate, manage, control, maintain, and develop the MIA. Judgment was
rendered in his favor, and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment was affirmed.

Issue:
Whether the CAA, being an agency of the government, can be made a party
defendant?

Held:
Yes. Not all government entities whether corporate or not are immune from suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity
was organized. The CAA is not immune from suit it being engaged in functions
pertaining to a private entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the
exclusive prerogative of the state, may more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns. The CAA was created not to maintain a necessity of the
government, but to run what is essentially a business even if the revenues be not its
prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling
public.
 Department of Health v. Philippine Pharmawealth Inc.
G.R. No. 182358
February 20, 2013

Facts:
Administrative Order No. 27 series of 1998 was issued by the Department of
Health Secretary Alfredo Romualdez which set the guidelines and procedures for
accreditation of suppliers of pharmaceutical product. Administrative Order No. 10 series
of 2000 was then issued amending the previous order that reduced accreditation period
to two years from three and stated that such may be recalled, suspended after due
deliberation. And once again was amended by Administrative Order No. 66. A
memorandum was released by Department of Health stating list and category of
sanctions that are to be imposed.

Undersecretary Margarita Salon then called for a meeting to 24 drug companies

where a report by BFAD was handed. BFAD found Philippine Pharmawealth Inc.’s
products to be unfit for the human consumption and directed them to submit
explanations however Philippine Pharmawealth Inc. failed and instead sent a letter
informing that report has been referred to lawyers. Undersecretary Galon therefore
suspended respondent’s accreditation which rose to the company’s complaint seeking to
declare issuances null and void and a prayer for damages against Department of Health,
former Undersecretary Alfredo Romualdez and Undersecretary Margarita Galon on
grounds of violating substantive due process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not complaint would prosper

Held:
No. Department of Health to begin with is an unincorporated agency which
performs governmental functions and was invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty which is immune from suit. The mantle of its non-suability extends to
complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their official
functions. Former Undersecretary Alfredo Romualdez and Undersecretary Margarita
Galonwith implementing assailed isuuances are in the parameters of their authority.
Moreover, there was no showing of bad faith on their part.

Not only was it a suit against them, but also demanding a financial charge that
would mean requiring an appropriation from the state which is not allowed.
 Sanders v.Veridiano II
162 SCRA 88

Facts:
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers (deceased) were both
employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the US Naval
Station (NAVSTA). They were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion
and to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended the
reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus back wages.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding Officer of Subic Naval

Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the
recommendation and asked for its rejection. Moreau, even before the start of the
grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change
of the private respondent‘s status and requested concurrence therewith.

Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the letters contained
libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and had caused them mental
anguish, and prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights. They make it clear that petitioners were being sued in
their personal capacity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed
by the petitioner and was denied.

Issue:
Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they are being sued for damages?

Held:
Yes. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel including the private respondents and had a hand in their
employment, work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The act
of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by him as the immediate superior of
Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special
department of NAVSTA.
 Shauf v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 90314
November 27, 1990

Facts:
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is
a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified. Private respondent Don Detwiler was civilian personnel officer Clark
Air Base maintained by the U.S, while private respondent Anthony Persi was education
director in Education Branch, Personnel Division.

By reason of her non-selection to the position, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed an

equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, for alleged
discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. Petitioner Loida
Q. Shauf wrote to the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on her
complaint for discrimination. Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision
petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages, against private respondents
Don Detwileran Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles
City. Thereafter the trial court rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf. Both parties applealed on CA. Respondent Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court, dismissed herein petitioners' complaint and denied their motion
for reconsideration. Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their
private capacity for discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority, hence the
instant action is not a suit against the United States Government which would require its
consent. Respondents aver, th acts complained of were done by respondents while
administering the civil service laws of the United States. The acts sued upon being a
governmental activity of respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the
United States, as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its consent and by the immunity
of the officials of the United States armed forces for acts committed in the performance
of their official functions pursuant to the grant to the United States armed forces of rights,
power and authority within the bases under the Military Bases Agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not Detwiler and Persi is immune from suit.

Held:
No. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Respondents Persi and Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of have, in
effect, violated the basic constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living
which is very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should be held
accountable.
 Wylie v.Rarang
G.R No. 74135
May 28, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner
Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay,
Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the Office of
the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard. M.H. Wylie published in
"Plan of the Day" (POD) which was published daily at the US Naval Base station an
inquiry stating that respondent Aurora or Auring a disgrace to her division and to the
Office of the Provost Marshall for consumming confiscated items such as ciggarattes
and foods from the base personnel. Petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology
for the "inadvertent" publication. The private respondent then commenced an action for
damages in the Court of First Instance of Zambales against M. H. Wylie, Capt. James
Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that the article constituted false,
injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was
published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval
Base personnel. CFI rendered in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the petitioners
reiterated their stance that they are immune from suit since the subject publication was
made in their official capacities as officers of the U.S. Navy. They also maintained that
they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the questioned publication. Intermediate
Appellate Court favors Aurora.

Issue:
Whether or not the United States personnel who are assigned and stationed in
Philippine territory are immune from suit.

Held:
No. RP-US Bases Treaty do not confer on the United States of America a
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely
because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official
functions. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra viresor where there is showing of bad faith.|||
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a
defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner
Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the
deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were
negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the
name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It
was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.
 Republic v.Sandiganbayan
G.R No. 142476
March 20, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Republic and the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) issued several sequestration orders, one of which covers an aircraft. The
Falcon jet was leased by the United Coconut Chemicals Inc. (Unichem) from Faysound
Ltd., a company in the United States. The lease over the aircraft lapsed in 1987, at
which time the aircraft should have been returned by Unichem to Faysound Ltd., its
owner-lessorbut no one, not even the owner, Faysound Ltd., came forward or
questioned before the Sandiganbayan the legality of PCGG's sequestration of the
aircraft. PCGG, sold the aircraft to Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc., a US corporation without
the authority from Sandiganbayan.The Supreme Court en banc dismissed PCGG's
petition hereby ordered PCGG to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the subject aircraft
under a special time deposit with the PNB for the account of the Sandiganbayan in
escrow for the person or persons, natural or juridical, who may be adjudged lawfully
entitled thereto.Meanwhile, Faysound Ltd., filed with the District Court of Arkansas in the
United States an action to recover the Falcon jet from Fuller Aircraft, the buyer in the
1989 PCGG sale. The PCGG, in order to settle the money judgment against it, entered
into an "Agreement" 6 with Fuller Aircraft providing, among others, that the Republic of
the Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in
equal monthly installments. tTheSandiganbayan issued the first questioned Resolution
denying petitioner's motion to release the "Falcon Jet escrow account”.

Issue:
Whether or not the Republic be held liable under the "Agreement.”
Held:
No. It must be stressed that petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into
such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the PCGG was so authorized, however, it
exceeded its authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft was without the approval of the
Sandiganbayan. the decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited administrative
powers of the PCGG but requires the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can grant or
withhold the same in the exercise of sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence
before it. Without such approval by the judicial authority concerned, and no abuse of
discretion on its part having been established, it irresistibly follows that any sale of said
aircraft under the circumstances obtaining in this case would constitute a prohibited and
invalid disposition by the PCGG.In Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, 9 this Court ruled that
the PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly liable if they did not act in good faith
and within the scope of their authority in the performance of their official duties. Likewise,
in Director of Bureau of Communications vs. Aligaen, 10 this Court held that
unauthorized acts by its government officials or officers are not acts of the State.
 US v. Reyes
G.R No. 79253
March 1 1993

Facts:
Private respondent, hereinafter referred to as Montoya, is an American citizen
who, at the time material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at
the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She is married to one Edgardo H. Montoya, a
Filipino-American serviceman employed by the U.S. Navy and stationed in San
Francisco, California. Petitioner Maxine Bradford, hereinafter referred to as Bradford, is
likewise an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at the said
JUSMAG Headquarters. As a consequence of an incident which occurred on 22 January
1987 whereby her body and belongings were searched after she had bought some items
from the retail store of the NEX JUSMAG, where she had purchasing privileges, and
while she was already at the parking area. Montoya filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive and
discriminatory acts committed by the latterin excess of her authority as store manager of
the NEX JUSMAG. The petitioners claimed that JUSMAG, had been established under
the Philippine-United States Military Assistance Agreement entered into in 1947 to
implement the United States' program of rendering military assistance to the Philippines.
The 1979 amendment of the Military Bases Agreement made it clear that the United
States shall have "the use of certain facilities and areas within the bases and shall have
effective command and control over such facilities and over United States personnel,
employees, equipment and material." Checking of purchases at the NEX is a routine
procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise, cash
and equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST.
5500.1. 7 Thus, Bradford's order to have purchases of all employees checked on 22
January 1987 was made in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG.

Issue:
Whether or not Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her in the
performance of her official functions.
Held:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his
act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal
capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official
functions, said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical
admission of the truth of the allegations therein, the case falls within the exception to the
doctrine of state immunity.
 Republic v. Sandoval
G.R No. 84607
March 19 1993

Facts:
In between Jan 20-21, 1987, KMP demanded for “genuine agrarian reform,” to
which multiple dialogues were held between KMP leader Jaime Tadeo and Minister
Heherson Alvarez, to which Alvarez just advised Tadeo to wait for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehensive land
reform program. Tadeo said that he did not believed in the Constitution and that genuine
land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress and on Jan 22
Tadeo’s group decided to march to Malacanang. Marchers, now number 10000-15000
proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place, and the clash occurred. 12
marchers were officially confirmed dead, 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12
sustained minor injuries for the marchers; 3 military personnel sustained gunshot
wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries. President Aquino issued Administrative
Order No. 11, which created Citizens’ Mendiola Commission for the purpose of
conducting the investigation. Commission recommended criminal prosecutions;for the
deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government.Caylao group
instituted action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines. SolGenfilled a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent;
petitioner mentained that the state has waived its immunity from suit due to the
recommendations made by the commission for the government to indemnify the heirs
and victims. Respondent Judge dismissed complaint on the ground that there was no
waiver by the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the State is liable.
Held:
No. This is not a suit against a state with its consent . Recommendation made by
the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the
state. A.O. 11 stated the purpose of the commission as for “investigation of the disorder,
deaths and casualties that took place.” Only to provide guidelines, in effect, whatever
findings may be, will serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to
litigate his/her claim. The commission being a preliminary venue. Any acts or utterances
of then President Aquino may have done or said are not tantamount to the state having
waived its immunity from suit. Though it is the general rule that a sovereign state and its
political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts exept when it has given consent, it
cannot be invoked by the military officers to release them from liability. The state cannot
be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident; instead the liability should
fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in
Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted
beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages.
 Lansang v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 102667
February 23, 2000
Facts:
In 1970, the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) started operating several
kiosks in Rizal Park under a verbal contract of lease with the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the
development of national parks. The contract was terminated in 1988 by the new
chairman of NPDC, herein petitioner, by serving written notice to respondent Iglesias,
President of GABI, with a demand to vacate the premises. GABI filed an action for
damages and injunction with the trial court alleging that petitioner acted beyond the
scope of his authority when he showed malice and bad faith in ordering GABI's
ejectment from Rizal Park. Perusal of the complaint disclosed that petitioner, as
Chairman of NPDC, acted under the spirit of revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal
resentment in serving the notice of termination to Iglesias who is totally blind and who
was deceived into signing the notice. The complaint failed to categorically state that he is
being sued in that capacity. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
It ruled that the complaint was a suit against the State which could not be sued without
its consent. It further ruled that GABI, a mere concessionaire, cannot claim damages for
termination of contract. The decision was, however, reversed by the Court of Appeals
ruling that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official
capacity is not enough to protect him from liability for acts done without or in excess of
his authority. It found petitioner liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorneys fees.

Issue:
Whether or not Lansang acted in his authority and is immune from suit.
Held:
Yes. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit
must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as
appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.The
rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that
are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their
personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it
apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he
occupied a public position. The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered
the ejectment of GABI from their office and kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute
that petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked to administer
Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the agreement with GABI and order the
organization's ejectment. There is noevidence of such abuse of authority on record. As
earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the
subject of a lease contract.
 Department of Health Secretary v. Philippine Pharmawealth
G.R No. 169304
March 13 2007

Facts:
Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government
hospitals in the Philippines. Then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27 outlining the guidelines and procedures on the
accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was
later amended by providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers
aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner.
Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in
its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin GBenzathine." DOH
issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G
Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s
request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent
submitted its bid for the Penicillin GBenzathine contract. Only two companies
participated, the respondent being the lower bidder. In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin GBenzathine product, the contract was awarded
to the other company. Hence, respondent filed a complaint injunction, mandamus and
damages against DOH.
Issue:
Whether or not DOH is immune from suit.
Held:
NO. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official
concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts
done in the performance of official functions will result in charge or financial liability
against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of
judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper
party. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite
its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action
directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.
 Minucher v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 142396
February 11, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner KhosrowMinucher, an Iranian national, was charged for violation of
"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." The narcotic agents who raided the house of Minucher
were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. Minucher was acquitted by the
trial court of the charges. Minucher filed a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss. Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Court, asking that
the complaint be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo
and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for
review with the Court, appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower
court. The Manila RTC continued with its hearings on the case. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner KhosrowMinucher and adjudged private
respondent Arthur Scalzo liable in actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of
Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty
and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State"
pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Issue:
Whether or not Scalzo is immune from suit being a diplomat.

Held:
Yes. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity
from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of
the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic
courtesy between the two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust
operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter, but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to
inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting
surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties
 Arigo v. Swift
G.R No. 206510
September 16, 2014

Facts:
After receiving diplomatic clearance from the Philippine Government, USS
Guardian, an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy, arrived for
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty at the port of Subic Bay.
Thereafter, it departed Subic Bay on Jan. 15, 2013 for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On Jan. 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of the South Shoal of the Tubataha Reefs. Tubataha
Reefs are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.
On April 17, 2013, petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order
(TEPO) for the alleged violations of domestic environmental laws and regulations,
specifically, provisions of RA No. 10067 or the “Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP)
Act of 2008” in relation to the grounding of the USS Guardian over the Tubataha Reef.
The respondents included three (3) military officers of the United States.

Issue:
Whether or not the 3 military officers are immne from suit.

Held:
Yes. This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved
into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the
restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.
Conventions on Previledges and Imunities of the United Nations, et al., v. Aquino
G.R No. L-35131
November 29,1972

Facts:
Petitioner Dr.LeonceVerstuyft, who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the
WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host
Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the
World Health Organization, which carried with it exemption from taxation and local
duties. When his personal effects contained in crates arrived in the Philippines, they
were allowed free access. COSAC subsequently applied for a search warrant on
Dr.Verstuft’s personal effects for alleged violation of R.A. 4712, which Judge Aquino
granted. Foreign Affairs Sec. Romulo informed Judge Aquino of Dr.Verstufyt’s diplomatic
immunity. Nevertheless, Judge Aquino refused to quash the search warrant. The SC
nullified the search warrant, stating that Dr.Verstufyt did enjoy diplomatic immunity, and
was thus free from all customs duties and taxes.

Issue:
Whether or not Verstutft is immune from suit.
Held:
Yes.The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly
recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the
provisions of the Host Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position that accordingly
"Dr.Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons without violating an
obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of
the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed
free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be baselessly claimed to have
been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by
respondents COSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the
Government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity
and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and
courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by
the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under
his direction.
 Lasco v. UNFRE
G.R Nos. 109095-109107
February 23, 1995

Facts:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the
United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is
a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in
a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work
in Dinagat Island. In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity
pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
The letter from the DFA confirmed that private respondent, being a special fund
administered by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was
an original signatory. On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order
dismissing the complaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by
diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated
September 10, 1991. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an
appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its
Resolution dated January 25, 1993.

Issue:
Whether or not UNFRE is immune from suit.
Held:
Yes. As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine
Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the
United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of
law.The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the
letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of
UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an
international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and
such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-
judicial agencies.Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it
expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench. Private respondent
is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue
of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources
and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people,
including that of petitioners.
 Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center v. NLRC
G.R No 82631
February 23, 1995

Facts:
Private respondent Yong Chan Kim (Yong) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC).The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner ". . . to reinstate complainant
[respondent Yong] to his former position . . . with full back wages . . . and to pay
complainant moral damages. Petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC. Respondent
Yong likewise filed a partial appeal wherein he sought to increase the award of moral
damages. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but increased the moral
damage, added P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and awarded ten percent of the total
monetary awards as attorney's fees . The motion for reconsideration was denied by
NLRC in its Resolutio, which prompted petitioner to elevate the matter to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order restraining NLRC from issuing a writ of execution. In a resolution,
this Court, without giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining
order. This Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. This Court, in Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center — Aquaculture Department v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 206 SCRA 283 (1992), held that NLRC had no jurisdiction over petitioner,
the latter being "an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local
agencies of the Philippine Government."

Issue:
Whether or not SEFDEC is immune from suit.

Held:
Yes. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity
from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by
the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operation or
even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
 Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center v. Acosta
G.R Nos. 97468-70
September 2, 1993

Facts:
Two laborcases,were filed by the herein private respondents against the
petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In
these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their
employment by the petitioner. The petitioner, contending to be an international inter-
government organization, composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion
to Dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of
the above cases. Respondent issued the assailed order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
In due course, a Motion for Reconsideration was interposed but the same, was likewise
denied. Hence, the instant petition. This Court, issued the temporary restraining order
prayed for. The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the
petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly
raising the issue of jurisdiction. The Solicitor General, on his part, filed a Manifestation
and Motion, which the Court granted, praying that he be excused from filing his comment
for respondent Labor Arbiter, he not being in agreement with the latter's position on this
matter. Court dismissed the instant petition for failure to sufficiently show that the
questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.In time, the petitioner
moved for a reconsideration, arguing that the ground for its seeking the allowance of the
petition is the labor arbiter's lack of jurisdiction over the dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not SEFDEC is immune from suit.

Held:
Yes. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency
enjoying diplomatic immunity. This, we have already held in Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
where we said — "Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. "It was established by the Governments of
Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos,
Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and
Republic of Vietnam . . . "The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the
Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16, 1968. The purpose of the Center is to
contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-
operation among the member governments of the Center. Certain administrative bodies
created by agreement among states may be vested with international personality when
two conditions concur, to wit:, that their purposes are mainly non-political and that they
are autonomous, i.e., not subject to the control of any state".
 Callado v. International Rice Research Institute
G.R No. 106483
May 22, 1995

Facts:
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI, while driving
an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to
the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.Petitioner was informed of the findings of a
preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development
Department Manager in a Memorandum. In view of the aforesaid findings, he was
charged withDriving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of
liquor, serious misconduct, and gross habitual neglect of duties. Petitioner submitted his
answer and defenses to the charges against him. After evaluating petitioner's answer,
explanations and other evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination. private
respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. While
admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order
issued by the Institute on August 13, 1991 to the effect that "in all cases of termination,
respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of
immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit in
private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose
from an employer-employee relationship.

Held:
No. IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620,
Article 3 provides: "Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his
authorized representatives." The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and
an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or
abandon this immunity. On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early
on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter
categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.
 International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja
G.R No. 85750
September 28, 1990

Facts:
ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in MorongBataan, is a non-profit
agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered
with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys
Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the International Committee
for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On July 14,
1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank
and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground
that it enjoys diplomatic immunity. The Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the
petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, Director PuraCallejaof the Bureau
of Labor Relations reversed the Med – Arbiter’s Decisionand ordered the immediate
conduct of a certification election.the Philippine Government, through the DEFORAF,
granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic
privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the
Government and ICMC. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS
Petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted but the same
was denied by respondent BLR Director who, again, ordered the immediate conduct of a
pre-election conference. ICMC's two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite
an opinion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order violated
ICMC's diplomatic immunity.

Issue:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends
to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

Held:
Yes.The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC and IRRI extends
to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly
necessitated by their international character and respective purposes which is to avoid
the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. .
The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat
the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations,
in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host
country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions.The immunity granted being "from every
form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly
waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the
scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification
election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a
series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents
and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process,"
which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings."
 Republic v. Feliciano
G.R No. 70853
March 12, 1987

Facts:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the
Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he
bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated
May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola
had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title
to the said property was evidenced by an informacionposesoria; that upon plaintiff's
purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various
improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was
approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954,
President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and
Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land
Authority, started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in
question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90,
was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question
consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on
informacionposesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal, valid and
subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the
settlers.On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the
ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and
hence the action cannot prosper.

Issue:
Whether or not the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of
land

Held:
No. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in
an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the
State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of
property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in
personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment
therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private
respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against
the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing
that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the
use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
 Department of Agriculture v. NLRC
G.R No. 10426
November 11, 1993

Facts:
The Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the
various premises of the petitioner. On 13 Several guards of the Sultan Security Agency
filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, against the
DA and Sultan Security Agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA
jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of
the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ
of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the
security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
DA.A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction, was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC, Cagayan de Oro. In this petition for
certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to
quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over
a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private
respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issue:
Whether or not the security guards can claim from DA
Held:
Yes. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the doctrine only conveys,
"the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State
may at times be sued. The States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this
jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any
money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other
hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The claims of private respondents, arising from
the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083,
aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
 Amigable v. Cuenca
G.R No. L-26400
February 29, 1972

Facts:
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of
the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060,
which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The
claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement. A
copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the
President. Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended upon
motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in
his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought
the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal
occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the
sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The defendants filed a joint answer denying
the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative
defenses, to wit: that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with
the Office of the Auditor General; that the action being a suit against the Government,
the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to
these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government.

Held:
Yes. In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, involving a
claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that
where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.Considering
that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of
title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to
the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner,
she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at
anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, the only
relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled
thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up
to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should
pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after
hearing.
 EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar
G.R No. 131544
March 16, 2001

Facts:
The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH, constructed 145
housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the said contracts was
only for 2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request and assurance of then
DPWH Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructions for the
completion of the project, but said additional constructions were not issued payment by
DPWH. With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for Legal
Affairs, the petitioners sent a demend letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor
did not object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt. Through the
request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM released the amount for payment
but respondent DPWH SecreatryVigilar denied the money claims prompting petitioners
to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC which said trial court denied. Hence, this
petition.Among others, respondent-secretary argues that the state may not be sued
invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty.

Issue:
Whether or not DPWH is immune from suit.

Held:
No.Respondent's argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State
Immunity finds no application in the case before us. Under these circumstances,
respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently
hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle
yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute
for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
Thus, in Amigable vs. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud
which shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of
Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu that "the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of
law were to be maintained.
Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously tackled the issue of the
State's immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of just compensation for expropriated
property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned
cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering that the ends of justice would be
subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State's immunity from suit.
The Court find the instant petition laden with merit and uphold, in the interest of
substantial justice, petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated for the "additional
constructions" on the public works housing project, applying the principle of quantum
meruit.
 Santiago v. Republic
G.R No. L-48214
December 19, 1978

Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago filed on August 9, 1976 an action in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga City naming as defendant the government of the Republic
of the Philippines represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. His plea
was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse in January
of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. As alleged in such complaint,
such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and
water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot]
thereon which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on or before
December 7, 1974." That led him to conclude that under the circumstances, he was
exempt from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command. The lower court,
in the order challenged in this petition, was of a different view. It sustained a motion to
dismiss on the part of the defendant Republic of the Philippines, now named as one of
the respondents, the other respondent being the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City, Branch II. It premised such an order on the settled "rule that the state cannot be
sued without its consent. This is so, because the New Constitution of the Philippines
expressly provides that the state may not be sued without its consent." Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, in the comment on the petition filed with this Court, is for the
affirmance of the order of dismissal of respondent Court precisely to accord deference to
the above categorical constitutional mandate.

Issue:
Whether or not the state can invoke state immunity.

Held:
No. The constitutional provision itself allows a waiver. Where there is consent, a
suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be implied. So it was more than
implied in Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu: "The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen." The fact that this decision arose from a suit against the Public Highways
Commissioner and the Auditor General for failure of the government to pay for land
necessary to widen a national highway, the defense of immunity without the consent
proving unavailing, is not material. The analogy is quite obvious. Where the government
ordinarily benefited by the taking of the land, the failure to institute the necessary
condemnation proceedings should not be a bar to an ordinary action for the collection of
the just compensation due. Here, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under
which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action,
the consent likewise being presumed. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
while a donation partakes of a contract, there is no money claim, and therefore reliance
on Commonwealth Act No. 327 would be futile.
It must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the
Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under
the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It
is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the
negation of arbitrariness and inequity.
 Merritt v. Government of the Philippines
G.R No.11154
March 21, 1916

Facts:
E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he
was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government
ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of
the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation
so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot
even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the
legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said
suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.

Held:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by
virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in
the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the
government. “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the
fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.”
 Republic v. Purisima
G.R No.L-36084
August 31, 1977

Facts:
The jurisdictional issued raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of reiterated doctrine of the non-suability
of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so
alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim
arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow
Ball Freight Lines, Inc. Such a motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972. At that
time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service,
were Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of
a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There is
thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional infirmity against the
order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972.

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of the non-suability of a State applicable in this case

Held:
Yes. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation
found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its
consent.” Even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly
expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the
general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for
its continued applicability. “The doctrine of non-suability of the government without its
consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be
the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state
activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still
exist is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests,
so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to
satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its
continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law.” (Switzerland
General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines)
Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between
the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration
which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties
and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come
from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon
in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to
had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his
authority. At any rate, Justice Sanchez, in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, was
quite categorical as to its "not [being] possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence. On the contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly 'under the
Office of the President of the Philippines."
 Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping
G.R No.L-6060
September 30, 1950

Facts:
Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had
been repossessed by the Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by the
government, following the original purchaser, Fernando Froilan’s, default in his payment
of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said vessel. Pan Oriental
chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel and paid
the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a
bareboat charter contract entered between said company and the Shipping Corporation.
The Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his right sunder the original contract of sale on
condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he
shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and that he shall assume the
expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the vessel. Pan Oriental protested to
this restoration of Froilan’s right sunder the contract of sale, for the reason that when the
vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said
authority to the property, Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may
have thereon. Froilan paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused
to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to
recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property.
The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be
foreclosed.

Issue:
Whether or not the republic is immune from suit.

Held:
No, because the moment when the government filed its complaint in intervention
which in effect waived its right of non-suability. "The immunity of the state from the suits
does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as
plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short,
by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defense he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus
explains: No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action
is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal
claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up
such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.'".
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it
was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complainant in intervention was directed.
This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a
sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in
question.
 Lim v. Brownell
G.R No.L-6060
September 30, 1950

Facts:
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of
Manila. The lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian
of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an
enemy country, Japan, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to
65140. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf
of the President of the United States) and the President of the Philippines, executed two
formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby
the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines
upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all claims in relation
to the property transferred, which claims are payable by the United States of America or
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator of the United States under the Trading with
the Enemy Act, as amended, and for all such costs and expenses of administration as
may by law be charged against the property or proceeds thereof hereby transferred.
Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator. On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia
Enriquez, that they were mortgaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of China; that the
mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction during the war
to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and intimidation succeeded in
preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right of redemption; and that Kagawa
never acquired any valid title to the property because he was ineligible under the
Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by reason of alien age. On
March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims Committee of
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and copy of the decision disallowing the
claim was received by claimant's counsel on the 15th of that month. On November 13,
1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia
Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Philippine
Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United
States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The complaint was
later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not the Republic can be sued.

Held:
No. The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor
defendant Republic of the Philippines to which it was transferred, likewise, cannot be
maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously
constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and consequently
cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government Plaintiff
argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the Philippines, in effect, waived its right
of non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the case
merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting
plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the
answer in intervention it filed. On the other hand, plaintiff in his original complaint made
no claim against the Republic and only asked for damages against it for the use of the
property when the complaint was amended.
 United States v. Ruiz
136 SCRA 487
May 22, 1985

Facts:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of
bids for the following projects: (1) repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval
Station Subic Bay, Philippines and (2) repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline;
repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte
Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. The
company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the
requests.[In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its
bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid
pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." The truth of this allegation has
not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.] In June, 1972, the
company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director, Contracts
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the
Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein.

The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract
for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter
further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign
which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action
asserted in the complaint, may invoke state immunity.

Held:
Yes. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
 United States v. Guinto
182 SCRA 644
February 26, 1990

Facts:
Private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the base. On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office,
Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its
contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those that submitted their bids were the
private respondents. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the
private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX).

The latter, through its representatives petitioners Reeves and Shouse, explained that the
Civil Engineering concession had not beenawarded to Dizon as a result of the February
24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession and the expiration of
the contract had been extended. Private respondents filed a case to compel PHAX to
cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding, and by a writ of preliminary injunction
to continueoperation of concessions pending litigation.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was in effect a
suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The
individual defendant, as official employees of the US Air Force, were also immune from
suit. Trial court denied the petition on the basis that the Court's attention is called by the
relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US
Government, in that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding
contract between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

Held:
Yes. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes. The barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United
States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are
not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. This being the case, the petitioners cannot
plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court
below.
 JUSMAG Phil. v. NLRC
G.R. No. 108813
December 15, 1994

Facts:

JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NLRC (public
respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991
Order of the Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) against
petitioner. Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance
support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG
from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992.

When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator and was the incumbent
President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position.2
He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992,
although the same was not charged against his leave.

On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of
Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
from service by JUSMAG.3 He asked for his reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a
Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It
further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued.

In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the
subject complaint “for want of jurisdiction.” Private respondent appealed to the NLRC,
assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune from suit for alleged violation of our labor
laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, reiterating its immunity from suit for its non-
contractual, governmental and/or public acts. Later, in a Resolution, dated January 29,
1993, the NLRC8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:
Whether or not JUSMAG is immune from suit.

Held:
Yes. JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit,
the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of
these universally recognized principles. In international law, “immunity” is commonly
understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of
another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under
which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).
 Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon
G.R. No. 154705
June 26, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, SitiPartinah,
entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon,
sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that
respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main
Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of
petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance
Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters,
and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective
for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either
party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said
agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the
agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor AzhariKasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister
Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he
allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance
with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy
terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover,
that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the
agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision
that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis a provision in
the Maintenance Agreement.

Held:
Yes. The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal
action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of
sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily
inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be
meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise
waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be
deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing
sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of
settling the case, except to dismiss it.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal.

It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. There is no such waiver in this
case.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 142476
March 20, 2001

Facts:
On July 31, 1987, petitioner Republic and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed with respondent Sandiganbayan the said Civil Case No. 0033
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other defendants. On the strength of this complaint, the PCGG
issued several sequestration orders, one of which covers an aircraft Falcon jet which
was leased by the United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (Unichem) from Faysound Ltd., a
company in the United States.

On March 20, 1989, or two (2) years after the lease of the Falcon jet expired, the
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan, a “Motion For Authority To Sell Sequestered
Aircraft Pending Litigation” on the ground that it is fast deteriorating. The
Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated May 18, 1989, denied PCGG’s motion.
Forthwith, the PCGG filed with this Court a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 88336)
alleging in the main that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying its motion to sell the aircraft and praying that the Resolution of May 18, 1989 be
nullified. On June 6, 1989, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from enforcing its assailed May 18, 1989
Resolution.

Relying on the temporary restraining order issued by this Court, the PCGG, on
September 28, 1989, sold the aircraft to Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc., (Fuller Aircraft), a US
corporation, for US $7,138,168.65 which was deposited in escrow with the PNB. The
sale was without authority from the Sandiganbayan.

On December 26, 1990, the Supreme Court en banc dismissed PCGG’s petition
in G.R. No. 88336, now in 192 SCRA 743 (1990), holding that “the decision to sell the
aircraft is not within the limited administrative powers of the PCGG but requires the
sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can grant or withhold the same in the exercise of
sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence before it.

Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines may be held liable under the
contract between PCGG and Fuller Aircraft.

Held:
No. Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, we rule that petitioner
Republic cannot be held liable under the “Agreement.” It must be stressed that petitioner
did not authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that
the PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its authority. Worse, the sale of the
aircraft was without the approval of tie Sandiganbayan.

Inasmuch as the sale of the aircraft by the PCGG to Fuller Aircraft is void, it
follows that the “Agreement” between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft is likewise a nullity.
Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound by the terms of the said
“Agreement” and thus, there can be no cause of action against it.
Republic v. Villasor
 54 SCRA 83
November 28, 1973

Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd,
GavinoUnchuan and the International Construction Corporation was declared final and
executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P.Villasor.

Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. For the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment
with several banks, especially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment. The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances
of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.

Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against
the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is
valid.

Held:
No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a
recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,6
with its affirmation that “a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to
be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on
the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that
constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.”
 Department of Agriculture v. NLRC
227 SCRA 693
November 11, 1993

Facts:

The Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA
and the security agency.

Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and
severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ
of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the
security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
DA.

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in this particular
case

Held:

Yes. The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be
sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty.
A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under
any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given
expressly or impliedly.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it
could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly
constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon
any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must
first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
 Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan
83 SCRA 595
June 15, 1978

Facts:
Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution on December 17, 1970. It was
followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment on the funds of respondent Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration for the sum of P12,724.66. This amount was said to
belong to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration and was deposited with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) La Union branch. On January 25, 1971, it is ordered that
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration funds deposited with PNB shall be garnished
and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the Writ of Execution for one-half of
the amount awarded in the decision of November 16, 1970. PNB invoked the doctrine of
non-suability in behalf of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. PNB claims that
since fund is public in character, a prohibition must be issued against Pabalan’s order.

Issue:
Whether or not funds are public in character, thus immune from suit.

Held:
No. The petition was dismissed. It is to be admitted that under the present
Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law
has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent."If
the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government,
then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case
here.
It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
 National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo
G.R. No. 154411
June 19, 2003

Facts:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent
domain against AssociacionBenevola de Cebu, EngraciaUrot and the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing. On November 12,
1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving
their objections to NHA’s power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of
execution has been granted and the court already appointed commissioners to
determine the amount for just compensation. On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners
submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just compensation of the
subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment
has been rendered.

After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR
on the amount for the just compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and
support. Both MR was denied by the court. While the judgment has been rendered in the
RTC and an entry of judgment and the motion for execution has been issued, NHA filed
a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition on the ground
that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when
petitioner failed to appeal the same.

Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity may be applied to NHA.

Held:
The court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied
to the NHA, although it is “public in character”, it is only public in character since it is
government-owned, having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government, the funds of such government owned and controlled corporations and non-
corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from
garnishment.

If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled

corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that
of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
 Larkins v. NLRC
G.R. No. 92432
February 23, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner AldoraLarkins was a member of United State Air Force assigned to
oversee dormitories of Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base
Pampanga. 3 AGS terminated the contract for maintenance of dormitories with De
Guzman Custodial Services. It was left to new contractor JAC Maintenance Service
owned by JoselitoCunanan and decided whether it would retain services. Cunanan
decided to bring in his own workers.

A complaint was filed against Larkins, Lt. CorFrankhauser for illegal dismissal
and underpayment of wages and added claims for emergency, cost of living allowance,
etc. The petitioner failed to answer the complaint and appear to hearings, thus the Labor
Arbiter rendered the decision granting all claims of private respondents and found both
the petitoner and Lt. Col. Frankhauster “guilty of illegal dismissal”. The petitioner
appealed but NLRC affirmed the decision or the Labor Arbiter, but declared that: “In the
event this decison is executed and/or enforced and considering our finding that the real
party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed Forces stattioned
at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing international agreement
and diplomatic protocol”

Issue:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
case, on the basis of lack of proper jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and
violation of RP-US Base Agreement and / or submission of the Government of America
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Held:
No. The Labor Arbiter did not follow the procedure under R.P.-U.S. Agreement
under Article XIV. In this case, summons was addressed to Lt. Col. Frankhauser instead
to the Base Commander, or if he withholds givingpermission to serve the summons, he
should instead designate another person to serve the process and obtain ther server’s
affidavit for filing with theappropriate court. It is basic that Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
jurisdiction overthe person of the respondent without the latter being served with
summons.

Although petitioner participated in the NLRC, it does not constitute on the waiver
of lack of summons and voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter.

Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col.

Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the U.S. Government. The employer of private
respondents was not Lt. Col. Frankhauser nor petitioner. The employer of private
respondents, as found by NLRC, was the U.S. Government which, by right of sovereign
power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the
USAF.
 Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. University of the Philippines
G.R. No. 185918
April 18, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered
into a contract for security services with respondent University of the Philippines (UP).
In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against
Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for
rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift
differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual
Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and
attorney’s fees.

Lockheed contends that UP has its own separate and distinct juridical entity from
the national government and has its own charter. Thus, it can be sued and be held
liable. Moreover, Executive Order No. 714 entitled “Fiscal Control and Management of
the Funds of UP” recognizes that “as an institution of higher learning, UP has always
granted full management and control of its affairs including its financial affairs.”
Therefore, it cannot shield itself from its private contractual liabilities by simply invoking
the public character of its funds. Lockheed also cites several cases wherein it was ruled
that funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt from
garnishment.

Issue:
Whether or not the funds of UP are exempt from garnishment.

Held:
No. There was no point for Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state immunity
from suit as this was never an issue in this case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued.
Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to
garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to
examine, audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due from or owing the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

A reading of the pertinent Commonwealth Act provision clearly shows that it does
not make any distinction as to which of the government subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries whose debts should be filed before the COA.

As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that there is
nothing that can be done since the funds of UP had already been garnished, since the
garnishment was erroneously carried out and did not go through the proper procedure
(the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished
funds plus interest of 6% per annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand to
be reckoned from the time UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which occurred
right after the withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.
 University of the Philippines v. Dizon
G.R. No. 171182
August 23, 2012

Facts:
On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered
into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation
(Stern Builders), represented by its President and General Manager Servillanodela Cruz,
for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts
and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños
(UPLB).

In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted

three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only
two of the billings. The third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance,
the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP
and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various
damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the funds of UP are subject to garnishment.

Held:
No. Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a
“chartered institution” performing a legitimate government function. It is an institution of
higher learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any dividends. In
enacting Republic Act No. 9500 (The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008),
Congress has declared the UP as the national university “dedicated to the search for
truth and knowledge as well as the development of future leaders.”

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be
spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. The funds subject of this
action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. A
distinction should first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is
not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove,
if it can, that the defendant is liable.
 Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez
130 SCRA 56
June 25, 1984

Facts:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled “Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. v. Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.”, the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to
private respondents.

The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner’s appeal was
dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was
affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for issuance of a
writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment.

Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the
ground that the municipality’s property or funds are all public funds exempt from
execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge in
an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and
effect.

When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of
September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will
be released only upon compliance thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands
of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are
public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money
judgment.

Held:
Yes. It is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial
Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from
execution.

There must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly

passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid
out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed
an ordinance to this effect.
 City of Caloocan v. Allarde
G.R. No. 107271
September 10, 2003

Facts:
Sometime in 1972, then Mayor of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant
City Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of
Caloocan. The Assistant City Administrator, Delfina Santiago and the 17 others assailed
the legality of the abolition before the CFI of Caloocan. The abolition was declared to be
illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of
their back salaries and other emoluments.

In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid Santiago in partial while her co-
parties were paid in full. In 1987, the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries
which was included in Supplemental Budget No. 3 for the fiscal year 1987. Surprisingly,
however, the City refused to release the money to Santiago. Santiago moved for a writ
of execution which was granted by the CFI Judge. A garnishment was subsequently
ordered against the City’s account in PNB.

Issue:
Whether or not the garnishment of the City’s funds in PNB was invalid inasmuch
as these were public funds exempt from execution.

Held:
No. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the
PNB are government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy unless there
is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In the case at bar, the City Council
of Caloocan already approved and passed an ordinance allocating the necessary
amount for Santiago’s back salaries. Thus this case falls within the exception. The city
cannot also claim that the City Mayor did not authorize PNB to release the funds. The
mayor’s signature approving the budget ordinance, which includes the payment of back
salaries to respondent shows his assent to the appropriation of funds in favor of
Santiago.
 Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
190 SCRA 206
October 1, 1990

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of
Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00.
It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.

However, the order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for

reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor
levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of
the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the
Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition
for review.

Issue:
Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment
and levy upon execution.

Held:
Yes. It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge
involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent
sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted
from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in
this contention.
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived
from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively
for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality,
are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in
their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, the
Supreme Court ordered petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use
already. It held that it will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power
of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
 Pacific Products, Inc. v. Ong
181 SCRA 536
G.R. No. 33777 January 30, 1990

Facts:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (p. 45,
Rollo) in CA-G.R. No. 34038-R entitled “Vicente S. Ong, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus
MacarioOfilada, in his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, The Pacific Products, Inc. and the
First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc., Defendants-Appellees,” which reversed the
decision (pp. 32-37, Record on Appeal, p. 26 Rollo) of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Civil Case No. 53124. Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong, 181 SCRA 536, G.R. No.
33777 January 30, 1990

Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals when it held that the
garnishment of the amount of P10,500.00 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it
was still in the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and
therefore, null and void. It is also petitioner’s contention that the cases of Director of
Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 384 and Avendaño, et al. vs. Alikpala,
et al., G.R. No. L-21189, November 28, 1964, wherein this Court declared null and void
the garnishment of the salaries of government employees, relied upon by the appellate
court are not applicable because no garnishment of salaries of government official or
employee is involved in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the writ of garnishment issued against the P10,500.00 payable to
BML Trading while still in the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications is illegal
and therefore is null and void.

Held:
Yes. Suability would follow only if the contract entered into by the government is
in the exercise of a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental function. The
Bureau of Telecommunications is a service bureau and is not engaged in business.
There is also nothing in the records of this case from which it could be concluded that in
the purchase of the 15,000 pounds of bluestone copper sulfate, the Bureau was
engaging in business. Likewise, petitioner contends that in this case, where the Bureau
is authorized to enter into a contract, the government “may sue and be sued and may be
subjected to court processes just like any other person.”

The Bureau of Telecommunications is a government agency created under

Section 78 of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947. It has no charter and no distinct
personality of its own. Being a government agency, the doctrine of State immunity from
suit applies.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that the writ of
garnishment issued against the P10,500.00 payable to BML Trading while still in the
possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications is illegal and therefore, null and void.
 National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129169
November 17, 1999

Facts:
In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
National Irrigation Administration (hereafter NIA), seeks to annul and set aside the
Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37180 dated 28 June 1996 and
24 February 1997, which dismissed respectively NIA’s petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (hereafter CIAC),
and the motion for reconsideration thereafter filed.

Records show that in a competitive bidding held by NIA in August 1978, Hydro
Resources Contractors Corporation (hereafter HYDRO) was awarded Contract MPI-C-2
for the construction of the main civil works of the Magat River MultiPurpose Project. The
contract provided that HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S.
dollars. HYDRO substantially completed the works under the contract in 1982 and final
acceptance by NIA was made in 1984. HYDRO thereafter determined that it still had an
account receivable from NIA representing the dollar rate differential of the price
escalation for the contract.

After unsuccessfully pursuing its case with NIA, HYDRO, on 7 December 1994,
filed with the CIAC a Request for Adjudication of the aforesaid claim.

Issue:
Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction to hear and try the dispute between the
parties.

Held:
Yes. Contrary to the claim of Petitioner NIA, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the
controversy. EO No. 1008, otherwise known as the “Construction Industry Arbitration
Law” which was promulgated on 4 February 1985, vests upon CIAC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into
by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before
or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The
disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire
jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration.

The complaint of Respondent HYDRO against Petitioner NIA on the basis of the
contract executed between them was filed on 7 December 1994, during the effectivity of
E.O. No. 1008. Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of CIAC. The jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
 Fundamental Principles and State Policies
Section 1
Villavicencio v. Lukban 39 Phil.778 March 15, 1999

Section 2
Kuroda v. Jalandoni 42 O.G. 4842 March 26, 1949
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 42 O.G. 4842 September 17, 1945
Pharmaceutical and Health Care G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
Association v. Duque III
Ichong v. Hernandez 101 Phil. 115 May 31, 1957
Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 October 22, 1963
In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 984 August 15, 1961
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion G.R No. 139465 January 18, 2000
Lim v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151455 April 11, 2002

Section 3
Alih v. Castro G.R No. L-69401 July 23, 1987

Section 4 and 5
People v. Lagman G.R No. 45892 June 13, 1938
Chavez v. Romulo G.R No. 157036 June 9, 2004

Section 6
Aglipay v. Ruiz G.R No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Garces v. Estenzo G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981
Everson v. Board of Education 30 US 1 February 10, 1947
Engel v. Vitale 370 US 421 June 25, 1962
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003
v. Office of the Executive Secretary

Section 7
Bayan v. Executive Secretary G.R No. 138570 April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary G.R No. 151445 December 2, 1940

Section 10
Calalang v. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Almeda Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-43800 July 29, 1977
Ondoy v. Ignacio G.R No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
Salonga v. Farrales G.R. No. L-47088 July 10, 1981

Section 11
Simon v. Commission on Human Rights G.R No. 100150 January 5, 1994
Section 12 and 13
Meyer v. Nebraska 163 US 393 June 4. 1923
Pierce v. Society of Sisters 266 US 510 June 1, 1925
Cabañas v. Pilapil G.R No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
People v. Ritter G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
People v. Larin G.R No. 128777 October 7, 1998
Department of Education v. San Diego G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978

Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Section 14
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. G.R. No. 18978 May 23, 1997
v. National Labor Relations Commission

Sections 15 and 16
Oposa v. Factoran 224 SCRA 792
C&M Timber Corporation v. Alcala G.R. No. 111088 June 13, 1997
Paje v. Casiño G.R. No. 207267 February 3, 2015

Section 17
Philippine Merchant Marine School v. 244 SCRA 770
Court of Appeals
Villar v. Technological Institute of the 135 SCRA 706
Philippines
Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730
Professional Regulation Commission v. G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004
De Guzman

Section 18
JMM Promotion and Management v. 260 SCRA 319
Court of Appeals
Philippine Association of Service 163 SCRA 386
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon
Bernardo v. National Labor Relations G.R. No. 122917 July 12, 1999
Commission
Sections 19 and 20
Tañada v. Angara 272 SCRA 18
Association of Philippine Coconut G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
Authority
Pest Management Association of the G.R. No. 156041 February 21, 2007
Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority
Pharmaceutical and Health Care G.R. No.173034 October 9, 2007
Association v. Duque
Espina v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 143855 September 21, 2010

Section 21
Association of Small Landowner in the 175 SCRA 343
Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform

Section 25
League of Provinces of the Philippines v. G.R. No. 175368 April 11, 2013
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and 197 SCRA 52
Gaming Corporation
Limbonas v. Mangelin 170 SCRA 786
Lina v. Pano G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001
Dadole v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 125350 December 3, 2002

Section 26
Pamatong v. Commission on Election G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
Maquerra v. Borra G.R. No. L-24761 September 7, 1965

Sections 27 and 28
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
Valmonte v. Belmonte G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
Garcia v. Board of Investments G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
 Villavicencio v. Lukban
39 Phil. 778
March 15, 1919

Facts:
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the
morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,
purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in
houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in
two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had
no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.

The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They
prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them
to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will.

During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their
consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was
no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.

Issue:
Whether or not the deportation order issued by Lukban was valid.

Held:
No. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to
a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the
contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change his residence.

Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate
themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For
this, Lukban and the other officials must be severely punished.
 Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
42 O.G. 4842
March 26, 1949

Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a
period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Mili-tary Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control
the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and pris-oners of the Imperial
Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war"—comes before this Court
seek-ing to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
par-ticipating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission; and
to permanently prohibit respond-ents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional

Held:
Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try
Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2
of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague
Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established
by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan,
preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and
customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time
but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US
and Japan).
 Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh
42 O.G. 4842
September 17, 1945

Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated during the time of the
Japanese occupation. After the liberation of Manila Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to
continue hearings on his case saying that the proclamation of Gen Douglas MacArthur
has invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgements of the courts of the
Philippines and without the enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese.

Issue:
Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions during the Japanese
Occupation were valid and remained valid.

Held:
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings
of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good
and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established
in these Islands under the names of Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto
governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments
remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino Forces.
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III
G.R. No. 173034
October 9, 2007

Facts:
On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS),
a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the
DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the
provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents (officers of the DOH) acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.

Held:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 were declared null and void for
being ultra vires. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic
system. Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under
the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. “Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to
norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states.

The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the
Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials
may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not
presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of
the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the
member states and obligatory in nature.
 Ichong vs. Hernandez
101 Phil. 115
May 31, 1957

Facts:
The main provisions of the Act are (1) prohibition against persons, not citizens of
the Philippines and against associations, partnerships and corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of this country, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business.”

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional because it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law and that it violates international treaties.

In an answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend
that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which
exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival
and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 1180 violates international treaties and obligations.

Held:
No. The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United
Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom
of their, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China
of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the
same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not
discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law,
and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
 Gonzales vs. Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
October 22, 1963

Facts:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency."

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the

theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military
stock pile purposes."

It is also contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered
into two (2) contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and
another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding effective
upon the signing thereof by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict
between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned
contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are
inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American
jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein
assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of
which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have
already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the
price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of
the said commodity

Issue:
Whether or not the questioned executive agreements may be validated in our
courts.

Held:
No. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void,
from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of
the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
 In Re Garcia
2 SCRA 984
August 15, 1961

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition,
he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of
Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the
course of “Bachillerato Superior”; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the
“Instituto de Cervantes” for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he
studied and finished the law course graduating there as “Licenciado En Derecho”; that
thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the
provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition
to be admitted to the practice law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar
examinations.

Held:
No. It is clear that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant
are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in
connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that
before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first
successfully pass the required bar examinations; and

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines

and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the
Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to
the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).
 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
G.R No. 139465
January 18, 2000

Facts:
As a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty, private respondent
Mark Jimenez contended that he should be furnished a copy of the US government
request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while he is still under
evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice. Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III of
Department of Justice, however, feared the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to
flee. In permanently enjoining the RTC from further conducting proceedings in Civil Case
No. 99-94684, the Supreme Court held: that Jimenez is not entitled to the right of notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process; that there is no
provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 giving an extraditee such
right; that a court cannot alter, amend or add to a treaty any clause, upon any motion of
equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice; that the terms of the treaty should
be interpreted in the light of their intent; that other countries with similar extradition
treaties with the Philippines have expressed the same interpretation adopted by the
Philippine and US governments; and that an extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.||.

Issue:
Whether or not providing Jimenez with the notice and hearing constitute a breach
of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Held:
No. Petitioner is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The court ruled that under the
doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited
constitutional provision.
 Lim v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 151455
April 11, 2002

Facts:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, several military
personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in
Mindanao to engage in the so called "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan
02-1 exercises involve the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the two states and signed on 1951. The exercise is rooted
from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in
reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C.
allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September
11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu
directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

In his comment, the Solicitor General is of the view that since the Terms of
Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan 02-1," the issues raised
by petitioners are premature, as they are based only on a fear of future violation of the
Terms of Reference. Even petitioners' resort to a special civil action for certiorari is
assailed on the ground that the writ may only issue on the basis of established facts.

Issue:
Whether or not Balikatan 02-1 is unconstitutional

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the
framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The first of
these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT.) The MDT has been described as the "core"
of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United
States. It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it
seeks to reaffirm. The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited
from engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the
Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the
petitioners were only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference.
 Alih v. Castro
G.R No. L-69401
July 23, 1987

Facts:
On November 25, 1984, more than 200 Philippine marines and elements of
home defence forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners in Gov. Alvarez
Street, Zamboanga City in search of loose firearms, ammunitions, and other explosives.
The people fired a burst of gunfire as a resistance and the soldiers returned the fire and
a bloody shoot-out ensued resulting to a number of casualties. The petitioners, one of
whom was Rizal Alih, filed a petition for prohibition a mandamus with preliminary
injunction and restraining order. Their objective was to recover the seized articles and
prevent these from being used as evidence against them. They also claim that those
items were taken from them without a search warrant. In their defense, Maj. Gen. Delfin
Castro in his capacity as the Commander Southcom and Regional Unified Command of
Region IX, contends that they were acting under superior orders and the measure taken
was aggravated by the existing problems on peace and order in the city brought about
by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. .

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure is constitutional

Held:
No. The Court ruled that it is against the State policy of civilian supremacy.
Section 3 Article III clearly states that “Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military.” The urgency of the raid and the existing state of lawlessness is not a valid
excuse to conduct such search and seizure without a warrant. By doing so, they already
by-passed the civil courts which had the authority to determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the
raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's
guilt. It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the
Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are
inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles
are "fruits of the poisonous tree”.
 People v. Lagman
G.R No. 45892
June 13, 1938

Facts:
The two appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa were charged with
the violation of Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 also known as the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that the appellants refused to register in the military service
notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so and that they possess all
the qualifications – being Filipinos and having reached the age of 20. The appellants do
not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the
military service because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight
years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed. Both of them averred that the National Defense
Law is unconstitutional.

Issue:
Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the National Defense Law, which establishes a
compulsory military service, is constitutional. The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision
but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. The right of the
government to require compulsory military service is the consequence of its duty to
defend the State and is reciprocal to its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizens. Having dependent families to support does not excuse them from
compliance with the law since they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty
and obtain proper pecuniary allowance for their family responsibilities.
 Chavez v. Romulo
G.R No. 157036
June 9, 2004

Facts:
On January 2003, President Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of
Philippine National Police stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places. She directed PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance of
Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). On January 31, 2003, PNP
Chief Ebdane issued the assailed guidelines. Some of the pertinent provisions are:
revoking all the permits, requirements for application to a new permit and those who are
authorized to carry firearms outside their residence. Petitioner Francisco T. Chavez, a
licensed gun owner to whom a permit has been issued previously, requested
Department of Interior and Local Government to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed guidelines. His request was denied, thus the submission of this present petition.
He claims that PNP has no authority to issue such guidelines, that it is a violation of the
right to due process and at the same time, it is oppressive or invalid exercise of police
power.

Issue:
Whether or not the guidelines is a valid exercise of police power

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that it is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power. All
property in the State is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common
good and general welfare, as reflected in Section 5 Article II which states that, “The
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.”

In a number of cases, the Court has down the test to determine the validity of a
police measure: (1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and (2) The means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. From the foregoing, it is clear that the basis for its issuance
was the need for peace and order in the society, specifically the proliferation of crimes
committed by the New People’s Army (NPA). PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in
other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but
only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed.
 Aglipay v. Ruiz
G.R No. L-45459
March 13, 1937

Facts:
On May 1936, the Director of Posts Juan Ruiz announced in the dailies of Manila
that he would order the issuance of postage stamp commemorating the celebration in
Manila City of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. Petitioner Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent from issuing and selling the postage stamps since it is a violation of Section
13 Article VI which prohibits the use of public money in support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion.It is assailed to be corollary to
the principle of separation of Church and State.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of postage stamps is against the principle of
separation of Church and State

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the issuance of postage stamp was not inspired by any
sectarian domination since the purpose of which is to advertise the Philippines and to
attract many tourists. Instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
the stamp contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila||. What
is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church.
 Garces v. Estenzo
G.R. No. L-53487
May 25, 1981

Facts:
On March 23, 1976, the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted
Resolution No. 5 which provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the project were obtained through the
selling of tickets and cash donations. Resolution No. 6 was subsequently issued
specifying that the hermano mayor will be the caretaker of the image for a year.

However, on April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily places in the altar of the
Catholic Church. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Fr. Sergio Osmeña
refused to return custody of the image to to the barangay council on the pretext that it
was a property of the church and he uttered defamatory words against Barangay
Captain Manuel Veloso. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Fr. Osmeña in the
city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution Nos. 5 and 6 are unconstitutional

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the assailed resolutions do not directly or indirectly
establish any religion nor abridge neither religious liberty nor appropriate public money
for the benefit of any sect, church or sectarian institution. In fact, the image was
purchased with the use of public funds such as funds from solicitations and cash
donations and not with tax money. The wooden image was purchased in connection with
the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not
for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who
should have custody thereof. The barangay council designated a layman as the
custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the
Catholic church.|||In addition, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is
an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.|||
 Everson v. Board of Education
30 US 1
February 10, 1947

Facts:
A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and
contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools. The Board of Education
of the Township of Ewing authorized reimbursement to parents from the money spent by
them for the bus transportation. Part of this money was for the payment of transportation
of some children in the community to Catholic parochial schools. The appellant
challenged the right of the Board of Education to reimburse parents of parochial school
students. They contend that it is a violation of the constitutional mandate on the
separation of Church and State and on non-establishment of a law respecting certain
religion. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider
the issue.

Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of Board of Education violates the constitutional
provision on not establishing a law respecting certain religion

Held:
No. The assailed issuance of the Board of Education is constitutional and does
not, in any way, contribute money to the parochial schools nor support them. The
program only provides help to the parents to get their children safely and expeditiously to
and from schools. The Supreme Court found the statute was not unconstitutional
because it was merely designed for the convenience and benefit of the parents of all
school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged.
Further, it allows the parents to choose whether to send their children to religious or to
public school.
 Engel v. Vitale
370 US 421
June 25, 1962

Facts:
The New York State’s Board of Regents wrote and authorized a voluntary
nondenominational prayer that could be recited by students at the beginning of each
school day. The prayer states, “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country.”
The law allowed students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it
objectionable. A group of parents that included Steven Engel sued the school board
president, William Vitale on behalf of their children, arguing that the law violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue:
Whether or not the order issued by the Board of Regents violates the
constitutional provision on non-establishment of religion

Held:
Yes. Majority of the justices through Justice Black, held that school-sponsored
prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority stated
that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this activity did not make
the law constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent
government interference with religion. However, just as the government may not
promote any or all religions, it is also prohibited from inhibiting or interfering with religion,
as the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment establishes. The First Amendment
requires the state to be neutral not only as between different groups of religious
believers but also as between religious believers and nonbelievers.

In his dissent, Justice Steward argues that the Establishment Clause was only
meant to prohibit the establishment of a state-sponsored church, such as the Church of
England, and not prohibit all types of government involvement with religion. In particular,
he found that the nondenominational nature of the prayer and the "absentee" provision
removed constitutional challenges.
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888
July 9, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner IDCP is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. One of the functions of
IDCP is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. However on October 26, 2001, the
Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme. Under the EO, respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) was vested with the
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and to perform other related regulatory
activities.

Finding EO 46 to be in violative of the constitutional provision on the separation

of Church and State, IDCP filed the present petition for prohibition praying that EO 46 be
declared null and void. According to IDCP, it is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme
is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly
perform. IDCP argues that a food product becomes halal only after the performance of
Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to
slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot
therefore, perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 46 is constitutional

Held:
No. The Court finds no compelling justification for the government to deprive the
petitioner their right to classify products as halal. Freedom of religion was accorded
preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty
of others and with the common good."

Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because

the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation
of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
 BAYAN v. Executive Secretary
G.R No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. Subsequently, on August 30,
1951, the two States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty to further strengthen their
defense and security relationship. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. However, on September 16, 1991,
the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security which would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel,
headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on
the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the
Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of
the Presidentand the VFA, for its concurrence. Petioner, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN) assails the constitutionality of the VFA and imputes to herein respondents
grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not VFA is unconstitutional

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the VFA is well within the policy on adherence to
generally accepted principles of international law as well as in pursuing an independent
foreign policy. Based on Section 7 Article II, “In its relations with other states the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national
interest, and the right to self-determination.” In this case, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the VFA. In addition, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly
obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires,
among other things, that the treaty, the VFA, in the instant case, be duly concurred in by
the Senate, it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light
of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms,
requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -
thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not
be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII. It is a finely-imbedded principle in
statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one (Lex
specialis derogat generali).
 Lim v. Executive Secretary
G.R No. 151445
April 11, 2002

Facts:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, several military
personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in
Mindanao to engage in the so called "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan
02-1 exercises involve the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the two states and signed on 1951. The exercise is rooted
from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in
reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C.
allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September
11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu
directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

In his comment, the Solicitor General is of the view that since the Terms of
Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan 02-1," the issues raised
by petitioners are premature, as they are based only on a fear of future violation of the
Terms of Reference. Even petitioners' resort to a special civil action for certiorari is
assailed on the ground that the writ may only issue on the basis of established facts.

Issue:
Whether or not Balikatan 02-1 is unconstitutional

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the
framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The first of
these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT.) The MDT has been described as the "core"
of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United
States. It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it
seeks to reaffirm. The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited
from engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the
Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the
petitioners were only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference.
 Calalang v. Williams
G.R. No. 47800
December 2, 1940

Facts:
On July 17, 1940, respondent Williams, Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, recommended to the Director of Public Works that animal-drawn vehicles
be prohibited from passing certain streets, like Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue, at
certain hours for a period of one year. Acting favorably on the recommendation of
Williams, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works, promulgated rules and regulations prohibiting animal-vehicles from passing in
the streets mentioned in the rules and regulations.

Contending that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public
Works have the effect of infringing upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice, petitioner Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private
citizen and taxpayer of Manila, brought the present petition for prohibition against herein
respondents praying that the disputed rules and regulations be declared
unconstitutional. He contends that such regulations constitute an unlawful interference
on legitimate business and abridge the freedom of locomotion.

Issue:
Whether or not the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public
Works is violative of the constitutional provision on social justice.

Held:
No. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
 Almeda v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-43800
July 29, 1977

Facts:
Private respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of the
Angeles family, on their land situated in Tanauan, Batangas which is devoted to sugar
cane and coconuts.||| On September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the property to
petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying
respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. Subsequently, the document of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas. Respondent-tenant thus
seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed on March 27, 1971, pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of
Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.||| The petitioners contend that Gonzales went personally
to their house and implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy
the land, he may not be taken in as tenant. On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court
rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant, Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the
tenanted land for P24,000.00. The Almedas excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian Court
and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.|||

Issue:
Whether or not Gonzales is entitled to redeem the tenanted land

Held:
No. The Court ruled that Eulogio Gonzales did not validly exercised his right of
redemption over his tenanted agricultural land.|||Neither prior tender nor judicial
consignation of the redemption price accompanied the filing of the redemption suit.||The
right of redemption under the Agricultural Land Reform Code may be exercised within
one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on
all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the
sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The timely exercise
of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the price or valid consignation
thereof. The statutory periods within which the right must be exercised would be
rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make
an actual tender in good faith.

Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well.
The State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property,
ownership and profits.
 Ondoy v. Ignacio
G.R No. L-47178
May 16, 1980

Facts:
On October 22, 1968, Jose Ondoy, a fisherman in the ship owned by respondent
Virgilio Ignacio, while in the actual performance of his work in the fishing enterprise,
drowned and died. The hearing officer dismissed the claim for the lack of merit. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed by Minister Ople for the same reason,
Petitioner Estrella Ondoy, the mother of Jose, filed a claim for compensation against
respondent Ignacio.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim for compensation is valid

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the claim for compensation is valid considering that the
deceased drowned and died while in actual performance of his work. The petitioner can
even rely on the presumption of compensability under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, which is in accordance with the constitutional scheme of social justice and
protection of labor. The Court held that the principle of social justice is strengthened and
vitalized most especially in favor of the workers. As between the laborer and the
employer, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. In this case,
social justice is not equality but protection.
 Salonga v. Farrales
G.R. No. L-47088
July 10, 1981

Facts:
In an ejectment case filed by the appellee Julita Farrales, the titled owner of the
land in question against the possessors, the appellants Consolacion and Wenceslao
Salonga, who erected a house thereon, the Olongapo City Court rendered a decision
ordering the Salongas to vacate the land and to pay the rentals in arrears. When
aforesaid decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City and the decision was partially satisfied by the payment of
rentals, Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales said land but the latter persistently
refused. Instead Farrales insisted on the execution of the judgment. Salonga filed a
complaint against Farrales and the Sheriff with the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City for specific performance which was dismissed on the ground that
there exists no legally enforceable compromise agreement by which Farrales can be
compelled to sell the land in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals certified this case
to the Supreme Court on purely question of law.|||

Issue:
Whether or not there is no legal contract between Farrales and Salonga to justify
the claims

Held:
No. The Court ruled that the offeree, Julita Farralesrejected the offer of plaintiffs-
appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there
is, therefore, no contract to sell to speak of.||| As correctly found by the trial court, the
plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are neither builders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their
rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Article 1678 of the New Civil Code. As
lessees, they may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse
them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land.

Social Justice provided for in Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under the Constitution and laws
are also entitled to protection. The Social justice consecrated in our constitution was not
intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled
thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and
contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Courts to grant.
 Simon, Jr. v. Commission of Human Rights
G.R No. 100150
January 5, 1994

Facts:
A Demolition Notice, dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity
as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents
who are officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association. e respondents
were given a grace-period of three days within which to vacate the questioned premises
of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents
were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to
the "People's Park.”

On July 12, 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking them to stop the demolition of the
private respondents' stalls and stores. On July 23, 1990, CHR issued an Order, directing
the petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors’ complaint before the Commission and ordering the said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.

Issue:
Whether or not CHR has a jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violation of
business rights of the private respondents

Held:
No. Under EO 163, which created CHR, the Commission may only investigate,
that is to receive evidence and make findings of the facts as regards to human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The Commission does not have legal standing to indorse, for
appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of
government.
 Meyer v. Nebraska
163 US 393
June 4. 1923

Facts:
Plaintiff Robert T. Meyer is an instructor at Zion Parochial School. It was alleged
that he had been unlawfully teaching the subject of reading in German language which
was said to be against and Act relating to the prohibition of teaching foreign language in
the state of Nebraska. In the said Act, only English language must be used and foreign
language may only be taught after the eighth grade. Meyer has been convicted of the
violation of that provision. Hence, he filed an appeal to the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the teaching of foreign language is injurious to the students

Held:
No. The mere knowledge of German language cannot be reasonably regarded
as harmful to the students. In fact, it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and
desirable to the intellectual growth of children. The Court held that Meyer taught the
German language as part of his duty to each and within the liberty of the amendment.
The proficiency in foreign language is not injurious to health, morals or the
understanding of an ordinary child.
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters
266 US 510
June 1, 1925

Facts:
Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Hill Military Academy, a private organization
conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders. Further, they contend the constitutionality of the statute
under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that it deprived them of property without due
process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not the Act interfered with the right of the parents regarding the
upbringing of their children

Held:
Yes. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s
right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. The State may not usurp
this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state
interest. The court upheld the right of parents to make educational decisions on behalf of
their children while acknowledging the States’ right to regulate education, even in non-
public schools. Thus, the Court ruled that the statute violated the due process clause.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the Oregon statute unreasonably interfered with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children. The
State could not force schoolchildren to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
State has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right
and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
 Cabanas v. Pilapil
G.R No. L-25843
July 25, 1974

Facts:
The insured Florentino Pilapil had a child named Milian with the plaintiff Melchora
Cabanas. Florentino died and instituted as beneficiary his child and that his brother,
Francisco Piplapil, acted as a trustee during Milian’s minority. Accordingly, the proceeds
have been given to Francisco. Cabanas filed this complaint seeking the delivery of such
money considering that the child is living with her.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim of Cabanas is valid

Held:
Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic
social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child
than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this
country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.
 People v. Ritter
G.R. No. 88582
March 5, 1991

Facts:
On October 10, 1986, Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.
Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object
to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200 pesos, and Rosario
300 pesos. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.
Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed
from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul
smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-
Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was
deeply embedded and covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and
distended, symptoms of peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro
inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago. Rosario died because of septicaemia or
blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity
caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the
victim. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. The Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo found him guilty of rape with homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

Held:
No. The circumstances presented are capable of varying interpretations and are
not enough to justify Ritter’s conviction. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was
only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. The evidence shows that
Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant and that Rosario
prostituted herself even at the tender age. The environmental circumstances coupled
with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that
Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute in spite of her tender age.
Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the
circumstances do not come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict
for rape.

However, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. The sexual exploitation
committed by the appellant should not and cannot be condoned. Thus, considering the
circumstances of the case, the Court ordered Ritter to pay the damages to the heirs of
Rosario Baluyot in the amount of 30,000.00 pesos.
 People v. Larin
G.R No. 128777
October 7, 1998

Facts:
On April 17, 1996 after a practice swim at the university pool in Baker's Hall, U.P.
Los Baños, the Carla Lenore Calumpang proceeded to the bath house to shower and
dress up; unknown to her, the accused Ernesto Larin followed her then instructed her to
remove the towel wrapped around her; clad in her swimsuit, accused again ordered her
to undress to allow him to shave her pubic hair which he allegedly noticed was visible.
Then he performed the act of cunnilingus. He told her not to give malice to what he was
doing. Then her started licking her right breast while touching her vagina at the same
time. The next day, when they met, Larin forced her to kiss him on the right cheek and
on the lips. Due to this traumatic experience, she qit swimming and went to the National
Bureau of Investigation where she filed her complaint. The Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna Brach 34 found Larin guilty of violating Section 5(b) of RA 7610
regarding child prostitution and other sexual abuse. Larin challenges the incredible and
unnatural testimony of the offended party as the lone eyewitness for the prosecution.

Issue:
Whether or not the findings of the trial court is correct

Held:
Yes. It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
a witness and his or her testimony is entitled to the highest degree of respect.The
victim's testimony, given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner, is worthy of faith and belief.||| No proof of ill motive on her part to falsely accuse
and testify against appellant has been offered. We stress that no young and decent girl
like Carla would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to medical examination
and undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not motivated
by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her.|||

Republic Act. No. 7610 penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses. It
must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for
profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any
lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes not only child prostitution,
the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children.| It was
enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to "provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse." The Court thus applied this law and granted the victim
the full vindication and protection that RA 7610 accords to this helpless sector of society.
 Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572
December 21, 1989

Facts:
Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of BS Biology, took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) thrice
and flunked it as many times. Invoking his right to quality education and academic
freedom, San Diego filed a petition to declare the three-flunk rule of the DECS as invalid,
and to allow him to take the NMAT for a fourth time. After hearing, respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong supported San Diego’s contention and held that the
respondent has been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education due to that
arbitrary exercise of police power.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the right to quality education

Held:
No. The right to quality education invoked by San Diego is not absolute. No less
than the Constitution provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.” It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise.

The right of the citizen to quality education is likewise subject to the duty of the
State to regulate and enrich the country’s system of education by directing the student to
the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations.
Otherwise, the country will be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice
Holmes, not because its citizens lack intelligence but because the country has become a
nation of misfits.
 Virtuoso. Jr. v. Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan
G.R. No. L-47841
March 21, 1978

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Viruoso Jr. filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the preliminary examination which led to the issuance of warrant of
arrest against him failed to meet the strict standard in ascertaining probable cause. He
further alleges that the bail imposed was clearly excessive, an amount of Php 16,000.00
for the robbery of a television set. It was ascertained that Virtuoso Jr. is only 17 years
old, a minor, who us entitled to the benefits and protection of Child and Youth Welfare
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be afforded with the benefits of Child and
Youth Welfare Code

Held:
Yes. The petitioner being 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
is considered as a youth offender under the said Code. A youth offender is one who is
over nine years old but less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense. This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth
and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate:
"The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their
physical, intellectual, and social well-being."
 Imbong v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014

Facts:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. Despite calls to withhold support
thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012. The Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention.

Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection
clause, involuntary servitude, among others. It is also argued that the RH Law providing
for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is
an affront to their religious beliefs. While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of
religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear
and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation
of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

Issue:
Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional.

Held:
The petitions are partially granted. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
10354 as not unconstitutional except with respect to the following provisions which are
declared unconstitutional.

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. In
answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12. Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak
of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription
prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly,
there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception
is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 18978
May 23, 1997

Facts:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April
20, 1991 which is immediately terminable upon expiration. On September 2, 1991,
private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner’s company as a probationary
employee. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the
purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although
she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.

When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M.
Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy.
Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the
status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company
policies.

Issue:
Whether or not the company policy was discriminatory against married women.

Held:
Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason
of the marriage of a female employee. Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering
as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the
test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor
laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record
discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of
the company’s policy.

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy
against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the
nation.
 Oposa v. Factoran
224 SCRA 792

Facts:
The plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit against defendant (respondent) Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to: cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in
the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs.

They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as Parens
Patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to
cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment
of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to file the case.

Held:
Yes. the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
rights enumerated in the latter: “[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions”. The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is
“fundamental”, “constitutionalized”, “self-executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It
imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others
of their generation and for succeeding generations as “the minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.”
 C&M Timber Corporation v. Alcala
G.R. No. 111088
June 13, 1997

Facts:
C&M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification of the order dated February 26,
1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, declaring as
of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on
June 30, 1972.

In a letter to President Marcos, Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation

(FLDC), requested a timber concession over the same area covered by petitioners TLA
No. 106, alleging that the same had been cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive
banning all forms of logging in the area. The request was granted. In 1985, FLDC began
logging operations. Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA
No. 360 for FLDCs gross violation of the terms and conditions thereof, especially the
reforestation and selective logging activities and in consonance with the national policy
on forest conservation. Learning of the cancellation of FLDCs TLA, petitioner requested
revalidation of its TLA No. 106 but area was awarded to FLDC. In his order dated May
2, 1988 DENR Secretary, declared petitioners TLA No. 106 as of no more force and
effect and consequently denied the petition for its restoration

Issue:
Whether or not the new policy consideration should be prospective in application
and cannot affect petitioners vested rights in its TLA No. 106.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court declared that the “total log ban” is not a new policy but a
mere reiteration of the policy of conservation expressed in Section 16, Article II, of the
Constitution which provides: “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”

Also, a TLA is a mere privilege granted by the State and does not vest in the
grantee a permanent or irrevocable right to the concession area. TLAs are not contracts
and may therefore be amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require.
 Paje v. Casiño
G.R. No. 207267
February 3, 2015

Facts:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized and
established under RA 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant
in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial
Park.

The SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate

(ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), for the
construction, installation, and operation Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant. The
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City and Zambales issued resolutions
expressing objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the
proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay. On September
11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of kalikasan was docketed. In the Petition, the Casiño
Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause grave
environmental damage;that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the
municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.

Issue:
Whether or not the there was a violation of Section 16, Article II of the
Constitution that would warrant a writ of kalikasan.

Held:
No. The CA initially rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ
of kalikasan and the application for an environment protection order due to the failure of
the Casiño Group to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology was violated or threatened.

Upon appeal it was concluded by the court that the appellate court correctly ruled
that the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and
operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented
evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental
damage, through its Environmental Management Plan, which will ensure that the project
will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards.
 Philippine Merchant Marine School v. Court of Appeals
244 SCRA 770

Facts:
Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. (PMMSI), was established in Manila to
train and produce competent marine officers. DECS, private respondent has repeatedly
disapproved petitioners request for renewal of permit/recognition due to various violation
one of them is the school's training equipment and instructional facilities are very far
below the standards set by DECS.

Despite of these violations, petitioner still continues to enroll students and still
offered courses in Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation. The DECS informed
the Petitioner that it had received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its
maritime programs which were ordered phased out.

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the president regarding the decision of

DECS, but the latter dismissed the appeal finding no reason to disturb the DECS action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for
another ocular inspection of its alleged improved facilities, since it had made substantial
improvements on school equipment and facilities and there existed no valid ground to
deny them a permit to offer maritime courses, but the Office of the President found no
reason to set aside its previous resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
No. The Court stated briefly the concept regarding establishment of schools. The
educational operation of schools is subject to prior authorization of the government and
is effected by recognition. In the case of government-operated schools, whether local,
regional or national, recognition of educational programs and/or operations is deemed
granted simultaneously with establishment. In all other cases the rules and regulations
governing recognition are prescribed and enforced by the DECS, defining therein who
are qualified to apply, providing for a permit system, stating the conditions for the grant
of recognition and for its cancellation and withdrawal, and providing for related
matters. The requirement on prior government authorization is pursuant to the State
policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and therefore
shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical
plant and facilities and of administrative or management viability.
 Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines
135 SCRA 706

Facts:
Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression against the respondents, in
their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the Philippines.
However, reference was made to some of the petitioners' school records. Petitioners
Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco, Venecio Villar, Inocencio Recitis had failed in one or
two of their subjects in 1983-1985. However, petitioner Noverto Baretto had five failing
grades in the first semester in the first school year, six failing grades in the second
semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon Jr. had three failing grades, one
passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984 -1985.
Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grade with no passing grade in the first
semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana
could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades.

Issue:
Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain
students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for
their being barred from enrollment.

Held:
No, as is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, “the invocation of
the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to
free speech”.

What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social,
economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high
school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State
maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances
permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education"

It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social
economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the
State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher
education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that
extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned
petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency. The academic freedom
enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards
to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously.
It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection
clause being disregarded.
 Tablarin v. Gutierrez
152 SCRA 730

Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the
school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of
Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners
sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and
(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985,
dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held:
Yes. Prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable

power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests
and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well-being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type:
the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required
degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
 Guigona v. Carague
196 SCRA 221

Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of 98.4 billion pesos in automatic appropriation with
86.8 billion pesos for debt service and 155.3 billion pesos appropriated under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of
233.5 billion pesos, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to 27.0 billion pesos.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 18, entitled “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by P.D.
No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No.1967, entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines
on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating
Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic

appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it
is against Section 5 paragraph 5, Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

Issue:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional for
it being higher than the budget for education.

Held:
No. While it is true that under Section 5 paragraph 5, Article XIV of the
Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
 Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 144681
June 21, 2004

Facts:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of
successful examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines
observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful
examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of
the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology. The Board then issued
Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from
Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the
results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close
to each other. The NBI investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early
access to the test questions.”

On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus

before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice
medicine. Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21
charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and
recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified. On December
19, 1994, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the
PRC to allow the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as
physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 382 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:
Yes, this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard
health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers.

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a

profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in
an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise
of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up
ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.
 JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals
260 SCRA 319

Facts:
President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however,
rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full
support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place,
the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued
Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC),
which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and
deployment of performing artists abroad.

Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,the Secretary of Labor, on January 6,

1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements
for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary
prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.

Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order No. 3 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:
Yes, the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order
related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise
of the police power. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Section 18 of Article
II of the Constitution mandates the government to extend the fullest protection to Filipino
overseas workers.

Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the
welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional
duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.

A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our

constitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate
subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their
conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon
163 SCRA 386

Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. is a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," It challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 of herein Respondent
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner contends that the Department
Order is in "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills; and that it violated
the right to travel. Petitioner likewise held that the Order is invalid exercise the law
making power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. The
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the
Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban
in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue:
Whether or not the impugned Department Order is valid under our Constitution.

Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The court ruled that the Department
Order has valid classification, there is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It
is well-settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. Department Order No. 1 does not impair
the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right, as the right to travel is a subject among other things, to the
requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative
power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
 Bernardo v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 122917
July 12, 1999

Facts:
The forty-three (43) petitioners are deaf-mutes who were hired various periods
from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and
Counters through uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers. The said agreement provides for the manner of how they are
hired and be rehired, the amount of their wages, period of employment and the manner
and methods of how their works are to be done.

Their employments were renewed every six months such that by the time this
case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent. Far
East Bank and Trust Company, herein respondent maintained that the complainants
who are a special class of workers were hired temporarily under a special employment
arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political
personalities to the respondent Bank. Petitioners claim that they were hired and should
be considered as regular employees. Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and recovery of various benefits.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are regular employees and were illegally
dismissed.

Held:
This Court appreciates the nobility of private respondent’s effort to provide
employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive
members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of
that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed
in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show
that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As
such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold,
not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.

As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of

tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized
cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause, these twenty-seven petitioners
are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
 Tañada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18

Facts:
Petitioner Senator Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the International
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO opens access
to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs
on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and
more investment in the country.

Petitioners argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO
Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our
Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

Issue:
Whether or not the WTO agreement is unconstitutional.

Held:
No. The Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact,
it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.

The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy”

does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.”
 Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority
G.R. No. 110526
February 10, 1998

Facts:
On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies
belonging to the Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) brought suit in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to enjoin the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) from
issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut
processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants
would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were
seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative
order.While the case was pending in the RTC, the Governing Board of the PCA issued
Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority
from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the
registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the
"monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards.

The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to

operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the
Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution
in question. Despite follow-up letters sent, petitioner received no reply from the Office of
the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has
enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.

Issue:
Whether or not the PCA Resolution is valid.

Held:
No. The role of the PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of
development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects." By limiting the
purpose of registration to merely "monitoring volumes of production and administration of
quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and
leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop.

Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the

entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely on competition —
with all its wastefulness and inefficiency — to do the weeding out, in its naive belief in
survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise
degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the
production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade
performance of the coconut industry.

Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-
faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.
 Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority
G.R. No. 156041
February 21, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner, a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, is an association of pesticide handlers duly licensed by respondent
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). It questioned the validity of Section 3.12 of the
1987 Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines, which provides thus:

3.12 Protection of Proprietary Data

Data submitted to support the first full or conditional registration of a
pesticide active ingredient in the Philippines will be granted proprietary protection
for a period of seven years from the date of such registration. During this period
subsequent registrants may rely on these data only with third party authorization
or otherwise must submit their own data.

Pesticides granted provisional registration under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

1144 will be considered first registered in 1977, the date of the Decree. Pesticide
products in which data is still under protection shall be referred to as proprietary
pesticides, and all others as commodity pesticides. Petitioner argued that the specific
provision on the protection of the proprietary data in FPA’s Pesticide Regulatory Policies
and Implementing Guidelines is unlawful for going counter to the objectives of P.D. No.
1144. The RTC dismissed and held that "the FPA did not exceed the limits of its
delegated authority because the issuance of the aforecited Section was a valid exercise
of its power to regulate, control and develop the pesticide industry under P.D. No. 1144."

Issue:
Whether or not said proprietary data protection is an unlawful restraint of free
trade.

Held:
No. There is no evidence whatsoever to support petitioner's allegation that the
grant of protection to proprietary data would result in restraining free trade. Furthermore,
as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
Authority,despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a
policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the
unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment.
Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for
removal of ‘protective regulations’

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,the Court held that "the mere
fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of
others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition."
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Duque
G.R. No.173034
October 9, 2007

Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that
the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond
what it is supposed to implement.

E.O. No. 51 was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish
infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and
children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. The DOH issued RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue:
Whether or not promulgating the RIRRconstituted restraint in trade.

Held:
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting
reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as
such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade

The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to
some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over
business interests.

The Court held that free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective
regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence how such
protective regulations would result in restraint of trade.

In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’
participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women
and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training
(Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the
trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed
activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and
oppressive for being in restraint of trade.
 Espina v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 143855
September 21, 2010

Facts:
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly
repealed R.A. No. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in
the retail trade business. R.A. No. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who
had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade
business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. Petitioners, all members of the House
of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8762. Petitioners argue that the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of
the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control
of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and
full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade
policies.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8762 is unconstitutional.

Held:
No. As the Court ruled in Tañada v. Angara, Section 19 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world
as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and
speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well
as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

R.A. No. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigner’s right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be
said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process
of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
 Association of Small Landowner in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
175 SCRA 343

Facts:
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of
retention granted by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the
same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by
tenants who re actually cultivating such lands. Because P.D. No. 316 provides that no
tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-
farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary to
issue the implementing rules and regulations, as they could not eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power;
2. Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the
CARP is violative of the Constitution; and
3. Whether or not the CARP and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228 contravene a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property
even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation.

Held:
1. Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it
is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the
provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the
right to review with finality the said determination.

2. No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money
and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the
power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which
involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of 50 billion
pesos may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The
invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.

3. No. E.O. No. 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were
deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP No. 27, after proof of full
payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner.
League of Provinces of the Philippines v. Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
G.R. No. 175368
April 11, 2013

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court
order the following: (1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section
24 of R.A. No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991;
(2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare
as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources'
(DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued
by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local
autonomy of provinces.

Held:
No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR
Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining
Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said
provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement
of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program
is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local
government agencies.

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution Article X, Section 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as
its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
197 SCRA 52

Facts:
On July 11, 1983, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
was created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869, pursuant to the policy of the
government, “ to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was subsequently
proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is
a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is

allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

Issue:
Whether or not P.D. No. 1869 is violative of the constitutional principle of Local
Autonomy.

Held:
The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to
“limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Since P.D. No. 1869 remains an
“operative” law until “amended, repealed or revoked, its “exemption clause” remains as
an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means “decentralization”. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
or an “imperium in imperio.”

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or

state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local
governments can only be an intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a
measure of decentralization of the function of government.

The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State

concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.
 Limbonas v. Mangelin
170 SCRA 786

Facts:
Limbonas was elected Speaker of the Regional Assembly of Central Mindanao.
On October 21, 1987, Congressman Matalam invited Limbonas in a consultation or
dialogue with local government officials. Limbona accepted the invitation and informed
the Assembly Members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the House Committee hearing of Congress.
However, the Assembly held a meeting on November 2, 1987, and unseated Limbonas
from his position. Limbonas prays for the session to be declared null and void and that
he still be declared Speaker of the Regional Assembly. Pending the case, the Supreme
Court also received a resolution from the Assembly expelling Limbonas’ membership.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous
governments or regions

Held:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous

governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.
 Lina v. Pano
G.R. No. 129093
August 30, 2001

Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office to install a terminal for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro, Laguna. It was denied on the ground that
an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province,
including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private respondent filed
an action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent
enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995 is valid.

Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the “objection” of the council to the
said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not
self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto
systemin the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local government
’sobjection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government.
However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments
may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given
this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted
as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm
that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still
includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Article X, Section 5,
Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however,
the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot
defy its will or modify or violate it.

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form
of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within
the extent allowed by the central authority.
 Dadole v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 125350
December 3, 2002

Facts:
Acting on the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)'s Local Budget
Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to regional
trial court and Metropolitan Trial Court Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of
1,000 pesos and 700 pesos in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively)
authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be
reduced to 1,000 pesos each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they
received in excess of 1,000 pesos from the last six months.

Issue:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President.

Held:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and
the power of supervision by the President. Section 4, Article X of 1987 Constitution:

"The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision

over local governments.

xxx

The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of

control.”

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos
of the President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he
will see to it that the local governments (LGUs) or their officials were performing their
duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can
be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere
in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.
 Pamatong v. Commission on Election
G.R. No. 161872
April 13, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy. On January 15, 2004,
petitioner moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective
positions, denied the same. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35)
others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari alleging that COMELEC erred in
disqualifying him in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a constitutional right to run or hold public office.

Held:
There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. The privilege of equal access
to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is
not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.
 Maquerra v. Borra
G.R. No. L-24761
September 7, 1965

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4421 which
requires that "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a
surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he
is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or
municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to
obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of
candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office. In
compliance with this, Commission on Election (COMELEC) decided to require all
candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good reputation,
acceptable to the Commission, in the sums of 60 thousand pesos and 40 thousand
pesos, for President and Vice-President, respectively, and 32 thousand pesos for
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. To that effect, this prevents or
disqualifies from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives those persons who, although having the qualifications prescribed by
the Constitution, cannot file the surety bond aforementioned.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 4421 is constitutional.

Held:
No. It is unconstitutional. The effect of imposing property qualifications is
inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our
Constitution and the principle of social justice and that the right to vote and to be voted
for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly,
no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office. A democratic form of government requires that political rights be enjoyed by the
citizens regardless of social or economic distinctions.
 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. L-72119
May 29, 1987

Facts:
A special civil action for mandamus was instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians. CSC denied the request interposing that he does not possess any clear
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be granted access to the official records and
documents requested from CSC.

Held:
Yes. It is an expressed mandate and the duty of the State and its agents to
afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government
research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, under Section 28, Article III. Government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. The
information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligible for the positions to which they
were appointed. Section 28 is self-executing by guaranteeing the right and mandating
the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
 Valmonte v. Belmonte
G.R. No. 74930
February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioners, members of media, invoking their right to information, seek to compel
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) by mandamus to furnish them with
the list of names of Batasan members belonging to UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election through
intercession of Imelda Marcos; to furnish them with certified true copies of the document
evidencing their respective loans; or to allow petitioners access to public records for the
subject information. In reply, GSIS, through the Deputy General Counsel of GSIS,
asserts that confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow
from it; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that
it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the
courts.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valmonte should be denied the list of Batasan
members who were able to secure loans from GSIS.

Held:
Yes. Petitioners have the right of access to the public documents. The public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought a matter of public concern. Petitioners are
entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulatons it may promulgate relating to the matter and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that
undue interference with the duties of custodian of the records may be prevented and that
the right of the other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.
 Garcia v. Board of Investments
G.R. No. 92024
November 9, 1990

Facts:
Taiwanese investors formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) which
received its certificate of registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals. BPC later proposed to amend its original
registration to, among others, change the feedstock from naphtha only to “naphtha
and/or LPG” and transferring the job site from Bataan to Batangas. It must be noted that
the original proposed site in Bataan is under the administration, management, and
ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) affording government
participation in the venture should the project proceed there. Despite vigorous opposition
from Congress and President Aquino, BOI still approved of the proposed revisions. BOI
recognizes and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent.

Issue:
Whether or not BOI commit a grave abuse of discretion granting the proposed
site transfer.

Held:
Yes. The Court holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of
discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas
and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for
the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the
contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by
this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government
expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems
best for the national interest. The development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Article II, Section 19 of the
Constitution.
 Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato
G.R. No. 92541
November 13, 1991

Facts:
In February 1989, petitioner Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento, herself a member of
respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its
records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining
to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the
movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer
informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel
Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as
such, are purely and completely private and personal. On July 27, 1989, that respondent
Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal,
the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the examination of the individual voting slips
constitute a violation of the constitutional right of access to official records.

Held:
As may be gleaned from the decree (P.D. No. 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an
office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid
claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private
capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no
invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of
action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise
would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against
public scrutiny for their official acts.

Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished
by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as
such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are,
therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than
the fundamental law of the land.
 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002

Facts:
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating the Public Estates Authority (PEA) which was tasked to
develop, improve, and acquire reclaimed lands, among others. On April 25, 1995, PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of
PEA confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
JVA. On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Contending that the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article
II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.

Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that the right to information contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. The State policy of
full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people’s right
to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest. It seeks to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. This provision is essential to
the exercise of freedom of expression. It is also essential to hold public officials at all
times accountable to the people, for unless citizens have the proper information, they
cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation.
 Separation of Powers

Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. 40 O.G. 8th

Public Service Commission Supp. 57
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. G.R No. December 1, 2004
Ramos 127884
Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464

Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Arnault v. Nazareno 87 Phil 29

Osmeña v. Pendatun 109 Phil 863

Vera v. Avelino 77 Phil 192

Arnault v. Balagtas 67 Phil 358

Philippine Bar Association v. G.R No. 72915 December 20, 1995

COMELEC
Avelino v. Cuenco 83 Phil 17

Marcos v. Manglapus 178 SCRA 760

Casibang v. Aquino 92 SCRA 642

Tañada v. Cuenco 100 Phil 1101

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona G.R. No. November 18, 1998

134577

Tañada v. Angara 272 SCRA 18

Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496

 Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc v. Public Service Commission
G.R. No. 47065
June 26, 1940

Facts:
This is a case on certificate on public convenience. Petitioner, Pangasinan
Transportation Co. Inc (PANTRANCO), has been engaged for the past twenty years in
the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and
Tarlac,Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public
Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted
the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their
existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service
Commission.Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
Petitioner challenges the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 to be an invalid and
unconstitutional because it is an improper delegation of legislative power granted to
PSC.

Issue:

Whether or not the legislative power granted to PSC constitutes an invalid

delegation of power

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers. The
theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the
same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of
powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and
the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation.” All that has been
delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of
discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the
promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public
Convenience is a mere license or privilege subject to government control. PSC has a
delegated power to revoke or modify its terms and conditions whenever circumstances
warrants it.
 La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association Inc v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882
December 1, 2004

Facts:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and
regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March
30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they
allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of
the Filipino nation.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7942 is constitutional

Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement. Full
control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that
the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify
plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is
exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of
managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to
subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual
control of the business. The FTAA is a political question, a matter of wisdom that is in
the full discretionary authority upon the Legislative.
 Maceda v. Vasquez
G.R. No 102781
April 22, 1993

Facts:
Maceda seeks the review of the following orders of the office of the Ombudsman,
1.) The order dated denying ex parte motion refer to the SC filed by the Petitioner and,
2.) The order denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioners
to file his counter affidavit and other controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint,
respondent Abiera asserts that petitioner falsely certified that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have
been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998 where in truth and in fact,
petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in some of those cases that have
been submitted for decision. Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificate of Service. Petitioner counters that he had been granted by this court an
extension of 90 days to decide said cases, and that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over the case since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under control of this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the separation of power has been violated by the Ombudsman

Held:
Yes. A judge who falsifies his certificate is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the rules of Court
and criminally liable to the state under the revised Penal Code for his felonious Act. In
the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to
his certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, in committing any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine separation of power.
 Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936

Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas in the September 17, 1395
election. Petitioner was proclaimed to be a member-elect of the National Assembly by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Thereafter, petitioner took his oath. Respondents
filed Motion of Protest before the Electoral Commission, however petitioner Filed Motion
to Dismiss Protest on the grounds that Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly, and that the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to
regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to
the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly.

Issue:
Whether or not the Electoral Commission has the power to take cognizance of
the case

Held:
Yes. Electoral Commission is an instrumentality of the Legislative Department
that is invested with the jurisdiction, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, to
decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly". It acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential
to carry out the powers and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that
the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government.
 Arnault v. Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820
July 18, 1950

Facts:
Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the
Philippines. Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to
determine the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just.
There was an apparent irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of
P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates. The Committee
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at
the expense of the Government. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was
asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered, Arnault refused
to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to
the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned him in Bilibid Prison until he shall
reveal the name of the person involved and pertinent questions in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

Issue:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to imprison the petition for contempt

Held:
The power of Legislative inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. The question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held
in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry and is in fact an
inferred power granted to the Legislative to sought the very thing that is to be determined
– name of the person whom the witness gave the money in question. The power of
Legislative inquiry, by doctrine of implication, carries with it all other powers that may be
reasonably inferred from it. Thus, holding the witness in contempt is a granted power of
Legislative inquiry.
 Osmena v. Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144
August 9, 2016

Facts:
In a privilege speech before the House of Representatives, Congressman Sergio
Osmena from the 2nd District of Cebu made serious imputations of bribery against then
President Garcia. A resolution was then passed forming a special committee of 15
members to be appointed by the Speaker shall be tasked to investigate the truth of the
charges against Garcia and for Osmena to substantiate his charges with evidence (i.e.
papers and witnesses) and if he fails to do so, he should show cause why he should not
be punished by the House. However, Osmena refused to comply. Osmeña alleged that
the Resolution violated his constitutional right to absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House. He was then suspended for 15 months for disorderly
behavior. Osmena then filed this petition to the Supreme Court. Respondents filed their
answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not the suspension and involves a political question

Held:
Yes. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior not only
because the Constitution delegates it but also because this matter depends on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best and cannot be presented to and
adjudicated by the Courts. If this Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmeña’s conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. The
general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in
what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the
power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision.
 Vera v. Avelino
G.R. No. L-543
August 31, 1946

Facts:
Commission on Elections submitted, last May, to the President and the Congress
of the Philippines, its report on the national elections held the preceding month, and,
among other things, stated that, by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and
violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. During the
session, when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was
approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be
sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the
protest lodged against their election. Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action
against their colleagues responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it
and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their
senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert
the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case

Held:
No. It involves a political question. Court has no jurisdiction of the case because
the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the
doctrine of separation of powers. Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept
of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the
inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
 Arnault v. Balagtas
G.R. No. L-6749
July 30, 1955

Facts:
This is an appeal of the continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault
in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November
8, 1952,that is illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear
abuse of discretion in considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person
to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate
committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer,
has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and
discharged.

Issue:
Whether the Senate has committed a grave abuse of discretion in punishing the
petitioner for contempt

Held:
No. The Court held that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he
refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the
information. Courts have no right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the
exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their
discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The Legislature is given a large
discretion in reference to the means it may employ to promote the general welfare, and
alone may judge what means are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end.
 Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006

Facts:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 8 83 which
calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of
President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in
that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special
election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional
“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President
and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The
letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President
effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified
as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

Issue:
Whether or not BP Blg. 883 which provides for a "snap" election on February 7,
1986 violates the Constitution

Held:
No. B.P. Blg. 883 is the product of the joint action of the executive and legislative
departments. When the issue is a political one which comes within the exclusive sphere
of the Legislative or Executive Department of the government to decide, the Judicial
Department or the Supreme Court has no authority to determine whether or not the act
of the Legislature or Chief Executive is against the Constitution. The enactment of BP
Blg. 883 falls well within the legislative authority of the Batasang Pambansa. The narrow
issue is whether the law violates the Constitution, particularly Section 9, Article VII. Court
ruled that the events transpired have turned into a political question which it does not
have the power to take judicial review. Court held that all reasonable doubt should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Hence, in assessing the constitutionality of a law,
"to doubt is to sustain." This approach is dictated by a healthy respect of the courts for a
co-equal department, the Legislature, and the latter's assumed wisdom within the area of
its competence.
 Avelino vs Cuenco
G.R. No. L-2821
July 19, 2016

Facts:
Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and would do so the
next session day. On the next session day, Avelino delayed the opening of the session
for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by other Senators, Avelino was forced to
open session. He initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from
delivering his piece. At this point, disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery.
Petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by other senators. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The
members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President
of the Philippines. Petitioner asked the Court to declare him the rightful Senate
President.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the case

Held:
No. Court cannot take cognizance of the case because it involves a political
question. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
Thus, SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them.
 Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989

Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to
former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may
do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President Cory may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

Held:
Yes. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance
with her oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people.
Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty. Philippines at this time was in political unrest: communist insurgency,
separatist movement in Mindanao, urban terrorism, impunities, bolsters the conclusion
that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos; The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic
effect, have not been shown to have ceased.
 Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025
August 20, 1979

Facts:
Respondent Remigio Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan over his rival, petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest with the trial court,
presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is
unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the meantime, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; thereafter, a new
Constitution was adopted. Yu moved to dismiss the election protest on the ground that
the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution by reason of a political question has intervened in the case. Yu contended
that "the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been
superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Judge sustained the political question
theory and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest.

Issue:
Whether or not this case involves a political question sustaining the Judge’s
action not to take heed of the case

Held:
No. This involves a justiciable question. If the respondent Judge decides the
election protest, there’s not any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with. Issue in the electoral protest
case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between
Yu and petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally
entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to
discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position. If it is Yu that Judge will
upheld, then he continues in office; otherwise it would be the petitioner. That is the only
consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved — a purely justiciable question
or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable.
 Tañada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-10520
August 2, 2016

Facts:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected
respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the
nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for minority
party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under
Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently,
the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of
Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner assails this process before the SC and alleges that the
nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate,
violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority senators
duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Respondents contend that the
Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a
constitutional right granted to Senate.

Issue:
Whether or not this case involves a justiciable question

Held:
Yes. Court held that petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the
Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a
justiciable and not a political question. Thus, it is within its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the selection proceedings. The procedure therein prescribed contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in
the Senate. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject
to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly
within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the
proceedings.
 Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577
November 18, 1998

Facts:
On July 31, 1998, Senators Defensor Santiago and Tatad instituted an original
petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of
Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party is also a minority and had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this
Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue:
Whether or not the case involves the power of judicial review

Held:
Yes. The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives, specifically in the selection of minority
leader. Court further held that the resolution of the issue hinges on the interpretation of
the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein
elect a Senate President. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have
been met, or the limitations respected is a question of validity or legality and not of
wisdom.
 Tañada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295
May 2, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the
WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the
“national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in
contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless
the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the case

Held:
Yes. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government,
it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down
only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of
discretion. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.
 Daza v. Singson
G.R. No. 86344
December 21, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner was a member of the Commission on Appointments representing the
Liberal Party. With the organization of the LDP, some congressional members belonging
to the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the LDP. Congress revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by
the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP to herein respondent Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP. Petitioner contends and challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments. Respondent argues that the question
raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the case involves a political question

Held:
No. The question is justiciable. What is involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. The ascertainment of the manner of forming the Commission on
Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the parties to designate their
representatives. Court further held that it is subject to judicial review since they have to
determine whether the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments was as
prescribed by the Constitution. And even if the question were political in nature, it would
still come under the expanded power of review in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
 Delegation of Powers
Concept
Lim v.Pacquing G.R No. 115044 January 27, 1995
Bondoc v. Pineda G.R No. 144463 July 14, 2004
Garcia v. Drilon G.R No. 179267 June 25, 2013

Permissible Delegation
Garcia v. Executive Secretary G.R No. 101273 July 3, 1992
Philippine Interisland Shipping G.R No. 100481 January 22, 1997
Association v. CA
Araneta v. Dinglasan G.R No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Rodriguez v. Gella G.R No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R No. 171396 May 3, 2006
People vs. Vera G.R No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
Conference of Maritime Manning G.R No. 114714 April 21, 1995
Agencies Inc. v. POEA

Tests
Pelaez v. Auditor General G.RNo. L-23825 December 24, 1965
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R No. 74457 March 20, 1987
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho G.R No. 17122 February 27, 1922
De la Llana v. Alba G.R No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
Chiongbian v. Orbos G.R No. 96754 June 22, 1995
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy G.R No. 124360 November 5, 1997
Gerochi v. Department of Energy G.R No. 159796 July 17, 2007
 Lim v.Pacquing
G.R. No. 115044
January 27, 1995

Facts:
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the
authority to regulate Jai-Alais from local government to the Games and Amusements
Board (GAB). On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor
To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And
For Other Purposes." On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by
then President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting
By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms
Of Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
issued by local governments. In May 1988, ADC tried to operate Jai-Alai. The
government, through the GAB intervened and invoked PD No. 771 which expressly
revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling, including
Jai-Alai, by the local government. ADC then assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771.
Issue:
Whether or not ADC has a valid franchise to operate and maintain Jai-Alai
Held:
No. ADC does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and
conduct Jai-Alai under PD No. 771. R.A. 409, which was enacted by Congress gave the
Municipal Board certain delegated legislative power. These powers are basically
regulatory in nature. Hence, it is the congressional franchise that must be acquired as a
requisite to operate Jai-Alai. In other words, the authority to grant franchises for the
operation of Jai-Alai frontons in the Congress, while the regulatory function in the
GAB.Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate Jai-Alai, it may not so
operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor.
 Jaworski v. PAGCOR
G.R No. 144463
July 14, 2004

Facts:
On July 11, 1983, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1869,
thereby creating the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a
government owned and controlled corporation. On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of
directors granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the
authority to operate and maintain sports betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations
and internet gaming facilities, provided that appropriate safeguards and procedures
would be established to ensure the fairness of the games. Pursuant to the authority
granted by PAGCOR, SAGE conducted a trial-run of its internet gambling, making pre-
paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.

In his capacity as a member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate

Committee on Games, Amusement, and Sports, Senator Robert Jaworski, petitioner
herein, filed the instant petition, praying that the authority granted to SAGE by PAGCOR
be nullified as the latter allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet.
According to Jaworski, PAGCOR, under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, is not
authorized to operate gambling on the internet based on three grounds: (1) that the
internet was yet inexistent during the enactment of said decree on July 11, 1983, and
gambling activities were exclusively confined to real-space; (2) that the internet, as an
international network of computers, transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, contravening the limitation of PAGCOR’s franchise under Section 14 of PD
No. 1869, which provides that the corporation shall conduct gambling activities or games
of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines; and (3) that
internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling
activities enumerated under Section 10 of PD No. 1869.

Issue:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another
entity such as SAGE.

Held:
No. While its charter allows it to enter into management contracts, PAGCOR is
not allowed, under the same charter, to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant
a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. Applying the principle of
delegatapotestasdelegare non potest, PAGCOR cannot delegate its power to another,
as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court stated that “since ADC has no franchise form
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit
from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.” In the same way, SAGE
has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not “ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it
were to legally operate on-line internet gambling.
 Garcia v. Drilon
G.R No. 179267
June 25, 2013

Facts:
Rosalie, herein private respondent, filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
Garcia, herein petitioner, for allegedly violating R.A. 9262. According to Rosalie, she is a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, and that petitioner
not only practiced marital infidelity, but also threatened her deprivation of custody of their
children and of financial support.

Although the TPO was granted, Jesus failed to faithfully comply with its
conditions, impelling the private respondent to file yet another application for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with the CA, and
prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), questioning the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262, also known as the VAWC Act, for allegedly violating the equal protection and
due process clauses, and for constituting an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial
court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9262 is unconstitutional for constituting an undue delegation
of judicial power to barangay officials.

Held:
No. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
while executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."

The BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws
and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."
 Garcia v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 101273
July 3, 1992

Facts:
On November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438,
imposing an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax, in addition to other duties, taxes, and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported, including crude oil and other oil
products, into the Philippines. The next year, Executive Order No. 443 was issued,
increasing the additional duty imposed to 9%. The same year, Executive Order No. 475
was passed, reinstating the previous 5% duty, except that in crude oil and other oil
products, which continued to be taxed at 9%. On August 23, 1991, the President issued
Executive Order No. 478 which, in addition to the aforementioned additional ad valorem
duty and all other existing ad valorem duties, levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, assails the constitutionality of EO

475 and 478 on the ground that the said orders allegedly violate Section 24 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that: “all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.” According to Garcia, the President may not enact revenue
bills, as the Constitution vests such authority to Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

Held:
Yes. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that: “the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government”.

In this case, Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, provides the
President authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
 Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v. CA
G.R No. 100481
January 22, 1997

Facts:
Private respondent United Harbor Pilots’ Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(UHPAP) is the umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage service in
different ports of the Philippines. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government
agency which regulates pilotage. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 857, it has the
power to: (1) "supervise, control, regulate such services as are necessary in the ports
vested in, or belonging to the Authority"; (2) "control, regulate and supervise pilotage and
the conduct of pilots in any Port District”; and (3) “impose, fix, prescribe, increase or
decrease such rates, charges or fees. . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by
any private organization within a Port District”.

A series of cases arose out of the efforts of harbor pilots to secure enforcement
of Executive Order No. 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage service, and the equally
determined efforts of the PPA and its officials, the herein petitioners, to block
enforcement of the executive order, even as they promulgated their own orders which in
the beginning fixed lower rates of pilotage and later left the matter to self-determination
by parties to a pilotage contract.

In this case, UHPAP filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Manila, Branch
2 for the annulment of A.O. No. 02-88, which vested authority to provide pilotage service
to: (1) Harbor Pilots of the present Pilotage Associations of the different pilotage districts
in the Philippines; and (2) Members/employees of any partnership/corporation or
association, including Filipino shipmasters/ captains of vessel (domestic/foreign) of
Philippine Registry and individuals who meet the minimum qualifications and comply
with the requirements prescribed in Sec. 29 of PPA AO No. 03-85, on the ground that:
(1) that A.O. No. 02-88 was issued without the benefit of a public hearing; (2) that E.O.
No. 1088 had not been repealed by any other Executive Order or Presidential Decree
and, therefore, should be given effect; and (3) that A.O. No. 02-88 contravened P.D. No.
857.

Issue:
Whether or not A.O. No. 02-88 is valid.

Held:
No. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When the same is delegated
to the President, he may exercise it directly, e.g., issuance of the questioned Executive Order
1088, without thereby withdrawing an earlier delegation made to the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA). But when the President directly exercises the delegated authority, the PPA
may not revise the rates fixed by the former.

The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated
by E.O. No. 1088. Moreover, the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No. 1088 or alter it as
it did in promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, much less could the PPA abrogate
the rates fixed and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage service to the contracting parties as
it did through A. O. No. 02-88, Section 3.
 Araneta v. Dinglasan
G.R No. L-2044
August 26, 1949

Facts:
Commonwealth Act No. 671, also known as An Act Declaring a State of Total
Emergency as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to
Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet Such Emergency, was issued by President
Manuel L. Quezon on December 1941, which granted emergency powers to the
President.

Charged for violating Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses
and lots for residential buildings, Araneta filed a petition seeking to prohibit Dinglasan,
the judge hearing his case, and the Fiscal from proceeding with the said case on the
ground that Commonwealth Act No. 671, the enabling act for Executive Order No. 62, is
already inoperative, thereby making all Executive Orders issued pursuant to it ceases to
exist.

Likewise, three other cases, consolidated with this one, avers the existence of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. L-3055 is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe
exporter who was seeking to have a permit issued to him, against EO 192 which controls
exports in the Philippines. On the other hand, L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to
prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225, while L-
3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold
the national elections.

Issue:
Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceases to exist and that Executive
Order No. 62 cease to exist.

Held:
Yes. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative ex propriovigore when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of
Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of
the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a
special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must
be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon
reconvening or upon early repeal.
 Rodriguez v. Gella
G.R No. L-6266
February 2, 1953

Facts:
In 1952, Executive Orders No. 545 and 546 were issued pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 671, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent
and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for
relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities.

Eulogio Rodriguez et. al. seek to invalidate said Executive Orders and have
Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to the
said orders. It is to be noted that in prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed
House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President
due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact CA 671
was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court. However in Araneta vs.
Dinglasan, CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are valid.

Held:
No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671
shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or
calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without
such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared
cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the
repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to
contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier
for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and
ought not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,
whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled
to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation
in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created
under the Act is coupled with interest.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R No. 171396
May 3, 2006

Facts:
In February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017,
implemented by General Order No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, by virtue
of Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
In her capacity as the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Commander-in-Chief, she
commanded the Armed Forces of the Philippines to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by her personally or upon her direction. According to
Arroyo, said proclamation was based on theconspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate her.

On the same day of the issuance of the assailed proclamation and general order,
Petitioner David and Llamas were arrested without warrants while they were on their
way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was
perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 in the morning,
the next day, several materials for publication were seized. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited Presidential Proclamation 1017 and
General Order 5 as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search.

Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 1017 is constitutional.

Held:
PP 1017 is partially constitutional. A distinction must be drawn between the
President’s authority to declarea state of national emergency and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
issues arise. On the other hand, under Section 23 (2), Article VI, the of grant emergency
powers to the President by Congress is subject to certain conditions: (1) there must be a
war or other emergency; (2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; (3) the
delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (4) the
emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet
of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Thus, the
assailed proclamation does not authorize the President during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
 People vs. Vera
G.R No. L-45685
November 16, 1937

Facts:
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him
by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). Two years after, he filed
for probation. Subsequently, a hearing was set in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
headed by Judge Jose Vera. Due to encountered delays in the proceedings, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that under
Republic Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law, courts like the Court of First Instance of
Manila have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation. According
to the prosecution, probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation
officers; and that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed
as a province, cannot grant probation because it has no designated probation officer.

On the other hand, HSBC alleged that Republic Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional
for: (1) it violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. According
to HSBC the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or not to apply the
probation law; (2) it is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law even if the legislature did
not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board; and (3) it is an
encroachment of the executive’s power to grant pardon.

In his defense, Cu Unjieng raised that the Prosecution, representing the State as
well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221,
which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila
who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 4221 is constitutional.

Held:
No. Republic Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as it
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have
provided for a probation officer. Moreover, said act does not provide a sufficient standard
that said provinces may use as guide in determining whether or not to apply the probation
law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily
according to its whims.
 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies Inc. v. POEA
G.R No. 114714
April 21, 1995

Facts:
On January 14, 1994, Governing Board Resolution No. 01 was issued,
increasing the compensation and other benefits received by seafarers. On January 19,
1994, Memorandum Circular No. 05 was issued by POEA Administrator
FelicisimoJoson, addressed to all Filipinos seafarers, manning agencies, ship owners,
managers, and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informing them that Governing Board
Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of compensation and other benefits in Part II,
Section C. paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and Appendix 1-A of the POEA
Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers. On March 20, 1994, said adjustments
took place.

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated

association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective foreign shipowner-principals, filed a petition to annul said resolution and
circular on the grounds that: (1) the POEA does not have the power and authority to fix
and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can; (2) that even granting that the
POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its exercise; (3) that
the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate
the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the
Constitution.; and (4) that he resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts
of the Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by law has
not been appointed by the President since the creation of the POEA.

Issue:
Whether or not Governing Board Resolution No. 01 is a valid exercise of
delegated legislative authority.

Held:
Yes. The assailed resolution is valid inasmuch as it conforms to the sufficient and
valid standard of “fair and equitable employment practices” prescribed in E.O. 797. It is
well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the
law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law.
 Pelaez v. Auditor General
G.R No. L-23825
December 24, 1965

Facts:
Pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, President Ferdinand
Marcos issued executive orders, creating thirty three (33) municipalities, in 1964.
Purportedly it was provided under the said law that: “the President may by executive
order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require”.

As a taxpayer, then Vice President, Emanuel Pelaez, filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the creation of
the said municipalities. According to Pelaez the Executive Orders were unconstitutional
as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of Republic ActNo. 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by an act of Congress. In his
argument Pelaez contends that: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?”

On the other hand, the Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and
that only barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios.
Moreover, he further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code is constitutional.

Held:
No. For delegation of power to be valid, the law must: a) be complete in itself — it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, however, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details
in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R No. 74457
March 20, 1987

Facts:
With the aim of strengthening Executive Order No. 626, a law prohibiting the
slaughtering of carabaos, President Ferdinand Marcos, issued Executive Order No. 626-
A, which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef.

On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was charged for violating Executive Order 626-A after he
was caught transporting six (6) carabaos from Masbate In his defense, Ynot averred EO
626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process.
According to him, he said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the Executive Order is a valid exercise of police power in order
to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Issue:
Whether or not there is invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

Held:
Yes. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall
be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
 U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
G.R No. 17122
February 27, 1922

Facts:
During a special session in July 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act, vested in the Governor General the power and authority to
issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order No. 53,
fixing the price at which rice should be sold, and was published in August 20, 1919.
In August 6, 1919, prior to the publication of the said order, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos, an amount
way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. As a consequence, he was
charged for violation of the said Executive Order, was found guilty as charged, and was
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. On appeal, petitioner
contends that the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.

Issue:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Held:
No. The said Act fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves
the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance,
it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

In Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co., the opinion says: "The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made."
 De la Llana v. Alba
G.R No. L-57883
March 12, 1982

Facts:
In 1981, Batas PambansaBlg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Affected by the said
law, Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olangapo, assails the validity of PambansaBlg.
129 on the following grounds: (1) that such law contravenes Section 9, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides judges of the courts security of tenure; (2) that only
the Supreme Court can remove judges and not the Congress; and (3) that such law
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President in granting him
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed.

Issue:
Whether or not PambansaBlg. 129 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President in granting him authority to fix the compensation and the
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed.

Held:
Yes. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: "to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.

In this case, the language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions
reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan
Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive
such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of a
standard is thus clear.
 Chiongbian v. Orbos
G.R No. 96754
June 22, 1995

Facts:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6734 was issued, calling for a
plebiscite to create an autonomous region in Mindanao. Subsequently, the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao was created, composing of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, all of which voted for its creation, by President Corazon Aquino
through Executive Order No. 429, consistent with the authority granted to her by Section
13, Article XIX of Republic Act No. 6734.

Assailing the constitutionality of the said law, petitioners contend that Section 13,
Article XIX of Republic Act No. 6734 contravenes the constitution as it unduly delegates
legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative
determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of
the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
Moreover, the petitioners also assails the validity of Executive Order No. 429 on the
ground that the power granted by Republic Act No. 6734 to the President is only to
merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in
Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga
City to Pagadian City.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 6734 is constitutional.

Held:
Yes. In conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative
determination the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The
choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into
regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also
the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional
offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.

Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are
definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and
insuring the efficient delivery of essential services
 Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
G.R No. 124360
November 5, 1997

Facts:
In 1996, Republic Act No. 8180, known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act
of 1996, was issued pursuant to the aim of the country to find ways to alleviate the oil
industry in the Philippines. Said law allows that “any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Assailing the constitutionality of the said law, together with Executive Order No.
392, Senator Francisco Tatad contends that: (1) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry; (2) that E.O. No. 392, implementing the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to
the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and
(3) that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 8180 and Executive Order no. 392 constitutes a
valid delegation of power.

Held:
While, Republic Act No. 8180 contained sufficient standards for the delegation of
power to the President to advance the date of full deregulation of the oil industry,
Executive Order No. 392 is invalid as it constituted a misapplication of Republic Act No.
8180, because the President rewrote the standards set forth in the law when he
considered the extraneous factor of depletion of OPSF funds.

The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases
at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors
of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the
US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the
weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could
well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been
accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty,
we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of
R.A. No. 8180.
 Gerochi v. Department of Energy
G.R No. 159796
July 17, 2007

Facts:
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), was issued, imposing a universal charge upon all end-
users of electricity for the purpose of funding the projects of NAPOCOR.

Assailing the constitutionality of the EPIRA, petitioners contend that: (1) the
universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented
under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all
electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative
function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative
agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The
assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed
and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority; (2) the ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds
collected should be used; and (3) the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as
the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.

Issue:
Whether or not EPIRA constitutes a valid delegation of power.

Held:
Yes. Read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, EPIRA is
ruled to be complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification
of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power”, and “watershed rehabilitation and management” are sufficient standards, as they
provide the limitations on the Energy Regulatory Commission’s power to formulate the
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
 Legislative Department
Apportionment of Legislative Districts
Aldaba v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078 March 15, 2010
Aquino III v. COMELEC G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
Mariano v. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
Tobias v. Abalos G.R. No. L- December 8, 1994
114783
Montejo v. COMELEC G.R No. 118702 March 16, 1995
Sema v. COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16,2008

Qualifications
Marcos v. COMELEC G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Aquino v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265 September 8, 1995
Coquilla v. COMELEC G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002

Party-List System (Republic Act No. 7941)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2013
COMELEC
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANAD v. COMELEC G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013
Coalition of Association of Senior G.R. No. July 23, 2013
Citizens v. COMELEC 206844-45
Bello v. COMELEC G.R. No. 191998 December 7, 2010
ABC v. COMELEC G.R. No. 193256 March 22, 2011
Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC G.R. No. 206952 October 22, 2013
COCOFED v. COMELEC G.R. No. 207026 August 6, 2013
Amores vs. HRET G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
COMELEC
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
v. COMELEC
BANAT v. COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Election, Salaries, Privileges

Lozada v. COMELEC G.R. No.L-59068 January 27, 1983
Philconsa v. Mathay G.R. No. L- October 4, 1966
25554
Ligot v. Mathay G.R. No. L- April 30, 1974
34676
People v. Jalosjos G.R No. 132875 February 3, 2000
Trillanes IV v. Pimentel G.R No. 179817 June 27, 2008
Osmeña v. Pendatun G.R. No. L- October 28, 1960
17144
 Jimenez v. Cabangbang G.R. No. L- August 3, 1966
15905

Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions

Adaza v. Pacana G.R. No. 68159 March 18, 1985
Liban v. Gordon G.R. No. 175352 July 15, 2009
Liban v. Gordon G.R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011

Sessions, Officers, Quorum, Rules of Proceedings and Discipline of Members

Avelino v. Cuenco G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
Arroyo v. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998
Pacete v. Secretary of the G.R. No. L- July 23, 1971
Commission on Appointments 25895
Osmeña v. Pendatun G.R. No. L- October 28, 1960
17144
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001

Records and Books of Accounts; Legislative Journal and Congressional Record

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947
Arroyo v. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. G.R. No. L- February 28, 1963
Gimenez 17931
Astorga v. Villegas G.R. No. L- April 30, 1974
23475
Morales v. Subido G.R. No. L- November 9, 1968
29658

Electoral Tribunals
Tañada v. Cuenco G.R. No. 10520 February 28, 1957
Bondoc v. Pineda G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
Abbas v. Senate Electoral G.R. No. 83767 October 7, 1988
Tribunal
Pimentel v. House of G.R. No. 141489 November 29, 2002
Representatives Electoral
Trinunal
Sampayan v. Daza G.R. No. 103903 September 11, 1992
Aquino v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
Vinzons Chato v. COMELEC G.R. No. 172131 April 2, 2007
Bello v. COMELEC G.R. No. 191998 December 7, 2010
Vilando v. House of G.R. No. 192147 August 23, 2011
Representatives Electoral
Tribunal
Angara v. Electoral Commission G.R. No. L- July 15, 1936
45081
 Lazatin v. House of G.R. No. L- July 15, 1936
Representatives Electoral 45081
Tribunal

Commission on Appointments
Daza v. Singson G.R. No. L- July 15, 1936
45081
Coseteng v. Mitra G.R. No. L- July 15, 1936
45081
Guingona v. Gonzales G.R No. 106971 October 20, 1992
Drilon v. De Venecia and G.R. No. 180055 July 31, 2009
Madrigal v. Villar G.R. No. 183055 July 31, 2009
Bautista v. Salonga G.R No. 86439 April 13, 1989
Sarmiento v. Mison G.R No. 79974 December 17, 1987
 Aldba v. COMELEC
G.R No. 188078
March 15, 2010

Facts:
In 2007, House Bill 3162, later known as Republic Act No. 9591, was passed in
Congress, relying on the undated certification issued by the Regional Director Alberto
Miranda of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate
of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
In May 1, 2009, Republic Act No. 9591 lapsed into law, thereby amending the
charter of Malolos City by creating a separate legislative district for the city. Originally,
the Province of Bulacan has four legislative ditricts. The First District is comprised of the
City of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and
Paombong.

Assailing the constitutionality of the said law, petitioners, as taxpayers, registered

voters, and residents of Malalos City, contends that Republic Act No. 9591 failed to meet
the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in
Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9591 is constitutional and whether or not the
City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000 to qualify for the creation of a
district.

Held:
No. RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has
no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its
face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be
less than 250,000 in the year 2010.

It should be noted that: (1) certifications on demographic projections can be

issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board (NSCB); (2) certifications based on demographic projections can
be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer; and (3) that
intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
 Aquino III v. COMELEC
G.R No. 189793
April 7, 2010

Facts:
In October 12, 2009, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed Republic Act No.
9716 into law, reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province to create an additional legislative district in the Province of Camarines Sur.
Estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, the Province of Camarines Sur was
reapportionated. The first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, Senator Benigno Aquino
III and Mayor Jesse Robredo contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic
Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for
the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.

Issue:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Held:
No. The 250,000 minimum population required by Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution is only applicable to cities, but not for provinces. Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. – A province may be created if it has an average annual

income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(1) contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or (2) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
 Mariano v. COMELEC
G.R No. 188577
March 7, 1995

Facts:

Petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo

Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino
Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief against R.A. No. 7854, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”. As a resident of Makati, Mariano Jr.,
together with other taxpayers, assailed the constitutionality of Section 21, 51, and 52 of
Republic Act No. 7854 on the ground that: (1) Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not
properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; (2) Section 51 of R.A. No.
7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution;
and (3) Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was
not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854, adding another legislative district, is
unconstitutional.

Held:
No. In Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a
general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city
or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time.
 Tobias v. Abalos
G.R No. L-114783
December 8, 1994

Facts:

In February 9, 1994, Republic Act No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality
of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”,
was signed into law by President Ramos. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of
1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as provided under Republic Act. No. 7675. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes"
whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, Republic Act. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong

and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Petitioners now contend that
Republic Act. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional
for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution: (1) Article VI, Section
26(1) “One subject one bill rule”; (2) Article VI, Sec. 5(1); and (3) Article VI, Sec. 5(4).

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7675 violates Article VI, Sec. 5(4) for
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts.

Held:
No. Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.

The reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law.

To hold that reapportionment can be made only through a general law would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation
would deprive the people in the new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of subtraction; it is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is
not sovereignty.
 Montejo v. COMELEC
G.R No. 118702
March 16, 1995

Facts:
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5
districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. In
1959, Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 was enacted, making Biliran a subprovince of
Leyte.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran
became a regular province. As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of
the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to
reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities with a total population of 146,067 as per the
1990 census.

As a representative of the first district of Leyte, Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo,

pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of
representation.

Issue:
Whether or not the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative
power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:
No. The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows
that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987
constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts
and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987

constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as
part of the power to make laws.

, ,
 Sema v. COMELEC
G.R No. 177597
July 16, 2008

Facts:
In August 28, 2006, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 was enacted by the
ARMM’s legislature and the ARMM Regional Assembly, by virtue of the its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. In February 6, 2007, Cotabato
City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status
of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province” under Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201. Three months after, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming
the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.”

Issue:
Whether or not the ARMM Regional Assembly can create the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot validly delegate to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts, nothing in Sec. 20,
Article X of the Constitution, authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress. Accordingly, Sec. 19, Art. VI of R.A. 9054, granting the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Sec. 5, Art. VI, and Sec. 20, Art. X, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
 Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976
September 18, 1995

Facts:
With intent to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte,
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy, stating that she has been a
resident of the said district for already 7 months. Montejo, incumbent Representative and
a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification,
alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement.

In her defense, Imelda amended her Certificate of Candidacy, changing “seven”

months to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the
amended Certificate of Candidaacy for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda,
thus, filed her amended Certificate of Candidacy with Comelec's head office in Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos satisfied the one-year residency requirement and
may therefore run for district representative.

Held:
Yes. Despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had
resided in the district for only seven months, the Court found the Petitioner to have
satisfied the one-year residency requirement for the following reasons: (1) a minor
follows the domicile of his parents; Tacloban became IRM’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (2) domicile of origin is lost
only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bonafide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (3) the
wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when IRM married Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium; and (4) Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice.
 Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265
September 8, 1995

Facts:
On March 20, 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned
district 284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati for 10 months.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino
to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco
with 35,910 votes.
Under reconsideration, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue:
Whether or not the theory of legal impossibility may be imposed in this case.

Held:
No. Theory of Legal Impossibility revolves around how it would be legally
impossible to impose a one year residency requirement for a newly established political
district. In this case, such theory is not applicable in the newly established second district
of Makati, although only four months old, as a new political district did not just spur from
thin air, rather it is carved out from a real and existing geographic area. Thus people who
lived in the old municipality prior to the change, may satisfy the one year requirement.
 Coquilla v. COMELEC
G.R No. 151914
July 31, 2002

Facts:
Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and
resided there until he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized
as a US citizen. In 1998, he came back to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate. He also applied for repatriation which was approved in 2000. He then took his
oath as citizen of the Philippines. In the same year, he applied for registration as voter in
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. On Feb. 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
stating therein that he had been resident of Oras for two years. Alvarez, the incumbent
mayor, seeking for reelection, sought for cancellation of Coquilla’s COC alleging that he
has resided in Oras for only six months since November 2000 when he took his oath.
Coquilla won and was proclaimed mayor of Oras.

In July 2001, COMELEC Second Division granted the petition to cancel

Coquilla’s COC on the ground that he failed to satisfy the one year residency
requirement. Coquilla filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, he
filed this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Coquilla satisfies the one year residency requirement before the
May 2001 elections?

Held:
No. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, the term "residence" is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.

Petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after
enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as
a resident alien. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000,
petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country. It would appear then that
when petitioner entered the country in 1998, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor
whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to
have waived his status as an alien and as a nonresident only on November 10, 2000
upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the
requisite residency to qualify him for the mayoralty of Oras, Eastern Samar. He made a
false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation.
 Atom Paglaum Inc. v. COMELEC
G.R No. 203766
April 2, 2013

Facts:
These are 54 petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed by 52 party lists groups
assailing the COMELEC resolution disqualifying them from the 2013 elections, by denial
or cancellation of their registration and accreditation. Pursuant to RA 7941 and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 2013 elections.

COMELEC scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups

and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have
continually complied with the requirements of RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party vs. COMELEC. The COMELEC disqualified said Atong Paglaum and the
other petitioners. They prayed for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction. The Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders.

Issue:
Whether or not the rule laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT should be
applied in this case?

Held:
No. Citing from the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The framers of the
Constitution intended to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties. Political parties
can participate for as long as they field candidates who come from different marginalized
sectors. Section 5 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that there shall be “a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” It
is clear that the framers did not intend the party-list system to be only sectoral but
composed of three different groups: national, regional, and sectoral parties.

Moreover, Section 3 (a) of RA 7941 defines a “party” as either a political or

sectoral party. It further provides a definition for each. Said law does not require national
and regional parties to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. It is
sufficient that a political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens. Section 5 of RA 7941 are not necessarily marginalized and
underrepresented as some may “lack well-defined constituencies” and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties and advocate for their respective interests and
concerns. Another reason is that in Section 6, none of the eight grounds to refuse or
cancel registration refers to non-representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” Said phrase should refer only to sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically “marginalized and underrepresented”. For these sectors, a
majority of the members must belong to the sector and its nominees must be either
belonging to the sector or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. The case was remanded.
 Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc. v. COMELEC
G.R No. 190529
April 29, 2010

Facts:
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks to nullify COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration for its delisting from the
roster of registered national, regional, or sectoral parties. It was delisted for the May
2010 elections because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections which were required by Section 6 (8) of the RA 7941.

PGBI asserts that since it filed a Request or Manifestation seeking deferment of

its participation in the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether to participate
or not in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. COMELEC did not find merit alleging, among others, the
provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party does not
participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party must go through
the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not
exempt PGBI from registering anew. PGBI asserts that following the interpellations of
Senate Bill 1913, Section 6 (8) does not apply as it only failed in one and not two
preceding elections.

Issue:
Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI?

Held:
No. The Minero ruling is erroneous in applying Section 6 (8) of RA 7941. By the
use of the word “or” in the provision, it is clear that there are two separate reasons for
delisting. The disqualification for failure to get 2% must therefore be understood in light
of the Banat ruling that party-list groups garnering less than 2% may yet qualify for a
seat.

The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups

that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for constituency in which it is
registered.

PGBI’s situation – a party list group that failed to garner 2% in a prior election
and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something
not covered by Section 6 (8) of RA 7941. The petition is granted.
 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
G.R No. 190582
April 8, 2010

Facts:
Ang Ladlad assail COMELEC’s refusal to accredit it as a party-list organization
under RA 7941. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
It argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that
is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
they are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.

COMELEC dismissed the petition based on moral grounds; that the definition of
LGBT makes it tolerate immorality which offends religious beliefs; that it collides with
Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘any act omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which…shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality; it also collides with Article 1306 of the same Code; and the RPC as
amended which penalizes ‘immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows.’

Ang Ladlad contended that in so far as COMELEC used religious dogmas to

justify its stand, it violated the constitutional guarantee against establishment of religion;
that it also contravened the group’s rights to privacy, freedom of speech, assembly, and
equal protection of laws.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad may be granted accreditation?

Held:
Yes. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. With regards to the issue of public morals, the assailed
resolutions do not identify any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
COMELEC failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented or why special
protection is required for the youth. Moreover, a violation of the RPC requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

In other words, the denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Absent any compelling reason, the
COMELEC or the Court cannot impose its view on the populace and not injure the right
to expression. Furthermore, the Philippines adheres to principles of non-discrimination
based on international laws and customs.
 ANAD v. COMELEC
G.R No. 206987
September 10, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner seeks to compel COMELEC to canvass the votes cast for it in the held
2013 elections. On Nov. 7, 2012, COMELEC En Banc cancelled petitioner’s Certificate
of Registration/Accreditation on three grounds: it does not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented under Section 5 of the law; no proof showing its nominees,
Tariman and Labandria, are actually nominated by ANAD itself and it failed to follow
procedural requirements on nominees; and it failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local Elections.

Following the decision of Atong Paglaum and the remand of cases, COMELEC
still denied ANAD’s qualification asserting that while it can be considered a sectoral
party, it nonetheless failed to comply with the second and third points in the assailed
resolutions.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted only three
nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in
the 2007 elections?

Held:
No. ANAD violated Section 8of RA 7941 when it submitted only three and not five
nominees. Compliance with Section 8 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard
against arbitrariness. It rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute and
replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of nominees, after submission of the
list to COMELEC.

Its failure to submit said Statements as found by the COMELEC was also
affirmed by the Court reiterating the well-established principle that findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed except in particular cases.

Nonetheless, even if petitioner is qualified it still failed to obtain enough votes to

qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
 Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC
G.R No. 206844-45
July 23, 2013

Facts:
The petitions were filed by two rival factions within the same party-list
organization which are praying for the same reliefs. One is headed by Arquiza, the
organizations incumbent representative. The other group is led by Datol, the
organization’s third nominee.

The party participated in the 2007 elections but failed to get the required 2% of
the total votes cast. In accordance with BANAT, it was allocated one seat in Congress
and Arquiza served as its representative. In 2010, its nominees signed an agreement,
entitled Irrevocable Covenant. After the 2010 elections, it garnered to seats wherein
Arquiza and Kho represented the party.

According to the Datol group, there was a convention to address the unfulfilled
commitment of Arquiza to his constituents and that Datol was supposedly elected as the
representative. However, as the Board of Trustees of the party is allied with Arquiza,
they expelled Datol. Rep. Kho also passed his resignation.

During the Atong Paglaum case, this case was also remanded to the trial court.
This petition assails cancellation of their registration because of violation of term sharing.

Issue:
Whether or not Senior Citizens are disqualified to have a seat in the said
elections?

Held:
No. The Datol group argues that the public policy prohibiting term sharing was
provided in Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, promulgated on
February 21, 2012. Hence, it should not be applied retroactively to the agreement of the
party. Still, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument that the Senior Citizens already
earned a vested right to its registration as as a party-list organization.

Court finds that COMELEC erred in disqualifying Senior Citizens. There was no
indication that the term sharing agreement was implemented. Hence, there was no
violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly, the disqualification of
the Senior Citizen has no leg to stand on.
 Bello v. COMELEC
G.R No. 191998
December 7, 2010

Facts:
There are 3 consolidated special civil actions which aim to disqualify respondent
“Mikey” Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-list (AGPP) in the 2010
elections. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution 8807 provides that party-list groups and
their nominees must submit documentary evidence to duly prove that the nominees truly
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and to the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.

Petitioners argue that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the

marginalized and underrepresented sector, particularly the sector which the AGPP
represents – tricycle drivers and security guards – because he is not only a member of
the First Family, but is also an incumbent member of the House of Representatives,
Chairman of the House’s Energy Committee, and member of key committees in the
House. Arroyo contended that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over cases
involving the qualifications of party-list nominees and that it lies with the HRET.

COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition and COMELEC en banc

refused to consider. It held that the nominee only needs to be a bona fide member of the
party which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of election, and
must likewise be at least twenty-five years of age on the day of election.

Issue:
Whether or not HRET has the jurisdiction over Arroyo’s qualification following his
proclamation?

Held:
Yes. HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Once the party list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office,
the COMELEC jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

In the case at bar, Arroyo has already been proclaimed. There are also two
petitions for quo warranto against Arroyo pending in the HRET. HRET now has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo’s qualifications. The Court resolves to dismiss
the petitions.
 ABC Party List v. COMELEC
G.R No. 193256
March 22, 2011

Facts:
Mauricio filed a petition for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of
petitioner ABC on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization. It
contends that ABC is a front for Children of God International, which is more popularly
known as Ang Dating Daan, alleging that one of its nominees is a top official of Ang
Dating Daan; it is being run, its resources come from, and its membership is composed
of Ang Dating Daan.

COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on grounds of lack of proper

verification of petition and that ABC is not a religious sect and therefore, not disqualified
for registration. COMELEC En banc reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC may direct a hearing for cancellation of petitioner’s
registration?

Held:
Yes. The jurisdiction of COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration
of any political party is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. It
states, among others, “Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.”
Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties and the
authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. In the case of
nominees, it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over contests relating to their
qualifications.

The COMELEC has the constitutional mandate to register political parties,

organizations and coalitions, and to cancel their registration on legal grounds; hence, the
COMELEC en banc, in this case, has the prerogative to direct that a hearing be
conducted on the petition for cancellation of registration of the ABC Party-List. The
COMELEC en banc stated in its Resolution that only then can the petition be resolved
on its merits with due regard to private respondent's right to due process.

Hence, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled
the registration of petitioner based on legal grounds. The case is dismissed.
 Abang Lingkod Party List v. COMELEC
G.R No. 206952
October 22, 2013

Facts:
This is a petition assailing the cancellation of Abang Lingkod’s registration as a
party-list group. Abang Lingkod is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of
peasant farmers and fisherfolks. In 2012, Abang Lingkod manifested before the
COMELEC its intent to participate in the 2013 elections. COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 9513, which, inter alia, required previously registered party-list groups to undergo
summary evidentiary hearings for purposes of determining their continuing compliance
with the requirements under RA 7941 and the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. After
due hearing, COMELEC En Banc cancelled Abang Lingkod’s registration. Atong
Paglaum doctrine led to the remanding of this case, wherein the cancellation was
affirmed. COMELEC issued a Resolution sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing
the proximity of the 2013 elections as the reason therefor.

Petitioner contends that there was no valid justification for the cancellation. On
the other hand, COMELEC claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled
the registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track record representing the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling
petitioner’s registration?

Held:
Yes. Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of
likely future performance. Under Section 5 of RA 7941, attachments of “constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information” are needed. The law did not require party list groups to submit
proof of their track record as a group. Ang Bagong Bayani only required the track record
to show that party list truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

Atong Paglaum stated that for purposes of registration, it is enough that the
principal advocacy of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector they represent.
Considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as
to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration – it is no
longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In other words, the track
records which were misrepresented do not affect the qualification of the party list and
cannot be used as a ground to cancel its registration.
 COCOFED v. COMELEC
G.R No. 207026
August 6, 2013

Facts:
COCOFED is an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from
the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and producers. It manifested its
intent to participate in the 2013 elections and submitted the names of only two nominees
– Atty. Emrito Calderon and Atty. Domingo Espina. COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s
registration because it submitted only two nominees. Hence, it failed to comply with
Section 8 of RA 7941. COCOFED then submitted the names of Charles Avila, as
substitute for Atty. Espina and Efren Villasenor, as its third nominee. However,
COMELEC maintained its decision.

COCOFED submits that its failure to submit the required number of nominees is
based on good faith believing that its submission is sufficient for purposes of election
and that it could still be remedied since it can simply submit the additional two names.
COMELEC, on the other hand, contends that the petition is mooted by the current start
of canvass of votes.

Issue:
Whether or not COCOFED may be disqualified for failure to submit the required
number of nominees?

Held:
Yes. It is a mandated requirement under Section 8 of the law. Under Section 6
(5) of RA 7941, violation or failure to comply with the laws and rules relating to elections
is a ground for cancellation of registration. COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of five
nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation
imputable to the party under Section 6 (5) of RA 7941. The use of the word “shall” shows
it mandatory nature.

Moreover, the fact that a party list is entitled to no more than three seats in
Congress, regardless of the number of votes it garner, does not render Section 8
permissive in nature. The requirement of additional two nominees actually addresses
contingencies that may happen during the term of these party list representatives.

Furthermore, after the submission of the list, the party itself has no discretion to
change the names or to alter the order of nomination in the list submitted. To allow
COCOFED to complete the list of its nominees beyond the deadline set by the law
would allow the party to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
 Amores v. HRET
G.R No. 189600
June 29, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner challenges the decision of HRET which dismissed petitioner’s petition
for quo warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel
Villanueva as representative of CIBAC or Citizens Battle Against Corruption. She asserts
that Villanueva assumed office without a formal proclamation; he was disqualified to ne a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filling of his certificate of
nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30
pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7941; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least
six months prior to May 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector
under Section 15.

Villanueva argues that the petition was filed out of the reglementary period of 10
days from his proclamation. Regarding the age qualification, he contends that it only
applies to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification
of the Constitution. Section 15 also does not apply as there was no resultant change in
party-list affiliation.

Issue:
Whether or not the quo warranto was rightfully dismissed?

Held:
No. The law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must
at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of election, so it must be that
a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee.

Moreover, Section 15 covers changes in both political and sectoral affiliation. It

states that “any elected party list representative who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, that if he
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six months before an election, he
shall not be eligible for nomination as party list representative under his new party or
organization.”

Hence, Villanueva is not qualified to be a representative of either sector. The

petition is granted.
 Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC
G.R No. 177271
May 4, 2007

Facts:
Two petitions seek to compel the COMELEC to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of the various party list groups named in the petitions. Bantay Republic Act
and UP-LR seek to disqualify the nominees of certain party list groups. Both petitioners
appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still
asked for a copy of the list of nominees.

COMELEC en banc issued Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007, virtually
declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’
basic disclosure request. It states that names will be disclosed only after 3:00 pm on
election day.

Petitioners invoke their right to information and free access to documents as

guaranteed by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC is mandated to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees?

Held:
Yes. While the COMELEC did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose
the names of the nominees on Section 7 of RA 7941. While commanding the publication
and the posting in polling places of a certified list of participating party list groups,
nonetheless tells the COMELEC not to show or include the names of the nominees in
said certified list.

However, the Court agrees that the COMELEC has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party list groups. There is
absolutely nothing in RA 7941 that prohibits the COMELEC from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the “certified list” the names of party list
nominees. There is a need for voters to be informed about matters that have bearing in
their choice.
 Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
G.R No. 136781
October 6, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the
proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA
7941.

On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory,
wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is
filled up at all times.

Issue:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory?

Held:
No. It is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared
therein a policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions

participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than

three seats in the House of Representatives as stated under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
 Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC
G.R No. 147589
June 26, 2001

Facts:
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a
Petition praying that "the names of some of herein respondents be deleted from the
'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in
the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. On April 17, 2001,
Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, also challenging
COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,
the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents
named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May
15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations?

Held:
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may
do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to
numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals." However, it is not enough for the candidate to
claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation
is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial
unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with
the "marginalized or underrepresented."
 BANAT v. COMELEC
G.R No. 179271
April 21, 2009

Facts:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list election which
was held in May 2007.

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula
being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at
least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or
is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be
instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in
the “HELD” portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also
raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling?

Held:
No. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling –
meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total
number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.

The Court also provided the formulas for the computation of seats: for the 80-20
rule (Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives. The 2% rule should mean that if a party-
list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This
allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. In computing the
additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional
seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the
first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-
percenters is then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists.
 Lozada v. COMELEC
G.R No. L-59068
January 27, 1983

Facts:
The petition is to compel the COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing
vacancies numbering twelve in the Interim Batasang Pambansa which is based in
Section 5 (2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. It reads, “In case a vacancy arises in
the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the
Commission on Elections shall call a special election to be held within sixty days after
the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.”

COMELEC contends that the above provision does not apply to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa.

Issue:
Whether or not said provision applies to the Interim Batasang Pambansa?

Held:
No. Said provision applies only to the regular Batasang Pambansa. Section 5 (2)
of Article VIII of the Constitution is in the main body of said Constitution, not in the
transitory provisions in which all matters relating to the Interim Pambansa are found. No
provision outside of Article VIII on the “Transitory Provisions” has reference or relevance
to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

Moreover, the Interim National Assembly had only one occasion on which to call
for an election, and that is for the election of members of the regular National Assembly.
The foregoing observations make it indubitably clear that the above provision for calling
special elections to fill up vacancies apply only to the regular Batasan Pambansa. This is
evident from the language thereof which speaks of a “vacancy in the Batasan
Pambansa,” which means the regular Batasan Pambansa as the same words “Batasan
Pambansa” found in all the many other sections of Article VIII, undoubtedly refer to the
regular Batasan, not the interim one.
 Philconsa v. Mathay
G.R No. L-25554
October 4, 1966

Facts:
Philconsa filed a suit to enjoin the passing in audit of the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4134. It provides for the increase of salary of
Senators to and Members of the House of Representatives to Php32,000 and an
increase to Php40,000 in the salary of the Senate President and Speaker of the House.

Petitioner contends that the implementation of the law violates Section 14, Article
VI of the Constitution which provides that “No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and
House of Representatives approving such increase.”

In the case, the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, will expire only in December 30, 1969, while the term of the
members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on
December 30, 1965.

Issue:
Whether or not to implement RA 4134 before the expiration of the term of all
those who approved it, Senators and Members of the House, violates the Constitution?

Held:
Yes. The Constitution refers to “all the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives
that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the
difference in the terms of office. The fundamental consideration is that the terms of office
of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.

In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the increased
compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the
full term of all members of the Senate and the House that approved it in June 20, 1964
will have expired.
 Ligot v. Mathay
G.R No. L-34676
April 30, 1974

Facts:
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
1969. During his second term of office, RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional
officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted and took
effect in July 1, 1964. The salaries of the members of Congress were increased under
said Act form Php7,200 to Php32,000 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
Petitioner was re-elected for a third term but was held not entitled to the increase as held
in Philconsa v. Mathay. It upheld the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provides that “No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and
House of Representatives approving such increase.”

Petitioner lost his bid for a fourth term. He then applied for retirement.
Respondent, disallowed his retirement claims. Petitioner submits that it should not have
been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress “as provided by law” was already Php32,000 per annum.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the Php32,000 salary basis on his
retirement claims?

Held:
No. The rate of their retirement must be based on their salary as provided by law
during their term of office which is Php7,200. Increasing their retirement claim would
amount to paying them prohibited emoluments which in effect raise their salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. In
other words, to allow him to collect such amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies
logic.

To compute his retirement gratuity at the rate of Php32,000 per annum after the
expiration of his term of office would effectively give him the benefits of increased
compensation to which he was not entitled during his term, thereby violating the
constitutional prohibition against increased compensation of legislators during their term
of office.
 People v. Jalosjos
G.R No. 132875-76
February 3, 2000

Facts:
Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress who was confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge his duties as a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense.

His primary argument was that his re-election is the “mandate of sovereign will”.
He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. And that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Issue:
Whether or not Jalosjos may discharge his duties as Congressman despite his
criminal conviction?

Held:
No. The immunity of Congress from arrest and detention arises from a provision
in the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. It cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms or by intendment, implication, or equitable considerations.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rules as its

predecessors minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to
the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. While detainees are allowed emergency or
temporary leaves, what Jalosjos seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing him to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.

Moreover, despite Section 16 (2) of Article VI, members of Congress cannot

compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.

Lastly, Jalosjos was provided with an office in the New Bilibid Prison where he
attends to his constituents. Court held that election to a position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
 Trillanes IV v. Pimentel
G.R No. 179817
June 27, 2008

Facts:
On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the AFP stormed in the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. Pres.
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress it. In the aftermath of this
“Oakwood Incident”, Antonio Trillanes IV and his comrades were charged with coup d’
etat.

Around four years later, Trillanes, who has remained in detention, won a seat in
the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon of June 30, 2007. He filed an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests wherein he requested to be able to function as a senator despite his
detention. However, the trial court denied his request and so he filed this petition for
certiorari. Among others, he posits that his election provides the legal justification to
allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him
as Senator.

Issue:
Whether or not Trillanes may be allowed to exercise his functions as senator
despite his detention?

Held:
No. Charged with coup d’ etat which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, he shall
not be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. Contrary to petitioner’s argument that his request may be granted as he
has still not been convicted and further drawing comparisons with the Jalosjos case, the
Court ruled in People v. Hon. Maceda that “all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention”. These
limitations, however, must be taken in to account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement.

On his argument of election to the Senate as a justification, the Court ruled his
electoral victory signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
"they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison".

As ruled in Jalosjos, allowing Trillianes to attend sessions and committee

meetings will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position.
 Osmena v. Pendatun
G.R No. L-17144
October 28, 1960

Facts:
A special committee of fifteen members was created by a Resolution to
investigate the truth of the charges of bribery against the President of the Philippines
made by Sergio Osmena, Jr. in his privilege speech in June 1960, and for such purpose
it was authorized to summon Osmena to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as
well as to issue subpoena to require the attendance of witnesses and/or production of
pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so to require him to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House.

Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional

absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words
constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House
provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.

Osmena was found guilty of serious disorderly behavior and was suspended for fifteen
months by virtue of House Resolution 175.

Issue:
Whether or not Osmena may invoke parliamentary immunity in the case at bar?

Held:
No. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall
not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6,
clause 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision
has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.

The Constitution guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression

without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
 Jimenez v. Cabangbang
G.R No. L-15905
August 3, 1966

Facts:
The case is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and
Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. At the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense. It was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session,
and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It describes “three operational
plans”. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of
then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing
him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To
this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is
'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines. Plan No. II is said to be a "coup
d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning
stage. Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage
the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen.
Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an
effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian
support. Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.

Issue:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication?

Held:
No. Under the Constitution, the Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. Said expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time
of the performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not
belong to this category.

It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was

not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
 Adaza v. Pacana
G.R No. 68159
March 18, 1985

Facts:
Adaza was elected governor and Pacana as vice-governor of Misamis Oriental in
the 1980 elections. In 1984, both filed their respective certificates of candidacy for the
Batasan Pambansa elections. Adaza won while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of
office as Mambabatas Pambansa and started to perform its functions. Meanwhile,
Pacana assumed office as governor and took his oath before President Marcos a few
days after Adaza started his office in the Batasan Pambansa.

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza brought this
petition arguing that he was elected for a term of six years and remains the givernor until
it expires. He also contends that Pacana abandoned his position upon filing of his
candidacy in 1984.

Issue:
Whether or not Adaza may hold the offices of Mambabatas Pambansa and
governor simulataneously?

Held:
No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which states, “A
member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure,
except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet…”, the prohibition against a
member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or employment in the
government during his tenure is clear.

In the present case, there is no question that Adaza has taken his oath of office
as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In
light of the mentioned prohibition, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he
cannot now continue to occupy the same. Moreover, when Pacana reassumed the
position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within the
law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in
accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code.
 Liban v. Gordon
G.R No. 175352
July 15, 2009

Facts:
This is a petition to declare Senator Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the
Senate. During Gordon’s incumbency, he was elected Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC). Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship,
Gordon has ceased to be a member of the Senate as prohibited under Section 13 of
Article VI. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. According to Flores v. Drilon, incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.

Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he

was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected
in 2005. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is
neither an office nor an employment.

Issue:
Whether or not the office of PNRC Chairman is a government office for purposes
of prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution?

Held:
No. PNRC is a privately-owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organization. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. The PNRC is a
non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring
timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation. It is a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Convention of July 27, 1929. Moreover, the PNRC as member of the National Society of
the Movement has to be autonomous. Hence, it cannot be seen as government-owned
or controlled. Furthermore, the PNRC does not have government assets and does not
receive any appropriation from the Congress.

The office of PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive

branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. He is elected by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board, four-fifths of
which are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Philippine Government. Hence, he does not hold a government office or
employment.
 Liban v. Gordon
G.R No.175352
January 18, 2011

Facts:
Respondent Richard Gordon filed a motion for partial recommendation regarding
an earlier decision of the Supreme Court which ruled that his chairmanship in the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not warrant forfeiture in his Senatorial seat
and that the charter which created the PNRC was unconstitutional since the PNRC is a
private corporation which Congress cannot create. Gordon asserts that the issue of
constitutionality of the Charter creating PNRC was only touched upon in the issue of
locus standi. He furthers that such constitutionality will not be touched it is not the lis
mota of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for the Supreme Court to have ruled on the
constitutionality of the charter that created the PNRC.

Held:
No. In the present case, since the constitutionality was raised in the issue of
standing, the Court shall not have declared the provisions of such as unconstitutional. As
regards to the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis – it is apart from the private
corporations prohibited by the Constitution to be created by Congress for the following
reasons: (1) PNRC is not profit oriented; (2) the PNRC was created to participate in the
mitigation of war and its evil effects pursuant to the Geneva Conventions, and hence its
creation was made in compliance with the international treaty obligations; (3) the PNRC
is an auxiliary of the government, which is apart from GOCCs and government
instrumentalities.
 Avelino v Cuenco
G.R No L-2821
March 4, 1949

Facts:
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation
thereof. When the meeting was called to order, the roll was called to ensue. Before and
after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the
petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored him; and when after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being
previously recognized by him. At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the
Senate gallery. Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, moved
for adjournment of session. Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the
adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who
moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion
ensued. Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly
walked out of the session hall followed by his followers, while the rest of the senators
remained.
The remaining Senators proceeded with the session. Tañada was subsequently
recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68)
that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and
was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took
his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC
to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the petition.

Held:
No. The constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president,which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The
Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved
that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding
citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the
session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators
from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might
be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
 Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R No.127255
June 26, 1998

Facts:
Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Courts decision dated
August 14, 1997 in G.R No.127255, dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition
The present case involves the validity of RA 8420. In the conference committee report
on the bill that enacted RA 8420, Representative Arroyo alleges that when he asked,
"What is that, Mr. Speaker?", the Chair thereafter ignored him and approved the said
report. Petitioners seeks for rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's decision
dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition claim that the question "What is
that, Mr. Speaker?" was a privileged question or a point of order which, under the rules
of the House, and has precedence over other matters.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 8420 is valid

Held:
Yes. Upon the courts inquiry in the legislative journal and/or congressional
record, the court found that when Rep. Arroyo asked, "What is that,Mr. Speaker?" he did
not requested to be recognized. Hence, the Chair did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his
attention was on the Majority Leader. It is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was
ignored. He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the
Chair. Furthermore, even if the allegations were true, the disregard of internal rules of
procedure in this case would not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240.It is well settled rule
that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.

Furthermore, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due enactment. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on
the courts."
 Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
G.R No.L-25895
July 23, 1971

Facts:
Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed as Municipal Judge
of Pigcawayan, Cotabato and assumed office on September 11, 1964. As his
appointment, was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the
Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965 and was unanimously
confirmed. Then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition, through
the Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge,
the ground being that his appointment had been by- passed – he had not been duly
confirmed and as a consequence withheld his salary. Petitioner contends "that the power
to approve or disapprove appointments is conferred by the Constitution on the
Commission on Appointments as a body and not on the members individually. Petitioner
also seeks to compel Secretary of CoA to issue certificate of confirmation.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition would prevail.

Held:
Yes. A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative
requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session
and when it is in recess. In the former the President nominates, and only upon the
consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office.
It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The
individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title
to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is
effective "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." The constitutional requirement is clear. There must
either be a rejection by the Commission on Appointments or non-action on its part. No
such thing happened in this case. Petitioner, as pointed out, had instead in his favor a
unanimous vote of confirmation. He could thus invoke constitutional protection. The
Court ruled that petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation
prayed for by petitioner.
 Osmeña v. Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144
October 28, 1960

Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. Delivered his privilege speech befpre the
House of Representatives which made serious allegations of bribery charges against the
President Carlos Garcia of which eventually led to the passage of Resolution No. 59
which formed a special committee tasked to investigate the matter. Congressman
Salipada Pendatun along with other members of the House of Representatives found
Osmeña guilty of serious disorderly behaviour and sentenced him to a fifteen-month
suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not speeches attacking the President can be a ground for disorderly
conduct to warrant Osmeña’s disciplinary action.

Held:
Yes. The House of Representatives itself is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour of its members. This is so not just because of the Constitutional
mandate which empowers it, but also because of the fact that it is also they, themselves,
who may best judge the matter which is based on factual circumstances. The House has
the exclusive power and courts cannot interfere by virtue of the principle of separation of
powers.
 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R No.128055
April 18, 2001

Facts:
The present case arose from complaints filed by the employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago for alleged violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint
involved petitioner’s approval of the application for the legalization of various aliens,
such being a violation of EO No. 324 which prohibited the same. Two other criminal
cases were also filed against her, to wit: (1) violation of PD No. 46; and (2) libel cases
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The prosecution then filed a motion in the
Sandiganbayan to suspend Santiago. She then assailed the authority of the
Sandiganbayan in suspending her, a Senator, from any governmental position.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to issue Santiago’s
suspension.

Held:
Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to suspend petitioner is grounded with
legal support. Section 13 of RA 3079 authorizes Sandiganbayan to suspend any
incumbent public official for any offense involving fraud upon governments or public
funds or property whether as a simple or complex offense.
Furthermore, the order of suspension prescribed in RA 3079 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its members, as provided in Section 16, Article VI of the
Constitution, which warrants suspension due to disorderly behaviour. In RA 3079, the
suspension is a preventive measure and not a form of punishment likened to that of
Congress’ suspension powers.
 Mabanag v Lopez Vito
G.R. No. L-1123
March 5, 1947

Facts:
Petitioners include three members of the Senate and eight members of the
House of Representatives who were either suspended due to election irregularities and
were not allowed to take their seats in the Lower House except in the election of the
House Speaker. Petitioners argued that some members of both Houses were not
considered in determining the three-fourths vote requirement in order to pass the
enrolled bill which proposes Constitutional amendments. The votes had already been
entered into the journals of each house. Petitioners further contend that the results
would have been negative had they been allowed to vote since it would run short of the
¾ requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not the enrolled bill was duly enacted by Congress.

Held:
Yes. The Court is bound by a duly authenticated measure – such as the enrolled
bill – by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill should prevail
over those of the journals. Due enactment of a law may be proved in either (1) by the
journals or by published statutes, resolutions, and etc., (2) a copy of the act itself signed
by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof pursuant to Section 313 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210. The Court found no irregularities in the
journals and did not bother considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had
been introduced.
 Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R No.127255
August 14, 1997

Facts:
The present case involves the validity of RA 8420 amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. The said law was challenged by
Representative Joker Arroyo. Petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives,
brought this suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House

Held:
No. First, it is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e. Article VI,
Sections. 26-27. The Constitution provides that ―each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. The Court has no more power to
look into the internal proceedings of a House as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
Furthermore, the Court declared that the question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly, especially when a quorum is obviously present, for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963

Facts:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1,
1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. The Central Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the
procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee. Petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee following another
purchase. Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Although the Central
Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the
Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground
that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations
of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions that would exempt.
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should
be construed as "urea and formaldehyde"

Issue:
Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment
of the aforesaid margin fee.

Held:
No. Section 2, paragraph XVIII of RA 2069 provides that “urea formaldehyde for
the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.” The contention of Casco that that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and,
“formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and
“formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support
of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of
the bill before said House, by members thereof. The enrolled bill however used the term
“urea formaldehyde”.
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts.
The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and
formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system
— the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
 Astorga v. Villegas
G.R. No. L-23475
April 30, 1974

Facts:
On March 30, 1964, HouseBill 9266 was sent to the Senate House for its
concurrence. Senator Roxas amended the said Bill by suggesting that the City Engineer
should succeed in case the city Vice-mayor loses its capacity. On its second reading in
the Senate, considerable amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino.
Thereafter, the Senate approved the said housebill which contained the amendments of
Senator Tolentino. However, when the bill was sent to the President for approval, the
amendment attached was not of Tolentino. Outraged, Senator Tolentino issued a press
statement that the signed bill was void ab initio for it did not contain the amendments
made by him and approved by the Senate. The secretaries of both Houses as well as by
the presiding officers thereof stated that the bill passed was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no
effect.
Vice Mayor Astorga filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondents to
comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondents' refused to do so for the said RA
was void arguing that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself
should be decisive in the resolution of the Issue.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 4065 is a law?

Held:
No. Petitioner argues that the attestation of the bill was not mandatory and
absent of which will not affect the validity of the statute. The contention finds no merit.
Absence of attestation would require the Court to look into the journal to determine
whether or not the bill has been duly enacted. The journal of the proceedings of each
House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. The purpose of
which is not for Courts to incorporate the said amendments but for the sole reason of
declaring that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. Thus, the
court held in this case, that the said RA 4065 have not been duly enacted and therefore
did not become law.
 Morales v. Subido
G.R. No. L-29658
November 9, 1968

Facts:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of Brig.
Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of
police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same
position by the mayor of Manila. Respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo
Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure
to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position. Subido certified other persons qualified for the post amd called the attention of
the Mayor to fill in the vacancy. An announcement was made of the vacant position and
the qualified applicants in metropolitan newspapers. Morales demanded that Subido
include him in the list, he contends that his service alone as Captain for more than three
years in Manila Police Department qualified him for the appointment. The Mayor
endorsed the letters formally but Subido refused to reconsider.

Issue:
Whether or not a person who has served as captain in the police department of a
city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for
appointment as chief of police.

Held:
No. While Act 4864 or the Police Act of 1966 gives credit for service and allows it
to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police
agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of
police. It provides that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally
appointed chief of police provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational
qualification. The Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a
high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable requisite. Also, Section
10 is clear which requires both educational and service qualifications for appointment
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or
as chief of police is evident from rereading of the House Bill 6951. Citing the United
States Court decision in Marshall Field and Co. v. Clark, an enrolled bill is an official
attestation as passed by Congress and the President. Justice Frankfurter stressed out
that an omission at the time of enactment cannot be judicially supplied.
 Tañada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. 10520
February 28,1957

Facts:
Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed
by members of the Citizens Party who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party. The
senate was at the time composed of twenty three (23) members of Nacionalista Party
(NP) and one (2) of Citizen’s Party (CP). When SET was being organized, Sen. Tanada,
in behalf of the CP, nominated himself alone. Senator Primidas, a member of the NP,
then nominated Senators Delgado and Cuenco in the mandate of Article 6, Section 11 of
the 1935 Constitution – "There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having
the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of
votes therein." Over the objection of Senator Tanada, Senators Delgado and Cuenco
were chosen to sit in the SET. Senator Tanada now contests them in Court.
Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as the
issue is a political question and not judicial.

Issue:
Whether or not the case involves a political question.

Held:
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case.
Here, the court is called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination
by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number
of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in
the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not
clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
 Bondoc v. Pineda
G.R. No. 97710
September 26, 1991

Facts:
In the congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rivals
for the position of representative of the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and upon recounting of votes, Bondoc was proclaimed as the winner.
Congressman Juanito Camasura of LDP and member of HRET revealed to
Congressman Conjuangco the LDP Secretary General that he voted for Bondoc
“consistent with truth, justice, and self-respect,” and to honor “gentleman’s agreement,”
this caused a rift among the group. On the day of the promulgation of the Bondoc
decision, Cong. Conjuangco through a letter informed Cong. Camasura that he was
expelled and Cong. Bautista for allegedly helping organize Partido Pilipino and inviting
LDP members to join said group. A letter was sent to chairman of HRET Justice Herrera
informing the tribunal of the letter given to Cong. Camasura, and the LDP’s withdrawal of
nomination and rescind the election of the latter to the HRET.

Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at request of the dominant political
party, can change the party’s representation in HRET?

Held:
No, HRET was created to function as a non-partisan court. It is an independent
and impartial tribunal for the determination of contest to a legislative office. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission, the tribunal may not be inferred by the judiciary when acting
within the limits of its authority but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Tribunal for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant of power. The independence of the HRET and its proceedings shall
be in force if the HOR or majority power may shuffle and manipulate the political
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interest of the party in power. The
removal of Cong. Camasura impairs HRET’s prerogative as sole judge of election
protest. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in HRET.
 Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 83767
October 7, 1988

Facts:
On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed a case against twenty two (22) Senators of
the PDP LABAN Coalition. Thereafter, on November 17, 1987, the said petitioners filed a
motion for disqualification against Senators-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents
therein. The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification.
Petitioners seek that only the three justices of the Tribunal should hear the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the Senate-Members of the SET should be disqualified from
hearing the said case?

Held:
No, the petition finds no merit. It has been laid down in Article VI, Section 17 of
the Constitution that the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be staffed by both Justices of
the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate. It is a clear intent of the Constitution
that SET should compose of "judicial" and "legislative" components to commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. Excluding the "legislative component" will violate the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. The three Justices-Members cannot alone have the power of
adjudicating a senatorial election contest.
 Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R No.141489
November 29, 2002

Facts:
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party list system in
the House of Representatives through election of the people. On March 3, 1995, the
Party-List System Act took effect, which sought to promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives through the party list system. In accordance with the Act,
on the May 11, 1998 elections, fourteen party-list representatives from thirteen
organizations where proclaimed winners. The House constituted its HRET and CA
contingent without party-list groups. Senator Pimentel Jr wrote a letter to Chairman of
the CA, Senator Blas Ople and Chairman of HRET Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court Justice Melo to restructure the CA and HRET pursuant to Section 17 and 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed an action against HRET and CA and
its chairman and members for failure to positively act of Senator Pimentel’s letter, and
such a grave abuse of discretion. They contend that party-list representatives should be
given 1.4 or at least 1 seat in HRET, and 2.4 seats in CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the refusal of HRET and CA to reconstitute themselves to include
party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
No, the Constitution expressly grants to the HOR the prerogative to choose
among its district and party-list representatives who may occupy the seats allowed to the
House in the HRET and CA. Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution expressly
confers on the Senate and on the HOR the authority to elect among their members
those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators, and 12 seats for HOR in the CA. Section
17, Article VI allows each chamber to choose who among their members would occupy
the allotted seats in HRET. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to
the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the Court. Only if
the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation after party list representatives show to the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in HRET and CA.
 Sampayan v. Daza
G.R. No. 103903
September 11, 1992

Facts:
On April 6, 1992, Residents of the second Congressional District of Northern
Samar seek to disqualify respondent Congressman Raul Daza on the ground that he is a
green card holder and a resident of the United States. Petitioners filed a disqualification
case before the COMELEC on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and on the grounds of unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30,
1987 until June 30, 1992.
Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a
permanent resident of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his
status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that it has no jurisdiction to decide the case at bar.
First, the instant case is moot and academic; the term of Daza as member of Congress
commenced on June 30, 1987 and would end on June 30, 1992, the case was filed by
petitioners on April 6, 1992, two months before Daza’s term would expire. Hence, a writ
of prohibition can no longer be issued since Daza’s term was about to expire. Second,
the jurisdiction of this case rightfully belongs to the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET),it is
the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of its members.. The proper remedy should have been a petition filed with
the Commission on Elections to cancel Daza’s certificate of candidacy, or a quo
warranto case filed with the HRET within ten days from Daza’s proclamation.
 Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265
September 18, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Move Makati, a
duly registered political party and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD filed
a petition to disqualify Aquino for failure to qualify the residence requirement as stated in
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Aquino stated that he only resided in
Makati for ten months. The day after the filing of the disqualification case, Aquino
amended his certificate of candidacy stating that he had resided for one year and
thirteen days in Makati. The amendment took place on April 25, 1995 and by May 6,
1995, COMELEC dismissed the case. The next day, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On May 8, 1995, the elections were held and Aquino
won the seat. Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Contedeum to suspend
Proclamation which was granted by COMELEC. Aquino contested the suspension of
proclamation stating that the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the
elections is lodged exclusively with HRET. On June 2, 1995, COMELEC En Banc
declared Aquino ineligible.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC can take cognizance over the case.

Held:
Yes. According to Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the electoral
tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of candidates only when they become members of either houses. A
candidate who has not been proclaimed or have not yet taken his oath of office cannot
be members of the House. While the proclamation of a winning candidate is ministerial,
Section 6 of RA 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances
mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election
and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon
the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue
to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates and may continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
 Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC
G.R No.172131
April 2, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and private respondent Renato Unico were
candidates for the congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2014
elections. Petitioner alleges that there were manifest errors during the canvassing of
election returns. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) gave petitioner twenty four
hours (24) hours to prove her allegations. However, before the deadline was about to
expire, MBC concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its
canvass to the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Petitioner then filed a case before the
COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc which COMELEC dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction

Held:
No, the contention of petitioner has no merit. The court held that a proclaimed
candidate who is about to assume office as member of the HOR, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Furthermore, if the Court and COMELEC
take cognizance of petitioner’s election protest against respondent Unico would be to
seize the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.Petitioner Chato's remedy
would have been to file an election protest before the said tribunal, not a petition for
certiorari in this court.
 Bello v. COMELEC
G.R No.191998
December 7, 2010

Facts:
Three (3) consolidated special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition were filed in aim of disqualifying respondent Juan Miguel "Mikey" Arroyo as
the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP). Petitioners argued that not only
must the party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized and the
underrepresented; the nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Arroyo counter-
argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over issues involving the qualifications of
party-list nominees; Section 9 of RA 7941 merely requires that the party-list nominee
must be a bona de member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent;
and that the case should be dismissed since the National Board of Canvassers already
proclaimed Arroyo as AGPP's duly-elected party-list representative.

Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over petitions.

Held:
No. In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPP's first nominee, has
already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, following the decision laid down by the Supreme Court in
Abayon and Perez cases, the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and
that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo's
qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.
 Vilando v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R No.192147
August 23, 2011

Facts:
In the 2017 elections, Private Respondent Limkaichong won over Olivia Paras in
the congressional race of the First Disctrict of Negros Oriental. Petitions for
disqualifications where filed against her questioning her citizenship for which the HRET
consolidated as they all challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent.
Petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong's
citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization
certificate of Julio Sy (father of Limkaichong). For her defense, Limkaichong claimed that
the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack. HRET
dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the inquiry to Julio Sy’s naturalization certification is a collateral
attack.

Held:
Yes. In this instant petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the
ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the
alleged nullity of the naturalization of Henry Sy which, however, HRET is not allowed to
permit such act as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Limkaichong’s father. In the court’s jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Clearly, under law and jurisprudence,
it is the State, that may question the illegality of certificate of naturalization and is plainly
not a matter that may be raised by private persons.
 Angara v Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas in the September 17, 1395
election. Petitioner was proclaimed to be a member-elect of the National Assembly by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Resolution No. 8 was issued by the National
Assembly confirming the election of petitioner Angara. Thereafter, Ynsua filed a “Motion
of Protest” before the Electoral Commission against the election of Angara and prayed
that the said petition be nullified. Angara then filed a motion to dismiss the protest
contending that the protest was filed after the deadline set forth by the National
Assembly; however, the Electoral Commission denied his motion. Hence, petitioner filed
a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking
cognizance against the election of Angara contending among other things that the
Electoral Commission has no jurisdiction and power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests as it solely belongs to the National Assembly.

Issue:
WON the Electoral Commission can take cognizance in the said election protests

Held:
Yes. The 1935 Constitution abrogated the Jones law and in the present
constitution, the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the elective
members of the National Assembly belongs to the Electoral Commission. The Supreme
Court upheld therefore that in the present case, the Electoral Commission was acting in
its capacity in assuming jurisdiction over the protest filed by respondent Ynsua against
the election of petitioner Angara. Also, contrary to the contentions of Angara, the
National Assembly cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to
its constitutional power to fix the time for the filling of said election protests.
 Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 84297
December 8, 1988

Facts:
In the 1987 elections, Lazatin was proclaimed Congressman-elect over Timbol
for the 1st district of Pampanga. Timbol filed an election protest which summarily, did not
meet success leading him to file with the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). Lazatin moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that it had been filed late
under BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). However, HRET ruled that the filling was
on time in accordance with HRET rules. Lazatin now comes to the Court averring that
HRET does not have jurisdiction of the protest filed because it has not acquired the
same, the protest having been filed out of time under BP 881.

Issue:
Whether or not HRET have the jurisdiction over the filed election protest.

Held:
Yes, the Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence,
the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House
of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its
jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute.
Applying the doctrine of implication, the rule-making power of HRET necessarily flows
from the general power granted it by the Constitution. The use of the word "sole"
emphasizes that it is the intent of the framers that HRET has the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred to it.
 Daza v. Singson
G.R. No. 86344
December 21, 1989

Facts:
After the Congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
apportioned 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments among several political
parties in accordance with Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul Daza
was a member of the Commission on Appointments representing the Liberal Party. With
the organization of the LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some congressional
members belonging to the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the LDP. When
the Commission on Appointments were reorganized, petitioner was replaced by an LDP
representative. Petitioner contends that the organization of the LDP cannot affect the
composition of the Commission on Appointments because LDP is not a registered party
and has not yet shown the stability of a party.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is a justiciable question and Wheter or not HOR can
reorganize its composition in the CA.

Held:
Yes. The question before the present case is justiciable for the issue is one of
legality and not of wisdom. The ascertainment of the manner of forming the Commission
on Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the parties to designate their
representatives. And even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
under the expanded power of review in Article VIII, Section 1.
Moreover, HOR can reorganize its composition in the CA to reflect at any time
the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
 Coseteng v. Mitra
G.R. No. 86649
July 12, 1990

Facts:
When Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized forming the new
majority in the House of Representatives, the house representation in Commission on
Appointments (CA) had to be reorganized. CA was subsequently composed of eleven
(11) members from the LDP, one from Liberal Party (LP) and another from Kilusan ng
Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Petitioner Congresswoman Anna Coseteng, the only member of
the Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA) party in the house, contested the validity
of their election to the CA on the theory that their election was violative of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. She also argues that the members
representing the political parties must be nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. She alleges futher that she is qualified to sit in the CA having the
support of nine (9) other house representatives of the minority.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA election is in violation of Article 6 section 18

Held:
No, the contention of Cong. Coseteng lacks merit. The composition of the House
membership in CA was based on the correct application of Article 6 section 18. There
are one hundred sixty (160) members of the LDP in the House. They represent 80% of
the house membership which entitles them to ten (10) seats. The remaining two seats
were apportioned to the LP the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL
as the principal opposition party in the House. Coseteng’s argument that the members
representing the political parties must be nominated and elected by their respective
political parties is of no merit for the Constitution provides that they be elected by the
House and not by their party. Furthermore, to be able to claim proportional membership
in the CA, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership. In
this case, Coseteng only represents less than 1%; she cannot be entitled to a seat in
CA.
 Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R No. 106971
October 20, 1992

Facts:
This is a petition to prohibit Senators Romulo and Taňada from sitting and
assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to prohibit
Senator Gonzales from recognizing and allowing Romulo and Taňada to sit as members
thereof.

As a result of the 1992 national elections, the senate was composed of 15 senators from
LDP, 5 from NPC, 3 from LAKAS-NUCD and 1 from LP-PDP-LABAN. Since Commission
on Appointment needed 12 representatives from each houses, Senate and House of
Representative, the parties mentioned earlier agreed to use the following traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.
The results of which is as follows: 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.

At the organization of the Senate, Romulo, as the majority floor leader, in behalf
of LDB, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that
Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. Such
nomination was objected by Guingona, Jr. To resolve the issue, Tolentino proposed a
compromise with elected members consisting of 8 LDP, 1 LP-PDP-LABAN, 2 NPC and 1
LAKAS-NUCD. However, Guingona, Jr. filed this petition as it is a violation of the rule of
proportional representation and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the
Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to combine their fractional representation in the
Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who, among
the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.

Issue:
Whether or not the election of Senators Romulo and Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the membership of Romulo and Tañada in the
Commission on Appointments is not in accordance with Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. It is not in compliance with the requirements of proportional
representation of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that a political party must have at least 2 elected
senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, where there are 2 or
more political parties represented in the Senate, a political party with a single senator in
the Senate cannot validly claim a seat in the Commission on Appointments. It is not
mandatory to elect 12 senators to the Commission on Appointments, what the
Constitution requires is that there must be at least a majority of the entire membership.
 Drilon v. De Venecia
G.R No. 180055
July 31, 2009

Facts:
In August 2007, the Senate and House of Representatives (HoR) elected their
respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments. The contingent of the
Senate for the Commission on Appointments is composed of 1 KAMPI, 1 UNO, 3 Lakas-
CMD, 2 PMP, 1 NPC, 1 LP, and 1 PRP; while for House of Representatives is 6 Lakas-
CMD, 2 KAMPI, 3 NPC, and 1 CIBAC Party List.

Due to non-representation of Liberal Party to the contingent, in the 2nd week of August,
petitioners requested Speaker De Venecia to consider putting 1 more seat for the Liberal
Party since they are entitled to such by having 20 elected members in the HoR. This
request was reiterated on the case filed by Drilon on behalf of the Liberal Party, which
was later withdrawn due to its mootness when Umali, Jr. from Mindoro was added to the
contingent of HoR to the Commission on Appointments.

In the meantime, Senator Madrigal, on another petition, claimed that the composition of
the Senate and HoR in the Commission on Appointments violated the Constitutional
requirement of proportional representation. Senator Villlar, however, commented that
Madrigal failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort wherein each
House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the composition of
its own contingent to the Commission on Appointments.

Issue:
Whether or not Madrigal’s petition is valid.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because in the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction it is necessary that prior recourse to the respective House of Congress is
made before she may bring her petition to court. Furthermore, her petition involves
question of fact which the Court has no jurisdiction, since it would entail the
determination of party affiliations of a number of senators named in her petition.
 Bautista v. Salonga
G.R No. 86439
April 13, 1989

Facts:
On 27 August 1987, President Aquino designated Mary Concepcion Bautista as
"Acting Chairman” of Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Realizing perhaps the need
for a permanent chairman and members of the CHR, befitting an independent office, as
mandated by the Constitution, the President on December 17, 1988 extended Bautista’s
office as a “Permanent Chairman” of the CHR. Pursuant with that, on December 22,
1988, Bautista took her oath of office and immediately acted as such.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requested

Bautista‘s presence along with several documents. However, Bautista refused on the
said request and sent a letter to the Secretary stating the reason why she considered
them without jurisdiction on her appointment. Hence, the Commission on Appointments
disapproved her “ad interim appointment” as the Chairman of the CHR.

On January 20, 1989, or even before Commission on Appointments had acted on her
"ad interim appointment,” Bautista filed with this Court a petition with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a restraining order and to declare "as unlawful and
unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the Commission on
Appointments regarding her extended appointments.

While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman” of the CHR but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because
of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post.

Issue:
Whether the President's appointment of Bautista is considered constitutional.

Held:
Yes. The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon
her by the Constitution, that she appoint executive officials. The second sentence of the
provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to
appoint, without confirmation of Commission of Appointments, several government
officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the
appointments which are to be made with the confirmation, hence, it follows that the
appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even
without the review or participation of Commission on Appointments. Bautista's
appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the
day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly
stated in her oath.
 Sarmiento v. Mison
G.R No. 79974
December 17, 1987

Facts:
Sarmiento seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the
Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary
of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment is unconstitutional on
the ground that the appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointment
for approval. Sarmiento noted that under the Constitution, the appointments made for
the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from Commission on Appointments.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Mison made by the President without the
confirmation from Commission on Appointments is valid.

Held:
Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, appointments of “Heads of Bureau” need not
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

The Constitution only provides four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:

 Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or

consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain,
and Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this
Constitution;
 All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;
 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first circumstance is the only instance which clearly expressed by the Constitution
where the appointment made by the President requires approval from the Commission
on Appointments.

Since the President’s power to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
devolves from Section 201 of Republic Act No. 1937:Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, as amended by PD No. 34, the appointment of Mison falls on the third
instances above. Hence, approval of the Commission on Appointments is no longer
needed and his appointment is therefore valid.
 Powers of Congress
Concept
Gonzales vs Hechanova 63 Phil 139

One Subject Rule

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory 151 SCRA 208
Commission
PHILCONSA v. Gimenez 15 SCRA 479
Lidasan v. COMELEC 21 SCRA 496
Chiongbian v. Orbos G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
Mariano v. COMELEC 242 SCRA 211
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
Tobias v. Abalos G.R. No. 114783 December 8, 1984
Lacson v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
Farinas v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003
Cawaling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319 October 26, 2001
Giron v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188179 January 22, 2013
Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Original Bills; Three Readings

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
Alvarez v. Guingona 252 SCRA 695
Arroyo v. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
Arroyo v. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998

Approval of Bills; Veto

Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. 11 SCRA 486
Valencia
Gonzalez v. Macaraig 191 SCRA 452
Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez 235 SCRA 506

Appropriation
TESDA v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 196148 February 10, 2015
COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla G.R. No. 151992 September 22, 2002
Araullo v. Aquino III G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566 November 11, 2013
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works 110 Phil 331
aaand Communications
Guingona v. Carague 196 SCRA 221
Garcia v. Mata 65 SCRA 520
Araullo v. Aquino III G.R. No. 209287 February 3, 2015
Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 Phil 201
Garces v. Estenzo 105 SCRA 510
Manosca v. CA G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996
Taxation
Lladoc v. CIR 14 SCRA 292
Province of Abra v. Hernando 107 SCRA 104
Abra Valley College v. Aquino 162 SCRA 106

Legislative Investigation and Question Hour

Miguel v. Gordon G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006
Philcomsat Holdings Corp. v. Senate G.R. No. 180308 June 19, 2002
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon 203 SCRA 767
Committee
Arnault v. Nazareno 87 Phil. 29
Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil. 358
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Standards Chartered Bank v. Senate G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
Committee on Banks
Neri v. Senate Committee on G.R. No. 180643 March 28, 2008
Accountability and Public Officers and
Investigations

Board of Canvassers in Election of President/Vice-President

Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines G.R. No. 163556 June 8, 2004
Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress G.R. No. 163783 June 22, 2004
 Gonzales v. Hechanova
G.R No. L-21897
October 22, 1963

Facts:
President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma, during his incumbency, for the importation of rice without complying
with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council
confirming that there is a shortage in cereals or rice in the country.

Pursuant to the agreements, Executive Secretary RufinoHechanova authorized

the importation of 67 thousand tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Hence, Ramon Gonzales, President of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed that the executive agreements were not valid and Hechanova’s
action as without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because Republic Act no. 3452
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency.

Issue:
Whether or not Gonzales contention is meritorious.

Held:
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce and
administer laws enacted by Congress. They may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of veto power of the President.

Hence, the President may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of
conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall
prevail, but this is not applicable to this case as Hechanova insists that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties but merely an “executive agreements”.

Hence, the executive agreements were not valid since no such justification can
be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
 Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Commission
G.R No. L-75697
June 18, 1987

Facts:
In 1985, Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the Videogram Regulatory
Board to regulate and supervise the videogram industry in the country. The said law
sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy specially its adverse effects to the
movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms
are to be taxed. Hence, Section 10 of the said Presidential Decree imposes a 30% tax
on the gross receipts of all entities engaging in videogram-related business, which is
payable to their respective Local Government Units.

In 1986, Valentin Tio, as a businessman affected by the said decree, assailed

that Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1987 is unconstitutional on the ground that it
is is not germane to the subject matter of the law, hence it is only a rider.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 10 of the Presidential Decree No. 1987 is a rider.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the Constitutional requirement that “every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.

In this case, the questioned provision, Section 10, is allied and germane to, and
is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board, as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms provided all throughout the statute.
 PHILCONSA v. Gimenez
G.R No. L-23326
December 18, 1965

Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assailed the validity of
Republic Act 3836: An Act Amending Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended by Republic Act. 3096, as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of
vacation and sick leave of Senators and Representatives.

According to PHILCONSA, the provisions on retirement gratuity and vacation and

sick leave are attempts to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of
the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. PHILCONSA also averred that the said provisions
constitute “selfish class legislation.” Further, they contended that provision for the
retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title
of the bill. They noted that the title does not give any inkling or notice to the public about
the said retirement gratuities and privileges.

The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, contented however that the grant of
retirement or pension benefits to the officers does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution; that the law in question does not constitute class legislation; and that the
payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits is merely “in the nature of a
basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an
indirect scheme to increase their salary; and that title of the law in question sufficiently
complies with the provisions of the Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”.

Issue:
Whether or not the title of Republic Act 3836 sufficiently complies with the
Constitutional requirement regarding the subject and title of a bill or statute.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the title is not requires to be an index of the
contents of the act or law. It is sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject, and all provisions of the statute is germane to that subject.

In this case, It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the
section 12 (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), who have rendered at
least 20 years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to
the subject of Commonwealth Act 186. However, the succeeding paragraph of Republic
Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers who are not members
of the GSIS. Hence, to provide retirement benefits, for these said officials, would relate
to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words,
the portion of the amendment regarding retirement benefits for Members of Congress
and elected officers is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act
186 establishing the GSIS and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits
to its members.
 Lidasan v. COMELEC
G.R No. L-28089
October 25, 1967

Facts:
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. On June 18, 1966, Republic
Act 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao
del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan, however discovered that certain barrios located in
Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to Republic Act 4790.

Pursuant to this law, Commission on Election (COMELEC) proceeded to

establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then
filed a petition to nullify Republic Act 4790 as it is in violation of the Constitution. He
averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would
be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

Issue:
Whether or not Lidasan’s argument is meritorious regarding Republic Act 4790’s
title in relation to the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

Held:
Yes. In determining sufficiency of particular title, its substance rather than its
form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving
notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that Republic Act 4790 is unconstitutional.
The title of the act did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the
law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. The title kept
the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill
that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province.
 Chiongbian v. Orbos
G.R No. 96754
June 22, 1995

Facts:
Pursuant to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution, Congress passed Republic
Act 6734 entitled “the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)”, which called for a plebiscite to be held in the following provinces: Basilan,
Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan,
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and
Zamboanga del Sur; and the following cities: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa, and Zamboanga.

On the said plebiscite, only 4 provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, which therefore became the ARMM.
However, provisions of Republic Act 6734 states that provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions. With this provision, President Aquino issued
Executive Order 429, “Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Mindanao.”

Hence this petition.Chiongbian, contended that Article XIX, Section 13 of Republic Act
6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge by administrative determination the existing
regions or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and
(2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

Issue:
Whether or not the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute.

Held:
Yes. The constitutional requirement that “every bill shall be passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof”
has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not
required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to the subject, such as the
reorganization of the remaining administrative regions.
Certainly, in this case, the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions
is germane to the general subject of Republic Act 6734, which is the establishment of
the ARMM.
 Mariano v. COMELEC
G.R No. 187167
July 16, 2011

Facts:
The petition assailed certain provisions of Republic Act 7854 as unconstitutional.
Republic Act 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.

Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with other residents of Taguig

assailed that Sections 2, 51 and 52 of Republic Act 7854 as unconstitutional on ground:
1. That Section 2 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating
sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. That Section 51 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will
allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms
as allowed by the Constitution; and
3. That Section 52 which adds another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law and it
was not expressed in the title of the bill.

Another petition which contended the constitutionality of the same Act was also
filed by Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 52 is unconstitutional as it is not express in the title of
Republic Act 7854.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court did not find merit in petitioners' contention that the
creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated
in the title of the bill. Citing the case of Tobias v. Abalos, the Supreme Court reiterated
the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so
as not to impede legislation. Also, the Constitution does not command that the title of a
law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it
should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
 Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
G.R No. 124360
November 5, 1997

Facts:
In liberalization and deregulation of the downstream oil industry in order to
ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous
supply of environmentally-clean and high-quality petroleum products, the government
created laws to accommodate innovations in the oil industry. One of such law is the
Republic Act 8180 entitled “Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996”. This law allows
that “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same
for his own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Tatad, the petitioner, seeks annulment of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 8180
which says that starting with the effectivity of the Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and
collected on imported crude oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined petroleum
products at the rate of 7%, except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same
as that for imported crude oil. He claimed that the imposition of different tariff rates
violates the equal protection clause and violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its
title.
.

Issue:
Whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title, one subject requirement of the
Constitution.

Held:
No. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute
details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.

Hence, in this case, Section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of Republic Act 8180 which is to achieve fair prices and adequate and
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products.
 Tobias v. Abalos
G.R No. 114783
December 8, 1984

Facts:
This petition assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 7675, otherwise known
as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong

and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became an act on February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April
10, 1994 for the approval of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting
population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of
these results, Republic Act 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Hence, this petition. Tobias contended that Republic Act 7675 contravenes the
"one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution.
He alleged that the inclusion of Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Further, Tobias contended that the said
Act violates Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 7675 contravenes Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been
liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation. Hence, the said act should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. In construing the said constitutional
provision, it should be noted that it should be a sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to that general subject.
 Lacson v. Executive Secretary
G.R No. 128096
January 20, 1999

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the KuratongBaleleng gang were
slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).

A member of the Criminal Investigation Command stated that what actually

transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the KuratongBaleleng
gang members and the ABRITG. Hence, Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against the petitioner, charged as
principal, and petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner
was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. However, pending
resolution of their motions, Republic Act 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused”.
Hence, petitioner questions the constitutionality Republic Act 8249 since the title of the
law is misleading as it contains innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually
expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law thereby violating the one-title-
one-subject requirement under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 8249 is in violation of one subject, one title rule of
the Constitution.

Held:
No. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of
the Constitution. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because
such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill
must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is severally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with
such requirement, since the title of Republic Act 8249 expresses the general subject and
all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2,
Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
 Farinas v. Executive Secretary
G.R No. 147387
December 10, 2003

Facts:
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code states that any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of Republic Act 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections
Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA

9006 constitutes a proscribed rider as its provision is not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Republic Act 9006.

Issue:
Whetheror not Section 14 of Republic Act 9006 is a rider.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the title and the objectives of Republic Act
9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of
the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the
RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule."

It was held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
 Cawaling v. COMELEC
G.R No. 146319
October 26, 2001

Facts:
On August 16, 2000, President Estrada signed into law Republic Act 8806, an
"Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
in the Province of Sorsogon, and appropriating Funds therefor." On December 16, 2000,
COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and
submitted the matter for ratificationOn December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, Cawaling filed the present petition
for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite. He also instituted another petition
declaring Republic Act 8806 unconstitutional, contending that the creation of Sorsogon
City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution); and that Republic
Act 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and
the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one
subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue:
Wether or not Republic Act 8806 violates the "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

Held:
No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation
of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and
distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
 Giron v. COMELEC
G.R No. 188179
January 22, 2013

Facts:
In this case, Henry Giron assailed the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution
of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act 9006, otherwise
known as the “Fair Election Act”.

Giron asserted that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires:
“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.” He averred that these provisions are unrelated to the main
subject of the Fair Election Act which is the lifting of the political ad ban.

Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates
after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of
Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of the Omnibus Election Code. Section
67 of the said Code is concern about the ipso facto resignation of elective officials
immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other
than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.

Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title”
rule.

Held:
No. The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason
that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the
Fair Election Act. Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for
the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be
an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have
not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
 Imbong v. Ochoa
G.R No. 204819
April 8, 2014

Facts:
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, Republic Act 10354, otherwise known
as the “Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)”, was
enacted on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield
the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces numerous controversy,
as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the ground that RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to
religious freedom, equal protection clause, and involuntary servitude of the people. They
also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. Aside from their
substantive arguments, petitioners also argued the constitutionality of the RH Law based
on the procedural issue such as issues on actual case or controversy, facial challenge,
locus standi, declaratory relief and one subject, one title rule.

Issue:
Whether or not RH Law violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
prescribing the one subject-one title rule, as it violates the constitutional standards of
due process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.

Held:
No. It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth. Considering the close intimacy
between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R No. 115455
August 25, 1994

Facts:
Arturo Tolentino are questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that
this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution and even though it originated as
House Bill 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the House of Representatives, the
same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred
to the Senate Ways & Means Committee and thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630, hence violating Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.

Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend the House Bill
approved by the House of Representatives by striking out its text and substituting it with
the text of Senate Bill 1630, hence it that way the bill remains a bill originated from the
lower house and the Senate version just becomes the text of the said bill.

Issue:
Whether or not the EVAT law is in violation of Sections 24 and 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which
is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. To
insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also
to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the
two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

With regards to Section 26(2), the phrase "except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it
has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice.
Therefore, contentions of the petition have no merit.
 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R No. 115455
October 30, 1995

Facts:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the
petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act
7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.

Some of the petitioners reiterated previous claims made by them that R.A. No.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art.
VI, §24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House
of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the
Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means
Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved
on May 24, 1994.

The fallacy in thinking that House Bill 11197 and Senate Bill 1630 are distinct and
unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' contention that because the
President separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these
measures, his certification was ineffectual and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the EVAT law is in violation of Sections 24 and 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution.

Held:
No. The history of this provision on Section 24 does not support the petitioner’s
contention. Article VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," but it also adds, that "the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments." Hence, in the exercise of this power,
the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.

With regards to the presidential certification, the certification had to be made of

the version of the same revenue bill which at the moment was being considered.
Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify
as many bills as are presented in a house of Congress even though the bills are merely
versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at
the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. In addition, if in all cases
three readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form
before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the
occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address.
Hence, the Supreme Court, at any rate, were satisfied that Senate Bill 1630 received
thorough consideration in the Senate where it was discussed for six days. Otherwise,
sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading
and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate
on third reading.
 Alvarez v. Guingona
G.R No. 118303
January 31, 1996

Facts:
In April 1993, House Bill 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago” was
passed in the House of Representatives.

In May 1993, a Senate Bill 1243 of similar title and content with that of House Bill
8817 was introduced in the Senate.

In January 1994, the House Bill was, then, transmitted to the Senate. In February
1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on said Senate Bill. In March 1994, the
Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of
House Bill 8817 as it was totally the same with Senate Bill 1243. Eventually, it became a
law known as Republic Act 7720.

In this petition, Alvarez are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City
of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20 million per annum in
order for it to be a city. In the computation of the reported average income of P20.97
million, the Internal Revenue Allotments was included which should not be.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 7720 is invalid for not being originated from House
of Representatives.

Held:
No. The contention of petitioner is untenable because it cannot be denied that
House Bill 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before Senate Bill 1243
was filed in the Senate. The filing of House Bill 8817 was thus precursive not only of the
said Act in question but also of Senate Bill 1243. Thus, House Bill 8817, was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act 7720.
Hence, no violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
under the circumstances.

Furthermore, the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its

receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement
that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
 Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R No. 127255
August 14, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill 7198. This bill
was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September
16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
conference committee submitted its report to the House on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was
interpellated.

In the course of interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise
a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioner contended that Republic Act 8240 is null and void on the ground that it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House; that the certification of Speaker De Venecia
that the law was properly passed is false and spurious and that Chairman, in the
process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 8240 can be nullified by the court on the ground that
it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court noted that the challenge to the validity of the enactment
of Republic Act 8240 was premised on alleged violations of the internal rules of
procedure of the House of Representatives rather than of constitutional requirements.
Based on jurisprudence,both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny
to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. Citing Osmea v.
Pendatun, it was held that at any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them and it has been said that parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
 Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R No. 127255
June 26, 1998

Facts:
In this case, petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Court's
decision dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition (related on the 1997
decision on the same case).

Basically, their contention is that when the Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano)
moved for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that became
Republic Act 8240, leading the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there was
any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo asked, "What is that, Mr.
Speaker?", the Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved.

Petitioners claimed that the question "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" was a
privileged question or a point of order which, under the rules of the House, has
precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to adjourn.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition has merit.

Held:
No. The contention has no merit. Rep. Arroyo did not have floor. Without first
drawing the attention of the Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result,
the Chair did not hear him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority
Leader's motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved.

Also, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this
case would not affect the validity of Republic Act 8240, the rules allegedly violated being
merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements
for the enactment of laws. It is well settled that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.
 Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia
G.R No. L-20740
June 30, 1964

Facts:
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc.
They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating
even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued
operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his
department.

Issue:
Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that Valencia failed to show that any right of his has
been violated by the refusal of the petitioners to cease operation. Further, the Supreme
Court noted that the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence,
since there was no appropriation allotted, there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and
they cannot claim damages therefrom.

Also, provided that the president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such
veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation
or item in the appropriation bill. It should be noted that the executive’s veto power does
not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no
effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains.
 Gonzales v. Macaraig
G.R No. 87636
November 19, 1990

Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186 or the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for the Fiscal Year 1989. It eliminated/decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. The GAB was signed into
law (Republic Act 6688) by the President who vetoed 7 special provisions and Section
55, a general provision. Senate, thru Senate Resolution No. 381 then declared the veto
as unconstitutional and void and upheld the validity of Section 55. Gonzales, together
with other 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of President Aquino’s veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill, and subsequently of its counterpart Section
16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill. They averred that the President’s line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision, therefore,
she exceeded her authority when she vetoed provisions Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill and Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill; that when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-
veto power but should veto the entire bill; that the item-veto power does not carry with it
the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers; and that the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of
that power.

Issue: Whether or not the President exceeded her veto power granted by the
Constitution.

Held:
No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the
1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if
exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is
what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of
the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In
other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of the same item. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales
et al. that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision
in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to
which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. The President promptly vetoed
Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they nullify the authority of the
Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in
the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the
Constitution
 Bengzon v. Drilon
208 SCRA 133
April 15, 1992

Facts:
In 1990, Congress sought to re-enact some laws including RA 1797 that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government officials. Meanwhile, a group of
retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions.

The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions. Congress took notice of the
readjustment in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress made an item entitled:
“General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in
different branches of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. However, President Aquino again vetoed the
said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the
GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she
vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and
justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The
President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.

Held:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is
due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797, it is also a cardinal rule that retirement
laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed
some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; when it comes to appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at
all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment
fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but
did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the
government.
 Philconsa v. Enriquez
235 SCRA 506
August 19, 1994

Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.

The President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which
he imposed certain conditions.

No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes. Judicial
intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the claim that
Congress and the President have impermissibly exceed their respective authorities, and
by several Senators on the claim that the President has committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power. Petitioners
contest the constitutionality of: the veto on special provisions added to items in the GAA
of 1994 without vetoing the entire bill.

Issue:
Whether or not the President exceeded the item– veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto “provisions” of an
Appropriations Bill?

Held:
The Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and
"be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any
provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be
vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate
provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend
other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate
enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress
cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the
President given by the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into
executive prerogative. Also, that any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval for executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
 TESDA v. Commission on Audit
GR No.196148
February 10, 2015

Facts:
In view of the inadequate policy on the basic health and safety conditions in work
of government officials, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued AO 430, based
from CSC MC No. 33 and Section 34 of the General Appropriations Act. AO 430
authorized the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000 to all officials
and employees of DOLE, including bureaus and attached agencies. COA then issued
Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-015 addressed to TESDA Director General Augusto
Syjuco, claiming that the payment of the allowance had no legal basis, it being contrary
to the Salary Standardization Law of 1989. Petitioner insists that the disbursement was
pursuant to MC no 33 and based on the authority granted by the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.

Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the COA to disallow the payment of health care
allowance

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the CoA's disallowance of the payment of the
P5,000 healthcare maintenance allowance. The CoA did not act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion because it properly exercised its powers
and discretion in disallowing the payment. MC no. 33 was worded in a clear manner to
effect that the health program for employees to include only hospitalization services and
annual mental, medical-physical examinations only. Such authority given to a
government agency was only limited to the choice between the two and not the choice to
convert the benefits to cash. The giving of healthcare maintenance allowance to TESDA
employees was not among any of the hospitalization services listed in the circular. Such
is contrary to Art VI, Section 29(1) of the Constitution which provides that no money
should be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The mere approval of the GAA does not make the funds instantly available for spending.
 COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla
GR No 151992
September 18, 2002

Facts:
Congress passed RA No. 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1196 which
provided for the modernization and computerization of the voters registration list and
appropriation of funds. COMELEC issued a resolution approving the Voter’s Registration
and Identification System Project (VRIS). The VRIS project envisioned a computerized
database system for the May 2004 Electionswhereby the registrant’s fingertips will be
digitally entered into the system. COMELEC invited suppliers for the supply and
installation and ancillary services for the VRIS Project. PHOTOKINA won the bid at
P6.588 Billion pesos. An award was issued by COMELEC, and formalization of the
contract was made. However in RA 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELEC modernization project was only 1 billion pesos.

Issue:
Whether or not a successful bidder can compel a government agency to
formalize a contract even if its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the
project

Held:
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
In the execution of government contracts, the constitutional restriction is to require the
various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for
each fiscal year. EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 Sec 46 provides that no
contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an
appropriation. Sec 47 provides that no contract shall be entered into unless the proper
accounting official certified that funds have been appropriated for the said purpose.

The existence of the appropriations and availability of funds are indispensable

pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.
Therefore there is no perfected contract between PHOTOKINA and COMELEC. To hold
otherwise would be to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would
obligate the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for
which the contract was attempted to be made.
 Araullo vs. Aquino III
GR No 209287
July 1, 2014

Facts:
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate revealing that
he, along with several Senators, had been allotted an additional 50 Million as incentive
for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. In response, Sec.
Florencio Abad of the Department of Budget and Management issued a public statement
explaining that the funds released had been part of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) which was a program designed to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion. Also, that the funds had been released to the Senators based on
their letters of request for funding.

These instances made the present controversy inevitable, while issues against
the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over the Pork Barrel
controversy. Thus, nine petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of the DAP
followed by the issuance relating to the DAP.

Araullo, together with the other petitioners, allege that NBC No. 541, which was
issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of
June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations for
continuing and current allotments.

Issue:
Whether or not DAP violates Sec. 29 of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
No. DAP was not an appropriation measure, therefore, no appropriation law was
required to adopt or implement it. It was only a program or an administrative system of
prioritizing spending the adoption of which was by virtue of the authority of the President
to ensure laws are executed. It is the Executive playing its role as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute laws
including General Appropriations Acts. Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or
implement DAP, for no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
Thus, Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Sec 29, Article VI of
the Constitution.

However, transfers within the respective offices contemplates realignment of

funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even if some projects were
within the Executive Department, these projects were non-existent insofar as the GAA
was concerned, because there were no funds actually appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent because
they were not provided for in the GAA. As such, these transfers are unconstitutional.
 Belgica v. Ochoa
GR No. 208566
November 11, 2013

Facts:
Pork barrelis described as lump-sum, discretionary funds. The system of
congressional pork barrel started as early as 1922 in the form of the Public Works Act.
However, it was only in 2000 when the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF)
appeared in the GAA. During the term of President Arroyo, NGOs were given formal
participation in the pork barrel system. On the other hand, the presidential pork barrel
system started during the term of President Marcos when he promulgated the
Malampaya Fund and PAGCOR.

The controversy surrounding the pork barrel system spurred in 2013 upon the
investigation of NBI wherein six whistle blowers attested that a certain Janet Lim
Napoles had swindled billions of pork barrel funds from the public officers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.

Petitioners seeking to issue a TRO enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the
Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing:
(a) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and
(b) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of
"financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the same provision
Issue:
Whether or not the Congressional and President Pork Barrels are
unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. The congressional pork barrel is unconstitutional, for it greatly encroach the
separation of powers for the Congressional Pork Barrel provides for authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its
core, legislators have the authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.

For the power of appropriation to be valid it must set apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for, and a specified purpose. In the PDAF, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate how
much from such fund would go to and a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine

No, the Presidential pork barrels are constitutional. However, Section 8 of PD 910 and
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993 are deemed unconstitutional due the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
which constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President's authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya.
 Pascual v. Sec of Public Works and Communications
110 Phil. 331
December 20, 1960

Facts:
Petitioner WenceslaoPascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this
action for declaratory relief, with injunction upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920,
entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works contained, in section 1-C (a)
thereof, an item of P85,000.00, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals where at the time of the passage and
approval of said Act, the feeder roads were “nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads, not yet constructed” and “do not connect any government property or
any important premises to the main highway” hence, still was a private property
therefore must be declared null and void.

The lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question, upon the
ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to
because the same does not affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based
upon the following premises namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the
constitutional infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be
annulled without a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of the said donation; and
(3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no
exception.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case
Held:
Yes. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time
of its passage or approval, not upon events occupying, or acts performed, subsequently
thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to
the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality
thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill,
which, later on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or when said
bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective,
or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need
not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. Hence, it is our
considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify
petitioner's action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this
action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of
preliminary injunction should have been maintained.
 Guingona v. Carague
196 SCRA 520
April 22, 1991

Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation which
includes P86.8 Billion for debt service while the appropriations for the DECS only
amounts to P27 Billion. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized
by the following presidential decrees:
1. PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)”
2. PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize
the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society”
3. PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation

for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.” They also contend that the automatic appropriation
provides for an undue delegation of power to the executive branch.

Issue:
Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional

Held:
Yes. An examination of PD 117 shows the clear intent that the amounts needed
to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall
become due precisely without the necessity of enacting separate laws appropriating
funds for it. The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution
of debt management policies. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine
Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, this will delay
payments only to worsen the country’s debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the
budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate payment even before due dates.
Furthermore, there is no undue delegation of power since the amount is fixed by the
parameters of the law itself which requires the simple act of looking into the books of the
Treasure. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed
for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets
incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.
 Garcia v. Mata
65 SCRA 520
July 30, 1975

Facts:
Petitioner Eusebio Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the AFP until
his reversion to inactive status in 1960 pursuant to RA 2332.

During that time, he received a monthly emolument of P478 as Captain which

comprised of his base and longevity pay and other allowances. Petitioners reversion to
inactive status due to RA 2334 was neither for a cause, his own request, nor after any
trial. From the time until the present, petitioner has been inactive status which denied
him any emoluments from the AFP. This led him to bring an action for mandamus and
recovery for sum of many to compel respondents to reinstate him in the active service, to
adjust his rank, and pay all the emoluments due to him during his reversion to inactive
status, invoking RA 1382 and RA 1600.

Issue:
Whether or not Garcia should be reinstated, and the emoluments due be
delivered to him

Held:
No. Petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months, and 12 days of service when RA
1382 took effect in 1995, rendering him shot of the 10 year minimum service
requirement provided in the law. Furthermore, as regards to RA 1600, which reinforces
the relevant provision in RA 1382, fails to disclose its relevance or any relation to any
appropriation item therein or to the GAA as a whole.

The first clause of paragraph 11 provides that after the approval of this act, and
when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the AFP may be called to a tour of
active duty for more than 2 years within five years. The incongruity and irrelevance are
already evident. While RA 1600 appropriated money for 1956-57, paragraph 11 refers to
the fundamental government policy matters of calling to active duty and the reversion of
inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence, it was a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure which violated the constitutional inhibition against
riders to the GAA. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to
the GAA
 Araullo vs. Aquino III
GR No 209287
February 3, 2015

Facts:
A motion for reconsideration was filed assailing the procedural and substantive
errors in the decision promulgated on July 1, 2014. Araullo and the rest of the
petitioners questioned the constitutionality of NBC No. 541, which was issued for the
implementation of Disbursement Acceleration Program whichwas supposedly seen as a
remedy to speed up the funding of government projects as it enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
year’s appropriation.Respondents contend that withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations under DAP are savings that may be used for augmentation
invoking Sec 25(5) Art VI of the Constitution that the President, may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Petitioners pray for
the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare
as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the DAP used for alleged augmentation
of appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies.

Issue:
Whether or not DAP is constitutional including NBC No. 541 and all other
executive acts issued for its implementation

Held:No.Thecourtupheld its prior decision regarding DAP’s unconstitutionality. However,

the decision was also modified to clarify certain matters. Sec. 38 of the Administrative
Code empowers the President to suspend or stop further expenditure of funds allotted
for any agency or any appropriations authorized by General Appropriations Act. Section
39 any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations
Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations.
As regards to Sec 38, when the President suspends or stops further expenditure
of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such
funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed,
discontinued or abandoned. The withdrawn unobligated allotments must be reissued for
the original programs and projects of the agencies concerned, from which the allotments
were withdrawn. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments is unconstitutional.
As to Section 39, it is unconstitutional for it contravenes Sec. 25(5) art VI of the
Constitution when it allowed the president to use any savings of any department, office,
or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. Sec. 25(5)
expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only
those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department's
appropriations (within 1 department only). Augmentations under the DAP which are
made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the
requisites under Section 25 (5) are complied with.
 Aglipay v. Ruiz
64 Phil 201
March 13, 1937

Facts:

The Director of Posts announced in Manila newspapers regarding the issuance

of postage stamps in commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
The government authorized the special postage stamp under the sponsorship of the
Catholic Church. Aglipay questioned the measure and contented that it is a violation of
the Constitution for it benefited a particular religion.

The SC discovered that the original design of the stamp featured a picture of a
Catholic chalice, but this was later rejected in favor of a map of the Philippines under
which appeared the caption "Seat, 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, February 3-
7, 1937. The said stamps were actually issued already and sold, though the greater part
thereof remained unsold. Thus, Aglipay sought to prevent the further sale of such
stamps.

Issue:
Whether or not the authorization of the selling of the commemorative postage
stamps is unconstitutional

Held:
No, the stamp was issued valid for its purpose was not intended to favor a
particular church or denomination. Specifically it did not benefit the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The
purpose of which, was to take the opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines, not by
focusing attention on the Eucharistic Congress but on its site to attract tourists to our
country.

This was also evident as the design of the stamp showed the map of the
Philippines, focused on the location of the City of Manila. This then signifies that contrary
to the contention, the stamps issued were made for the general benefit of the nation as a
whole, and not on a particular church or denomination.
 Garces v. Estenzo
105 SCRA 510
May 25, 1981

Facts:
Barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City issued four resolutions regarding the
acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer. Pursuant to Resolution No. 5,
the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council for the
celebration of the feast day of the saint. Private funds were raised by means of
solicitations and cash to purchase such image. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was
brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated
the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image.

After the fiesta, however, petitioner Father Osmeña, refused to return custody of
the image to the council on the excuse that it was church property bought by church
funds. The council, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the
required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for
annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending, among
others, that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and
state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.

Issue:
Whether or not public money was appropriated for secretariat benefit

Held:
No. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious
matters or beliefs of the barrio residents.Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s
custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena.
Most importantly, the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money, therefore it is the council’s property. Right of the determination of custody is their
right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the
Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of
the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or property.
 Manosca v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 106440
January 29, 1996

Facts:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig,
Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Petitioners
assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the
case of Guido v. Rural.

Progress Administration, to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large
number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land in question is constitutional

Held:
Yes. Court held that the view of petitioners is much too limited and restrictive.
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. A
historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to be one of constant
growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each
demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for
'whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use'. The taking to be
valid must be for public us. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any
more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play.

As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise
of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The practical reality that greater benefit may be
derived by members of the Iglesiani Cristo than by most others could well be true, but
such peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.

It is a right to take or reassert eminent dominion over property within the state for
public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance
even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against
possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power
is sought to be enforced.
 Lladoc v. Commission of Internal Revenue
14 SCRA 292
June 16, 1965

Facts:
In 1957, MB Estate, Inc. donated P10,000 to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, parish priest of
Victorias Negros Occidental, the predecessor of Fr. CasimiroLladoc. The donation was
made for the purpose of the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality, which
was spent for the intended purpose.

The following year, donor MB Estate, Inc. filed the donor's gift tax return.
Respondent issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the parish of Victorias
where the petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370 including surcharges,
1% monthly interest, and the compromise for filing of late return. Petitioner lodged a
protest to the assessment claiming that there is no legal entity or juridical person known
as the "catholic parish priest of victorias" and therefore, he should not be liable for the
donee's gift tax and that such would be a violation of Section 22(3) of the 1987
Constitution which exempts churches and all lands, buildings, and improvements
exclusively used for religious purposes.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the protest and the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner raised he appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, which affirmed
the decision of the CIR. Hence, Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not a donee’s gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic Church

Held:
Yes. Section 22 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides exemption only from
the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, such as cemeteries,
churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. In this case, what the respondent
assessed was a donee's gift tax and the assessment was not on the properties
themselves. Such did not rest upon general ownership, but an excise made upon the
use of such properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties.
Such is not within the exemptions in the Constitution. Such is not a property tax, but an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift. The Constitutional
provision should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Hence,
petitioner is liable for the payment thereof.
 Province of Abra v. Hernando
107 SCRA 104
June 15, 1998

Facts:
Provincial Assessor of Abra, Ladislao Ancheta levied a tax assessment on the
properties of respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The latter filed a petition
for declaratory relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes,
its properties being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable
purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a
summary hearing, respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side of
petitioner

Issue:
Whether or not Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued’s properties are exempt from
tax

Held:
No. Under the 1935 Constitution all lands buildings etc used exclusively for
religious and charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. In the 1987
Constitution, they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used
for religious or charitable purposes. The change should not be ignored. There must be
proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for
religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation. Exemption from tax is never
favoured nor presumed, if granted it must be strictly construed as against taxpayer.

Although it is true that the Constitution provides tax exemptions to “charitable

institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” of “lands, buildings, and
improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly”
used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and
is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
However, in this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and
directly used for religious or charitable uses.
 Abra Valley College v. Aquino
162 SCRA 106

Facts:
ABRA Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher
learning, filed a suit to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of
sale of its lot and building for non-payment of real state taxes and penalties. The
respondent, PaternoMillare offered the highest bid of P6,000, and a certificate of sale
was issued to him. The petitioner contented that the primary use of the lot and building
for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption
from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the
seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary.

Private respondents counter that the college lot and building in question which
were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (I) for the
educational purposes of the r college; (2) permanent residence of the President and
Director thereof, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for
commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and
rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation

Issue:
Whether or not the lot and the building in question are used exclusively for
educational purposes thereby exempting petitioner from property taxes

Held:
NO. The lot and building are not used exclusively for educational purposes.
While this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase
"exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22,
paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been
made that exemptions extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of
the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at
the bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under
the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose -
educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of
education.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that
the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the,
second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential
purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes.
However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of
the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
 Miguel v Gordon
GR No. 174340
October 17, 2006

Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate
Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in
the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task.

Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence

Gordon ordered Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of
the Senate. Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio. Chairman Sabio filed
with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services,
their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1 is constitutional
Held:
No. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress'
power of inquiry. Such contention cannot be tolerated. No provision in the Constitution
directly provides for an exemption thereof. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class. Undoubtedly, a mere provision of a law
cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, without any constitutional
basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article VII, Section 21, as well
as Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution.Section 4(b), being in the nature of an
immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG
members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative
bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.
 PHILCOMSAT Holdings v. Senate
GR No. 180308
June 19, 2012

Facts:
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution
directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred
by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their
respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public
hearings where petitioners Locsin and Andal (both directors and corporate officers of
PHC, as well as nominees of the government to the board of directors) were invited to
attend these hearings as "resource persons."This was because of the losses that the
government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC.

Senate committees submitted assailed committee reports and found

overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to
preserve the government's interests in the said corporations.Petitioners led the instant
petition before the Court, questioning the haste with which the respondent Senate
approved the challenged Committee Report.

Issue:
Whether or not the Senate Committee committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution and
should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily
approved by the respondent Senate

Held:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that “The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."The Court
explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct
legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very
same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to
Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless
 Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
April 15, 1992
GR 103524

Facts:
Benjamin Romualdez and his wife, together with the Marcoses were alleged to
have unjustly and unlawfully enriched themselves by obtaining control over some of the
biggest corporations in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines
and BEnguet Consolidated Mining Corporation, with the help of Bengzon Law Office and
President Corazon Aquino's brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa.

Senator Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Ricardo

Lopa took over various GOCCs, violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A
motion to investigate the matter was contained in Enrile's speech which was referred to
the respondent committee. Petitioners contend that the respondent committee, in
requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose.This petition seeks to enjoin respondents from requiring petitioners to
testify and produce evidence regarding the alleged sale of the equity of
KokoyRomualdez to the Lopa Group in 36 or 39 corporations.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s inquiry was done in aid of legislation

Held:
No. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The power of both
houses is limited by the qualifier included in the provision. Such power includes inquiries
to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation.

In the present case, the contemplated inquiry by respondent committee is not in

aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the Congress'
jurisdiction.The purpose of the inquiry being conducted is to determine whether or not
the relatives of the President or Ricardo Lopa had violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Such matter is within the province of the Courts and not of the Legislature.
Also, the speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, and he
merely called upon the Senate to investigate such possible violation.
 Arnault v. Nazareno
87 Phil 29
July 18, 1950

Facts:
In Oct 1949 the Philippine Government bought 2 estates---Buenaventura and
Tambobong for P5 million pesos from Ernest Burt, a non-resident American through his
attorney-in-fact Associated Estates Inc., represented by Jean Arnault. The original owner
of the Buenaventura Estate was San Juan De Dios Hospital who sold it to Ernest Burt.
The Tambobong Estate was owned by the Philippine Trust Company who sold the same
to Ernest Burt. The Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors ofthe
Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the
purchase of the two estates.

A special committee was created to examine, among others Jean Arnault as to

where the money went particularly the 440,000 pesos. Due to his insistence to not name
the person to whom he gave the 440,000, the Senate cited Arnault in contempt and
committed him to the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms and imprisoned until "he shall
have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special
Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions in connection therewith.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish for contempt
Held:
Yes. Included in the powers of congress is the power to punish for contempt.
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Member. Mere
requests for information are often unavailing, information volunteered is not always
accurate or complete, some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry
would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of that power. If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the
range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relate to that
subject, obedience to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness
to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of the course to his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and
the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question.
 Arnault v. Balagtas
97 Phil 358
July 30, 1955

Facts:
Arnault was the attorney-in-fact of Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The
purchase was effected and the price paid for both estates was 5 million. The Senate
issued a resoultion creating a Special committee to investigate upon the said
negotiation. Upon refusal to answer the questions directed to him regarding the said
purchase, he was imprisoned in the new BilibidPrision until such time when he shall
reveal to the Senate or the committee the name of the person who received the money,
and to answer the questions pertinent thereto. While still in confinement, Arnault
executed an affidativit providing the history of his life as well as the events surrounding
the acquisition of the Estates, naming Jess D. Santos as the person whom delivery of
the sum P440, 000 was made.

He petitioned for writ of habeas corpus contending that his continued detention
and confinement in the new Bilibid Prison is illegal on the ground that the Senate
committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his answer naming one Jess D.
Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum P440,000 was made in the sale of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the
Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that Arnault, by his answer, has
purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged
from imprisonment.

Issue:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed
against it under the circumstances of the case

Held:
Yes. Provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and
is committed in the course of legislativeprocess, the legislative authority is supreme.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.

When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of

powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must
have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the
other's authority or power. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by
the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be
distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of
justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them.
 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
GR No. 169777
April 20, 2006

Facts:
The issues pertained in this case involves the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well
as the controversies in the wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
Pursuant to its grant of power, the Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on
Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter toSenate
President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing, however, the Senate
refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, President Arroyo issued Executive Order 464, which
mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government
shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, all the respondent invited by the Senate therefore
invoked EO 464. Thereafter, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the
executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President
has not yet given her consent.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Number 464 is valid

Held:
Yes. The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate.
The “executive privilege” provides for an exemption in the aid of legislation. This
privilege is the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. The only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. However, in our Constitution, only the President may be
exempted from this power.

Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as
discussed, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to
categories of persons.The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does
not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are
being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of
consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter
assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive
privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President,
or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.
 Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks
GR No. 167173
December 27, 2007

Facts:
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of Senate Committee on Banks,
delivered a privilege speech before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R.
Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in
violation of the Securities Regulation Code and urging the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent
activity in the future. Acting on the referral, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J.
Angara, set the initial hearing. Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend
the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through
counsel, presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in
court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby
posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.

Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the
hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the
Bureau's Watch List. Hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date.
However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenaeadtestificandum
and ducestecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing. Petitioners claim
that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign
securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing
cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers
vested solely in these courts, citing Bengzon v SBRC.

Issue:
Whether or not a criminal or administrative complaint automatically bars
legislative investigation

Held:
No. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be
conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses
thereof. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said
resolution, exposes the error in petitioners' allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a
privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal
practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities." This
fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege
speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future."Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court
or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal
or administrative investigation.
 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
GR No. 180640
March 25, 2008

Facts:
The Senate passed resolutions regarding the contract between the DOTC with
Zhang Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Joe De Venecia issued a statement
that powerful people were using their influence to push NEDA to approve the NBN Deal.
Petitioner Romulo

Neri, then Secretary of NEDA, was invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee where he was interrogated for 11 hours. When asked about what he
and the President discussed about the deal, petitioner invoked Executive privilege and
refused to answer the questions as regard to whether or not Arroyo followed up with the
project, whether or not she directed petitioner to prioritize it, and whether or not she
directed him to approve the same. Thereafter, he refused to attend the other hearings
which led the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to cite him in contempt

Issue:
Whether or not the contempt and arrest order of the petitioner is valid

Held:
No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
contempt order suffers from constitutional infirmity. This is due to the fact that the
respondent did not comply with the requirements laid down in the case of Senate v
Ermita. The case provided that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry and the questions needed to the furtherance
thereof. Moreover, it violated Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure governing inquiries in
aid of legislation which requires the vote of majority of the Senate members because it
was found that onlya minority of the members of the Senate was present during the
deliberations. The issuance of the contempt order was arbitrary and heedless since the
respondents did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform the
petitioner of their ruling.

Also, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege.
1. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.
2. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3. Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailabilityof the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority
 Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 163556
June 8, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Ruy Elias C. Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative
District of the City of Davao, asks this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and
Vice- Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections particularly Section 13, Rule
8 of the said Rules.

Petitioner contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because: (1)
It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress; and (2)
It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; On the other
hand, respondents (Solicitor General, the Senate, and the House of Representatives)
counter-argued that the Canvassing Rules are internal matters of Congress which is
beyond this Court's scope of judicial inquiry and that there has been no invalid
delegation to the Joint Committee of the Constitutional duties of Congress.

Issue:
WON the creation of a Joint Committee is unconstitutional.

Held:
No. The court resolved to dismiss the Petition on the ground that it failed to show
that Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating such Joint Committee. Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of the certificates." the Court had no power to review the internal
proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.

The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot
be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions
and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint
session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately. The Petition was DISMISSED by
a unanimous vote of 14 to 0 by the Court.
 Brilliantes v. COMELEC
G.R No. 163193
June 15, 2004

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an
automated election system for the processing of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated
the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment,
devices and materials, and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

COMELEC separated the operation into three phases: PHASE I- Computerized

system of registration and voters’ validation (Biometrics), PHASE II- Computerized
voting and counting of votes, and PHASE III- Electronic transmission of results.
Validation scheme under Phase I encountered problems in its implementation as it was
reverting to the old listing of voters. Despite scrapping of Phase II, Phase III was
implemented through an electronic transmission of advanced “unofficial” results of the
2004 elections, also dubbed as UNOFFICIAL QUICK COUNT.

Senate President Drilon questioned the constitutionality of the proposed

electronic transmission for the positions of President and Vice President, apprised
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos to reconsider its plan, pointing out that Section 4,
Art 7 of the Consti. States that Congress has the sole and exclusive authority to canvass
the votes for President and VP. Therefore, any quick account would be lacking of any
Constitutional authority.

Issue:
Whether or not the unofficial quick count preempts the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress under Art 7, Section 4.

Held:
Yes. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation
of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. The resolution allows the use of the 3rd copy of the election returns of Pres,
VP, Senators and Congressmen, intended for COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.
Counting and consolidation of votes under Sec. 6 of RA 8436 refers to the official
COMELEC count under the fully automated system, and not any kind of unofficial count,
now provided under the assailed resolution. Resolution preempts the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress under Art 7, Section 4.
 Executive Department
The President
Macalintal v. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003
Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines G.R. No. 163556 June 8, 2004
Brillantes v. COMELEC G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
Pimentel v. Joint Committee G.R. No. 163783 June 22, 2004
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral GR No. 191698 March 23, 2000
Tribunal

Term of Office; Privileges

Osmena v. COMELEC G.R. No. 100318 July 30, 1991
Forbes v. ChuocoTiaco G.R. No. L-6157 July 30, 1910
In Re: Bermudez G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
Soliven v. Makasiar G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
Estrada v. Desierto G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
Gloria v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119903 August 15, 2000
Senate v. Ermita G.R. No. 16977 April 20, 2006
Neri v. Senate Committee G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008

Prohibitions/Inhibitions
Republic v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
Secretary
Funa v. Ermita G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010
Funa v. Agra G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013
National Amnesty Commission v. G.R. No. 156982 September 8, 2004
Commission on Audit
Bitonio v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 147392 March 12, 2004
Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
 Macalintal v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013
July 10, 2003

Facts:
Romulo Macalintal, a member of Philippine Bar, sought to declare
unconstitutional Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 “An Act Providing for A System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Thereof, and for Other Purposes” aka The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 as it
contravenes Art V Sec 1 and 2.

Petitioner contends that: Sec 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Sec 1,

Art V of the Constitution requiring that the voter must be a resident of at least 1 year and
in the place to vote for 6 months. Furthermore he argues that Sec 1 of Art V does not
allow provisional registration or promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified
to vote.

The Solicitor General, however, counter-argued that: a person can have only one
"domicile" but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other
temporary; and that the definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise
applies to absentee voters.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of
the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?

Held:
No. Sec 5(d) of RA 9189 provides that an immigrant or permanent resident
recognized in host country shall be disqualified from voting under the Act unless upon
registration he executes an affidavit declaring that he shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not less than 3 years from approval of his
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the
name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. Absentee Voting refers
to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, exercise their right to
vote. The law covers all citizens of PH abroad not disqualified by law.

The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three
years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the
elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the
immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
 Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 163556
June 8, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Ruy Elias C. Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative
District of the City of Davao, asks this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and
Vice- Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections particularly Section 13, Rule
8 of the said Rules.

Petitioner contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because: (1)
It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress; and (2)
It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; On the other
hand, respondents (Solicitor General, the Senate, and the House of Representatives)
counter-argued that the Canvassing Rules are internal matters of Congress which is
beyond this Court's scope of judicial inquiry and that there has been no invalid
delegation to the Joint Committee of the Constitutional duties of Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not the creation of a Joint Committee is unconstitutional?

Held:
No. The court resolved to dismiss the Petition on the ground that it failed to show
that Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating such Joint Committee. Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of the certificates." the Court had no power to review the internal
proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.

The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot
be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions
and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint
session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately. The Petition was DISMISSED by
a unanimous vote of 14 to 0 by the Court.
 Brillantes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193
June 15, 2004

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an
automated election system for the processing of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated
the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment,
devices and materials, and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

COMELEC separated the operation into three phases: PHASE I- Computerized

system of registration and voters’ validation (Biometrics), PHASE II- Computerized
voting and counting of votes, and PHASE III- Electronic transmission of results.
Validation scheme under Phase I encountered problems in its implementation as it was
reverting to the old listing of voters. Despite scrapping of Phase II, Phase III was
implemented through an electronic transmission of advanced “unofficial” results of the
2004 elections, also dubbed as UNOFFICIAL QUICK COUNT.

Senate President Drilon questioned the constitutionality of the proposed

electronic transmission for the positions of President and Vice President, apprised
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos to reconsider its plan, pointing out that Section 4,
Art 7 of the Consti. States that Congress has the sole and exclusive authority to canvass
the votes for President and VP. Therefore, any quick account would be lacking of any
Constitutional authority.

Issue:
Whether or not the UNNOFFICIAL QUICK COUNT preempts the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress under Art 7, Section 4?

Held:
Yes. Counting and consolidation of votes under Sec. 6 of RA 8436 refers to the
official COMELEC count under the fully automated system, and not any kind of unofficial
count, now provided under the assailed resolution. Resolution preempts the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress under Art 7, Section 4.

“There is no constitutional or statutory basis for Comelec to undertake a separate

and an “unofficial” tabulation of, results, whether manually or electronically. By
conducting such “unofficial” tabulation, the Comelec descends to the level of a private
organization, spending public funds for the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of
the envelopes containing the election returns and the election returns themselves. Thus,
if the Comelec is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the
President and Vice-President, the Comelec is, with more reason, prohibited from making
an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.” [Nachura, A.B. (2009). OUTLINE/REVIEWER IN
POLITICAL LAW]
 Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress
G.R. No. 163783
June 22, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and
void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and VicePresidential candidates in
the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11,
2004.

Pimentel moves that the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting
any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress
on Canvassing. Pimentel contends that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004
by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired
on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed
out of legal existence." Pimentel contends that "all pending matters and proceedings
terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on
“legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses
of Congress.”

Issue:
Whether or not the President may call a special session at any time?

Held:
Yes. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution reads: “The Congress shall
convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days
as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.

The President may call a special session at any time.” Section 15, Article VI of
the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening
of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session
at any time). Despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment
to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for
the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may
reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
 Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, et. al.
G.R. No. 221697, 221698-700
March 8, 2016

Facts:
These are two consolidated petitions mainly assailing the qualifications of Grace
Poe-Llamanzares as candidate for President on the following grounds: (1) that she is not
a natural born citizen and (2) she fails the 10-year residency requirement provided in the
constitution.

Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares was found by Edgardo Militar in Jaro, Iloilo

sometime 1968. She was left in the care of his relatives. Poe-Llamanzares was
registered as a founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. She was subsequently adopted
by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan Roces sometime in 1974. Sometime in 2005, Susan
Roces discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating Poe’s new name as well as the name of the adoptive parents. Roces then
submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo. She married Teodoro Llamanzares and
flew to the US right after the wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child in the US.
In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport
that same year.

In May 24, 2005, she secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the US. On July
7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. The
Bureau of Immigration approved the petition on July 18, 2006.

Issues:
Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen?
Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement?

Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court considers Grace Poe-Llamanzares to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen, satisfying one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for presidency. Petitioner’s physical features highly resembles that of a
Filipino and she was abandoned and found in a municipality with an overwhelmingly
Filipino population, it would be reasonable to assume based on the evidence that her
parents are Filipinos. By votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. Foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born
citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of international law.

Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with
animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Her domicile had been timely changed as
of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was
approved. Grace Poe presented satisfactory evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Additionally, with her eventual application
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, her intent for permanent residency is evident.
 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
GR No. 191698
March 23, 2000

Facts:

Macalintal argues that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET) is unconstitutional

on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of
the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.He cites Buac v. COMELEC
which peripherally declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PETin the exercise of quasi-judicial
power." and thus violative of Section 12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether the the creation of the PET is constitutional

Held:

Yes. The petition was dismissed. Section 4(7), Article VII, 1987 Constitution]
does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less
prohibit, otherwise. Macalintal’s construction is untenable, it is unreasonably restrictive
and does not offer a solution.When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential
or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
[Section 12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution] is not violated.

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be
read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on
the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found
in [Section 12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution]. The mirabile dictu of the grant of
jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article on the executive branch of
government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission.

There is a grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a Presidential Electoral

Tribunal. (Tecson v. Commission on Elections). The conferment of full authority to the
Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies,

independent of the three departments of government – Executive, Legislative, and
Judiciary – butnot separate therefrom.
 Osmeña v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 100318

July 30, 1991

Facts:
RA 7056 or “An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave
the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor,” is challenged by Governor Emilio M. Osmeña, et. al. of its
constitutionality.

They contend that, inter alia, violates the mandate of the Constitution for holding
of synchronized national and local election on the second Monday of May 1992. Upon
the comment of the respondents, the Solicitor General posed the denial of the petition by
arguing that the issue is a political question.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition – RA 7056 is unconstitutional. The
postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local election from 1992 to
1995 (Sec. 2 of RA 7056); the hold-over provision for incumbent local officials (Sec. 3 of
RA 7056); the reduction of the term of office of local officials to be elected on the second
Monday of November 1992 (Sec.2 (b), RA 7056) and the change in the campaign
periods, are violative of the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 8 of RA 7056).

Sec. 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year
– noon of June 30, 1992. This common termination date will synchronize future elections
to once every three years.

The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior
to June 30, 1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 – on the
second Monday of May, 1992. The incumbent officials were elected in January 1988.
Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2, 1991. But their term was
adjusted to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well
as those of the Senators, members of the LH, President and Vice-President, is the same
– to synchronize the national and local elections.
 W. Cameron Forbes, et. al. v. ChuocoTiaco and A. S. Crossfield
G.R. No. L-6157
July 30, 1910

Facts:
A writ of prohibition was issued against AS Crossfield as one of the judges of the
CFI of Manila to prohibit him from taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case
ending before him in which ChuocoTiaco (alias Choa Tea) is plaintiff and Forbes, et al
are defendants. On April of 1910 defendant filed a suit in the CFI of Manila against the
plaintiffs alleging that under the orders of Forbes, he was deported and sent to Amoy,
China by Harding and Townbridge, and that having been able to return to the PHL, he
feared, as he was threatened that he’d be deported again. Hence, this petition was filed.

Issues:
1. What are the powers of the Philippine Government to deport or expel
objectionable aliens?
2. In which department or departments of the independent departments of a
government does this inherent power exist?

Held:
i. That a government has the inherent right to deport aliens whenever the
government believes it necessary for the public good; and
ii. That the power belongs to the political department of the government and in
the Philippine Islands to the Governor-General, who is "the chief executive
authority in all civil affairs" in the Government of the Philippine Islands

Having reached the conclusion that the Government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands is a government with all the necessary powers of a government,
subject to certain control in the exercise thereof, we are of the opinion and so hold, that it
has impliedly or inherently itself in conformity with the will of the Congress of the United
States and the President thereof, and to this end it may prevent the entrance into or
eliminate from its borders all such aliens whose presence is found to be detrimental or
injurious to its public interest, peace, and domestic tranquility.

It being inherent in the political department of the government, it need not be

defined by express legislation. The mere absence of legislation regulating this inherent
right to deport or expel aliens is not sufficient to prevent the chief executive head of the
government, acting in his own sphere and in accordance with his official duty, to deport
or expel objectionable aliens, when he deems such] action necessary for the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation. One of the principal duties of the chief executive of a
nation is to preserve peace and order within the territory. To do this he is possessed of
certain powers. It is believed and asserted to be sound doctrine of political law that if in a
particular case he finds that there are aliens within its territory whose continued
presence is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the absence of express law,
deport them.
 In Re: Bermudez
G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986

Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a
lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides:

"Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected
in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992."

"The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992."

Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks
the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of
the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . . "

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s contention was meritorious?

Held:
No. Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action,
it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary
that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of

ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a
matter of public record and common public know ledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of
their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections.

There can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President

Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of the
Republic of the Philippines.
 Soliven v. Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585
November 14, 1988

Facts:
President Cory Aquino filed a libel case against Luis Beltran and et.al. Petitioner
Beltran argues that the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit. He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by the filing of the President of her complaint-affidavit, she may be a witness for the
prosecution and thereby bring her under the trial court’s jurisdiction This would be an
indirect way of defeating her immunity from suit because testifying on the witness stand
means exposing herself to the possible contempt of court or perjury.

Issue:
Whether or not President may under the Constitution initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioner through the filing of the complaint-affidavit?

Held:
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the government is a job that
requires all the office-holder’s time and demands undivided attention. But this privilege of
immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not any other person in the President’s behalf.

Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot

raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
the accused. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. The President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit
to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice to exercise the privilege or waive it solely rests on
the President’s prerogative. It cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
The case was dismissed.
 Joseph E. Estrada v. AnianoDesierto
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001

Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Ilocos
Sur Governos, Luis ChavitSingson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The Senate and House of Representatives conducted series of investigations
against Estrada. The CBCP, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos, including Arroyo
asked for Estrada’s resignation. In a a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.

January 18, 1999, a 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a
human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples’ solidarity in demanding petitioner’s resignation.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he
will not run in this election. In noontime of January 20, Chief Justice Davide administered
the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Estrada and his family
hurriedly left Malacanang Palace.After his resignation, the petitioner's legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously led against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion. Thereafter, Desierto (in his capacity as Ombudsman)
started to investigate the charges against Estrada. On February 24, 2001, the cases at
bar were deemed submitted for decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Joseph Estrada enjoys immunity from suit?

Held:
No. After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for
civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not
performed in the exercise of official duties. [Nachura, A.B. (2009). OUTLINE/REVIEWER
IN POLITICAL LAW]

The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great
themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
.
 Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119903
August 15, 2000

Facts:
Dr. BienvenidoIcasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division
of City Schools, Quezon City, by President Cory Aquino. DECS Secretary Gloria
recommended to Aquino the reassignment of Icasiano as Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent, Mr. BannaoagLauro, which was later on approved. The copy of the
recommendation for reassignment approved by the President was transmitted to
Director Rosas for implementation. Director Rosas informed Icasiano of his
reassignment, effective October 17, 1994 Icasiano requested Sec. Garcia to reconsider
the reassignment, which the latter denied. The petitioner prepared a letter dated October
18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his
reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he
subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of
President.

On October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition. Court of Appeals
denied Icasiano’s prayer for the issuance of TRO which was later on set aside, and
restrained the petitioners from implementing the reassignment of Secretary Garcia from
Incumbent School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology. • Court of Appeals
issued another resolution setting the hearing of the petition for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners from implementing the reassignment
of Icasiano. Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Icasiano and prohibited the
petitioners from implementing the respondent’s reassignment as it is violative of his right
to security of tenure. No period was fixed for private respondent’s reassignment, nor was
there any indication that the reassignment was only temporary. • Gloria theorize that the
petition for prohibition appealed by Icasiano is improper because the same attacks an
act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit

Issue:
Whether or not the petition is in violation of presidential immunity from suit?

Held:
No.Petition is directed against petitioner, and not against the President. The
questioned acts are those of petitioners, and not of the President. Furthermore,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse
of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Private
respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private
respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure. Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding petitioner's reassignment to MIST to be
indefinite which can be inferred from Secretary Gloria's Memorandum to the President
stated that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." Subject
reassignment is more than temporary as Icasiano is fit for the job, being an expert on
that field. Such reassignment is definitely violative of private respondent's security of
tenure which cannot be countenanced.
 Senate of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169777
April 20, 2006

Facts:
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last
September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional. On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a
whole, issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North
Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464. Section 3 of E.O. 464
required that all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 466 is unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to
disclose information must be clearly asserted. (U.S. v. Reynolds). The claim of privilege
under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has
not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is

privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
That is impermissible.
 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
G.R. No. 180643
September 4, 2008

Facts:
Consequent to the NBN Project deal between the DOTC and the ZTE (Zhing
Xing Telecommunications Equipment), the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee found it
relevant to investigate the matter in aid of legislation for considerations of some pending
bills. The Committee sent invitations to certain personalities involved in the NBN Project.
Sec. Romulo Neri, the NEDA chief, was one of those. He was summoned to appear and
testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only
the September 26 hearing and he testified for 11 hours. He disclosed that then
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when he was probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Sec. Neri
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on 1) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, 2)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3) whether or not she directed him to
approve. As said, only in the September 26 hearing Sec. Neri attended. He was however
subpoenaed several times but to no avail other than his excuse letter invoking “executive
privilege” for the three questions burdened upon him. He was later cited in contempt on
January 2008. But prior to that, on December 2007, he filed a petition with the Supreme
Court for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter to him on November 22, 2007,
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Sec. Romulo Neri
contends that his conversations with President Arroyo are “candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions” and that these discussions “dwelt on the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country’s
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the three (3) pending questions burdened to Sec. Romulo Neri
are covered by the executive privilege?

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition; reasoning, thus: “The Court is
convinced that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications related to a
“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries (“executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations). Second, the communications are received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, Sec. Romulo Neri can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President’s Arroyo’s cabinet. And, third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.”
 Republic v.Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154
July 15, 2003

Facts:
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic through the PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Case was titled Philippines v Ferdinand Marcos
represented by his estate/heirs and Imelda Marcos pursuant to RA 1379 in relation to
EOs no. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a. On October of 1993, respondents Imelda Marcos, Imee
Marcos Manotoc, and Irene Marcos Araneta, and Bongbong Marcos filed their answer.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment
on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later
adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan on the gorund that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement took precedence over the motion for summary judgment.

Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in
Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to
an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses,
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the
ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds.
In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. In a resolution dated 31
January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summary judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not the Swiss funs can be forfeited in favor of the Republic?

Held:
Yes. RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully
acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate
to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. From the
above, the following facts shirt be established in order for forfeiture or seizure can
materialize: a. ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his
incumbency, whether it be in his name or not; b. the extent to which the amount of that
money or property exceeds; c. that the said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as public officer and other sources of lawful income. Contrary to the respondents’
argument, the SC held that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other
lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply
because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to
know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such
other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their
answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the
known lawful income of respondents.
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83815
February 22, 1991

Facts:
President Aquino issued EO No. 284, which allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions. It was assailed for it violates the Constitution.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 284 on the principal submission that
it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof;
and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

Issue:
Whether or not an executive order allowing members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices in addition
to their primary positions is valid?

Held:
No. EO No. 284 is unconstitutional because it allowed Cabinet members to hold
two other offices in government, in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII. Executive
Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government
and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Ex-officio posts held by the executive official
concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or
employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that
the feared impractical consequences are more apparent than real.
 Funa v. Ermita
G.R. No. 184740
February 11, 2010

Facts:
Oct. 4, 2006 President Arroyo appointed Maria Elena H. Bautista as
Undersecretary of Department of Transportation and Communications. Oct. 23, 2006
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of DOTC under
Special Order No. 2006-171. September 1, 2008 Bautista was designated as Officer in
Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.Oct. 21, 2008 Dennis Funa, as taxpayer, filed petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista’s designation/ appointment violating Art VII Sec. 13:
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. Jan 5, 2009, during
pendency of the petition, Bautista was appointed as Administrator of the MARINA and
assumed duties Feb 2, 2009 Bautista did not receive salary as MARINA OIC. Petitioner
contends that the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC
Undersecretary, as gleaned from the provisions of its charter PD No. 474 as amended
by EO No. 125-A.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of Baustista as MARINA OIC concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. Bautista being appointed as Undersecretary of DOTC is covered by the
stricter prohibition under Sec. 13 Art. VII. She cannot invoke the exception provided by
Art IX-B Par 2 Sec 7 where holding of office is allowed by law or the primary functions of
the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which
is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union. The prohibition against holding
dual/multiple offices or employment under Sec 13, Art VII was held inapplicable to posts
occupied by Executive officials specified without additional compensation in an ex officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of
the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. Aside from the fact that Baustista did not receive
compensation as MARINA OIC, she also failed to demonstrate that her designation as
OIC was in an ex officio capacity required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport Bautista’s designation as OIC is not an imposition
of additional duties related to her primary function because it appears that the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry
Board.
 Funa v. Agra
G.R. No. 191644
February 19, 2013

Facts:
On January 12, 2010, Hon. Alberto Agra was then the Government Corporate
Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place
of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice.
On March 1, 2010, President Arroyo appointed Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice upon
the resignation of then Secretary Agnes Devanadera. Soon after, on March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo again designated Agra as Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
capacity. Agra then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and
that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as
the Acting Solicitor General On April 27, 2010, Petitioner Funa, in his capacity as
taxpayer and concerned citizen, challenged the constitutionality of the concurrent
appointments of Agra, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner also counters that there was no “prevailing special circumstance”
that justified the non-application to Agra of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution; that the temporariness of the appointment or designation is not an excuse
to disregard the constitutional ban against holding of multiple offices by the Members of
the Cabinet.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, constitutional?

Held:
No. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section
13, Article VII, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra
could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting
Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided. The text of
Section 13, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far
as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office
means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of
the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and
duties of the office. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section
13, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials.
 National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit
GR. No. 156982
September 8, 2004

Facts:
After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members
turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria
beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor
Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting
to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038. The NGAO upheld the auditor’s order and notices of
disallowances were subsequently issued to several representatives. NAC passed
Administrative Order No. 2, approved by President Estrada. NAC invoked Administrative
order no. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO
disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members’ representatives, to no avail.
NAC filed a petition contending that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion
(among others), in disallowing the payment of honoraria on the ground of lack of
authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio
members.

Issue:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion?

Held:
No. Position of NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct
that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria, or any allowance whatsoever to
the NAC ex officio members’ official representatives. The Constitution mandates the
Commission on Audit to ensure that the funds and properties of the government are
validly, efficiently and conscientiously used. Thus, Article IX-D of the Constitution ordains
the COA to exercise exclusive and broad auditing powers over all government entities or
trustees, without any exception. Ex officio members' representatives are also covered by
the strict constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family.
Cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex
officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their
services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their
principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members
were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation,
whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
 Bitonio v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 147392
March 12, 2004

Facts:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. May 11,
1995, Bitonio was designated to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of
PEZA. Such designation was in pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916
[Special Economic Zone Act of 1995] As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the
PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended
during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement
transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the
petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative
of the Secretary of Labor?

Held:
Yes. The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary where the Court declared Executive Order No.
284 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government,
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is in his capacity as
representative of the Secretary of Labor. There was no separate or special appointment
for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation
for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner
who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. There is also no merit in
the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the Court
when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union
case.

The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law, since it was
later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 was
amended so the Board of Directors was increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it
is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who should sit as board members of
the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to the Board by the different
Cabinet Secretaries and the payment of per diem
 Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001

Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Ilocos
Sur Governos, Luis ChavitSingson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The Senate and House of Representatives conducted series of investigations
against Estrada. The CBCP, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos, including Arroyo
asked for Estrada’s resignation. In a a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.

January 18, 1999, a 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a
human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples’ solidarity in demanding petitioner’s resignation.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he
will not run in this election.

In noontime of January 20, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to

respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Estrada and his family hurriedly left
Malacanang Palace.

On February 5, he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and for
Quo Warranto on the ground he is the “lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,” and declared
Arroyo to have taken her oath of as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in
an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the

Issue:
Whether or not Estrada is a President-on leave while Arroyo is only an Acting
President?

Held:
No. Arroyo is the de jure President of the Philippines. The Supreme Court
dismissed Estrada’s petition, reasoning, thus: Resignation is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The Validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the case
at bar, the facts show that Estrada did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking
of Arroyo. But, whether or not Estrada resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
 Powers of the President
General
National Electrification Administration v G.R. No 14381 February 15 2002
Court of Appeals
Villena v Secretary of Interior 67 Phil. 451
Planas v. Gil 67 Phil 62
Lacson v. Roque 92 Phil 456
Mondano v. Silvosa 97 Phil 143
Almario v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 189028 July 16 2013

Appointment
Valencia v. Peralta 8 SCRA 692
Binamira v. Garrucho 188 SCRA 154
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. 140 SCRA 22
Intermediate Appellate Court
Matibag v. Benipayo G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002
Sarmiento v. Mison 156 SCRA 549
Quintos-deies v. Committee on 177 SCRA 259
Constitutional Commissions,
Commission on Appointments
Soriano v. Lista G.R. No. 153881 March 24, 2003
Bautista v. Salonga 172 SCRA 16
Calderon v. Carale 208 SCRA 254
Manalo v. Sistoza G.R. No. 107369 August 11, 1999
Rufino v. Endriaga G.R. No. 113956 July 21, 2006
Lacson v. Romero 84 Phil 740
Luego v. Civil service Commission 143 SCRA 327
Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission 197 SCRA 106
Pobre v. Mendieta 224 SCRA 738
Pimentel v. Ermita G.R. No. 164978 October 13 2005
De Rama v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 131136 February 28, 2001
In Re: Mateo Valenzuela A.M. No. 98-5- November 9, 1998
01-SC
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010
Villaluz v. Zaldivar 15 SCRA 710
Alajar v. Alba 100 Phil 683
Aparri v. Court of Appeals 127 SCRA 231
Domingo v. Rayala G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008

Control
Banda v. Ermita G.R. No. 166620 April 20 2010
Malaria Employees And Workers G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007
Association of the Philippines v. Romulo
Domingo v. Zamora G.R. No. 142283 February 6, 2003
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive G.R. No. 196425 July 24 2012
Secretary for Legal Affairs
 DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees G.R. No. 149724 August 19, 2003
City of Ilagan v. Director of Lands 158 SCRA 158
Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano 21 SCRA 895
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory G.R. No. 181293 February 23, 2015
Board
Gloria v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119903 August 15, 2000
Tan v. Director of Forestry 236 SCRA 302
Kilusang Bayan v. Dpminguez 205 SCRA 92
Angangco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619
Huthcinson Ports Phils., Ltd. v. SBMA G.R. No. 131367 August 31 2000
Solar Team Entertainment v. How
G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000
Dadole v. Commission on Audit G.R. 125350 December 3, 2002
Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135
Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000
Ampatuan v. Puno G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011
Province of Negros Occidental v. G.R. No. 182574 September 28, 2010
Commission on Audit
Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes G.R. No. 130775 September 29, 2004

Military Powers
Gudani v. Senga G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
Ampatuan v. Puno G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
Zamora
Lacson v. Perez G.R. No. 147780 May 10 2001
Guanzon v. De Villa 181 SCRA 623
Sanlakas v. Reyes G.R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004
Kulayan v. Tan G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012
Ruffy v. Chieft of Staff 75 Phil. 875
Kuroda v. Jalandoni 42 O.G. 4282
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 150 SCRA 144
Quilona v. General Court Martial 206 SCRA 821
Navales v. General Abaya G.R. No. 162318 October 25, 2004
Langsang v. Garcia 42 SCRA 448
Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 190293 March 20, 2012

Pardon
People v. Salle 250 SCRA 581
People v. Bacang 250 SCRA 44
People v. Cartido G.R. No. 116512 March 7, 1997
People v. Nacional G.R. No. 11294 September 7, 1995
Monsanto v. Factoran 170 SCRA 190
 Sabello v. DECS 180 SCRA 190
Torres v. Sumulong 152 SCRA 273
In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1996
Wilfredo S. Sumulong
People v. Patriarca G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000
Vera v. People 7 SCRA 152

Diplomatic
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern 3 SCRA 351
Sea Trading
Bayan v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
 National Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 143481
February 15, 2002

Facts:
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 took effect. It provided for a salary
schedule for all government positions, appointive or elective, including positions in
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. In
order to alleviate the plight of government personnel, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed on March 3, 1994 Joint Resolution No. 01. This was approved
by President Ramos, and it adjusted the salary of all officials and employees. Paragraph
10 of the Resolution provides that "the new salary schedule shall be implemented within
four (4) years" beginning in 1994. On December 28, 1996, President Ramos issued EO
389 which directed the payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized by the
aforementioned resolution in two tranches. In January 1997, NEA implemented the
salary increases prescribed for the year 1997 pursuant to Joint Resolution No. 01.
However, NEA did not implement the salary increases in accordance with the schedule
of payment specified in EO 389 and NBC No. 458. NEA accelerated the implementation
of the salary increase by paying the second tranche starting January 1, 1997 instead of
November 1, 1997. The Commission on Audit’s resident auditor in NEA required them to
submit the legal basis of the implementation of the new salary schedule. NEA failed to
do so which resulted for the auditor to issue several notice of disallowance. NEA avers
that the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disallowing the increased salaries of NEA's officials and
employees, because it may accelerate the implementation of the increases because of
the availability of the funds.

Issue:
WON NEA can accelerate the implementation of the salary increases for the fourth
and final period of the salary increases provided for in the Joint Resolution no. 1

Held:
No. NEA is not allowed to accelerate the implementation of the salary increases.
Under our system of government all executive departments, bureaus and offices are
under the control of the President of the Philippines. This precept is embodied in Article
VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides as follows:
"Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends
to all executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. The
constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not
require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn,
by the legislature. This case would not have arisen had NEA complied in good faith with
the directives and orders of the President in the implementation of the last phase of the
Salary Standardization Law II. The directives and orders are clearly and manifestly in
accordance with all relevant laws. The reasons advanced by NEA in disregarding the
President's directives and orders are patently flimsy, even ill-conceived. This cannot be
countenanced as it will result in chaos and disorder in the executive branch to the
detriment of public service.
 Villena v. Secretary of Interior
G.R. No. 46570
April 21, 1939

Facts:
Upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, DOJ conducted an inquiry into the
conduct of the petitioner, D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter
was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and
unauthorized practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8,
1939, recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of the petitioner
to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted,
according to the answer of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939, verbally by the
President on the same day. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the petitioner a
letter, specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of
Emiliano Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges. The special
investigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be
commenced on February 17, 1939. Petitioner comes to this court to restrain the
Secretary and his agents from proceeding with the investigation of the herein petitioner
on the grounds that the Secretary has no jurisdiction or authority to investigate and
suspend upon municipal officers.

Issues:
1. WON the Secretary has power to investigate municipal officers
2. WON the Secretary has power to suspend municipal officers

Held:
1. Yes. Pursuant to Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code the Secretary of the
Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against
the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.

1. Yes (because of implied powers). There is no clear and express grant of power
to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation.
On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by section
2188 of the Administrative Code. If the power to suspend is expressly granted to
provincial governors it does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and
precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means
that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The President of the Philippines may himself suspend
the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal. Indeed, if the
President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it
would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of
suspension. If the Secretary is empowered to investigate the charges against the
petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose, preventive
suspension may be a means by which to carry into effect a fair and impartial
investigation. The grant of investigation implies grant of suspension; grant of
power to the president, with his authority, the grant of power shall also be vested
to the secretary.
 Planas v. Gil
G.R. No. L-46440
January 18, 1939

Facts:
La Vanguardia published a statement of the petitioner, then and now a member of
the municipal board of the City of Manila, who criticized the acts of certain government
officials in connection with the general election for Assemblymen held on November 8,
1938. The petitioner received a letter from the office of the president regarding the said
published statement, and directing the petitioner to appear before the Commissioner of
Civil Service either alone or accompanied by his counsel to prove his statements against
the President. Failure to sustain charges or that they have been made in good faith will
cause for the petitioner’s suspension or removal from office.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition at the same time prayed for the issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent commissioner from continuing with
the investigation. This was however denied by resolution of this court.
Petitioner requested Commissioner to refrain from making any ruling and abstain from
taking any further step until the jurisdictional issue could be finally passed upon the
court. The request was denied and the respondent ruled that it had jurisdiction, notifying
the petitioner as well to appear before him to testify in her behalf and produce evidence
to present in support of her charges against the President.

Petitioner also questioned the authority sought to be conferred on respondent by

means of the two letters signed 'By authority of the President: Jorge B. Vargas,
Secretary. to the President' is without any force or eff ect, since the powers and
prerogatives vested in the President of the Philippines by our Constitution and by our
laws can be exercised by the President alone, and cannot be delegated to Mr. Jorge B.
Vargas or to any other person;

Issue:
WON the President has the power to order the investigation

Held:
Yes. Extensive authority over the public service is granted the President of the
Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution provides that "The Executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." And that all executive authority is thus vested
in him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of seeing that the laws are
"faithfully executed." The President "shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices” and shall "exercise general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law”

The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may
act through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the executive
departments are his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of his
executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business,
are presumptively his acts.
 Lacson v. Roque
G.R. No. L-6225
January 10, 1953

Facts:
On October 20, 1952, Mayor Lacson, the petitioner made a radio broadcast in
which he criticized the court's decision stating, it is alleged: "I have nothing but contempt
for certain courts of justice. . . . I tell you one thing (answering an interrogator), if I have
the power to fire Judge Montesa (the trial judge) I will fire him for being incompetent, for
being an ignorant . . . an ignoramus."
Judge Montesa filed his projected complaint for "libel and contempt" with the City
Fiscal. Solicitor Vivo conducted a preliminary investigation in the Office of the Solicitor
General without the presence of either of the Assistant Fiscals assigned to the case, and
sent out subpoenas in his name and upon his signature. On October 31, the day
following the filing of the above complaint, the President wrote the Mayor a letter for
Mayor Lacson suspension. And notified of the suspension, Vice-Mayor Bartolome
Gatmaitan entered upon the duties of the office in place of the suspended city executive.

Issue:
Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.

Held:
No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President
sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the President “shall . . .
exercise general supervision over all local governments,” but supervision does not
contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are
always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in
section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done “conformably to law;”
and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time remove a
person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines.”
Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the
alleged libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.
 Mondano v. Silvosa
G.R. No. L-7708
May 30, 1955.

Facts:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against
him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive
Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor
Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him.
Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition
enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided
that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant
Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department
and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person
who shall conduct such investigations.

Issue:
Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power
of control over a mayor.

Held:
No. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec.
79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the
RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct
control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he
may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the
1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed
as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there
would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of
supervision.
 Almario v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. L-7708
May 30, 1955.

Facts:
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1001 and, upon recommendation
of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the
category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have
made distinct contributions to arts and letters. Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known
as the Law Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into
law. It established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it
an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino
national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.
Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on
June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were
issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz and private respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was
subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on
July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive powers of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the
Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group,
petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for
restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos
and that the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether the indorsement of the complaint, by the Assistant Executive Secretary,
to the respondent is legal.

Held:
Yes because the heads of various executive departments are agents of the
President who, constitutionally, have general supervision over local governments, as
may be provided by law. “Supervision, in administrative law, means overseeing or the
power or authority of an official to see that subordinate officers perform their duties…”
The respondent Governor, upon the endorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary,
is only acting as an agent of the President in investigating the petitioner.
 Valencia v. Peralta
G.R. No. L-20864
August 23, 1963

Facts:
In October 1961, Valencia was designated as acting chairman of the board of
directors of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) by then
President Carlos Garcia. He took his oath of office and in April 1962, the Commission on
Appointments (COA) confirmed Valencia’s appointment. His tenure was set to expire in
July 1967. But in June 1962, when President Diosdado Macapagal took power, he
appointed Macario Peralta, Jr. as chairman of the board of NAWASA. Valencia now
assails the appointment of Peralta on the ground that the office was not vacant and he
was the incumbent chairman when Peralta was appointed. Valencia further contends
that his appointment (by Garcia) is permanent because it was an ad interim
appointment; that the oath he took was even for an ad interim appointment.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Peralta is valid.

Held:
Yes. Valencia’s appointment is merely temporary because he was designated as
“acting” chairman only. This designation, being of revocable and temporary character,
could not ripen into a permanent appointment, even if it was subsequently confirmed by
the COA, because confirmation presupposes a valid nomination or recess appointment,
of which there is no trace. His claim that his appointment is ad interim lacks proof. He did
not show proof but he merely claimed that his appointment was ad interim. On the other
hand, it was shown that apparently, there was found, in the Malacanang Palace, a draft
purportedly for the ad interim appointment of Valencia however, said draft was never
released hence Valencia was never appointed ad interim. Also, the oath he took is not
valid because it did not correspond to his temporary appointment.
 Binamira v. Garrucho
G.R. No. 92008
July 30, 1990

Facts:
Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just
cause in violation of his security of tenure. Binamira claims that since assuming office,
he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board
of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices,
including the Office of the President.
He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded
by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. Binamira’s demurrer led to an
unpleasant exchange that led to his filing of a complaint against the Secretary with the
Commission on Human Rights.

Issue:
Whether Binamira was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority or merely designated

Held:
Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined
as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, the appointment results in
security of tenure. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by
law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in nature. The
implication is that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority.
 PLM v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-65439
November 13, 1985

Facts:
In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the
Vice-President for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM).
Esteban’s appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM Board of
Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later
discovered that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent
appointment. He then requested Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco,
however, appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his appointment as VP for
Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission
where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate
Appellate Court reversed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Esteban’s appointment became permanent.

Held:
Esteban had been extended several “ad-interim” appointments which PLM
mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature. An officer ad interim is
one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.
Later, in its Resolution 485, the PLM Board of Regents verified Esteban’s
appointment without condition nor limitation as to tenure. As of that moment, it became a
regular and permanent appointment. Note further that “. . . an ad interim appointment is
one made in pursuance of par (4), sec 10, Article 7, of the [1973] Constitution, which
provides that ‘the President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is
an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than
that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable
from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent
appointment is issued.”
 Matibag v. Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036
April 2, 2002

Facts:
The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.
Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV
of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad
interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad
interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum
reassigning the directors .Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief citing
the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001,
reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are
prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo
denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the
said memo circular.
Petitioner also filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right
to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of
the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of
the COMELEC.

Issues:
Whether or not the assumption of office by petitioners on the basis of the ad
interim appointments

Held:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
 Sarmiento v. Mison
G.R. No. 79974
December 17, 1987

Facts:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison
was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president
Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar,
taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison
because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution,
heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also
sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s
appointment.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by
the Commission on Appointment.

Held:
No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of
those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987
Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president
which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not
require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of
Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by
the COA.
 Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commission
G.R. No. 83216
September 4 1989

Facts:
Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a
sectoral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress
was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the
Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that
their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment
does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII
of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA
to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.

Issue:
Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the CoA.

Ruling:
Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5,
Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7,
Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
 Soriano v. Lista
G.R. No. 153881
March 24, 2003

Facts:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the
President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed
office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a
taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their
assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.
Issue:
Whether or not there is still need for confirmation of the COA.

Held:
It is clear from SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987 Constitution that only
appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require
confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of
the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction
that changes its meaning. The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by
the CA under SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The
clause "officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain" refers to
military officers alone.
 Bautista v. Salonga
G.R. No. 86439
April 13 1989

Facts:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII,
without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government
"whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive
Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

Issue:
Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation and is it
ad interim appointment?

Held:
No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the
appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the
authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7),
that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA. The Commission on
Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to
appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very
nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to
remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make,
that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad
interim appointments.
 Calderon v. Carale
Gr No. 91636
April 23, 1992

Facts:
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.
Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue
in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the
respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law
(RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such
appointments.The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which
amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the
confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

Issue:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution.

Held:
Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared
unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: (1) It amends by
legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) it
amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which
are otherwise entrusted only with the President.
It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what
it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it
interpreted.
 Manalo v. Sistoza
G.R. No. 107369
August 11, 1999

Facts:
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of
Interior and Local Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also
provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be
appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including
Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as
Directors and Chief Superintendents within the PNP. Said appointments were not
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the
validity of the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation by the
Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction, their appointment being
contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of
the said law. Manalo also insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption
of constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the courts.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

Held:
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers
of the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers
lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress
cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 Rufino v. Endriga
GR No 139554
July 21, 2006

Facts:
Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are
contesting each other’s appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members,
was appointed by then-President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino
group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada.
Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group
transgressed PD 15 – creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15,
specifically Section 6, appointment into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote
of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is entirely
vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of independence from pressure or politics.
Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on
appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the
Constitution. The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment
of its members.

Issue:
Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their
fellow members is constitutional

Held:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees
themselves is unconstitutional. While it is stated that appointing powers may be
delegated by the President, such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower
than the appointing authority.In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow
member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature.
CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the
limitation of delegate appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside the
control of the President.
 Lacson v. Romero
G.R. L-3081
October 14, 1949

Facts:
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of the
Philippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August 10,
1946, and thereafter performed the duties of that office.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the
President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the
same date, the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1949.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of
Tarlac. But respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros
Oriental) in Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and
thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros
Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office the following day, but
Lacson objected.

Issue:
Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position.
Held:
The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete
involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that
nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature
has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee
by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a
mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and
effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the
appointment or nomination. As held in the case "there is no Power in this country which
can compel a man to accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to
accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do
so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said
office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros
Oriental.
 Luego v. CSC
G.R. NO. L-69137
August 5, 1986

Facts::
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described
as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22
March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified
than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private
respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on
28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking
his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s
order and the private respondent’s title.

Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil
Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.
 Lapinid v. CSC
G.R. No. 96298
May 14, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to
the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on
October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private
respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals
Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement
Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal
supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the
appeal meritorious. It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79)
have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and
Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato
Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any
position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be
notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the officer may have the power of appointment.

Held:
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel.
While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the
selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the
appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing
authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to
review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
 Pobre v. Mendieta
G.R. No. 106677
July 23, 1993

Facts:
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable
Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A.
Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the
second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.
In a Memorandum, Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered
the queries as follows: Based on the foregoing premises, it is our view that Section 2 of
P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President. It has been
said that "those matters which the Constitution specifically confides to the executive, the
legislative cannot directly or indirectly take from his control"
Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because President Aquino
had already appointed him PRC Chairman and he had, in fact, already taken his oath of
office on February 17, 1992. Judge Somera denied the prayer for a restraining order as
well as the petition for declaratory relief for being moot and academic.
Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre's appointment
as chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded Francia as PRC
Chairman by operation of law. Pobre disputed Mendieta's claim on the ground that only
the President of the Philippines, in whom the appointing power is vested by law and the
Constitution, may name the successor of retired PRC Commissioner/Chairman Francia
upon the expiration of the latter's term of office.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the
Professional Regulation Commission by the President is lawful.

Held:
The power of appointment cannot be restricted to the point that the officer loses
the discretion. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the
Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
"succession" or by "operation of law" for that would deprive the President of his power to
appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed
by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion
for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position of junior
(or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when
the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and
appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only
the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency.
Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as
to avoid it.
 Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita
G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005

Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the Congress had
adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert
that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or
acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries
maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while
Congress is in session.

Issue:
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries while Congress is in session.

Held:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary,
the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. The office of a
department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office
must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office
of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of
her choice even while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments.
 De Rama v. CA
G.R. No. 131136
February 28, 2001

Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14
municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor,
done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s
request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC
dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out
that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those
appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local
elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue
appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification
standards for the position.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

Held:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight
appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law
that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his
or her tenure.
 In Re Mateo Valenzuela
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC.
November 9, 1998

Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President
dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of
the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear
prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution.
The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments
two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec.
15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in
the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec.
15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during

the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making
of the appointments during the period of the ban
 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
G. R. No. 191002
March 17, 2010

Facts:
Seven days After 2010 Presidential Election, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had
his compulsory Retirement by May 17, 2010. May the incumbent President appoint his
successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. But under Section 4 (1),
Article III judicial Department of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, “from a "list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy."
This provision sin in contrast with the provision mentioned above.The question now
arises whether the incumbent president has the right to appoint the next chief Justice
upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme
Court or to the Judiciary.

Held:
No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the
Executive Department. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower
courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC
should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list
to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period
allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. The duty of the
JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day
period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in
the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object
of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the
President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to
constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that
duty.
 Villaluz v. Zaldivar
G.R. No. L-22754
December 31, 1965

Facts:
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in
1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective
leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a
committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz
be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from
his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.

Issue:
Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.

Held:
Yes.The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service.The President of the
Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of
Republic Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be
investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the
Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint” .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President
may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong
to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or
employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power
cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that
“the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in heads of department”.
 Alajar v. Alba
G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433
January 17, 1957

Facts:
Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that
the vice mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio Alajar
was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alajar telling
him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was then declared
as the acting mayor. Alajar refused to leave his post and he filed a quo warranto case
before Judge Jose Evangelista who ruled in favor of him.
Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides: Appointment of City Officials. – The President of
the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of
the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may remove at
pleasure any of the said officers
Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the
constitutional inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are
mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.

Issue:
Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the president
upon displeasure.

Held:
Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during
good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress
could not deprive him.

The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and
fixing the “term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right and the “tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is
a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power,
Congress enacted RA 603 creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for
the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-
Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that
Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent
upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alajar was appointed by the pleasure of
the president and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.
 Aparri v. Court of Appeals
127 SCRA 231

Facts:
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was created
under Republic Act 1160. Remedios Fortich, Chairman, Angelino Banzon, Rafael Hilao,
Valeriano Plantilla, and Severo Yap, members of the Board of Directors of NARRA,
passed resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), appointing Bruno Aparri as General Manager
of NARRA which took effect on January 16,1960. This is pursuant to paragraph 2,
section 8, of R.A 1160, to wit:

Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of Directors shall
have the following powers and duties:
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager …, subject to the
recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the
President of the Philippines, …. The Board, by a majority vote of all members, may, for
cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the
approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General
Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
However on March 15, 1962, the same board of Directors passed resolution no.
24 (series of 1962), fixing the term of Aparri up to the closing time of the office on March
31,1962. Bruno Aparri filed a petition for preliminary injunction at the Court of First
instance but was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or
dismissal of the petitioner without cause.

Held:
Yes. Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his
term. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term.
Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his
term to hold such office. The approval of the President of Resolution No. 24 fixed the
term of Aparri until March 31, 1962 pursuant to Sec. 8, Par. 2 of R.A. 1160.
 Domingo v. Rayala
G.R. No. 155831
Feb 18, 2008

Facts:
On November 16, 1998, Maria Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter
III at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rogelio Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The committee constituted found Rayala
guilty of the offense charged Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee
Report and Recommendation to the Office of the President (OP), but with the
recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day, in accordance with AO 250. On May 8, 2000, the OP issued Administrative Order
119, disagreeing with the recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, ordered that Rayala be dismissed from
service for being found guilty of grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty
of suspension of service for the maximum period of one (1) year.

Issue:
Whether or not the President can dismiss Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for
sexual harassment.

Held:
No. It is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who
would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC
Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for cause as provided by law.
Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a
penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the
imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to
impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only
be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high
government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue
advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance[57] and
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala
is suspension for one (1) year.
 Banda v. Ermita
GR No. 166620
April 20, 2010

Facts:
National Printing Office was created by president Cory Aquino under Executive
Order 285, having printing jurisdiction over all standard form of the government, official
ballots, and official publications. On October 25,2004, President Gloria Arroyo issued
Executive Order 378, amending section 6 of E.O. 285, removing the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Printing Office over the printing services requirements of the
government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to E.O. 378, government agencies
and instrumentalities can source their printing services from private sector through
bidding. E.O. 378 also cut NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its
income. Petitioners here filed for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of E.O. 378.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 378 is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes. In the present case, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices,the
assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law
consisting mainly of streamlining the National Printing Office in the interest of simplicity,
economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President motivated
and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only but accept.

The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a

delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title
III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, "in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency." This is a matter already well-entrenched in
jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through executive or administrative
order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987.
 Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines v. Romulo
G.R. No. 160093
July 31, 2007

Facts:
President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant to
Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522,
also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for
structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of
Health. On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the
Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive
Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG)
composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.
Secretary of Health Issued issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of
2000, which set the implementing guidelines for the restructuring process on personnel
selection and placement, retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94 outlined
the general guidelines for the selection and placement of employees adopting the
procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No. 66564 or the "Rules on Governmental
Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78 of the GAA for
the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292. On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of
Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000.
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a
union of affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health.
MEWAP filed a case assailing that E.O. 102 violates E.O. 292 and R.A 8522.

Issue:
Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize structurally and
functionally the functions of the Department of Health.

Held:
Yes. The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the
Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws pursuant to Article VII,
Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule has always been that the
power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the
legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is
either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where
the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as
bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or
certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
 Domingo v. Zamora
GR No. 142283
February 6, 2003

Facts:
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order
No. 81 entitled "Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the
Role of DECS in School-Based Sports."

Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales issued

Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily
reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions
or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.

On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594

reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the
DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected
by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the
instant petition. Petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an
undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the President’s
issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also
challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.

Held:
Yes. Although the issue is moot and academic upon the passing of Republic Act
9155 which abolished the BPESS and transferred DECS’s functions relating to sports
competition to the Philippine Sports Commission, the Supreme Court stressed that E.O.
292 ( Administrative Code of 1987), grants the President continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President “to achieve simplicity, economy, and efficiency”.
The reorganization of the President of the Office of the President is limited only to
transferring functions from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies or vice
versa. Transfer does not result in the employee’s cessation in the office because his
office continues to exist although in another department or agency.
 Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
G.R. 196425
July 24 2012

Facts:
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 13, abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA),
more particularly to its newly established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the
IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely,
Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings
Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary

Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective
written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 13 is valid.
Held:
Yes. The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President
under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292.
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the
Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President
Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions
or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or agencies, and vice versa.
 DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees
G.R. No. 149724
August 19, 2003
Facts:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources of Region XII Israel Gaddi issued a memorandum
directing the immediate transfer of Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotobato pursuant to DENR Administrative Order 99-14, issued by DENR
Secretary Antonio Cerilles. Employees of DENR Region XII who are members of te
employees association, “COURAGE”, filed a case to nullify orders with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region
12 Office.

Held:
Yes. The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."

The DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of
the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
 City of Iligan v. Director of Lands
158 SCRA 895

Facts:
On August 9, 1952, The President issued Proclamation No. 335 pursuant to
Section 88 of the Commonwealth Act 141 withdrawing the sale or settlement of parcels
of land formerly Camp Overton Military Reservation for the use of the National Power
Corporation situated in Iligan City. NPC, a public corporation organized under
Commonweatlh Act 120 and Executive Order No. 399, constructed a Maria Christina
Fertilizer Plant.

On September 15, 1960, NPC sold the parcel of land to Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation with all appurtenant machineries, equipment, buildings, quarters, structures,
etc.,"including the right of occupancy and use of the land" described in Proclamation
335, Series of 1952; and further covenanted to "collaborate with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in facilitating the outright sale and/or right to lease for
at least 25 years, renewable for another 25 year, the lands wherein the properties of the
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant are erected, located and/or situated. Proclamation 89 and
198 series of 1964 were issued excluding areas occupied by Maria Christina Fertilizer
Plant from Proclamation 335 and declaring these lands to public disposition. Marcelo
Tire Corporation and Maria Christina Fertilizer Plant filed for Miscellaneous Sales
application. The plant was operated by Marcelo Steel Company, the sister company of
Marcelo Tire. President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 469, granting and donating
the lands in favor of Iligan City. Iligan City filed preliminary injunction upon the Director of
Lands and Marcelo Steel Corporation.

Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain
to any government like the City of Iligan.

Held:
Yes. Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive control among
others in the lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of the public
domain subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the President of the Philippines
has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., the President of
the Philippines has therefore the same authority to dispose of portions of the public
domain as his subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The President’s power is recognized in Section 69 of
the Public Land Act.
 Araneta v. Gatmaitan
101 Phil 328

Facts:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur, a part of the National waters of the Philippines with an extension of
about 250 square miles and an average depth of approximately 6 fathoms, is considered
as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. The operation of
trawls in the area was said to have depleted the marine resources in the area. On April
4, 1954, the President issued Executive Order 22, prohibiting the use of trawls in San
Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the
general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel
Bay. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to
declare E.O 22 as null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order Nos. 22, 60 and 80 were valid.

HELD:
Yes. Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or
catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and; b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture
and Nat. Resources to provide regulations and restrictions as may be deemed
necessary. The Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the
legislative intent. It also appears from the exhibits on record in these cases that fishing
with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the
millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie" , and that,
"the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the
ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime
catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the
life of the sea".

Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and
authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did
nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal
province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in
consonance and strict conformity with the law.
 Lacson-Magallanes Company, Inc. v. Pano
21 SCRA 895

Facts:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in
Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural
zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which
he is a co-owner.
Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The
Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied
his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He
also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of
power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued
that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

Issue:
Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.

Held:
Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers
in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive
Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are not required
by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the
fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive
and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit
which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even
reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the
Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain
valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no
reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.
 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 181293
February 23, 2015

Facts:
The Toll Regulatory Board was created under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in
order to regulate the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. Presidential
Decree No. 1113 was also enacted granting Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Company or PNCC) the right,
privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities at the North and
South Luzon Expressways for a period of thirty years starting May 1, 1977. Presidential
Decree no. 1894 amended 1113, granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to
construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities not only in the North and South Luzon
Expressways but also Metro Manila Expressway, provided that the franchise granted a
thirty-year term to PNCC from the date of completion of the project.
PNCC and CITRA, an Indonesian company, passed a Joint Investment Proposal
of the financing, design and construction of the Metro Manila Skyways. It was approved
by the TRB. PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement.
They established CITRA Metro Manila Tollways Corporation. In the Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement (STOA), the construction and design of the roads were primary
and exclusive privilege of the CMMTC while maintenance and operation was given to
PNCC Skyway Corporation.
In 1997, an Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operations Agreement was
issued by TRB, PNCC and CITRA and replaced PSC with Skyway O & M Corporation
(SOMCO) for the operation and maintenance of the Metro Manila Skyway.

Issue:
Whether or not approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid.

Held:
Yes. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on
which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally,
executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive departments
headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President
unless disapproved by the latter. There can be no question that the act of the secretary
is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the
ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The
same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on 24
January 2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve
contracts entered into by the TRB.
 Gloria v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119903
August 15, 2000

Facts:
On June 29, 1989, Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by Pres. Cory Aquino
as Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City. On October
12, 1994, Secretary Ricardo Gloria recommended that Icasiano be reassigned as
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology to fill up the vacancy
created by the retirement of Bannaoag Lauro. The President approved the
recommendation of Secretary Gloria. Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano requested respondent
Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request. The
petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines,
asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to
the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the
letter with the Office of President and filed a petition for review on certiorari. The Court of
Appeals granted Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano at temporary restraining order against his
reassignment.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Icasiano’s reassignment violates the security of tenure of
public officers.

Held:
Yes. Court ffirms the finding of the Court of Appeals that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being
"an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject
reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as
fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the
said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or
would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed;
which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent
with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.
 Tan v. Director of Forestry
236 SCRA 92

Facts:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice 2087 advertising for
public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales
consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252
hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine
Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir.
Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions
stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000
hectares for extension)

Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano

promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to
the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, Ordinary
Timber License of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the
Director of Forestry released the license.

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that
the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tan’s
OTL null and void. Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not revocation of Tan’s Ordinary Timber License was valid?
Held:
No. Timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The
utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision
of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest
only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate
officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, therefore, may impose reasonable
regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer". The power of control
of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse
or set aside acts of subordinate officials. Accordingly, Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued
by the Director of Forestry.
 Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez
205 SCRA 92

Facts:
On September 2, 1985, The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa through its
Mayor Santiago Carlos Jr. entered into a contract with KILUSANG BAYAN SA
PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG
MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for
the latter's management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The
contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985,
renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual
agreement of the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month which
shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5)
years only.

Santiago Carlos Jr. was then succeeded by Ignacio Bunye as mayor and wanted
to review the contract between the city and KBMBPM because of the “virtual 50-year
term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental”. The Commission on Audit
and the Metro Manila Commission sought for the rescission of the contract. On August
1988, the Municipal Council approved Resolution No. 48 abrogating the contract. Mayor
Bunye then went to the public market and announced that KBMBPM should immediately
transfer possession, management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the
Municipal Government of Muntinlupa. In an Order of Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez,
Secretary of Agriculture dated 28 October 1988, directed Mayor Bunye and to implement
the order, by taking over and assuming the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the
then incumbent Board of Directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the
General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful functions as such.

Issue:
Whether or not order of the Secretary of Agriculture is valid.

Held:
No. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of
Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are
authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge
under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all
cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An administrative officer has only
such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may
to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
 Angangco v. Castillo
9 SCRA 302

Facts:
Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co. wrote a letter to the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry requesting a special permit to withdraw certain items from the
customs house which were imported without dollar allocation or remittance of foreign
exchange. These were Pepsi-Cola concentrates which were not covered by any Central
Bank release certificate. The company also sent a letter to the Secretary of Finance who
was also Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. After failure to secure the
permit from the Central Bank, its counsels approached Collector of Customs Angangco
to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure
the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office
wrote a letter to Angangco that stated that his office had no objection to the release of
the concentrates but could not take action on the request as it was not in their
jurisdiction. Angangco telephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval
of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Angangco finally released the
concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an
administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Angangco. For three years
Angangco had been discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary
Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the President has the power to remove officials under the
classified civi service.

Held:
No. Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, only the Commissioner of the Civil
Service has jurisdiction over Angangco’s case. Angangco has been deprived of the
procedure and due process guaranteed by law. The President’s power to control
extends only to investigate, suspend or remove officials in the executive department only
if they are appointees of the President. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are
vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their
removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil
Service Act of 1959.
 Huthcinson Ports Phils, Ltd. vs Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
GR No. 131367
August 31 2000

Facts:
On February 12, 1996, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA)
advertised in leading national daily newspapers and in one international publication, an
invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern
marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of seven bidders who
responded to the published invitation, three were declared by the SBMA as qualified
bidders after passing the pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMAs Technical
Evaluation Committee. Royal Ports Services, Inc. filed a complaint that International
Container Terminal Services Inc. was barred to operate a second port in the Philippines
pursuant to Executive Order No. 212. The bid was finally awarded to Hutchison Ports
Philippines Incorporated. ICTSI filed a complaint to reconsider their bid. The SBMA
Board of Directors already declared HPPL as the winner. However by the
recommendation of the Executive Secretary, the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding however, HPPL was no
longer among the qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for injunction to
enjoin SBMA from conducting the rebidding.

Issue:
Whether or not the President has the power to call upon a rebidding.

Held:
Yes. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are subject to the control
and supervision of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require
the approval of the President of the Philippines under Letter of Instruction No. 620, which
places the SBMA under its ambit as an instrumentality, defined in Section 10 thereof as
an agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the
direct control of the Office of the President, particularly when contracts and/or projects
undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts of money. The President may,
within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of
Directors for justifiable reasons. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or
reject any bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts
will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless
it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or injustice.
 Solar Team Entertainment v. How
GR No. 140863
August 22, 2000

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Paranaque filed an estafa case against Ma. Fe Bariero
based on a complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment Inc. Before the scheduled
arraignment on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent judge Rolando How issued
an order resetting the arraignment on the ground that private respondent had filed an
appeal with the Department of Justice. The case was further reset twice but before the
scheduled hearing on November 18, 1999, private respondent again asked for the
deferment of the arraignment. Due to this motion, respondent judge issued an order
further deferring the arraignment until such time that the appeal with the DOJ is
resolved.

Issue:
Whether or not trial court can indefinitely suspend arraignment awaiting the
resolution of the Department of Justice.

Held:
Yes. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,[23] exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to
Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice
supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and
City Prosecution Offices. A court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to
resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file
information. This is in line with the pronouncement in the Crespo case that courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutor's discretion over criminal prosecution. Thus, public
respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the
arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice.

In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed out that: "the trial court in
a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the
arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon
proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the
Department of Justice." The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order
suspending the arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion to Defer
Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was well within the power of public respondent to grant the continuance
since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority
 Dadole v Commission on Audit
GR. No. 125350
December 3, 2002

Facts:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount
to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) granting
honorarium would be granted subject to conditions mentioned in the memorandum.

Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor
issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount
(maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively)
authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be
reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in
excess of P1000 from the last six months.

Issue:
Whether or not LBC 55 is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President.

Held:
Yes. LBC 55 is null and void. Supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.

The President’s supervisory power should not go beyond checking whether local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as
they act within the scope of their authority. Clearly then, the President can only interfere
in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has
acted contrary to law. The President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in
local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters
of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs
of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations.
 Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497
August 4, 1994

Facts:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice
declared Ordinance No. 7794, or the Manila Revenue Code, to be null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances, and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The petition for certiorari
filed by the City of Manila was sustained by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
and revoked the resolution and sustained the validity of the ordinance, holding that the
procedural requirements had been observed. It further held that Section 187 was
unconstitutional for vesting the Secretary of Justice the power of control over local
governments, in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution,
and in contravention with the President’s power of supervision over local governments.
In the petition before the Supreme Court, the Secretary of Justice argues that
Section 187 is constitutional, and that the procedural requirements for enactment of tax
ordinances specified in the Local Government Code has indeed not been observed.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 187 gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control
and not only of supervision, in violation of the policy of local autonomy.

Held:
No. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality of legality of the tax ordinance, and if warranted, to revoke it on either or
both of the stated grounds. When he alters of modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he
is not permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. What the Secretary did was only to set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, and not to replace it of his own version of what the Code should be. All
he did in reviewing the said measure was to determine if the prescribed procedure was
being complied with, which constituted an act of supervision and not of control. There is
therefore no violation of the policy of local autonomy.
 Pimentel v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 132988
July 19, 2000

Facts:
On December 27, 1997, The President issued Administrative Order No 372
stating that all government departments and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units will
identify and implement measures in Fiscal Year 1998 that will reduce total expenditures
for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services items.

This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul Section 2 of the
Administrative Order No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce
their expenditures and enjoin the implementation of sec. 4 of the Order, withholding a
portion of the internal revenue allotments.

Issue:
Whether or not Sections 1 and 4 of E.O. 372 are valid exercises of the
President’s power of general supervision over local governments.

Held:
Section 1 of the Administrative Order does not violate local fiscal autonomy.
Local fiscal autonomy does not exclude the national government from ensuring local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely
directory and can not be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The Local
Government Code allows the national government to interfere in local fiscal matters
provided that 1) there is an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
2) consultations are held with the presding officers of the Congress and the Presidents
of various local leagues; 3) there is a corresponding recommendation from the
secretaries of the DOF, DILG and DBM; and 4) adjustments shall in no case be greater
than 30% of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.

However, Section 4 cannot be upheld insofar as it violates local fiscal autonomy

mandated by the Constitution. Fiscal autonomy entails the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.
 Ampatuan v. Puno
G.R. No. 190259
June 7, 2011

Facts:
The day following the massacre of 57 men and women, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the province of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and the city of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She then directed
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to undertake such measures to prevent and
suppress all forms of lawlessness as may be provided by law. Three days later, Arroyo
issued Administrative Order No. 273 (AO 273), transferring supervision of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Due to issues on terminology
however, AO 273-A was issued, amending the term “transferring” to “delegating”
supervision instead.
Datu Zaldy Ampatuan and other ARMM officials subsequently filed a petition for
prohibition, claiming that the aforesaid issuances encroached upon ARMM’s local
autonomy, as it granted the DILG Secretary the power to exercise control over the
ARMM, instead of mere administrative supervision, which in effect empowered the DILG
Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize its regional government’s powers.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the
President issued the Proclamation to restore peace and order in the places in concern,
that the issuance was pursuant to her “calling out” power, and that she merely delegate
through the AOs her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary as her
alter ego.

Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 73 and 273-A violate the principle of
local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution and Section 1, Article V of
the Expanded ARMM Organic Act, or Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).

Held:
No. the DILG Secretary did not take over the control powers of the ARMM. After
taking the Governor of ARMM in custody for alleged complicity, the rule of succession
found in Section 12, Article VII of RA 9054 was carried into effect, and Ansaruddin
Adiong assumed the positon of governorship without incident. Thus, the DILG Secretary
did not take over the administration over the operations of the ARMM and violated its
autonomy.
 Province of Negros Occidental v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 182574
September 28, 2010

Facts:
In December 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed
Resolution No. 720-A, allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the
province. The insurance coverage was granted to Philam Care Health System
Incorporated (Philam Care) and in January 1996, the total premium amount of
P3,760,000 was paid. In January 1997, the Provincial Auditor issued a Notice of
Suspension, suspending the premium payment for lack of approval from the Office of the
President, as provided under Administrative Order No. 103 (AO 103). President Estrada
then directed the Commission on Audit (COA) to lift the suspension, but only in the
amount of P100,000. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive and proceeded to
issue a Notice of Disallowance.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA, which affirmed the Provincial
Auditor’s Notice of Disallowance, ruling that under AO 103, no government entity,
including a local government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the
President granting additional benefits to its personnel. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the COA as well.

Issue:
Whether or not the insurance benefits granted to the employees require prior
approval from the President under AO 103.

Held:
No. The main purpose of AO 103 us to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction, and
demoralization among government personnel who do not receive, or receive less
incentive benefits or other forms of allowances. A reading of the provision of AO 103
would indicate that the prohibition on non-acquisition of prior approval from the President
applies only to government offices/agencies, including government owned and controlled
corporations, as well as their respective governing boards. Being a local government
unit, petitioner falls under the President’s general supervision power, so the President’s
authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed and the laws faithfully
executed. The grant of additional compensation in this case therefore, does not need the
President’s approval to be valid.
 National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes
G.R. No. 130775
September 27, 2004

Facts:
On June 11, 1997, Manuel Rayos, as Punong Barangay of Barangay 52,
Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan, against Alex David, then President of the National Liga ng
mga Barangay (Liga) and of its Chapter in Caloocan City. He alleged that David
committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed
synchronized Liga elections in 1997. The elections went as scheduled and David was
elected and proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan. Rayos subsequently filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that he was the one elected President. Pending the
consolidation of cases, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) invoked
the President’s power of general supervision over local government units and sought to
provide remedies in view of the “chaos sweeping” the Liga, and the Liga Board’s
incapacity to address the problems properly.
In August 1997, Judge Paredes issued the order appointing the DILG as interim
caretaker of the Liga, and was allowed to manage and administer the affairs of the
National Liga Board. Thereafter, the DILG provided for supplemental guidelines for the
1997 synchronized elections of the chapters of the Liga, and appointed Rayos as
president of Liga-Caloocan. David’s protest against DILG’s appointment as interim
caretaker was thereafter denied, hence the petition for certiorari seeking nullification of
the order issued by Judge Paredes on the ground that the DILG acted beyond the scope
of the Chief Executive’s power of supervision over local government units.

Issue:
Whether or not the order appointing DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga ng
mga Barangay, and authorizing it to manage the affairs of the latter is valid.

Held:
No. The Liga is a government organization created by law, whose members are
either appointed or elected government officials. In the case of Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,
the Court ruled that the President’s power of general supervision, as exercised by the
DILG Secretary as his alter ego extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. Like the local
government units however, the Liga is not subject to the control by the President or his
alter ego. Thus, when the DILG was appointed to be the interim caretaker to manage
and administer the affairs of the Liga, the management exercised by the National Liga
Board was effectively removed and vested on the DILG. This was in the nature of
control, of which the DILG had no authority to exercise. Being in violation of the policy on
local autonomy, the order of Judge Paredes is therefore not valid and must be set aside.
 Gudani v. Senga
GR. No. 170165
August 15, 2016

Facts:
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several
senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005.
The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing
of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
President Gloria Arroyo issued Executive Order 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the
Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the
Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be
subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a
superior officer.

Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to prevent members of the Armed
Forces of Philippines from appearing before legislative history.

Held:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. However, the President may not
issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but
on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech
of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief
are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R No. 171396
May 3, 2006

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issuedPP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and issued G.O. No. 5 implementingPP 1017. The cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents
of the NPA, and some members of the political opposition in a plot assassinate
President Arroyo. In addition, the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan was also considered and the raid of an army outpost in Benguet
resulting in the death of three soldiers as additional factual basis for the issuance. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related
celebration of Edsa People Power I and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier
by the local governments. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that
warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented. Undeterred by the announcements groups of protesters (members of
Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
[NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
converging at the EDSA shrine. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of
the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the
Saturday issue. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices,
the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its
sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President liftedPP 1017.
Issue:
Whether or not PP1017 is valid exercise of calling out power of the President
Held:
Affirmative. Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo
found it necessary to issuePP 1017 owing to her Office's vast intelligence network, she
is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. Under the calling-
out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every
act that goes beyond the President's calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot
invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the
wisdom of ourConstitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
 Ampatuan v. Puno
G.R. No. 190259
June 7, 2011
Facts:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and
women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issuedProclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in the named places.
ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state
of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking
over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President's emergency powers.

Issue:
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence
in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
Held:
Negative. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same. The President, as Commander-in-Chief
has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to
call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284
August 15, 2000
Facts:
The President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and
the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the
"LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership
of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign
are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed
the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in
Metro Manila is violative ofthe Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in
Metro Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law
enforcement work
Issue:
Whether or not the President exercise a valid military powers
Held:
Affirmative. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination
of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether
it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that
the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there
exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful
hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President's judgment.
 Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001

Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She
likewise issuedGeneral Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected. Lacson, Aquino et al filed petitions to assail the declaration of a state
of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on
May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" in Metro Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1 are unconstitutional
Held:
The instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. In quelling or
suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, if the circumstances so warrant. Furthermore, the factual necessity of calling out
the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since
matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are
not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment
might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces
may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as
Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property.
 Guanzon v. De Villa
181 SCRA 623
January 30, 1990
Facts:
The "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by
the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range
from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at
Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. Guanzon et al claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses, to wit, there are no search warrants, banging
of doors, residents were pointed with high-powered guns, examining bodies of men for
tattoo marks, ransacking of homes and tosses belongings, arrests of those who will not
respond to their instructions, illegal detention and maltreatment, beatings and mental
and physical torture to extract information.
De Villa, Aguirre et al answered that they have legal authority to conduct saturation
drives and they allege that the accusations of Guazon et al about a deliberate disregard
for human rights are total lies.
Issue:
Whether or not the saturation drive is a valid exercise of military powers
Held:
Negative because the arrests were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. The
Solicitor General admits the saturation drives had been done with due regard to human
rights and that they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual
operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with
their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined these operations,
witnessed, and reported the events that transpired relative thereto. Therefore, the fact
that they had been carefully planned, executed in coordination with Tondo's barangay
officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness will not validate them. The
lack of a warrant makes them, per se, illegal. Furthermore, a show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. As a general
rule, a peace officer cannot act unless he is possessed of the proper arrest or search
warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before him, in which case,
action is justified and necessary.
 Sanlakas v. Reyes
G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004

Facts:
Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003.
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the
dayProclamation No. 427 andGeneral Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion"
and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-
long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did
not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1,
2003, through Proclamation No. 435.
Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa et al contend that Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the
armed forces and further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President
of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.
Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of
the declaration. In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the
petitioners to bring suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 is constitutional
Held:
The Court declares that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist which has
rendered the case moot. It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out
powerthe Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of
rebellion. In the exercise of the latter such power,the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public
safety requires the exercise of such power.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note thatthe Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with
Executive powers.
The President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-
in-Chief powers. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and
that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration
may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the
entire nation. But this Court's mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of
the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
 Kulayan v Tan
G.R. No. 187298
July 3, 2012

Facts:
On 15 January 2009, Andreas Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in
Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean
Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project
for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to
be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issuedProclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09) declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to theHuman Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence.
Kulayan et al contend thatProclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces.
In his Comment, Governor Tan deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires
because it is acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 ofthe Local Government Code,
which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during
calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code
authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency,and exercise the
powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general
searches and seizures.
Held:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive,
who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as well as the calling-out powers.
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called
upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-
out powers contemplated underthe Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may
not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 ofthe Local Government Code.
 Ruffy v. Chief of Staff
75 Phil 875
August 20, 1946

Facts:
On December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M.
Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine
Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the Japanese
forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering
to the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerilla outfit known as
Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area.
The 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer
of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of military
character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned
Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva
and 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan
as Finance Officer, as per Special Orders no. 99 dated November 2, 1943. In a
memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was
stated that Captain Garcia had been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut. Francisco
P9,000, P5,0000 for palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B Company.
A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June
8, 1944. Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo
Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944,
Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by Ruffy. It was this murder which gave rise to
Ruffy's trial, the legality of which is now being contested.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ruffy et al were subject to military law at the time the offense
was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy

Held:
Affirmative. By acceptance of Ruffy et al of appointments as officers in the Bolo
Area from the General Headquartersof the 6th Military District, they became members
of the Philippine Army amenable to theArticles of War. The Bolo Area received supplies
and funds for the salariesof its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command.
As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under
the orders ofduly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States
Army. Ruffy et al come within the general application of the clause in sub- paragraph
(a) ofArticle 2 of the 2d Article of War; "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or
ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are
required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same."
 Kuroda v Jalandoni
42 O.G 4282
March 26, 1949
Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period
covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Military Commission convened by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control the
operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese
Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking
to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to
enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in
the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission; and to permanently
prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional

Held:
Affirmative. In the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted
principles and policies and international law which are part of our constitution and
promulgated in the exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our armed
forces. The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspects of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the
issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
 Olaguer v Military Commission No. 34
150 SCRA 144
May 22, 1987

Facts:
On December 24, 1979, Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-
Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos-Maclang,
Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C.
Amado were arrested by the military authorities.
They were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the Judge Advocate
General and the approval of the Minister of National Defense.
On June 13, 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines created Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed against the
accused. Olaguer et al sought their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas
corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to
try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law.
They also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No.
34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the Petition, the Military
Commission No. 34 passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them
the penalty of death by electrocution. Thus, on February 14, 1985, petitioners Olaguer,
Maclang and Othoniel and Ester Jimenez went to this Court and filed the other instant
Petition, this time for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They also
sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians
for offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open and
functioning.
Held:
Negative. Military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government
and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by legislature for the
President as Commander of Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy
and enforcing discipline therein and utilized under his orders of those of his authorized
military representatives. As long as civil courts are open and functioning, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by
them. Proclamation 2045 is an acknowledgement on the part of the Executive
Department of the Government that national emergency no longer exist, thus military
tribunals be considered functus officio in their relationship to civilian
 Quilona v General Court Martial
206 SCRA 821
March 4, 1992

Facts:
Pat. Oscar Quilona was charged before the General Court Martial with crime on two
counts of murder. Through his counsel, he wrote a letter to President Corazon Aquino
expressing his desire to be tried in the civilian court. The date of his first arraignment
was reset then on his second arraignment, his motion was denied. The court then plead
for him “not guilty”. On 19 February 1991, petitioner filed with this Court an urgent ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a restraining order alleging, among others, that "the
respondent court martial and the members thereof are insistent on trying the accused
and have scheduled the hearing on 22nd of February 1991" and that "only a restraining
order of this Honorable Court will step them from proceeding with the trial of petitioner."
As prayed for by petitioner, the Court issued on 21 February 1991 a temporary
restraining order, directing the respondents to cease and desist from trying and/or
proceeding with the trial of the petitioner.
On 21 May 1991, the Solicitor General filed his comment on the petition,
recommending that the same be given due course.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion by the court.
Held:
Affirmative. It will be recalled that on 28 December 1990, the petitioner filed a motion
to inhibit respondent court martial from proceeding with his arraignment and that his
case be investigated by a civilian prosecutor or tried by a civilian court. Although the said
motion was set by petitioner-movant for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent
court martial decided to have it argued on 28 December 1990 — the very day it was
filed. And after a ten-minute closed-door deliberation among the members thereof, it
resumed session where it denied the petitioner's motion. Thereafter, it proceeded to read
the charges and specifications to petitioner. Notwithstanding the petitioner's refusal to
enter a plea, respondent court martial entered for him a "Plea of Not Guilty" and set the
trial of the case on 25 January 1991. AlthoughRepublic Act No. 6975 was not yet in
effect when petitioner was arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent
court martial knew or should have known that the said Act had already been signed or
approved by the President on 13 December 1990 and that the same was published in
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation on 17 December 1990 and that it
would take effect on 1 January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent court
martial decided to have the petitioner's motion to inhibit argued on 28 December 1990
and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same day despite his vehement refusal to
enter a plea. Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, respondent
court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December 1990.
 Navales v Abaya
G. R No. 162318
October 25, 2004

Facts:
Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the
resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine
National Police. Thirty one of them were accused of coup d’etat and 290 were freed for
insufficiency of evidence. Navales et al filed a motion for prohibition and for habeas
corpus contending that the court martial are without jurisdiction because the Regional
Trial Court determined that their offenses are not service related and they must not be
detained because those case were dismissed. Gen. Abaya et al argued that those acts,
which are Disrespect Towards the President, Disrespect Towards Superior Officers,
Mutiny and Sedition, Conduct of Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman and General
Article, were service connect as declared in Section 21, Republic Act 7055.

Issue:
Whether or not Navales et al are entitled for writs of prohibition and habeas corpus

Held:
Negative. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines will be tried by the civil
court except when the offense as determined before the civil court is service connected
in which case it shall be tried before a court martial unless the President order before
arraignment to try offenses in proper civil courts. Those service-connected offenses
were not absorbed by cou d’etat. The enactment of R. A No 7055 provides that
lawmakers merely intended to return to the civil courts the jurisdiction over those
offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction but did not divest the military
courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by Articles of War. Writ of Habeas Corpus will
not be issued where the person allege to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under a process issued by the court which has a jurisdiction to do so, and it
will not be issued after party sought to be released has been charged before any court.
 Lansang v Garcia
42 SCRA 448
December 11, 1971

Facts:
The Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda when two hand
grenades were thrown resulting to eight killed persons and several injuries. President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Order 889 to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The following persons was then arrested without warrant, and were
detained and filed a writ of habeas corpus: Lansang, Del Rosario, Alcala, David, Ilao,
Carandang and Ariend. Garcia answered their petitions and argued that they were
apprehended and detained on reasonable belief that they had participated the crime of
insurrection or rebellion. Presidental Order 889-A was then issued to suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus for persons presently detained.

Issue:
Whether or not the Presidential Orders issued is an exercise of valid military powers
of the President.

Held:
Affirmative. Two conditions must concur 1) there must be invasion, insurrection or
rebellion and 2) when the public safety requires. The suspension of Privilege of Writ of
Habeas Corpus is a grant of power which is neither absolute nor unqualified and it was
confined and restricted not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to
its existence but also regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised.
Rebellion need not be widespread but it may be limited to any part of the Philippines.
The court merely check or ascertain whether the President gone beyond the
constitutional limits and may not interfere with his prerogative because the President had
reason to feel that a situation was critical and demand immediate action.
 Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R No. 190293
March 20, 2012

Facts:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and
women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issuedProclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. The President then issued
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspension of writ of habeas corpus in the
said provinces except for areas of MILF. She then submitted her report in the Congress
within 48 hours and the Congress in Joint Session convened and review the validity of
the President’s Action. Before the Congress could act, President Macapal-Arroyo lifted
the martial law and restore the privilege of writ of habeas corpus. Sigrid Fortun et al
challenged the prompt lifting of the proclamation before the Congress could review it and
asked for any questions that may arise.

Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is valid

Held:
The President and Congress act jointly not sequentially in declarations of martial law
and suspension of habeas corpus, after the President initiated it, the Congress exercise
its own review powers automatically. Proclamation 1959 was not meaningfully
implemented because the Military did not take over the operation and control of local
government units, the President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao,
no mass arrest was reported and o habeas corpus filed. The rebellion which exist on the
Maguindano was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of armed government
presence.
 People v Salle
250 SCRA 161
December 4, 1995

Facts:
Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote, Gencilla and ten John Does were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and
destructive arson. They were granted a conditional pardon by the President. Atty. La'o
informed this Court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without
the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was merely a
bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison
(NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993.
He was discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She further informed the Court
that appellant Ricky Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional pardon and
released from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province without
consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal
and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Until now,
Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid

Held:
No pardon, whether full or conditional, may be extended before a judgement of
conviction becomes final, and it becomes final when 1) when no appeal is seasonably
perfected, 2) when the accused commences to serve the sentences, 3) when the right to
appeal is expressly waived in writing except where death penalty is imposed by the trial
court and 4) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
The rational of final conviction is that to prevent the President from exercising executive
power in derogation of judicial power, thus appealed conviction must be brought to
finality. Furthermore, acceptance of pardon does not operate abandonment of appeal.
 People v Bacang
260 SCRA 44
July 30, 1996

Facts:
Leopoldo Bacang, Francisco Palacio et al were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder. William Casido and Franklin Alcorin then filed a notice of appeal on
December 8, 1993 which the court accepted. On January 11, 1996, the court received a
motion to withdraw appeal of Casido and Alcorin, it was filed on their own free will. Court
required the counsel of Casido and Alcorin to comment, it was only at that time when the
court was informed that the latter were released on conditional pardon. The Court then
ordered to furnish them copies of the conditional pardon and discharge order.

Issue:
Whether or not the conditional pardon is valid

Held:
The practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending
appeals appears to be a clear violation of the law. No pardon, whether full or conditional,
may be extended before a judgement of conviction becomes final or during the
pendency of appeal from his conviction. The rule that acceptance of pardon does not
operate abandonment of appeal, fully binds pardon extended after January 31, 1995
which is during the pendency of the accused’s appeal.
 People v Casido
G.R No. 116512
March. 7, 1997

Facts:
On August 11, 1992, a Presidential Committee for Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon
is constituted, with Secretary of Justice as Chairman, and the Secretary of National
Defense and Secretary of DILG as members. On December 9, 1992, President Aquino
issued guidelines for the committee. The Secretariat then process and evaluated the
prisoners, they have an agreement to the counsels of applicant Casido and file motion to
withdraw the applicant’s appeal. The committee failed to verify the counsel of the
accused and no intention to violate the Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, and
they were not also aware if Hino and Salle rulings. Applications of for amnesty were
favorably acted by National Amnesty Commission on February 22, 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not the amnesty is valid

Held:
Affirmative. Amnesty carry with it the extinguishment of criminal liability and
restoration of civil and political rights and unlike pardon, it may be granted before or after
the institution of the criminal prosecution. While the pardon in this case was void for
having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied underProclamation No. 347, was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution
No. 12 adopted on 2 June, 1994. The release then of accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the "pardon."
 People v. Nacional
G.R No. 111294
September 7, 1995
Facts:
Walter Nacional, Absalon Millarnina, Efren Musa et al were charged with two counts
of murder attended by conspiracy and were convicted on those crimes. On March 1,
1994, Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante and Efren Musa, through counsel, moved to
withdraw their appeal. They claimed that the charges against them were political in
nature "committed while they were members of the New People's Army (NPA)." They
informed the Court that as political prisoners, they applied for and were recommended
by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by the President of
the Philippines. The Court granted their motion on May 11, 1994.
On February 1, 1995, Rudy Luces, through counsel, also moved to withdraw his appeal
for becoming moot and academic. He claimed that he had been granted conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines and had been released from prison per
instruction. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General opined that Rudy Luces
abandoned his appeal when he accepted the pardon granted him.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of pardon extinguish payment for civil indemnity

Held:
Negative. We rule that the grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal
of the appeals of Walter Nacional, Zacarias Militante, Efren Musa and Rudy Luces does
not exempt them from payment of the civil indemnity. A conditional pardon, when
granted, does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. The indemnity of
P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court for each of the deaths of Quirino and Joel
Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.
 Monsanto v Factoran
170 SCRA 190
February 9, 1989
Facts:
Salvacion A. Monsanto and three others were accused of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment. She was given
an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted. Monsanto requested that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the entire period of her suspension. Finance
Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment. Deputy Secretary Factoran said that that acquittal, not absolute
pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former
position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite. Monsanto argued that general rules on
pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive
clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been
no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer
could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.

Issue:

Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.

Held:

Negative. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the

pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable.
Pardon cannot mask the acts of constituting the crime. The absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. Hence, the pardon granted
to Monsanto has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
 Sabello v DECS
G.R. No. 86787
December 26, 1989

Facts:

Sabello is an elementary school Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal
of the Talisay Barangay High School. The barangay high school was in deficit at that
time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay their tuition fees. Sabello was
authorized by the the barrio council to withdraw the P2000.00 allotted by the President in
each barrio which was subsequently deposited to the City Treasurer’s Office in the name
of Talisay Barrio High school. Sabello together with the barrio council was then charged
of the violation of R.A 3019 and sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment and
disqualification to hold public office. Sabello was then granted by the President an
absolute pardon. With this, he applied for the reinstatement on his office. However, he
was reinstated not to the former position but as a mere classroom teacher.

Issue:
Whether or not Sabello merits reappointment to the position he held prior to the
conviction

Held:
Affirmative. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms
part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code and that pardon frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights. Sabello was reinstated as classroom teacher; justice and equity dictate that he be
returned to his former position prior to conviction but he was not entitled to payment of
his back salaries because this is only afforded to those illegally dismissed.
 Torres v Sumulong
G.R. No. 76872
July 23, 1987

Facts:
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979,
a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on
condition that Sumulong would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines." Sumulong accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. 6
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the
conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A.
Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment
against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.

Issue:

Whether or not the President may cancel the conditional pardon granted

Held:

Affirmative. The grant of pardon and determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of a branch of a condition of a purely pardon and the proper
consequences of such breach may either be a purely executive act not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 4 of the Revised Administrative Code or it may be a judicial act
consisting of a trial for and conviction of violation for conditional pardon under Article 159
of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary in order that the convict may be recommended for violation of the
conditional pardon.
 In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong
G.R No. 135457
December 29, 1995

Facts:
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila
some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional
pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that
Sumulong would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Sumulong
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President canceled the
conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A.
Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment
against Sumulong. He was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children,
seeks anew relief from this court.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of pardon is constitutional
Held:
Affirmative. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign
power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will
release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the
pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence
or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract,
the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or
his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms
and conditions of the pardon. The Chief Executive, who in the first place was the
exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary
prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee
from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. There is likewise nil
a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by
the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely loaded in his
office.
 People v. Patriarca
G.R. No. 135457
September 29, 2007

Facts:

Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo
before RTC Sorsogon. He was also charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de
Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag. The RTC found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca then filed his appeal and it was accepted by
the court.

Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting
Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have
Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of
Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Issue:

Whether or not the amnesty is proper

Held:

Affirmative. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason
or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Jose N. Patriarca, Jr.
Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.
 Vera v. People
7 SCRA 152
January 31, 1963
Facts:

Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran,
and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon.
The Commission is convinced that the motive for the kidnapping and killing of Lt.
Amadeo Lozanes of the Hunters was the keen rivalry, between the Vera's Guerrilla Party
and the Hunter's ROTC Guerilla organizations. It is noteworthy that the Hunters were
driven away by General Vera from Pitogo in December, 1944, and that after said
kidnapping and killing on February 13 and 14, 1945, Mayor Ramon Isaac of Unisan, was
in turn kidnapped by the Hunters, Leopoldo Miciano, secretary of Col. de Luna, of the
Vera's Guerrilla Party, testified that General Vera told him of his (Vera's) suspicion that
Mayor Isaac was kidnapped by way of reprisal as he, Vera, had ordered the liquidation
of Lt. Lozañes
It is an established fact that when Lozañes was kidnapped, tortured, and later killed,
he was actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organization then engaged
in the resistance movement, it may not be said with any amount of truth that the
aforesaid killing was to further the resistance movement at the time, as the defense
intimates.
Vera contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8,
dated September 7, 1946, it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the
crime charged, citing in support of their submission the cases of Barrioquinto, et al. vs.
Fernandez, et al "in order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation
(No. 8) of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed
comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation."
Issue:
Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having
committed the crime of which they were accused
Held:

Affirmative. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and

avoidance, which means that the leader admits the allegation against him, but disclaims
liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime
charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. Amnesty Proclamation No. 8
extends its provisions to "all persons who committed any act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy," and, hence, may not
invoked, where the commission of a crime was not in furtherance of the resistance
movement, but was due to rivalry between two guerilla outfits.
 Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading
3 SCRA 351
Facts:
Eastern Sea Trading was a shipping company charged in the importation from
Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs
ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to
comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO
328 which sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan as
provided by the Trade and Financial Agreement between the Philippines and Japan
then.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never
concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and
the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of the Senate?
Held:
No, executive agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence
of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President
which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no
less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments —
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The
point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.
It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the
act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have
abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore
entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such
subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits,
the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etc.
Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject
matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation. Decision was reversed.
 Bayan v. Executive Secretary Zamora
GR No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Facts:
The Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by
United States military personnel to further strengthen their defense and security
relationship. The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense
Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any
external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. In
view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military
bases agreement. The Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military
exercises conducted between the two countries were held in abeyance. The VFA
officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.

Issue:
Did the president acted with grave abuse of discretion?

Held:
No, as regards to the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least
two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him
no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the end of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA — specifically the acts of ratification
and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such
principal acts — squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus,
may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of
clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Court's considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in
submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits
of the powers vested in him by the Constitution.
 Judicial Review

A. General Principles
Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil. 139
Bondoc v. Pineda G.R. 97710 September 25, 1991
Ynot v. Intermediate Appelate Court G.R. No. 74457 March 20 1987
Garcia v. Drilon G.R. No. 282267 June 25, 2013
Mirasol v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128448 February 1, 2001
Tanada v. Cuenco 100 Phil. 1101
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona G.R. No. 134577 November 16, 1998
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010
Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566 November 11, 2013
Corona v. Senate of the Philippines G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012

B. Requisites for Judicial Review

iii. Actual Case or Controversy

Guingona v. Court of appeals G.R. No. 125532 July 1998
John Hay People’s Alternative G.R. No. 11975 October 24, 2003
Coalition v. Lim
Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566 November 11, 2013
PACU v. Secretary of Education 97 Phil. 806
Dumlao v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
Province of Batangas v. Romulo G.R. No. 152774 May 27, 2004
Pormento v. Estrada G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010
Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 132986 May 19, 2004
Lacson v. Perez G.R. No. 147780 May 20, 2001
Gonzales v. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835 August 14, 2000
Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary, G.R. No. 93100 June 19, 1997
Department of Agrarian Reform
Republic v. Manalo G.R. No.192392 June 4, 2014
Salonga v. Pano G.R. No. L-59524 February 19, 1985
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004
Acop v. Guingona G.R. No.134855 July 2, 2002
Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service G.R. No.191672 November 25, 2014
Commission
Araullo v. Aquino III G.R. No.20987 July 1, 2014
Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141
Montesclaros v COMELEC G.R. No.152295 July 9, 2002
Mariano v. COMELEC 242 SCRA 211
Fernandez v. Torres 215 SCRA 489
Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec 224 SCRA 272
Macasiano v. National Housing 224 SCRA 236
Authority
Board of Optometry v. Colet 260 SCRA 88
 iv. Proper Party
Salonga v. Warner Barnes 88 Phil. 125
Advocates of Truth in Lending, Inc. v. G.R. No.192986 June 15, 2013
Banko Sentral Monetary Board
Chamber of Real Estate & Builders G.R. No.174697 June 8, 2010
Association v. Energy Regulatory
Commission
People v. Vera 65 Phil. 56
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. G.R. No.141284 August 15, 2000
Zamora
Abaya v. Ebdane G.R. No.167919 February 14, 2009
Kilosbayan v. Guingona G.R. No.113375 May 5, 1994
Birago v. Philippine Truth Commission G.R. No.192535 December 7, 2010
Commission on Human Rights G.R. No.155336 November 25, 2004
Employees Association v. Commission
on Human Rights
Agan v. Philippine International Air G.R. No.155001 May 5, 2003
Terminals, Co.
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization 246 SCRA 334
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia 239 SCRA 386
Paguia v. Office of the President G.R. No.176276 June 25, 2010
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. G.R. No.157509 January 18, 2005
Romulo
Domingo v. Carague G.R. No. 11065 April 15, 2005
Cutaran v. DENR 134958 January 31, 2001
Joya v. PCGG 225 SCRA 568
Telecommunications and Broadcast 289 SCRA 337
Attorneys of the Philippines v.
COMELEC
Kilosbayan v. Guingona 232 SCRA 110
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy G.R. No.124360 November 5, 1997
Information Technology Foundation v. G.R. No.159139 January 13, 2004
COMELEC
Lim v. Executive Secretary G.R. No.151445 April 11, 2002
Kilosbayan v. Morato 246 SCRA 540
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority G.R. No.133250 July 9, 2002
Tatad v. Garcia 243 SCRA 436
Brllantes v. COMELEC G.R. No.163193 June 15, 2004
Jumamil v. Café G.R. No.144570 September 21, 2005
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No.148560 November 19, 2001
Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No.204819 April 8, 2014
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No.171396 May 3, 2006

v. Earliest Oppurtinity
Matibag v. Benipayo G.R. No.149036 April 2, 2002
Estrada v. Randa G.R. No.159314 June 26, 2006
Umali v. Guingona G.R. No.131124 March 21, 1999
Zabdyeta v, De ka Costa 66 Phil. 115

vi. Lis Mota

Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap v. G.R. No.20903 July 22, 2014
Robredo
Planters Products v. Fertiphil Corporation G.R. No.166006 March 14, 2008
Tarrosa v. Singson G.R. No.111243 May 25, 1994
Ty v. Trampe G.R. No.117577 December 1, 1995
Arceta v. Judge Mangrobang G.R. No.152895 June 15, 2004

C. Fiscal Autonomy
Bengzon v. Drilon 208 SCRA 133
Nitafan v. Tan 152 SCRA 284
In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the A.M. No. 01-1-04-
Organizational Structure and SC-Philja
Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine
Judicial Academy,
481 SCRA 1
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of A.M. No. 11-7-10- July 31, 2012
the Appraised Value of Properties SC
Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court,
Re. A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC (Re: Request for A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC August 26, 2014
Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and
Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vita
of the Justices of the Supreme Court and
Officers and Employees of the Judiciary)
and A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA (Re: Request
of Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism [PCIJ] for the 2008 Statement
of Assets, Liabilites and Networth [SALN]
and Personal Data Sheets of the Court of
Appeals Justices

D. Appointment
In Re: Mateo Valenzuela A.M. No. 98-5-01- November 9, 1998
SC
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No.191002 March 17, 2010

E. Judicial and Bar Council

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No.202242 July 17, 2012
Chavez v. Juicial and Bar Council G.R. No.202242 April 16, 2013
Jardeleza v. Sereno G.R. No.213181 August 19, 2014

F. Supreme Court
 i. Jurisdiction
Fortich v. Corona G.R. No.131457 August 19, 1999
Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of 261 SCRA 464
Appeals
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board G.R. No.106910 October 19, 2010
Jardeleza v. Sereno G.R. No.213181 August 19, 2014
People v. Redulosa 255 SCRA 279
Garia v. People G.R. No.106531 November 18, 1999
Republic v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No.135789 January 31, 2002
Fabian v. Desierto G.R. No.129742 September 16, 1998
Carpio-Morals v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.217126-27 November 10, 2015

ii. Change of Venue

People v. Guiterrez 39 SCRA 173

iii. Rule-making Power

Primcias v. Ocampo 93 Phil, 451
First Lepanot Ceramics v. Court of G.R. No.110571 March 10, 1994
Appeals
In Re Integration of the Bar of the 49 SCRA 22
Philippines
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice G.R. No.132601 January 19, 1999
Writ of Amparo A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC
Canlas v. Napico Homeowners G.R. No.182795 June 5, 2008
Association
Tapuz v. Del Rosario G.R. No.182484 January 17, 2008
Caram v. Segui G.R. No.193652 August 5, 2014
1. Writ of Habeas Data A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC
Lee v. Ilagan G.R. No.203254 October 8, 2014
Gamboa v. Chan G.R. No.193616 July 24, 2012
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College G.R. No.202666 September 29,
2014
2. Rules of Procedure for Environmental A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
Cases
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of G.R. No. 171947- December 18, 2008
Manila Bay 48

iv. Administrative Supervision

Fuentes v. Ombudsman-Mindanao G.R. No.124295 October 23, 2001
Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 469

v. Consultation/Decisions
Prudential Bank v. Castro 158 SCRA 646
Cruz v. Secretary, DENR G.R. No.135385 December 6, 2000
Mendoza v. CFI 66 SCRA 96
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 186 SCRA 1
Solid Homes v. Laserna G.R. No.166051 April 8, 2008
Dizon v. Judge Lopez A.M. No. RTJ-96- September 5,
1338 2007
People v. Baring G.R. No.137933 January 28, 2002
Martinez v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.123547 May 21, 2001
Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.127682 April 24, 1998
Tichangco v. Enriqez G.R. No.150629 June 30, 2004

G. Tenure of Justices/Judges
In Re First Indorsement from Hon. Raul A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
M. Gonzalez
People v. Gacott 246 SCRA 52
Caoibes v. Ombudsman G.R. No.132177 July 17, 2001
Fuentes v. Ombudsman-Mindanano G.R. No.124295 October 23, 2001

H. Periods for Decision

Young v. De Guzman A.M. No. RTJ-96- February 18,

1365 1999
Sanchez v. Vestil A.M. No. RTJ-98- October 13, 1998
1419
Bernardo v. Fabros A.M. No. MTJ-99- May 12, 1999
1189
 Angara v. Electoral Commission
63 Phil 139

Facts:
An action instituted by petitioner Jose Angara for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of petitioner as
member of the National Assembly (NA) for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
Jose Angara, and respondents Ynsua, Castillo, Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the NA for the said province. The provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes, then he took his oath
On December of the same year Ynsua , filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being
the only protest led after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
In response, Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest alleging that Resolution
No. 8 of the NA was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented, and that the protest was filed out of the prescribed period. He contends that ,
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised
because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission

Held:
Yes, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof. This includes the power of judicial
review. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
The National Assembly has, through Resolution No. 8 confirmed the election of
petitioner. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission, also through a Resolution, fixed
Dec 5, 1935 as the last day of filing of election protests, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly. Here is a case of actual controversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the
one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
Conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases. The Constitution is written and given effect by the
judicial department.
 Bondoc v. Pineda
G.R No. 97710
September 25, 1991

Facts:
Marciano Pineda of Laban ng Demokrationg Pilipino won against his rival Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc of Nacionalista Party as Representative for the Fourth District of
Pampanga, causing the latter to file a protest in the HRET. After the revision of ballots
and presentation of evidence, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda by a margin of 23 votes.

The LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the
ballots cast in some precincts resulting to the increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to
107 votes. Congressman Camasura (LDP) voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc (NP) as the winner of the contest.

Cong. Camasura was expelled from LDP because it was alleged that he
betrayed his party when he decided for Bondoc. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal ordered Camasura to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election from
the Tribunal Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET
for its resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review and annul the action of the House
of Representatives

Held:
Yes. It is the Court’s duty as part of its the judicial power vested in the courts by
an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
which deems judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of
the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts
are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary
may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of
legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts
by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action.
 Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R No. 74457
March 20, 1987

Facts:
An Executive Order 626-A was enacted which prohibited the transport of the
carabaos or carabao meat across the provincial boundaries without government
clearance, for the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate slaughter of those animals.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of EO 626-A.

The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The petitioner
claimed that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the said order for, among others,
because it is imposes a penalty without a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts can entertain constitutional issues

Held:
Yes. This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.

SC have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or

affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments
and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption
is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so. Judicial power authorizes
this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear
of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy
of the bench, especially this Court.
 Garcia v. Drilon
G.R No. 286267
June 25, 2013

Facts:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) led, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim
of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support. Petitioner contends the constitutionality of RA 9262 but was
dismissed for failure to prove such. Defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has
limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."

Issue:
Whether or not Family Courts can entertain the constitutionality questions

Held:
Yes. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute.

Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family
Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first
mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
VAWC defined under the latter law

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of
cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve
the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the general definition
of the judicial power.The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in
this Court, but in all RTCs.
 Mirasol v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128448
February 1, 2001

Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank
financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1975 under a crop
loan financing scheme, which continued until 1977. Petitioner signed a Credit Agreement
and Chattel Mortgage with PNB which empowered the latter as their attorney-in-fact to
negotiate and to sell the latter's sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Marcos issued PD No. 579 which
authorized Philippine Exchange Co. Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for
export to the United States and to other foreign markets.
The PD 579 also authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. PNB asked
petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners,
conveyed to PNB real properties valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago,
leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of P1,513,347.78
Mirasols failure to settle their outstanding accounts prompted PNB to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. The Mirasols asked for the accounting
of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar stating that were the proceeds properly
liquidated it could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank, which was denied by
PNB. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to
account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the
Philippines for public purposes

Issue:
Whether or not trial courts have jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional

Held:
Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

In JM Tuason vs CA, it was held, "Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law,
for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.”

BP 129 also grants to RTC, the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties
with the Constitution. RTC also has exclusive original jurisdiction on all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation
 Tanada v. Cuenco
100 Phil 1101

Facts:
The Senate of the Philippines consists of 23 members from the Nacionalista
Party and 1 member of the Citizens Party, namely Senator Tanada. In the session of the
Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tanada, be
given the privilege to nominate three members of the SET. Because the Citizens Party
was the second political party to have garnered the second largest of votes, hence
entitled to nominate three senators to be members of the SET.
Senator Tanada objected formally to the motion of Senator Sabido on the ground
that: there will be more members in the SET coming from the Nacionalista party, since
that party has 23 members in the Senate. Senator Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and
Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Senator Tanada, on the same session, nominated only himself as member of the
SET. He was also elected. Senator Primicias wanted to nominate Senators Delgado and
Cuenco but Senator Tanada objected because even the largest party (NP) can only
nominate three.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case
Held:
Yes. Political question is defined as questions to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity where full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is outside judicial control. Justiciable
questions are concerned whether the branches have acted within the powers granted to
them by the constitution. It has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain
amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure
therein, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts.

In this case, the Court is called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias – a member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate – on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination...of the party having the second largest
number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political
question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject
to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly
within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the
proceedings in connection therewith.
 Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577
November 16, 1998

Facts:
In July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
filed a petition to remove Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the
Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the minority leader. They contend that
the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining
exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Respondents allege that no constitutional issue is involved, since the Constitution
does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. And therefore, the
legislature has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to
determine the procedure of selecting its occupant. Petitioners argue that the Court has
jurisdiction, contending that the definitions of majority and minority involve an
interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating
that [t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition

Held:
Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. An issue is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of
legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President
and a House Speaker, it is silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
Constitution. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.The Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the
rules of its proceedings. To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would
practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers.
 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 162230
April 28, 2010

Facts:
Petitioners are all members of the Malaya Lolas, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for
the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.

Since 1998, petitioners claim that they have approached and asked for the
assistance of the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG to file a claim
against the Japanese officials who ordered the establishment of the comfort women
station in the Philippines. However, said Executive officials declined to assist them,
because they claim that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation
had already been fully satisfied by Japan's compliance with the Peace Treaty between
the Philippines and Japan.

Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in
not espousing petitioners' claims for reparations against Japan

Held:
No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan.
In Tañada v. Cuenco , the Court held that political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One
such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that " [t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative — 'the political' — departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision."

In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
 Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566
November 11, 2013

Facts:
First petition came from Samson Alcantara, President of Social Justice Society
who filed a petition for prohibition assailing that the pork barrel is unconstitutional and a
writ of prohibition be issued against respondents Franklin Drilon and Sonny Belmonte in
their capacities as President of the Senate and Speaker of the House.

Another petition came from Greco Belgica and others filed an urgent petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction to declare the Pork Barrel System which provided for the PDAF and
Malampaya Funds be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being an abuse of
discretion. They also pray for a TRO against cabinet secretaries Ochoa, de Leon, Abad,
and to immediately cease any expenditure under the funds.

A third petition came from Pedrito Nepomuceno filed a petition seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional and a cease and desist order be issued against
President Noynoy Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing the funds to Congress and
instead allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the local
development councils in consultation with the respective departments.

Issue:
Whether or not the issues raised are subject to judicial review

Held:
Yes. The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies" carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government."

Respondents submit that the present case is a political question because “the
political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but
also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at this stage."

The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue

dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
pork barrel under constitutional lines is an exercise of judicial power.

The duty includes the determination of whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
of the government.
 Corona v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 200242
July 17, 2012

Facts:
An impeachment case was initiated by the HOR against Chief Justice Renato
Corona, and a trial was being conducted by the Senate. The impeachment complaint is
rooted on his alleged culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and
graft and corruption. Present petition was led arguing that the Impeachment Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Respondents argue that unless there is a clear transgression of constitutional limitations,

this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of
Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge
when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound
questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Whether the
Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within
this Court's power of expanded judicial review

Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a
manner that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which
is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in
proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited
by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case

Held:
Yes. The precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of
utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if
tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction
includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.Petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which
would require corrective measures from the Court
 Guingona v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125532
July 10, 1998

Facts:
The NBI conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement
of national and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling.
Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of politicians and
gambling lords, sought admission into the Government's Witness Protection Security
and Benefit Program (RA 6981). The Department of Justice admitted Roque to the
program. Thereafter, Roque executed a sworn statement before the NBI, and on the
basis thereof, the latter recommended the filing of the necessary charges. Private
respondent Pineda was included in the list of government officials who offered Roque
money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to
cease conducting raids on their respective gambling operations. Thereafter, Pineda filed
a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano Roque to the Witness
Protection Program, but the Secretary denied the same. Thus, Pineda filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals. It disposed in favor of
the government. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not this case presents an actual controversy

Held:
No, The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do
not warrant the exercise of judicial power. The Constitution provides that judicial power
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable."
One of the requisites of judicial review is that there must be an actual case calling for
the exercise of judicial power; An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of
legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a
decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
The question must be ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In
the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court
reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of
Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in
conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed
decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come
out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular
case. A mere apprehension, does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.
 John Hay People v. Lim
G.R. No 119775
October 24, 2003

Facts:
The Baguio City government passed a number of resolutions in response to the
actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. BCDA entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents
Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point
in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers.
They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its
full development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.

Thus, the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a
portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of
tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. A petition for prohibition,
mandamus and declaratory relief was filed challenging, in the main, its constitutionality
or validity as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture
Agreement between public respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD.

Issue:
Whether or not there was an actual case or controversy

Held:
The court is convinced that the present petition embodies crucial issues,
therefore assumes jurisdiction over the petition. More than the economic interests at
stake, the development of Camp John Hay as well as of the other base areas
unquestionably has critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns.
Whatever use to which these lands will be devoted will set a chain of events that can
affect one way or another the social and economic way of life of the communities where
the bases are located, and ultimately the nation in general.

An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. The controversy
needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are
pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests. There is in the present
case a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising
from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area
covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation
contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.
Other requisites of a judicial review were complied.
 Belgica v. Ochoa
G.RNo. 208566
November 11, 2013

Facts:
First petition came from Samson Alcantara, President of Social Justice Society
who filed a petition for prohibition assailing that the pork barrel is unconstitutional and a
writ of prohibition be issued against respondents Franklin Drilon and Sonny Belmonte in
their capacities as President of the Senate and Speaker of the House.

Another petition came from Greco Belgica and others filed an urgent petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction to declare the Pork Barrel System which provided for the PDAF and
Malampaya Funds be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being an abuse of
discretion. They also pray for a TRO against cabinet secretaries Ochoa, de Leon, Abad,
and to immediately cease any expenditure under the funds.

A third petition came from Pedrito Nepomuceno filed a petition seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional and a cease and desist order be issued against
President Noynoy Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing the funds to Congress and
instead allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the local
development councils in consultation with the respective departments.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy

Held:
Yes. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy as
is embodied in Art VIII Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be ripe for adjudication such as
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny. A question is ripe when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.
Courts are without authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.

The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.
 Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education
GR No L-5279
October 31, 1955

Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities requested that Act. 2706
as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that: a) the law deprives the owners of schools and
colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of
law; b) the law deprives parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency; and c) the provisions of the law confer on the Secretary of Education
unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constituting unlawful
delegation of legislative power.

In support of their first proposition the PACU contend that the right of a citizen to
own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right,
amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law
and government. The Government’s legal representative counter-argued that the matter
constituted no justiciable.

The Solicitor General also pointed out that the PACU has no cause to present
the case, because all of the members of the Association have permits to operate and are
actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the Secretary of
Education has threatened to revoke their permits. “They have suffered no wrong under
the terms of the law – and, naturally need no relief in the form they seek to obtain.”

Issue:
Whether or not the case is mature for judicial review

Held:
No, the power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat
being insufficient.
Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on
the validity of statues is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
litigants.
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one
of the members of PACU does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein however
intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues reach constitutional
dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court’s duty to avoid decision of constitutional
issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.
 Dumlao v. COMELEC
G.R No. L-52245
January 22, 1980

Facts:
Patricio Dumlao is a former candidate for Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He filed
his certificate of candidacy for the January 30, 1980 elections. He questions the
constitutionality of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides a
special disqualification that “Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who
has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law,
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired.” A colleague Igot, also assailed said law.

Dumlao assails that said law is violative of the equal protection clause and it was
directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on
"purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.He sought to prohibit
COMELEC to implement the said law.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy

Held:
No, Dumalao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision.
No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. His
is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an
advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual
record. His case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction of COMELEC as sole judge of
all contests relating to the qualifications if all members of elective provincial officials as
provided by section 2, Art. XII-C of the Constitution.
 Province of Batangas v. Romulo
G.R No. 152774
May 27, 2004

Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the
“Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of
LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed
Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by
Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight
Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the
portion of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding
funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5 Billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the
release thereof. He invokes Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy
Held:
Yes. The question of whether or not the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs
of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991 is undoubtedly a legal question, thus it is justiciable.There is
also no need to remand the case to the lower courts since the factual issues needed to
answer the legal question are not disputed.

The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
violating of the principle of local autonomy.
 Pormento v. Estrada
G.R No. 191988
August 31, 2010

Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected as President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency
again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento
opposed private respondent's candidacy and led a petition for disqualification. However,
his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
COMELEC en banc. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he
ran.

Issue:
Whether or not Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from any re-
election

Held:
Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-election" will
bepremised on a person's second--whether immediate or not--election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights
exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.

No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case
that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy,
is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.The Court
is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a

President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
 Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R No. 132986
May 19, 2004

Facts:
Senator Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal an election protest
against Enrile and other senators who won in the 1995 elections. Thereafter, petitioner
filed his answer with counter-protest. The SET conducted revision of the ballots in
various provinces. Then, the SET directed the parties to submit their evidence and
memoranda.

On August 1997, the SET without resolving the election protest, held a press
conference at the SC Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the
revision of ballots in the pilot precincts. In the result, the name of petitioner dropped from
number 11 to number 15.On September of 1997, petitioner filed a motion to set aside
the partial results in Pimentel’s protest and to conduct another appreciation of ballots in
the presence of all parties. He alleged that the partial results were erroneous.

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an "oversight,"
hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be made. Consequently, the
30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those garnered by petitioner were "given back
to him." But the SET denied the motion on the ground that there was no sufficient basis
to discard the partial tabulation. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the SET in Resolution 98-02.Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion.

Held:
The case ismoot and academic, because the process of how the SET arrived in
the determination of partials results was different to that of petitioner. The tenure of the
contested senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998. A
case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.

In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that "where the issues have become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the
same of no practical use or value."
 Lacson v. Perez
G.R No. 147780
May 20, 2001

Facts:
Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Such declaration was rooted on a the violent behavior of the
angry mob who assaulted and attempted to break into Malacanang using explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly weapons.

General Order No. 1 was subsequently issued to direct the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress such rebellion which led to warrantless arrests against several
alleged leaders and promoters of such rebellion. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests
and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which gave a semblance of legality to arrests,
the four consolidated petitions were filed before the Court.

Signicantly, on May 6, 2001, President MacapagalArroyo ordered the lifting of the

declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions
have been rendered moot and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not the case can be dismissed because it is moot and academic
since the state of rebellion has ceased to exist

Held:
No, according to Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez dissenting in this case, the lifting of
the assailed Proclamation and General Order by the President does not render moot
and academic the very serious and unprecedented constitutional issues at hand,
considering their grave implications involving the basic human rights and civil liberties of
our people.

A resolution of these issues becomes all the more necessary since, as reported
in the papers, there are saturation drives being conducted by the police wherein
individuals in Metro Manila are picked up without warrants of arrest. Moreover, the acts
sought to be declared illegal and unconstitutional are capable of being repeated by the
respondents. In Salva vs. Makalintal, this Court held that "courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' . . ."
 Gonzales v. Narvasa
G.R No. 140835
August 14, 2000

Facts:
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by
PresidentEstrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order "to
study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution,
and the manner of implementing the same." Petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
this petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of the creation of
PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such
a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution — the amendment of the fundamental charter.

Also, Petitioner asked the Court to enjoin the PCCR and said presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such and to compel respondent
Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.It is alleged by
respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not the case has become moot and academic

Held:
Yes, the PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December
20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the
funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d'etre.
Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
This case had become moot and academic PCCR expired on December 31, 1999.

Petitioner lacks standing to seek judicial redress as a citizen because he has not
shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PCCR. Neither can he file a taxpayer's action which is proper only
when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The P3 Million
funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President,
and not from public funds made by law. The appropriations for the PCCR were
authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all.
Petitioner, however, has the constitutional and statutory right to be informed on
matters which are unquestionably of public concern — namely, requests for names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments
and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and
turned over to Malacañang. Respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary, was ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
 Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R No. 93100
June 19, 1997

Facts:
Atlas Fertilizer are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and
prawn farms, assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the
implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and
10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as unconstitutional. It claims that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the
Constitution for it accordingly extends agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as
Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands.
They even quoted the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, where
the SC has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural
lands.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition possesses an actual controversy

Held:
No, the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted
squarely with constitutional issues, but it willnot pre-empt the Legislative and the
Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of
amendment, said law or act.

On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress. The
above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn
farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question
concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and
academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881 as an amendatory law.Petition was
dismissed.
 Republic v. Manalo
G.R No. 192302
June 4, 2014

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) filed a complaint for civil forfeiture before RTC of Manila. The Republic
sought the forfeiture in its favour of certain deposits and government securities
maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were related to
the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public, in violation
of the Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
Respondents Rafael Manalo, Grace Oliva, Freida Rivera-Yapfiled an insolvency
case asserting that they were appointed as assignees of the properties of Spouses
Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay who were impleaded as defendants in the
aforementioned civil forfeiture cases.
RTC Manila ruled in favour of the Republic citing :
Sec. 35. Notice to file claims. — Where the court has issued an order
of forfeiture of the monetary instrument or property in a civil forfeiture
petition for any money laundering offense defined under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, any person who has not been
impleaded nor intervened claiming an interest therein may apply, by
verified petition, for a declaration that the same legitimately belongs to
him and for segregation or exclusion of the monetary instrument or
property corresponding thereto.
CA reversed the decision

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing RTC’s decision

Held:
The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.A case or
issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.

In this case, the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decisionby virtue of which the
assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of the government,
are supervening events which have effectively rendered the essential issue in this case
moot and academic, that is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by
the Manila RTC to intervene on the ground that they have a legal interest in the forfeited
assets.
As the proceedings in the civil forfeiture cases from which the issue of
intervention is merely an incident have already been duly concluded, no substantial relief
can be granted to the Republic by resolving the instant petition.
 Salonga v. Pano
G.R No. 59524
February 18, 1985

Facts:
This is a petition by Jovito Salonga invoking the his constitutional rights of life
and liberty as guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case
has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda
bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial
asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him.
Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the
issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him.

Only after four months of detention was Salonga informed for the first time of the
nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, he moved to
dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an informationafter finding that a prima facie
case had been established against all of the forty persons accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court can pursue a case against Salonga even if there
is no prima facie evidence against petitioner

Held:
No, but the Supreme Court denied the Petition of Salonga for being moot and
academic, because the Respondents Fiscal and Judge manifested that they will drop
Salonga in the information filed against his co-accused, as a co-conspirator.

The respondent, Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of City Fiscal Segio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the
Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of Jovito Salonga as ony of the accused in the information.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action
of the prosecution. The Court has been constrained by said actions.
 Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 159085
3 February 2004

Facts:
On July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders
have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption
in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. With
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.
On February 3, 2004 the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call
out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2) SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners
contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.
(3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not the issues are moot and academic

Held:
Yes. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not
adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual controversies.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers
beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
 Acop v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134855
2 July 2002

Facts:
On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known
as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City
in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation
of the May 18, 1995 incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no
shootout and that the eleven suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were
instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC, made
the same statement corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes. S
The Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the
subject incident. SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate
hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2 delos
Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government's Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program. The two officers were admitted to the said program.
On March 12, 1996, Chief Supt. Acop and Sr. Supt. Zubia, in their capacity as
taxpayers, but who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, led
before the court a quo a petition for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order
questioning the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into
the Program.
Issue:
Whether or not SPO2 delos Reyes and Dela Cruz can be admitted to the witness
protection program even though they are law enforcement officers
Held:
Yes. They can still be admitted to the witness protection program. Thus, petition is
without merit. A careful reading of Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. 6981 readily shows that these
are distinct and independent provisions. It is true that the provison in Section 3(d) disqualifies
law enforcement officers from being admitted into the Program when they "testify before any
judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority." This is the general rule.
However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation where a witness testifies
before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a legislative committee does not fall
under the category of "any investigating authority" referred to in Section 3. In other words,
Section 4 did not make any qualification or distinction. In the present case, it is clear that the
legislative intent that the proviso under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981 does not apply to
Section 4. The trial court did not err in concluding that if the framers of the law intended
otherwise, they could have easily placed the same proviso of Section 3(d) or referred to it
under Section 4. Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d), a
witness in a legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be
admitted into the Program subject only to the requirements provided for under Section 4.
 Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 191672
25 November 2014

Facts:
In 2010, PGMA appointed Francisco Duque III as the Chairman of CSC, which
was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA).Thereafter, she issued EO 865
titled “INCLUSION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES/DIRECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE HOME DEVELOPMENT
MUTUAL FUND”. Pursuant to the EO, Duque was designated as the member of the
Board of Directors of the following GOCCS: GSIS, Philhealth, ECC, and HDMF.
Petitioner asserts that EO 956, and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC which was constitutionally created to be
protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the significance of its
government functions. He further asserts that the CSC is not part of the Executive
branch of the Government while the GOCSS are instrumentalities of the Executive. In
this situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering
that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the Executive
Department.
However, respondent maintains that Duque’s membership in the Boards is
constitutional on the basis of their interpretation of EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. They say that the said provisions preserve the
independence of the CSC considering that GOCCs with original charters such as the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are excluded from the supervision and control
that secretaries and heads exercise over the departments to which these GOCCs are
attached.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair
the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the
holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions
Held:
The case is moot and academic because of the enactment of RA 10149. A moot
and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Even if the case is moot and academic, the Court can still exercise the power of judicial
review if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involves a
situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;(3) the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The case satisfies the abovementioned conditions.
 Araullo v. Aquino III
G.R. No. 209287
1 July 2014

Facts:
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate revealing that
he, along with several Senators, had been allotted an additional 50 Million as incentive
for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. In response, Sec.
Florencio Abad of the Department of Budget and Management issued a public statement
explaining that the funds released had been part of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) which was a program designed to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion. Also, that the funds had been released to the Senators based on
their letters of request for funding.

These instances made the present controversy inevitable, while issues against
the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over the Pork Barrel
controversy. Thus, nine petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of the DAP
followed by the issuance relating to the DAP. Araullo, together with the other petitioners,
alleges that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and
offices with low levels of obligations for continuing and current allotments.
Issue:
Whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of
petitioners
Held:
Yes. The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.
 Ople v. Torres
293 SCRA 141

Facts:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System," was issued by the President on December 12, 1996.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of said Administrative Order on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and (2) its
impermissibility intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Petitioner contends
that the Administrative Order is not a mere administrative order but a law and, hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He further alleges that said Administrative
Order establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the
life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates their right to privacy.

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues

relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar.
More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi in this case

Held:
Yes.The Supreme Court held that Senator Bias Ople was a proper party to
question the constitutionality of AO 308 in his capacity as Senator, as taxpayer and as
member of the GSIS. As Senator, he had the requisite standing to bring suit assailing
the issuance of the AO as a usurpation of legislative power; as taxpayer and GSIS
member, he could impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of the GSIS to implement the AO. It was held that the petition’s ripeness for
adjudication was not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of Administrative
Order No. 308 (Adopting a National Computerized Identification Reference System) had
not yet been promulgated, because Senator Ople assailed AO 308 as invalid per se and
infirm on its face; thus, his action was not premature. After all, the implementing rules
could not cure the fatal defects of the Administrative Order.
 Montescarlos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 152295
9 July 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Antoniette Montesclaros sent a letterto the Comelec, demanding that
the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Alfredo L. Benipayo then
Comelec Chairman, wrote letters to the Speaker of the Houseand the Senate President
about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections; where he intimated
that it was "operationally very difficult" to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002
and instead, expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to
hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November
2002. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002
but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. The Senate and the
House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK
elections.Bicameral Committee's consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections
to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more
than 18 years of age which was eventually signed into law. Petitioners, who all claim to
be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections
disenfranchises them, preventing them from voting and being voted for in the SK
elections. Petitioners' theory is that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later
than May 6, 2002, the postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who
will turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK elections.
Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to 15 but less than 18 years
of age from the then membership age of 15 but not more than 21 years of age would
disqualify about seven million youths. The public respondents' failure to hold the
elections on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly situated.

Issue:
Whether or not judicial review can be exercised upon case

Held:
No. There is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to
prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK
elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date
acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring
judicial intervention. Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial
review because it is not a law. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional
because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of
judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners
filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail
any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners' prayer to be allowed to vote and be
voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners
have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action
and adequately argue
 Mariano v. COMELEC
242 SCRA 211

Facts:
RA No. 7854 “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” Was enacted. Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba.
Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of
Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional
the RA.They assail that the RA did not specify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati, attempts to restart the three consecutive term limit, and increased the legislative
district.
In the Constitution, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representatives, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve
by them.|||

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can entertain this constitutionality challenge

Held:
SC cannot entertain the challenge on Sec 51. The requirements before a litigant
can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by
the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have not complied with these requirements. The contention is

premised on many events that may or may not happen (i.e.: Binay will run again, that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
post in the 1998 elections). petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to
ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
 Fernandez v. Torres
215 SCRA 489

Facts:
Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza, Arlene
Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton challenged the constitutionality of
and sought for certiorari and prohibition to prohibit the DOLE and POEA from enforcing and
implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91dated November 20, 1991.Before the
Circular’s promulgation, there was a “total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad
in response to the growing number of documented reports and complaints from entertainers
and their relatives about the exploitative working conditions, harassment, forcible detention,
physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers
abroad. Because a comprehensive prohibition of such deployment, however, would visit
obviously adverse economic consequences upon the entertainment industry, the First
National Tripartite Conference for the Protection of Overseas Entertainers, attended by
representatives from the Government and from the management and labor sectors of the
entertainment community, was held on November 18, 1991. The Conference was convened
to evaluate a Government proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deployment of the
Philippine entertainers and performing artists. At the end of the Conference, the consensus
among the management and labor representatives which emerged was that Government
should adopt a policy of selective prohibition of deployment abroad of Philippine entertainers,
to avoid the adverse effects which complete prohibition would impose on the country’s man
power program. The labor representatives recommended that the minimum age of
performing artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from 18 to 23 yrs. Old. The
Petitioners were, themselves, qualified performing artists, mostly singers and dancers of
ages 18 to 22 yrs.; they alleged that constitutional validity of the DOLE Circular as violative of
the equal protection clause and due process clause of the Constitution; that it is arbitrary,
oppressive and discriminatory against performing artists the same as their age.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioners can avail of judicial inquiry, or do they have an actual
case or controversy

Held:
No. The Supreme Court, reasoned that: “To engage in judicial review under the facts and
circumstances here obtained, in advance of official efforts to apply the provisions of the challenged circular,
upon the supposition that petitioners’ legal rights in the premises might be denied by public respondent
officials is too close to rendering an advisory opinion in a hypothetical case – an undertaking clearly beyond
the jurisdiction of this Court.The Court notes, in the first place, that Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE
Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers
below 23 years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that “the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for
justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof.’ The discretionary authority asserted by
the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit
and precisely drawn ground for exempting particular performing artists from coverage of Item No. 1 are set
out in a set of “Administrative Guideline Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91”.
 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC
244 SCRA 272

Facts:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide
free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated by the Commission,
free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The COMELEC space
shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and

magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC Resolution No.
2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by
the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the
Solicitor General a manifestation which attached a copy of COMELEC Resolution No.
2772-A dated 4 May 1995. COMELEC RESOLVED:
 Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 ~ No prosecution/penalty for not providing the free
COMELEC space. Basically it’s a “donation”.
 Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as constituting prior
restraint on the part of publishers with respect to the printing or publication of
materials in the news, opinion, features or other sections of their respective
publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear from the last sentence
of said Section 8 that the Commission shall, “unless the facts and circumstances
clearly indicate otherwise . . . respect the determination by the publisher and/or
editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published
are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.”

Issue:
Whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible
exercise of the COMELEC’s power under Article IX, Section 4 is a ripe for judicial review

Held:
No. PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of COMELEC
designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members
has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of COMELEC action under Section 8.
Whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the
COMELEC’s power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of — media of communication
or information — [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly honest, peaceful and
credible elections — is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy
involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.
 Macasiano v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 191672
25 November 2014

Facts:
Ret. Gen. Levy Macasiano seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional
Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locus standi on his being a consultant of the
DPWH pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and
Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement
on 2 January 1992 from the PNP) and his being a taxpayer. As to his role as consultant, he
alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve
as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of
the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he
assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a
direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."
Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because, (a) They
deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property without due
process of law and without compensation; (b) They reward, instead of punish, what this
Honorable Court has categorically declared as unlawful acts; (c) They violate the prohibition
against legislation that takes away one's property to be given to plain interlopers; (d) They
sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and (e) They
encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders.
Respondent NMRIA disagrees with the petitioner's stand that the said sections are
unconstitutional and avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian approach"
towards the less privileged citizens and does not in fact prohibit but merely discourages
eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers program beneficiaries.

Issue:
Whether or not the questioned provisions of RA 7229 are unconstitutional

Held:
No. They are not unconstitutional. Petition is without merit.It is a rule firmly entrenched in our
jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case, i.e.,the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent.
There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in
which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and
exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the
challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right
to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." The petitioner is not likewise a "proper
party." As a consultant of the DPWH under the "Contract for Consultancy . . .," he is not vested with any
authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on
private lands.
 Board of Optometry v. Colet
260 SCRA 88

Facts:
Petition to annul and set aside the Order of public respondent Judge Angel Colet
which granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioners from undertaking in
any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law
on the ground of being rendered with grave abuse of discretion. RA 8050, or the Revised
Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of HB No. 14100 and SB no. 1998 which
were respectively approved by both Houses and thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Reconciled Bill was then separately ratified by both Houses
and approved into law.

On July of that year, private respondents filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a TRO on the
following grounds, among others: (1) That it constitutes undue delegation; (2) there were
items inserted that were not allow in the Reconciled Bill; (3) it was suppressive of the
truthful advertising of optic goods; and (4) It was derogatory of the fundamental rights of
the Filipinos. Trial court respondent Judge Colet issued a TRO enjoining the Board from
enforcing or implementing RA 8050 or its Code of Ethics.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents have locus standi to the constitutionality of
RA 8050

Held:
No. “For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents
OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal
personality to bring an action”In order to have locus standi to question a statute’s
validity, petitioner should show that he has a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he would sustain or has sustained direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest. In the present case, respondents are not juridical entities
despite them being associations.
 Salonga v. Warner Barnes
88 Phil 125

Facts:
Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered into a contract with
Tina J. Gamboa whereby said company insured one case of rayon yardage which said
Tina J. Gamboa shipped from San Francisco, California, on steamer Clovis Victory, to
Manila, Philippines and consigned to Jovito Salonga, plaintiff herein.According to the
contract of insurance, the insurance company undertook to pay to the sender or her
consignee the damages that may be caused to the goods shipped subject to the
condition that the liability of the company will be limited to the actual loss which the
insured may suffer not to the exceed the sum of 2,000. Upon the arrival of the shipment
in manila, it was examined at the request of the plaintiff, and in their examination the
surveyors found a shortage in the shipment in the amount of P1,723,12. Plaintiff filed a
claim for damages in the amount of P1,723.12 against the American President Lines,
agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and when apparently no action
was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof from Warner, Barnes and
Co., Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines. In the meantime, the
American President Lines agreed to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P476.17 under its
liability in the bill of lading, and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally settled
in the amount of P1,021.25. As a result, the amount claimed in the complaint as the
ultimate liability of the defendant under the insurance contract was reduced to P717.82
only. After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court
rendered judgment against Salonga.

Issue:
Whether or not the Salonga, as agent of the insurance company, is the real party
in interest against whom the suit should be brought

Held:
No. Counsel next contends that Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., is not the real party in interest. It is claimed that
this action should have been filed against its principal, the Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York. Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." A
corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party in interest, or against a party which
may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The court disagrees in the contention that as such adjustment and
settlement agent, the defendant has assumed personal liability and, therefore, it can be sued in its own right. An
adjustment and settlement agent is no different from any other agent from the point of view of his responsibility, for he
also acts in a representative capacity. Whenever he adjusts or settles a claim, he does it in behalf of his principal, and his
action is binding not upon himself but upon his principal. The scope and extent of the functions of an adjustment and
settlement agent do not include personal liability. His functions are merely to settle and adjusts claims in behalf of his
principal if those claims are proven and undisputed, and if the claim is disputed or is disapproved by the principal, like in
the instant case, the agent does not assume any personal liability. The defendant issued upon in its capacity as agent of
Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York in spite of the fact that the insurance contract has not been signed by
it. As we have said, the defendant did not assume any obligation thereunder either as agent or as a principal. It cannot,
therefore, be made liable under said contract, and hence it can be said that this case was filed against one who is not the
real party in interest.
 Advocates of Truth in Lending, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board
G.R. No. 192986
15 June 2013

Facts:
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc., (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock
corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money
lending issues. Petitioners, as tax payers and concerned citizens, claiming that they are
raising issues of transcendental importance to the public, filed directly with this Court this
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, seeking to declare that
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank
Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, has no authority to
continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the CB-MB in 1982, which
"suspended" Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.

To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts petitioners contend the

transcendental importance of their Petition:
1. Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB had the statutory
or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for all kinds
of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the
limits prescribed in the Usury Law;
2. If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No.
905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as
regards usurious interest rates;
3. Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB
Circular No. 905.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a proper party to this case

Held:
No. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." in
public interest cases such as this petition, the Court has generally adopted the "direct injury" test that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."Thus, while petitioners assert a public right to
assail CB Circular No. 905 as an illegal executive action, it is nonetheless required of them to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. It is significant that in this
petition, the petitioners do not allege that they sustained any personal injury from the issuance of CB
Circular No. 905.

In the instant case, there is no allegation of misuse of public funds in the implementation of CB
Circular No. 905. Neither were borrowers who were actually affected by the suspension of the Usury Law
joined in this petition. Absent any showing of transcendental importance, the petition must fail.

While the Court acknowledges that cases of transcendental importance demand that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure, the delay of at least
15 years in the filing of the instant petition has actually rendered moot and academic the issues it now
raises.
 Chamber of Real Estate & Builders Association v. Energy Regulatory Commission
G.R. No. 174697
8 June 2010

Facts:
Pursuant to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA, the ERC promulgated the Magna
Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers, which establishes residential consumers' rights to
have access to electricity and electric service, subject to the requirements set by local
government units and distribution utilities (DUs).Article 14 of the Magna Carta pertains to the
rights of consumers to avail of extension lines or additional facilities. It also distinguishes between
consumers located within 30 meters from existing lines and those who are located beyond 30
meters; the latter have the obligation to advance the costs of the requested lines and facilities
ERC modified this provision when it issued the DSOAR. Section 2.6.1 reiterates the old rule
requiring consumers located beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance the costs of the
requested lines and facilities. Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs advanced by
consumers may be refunded at the rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution revenue derived
from all customers connected to the line extension. However, Section 2.6.2 amends Article 14 of
the Magna Carta by limiting the period for the refund to five years, whether or not the amount
advanced by the consumer is fully paid. The petitioner alleged that the entities it represented
applied for electrical power service, and MERALCO required them to sign pro forma contracts
that (1) obligated them to advance the cost of the construction of new lines and other facilities
and (2) allowed annual refunds at 25% of the gross distribution revenue derived from the
customer's electric service, until the amount advanced is fully paid, pursuant to Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR. ERC avers that it issued Section 2.6 of the DSOAR as an exercise of police power
directed at promoting the general welfare. The rule seeks to address the inequitable situation
where the cost of an extension facility benefiting one or a few consumers is equally shared by
them. The DUs have the obligation to reimburse the customers the advances within five years,
and whatever advances are unpaid during the five-year period are recorded as reductions in
"plant in service." Finally, it argues that petitioner lacks the standing to file the present suit since
the petitioner is not an end-user who will sustain a direct injury as a result of the issuance and
implementation of the DSOAR.

Issue:
Whether or not the case would prosper
Held:
No. Petitioner as an entity does not possess required standing to assail the validity of Section 2.6 of
the DSOAR. The petitioner expressly enumerates its members to be the following: developers, brokers,
appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, engineers, architects, and other persons or entities
engaged in the housing and real estate business.It does not question the challenged DSOAR provision as a
residential end- user and it cannot because the challenged provision only refers to the rights and obligations
of DUs and residential end-users; neither the petitioner nor its members are residential end-users. In fact,
the DSOAR has separate provisions for the extension of lines or installation of additional facilities for non-
residential end-users, under its Section 2.7 entitled "Modifications and New Connections: Non-Residential."
Thus, neither the petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as residential end-users, arising from the
challenged Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, nor cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-users that
would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision. The petitioner meets the objection to its capacity
to bring suit through the claim that subdivision developers are directly affected by the assailed provision
because MERALCO has asked them to advance the cost of installing additional lines and facilities, in
accordance with Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. This claim is specious. The court resolved to dismiss the
petition for its serious procedural and technical defects.
 People v. Vera
65 Phil 56

Facts:
Mariano Cu Unijeng was conviceted by CFI Manila to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison
mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.Cu Unijeng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were all denied by US
SC. He applied for probation under Act No 4221. He states that he is innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would
observe good conduct in the future

CFI referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial. Hearing
was set. Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjien. Cu Unjieng contends that the law is undue
delegation.

Issue:
Whether or not the government is a proper party to a constitutionality challenge

Held:
Yes, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so
that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal
But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of
sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality
of a statute should be presented.

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the

Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221
really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the
well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. The state is a
proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is always
interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved. “'It has an interest
in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an
individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury.”
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284
15 August 2000

Facts:
With the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila (i.e. robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings) Philippine President Joseph Estrada, in verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the PH Marines
to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated Letter
of Instruction 02/2000, which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. The Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President issured a Memorandum, dated January 24, 2000 addressed to the
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief, expressive of his desire to “improve the peace and order situation in Metro
Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. He further
stated “that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. The
President invoked his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
On January 17, 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the “IBP”) filed the instant petition to
annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marine, null and void and
unconstitutional on the ground that “no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify...the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work.” Solicitor General contends that the issue pertaining to the
necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question
and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the IBP has legal standing

Held:
No. The IBP failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisite of standing to raise
the issues in the petition.“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the
IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental
purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standard of the law
profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment
of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP,
assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific
injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its
members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the
operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that
their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.
 Macasiano v. National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 191672
25 November 2014

Facts:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines, through their respective
representatives, namely, Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
to the Republic of the Philippines, and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have
reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These loans
were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts. Prior to the
opening of the respective bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract
(ABC) was in the amount of P738,710,563.67. The bid for the improvement/rehabilitation of the San
Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road goes to private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation was corrected from the original P993,183,904.98 (with variance of 34.45% from the ABC)
to P952,564,821.71 (with variance of 28.95% from the ABC).
The petitioners contend that the award of the contract to private respondent China Road &
Bridge Corporation violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31:
SEC. 31. Ceiling for Bid Prices. – The ABC shall be the upper limit or ceiling for the Bid prices. Bid
prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from further participating in the bidding.
There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the award.
The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement is neither an international nor an executive
agreement that would bar the application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an
international or an executive agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the
case of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, the parties are the Philippine Government and the JBIC, a
banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese Government.
The respondents however contend that foreign loan agreements, including Loan Agreement
No. PH-P204, as executive agreements and, as such, should be observed pursuant to the
fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda (Latin for "agreements must be
kept").

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners, as taxpayers, possesslocus standi to file the present suit

Held:
Yes. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possesslocus standi to file the present suit. The petitioners suing as taxpayers,
have sufficiently demonstrated that, notwithstanding the fact that the CP I project is primarily financed from loans obtained
by the government from the JBIC, nonetheless, taxpayers money would be or is being spent on the project considering
that the Philippine Government is required to allocate a peso-counterpart therefor. Further, the serious legal questions
raised by the petitioners, e.g., whether RA 9184 applies to the CP I project, in particular, and to foreign-funded
government projects, in general, and the fact that public interest is indubitably involved considering the public expenditure
of millions of pesos, warrant the Court to adopt in the present case its liberal policy on locus standi.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. More particularly, it is a party’s
personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act being challenged. The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Consequently, the Court, has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi, including those cases
involving taxpayers. The prevailing doctrine in taxpayers’ suits is to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by
the national government or government- owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law. A taxpayer is
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.
 Kilosbayan v. Guingona
G.R. No. 113375
5 May 1994

Facts:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue
base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company and
one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia," long "engaged in, among others, successful lottery
operations in Asia, running both Lotto and Digit games, thru its subsidiary, Sports Toto Malaysia," with its
"affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc., . . . an American public company engaged in the
international sale or provision of computer systems, soft wares, terminals, training and other technical
services to the gaming industry," "became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO."
As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some
Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management
services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO." After the evaluation of the bid, On
21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-
signal to operate the country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract
would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance and approval by the Chief
Executive." On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. At the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on 12
November 1993, KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to the on-line lottery on account of its
immorality and illegality. Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of
Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line
lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1 (B) of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have locus standi
(2) Whether or not the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42 is legal and valid

Held:
The Courtfind the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the
aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is
expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of. Further, The Court agreed with the petitioners that the Contract of Lease is violates the
exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with" another.
 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
G.R. No. 192535
7 December 2010

Facts:
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated casesboth of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30,
2010, titled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." A special civil action for
prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitutionas it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. There
was also a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition led by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr.(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap”. Pursuant to this promise, he enacted EO no. 1 which created the PHL Truth
Commission of 2010 to investigate matters of graft and corruption allegedly committed during
the previous administration.
The petitioners contended that the commission is violative of the separation of
powers because it is only the Congress who can create a public office and provide funds for
its operation. The provision in the Revised Admin Code which was used to justify its creation
is misplaced because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth
Commission."

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing

Held:
For the petitioners in the second case (the members of the HOR), they have legal
standing. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress
as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the
cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their
power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. Indeed, legislators have a
legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of
any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. As for
Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his
petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise
judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.
 Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on
Human Rights
G.R. No. 155336
25 November 2004

Facts:
Congress passed RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998) which provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The
last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. The said RA has provided
that Constitutional offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy is authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices to fix and determine the
salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their respective personnel, make adjustments in
the personnel services itemization, including transferal of item or creation of new positions in
respective offices.
The CHR through its Charperson and commissioners promulgated a resolution
adoping an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of
funding for said staffing modification. The proposal for staffing and modification was
forwarded to the Department of Budget and Management but was denied as it effectively
involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services
CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of CSC-Regional Office that the subject
appointments be rejected arguing that that DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority
mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well
as creation of positions. This was however denied.
Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal
autonomy. Respondent CHR argues that petitioner has no locus standi considering that
there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as bona fide
organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president,
Marcial Sanchez, has the authority to sue the CHR. Also, that it has the authority to cause
the upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing scheme as it enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Issue:
Whether or not CHREA has locus standi

Held:
Yes. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file
employees of CHR, protests that such upgrading only benefited a select few in the upper
level positions resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently
meets the injury test. Since the personality of petitioner to file the case was recognized by
the CSC when it took cognizance of the request, and that CHREA's personality was a non-
issue in the CA, neither should also be an issue in the SC. For an issue that was neither
raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as
to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
 Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals, Co.
G.R. No. 155001
5 May 2003

Facts:
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Government for the development of Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957, as amended. It was endorsed
to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which, in turn, reviewed and
approved it for bidding. The Paircargo Consortium was the only company that submitted
a competitive proposal. AEDC questioned, among others, the financial capability of
Paircargo Consortium. However, the Pre- Qualification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) had prequalified the Paircargo Consortium to undertake the project. Later,
Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co.,
(PIATCO). And for failure of AEDC to match the price proposal submitted by PIATCO
(135M lang yung sa AEDC tapos sa PIATCO 17.75B), the project was awarded to
PIATCO. On July 12, 1997, the Government signed the 1997 Concession Agreement.
Thereafter, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and three
Supplements thereto were signed by the Government.

In G.R. No. 155001 individual petitioners are employees of various service

providershaving separate concession contracts with MIAA and continuing service
agreements with various international airlines to provide in-flight catering, passenger
handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling
and warehousing and other services. Also included as petitioners are labor unions
MIASCOR Workers Union-National Labor Union and Philippine Airlines Employees
Association, These petitioners filed the instant action for prohibition as taxpayers and as
parties whose rights and interests stand to be violated by the implementation of the
PIATCO Contracts.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are proper parties to the case

Held:
Yes. The Court held that petitioners have the requisite standing. In the
abovementioned cases, petitioners have a direct and substantial interest to protect by
reason of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. They stand to lose their source
of livelihood, a property right which is zealously protected by the Constitution. The
financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO Contracts on petitioners and
petitioners-intervenors in these cases are legitimate interests sufficient to confer on them
the requisite standing to file the instant petitions.
 Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization
246 SCRA 334

Facts:
President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a Program
for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets
thereof, and Creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust." Implicit in the
Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving business to the
private sector. The government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic services and the performance
of vital public functions
President Ramos approved the 40%-40%-20% privatization strategy of PETRON. Noting that the
privatization program has proven successful and beneficial to the economy in terms of expanding private
economic activity, improving investment climate, broadening ownership base and developing capital
markets, and generating substantial revenues for priority government expenditure, but [t]here is still much
potential for harnessing private initiative to undertake in behalf of government certain activities which can be
more effectively and efficiently undertaken by the private sector" The invitation to bid was published in
several newspapers of general circulation, both local and foreign. The deadline for the submission of
proposals was set
Petitioners contend that PETRON is a public utility, in which foreign ownership of its equity shall not
exceed 40% thereof and the foreign participation in the governing body shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital. According to petitioners, ARAMCO is entitled only to a maximum of four seats in the ten-
man board but was given five seats therefore award to ARAMCO must be nullified. PETRON questions the
locus standi of petitioners to file the action. Petitioners however, countered that they led the action in their
capacity as members of Congress

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners had legal standing

Held:
Yes, but as taxpayers and not as members of Congress. In Philippine Constitution
Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, we held that members of Congress have the legal
standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the
institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress. In the absence
of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded
into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action
in their capacity as members of Congress.
However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the
doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona. Under said ruling, taxpayers may question
contracts entered into by the national government or government- owned or controlled
corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of
petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. Nevertheless, a "public utility" under the
Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized "for hire or compensation" to serve the
public, which is given the right to demand its service. PETRON is not engaged in oil refining for
hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties
Likewise, the activities considered as "public utility" under Section 7 of R.A. No. 387 refer
only to petroleum which is indigenous to the Philippines. Hence, the refining of petroleum
products sourced from abroad as is done by Petron, is not within the contemplation of the law.
Petitions are wherefore dismissed.
 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia
239 SCRA 386

Facts:
On June 26, 1990 Sec of DOTC Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular No. 90-395 to the then LTFRB
Chairman Remedios Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range
of 15% above and15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. Finding the implementation
of the fare range scheme “not legally feasible” Fernando submitted to Orbos Section 16 (c) of the Public
Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and determination of rates -- (a) the rates to be approved
should be proposed by public service operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to concerned or
affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates; hence,
implementation of the proposed fare range scheme on August 6 without complying with the requirements of
the Public Service Act may not be legally feasible.
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines Inc. filed an application for fare rates
increase. An across the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of
provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and below the proposed
basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary, first
class and premium class buses and a fiftycentavo P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for aircon buses, was
sought. P0.065 centavos per kilometre for ordinary buses.
The application was opposed by Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc. alleging that it was
exorbitant and unreasonable. LTFRB granted the fare rate increase. On Mar 30, 1992 DOTC Sec Pete
Prado issued DO No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. LTFRB
issued a Memorandum Circular widening that existing fare range system to 20% and 25% limit. PBOAP
availed itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20%
and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of
a public hearing announced a fare increase of 20%. KMU opposed. LTFRB ruled in favour of PBOAP.

Issue:
Whether or not KMU has standing to sue

Held:
KMU has locus standi. Judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending
between parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. One who is directly
affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing
to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the
case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in
his behalf.KMU’s members have suffered and continually suffer a grave and irreparable damage
due to the implementation of the memoranda. It is a clear legal right that is being violated. They
are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public.
Assuming that KMU is not possessed with the standing to sue, the court may brush aside
procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.In line with the liberal policy
of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of
planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before
this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of
various government agencies or instrumentalities.
 Paguia v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 176276
25 June 2010

Facts:
Alan Paguia, as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition challenging to invalidate President
Gloria Arroyo’s nomination of Chief Justice Hilario Davide as Permanent Representative to the
UN for violation of Section 23 of RA 7175 (the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991). He argued
that Davide’s age at the time of his nomination in March 2006, is 70; which, therefore, disqualifies
him from holding his post. Paguia grounds his argument on the said Section pegging the
mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the DFA at 65. He theorizes that
Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus Davide’s
entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
In the comment of respondents (Davide, Office of the President and DFA), they raised
that petitioner 1) has no legal standing to bring suit because he is suspended from the practice of
law; 2) that he, being a citizen nor a taxpayer statues does not vests him with standing to
question Davide’s appointment because he remains without personal and substantial interest in
the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
disbursement of public funds.

Issue:
Whether or not Paguia has legal standing to sue?

Held:
No. Paguia has no legal standing. The Supreme Court reasoned, that:
First, Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring
this suit. [The Court] has granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they
raise issues of transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution.
Three factors are relevant in the determination to allow third party suits so [the Court] can
reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised – 1) the character of funds or assets
involved in the controversy; 2) a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition; and 3)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.
None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit
in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of statutory provision on the retirement of government
personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a clear disregard
of constitutional or statutory prohibition is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with
“more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.” Career ambassadors forced to leave the
service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and
personal than petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of law.
The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status.
Taxpayer’s contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for
expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. However, the salaries and
benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and
other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s
total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s
nomination.Second. He is suspended from the practice of law which bars him from performing
any activity in or out of the court.Third. This case is moot and academic already because Davide
resigned his post at the UN on April 2010.
 Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) v. Romulo

G.R. No. 157509

January 18, 2005

Facts:

Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its affiliated unions call upon the Supreme Court
to exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order assailed to be in
derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. They invoke their status as labor unions
and as taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order 185
dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters
was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

In support of their position, the Unions argue that the NLRC -- created by Presidential Decree 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code, during Martial Law – was an integral part of the Department (then
Ministry) of Labor and Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with legislative functions after
EDSA I, Executive Order 292 was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the DOLE for
policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision. On 2 March 1989, Article 213 of the
Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to
the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its
regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The subject EO 185, in
authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional
branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 set-up, amending the latter law which only
Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her
capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
opposed the petition on procedural and substantive grounds.

Issue:

Whether AIWA has locus standi

Held:

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said
that EO 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary
of Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and
specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein.
Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, and not the Unions herein, can claim any injury from the alleged
executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws. Neither can standing be
conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since they have not established disbursement of public funds in contravention of
law or the Constitution.
A taxpayer’s suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress. EO 185 does not even require for its implementation additional appropriation. Locus standi, however, is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when the public interest so requires.
 Domingo v. Carague

G.R. No. 161065.

April 15, 2005.

Facts:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners
basically alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law
authorizing COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards,
conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters.
Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan
without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan, Pascasio S.
Banaria are retired Chairmen, while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired
Commissioners of COA. All claim "to maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of
COA,"especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.
The other petitioners are incumbent officers or employees of COA. These petitioners
claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks as Unit Head,
Team Supervisor, and Team Leader upon implementation of the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due process, in violation of Civil Service
Law. Moreover, they were deprived of their respective Representation and Transportation
Allowances (RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition

Held:

No. Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan
There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
implementation. In fact, they admitted that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident
act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents
that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Clearly, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. As
for the other petitioners who averred that they were unceremoniously divested of their proper designations, such
averments lack merit. They were not demoted. Under Section 11, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987, a demotion is the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an
appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve reduction in salary. A
demotion by assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower rate of compensation is
tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.

Here, there have been no new appointments issued to Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi- An under the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan. Thus, their contention that they have been demoted is baseless. Moreover, the change
in their status from COA auditors (receiving monthly RATA) to COA auditors (receiving only reimbursable RATA) cannot
be attributed to the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan but to the implementation of the Audit Team Approach
(ATAP), pursuant to COA Resolution No. 96-305 dated April 16, 1996. Thus, in the implementation of the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan, we fail to see how petitioners could have sustained personal injury as they have not
shown to have a personal stake therein. They are wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition. The SC found
no reason to delve into the constitutionality or legality of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan.
 Cutaran v DENR

G.R. No. 134958

January 31, 2001

Facts:

In 1990, Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order No. 31 which
created a special task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation, and delineation of ancestral land
claims of the CAR. The Task force was authorized to accept, evaluate, and delineate ancestral land claims
within the said area, and after due evaluation of such claims, to issue appropriate land titles according to
law.
On January 15, 1993, DENR Secretary issued SO no. 25 which created task forces, provincial and
community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation, and recognition of
the ancestral land claims nationwide. It also issued DENR AO No.2 which contained the IRRs of SO no. 25.
In 1990, the relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC)
over the land they respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996, the applications
were denied by the task force of the DENR on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they
belong are not among those recognized of Baguio City.
Heirs of Apeng Cerantes also filed an application for certification of ancestral land claim over a
parcel of land also within the same area and overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the
petitioners.
Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued by the DENR
in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents issued by the DENR, tried
to acquire possession of the land they applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners.
Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the improvements they introduced within
the area they actually occupy and if not for the petitioner's timely resistance to such intrusions, the
petitioners would have been totally evicted therefrom.
The petitioners now seek to enjoin the respondent DENR from processing the application for
certificate of ancestral land claim filed by the Heirs of Carantes. Petitioners contend that in addition to the
failure of the DENR to publish the assailed administrative issuances in a newspaper of general circulation
prior to its implementation, RA 7586, which provides for the creation of a National Integrated Protected
Areas System, does not contain the slightest implication of a grant of authority to the DENR to adjudicate or
confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities.

Issue:

Whether there is a justiciable controversy.

Held:

No. From a reading of the records, it appears that the petition was prematurely filed. There is yet no
justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the trial court
on this ground. The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of
Carantes to possess a common piece of land. A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests"which may be
resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.Courts have no judicial power to review cases
involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical
cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot.
This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the DENR will approve the
application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will
imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction
of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by
the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.
 Joya v PCGG

225 SCRA 568

Facts:

Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her
for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through
PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. concerning the scheduled sale (82) Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged
to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman
Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art
pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the
eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the
silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and
such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject
to the provisions of the agreement.
The Commission on Audit (COA) submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations
of COA stating that the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence,
their disposal was prohibited by law
Director of National Museum Gabriel Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the
Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not
specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Despite the petitions raised, the sale at public
auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners are the proper party to file the instant case

Held:

No. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality due to their public
duty to conserve the artistic creations Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings
and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and
enjoy as great works of art.

The Court ruled that petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent
officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed. Petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the
artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such fund. Petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public
funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties.
Petitioners failed to show ownership of the artworks, they are not proper parties to enjoin the
PCGG form proceeding with the auction sale. They do not stand to be injured by the action of the PCGG.
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the
legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
 TELEBAP VS COMELEC

237 SCRA 337

Facts:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is

an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are
suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
under a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners assail the validity of Section 92 of
B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and television time be
given free takes property without due process of law; that it violates the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation; that it
denies broadcast media the equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it
violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have legal standing

Held:

No. Petitioner TELEBAP is without legal standing. In cases in which citizens were authorized to
sue, this Court upheld their standing in view of the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question
raised which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, as will presently be shown,
petitioners' substantive claim is without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined
by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to
be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a
result of the operation of Sec 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest
as registered voters since this case does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in Section 92 of
B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity. Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers
since this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as
a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute.

The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this
constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast
companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other
political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that
it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will
suffer losses again because it is required to provide free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question
the validity of Section 92.
 Kilosbayan v. Guingona

232 SCRA 110

Facts:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on-
line lottery system, also known as "lotto."

Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery
system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. The
Office of the President approved the award of the contract to, and entered into the so-called
"Contract Of Lease" with, respondent PGMC for the installation, establishment and operation of
the on-line lottery and telecommunication systems required and/or authorized under the said
contract.

Petitioners, question the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding
and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign." The petitioners also point out that
paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a
telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory.
However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install,
establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover,
PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a
franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
requires that for a corporation to operate a public utility, at least 60% of its capital must be owned
by Filipino citizens. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to
about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter
into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are
included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act
(R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have the Locus standi to file the petition at bench

Held:

Yes. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers,
members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations
were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities. The Supreme Court finds the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest
and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases.
 Tatad v. Secretary of Energy

G.R. No. 124360

November 5, 1997

Facts:

RA No. 8180 "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes” R.A. No.
8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Prior to 1971 ,
there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary
commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference
There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six
(6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the
country.
The Oil Industry Commission (OIC) was created to regulate the business of importing, exporting,
re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil,
gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the
market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to
regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. Marcos created the Philippine National Oil
Companies (PNOC) to break the control of foreigners in our oil industry.
Marcos, through Sec 8 of PD No. 1956 created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund to cushion the
effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or market price of crude.
President Aquino signed EO No. 172 creating Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the business of
importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing
energy resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires.” Congress enacted RA 7638
creating the Department of Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans,
programs,projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development,
utilization, distribution and conservation.
Congress enacted RA 8180. Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for
his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Francisco Tatad seeks to
annul Sec 5(b) of RA 8180 which provides for a tariff duty at 3% on imported crude oil and 7% on imported
refined petroleum
He contends that the 3-7% favors the big oil companies

Issue:

Whether petitioners have standing

Held:

Respondents contend that the deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision
made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court.Judicial power includes
not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision
is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide.
 Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 159139

January 13, 2004

Facts:

On June 7, 1995, Congress passed RA 8046, which authorized the COMELEC to conduct a
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to test the system in
the 1996 elections in the ARMM. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing
COMELEC to use an Automated Election System for the process of voting, counting votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
During the May 11, 1988 presidential elections, COMELEC decided against the full national
implementation and limited the automation to the ARMM. On October 29, 2002, COMELEC resolved to
conduct biddings for the three phases of the Automated Election System (Phase 1 – Voter Registration,
Phase 2 - Automated Counting and Canvassing System. Phase 3 – Electronic Transmission). On January
28, 2003, the COMELEC issued an invitation to bid pursuant to EO 172. Out of 57 bidders, the Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible.
For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BAC’s Technical Working Group, and the DOST.
Petitioners, in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens, argued that
the case is of transcendental importance and of national interest. “Allegedly, the COMELES’s flawed bidding
and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the
failure of the electoral process.It is further argued that the award of any contract for automation involved
disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws
governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Respondents contend that the petitioners do not possess
locus standi, in as much as they are not challenging the validity or constitutionality of RA 8436.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners have legal standing

Held:

The Court agreed with the petitioners. The nation’s political and economic future virtually
hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious
doubt that the subject matter of this case is “a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest”; in other words, is of “paramount public interest” and “transcendental importance.” This
fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society. The legal standing
of the petitioners in therefore recognized and upheld.

Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds, or if public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In the instance case, the petitioners, suing as
taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
used. They claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the
award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain
respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted
expenditure of public funds.
 Lim v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 151445

April 11, 2002

Facts:

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part in
"Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered
into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.
The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into
twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in
Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on
September 11, 2001.
Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists
Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by
the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a
fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to
ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan
02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since
it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.
Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers.
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain members of their organization
are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being
conducted in Mindanao. They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi
citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners, Lim and Ersando has locus standi in their capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers

Held:

No. They may not file suit in their capacities as taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been
shown that Balikatan 02-1 involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers. Their
being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, citing our ruling
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora. Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the
requisite showing of direct personal injury.
The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
 Kilosbayan v. Morato
G.R. No. 118910
July 17, 1995

Facts:

As a result of the SC’s decision in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, invalidating the Contract of Lease
between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on
the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new
agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid
Decision.”“(On January 25, 1995 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the
PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of
the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than
an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation.
The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the
annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current
ticket sales. Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity. On February 21, 1995 this
suit was led seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease
nullified in the first case.
Petitioners again seek to nullify the ELA. Petitioners contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their
standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case" and therefore
the question of their standing can no longer be reopened. Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit
on the ground that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and
substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners have locus standi in this case

Held:

Petitioners have no locus standi in this case. Even though the petitioners gained locus standi in the previous
case, they cannot be real parties in interest in the present case. The Court considers the judgment from the previous that
the petitioners are real parties in interest, a departure from settled rulings on real parties in interest, because there was no
constitutional issue involved. However, it was granted because of the exceptional effect the contract of lease to the
general public. The additional reason for the examination of the locus standi is that the voting on petitioners' standing in
the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying
petitioners' right to bring the suit. The doctrine of stare decisis cannot apply to the upholding of the locus standi of the
petitioners.

The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment Lease Agreement or ELA is a
legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is
essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination
in the prior case (G.R.. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease
of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.
It is important to note that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party-in-interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

Facts:

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corp of the Philippines (CDCP to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of Manila
Bay. Contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. On 1977,
then President Marcos issued PD 1084 which created the Public Estates Authority (PEA) and tasked it to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands.

PD 1085 was thereafter issued which transferred to the PEA lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) On
December 29 of 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract
with the CDCP so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP . . . shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly,
PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981

On 1988, Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 which granted and transferred to PEA the
parcels of land reclaimed under the MCCRP. On April of 1995, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The agreement also required the
reclamation of an additional 250ha of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Devt Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Of cers
and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation.

On April 4 and 5 of 1998, the PDI and Today published reports that there were ongoing
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Ramos. According to
these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, Chairman Arsenio Yulo, and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz
composed the negotiating panel of the PEA.

Issue:

Whether petitioner has the locus standi to bring the suit

Held:

Yes. “We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights — to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of
transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.” The petitioner has standing
to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties.

There are two constitutional issues involved here: First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on
the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose; Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the
second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
 Tatad v. Garcia

243 SCRA 436

Facts:

The DOTC planned to construct the EDSA LRT III. RA 6957 was enacted, providing
for two schemes for the financing, construction and operation of government projects through
private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Transfer (BT).
The EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC. Finding this
proposal to be in compliance with the bid requirements, DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT
Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an "Agreement
to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA"
The DOTC, represented by Secretary Jesus Garcia vice Secretary Prado, and
private respondent entered into a "Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised
and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA"
so as to "clarify their respective rights and responsibilities" and to submit [the] Supplemental
Agreement to the President, of the Philippines for his approval". Secretary Garcia submitted
to President Ramos the two agreements, which were approved. According to the
agreements, the EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republics.
The private respondent would undertake and finance the said project. DOTC shall
pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. As
agreed upon, private respondent's capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by
the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years
and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be
transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S. $1.00
Senators Tatad, Osmena, and Biazon, as senators and taxpayers, opposed the
implementation of said agreement arguing that EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the
ownership and operation thereof is limited by the Constitution to Filipino citizens and
domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like the private respondent.

Issue:

Whether petitioners’ as taxpayers have the legal standing to institute the action

Held:

Yes. The petitioners have the legal standing to institute the action. The prevailing
doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the
national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to
disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and
Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 [1989]). For as long as the ruling in
Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the
legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.
 Brillantes v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 163193

June 15, 2004

Facts:

In 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system
for the national and local elections. The COMELEC’s first attempt to conduct an automated election
happened in ARMM, however, it failed for the machines were unable to correctly read the automated ballots.
Persisted, COMELEC adopted a resolution for the modernization of the 2004 elections consisting of three
phases. Thereafter, President Arroyo issued EO 172 disbursing P2.5B to fund the AES. COMELEC then
issued Resolution No. 6074 and entered into a contract with Mega Pacific Consortium and Philippine Multi-
Media System.

In ITFP v COMELEC, the court nullified Resolution No. 6074, thereby scrapping entirely Phase II.
Notwithstanding the court’s decision, Comelec still continued the electronic transmission of advanced
unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial, and municipal positions, also dubbed as an
“unofficial quirk count”. On statutory grounds, the petitioners (Brillantes and NAMFREL) assailed resolution
encroaches upon the authority of NAMFREL to conduct unofficial quick count and violated Article VII,
Section 4 of the Constitution.

COMELEC on its part, asserts that the present controversy involves a "political question;" hence,
beyond the ambit of judicial review. It, likewise, impugns the standing of the petitioner to file the present
petition, as he has not alleged any injury which he would or may suffer as a result of the implementation of
the assailed resolution.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are proper parties to this case

Held:

Yes. A taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, is a proper party to question the validity of a law
appropriating public funds. Since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves the
expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite
standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation.

In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds, or that public money is being delegated to any improper purpose, or where the petitioners seek to
restrain the respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.

Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also representatives of major political parties that have
participated in the May 10, 2004 elections. On the other hand, petitioners-in-intervention Concepcion and
Bernas represent the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which is the citizens' arm
authorized to conduct an "unofficial" quick count during the said elections. They have sufficient, direct and
personal interest in the manner by which the respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including
the counting and canvassing of the votes cast therein. Moreover, the petitioners-in-intervention Drilon and
De Venecia are, respectively, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
heads of Congress which is exclusively authorized by the Constitution to canvass the votes for President
and Vice President. They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the constitutional
prerogative of Congress.
 Umamil v. Cafe

G.R. No. 144570

September 21, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Jumamilfiled before the RTC of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte where he questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolutions that
provided for an appropriation for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public
Marketwhich was destroyed by fire.

Petitioner alleges its unconstitutionality for it was passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of
private respondents who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior
contract to award the would be constructed stalls to all private respondents. . . . As admitted by public respondents some
of the private respondents are close friends and/or relatives of some of the public respondents which makes the
questioned acts discriminatory. The questioned resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication
that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private respondents maybe (sic) availed of by
anybody who can deposit the amount of P40,000.00.

Neither was there any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private
respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by
anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00.

RTC and the CA dismissed his motion for declaratory relief on the ground of petitioner's lack of legal standing
because he suffered no wrong under their terms. It also concluded that "the issue (was) not the ordinances themselves
but the award of the market stalls to the private respondents on the strength of the contracts individually executed by them
with Mayor Cafe." Consequently, it ruled that petitioner, who was not a party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file
the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation of the agreements.

Issue:

Whetherpetitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief

Held:

Yes. Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and
not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and
entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its
validity.

Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation.The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.The resolutions being assailed were appropriations
ordinances. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory.
Considering that he was asking this Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte,
he should have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who
were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified
did not suffice. Disregarding such, petition must still fail for the contracts were authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Panabo per Resolution No. 180 where "all the people interested were invited to participate in investing their savings."
 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

Facts:

Joseph Estrada is being prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659. He assails its
constitutionality on the on the grounds that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

Issue:

Whether Estrada has the standing to question the constitutionality of Plunder

Law

Held:

The law leans on the constitutionality of the law. The onerous task of rebutting
the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He
must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing; there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A
doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice.

Taking into consideration that the Plunder Law is a penal statute that imposes
the supreme penalty of death, and that petitioner in this case clearly has standing to
question its validity inasmuch as he has been charged thereunder and that he has been
for sometime now painfully deprived of his liberty, it behooves this Court to address the
challenge on the validity of R.A. No. 7080
 Imbong v. Ochoa

G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

Facts:

Despite the forgoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. To rein in the problem, the RH law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to
ensure that its objective to provide for the people’s right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of
modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health
education.
After the President placed its imprimatur (signed) on the said law, challengers from various sectors
of society came to the Supreme Court; 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention have been filed, on the
ground that the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, the matter is of transcendental importance.
The OSH asserts that the issue is political in nature it being “a product of a majoritarian democratic
process”. The OSG further claimed that the Court has no authority to review social legislation like the RH
Law. Moreover, it contends that as an “applied challenge”, the petition cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that RH law cannot be challenged “on its
face” as it is not a speech-regulating measure.

Issue:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy?

Held:

The Court partially granted the Petition and declared RA 10354 as not unconstitutional except
some provisions.

In the case at bar, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute. Moreover, under the RH Law, medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of
being criminally prosecuted for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.

In view of the novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and
bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that
the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. No. 171396

May 3, 2006

Facts:

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation
of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his
arrest.Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos.
His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March,
GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also
such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners
claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue
of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power,
take care power and take over power.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have locus standi

Held:

The Court held that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. The direct injury test posits that for
a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action,
he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he
has a general interest common to all members of the public.Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
- The cases involve constitutional issues;
- for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
- for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
- for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
- for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the ‘liberality doctrine’ on
legal standing.The petitions thus call for the application of the ‘transcendental importance’ doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the ÒPP 1017 cases.
 Matibag v. Benipayo

G.R. No. 149386

April 2, 2002

Facts:

COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag as "Acting Director IV" of
the EID. Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV
of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the
appointment of petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary" capacity.
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years
and all expiring on February 2, 2008. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on
Appointments the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmations
however, was not acted upon.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to
petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco
Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID
Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner's reassignment for Benipayo's
failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department however was denied. Petitioner appealed the denial of her
request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc and also filed an administrative and
criminal complaint with the Law Department. During the pendency of her complaint before the
Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to
remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate
the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. In the
meantime, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim appointments.

Issue:
Whether the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution

Held:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear
that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is
possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any
withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has
qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by
the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.
 Estarija v. Ranada
G.R. No. 159314
June 26, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Edward Ranada is a member of the Davao Pilots Association (DPAI) and Davao
Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc. (DTASI) failed an administrative complaint of Gross Misconduct before the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioner Edgardo Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority
in Sasa, Davao. The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing
permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding monies ranging from P200 to P2000
for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI.
Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioner's preventive suspensionand directed him to answer the
complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Davao RTC (Case was gross honesty and misconduct)
Respondent denied the allegations, claiming that such dismissal was unconstitutional since the
Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or
appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. The Ombudsman rendered him guilty, and the CA
denied his appeal.

Issue:

Whether the petition meets the requisites of judicial controversy

Held:

No. Only the third requisite is present based on the decision of the CA (kasi daw di na raise yung
question at the earliest possible opportunity): the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a
law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court of
Appeals, which is the competent court, the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time.

In assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770, petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has
only the powers enumerated under Section 13,Article XI of the Constitution; and that such powers do not
include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. Its power is
merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned.

Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In
passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the
people in ensuring accountability in public office.

Consistent with the intent of the constitution’s framers, they gave Congress the discretion to give
the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the
Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman
with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members
of Congress and the Judiciary.

Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers
gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of
Congress, and the Judiciary
 Umali v. Guingona

G.R. No. 131124

March 21, 1999

Facts:

Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue by the then President Fidel Ramos. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos
received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of
internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director
On August 2, 1994, President Ramos authorized the issuance of an Order for the
preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint against the
latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation
Sufficient evidence were collected to support 6 charges of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance against the petitioner. Thus, President Ramos issued an
Administrative Order dismissing Umali with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under
the law. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Office of the
President.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction was brought by Umali before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati which was later on dismissed. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, theorizing that the PCAGC is an unconstitutional office without
jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against him, which was also later on dismissed.
Thus, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the contention was raised at the earliest opportunity

Held:

No. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by
petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It
was certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings.
 Zandueta v. Dela Costa

66 Phil 115

Facts:

While petitioner Francis Zandueta was presiding over the 5th Branch of Courts of
First Instance of Manila, he received a new ad interim appointment, issued in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 145, to discharge the Office of Judge in the
Court of First Instance of the 4th Judicial District with authority to preside over the CFI of
Manila and Palawan. The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on
Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment. The Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the ad interim appointment of
petitioner. Subsequently, the President of the Philippines appointed respondent Sixto de
la Costa, judge of first instance of the 4th Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the CFI of Manila and Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission
on Appointments of the National Assembly. Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings against respondent and also questioned the validity of the appointment
alleging that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of C.A. No.
145 by virtue of which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the 4th
Judicial District, to preside over the CFI of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor

Held:

No. Petitioner is estopped by his own act form proceeding toquestion the
constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He likewise knew, or at leasthe should know, that his ad
interim appointment was subject to theapproval of the Commission on Appointments of
the National Assemblyand that if said Commission were to disapprove the same, it
wouldbecome ineffective and he would cease discharging the office. Thepetitioner was
free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued bythe President of the
Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with saidC.A. No. 145. Nothing or nobody
compelled him to do so. When a publicofficial voluntarily accepts an appointment to an
office newly created orreorganized by law – which new office is incompatible with the
oneformerly occupied by him – qualifies for the discharge of the functionsthereof by
taking the necessary oath, and enters in the performance of hisduties by executing
actsinherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving thecorresponding
salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the officehe was occupying by virtue of
his former appointment, and he cannotquestion the constitutionality of the law by which
he was last appointed.He was estopped form questioning the validity of said
appointment byalleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued,
isunconstitutional. He is exempted from said rule only when his nonacceptanceof the
new appointment may affect public interest or when heis compelled to accept it by
reason of legal exigencies.
 Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap v. Robredo

G.R. No. 200903

July 22, 2014

Facts:

Petitioners were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the LGUs of San Juan, Navotas and
Quezon.

These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by the
petitioners.

The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by generally averring that they have no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

They also posit that the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279 which are patently unconstitutional. They likewise insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondents'
threats of evictions and demolitions. Finally, that same offend their constitutional right to due process because they
warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. On the defense of the respondents, they contested that
petitioners were personally notified of the intended eviction and demolition as provided in Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279 which already laid down the procedure in evicting informal settlers in a just and humane manner.

Issue:

Whether the raised issue is the lis mota of the case

Held:

No. What constrained the Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that this issue is not the
lis mota of this case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-
equal branches of the government.

This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the
case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionality should be avoided.Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.

The Court carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to compellingly show the necessity of
examining the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution.

The Court noted that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers
shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy
danger areas and when persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding
are about to be implemented.

To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of
RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or
demolition orders.

Since the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents' alleged abuse of discretion was so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
this petition must necessarily fail.
 Planters Products v. Fertiphil Corporation
G.R. No. 166006
March 14, 2008
Facts:

PPI and Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws. Both are
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
Marcos issued LOI 1465 which provided for the imposition of capital recovery component (CRC)
on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.
The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution
shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution
shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 to Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority for every bag
of fertilizer it sold and remitted the same to Far East Bank and Trust Co. depositary of PPI.After
the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10.With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it paid, PPI refused.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC
in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law
FPA countered that LOI is a valid exercise of police power of the state to ensure the stability of
the fertilizer industry and Fertiphil did not sustain any damage since the levy is ultimately imposed
on the consumer
RTC ruled in favour of Fertiphil. RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle
that taxes can only be levied for public purpose. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA ruled
that the lis mota of the complaint for collection was the constitutionality of LOI.

Issue:

Whether such is the lis mota of the case

Held:

Yes. PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the
LOI. It asserts that the constitutionality of the LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint
for collection. Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of LOI is the lis mota of the case because
trial court cannot decide on its claim without resolving the issue. It is settled that RTC has the
jurisdiction to resolve constitutionality issues. The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be
properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination
of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.The
constitutionality of LOI No 1465 was properly raised RTC. It is also the lis mota of the complaint.
Fertiphil filed a complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies it paid on the ground of the
unconstitutionality of the LOI. An unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void,
Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. The levy should be refunded or it is unjust
enrichment. It is a consequence for being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot
order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the
unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis
mota of the complaint with the RTC
 Tarrosa v. Singson

G.R. No. 111243

May 25, 1994

Facts:

Jesus Armando Tarrosa filed a petition as a taxpayer questioning the

appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; hence null
and void. Respondents counter-argued that the BSP has its own budget and
accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General
Appropriations Act (GAA)

Issue:

Whether the petition can prosper

Held:

No, the petition cannot prosper on the ground that Tarrosa is not part of the
Monetary Board. The Supreme Court reasoned that, the action filed by the petitioner can
only be exercise by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.

Further, the Supreme Court said: “It’s (the case) capstone having been removed,
the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of
whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson can be enjoined.The petition was dismissed.
 Ty v. Trampe
G.R No. 117577
December 1, 1995

Facts:
Alejandro Ty, a resident and registered owner of lands and buildings in Pasig
City and MVR Picture Tube, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in Pasig have
sued Aurelio Trampe, in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163 of the RTC-NCR.

The petitioners, as residents and registered owners of land and buildings in

Pasig City filed a case impugning the validity of the new tax assessments prepared
solely by the municipal assessor. PD 921 and LGC of 1991 are statutes involved, both
dealing with the assessment and collection of real estate taxes.

Petitioners claim that the schedule of market values and the assessments, in
accordance with LGC 1991 are invalid and illegal because the said Code did not
effectively repeal the previous law (i.e. PD 921). The latter therefore is strict and
mandatory.

The Respondents counter-argued that the assessments are valid. That PD 921
and LGC 1991 are clearly and unequivocally incompatible since both dwell on the same
subject matter (preparation of schedule of values for real property in Metro Manila area).
Due to this, PD 921 was not expressly repealed in the Code’s repealing clause, but ut
was impliedly repealed. Therefore, LGC 1991 is the prevailing statute.

Issue:
Whether or not the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and
therefore unconstitutional

Held:
The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. To reiterate,
the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law
are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a
proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity,
and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of
the case.

SC ruled that PD 921 is still a good law and the schedule of values prepared
solely by the municipal assessor is illegal & void. It was held that if the intention of the
legislature was to abrogate PD 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause.
 Arceta v. Judge Mangrobang
G.R No. 152859
June 15, 2004

Facts:
Ofelia V. Arceta and Gloria S. Dy, in separate cases, were charged with the
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law i.e. BP Blg. 22. It was alleged that they wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue checks to some third person.

Both the accused did not move to have the charge against them dismissed or the
Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 is unconstitutional. They reasoned
that the Lozano doctrine is still in place and such moves (i.e. to dismiss or to quash)
would violate the doctrine.Both accused therefore filed a petition invoking the Court’s
power of judicial review to have the said law be considered void.

Issue:
Whether or not B.P. no. 22 is constitutional

Held:
The Court did not find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis
mota presented.Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. [The Court] ha[d] examined
the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P.
Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution.
Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be
a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant
consideration. However, the petition is dismissed for utter lack of merit.
 Bengzon v. Drilon
208 SCRA 132

Facts:
The petition questions the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain
provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment
of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of
Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. In the explanatory note of House Bill No.
16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos.
1797 and 3595 to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and
members of the Constitutional Commissions.
However, President Aquino vetoed the bill on the ground that it would erode the very
foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the
policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in RA 6758 known as
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, and that the Government should not
grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing
laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service
servants.

Issue:
Whether or not the veto of President Aquino impairs Fiscal Autonomy granted to the
Judiciary by the Constitution

Held:
Yes.The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation,
the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited
their objections to constant reminders.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations
Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments
in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the
use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the
judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free
hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. The veto impairs
the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in
contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy”.
 Nitafan v. Tan
152 SCRA 284

Facts:
Petitioners David Nitafan Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano are duly
appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC, NCR Manila. They sought to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondent Commission of Internal Revenue and Finance Office of
the SC from making any deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit
that a tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitute a decrease or
diminution of their salaries contrary to the provision of Sec.10 of Art.VIII of the
Constitution mandating that "during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased.

Issue:
Whether or not the deduction in the said salaries violates Sec.10 of Art.VIII

Held:
Yes. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art VIII reads as "their salary shall not be
decreased" and the words "not subjected to income tax" was deleted so as to give
substance to equality among the three branches of government. Thus, the clear intent of
the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption
from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary. In the course of deliberations,
it was made clear that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to
general income tax does not fall within their continuance in office.The court disregarded
the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of income tax and considered such payment as diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office. Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law
fixing another rate of compensation of Justice and Judges but such rate must be higher
than that which they are receiving at the time of the enactment, of if lower, it would be
applicable only to the appointed after its approval. It would be strained construction to
read into the provision an exemption from taxation when the true intent of the framers
was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable.
 In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and
Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine Judicial Academy
A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA. January 31, 2006.

Facts:
The Court promulgated on February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the
organizational structure and administrative set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).
Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising
Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23, respectively, were created in the 3
Divisions of the PHILJA. However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation
Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades from 25 and 23 to 24 and 22.
PHILJA Chancelor, Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, requested the Court to issue another
resolution retaining the position titles and salary grades of SCin light of the NOSCA issued by the
DBM downgrading said positions. She alleged the DBM violated by such downgrading. According
to the PHILJA Chancellor, to allow the DBM to disregard such resolution would "undermine the
independence of the Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme Court's exercise of its fiscal
autonomy expressly granted by the Constitution." Atty. Edna E. Diño, Office of the Chief Attorney,
recommended that the DBM be directed to implement the Court's Resolutions of February 24,
2004 as it (DBM) had "no authority to revise a Resolution of this Court issued in the exercise of its
constitutional mandates of fiscal autonomy and administrative supervision over court personnel."

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of DBM undermine the fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court

Held:
Yes. DBM’s authority to review Supreme Court issuances are limited by Article VIII,
Section 3 on fiscal autonomy and Article VIII, Section 6 on administrative supervision over court
personnel. Thus, the authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court
personnel extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive as
erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules on position classification. The DBM may not
overstep its authority in such a way as to cause the amendment or modification of Court
resolutions even if these pertain to administration of compensation and position classification
system. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition
of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not
only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially the separation of powers.

Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its
authority and encroached upon the Court's fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as
enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the Constitution itself.
 Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC

Facts:
COA has found an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5)
retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties
assigned to them during their incumbency which accordingly was because of the wrong formula
in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the Office of
Administrative Services, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advised the COA to
respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula. And, even added that two
previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld
the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines.

Issue:
Whether or not COA’s contention was right

Held:
No. Court En Banc’s Resolution serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s
properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts.

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the
Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how
of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the
manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference
on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the
fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional
duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s
own affairs.

The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted

fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution however,
must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence

The Court’s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the
Judiciaryis more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations; real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and
dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF
THE JUDICIARY
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC
RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM [PCIJ]
FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN]
AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC
August 26, 2004

Facts:
Rowena Paraan, research director of the PH Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) sought
copies of the SALN of Justices of SC for 2008. She also requested the Personal Data Sheets (P • DS) or
Curriculum Vitae (CV) of same justices for the purpose of updating their database of information on
government officials. Karol Ilagan, a researcher-writer of PCIJ sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the
Justices of the Court of Appeals for the same purpose. The Court resolved to create a special committee to
review the policy on requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend
appropriate action on such requests. The Special Committee submitted a Memorandum recommending the
creation of a Committee on Public Disclosure that would take over the functions of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal
documents of members of the Judiciary. Several request for copies of SALN and other personal documents
of SC, CA and Sandiganbayan justices were filed

Issue:
Balance between right to information and Judicial Independence

Held:
Guidelines for requests of SALN and other personal documents:
1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and to influence a decision or to warn the court of the
liabilities of any Justice or Judge shall be filed with unpleasant consequences of an adverse
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court or with judgment, the request may be denied..
the Court Administrator, as the case may be
(Section 8 [A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state the
purpose of the request 3. Where a decision has just been
2. The independence of the Judiciary is rendered by a court against the
constitutionally as important as the right to person making the request and the
information which is subject to the limitations request for information appears to be
provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the a fishing expedition intended to
need for fair and just adjudication of litigations may harass or get back at the Judge, the
require a court to be wary of deceptive requests request may be denied.
for information which shall otherwise be freely 4. In the few areas where there is
available. Where the request is directly or extortion by rebel elements or where
indirectly traced to a litigant, lawyer, or interested the nature of their work exposes
party in a case pending before the court, or where Judges to assaults against their
the court is reasonably certain that a disputed personal safety, the request shall not
matter will come before it under circumstances only be denied but should be
from which it may, also reasonably, be assumed immediately reported to the military.
that the request is not made in good faith and for a 5. The reason for the denial shall be
legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and, given in all cases
with the implicit threat of its disclosure,
While the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to matters of concern, the
Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary. The disclosure of SALN and other
personal document must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
 In Re: Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC
November 9, 1998

Facts:
There were two vacancies in the RTC. One in Bago City and the other was in
Cabanatuan City. Before, however, of the appointment by the President of the Judges of
the two RTCs, there were correspondences between the Chief Executive and the Chief
Justice clarifying the applications and relations of Sec. 15, Art. VII and Secs. 4(1) and 9
of Art. VIII. On those correspondences, in view that the President was insistent to fill the
vacancy and that the Chief Justice was adamant to said insistency because there is an
upcoming presidential election, the Judicial and Bar Council had meetings discussing
the matter, resulting to the referral of the Council to Supreme Court en banc.
Nonetheless, on March 30, 1998 the President appointed Mateo Valenzuela (Bago City)
and Placido Vallarta (Cabanatuan City).

Issue:
Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15,
Article VII, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view
of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII

Held:
No. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted
to the office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably made during the
period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition
relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or
influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in
the public interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, here is a
strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of
the ban.

To the contention that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII should prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they may be considered
later expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution, it suffices to point
out that the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one single instrument.
 De Casto v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 191002
March 17, 2010

Facts:
May 10, 2010; Presidential Elections. May 17, 2010; Compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. January 20, 2010; JBC opened the position of Chief
Justice for application or recommendation. February 8, 2010; JBC resolved to proceed
to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public
to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition. February 13, 2010;
announcement through Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star

Issue:
Whether or not Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that
any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor applies in this case despite
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President or Acting President
from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety

Held:
Yes. Section 4 (1), Article VIII applies. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof. The exchanges during deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy
in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President.
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242
July 17, 2012

Facts:
Article 8, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides in part: “A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of... a representative of the Congress as ex-officio Members...”In compliance therewith,
Congress, from the moment of the creation of JBC, designated one representative to sit
in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. In order, however, to give equal
opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the HOR and the Senate would
send alternate representatives to the JBC.
In 1994, however, the composition of JBC was substantially altered. Instead of 7
members, an 8th member was added to the JBC; thus, 2 representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC, with, first, each having ½ vote; then later, given each 1
vote.Petitioner Chavez questioned this and argued that Article VIII, Section 8(1) is clear
and definite and needs no interpretation; the JBC shall have only one representative.

Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight
(8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
Yes. The petition was granted. As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the
singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to
the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.Moreover, under the maxim
noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and speci c
by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242
April 16, 2013

Facts:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed by the petitioner, former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).

Respondents contend that (1) allowing only one representative from Congress in
the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature (2) the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight (3) that two representatives from Congress would
not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship (4)
that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a
solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

Issue:
Whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
allows more than one member of Congress to sit in the JBC

Held:
No. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must
be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text,
compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it. In
opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino
people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in
the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
 Jardeleza v. Sereno
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014

Facts:
After Justice Abad's compulsary retirement, the Judicial Bar Council announced the
application for the position left by the Associate Justice including Jardeleza. However, he
was informed through a phone call from some Justices that Chief Justice CJ Sereno will be
invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC- 009 or "unanimity rule" against him. The rule implies that an
applicant is included in the shortlist when he obtains affirmative vote of atleast a majority of
all the members of the JBC. Since Jardeleza's integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote shall
be required. He was invited to the JBC and was informed of the objections to his integrity.
Petitioner sent a letter-petition to the SC asking it to exercise its supervisory power
and direct JBC to give him a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or
any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the
voting process for nominees on June 30 2014
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be ncluded in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4
nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC
shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the "unanimity
rule."
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order to compel the JBC to include him in the list of the nominees on the grounds that JBC
and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC
proceedings
Held:
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that thr
application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza's deprivation of his right
to due process. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Even as Jardeleza was verbally
informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked
to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense
perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court.
Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have
never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against
Jardeleza's integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC's discretion in
the selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in
conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been
able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a
majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the
position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to
the President.
 Fortrich v. Corona
G.R. No. 131457
August 19, 1999

Facts:
On April 24 1998, the Supreme Court gave a decision; motion for reconsideration was
filed upon the Supreme Court Division. On November 17, 1998, the Supreme Court Division, by
a vote of 2- 2, denied the motion for reconsideration. The intervenors filed a "Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc." on December 3, 1998.
The Court then noted without action the "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The
Matter To The Court En Banc."

In this petition for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case
be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for
reconsideration were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e.,
three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en
banc pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4 (3):
"Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc."

Issue:
Whether or not the case should be decided by the Court en banc

Held:
No. A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution reveals that there is a
distinction between "cases" and "matters", that "cases" are decided while "matters" are resolved.
Therefore, only "cases" are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required
number of votes is not obtained and does not apply in the resolution of motions for
reconsideration.
The case has its origin from a decision of the Office of the President vesting rights to the
land in dispute to petitioners and those similarly situated and denying benefits to intervenors who
were seasonal farmworkers. In the case at bar, the present motions for reconsideration
necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the
clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, but the same must be filed with express leave of court. In this case, not only did
movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show
that there are exceptional reasons for the court to give due course to their second motions for
reconsideration. Also, the issue raised had been settled in the case of Province of Camarines
Sur, et al. vs. CA in the negative.
 Limketai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118509
September 5, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner bewails the present composition of the Third Division which deliberated on
private respondents' motion for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed the unanimous
decision of December 1, 1995.
More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the
chairmanship of the Third Division.
We need only to stress that the change in the membership of the three divisions of the
Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is purely
an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all.
According to petitioner, that the case should be referred to the Court En Banc as the
doctrines laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and De Gracia, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, and Villonco
Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et al despite have been modified or reversed.

Issue:
Whether or not a new member of the third division where the present is docketed is
bound to follow the decision of the previous membership

Held:
No. A more circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a-vis the case at bench would
inevitably lead petitioner to the conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modifications of the
doctrines laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases. In fact, the inapplicability of the
principle enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has already been extensively discussed
in the Court's resolution, hence the same will not be addressed anew. As regards the case of
Villonco, petitioner mistakenly assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu with the former.
The Court finds no further need to elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the significant
fact that the offer of the buyer in Villonco, unlike in this case, was accepted by the seller,
Bormaheco, Inc.; and Villonco involves a perfected contract, a factor crucially absent in the
instant case as there was no meeting of the minds between the parties.
Suffice it to say that the Court with its new membership is not obliged to follow blindly a
decision upholding a party's case when, after its re-examination, the same calls for a rectification.
"Indeed", said the Court in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, et al., "a change in the composition of the
Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision." And it is precisely in recognition
of the fact that the Court is far from infallible that parties are duly accorded a remedy under the
Rules of Court to bring to the Court's attention any error in the judgment by way of, among others,
a motion for reconsideration. "More important that anything else", in the words of Mr. Justice
Malcolm, "is that the court should be right" and to render justice where justice is due. It is
therefore unfair, if not uncalled for, to brand the instant case as "one of utmost uniqueness in the
annals of our judiciary."
We need only to stress that the change in the membership of the three divisions of the
Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is purely
an internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all.
 Francisco Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 106910
October 19, 2010

Facts:
1987 Constitution came ---Art XII Sec11. No franchise shall be granted except to citizens
of PH or corporations organized under the laws of PH at least 60% of whose capital is owned by
such citizen.
DPWH, TRB, PNCC, Benpres Holdings Corporation and First Philippines Holding
Corporation executed a Memorandum Agreement envisaged to open the door for the entry of
private capital in the rehabilitation, expansion (to Subic and Clark) and extension, as flagship
projects, of the expressways north of Manila, over which PNCC has a franchise. PNCC entered
into financial and technical joint venture agreements(JVA) with private entities or investors for the
toll operation of its franchised area. The procedure: after JVA, government approval then
execution of Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) to implement the TOA. Once the
STOA approval is given, project starts TRB then approves initial toll rate. STOA defines the scope
of the road project coverage, the termination date of the concession and toll rates.Petitioner
Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway users sought to nullify the various STOAs as
it violate the Constitution as they veritably impose on the public the burden of financing tollways
by way of exorbitant fees and thus depriving the public of property without due process. And that
the STOA is infirm by granting build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects without public bidding
contrary to RA 7718.

Issue:
Whether or not TRB’s executive and quasi-judicial function is in violation of the
Constitution

Held:
By PD 1112, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was given the power to grant
administrative franchise for toll projects. It is also empowered to issue, modify, and promulgate
rates of toll to be directly charged on users of toll facilities, and approve or disprove the increase
or decrease thereof.
It must be presumed that the Congress, in creating said agencies and clothing them with both
adjudicative powers and contract-making prerogatives, must have carefully studied such dual
authority and found the same not breaching any constitutional principle or concept. LTFRB and
NTC have been given similar concurrent powers.
The fact that an administrative agency exercising its administrative/executive function
and its quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial function is not in violation of due process or the
Constitution.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special
expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-
judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative
agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters
calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be
handled by regular courts.
 Jardeleza v. Sereno
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014

Facts:
After Justice Abad's compulsary retirement, the Judicial Bar Council announced the
application for the position left by the Associate Justice including Jardeleza. However, he was
informed through a phone call from some Justices that Chief Justice CJ Sereno will be invoking
Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC- 009 or "unanimity rule" against him. The rule implies that an applicant is
included in the shortlist when he obtains affirmative vote of atleast a majority of all the members
of the JBC. Since Jardeleza's integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote shall be required. He was
invited to the JBC and was informed of the objections to his integrity.

Petitioner sent a letter-petition to the SC asking it to exercise its supervisory power and
direct JBC to give him a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or any
documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting
process for nominees on June 30 2014.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to
be ncluded in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was
revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1
nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the "unanimity rule."

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
to compel the JBC to include him in the list of the nominees on the grounds that JBC and CJ
Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case, however, only as a supervising
authority. The Supreme Court reasoned that: as a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides
the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the
conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done
or redone, by only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.
 People v. Redulosa
255 SCRA 279

Facts:
The case is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, finding appellant Romeo Redulosa and his co-accused Roselo Carton guilty of
kidnapping for ransom with murder and sentencing each of them to death.Romeo
Redulosa and Roselo Carton were sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the
victims heirs in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay P 100,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and the
costs. Thereafter the case was brought to this Court on automatic review.However,
Carton escaped from the rehabilitation center; the Court thereafter dismissed his
appeal.Redulosa, filed a motion to Withdraw Appeal. After due deliberation the Court
resolved to grant appellants motion to withdraw his appeal. To begin with the death
penalty imposed on appellant was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of
Art. III, 19(1). of the Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is still subject to automatic review

Held:
No. Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the trial
court forward the records of the case to the SC for automatic review of the conviction.
(NACHURA) Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0(1) (1) that notices be given to all the
accused in the pending cases before the Court wherein the death penalty has been
imposed, advising said accused that the death penalty imposed upon them has been
officially commuted to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) by virtue of the abolition of
the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution and that with such abolition of the death
penalty their cases are no longer subject to automatic review by this Court.
 Garcia v. People
G.R. No. 106531
November 18, 1999

Facts:
On September 29, 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iloilo City, an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of
one Jose Estrella. After due trial, on September 21, 1990, the trial court promulgated its
decision convicting petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
But it was denied, and they received a notice of denial. Petitioners did not interpose an
appeal from the decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became
final on September 17, 1991. Accordingly, the trial court issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners.

On November 13, 1991, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift warrant
of arrest and to allow accused to appeal, arguing that there was no need for them to
appeal the decision as the same was subject to automatic review by the Supreme
Court.The trial court denied the motion and the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
present recourse.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial court's
decision convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua

Held:
No. The Court has consistently ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty
actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction. As the petitioners did not file a
notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the decision convicting
them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the decision became
final and unappealable. Consequently, mandamus will not issue to compel the trial court
to elevate the records to the Supreme Court. The petition is dismissed.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 135789
January 31, 2002

Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a
sequestration writ against all the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank
deposits of Hans Menzi Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI). The estate of Hans
M. Menzi, in behalf of HMHMI, led with the Sandiganbayan a motion to lift freeze order
which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines
led with the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order. The Court set aside the Sandiganbayan
resolution and remanded the case back to the Sandiganbayan to resolve the issue of the
issuance of the writ of sequestration. The Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestration
reasoning that there was no prima facie factual basis for its issuance. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
What is the extent of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court regarding decisions
rendered by the Sandiganbayan

Held:
Petition denied for it being a question of fact. It is well settled that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is
limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when
the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.A question of fact exists when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
The SC is not a trier of facts, because it is not the duty of the SC to examine and
weigh all over again the evidence presented in such proceedings.The SC agreed with
the respondents that the Sandiganbayan has the full authority to decide all incidents in
the ill-gotten case, which includes the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the
PCGG initially issued.
 Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
September 16, 1998

Facts:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects
inlucding those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of
his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted
for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Thereafter, bitterness in their relationship arose, which caused petitioner to
terminate their relationship but was refused by the private respondent by filing against
him an administrative case seeking the dismissal of private respondent for violation of
Section 19 RA 6770 and Section 36 of PD 807.
The Graft Investigator found private respondent guilty and ordered his dismissal.
The Ombudsman approved the resolution of the Graft Investigator, but upon motion for
reconsideration, transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman which exonerated
private respondent from the administrative charge.
Petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned
adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing"
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such
appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved."

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 27 of RA 6770 may authorize an appeal to the Supreme
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases

Held:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to
give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court.
It was provided in the Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent."
Senator Angara, as co-author and principal sponsor of the bill admitted that the said provision will
expand the Court's jurisdiction and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not
consulted this Court on the matter. There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic
Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent. Thus, it is
unconstitutional.
 Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 217126-27
November 10, 2015

Facts:
The Ombudsman filed against Mayor Binay a complaint of plunder; the complaint
alleged that the Mahor was involved in anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Building project.

Binay was required to file counter-affidavits. Before, however, Binay could file his
counter-affidavit, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order against the
Mayor and several other. As a result, the Mayor filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the Ombudsman’s implementation of the preventive
suspension order.The CA issued a TRO against the Ombudsman; the latter ignored it;
Binay filed a petition for contempt. The CA, in turn, consolidated the two cases Binay
filed and directed the Ombudsman to file her comment. Hearings of oral arguments
where scheduled. Prior to the hearing however, the Ombudsman filed with the SC the
present petition assailing the jurisdiction of the CA in granting Mayor Binay the TRO,
citing the Ombudsman Act of 1998, which states that no injunctive writ could be issued
to delay the Ombudsman’s investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes. Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy
against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional
and perforce, invalid. Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that
the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
 People v. Gutierrez
39 SCRA 173

Facts:
17 persons and 82 unidentified others were the subjects of the two Informations
in the Court of First Instance charging them of “confederating, conspiring, constabulating
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or
caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be
occupied.” The Secretary of Justice issued AO 221, authorizing the Judge of Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special trial in Ilocos Sur; three
days after, the Secretary of Justice issued AO 220, authorizing said Judge to transfer the
criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.The prosecuting moved the respondent
Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal court invoking the said AOs and
the security and personal safety of the witnesses.The accused and the respondent judge
opposed the move on the ground that the change of venue should have been done right
at the very inception of the cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to
transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court

Held:
No. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as
permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated
neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department
AO No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act
upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred to
the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice
was impending, in view of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt
their lives would be endangered.

This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the
imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the
cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and
the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
 Primicias v. Ocampo
93 Phil 451

Facts:
Cipriano Primicias was charged before CFI Manila with 1) Violation of CA 606,
contending that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without
the approval of the President of the Philippines 2) violation of section 129 in relation to
section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code that he failed to submit to the Collector
of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic"
and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the
departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
Before trial of the criminal cases, petitioner prayed that the assessors be
appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases
as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the
City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure
CFI dismissed the case stating that the promulgation of Rules of Court by the SC
superseded and expressly repealed all rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing.
CFI added that SC vested with the rule-making power expressly omitted the
portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not right to trial with aid of assessor is a substantive right that cannot
be impaired by the rule making power of this Court

Held:
The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such
are not embraced by the rule making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said
section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 2477 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied when
invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code
of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in
several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked. Inclusion of trial by assessor in the
Rules of Court would be a travesty of its rule making power, as directed by the Constitution to be
limited to matters referring to pleading, practice and procedure.
There are remedial provisions but are inextricably interwoven with the substantive part, it
must have been deemed wise and proper to leave them as they were for reasons of coordination
and expediency, it being a truism that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. Remedial measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to
the portion of the law to which they belong.
While our Constitution has given the power to adopt rules of procedure to the Supreme
Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any procedural law or altering,
amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
 First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110571
March 10, 1994

Facts:
On December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted the First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc.’s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the
scope of its registered product from ‘glazed floor tiles’ to ‘ceramic tiles.’ Eventually,
Mariwasa filed a motion to reconsider the said decision but to no avail. It then filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. The Court of
Appeals did its duty and required First Lepanto to comment on the case. It also issued a
Temporary Restraining Order against the implementation of the Decision of the BOI.
(This is not too important anyways, but its found on page 1 of the case, paragraph 3) On
February 24, 1993, First Lepanto Ceramics filed a motion to dismiss the petition and to
lift the restraining order “on the ground that the [Court of Appeals] has no appellate
jurisdiction over the BOI Case No. 92005, the same being exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of [EO 226]. On May 25, 1993, the CA denied the
motion to dismiss filed by First Lepanto. On June 4, 1993, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court with the view that the CA “acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in issuing the question resolution of May 25, 1993.”

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted within its jurisdiction

Held:
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 81 of EO 226
insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the
BOI are concerned. Appealed from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court
of Appeals.
 In Re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
49 SCRA 22
January 9, 1973

Facts:
In 1970, the Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar Integration (CBI) to
ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In 1971, the Congress passed
HB 3277 (An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor). President Marcos signed the measure and it became RA 6397. The
law authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.

In 1972, the CBI submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation to ordain
the integration of the Philippine Bar through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule. The Report, alongside the proceedings in Administrative Case
526 and the views and sentiments of the Board of Consultants and the Philippine Bench
and Bar prayed for such integration.

Issue:
Whether or not the integration of the Bar is constitutional

Held:
Yes. Because the practice of law is a privilege clothed with public interest, it is
but fair that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer’s public responsibilities. The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Article
VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar as an inherent part of its authority over it. RA 6937 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s inherent power, but acts as a mere
declaration that the integration of the bar will be for public interest.
 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999

Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day.
The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that
the action not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve per Article VII, Section 19 of the 1987
Constitution. In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends that the exercise by the
Supreme Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable and it did not lose
jurisdiction to address incidental matters arising from the case herein.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court, in restraining the execution, encroached

upon the powers of the Executive in granting a reprieve, and upon the powers of the
Legislature in promulgating such rules

Held:
No. The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts as provided in Art. VIII,
Sec. 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution. Art. VII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution is simply the
source of the President’s power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment
and its jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter the same. The former continues even after
the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcing the judgment, while the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final. The power of control of execution of its
decision is an essential aspect of the Court’s judicial power, as vested in its entirety by
the Constitution. It cannot thus be subject of substantial subtraction of its judicial power.

The power of Congress under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions to repeal, alter or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was taken away by the
1987 Constitution in the expansion of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in the
furtherance of its independence.
 Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association
G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners Canlas et. al. are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of
filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They
claim that Napico Homeowners Association hold fraudulent and spurious titles issued by
unprincipled Land Officials. As a result, they allege that they have been deprived of their
liberty, freedom and rights to shelter, thus, the petition for writ of amparo.

Issue:
Whether or not the writ of amparo is the correct remedy for petitioners

Held:
No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that it shall be available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official xxx The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.“

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of final judgment of the court is

not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. There must be a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected for
a writ of amparo to be issued. Their claim to their dwelling does not constitute right to
life, liberty and security. Lacking the factual and legal basis for their claim, there is thus
no basis for the writ of amparo to be issued.
 Tapuz v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 182484,
January 17, 2008

Facts:
The spouses Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes Sanson filed a complaint before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible entry with
damages against the petitioners Tapuz et. al., and about 120 John Does. The Sansons
allege that they own 1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name, and that
Tupaz et. al., armed with bolos and suspected firearms, entered and took possession of
the disputed property of the Sansons and built a nipa and bamboo structure.

The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that they had possession of the
disputed land since 1993 up to 2006 when the land was taken. The MCTC issued the
injunction prayed for. Tupaz et. al. filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
which however issued a preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of demolition against
the former, upon motion of the Samsons. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
denied, so they before the Court of Appeals and filed a Petition for Review of the
decision of the RTC. The Sheriff of Aklan meanwhile, served the Notice to Vacate and
for Demolition to the petitioners. The petitioners thus filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for three remedies, namely: certiorari under Rule 65, the issuance of the writ of
habeas data and the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Issue:
Whether or not the remedies prayed for are proper

Held:
No. The petitions for certiorari and the issuance of a writ of habeas data are
fatally defective in substance and form, while the writ of amparo is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It was not conceived to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. It cannot be issued as well on the basis of amorphous
and uncertain grounds. As the threat posed to petitioners seemed to be purely property-
related and focused on a land dispute, the proper remedy sought for may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy
of the writ of amparo.
 Caram v. Segui
G.R. No. 193652
August 5, 2014

Facts:
PetitionerMa. Christina Caram had an amorous relationship with Marcelino
Constantino III and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child out of wedlock.
After getting pregnant, Christina misled Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in
Parañaque City.

After giving birth, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed
of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. A certificate was then issued declaring Baby
Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses
Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced. Thereafter, Christina
changed her mind about the adoption and wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. The DSWD, through respondent
Atty. Segui, informed her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for
adoption had attained finality which effectively terminated her parental authority and
made Baby Julian a ward of the State.Christina then filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of amparo before the Regional Trial Court seeking custody of Baby Julian from
DSWD.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child

Held:
No. There was no enforced disappearance in this case, so the writ of amparo
may not be availed of in this case. The Court held in the case of Navia v. Pardico that
the elements constituting “enforced disappearances”, as defined in Sec. 3(g) of RA 9851
consist of the following: (1) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (2) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (3) that it be followed by the State
or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (4) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

The DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts, and the
adoption proceedings were conducted in accordance with law. Since the third and fourth
elements appear to be missing, there is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used
in the context of the Amparo rule.
 Lee v. Ilagan
G.R. No. 203254
October 8, 2014

Facts:
Respondent Ilagan and petitioner Lee were common law partners. Sometime in
July 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at her residence and thereafter proceeded to his office,
and, upon arrival, noticed that his digital camera was missing. Lee thereafter confronted
Ilagan regarding a sex video she discovered from Ilagan’s previously missing camera
involving the latter and another woman. A confrontation ensued, and Lee was allegedly
slammed against a wall. She then instituted a criminal and administrative complaint
against Ilagan using the video as evidence. Ilagan filed for a writ of habeas data, alleging
that Lee’s acts of reproducing the video, and uploading it to the Internet violated not only
his right to life, liberty, security and privacy, but also that of the other woman. The
Regional Trial Court thereafter granted the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of Ilagan

Held:
No. the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a response to
address the rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, conceptualized
as a remedy to enforce the right to informational privacy of individuals. Thus, in order to
support the petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges “the manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty, or security of the aggrieved party”,
and be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of
that individual’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security.

Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the reproduction of the sex video. There is
therefore no sufficient basis for the issuance of the writ.
 Gamboa v. Chan
G.R. No. 193616
July 24, 2012

Facts:
In 2009, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275
(AO 275), which created the Zeñarosa Commission to investigate the existence of
private army groups (PAGs) in the country. It included in its report that Marynette
Gamboa, then Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, maintained a PAG. Gamboa alleged that
the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP-Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG on the basis of unverified information. Contending that her right to privacy
was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of
the PNP-Ilocos Norte. The RTC issued the corresponding writ after finding that it is
meritorious on its face. The respondent members of PNP-Ilocos Norte asserted that the
Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the requisites under the Rule on
Habeas Data, and that it was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching
of the reputation of Gamboa. The RTC thereafter dismissed the Gamboa’s petition for
failing to prove through substantial evidence that the information originated from officials
of PNP-Ilocos Norte.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper

Held:
No. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. In order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. The state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. The privilege of the writ of habeas data therefore, must be
denied.
 Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College
G.R. No. 202666
September 29, 2014

Facts:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a graduating high school student at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), uploaded on her Facebook profile several pictures of her and her
classmates, Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos Mylene Escudero, a computer
teacher, whome they showed the pictures to, using their respective personal Facebook
accounts. Escudero then showed the pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action. Tan and her friends were then found to have violated the manner
prescribed intheir student’s handbook and were banned from joining their graduation
ceremony scheduled in March 2012. Tan’s mother successfully acquired a temporary
restraining order (TRO) before the RTC to allow them to join the graduation ceremony,
but despite its issuance, Tan et. al. were still barred. Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares,
mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school. They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data
be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. Their prayer
was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued

Held:
No. Although the petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if the
case involved is not one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance, there must be a
showing of reasonable expectation of privacy that must be respected and protected. An
online networking site like Facebook has privacy tools which the students could have
made use of to ensure their right to privacy, but as it is, the evidence would show that
their Facebook posts were published as “Public”, and no attempts were done to change
the privacy setting of said posts. There is thus no reasonable expectation of privacy on
the part of the petitioners. Moreover, STC did not violate their students’ right to privacy
as the manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal.
There is, therefore no need for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
 MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
G.R. No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

Facts:
On January 29, 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies, including the Metropolitan Development Authority, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water
quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by the
Philippine Environment Code, or Presidential Decree No. 1152 (PD 1152), and that its
continued neglect constituted a violation of their right to life, health and a balanced
ecology and various environmental laws. The RTC ordered the government agencies to
clean up Manila Bay and rehabilitate its waters. Several agencies filed a petition before
the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the pertinent provisions of PD 1152 relate only to
the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general, and that
the cleaning of Manila Bay was not a ministerial act which cannot be compelled by
mandamus. The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC, hence the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court may compel government agencies to conduct the
cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be
compelled by mandamus because even though the implementation of their tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may therefore be compelled to be done. As the cleanup and
restoration of Manila Bay is only one aspect of, and an initial stage of the long-term
solution, the Court may issue the writ of continuing mandamus to ensure full compliance
with the Court’s directives for the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over the parties
concerned until the judgment has been fully executed.
 Fuentes v. Ombudsman-Mindanao
G.R. No. 124295
October 23, 2001

Facts:
The case involved a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the
Ombudsman’s investigation of petitioner Fuentes for violation of Republic Act No. 3019
(RA 3019).
In an expropriation case, petitioner Judge Fuentes directed the attachment of
government property and issued a writ of execution against the DPWH, which enabled
one Alex Bacquial to take ownership of the property in question and haul equipment it.
Acting on the letters received from the Court Administrator, Sheriff Norberto Paralisan,
who served the notice of levy and the corresponding certificate of sale for said property,
was charged guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and was promptly
dismissed from service. After which, Director Valenzuela of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Fuentes be charged with violation of
RA 3019 as well, and be administratively charged before the Supreme Court. He later
filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint
against Judge Fuentes. Petitioner motioned for its dismissal and manifested his intention
to have the case referred to the Supreme Court for proper adjudication.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may investigate petitioner judge

Held:
No. The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative
complaint before his office against a member of the judiciary, pursuant to his power to
investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must first indorse the case to the Supreme
Court for appropriate action. This is pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution,
exclusively vesting the power of administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel to the Supreme Court. Hence, no other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
 Maceda v. Vasquez
221 SCRA 469
April 22, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Maceda, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique was charged with a complaint filed by Napoleon Abiera of the Public Attorney’s
Office for alleged falsification of Certificate of Service, certifying that “all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998.” He further alleged
that Maceda knew that no such decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision.

Maceda contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since it
arose from the performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Courts power of control and supervision over all inferior
courts.

Held:
Yes. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with
all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. A judge who falsifies his certificate
of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised
Penal Code for his felonious act. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other
court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
 Prudential Bank v. Castro
158 SCRA 646
June 5, 1986; March 15, 1988

Facts:
In the case Macro Textile Mills Corporation v. Prudential Bank, Judge Castro
resolved the case through a summary judgment, declaring the property of Macro null
and void, and directed Prudential Bank to pay Macro more that P33 million in damages
plus attorney’s fees. Prudential Bank moved for reconsideration, however it was denied
by respondent Judge “not only for being pro forma but also for lack of merit.”
Consequently, Judge Castro considered the decision to be final and ordered the
issuance of a Writ of Execution. Prudential Bank thus instituted an administrative
complaint against respondent Judge for committing serious and grave misfeasance. The
Court found the judge to be guilty for showing partiality towards Macro, and was
accordingly dismissed from service.

Respondents Judge Castro and Atty. Grecia then filed for a motion for
reconsideration but the Court denied it with finality upon a Minute Resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court disregarded the provisions in the Constitution in
promulgating the Minute Resolution

Held:
No. Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution is inapplicable in administrative
cases before the Supreme Court. And even if it were, “lack of merit” which was
one of the grounds for the denial of the motion, is a legal basis and therefore, the
constitutional requirement was adhered to faithfully.
 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
G.R. No. 135385
December 6, 2000

Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assailed the validity of Republic Act
No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) on the ground that the law
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The assailed
provisions enumerate the rights of indigenous peoples and their priority over such
minerals or natural resources found in ancestral domains. They further contend that by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands”
which might include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law also violate the rights of private landowners.

Issue:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional

Held:
After deliberation, the members of the Supreme Court voted to resolve the
petition. Seven members voted to dismiss, while seven other members voted to grant
said petition. They deliberated again and the voting remained the same. Since there was
no majority vote, the petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was
sustained. This is pursuant to Rule 56, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that in case the majority vote is not obtained, the petition shall be dismissed.
 Mendoza v. CFI
66 SCRA 96
June 27, 1973

Facts:
In a resolution by the Court on January 26, 1973, they ruled that petitioner
Norberto Mendoza failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was
marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, Mendoza motioned for reconsideration objecting
the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus through a minute resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the brief issuance of a dismissal order goes against the
constitutional provision requiring that no decision “shall be rendered by any court of
record without on which it is based

Held:
No. In Jose v. Santos, the Court held that what is expected of the judiciary is that
the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to
the facts as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be
employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the
judge in rendering his decision, while not unlimited, is decidedly broad. Since the relief
sought will not in any way resolve the cases filed against him, the constitutional provision
requiring an account of basis of the decision rendered did not find applicability in this
case.
 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals
186 SCRA 1
September 28, 1972

Facts:
Jose Villamor borrowed from Canuto Borromeo a large sum of money for which
he mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City. Thereafter, Mr. Miller, who was the
owner of lumber distributed by Villamor, instituted a civil action against the latter thereby
attaching his properties, including those mortgaged to Borromeo. When Borromeo
pressed Villamor to settle his obligations, the latter offered instead to execute a
promissory note to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years, agreeing to
pay “as soon as I have money.” It further stipulated a waiver of rights to prescriptions
established by the Code of Civil Procedure for the collection of the debt. Eventually
Borromeo filed a complaint against Villamor for failing to settle his account. The Court of
First Instance-Cebu ordered Villamor to pay the sum of P7,220 with interest at the rate of
12% to Borromeo, but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the basis of
lack of validity of the stipulation amounting to a waiver, in line with the principle that a
person cannot renounce future prescription.

Issue:
Whether or not the ruling of the Court of Appeals was proper

Held:
No. The disposition of the Court of Appeals was rather summary, and greatly
relied upon the literal interpretation of the words employed in the document executed by
the parties. In the determination of the rights of the contracting parties, the interest of
justice and equity should not be ignored. The Court of Appeals, in adhering to such
technicalities, impaired the rights of one of the parties and caused injustice, rather than
promote justice. It is a fundamental principle that in the interpretation of contracts,
intention shall prevail rather than the literal sense of the words employed.
 Solid Homes v. Laserna
G.R. No. 166051
April 8, 2008

Facts:
Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe bought a parcel of land located at Loyola
Grand Villas, Quezon City from Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI). The total contract price agreed
upon was P172,260, to be paid through a down payment upon signing of the contract,
with the remaining balance payable for a period of three years at a monthly installment.
When 90% of the purchase price was paid, Laserna and Cajipe demanded execution
and delivery of the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) of the property
upon final payment of the balance, but SHI did not comply. A complaint was filed against
SHI before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which directed SHI
to execute the deed and TCT the instant the purchase price is fully settled, and to cease
and desist from charging fees other than those authorized by law.

Aggrieved, SHI appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners and modified

the decision rendered previously. Still unsatisfied, SHI appealed the decision before the
Office of the President which affirmed in toto the decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. SHI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for
Review under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. SHI’s motion for reconsideration was denied as well.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals in affirming the decision of the Office of the
President, which adopted by reference the decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners without recitation of the facts and law of the case

Held:
No. In view of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution, the constitutional mandate that
the decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does
not preclude the validity of memorandum decisionswhich adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Memorandum
decisions are a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance
with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts.

To be valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of
the lower court only by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum
decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access
to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to
the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made
an indispensable part of the decision
 Dizon v. Judge Lopez
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338
September 5, 1997

Facts:
On April 22, 1993, Dizon was convicted of falsification of private document. The
promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision
sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving him a copy of the decision. He was told
to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but they were not able to obtain it.
In a motion for reconsideration, Dizon alleged that the failure of respondent judge to
furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after the
promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII,
Sec.14 of the Constitution, which prohibits courts from rendering decisions without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based; and
Sec.15 of the same, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their
decisions within three months from the date of their submission.

Judge Lopez claimed that on April 22, 1993, when the decision was promulgated,
her decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the process of
preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation. She
further stated that she gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo, with the designation of Social
Worker II for typing and incorporating into the text of the decision the dispositive portion.

The Deputy Court Administration was of the opinion that Judge Lopez should be
given admonition for her negligence, but recommended that the other charges against
her for violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed
for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution

Held:
Yes. The fact that it took more than a year for the decision to be furnished to the
complainant is sufficient for it to constitute a violation of the aforementioned provision.
Mere reading of the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It
is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such
judgment is based. The proper recourse for the judge should have been an application
for an extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of the decision
until she had finished it. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision, as
there would be no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret, once the
judgment has been promulgated.
 People v. Baring
G.R. No. 137933
28 January 2002

Facts:
Valentin Baring, Jr., was charged with rape committed against a seven-year-old
girl. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused on the basis of the victim’s clear,
trustworthy and positive testimony. The ruling was rendered in a three-page double-
spaced decision. On automatic review, Baring, through his counsel, moved for the
dismissal of the case for the reason that it was bereft of material facts supporting the
conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on account of the decision
rendered by the lower court

Held:
No. The trial court’s decision may cast doubt on the guilt of the accused, not by
the lack of direct evidence against the accused but by the trial court’s failure to fully
explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence, the
assessments made from the evidence, and the conclusion drawn therefrom, after
applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision. A decision need not be a complete
recital of the evidence presented, so long as the factual and legal bases are clearly and
distinctly laid down.
 Martinez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123547
21 May 2001

Facts:
Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz
entered into an oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant
parish priest of Cabanatuan City, and sold to the latter a vacant lot located at Villa Fe
Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. It was agreed that Martinez
would give a down-payment of P3,000.00 to De la Paz and that the balance would be
payable by installment. After giving the down-payment, Martinez began the construction
of a house on the lot and started paying the real estate taxes on said property. The
construction of the house was completed, and the payment for the lot was then
completed. The deed of sale however, was never delivered. In the meantime, De la Paz
sold three lots with right to repurchase the same within one year to private respondent
spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00. One of the lots
sold was the lot previously sold to Martinez. The latter discovered the sale, and that the
lot he was occupying had been sold to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter
from Reynaldo Veneracion claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they
vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon. Martinez, through his
counsel, demanded the execution of the deed of sale from De la Paz and informed
Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the rightful owner of the property as he had previously
purchased it from De la Paz. Veneracion brought an action for ejectment before the
Municipal Trial Court against Martinez. The trial court ruled adversely against
Veneracion and held that Martinez and his mother were, in good faith, the rightful
possessors of the land. Veneracion filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court,
which found them the rightful owners of the land, and ordered for Martinez to vacate said
land. Martinez thereafter filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the RTC ruling in favor of Veneracion, as they were deemed first registrants in
good faith. Martinez assailed the ruling, alleging that the Court of Appeals overlooked
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and that
the decision rendered in denying his motion for reconsideration is in violation of Art. VIII,
Sec. 14 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling

Held:
Yes. The Court of Appeals failed to determine certain facts and circumstances
instrumental in the determination of the case. However, on the contention that the denial
for motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution for lack of
legal basis, the Court found that the requirement was fully complied with as no new
issue nor evidence had been raised, thus the Court of Appeals found no reason to
change its ruling.
 Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127682
April 24, 1998

Facts:
Sometime in 1975, the National Investment and Development Corp. (NIDC)
granted Komatsu Industries Phils. Inc. (KIPI) a direct loan of P8,000,000 and a
guarantee worth P2,000,000 to secure Philippine National Bank (PNB). As security
thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by KIPI in favor of NIDC,
covering among others, a parcel of land in Makati. A Mortgage Deed was then executed
concerning the same land, in favor of PNB and NIDC. Upon full payment of P2,000,000
credit line NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage for the return
of the TCT of the mortgaged land. It was found that there were some accounts
chargeable to KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened and established in 1974 and
1975 settled by PNB with foreign suppliers in 19978 and 1979, but came only to the
latter’s knowledge in 1981 and 1982. Upon making the request, the TCT of the land in
question was returned to PNB. It then extra-judicially foreclosed the properties belonging
to KIPI by way of Chattel Mortgage. KIPI contested the foreclosure, alleging that the
release by the NIDC had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage.
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled adversely against KIPI, thus it was prompted to
file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. For failure to sufficiently
show that the CA committed any reversible error in its judgment, the petition was denied,
rendered in a minute resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the minute resolution is in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution

Held:
No. These resolutions are not decisions within the aforesaid constitutional
requirements. The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for
decision, i.e. given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution stating
the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s
decision, there is thus deemed sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
 Tichangco v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 150629
June 30, 2004

Facts:
Sometime in March 1996, Renato Tichangco, in behalf of the occupants of
various parcels of land in Gagalangin and Sunog Apog in Tondo, Manila, filed a land title
verification request with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). The claim was prompted
by an alleged claim by a certain Manotok over the land which Tichangco, et.al. occupy,
and which allegedly have been identified as Area for Priority Development under the
Urban Poor Law. The LRA-Task Force issued a report stating that a part of the land
belonged to Ricardo Manotok. Public respondent LRA Administrator Enriquez, upon
being directed to review and evaluate the records on the issuance of Transfer Certificate
Titles (TCT) by the Office of the Solicitor General, rendered the assailed decision finding
no legal ground to initiate an action for the nullification of the assailed certificates of title.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of public respondent. In its decision,
no mention of the completion of the magnetic survey was made. Petitioners, in elevating
the case to the Supreme Court argue that the CA decision is invalid on the basis of this
fact.

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed Court of Appeals decision failed to comply with the
constitutional mandate laid down in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

Held:
No. The Court of Appeals deliberated on the law and the reasons it relied upon in
its determination of the issues presented only after giving a detailed account and
assessment of the factual antecedents found by respondent administrator. Since its
decision contains the necessary antecedents to warrant its conclusions, the CA cannot
be said to have withheld any specific finding of facts. Moreover, what the law insists on
is that a decision state the essential and ultimate facts. Mere failure to specify the
contentions of petitioner and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to
invalidate the decision. The aforesaid provision deals with the disposition of petitions for
review and motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require
comprehensive statement of facts or mention of applicable law, but merely a statement
of the legal basis for denying due course.
 In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzales
A.M. No. 88-4-5433
April 15, 1988

Facts:
Gonzales was a Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a 1st
Indorsement to Justice Fernan which contained an anonymous letter by “Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court” with charges for disbarment by Miguel Cuenco
against the former, and asking Gonzales “to do something about this.”
Justice Fernan brought the matter before the Supreme Court en banc, and the
Court resolved to dismiss it for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court
required Cuenco to show cause for the unfounded serious accusations against Justice
Fernan.

Issue:
Whether or not a sitting member of the Supreme Court may be disbarred

Held:
No. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from
office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during his incumbency.
Further, he cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court
with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty
service of which would amount to removal from office.

A member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via
impeachment before any charge may proceed against him. This rule rests on the
fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
 People v. Gacott
246 SCRA 52
July 13, 1995

Facts:
Judge Gacott ordered the dismissal of a criminal case, and was deemed to have
committed grave abuse of discretion for doing so by the Second Division of the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Bidin. The latter specified in his ponencia that Judge
Gacott gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case while failing to take judicial
notice of all the laws of the land, and that it is because of his neglect and irresponsibility
in the performance of his duties that his error amounted to gross ignorance of the law
which could undermine the public perception of the competence of the courts.

Judge Gacott in turn, and relying on Art. VIII, Sec. 11, questioned the
competence of the Second Division of the Court to administratively discipline him.

Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court may exercise
administrative discipline over respondent Judge

Held:
Yes. Insofar as the power of discipline is concerned, Art. VIII, Sec. 11 does not
necessarily mean the Court en banc. The disciplinary power is granted to the Court en
banc. It was not intended that it be exercised solely by the Court en banc, as that would
result in absurdity. What is required to be exercised by the Court en banc is the power to
order the dismissal of a judge of a lower court.
 Caoibes v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 132177
July 17, 2001

Facts:
Judge Florentino Alumbres filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal
complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of his glasses, and
assault upon a person in authority against Judge Caoibes. Judge Alumbres alleged that
at a hallway, he requested from Judge Caoibes the return of the executive table the
latter borrowed from him, but instead of responding, Judge Coibes boxed him so that his
eyeglasses was thrown away. He subsequently filed criminal charges against Judge
Caoibes before the Sandiganbayan, and an administrative case before the Supreme
Court, praying for his dismissal on the ground of conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.
Judge Caoibes in turn, prayed for the dismissal of the case against him, before the
Ombudsman, averring that it is the Supreme Court and not the Office of the
Ombudsman who has the authority to determine his culpability. Invoking Sec. 15 of
Republic Act No. 6670, the Ombudsman denied the motion. Hence Judge Caoibes filed
a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may exercise its jurisdiction against petitioner
judge.

Held:
No. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a court personnel involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman
is duty-bound to refer all such cases to the Supreme Court for its own determination as
to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. Further, the Ombudsman cannot
bind the Court to its findings if there exist administrative aspects to the case as that
would constitute undue encroachment upon the Court’s prerogative to exercise
administrative supervision over all of its personnel.
 Fuentes v. Ombudsman-Mindanao
G.R. No. 124295
October 17, 2001

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation
case against the owners of the properties affected by the project before the trial court
presided by petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes. DPWH won the expropriation case and
as of 19 May 1994,it still owed the lot owners the following amounts: Reynaldo Lao –
P489,000; Tessie Amadeo –P1,094,200; and Alfonso Galo – P13,927,215. On 5 April
1994, the trial court granted Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The writ was served by Sheriff Paralisan
to the DPWH-Region IX.

On 3 May 1994, Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy addressed to the Regional

Director describing the properties subject of the levy. The auction sale pushed through
on 18 May 1994 with Alex Bacquial as the highest bidder and the corresponding
certificate of sale was issued by Paralisan.On 19 May 1994, Bacquial and Paralisan
attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but were prevented from doing so by the
custodian of the subject DPWH properties. On 20 May1994, Bacquial filed an ex-parte
urgent motion for the issuance of a “break through” order to enable him to effect the
withdrawal of the auctioned properties.

On 15 January 1996, Dir. Antonio Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-

Mindanao recommended that petitioner be charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of R.A. 3019,
Sec. 3(e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court for actsun
becoming of a judge. On 22 January 1996, Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging petitioner with violation of R.A.
3019, Sec. 3(e). On 22 February 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all
records to the Supreme Court. The motion was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge
in the exercise of his official functions

Held:
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrativecomplaint before his office against
petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate publicofficers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court, for appropriate action.Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrativesupervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Judge of the Court of Appealsto the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to overseethe judges and the court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if theycommit any violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may intrude into thispower, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the
doctrine of separation of powers.
 Young v. De Guzman
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365
February 18, 1999

Facts:
In verified letter-complaint, dated 26 March 1996, Robert G. Young, President of Banawe
Realty Development Corporation, Charged Judge Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, with unreasonable delay in the disposition of Civil Service No.
873-R, entitled "La Commercial Company, et al. vs. China Banking Corporation," for recovery of
unpaid rentals owing from store space lessees and accounting of all rentals due and
demandable, as well as the proceeds and receivables from the sales of units, over a
condominium property. During the pendency of the case, La Commercial Company was
substituted by Inter Realty Development Corporation, While China Banking Corporation was
substituted by Banawe Realty Development Corporation. On 16 July 1990, the condominium
building was destroyed by a relatively strong earthquake, prompting the parties to file a
manifestation to the above effect along with a joint motion to dismiss the case, with the Court. On
01 December 1994, counsel for both parties submitted, reiterating the above motion to dismiss,
an opposition to a request for answers by written interrogatories caused to be made by the
manager of Prudential Bank of Baguio City. The motion remained unresolved until the institution,
months later, of the instant administrative case. Instead, complainant averred, Judge De Guzman
had acted "with indecent haste" on a collateral issue granting Atty. Helenea M. Dauz, former
counsel of Banawe Realty Development Corporation, attorney's fees amounting to P250,000.00
issuing forthwith a writ of execution to enforce the award. It was unfortunate, he said, that the
issue on the withdrawn rentals, submitted for resolution on 04 August 1995, remained unresolved
because he had to take a prolonged leave of absence due to sickness until, in fact, he finally had
to file, on 16 February 1996, an application for retirement on total disability which the Court
approved on 18 June 1996. Respondent Judge denied that he had hastily decided the motion for
payment of attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz, which, he said, indeed took him three months
to resolve in favor of Atty. Dauz and only because no opposition was filed by Banawe Realty. The
petition to reverse the said order, he stressed, was even dismissed by the Court of Appeals on
26, June 1996.
The Office of the Court Administrator, to which the case was referred for evaluation,
report and recommendation, opined that respondent Judge had failed to abide by paragraph 1.2
of Administrative Circular No. 4.

Issue:
Whether the respondent judge failed to abide to the rules of periods of decision

Held:
No. It is truly the duty of every judge to resolve cases filed before him with good
dispatch; no less than the Rules of Court commands that justice must be administered without
unnecessary delay.Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct generally admonishes a judge to
dispose of the business of his court promptly Nevertheless, the judge must not sacrifice for
expediency's sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor to forget that he must
conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to
dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to every
party.
 Sanchez v Vestil
A.M No. RTJ-98-1419
October 13, 1993

Facts:
In a complaint dated July 3, 1996, Atty Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding
Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with
(1) grave misconduct, (2) graft, (3) gross ignorance of the law and (40 falsification of his
certificate of service in relation to Special Proceedings No. MAN 185 entitled Intestate
Estate Proceedings of the Deceased Jose D. Sanchez. Aside from the mentioned case,
so far as known to this representation, the following some criminal cases submitted to
the court for decision which has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day reglementary period.
In this connection, respondent would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Supreme
Court that he has been exerting utmost efforts reducing his case load which at one time
reaches more than one thousand one hundred (1,100) cases including the almost seven
hundred (700) unloaded to him in 1993. Almost EVERY SATURDAY and during some
holidays, respondent with two or three of this staff have been reporting for work at no
additional compensation.

After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated
December 3, 1997, adopted the following recommendations of the OCA and directed
respondent (1) to concentrate meanwhile in deciding with dispatch those cases which
have remained unresolved beyond the constitutionality prescribed ninety days and (2) to
explain within ten days from notice the reason for the delay in the resolution of said
cases. The Court further directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the OCA
to withhold the salary of respondent until he has decided the said cases and has
submitted copies of the decision to the Office of the Court Administrator.

Issue:
Whether respondent Judge should be sanctioned

Held:
Yes. The Court reiterate that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is
the visible representation of the law and justice,"and that " a judge's official conduct
should be free and untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in performance of judicial duties, but also in his or
her everyday life, should be beyond reproach."Evidently, the acts of herein respondent
judge have not been consistent with the conduct expected of his stature and profession.
Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from disposing their
cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time. While the certificate of
service of respondent judge contained a statement that there were cases before his sala
that were still undecided beyond the reglementary period, he made no attempt to
request an extension of time.
 Bernardo v.Fabros
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189
May 12, 1999

Facts:
The Court stresses this principle in resolving the February 29, 1996 sworn
Complaint of Fe T. Bernardo, in which Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 9) was charged with failure to decide Civil Case No. 150796, an
ejectment case, within the reglementary period of thirty days. In her Comment filed on
June 26, 1997, Judge Fabros admitted that she failed to decide the said case within the
prescribed period due to oversight. She offered no excuse for the omission, but assailed
the legal standing of complainant. In her own words: “While the case was submitted for
decision on June 11, 1996 it was only on December 23, 1996 that it was decided. The
explanation is simply that in the course of [my] working as the Presiding Judge of Branch
9 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila there was an oversight. There was a failure to
record the due date when it should be decided. I offer no excuses. I cannot even say
that because of the volume of work now facing Metropolitan Trial Court Judges it is
virtually impossible to monitor each and every case. My court receives an average
monthly input of raffled cases at the rate of 157 a month. I have 994 pending cases as of
April 1997. Despite this I am able xxx to the best of my ability xxx resolve an average of
42 cases a month.”

Issue:
Whether the act of the judge constitute gross dereliction of duty

Held:
Yes. The failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period
constitutes gross dereliction of duty. The gravity of this offense depends on several
factors, including the number of cases not decided on time, the damage suffered by the
parties as a result of the delay, and the presence of other aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.

Respondent admits that she failed to decide the aforementioned

case within the thirty-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. For this reason, she should be administratively sanctioned.
 Constitutional Commissions
Common Provisions
Brillantes v. Yorac 192 SCRA 358
Matibag v. Benipayo G.R No. 149036 April 2, 2002
Civil Service Commission v. G.R No. 158791 July 22, 2005
Department of Budget and
Management
Funa v. Chairman, CSC G.R No. 191672 November 25, 2014
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit G.R No. 140335 December 13, 2000
Estrella v. COMELEC G.R No. 160465 May 27, 2004
Dumayas v. COMELEC G.R No. 141952-53 April 20, 2001
Sevilla v. COMELEC G.R No. 202833 March 19, 2003
Alvarez v. COMELEC G.R No. 142527 March 1, 2001
Aratuc v. COMELEC 88 SCRA 251
Loong v. COMELEC G.R No. 133676 April 14, 1999
Reyes v. Commission on Audit G.R No. 125129 March 29, 1999
Mahinay v. Court of Appeals G.R No. 152457 November 17. 2004
Abella v. Civil Service Commission G.R No. 152574 November 17, 2004

Civil Service Commission:

Scope
National Service Corporation v. NLRC 168 SCRA 122
Juco v. NLRC G.R No. 98107 August 18, 1997
Liban v. Gordon G.R No. 175352 January 18, 2011
Flores v. Drilon G.R No. 104732 June 22, 1993
Funa v. Ermita G.R No. 191644 February 19, 2013
Funa v. Chariman, CSC G.R No. 191672 November 25, 2014
Public Interest Center v. Elma 494 SCRA 53
National Amnesty Commission v. COA G.R No. 156982 September 8, 2004

Security of Tenure
General v. Roco G.R No. 143366 January 29, 2001
Villaluz v. Zaldivar 15 SCRA 710
Palma Fernandez v. Dela Paz 160 SCRA 751
De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294
Dario v. Mison 176 SCRA 84
Cabagnot v. CSC 223 SCRA 59
CSC v. Dacoycoy G.R No. 135805 April 29, 1999
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive 194 SCRA 317
Secretary
Canonizado v. Aguirre G.R No. 133132 February 15, 2001
Partisan Political Activity
Cailles v. Bonifacio 65 Phil 328
Santos v. Yatco 106 Phil 745

Right to Self-Organization
SSS Employees Association v. Court of 175 SCRA 686
Appeals
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals G.R No. 124540 November 17, 1997

Commission on Elections
Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No. 10013 September 3, 1991
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 140335 December 13, 2000

Decisions
Estrella v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 160465 April 20, 2001
Dumayas v. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 141952- April 20, 2001
53
Sevilla v. COMELEC G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013

Powers
Ibrahim v. COMELEC G.R. No. 192289 January 8, 2013
Jaramilla v. COMELEC G.R. No. 155717 October 23, 2003
Typoco v. COMELEC G.R. No. 186359 March 5, 2010
Villarosa v. COMELEC G.R. No. 212953 August 5, 2014
Hayudini v. COMELEC G.R. No. 207900 April 22, 2014
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC 380 Phil 780 January 28, 2000
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC G.R. No. 205720 January 21, 2015
Lokin v. COMELEC G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012
Cagas v. COMELEC G.R. No. 209185 October 25, 2013
National Press Club v. COMELEC 207 SCRA 1 March 5, 1992
Chavez v. COMELEC G.R. No. 162777 August 31, 2004
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC 224 SCRA 272 May 22, 1995
SWS v. COMELEC G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001
Sanidad v. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 October 12, 1976
GMA Network v. COMELEC G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
Sison v. COMELEC G.R. No. 134096 March 3, 1999
Soliva V. COMELEC G.R. No. 141723 April 20, 2001
Brillantes v. COMELEC G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004
Cerafica v. COMELEC G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014
Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC G.R. No. 147066 March 26, 2001
Goh v. COMELEC G.R. No. 212584 November 25, 2014
 Jalosjos v. COMELEC G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012
192704, 193566
Reyes v. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
Sahali v. COMELEC G.R. No. 201796 June 15, 2013
Galang v. Geronimo G.R. No. 192793 February 22, 2011
Flores v. COMELEC 184 SCRA 484 April 20, 1990
Lloren v. COMELEC G.R. No. 196355 September 18, 2012
Nollen v. Comelec G.R. No. 196355 January 11, 2010
Relampagos v. Cumba G.R. NO. 118861 April 27, 1995
Balajonda v. COMELEC G.R. No. 166032 February 28, 2005
Cawasa v. COMELEC G.R. No. 150469 July 3,2002
Dumarpa v. COMELEC G.R. No. 1922249 April 2, 2013

Commission on Elections
Orocio v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 75959 August 31, 1992
Osmena v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 110045 November 29, 1994
TESDA v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 204869 March 11, 2014
Gonzales v. Provincial Board of Ilo-ilo G.R. No. L-20568 December 28, 1964
Guevara v. Gimenez G.R. No. L-17115 November 30, 1962
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 147402 January 14, 2004
Development Bank of the Philippines v. G.R. No. 88435 January 15, 2002
Commission on Audit
Sambeli v. Province of Isabela G.R. No. 92279 June 18, 1992
Bustamante v. Commissioner on Audit G.R. No. 103309 November 27, 1992
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 149154 June 10 2013
Funa v. Manila Economic Cultural G.R. No. 193462 February 4, 2014
Office
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. G.R. No. 177131 June 7, 2011
Commission on Audit
Bagatsing v. Committee on G.R. No. 112399 July 14, 1995
Privatizations
Nacion v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 204757 March 17, 2015
 Brillantes v. Yorac
192 SCRA 358

Facts:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a
fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently, he has
to vacate his chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his
substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity”. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting
chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved
by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.

Held:
Yes. The appointment of Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is
unconstitutional.

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the

Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their
respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under
the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as
provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman

comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines.

A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and

therefore revocable at will. A cause need not be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any
time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
 Matibag v. Benipayo
G.R. 149036
April 2, 2002

Facts:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV"
of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed thea
ppointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February
15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner
to the sameposition in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra
and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position
of COMELEC Chairman; and Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President
submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmations. However, the
Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. This process was
repeated twice.

On April 11, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo issued a Memorandum

whereby here assigned petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo
to reconsider
her reassignment to the Law Department but to no avail. Upon denial, petitioner filed ana
dministrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging
that her reassignment violated Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07 and other pertinent administrative and
civil service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under
Section 1 (2) Article IX-C of the Constitution.

Held:
No. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or
failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final
decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free
to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.
 Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget
G.R.No.191672
November 25, 2014

Facts:
CSC seeks to compel DBM to release the balance of its budgets for fiscal year
2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. By CSC claim, the amount of 215,270,000.00
php was appropriated for its central office by the General Appropriations Act of 2002,
while total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount
to 285, 660, 790.44 php. It complains, however that total fund releases by DBM to its
Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14 thereby leaving an
unreleased balance ofP5, 807, 392.30. to CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld
by DBM on the basis of its” no report, no report” police whereby allocations for agencies
are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in the Nation Budget
Circular No. 478.

Issue:
Whether “no report, no release” policy violates concept of fiscal autonomy.
Held:
Yes. “Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to CSC, a
constitutional Commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

However, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by the Congress
below the amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the case of judiciary, must be
rejected. The plain implication for this omission is that the Congress is not prohibited
from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commission below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.
 Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 191672
November 25, 2014

Facts:
On January 11, 2010, then President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque's appointment on February 3, 2010.
Consequently, the President issued Executive Order No. 864 which designated Duque
as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the (a) GSIS,(b) PHILHEALTH,(c)
ECC, and (d) HDMF. Funa then filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of EO
864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, and
the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO No. 292 is constitutional
2. Whether or not the designation of Duque, pursuant to EO 864, as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF
constitutional

Held:
1. Yes. Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO No. 292 enumerates the specific
functions and duties of the CSC Chairman. The Court upheld its validity, saying that it
found no irregularity in said section because matters affecting the career development,
rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary functions of the
CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman's
membership in other agencies must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his
position as such.
2. No. Duque is covered by the general rule enunciated under Sec. 7(2) of Article IX-B.
He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such
holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. While powers and
functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status,rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, the GSIS,PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform
other corporate powersand functions that are not personnel-related. When the
CSCChairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH,ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are
notanymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on
unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care
providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment, of unpaid loan
amortizations.Moreover, Duque's designation as member of the governing Boards of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMFentitles him to receive per diem, a form of
additional compensation that isdisallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by
virtue of its clearcontravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987Constitution. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices,
Duque'sdesignation also impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,
Article VIIof the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices
inthe Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of thePresident is
not part of the Executive Branch.
 Gaminde v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 160465
May 27, 2004

Facts:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma
P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On
September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confi
rmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification
from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her
request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that
petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02,
1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after
February 02, 1999. On February 04,
1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de theCommission on Audit requesting opinion on wh
ether ornot Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid
their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion
that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in
her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.”

Issue:
Whether the term of respondent expired in February 2, 1999
Held:
Yes. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years
should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of
the terms.[13]

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the
interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must
be counted against the latter.
 Estrella v, COMELEC
G.R. No. 160465
May 27, 2004

Facts:
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001
elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an
election protest which consequently annulled Salvador’s proclamation and declared
Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While
Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner
Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner
Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute
him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC
decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time,
Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the
COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the
Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc.
Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division
deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation

Held:
The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC
En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to
voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc
proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary
votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The
order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of
a decision or order.
 Dumayas v COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 141952-53
April 20, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position
in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing
by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of
Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion
committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied
petitioner’s objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal
garnering more votes than the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second
Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to
reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns.

The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal
filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioner’s proclamation. Petitioner filed with
COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion
declare void petitioner’s proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be
deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.

On March 2, 200 the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second
Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a new MBC.
Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected
Mayor of the Municipality.

Petitioner claims that March 2, 2000 Resolution of the COMELEC is void

because Commissioners Manolo Gorospe and Japal Guiani have already retired on the
date of its promulgation, even if they had participated earlier in the deliberations of the
case and signed the resolution dated August 24, 1999. Petitioner submits that this defect
invalidated the entire decision of the Commission and that accordingly, a new vote
should be taken to settle the matter.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner correct

Held:
No. The votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be
considered as withdrawn for the reason that their retirement preceded the resolutions
promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not
signed the resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be
properly considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy. However, unless the
withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a
party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the decision a nullity. In the present
case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani,
the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at the time of the
resolutions promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent. Noteworthy, these
remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In our view, the defect cited by
petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of respondent Commissions
disposition of the controversy. The nullification of the challenged resolution, in our view,
would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.
 Sevilla v COMELEC
G.R No. 202833
March 19, 2013

Facts:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed
Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes over
So's 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC
on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all
the protested precincts.

The MeTC issued an Order dated May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest.
On May 9, 2011, SO filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead
of a notice of appeal, which MeTC denied, in response, So filed a petition
for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the MeTC Judge, which was granted by the Comelec 2nd division. The
Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the Comelec Second Division's ruling in its
October 6, 2012 Resolution.

Sevilla contends that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it gave due
course to the petition for certiorari. The respondent contends that the petition was filed
prematurely. He emphasizes that the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en
banc was not a majority.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is correct

Held:

Yes. When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the

necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced
in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not
issue an Order for a rehearing of the case in view of the filing in the interim of the
present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. The Court find that a remand of this case is
necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of Section
6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
 Alvarez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 142527
March 1, 2001

Facts:
OnMay 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of
Doa Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent
Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest
claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of
Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the
Metropolitan Trial Court rendered its decision that private respondent won the
election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent
won over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending
appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and
private respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for
resolution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed
the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when Commission violated its mandate
on preferential disposition of election contests as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C,
1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC
shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of
submission. He points out that the case was ordered submitted for resolution on
November 15, 1999 but the COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution only on April
4, 2000, four months and four days after November 14, 1999.

Issue:
Whether the case was not preferentially dispose

Held:
No. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is
critical. Considering further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible
to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to
deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason
of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended
since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the
electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.

Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
will be noted that the preferential disposition applies to cases before the courts and not
those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.
 Aratuc v. COMELEC
88 SCRA 251

Facts:
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the BatasangPam
bansa was held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results
of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, LanaoDel
Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken
by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out
of 4,107voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial
results.

Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duqu

e hadconducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged
irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the
Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya
ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan
candidates elected. Appeal was taken by theKB candidates to the Comelec. On January
13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates
and one KB candidate as having obtained the
firsteight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction

Held:
No. Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 “the commission
on elections shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers”. In
administrative law, a superior body or office having supervision or control over another
may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is
hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.
 Loong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133676
April 14, 1999

Facts:
Automated elections systems were used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections
held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the
Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have
administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.

Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was
not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were
Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the
wrong sequence code.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the
COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count
in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution
No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day,
May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino,
Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the
manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of
votes for Sulu at the PICC.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions

Held:
Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but
one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It
is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to
the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise
of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
 Reyes v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 125129
March 29, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Provident Fund Board of
Trustees, filed this petition with the Supreme Court on June 17, 1996, as an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the refund of the government share in the fund
to the employee-members, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.

Issue:
Whether the mode of appeal was correct

Held:
No. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of
rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved
party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was
filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on
Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the
1987 Constitution.The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit.
 Mahinay v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 152457
November 17, 2004

Facts:
On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through
Officer-in-charge Jesus S. Sirios, charged its employee, petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay,
for receiving unofficial fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils. Inc. by reason of his office and in
consideration of the latters rendering escort service to FRITZ trucks from Baguio City to
Manila and vice-versa. On January 8, 1999, the PEZA rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged.

Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In Resolution No. 000878 dated March 30, 2000,
the CSC upheld the PEZAs decision, but modified the penalty of forced resignation to
dismissal from the service in accordance with Sec. 52 (A.9), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Sec. 22 (i) Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations.

On September 12, 2000, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Petition for Certiorari, requesting for a period of up to November 10,
2000within which to file his petition.

On October 30, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion for
being the wrong mode of appeal and for being filed out of time. The CA stated that since
the assailed Resolution was rendered by a quasi-judicial body, the proper mode of
appeal is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which petition should
be filed within 15 days from notice of the resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal by way of special civil action
for certiorari on the ground that it was the wrong mode of appeal

Held:
No.As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal from
the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the
CA.

The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be
resorted to only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petition dismissed.
 Abella v, Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 152574
November 17, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA),
as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service
eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed thet raining program
for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy,
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850, which was then the required eligibility for said
position.

The CSC issued issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 (Pertinent
provision: Positions covered by the CES: (a) the position is a career position, (b) above
division chief level (c) duties and responsibilities require performance of executive or
managerial functions. Upon promotion or transfer to other Career Executive Service
(CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES
positions until they qualify.

Two years after retirement, petitioner was hired by the SBMA on a contractual
basis. He was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III,
Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to CSC
Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility
was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his
appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment. The CSC
affirmed the disapproval of his permanent appointment. The CA shunned the issue
of constitutionality of the Memo Circular. CA added that petitioner was not the real party
in interest, as his appointment was dependent on the CSCs approval. Accordingly, he
had no vested right in the office, since his appointment was disapproved

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner lacks the personality to question
the disapproval

Held:
Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is
adversely affected by the CSCs Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is
rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he
is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would
necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment
would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

Petitioner imputes to the CA grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction for ruling that he had no legal standing to contest the disapproval of his
appointment. Grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, this Court resolved to grant due course to the
Petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The grounds shall be deemed reversible errors, not grave abuse of
discretion.
 National Service Corporation v NLRC
168 SCRA 122

Facts:
Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She
claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO
argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as
a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly
owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National
Housing v Juco

Issue:
Whether employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed
by the Civil Service Law

Held:
NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to
cases that arose before its promulgation of January 17, 1985. To do otherwise would
be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973
Constitution but prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability
of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in
GOCC's, among them NASECO.
In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Constitution
starkly differs from the 1973 constitution where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that
the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with original
charter." Therefore, by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which
are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.
 Juco v NLRC
G.R. No. 98107
August 18, 1997

Facts:
Juco was the Project Engineer of National Housing Corporation but was
dismissed for being implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.
Juco then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with DOLE but labor arbiter dismissed
complaint on ground that NLRC had no jurisdiction.

Case was elevated to NLRC which reversed labor arbiter’s decision. Juco then
filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal but was
dismissed because Civil Service Commission had no jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether CSC has no jurisdiction

Held:
Yes. The National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation
organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the
Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock
are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that
own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social
Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National
Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459,
the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or
controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
 Liban v. Gordon
G.R. No.175352
January 18, 2011

Facts:
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter while Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec. 13,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office/employment in the Gov’t, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including gov’t-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term w/o forfeiting his seat, neither shall he be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that
PNRC is a gov’t-owned or controlled corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts upont heir appointment to another
government office.

Issue:
Whether PNRC Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

Held:
No. The Philippine Government does not own the PNRC. PNRC does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Congress. It is
financed primarily by contributions from private individuals/entities obtained through
solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of
the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised
by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national
disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the
country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should
not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only
have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.
 Flores v. Drillon
G.R. No. 104732
June 22 1993

Facts:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision
provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that
in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and
chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the
constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that
Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

Issue:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.

Held:
Yes. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the
President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will
work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.
 Funa v Ermita
G.R No. 184740
Febuary 11, 2010

Facts:
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator
Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned
citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such
on February 2, 2009.

Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary

and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. On the
other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present
in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be
resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator
effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic.
Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is
likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to
enjoin.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants

Held:
Yes. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC,
she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the
position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is
the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied
by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials.
 Funa v Agra
G.R. No. 191644
February 19, 2013

Facts:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated
him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has
been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting
Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then
relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an
Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his
concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he
was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is
merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being
the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

Issue:
W/N Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid

Held:
No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article
VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.
Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding
other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed
as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary,
because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
 Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 191672
November 25, 2014

Facts:
On January 11, 2010, then President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of
the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque's appointment on
February 3, 2010. Consequently, the President issued Executive Order No. 864 which
designated Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the (a) GSIS,
(b) PHILHEALTH, (c) ECC, and (d) HDMF. Funa then filed a petition challenging the
constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of
Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO No. 292 is
constitutional
2. Whether or not the designation of Duque, pursuant to EO 864, as a member of
the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF
constitutional

Held:
1. Yes. Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO No. 292 enumerates the
specific functions and duties of the CSC Chairman. The Court upheld its validity, saying
that it found no irregularity in said section because matters affecting the career
development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary
functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC
Chairman's membership in other agencies must, therefore, be considered to be derived
from his position as such.

2. No. Duque is covered by the general rule enunciated under Sec. 7(2) of
Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his
tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. While
powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect
the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also
tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related.
All of these powers and functions are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a
member of the governing Boards of the said agencies, he may exercise these powers
and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman.
Moreover, Duque's designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional
compensation that isdisallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its
clearcontravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987Constitution. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices,
Duque'sdesignation also impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,
Article VIIof the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices
inthe Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of thePresident is
not part of the Executive Branch.
 Public Interest Center v. Elma
G.R. No. 138965
June 30, 2006

Facts:
On 30 October 1998, Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman of the
PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman,
respondent Elma was appointed Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He took his
oath of office as CPLC thefollowing day, but he waived any remuneration that he may
receive as CPLC. The petitioners assailed the two appointments, citing the case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary to support their position that Elma's concurrent
appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes Section 13, Article VII and
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. They also maintained that
respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices. The Court still decided to resolve the
case despite President Arroyo’s move to replace the appointees of former President
Estrada because of the significant legal question the petitioners raised.

Issue:
Whether or not the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC without
violating the prohibitions under Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 7, par. 2, Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution

Held:
No. The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an
appointive official to hold more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position." In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, the Court ruled that, "[t]here
is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and
performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility." The crucial test in
determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices is to see whether one
office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere
with the other. In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and
agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and
agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are
subject to the review of the CPLC. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will
inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the
prohibition against holding incompatible offices. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, however, is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as
neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the
former may have the same rank as the latter positions. Despite the non-applicability of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to Elma, he remains covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply
with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein; failing which, his
appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution.
 National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 156982
September 8, 2004

Facts:
3 ex officio NAC members turned over the responsibility of attending NAC
meetings to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12,
1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit
the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to COA Memorandum No.
97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditor’s order and notices of
disallowance were subsequently issued. Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed
Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on
October 19, 1999. Section 1, Rule II thereof allows ex-officio members to designate
representatives and give the latter’s compensation for such.

Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in stating that the
grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members'
official representatives is without legal basis

Held:
No. The NAC ex officio members' representatives who were all appointive
officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional
prohibitions underSec 13, Art VII and Sec 7, par. 2, Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution.First, the NAC ex officio members' representatives are not exempt from the
general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office
orposition and authorizing additional compensation therefor. The representatives in fact
assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselvesalso designated as such.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment,a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the
position. The legalbasis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a
duly issued andapproved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.
Second, the ex officio members' representatives are also covered by the strict
constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family. Again, in Civil
Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants,
who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional
compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to their principal offices. The laws, rules, prohibitions or
restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal force to his representative.
In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional
compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative
likewise restricted.
 General v. Roco
G.R. No. 143366
January 29, 2001

Facts:
Roco was appointed by then President Ramos on August 26, 1996 as Regional
Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to
CES rank level V. Subsequently, then Estrada re-appointed him to the same position on
February 8, 1999. At the time of Roco's appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a
CES eligible. However, during his incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, he was conferred
CES eligibility by the Career Executive Service Board. On September 7, 1999, General,
who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of
the LTO in Region V, the same position being occupied by respondent. Aggrieved, Roco
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming the appointment of respondent Roco to the Office
of Regional Director of the LTO, Region V, nullified the appointment of petitioner General
and ordered him to vacate the subject post in favor of respondent Roco. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Roco’s contention that he cannot be removed from office
because of his security of tenure is correct

Held:
No. Two requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career executive
service may attain security of tenure: (1) CES eligibility and (2) Appointment to the
appropriate CES rank. In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of
employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in
the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which
they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or
reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him
wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In the present case, there is no question that
respondent Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank,
which is — CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V).
Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES,
respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he
could be validly reassigned to other positions in the career executive service. Also,
respondent capitalizes on the fact that petitioner General is not a CES eligible. The
absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment. Part III, Chapter I, Article IV,
paragraph 5(c), of the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows appointment of those who
are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said eligibility, in the same manner that
the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank (CES rank
level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary
capacity.
 Villaluz v. Zaldivar
G.R. No. L-22754
December 31, 1965

Facts:
Villaluz was nominated as chief of the Motor Vehicles Office on May 20, 1958
and two days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
In a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by
Congressman Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of the House
of Representatives, however, the latter informed the former of the findings made by his
Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by
petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office. On February 15, 1960, the then Executive
Secretary Castillo suspended petitioner asAdministrator of the Motor Vehicles Office,
having thereupon created an investigatingcommittee with the only purpose of
investigating the charges against petitioner and hisassistant de Leon, and to undertake
the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor
Gancayco. After the investigation, saidcommittee submitted its report to the President of
the Philippines who thereafter issuedAdministrative Order No. 332 decreeing the
removal from office of petitioner. On April 1, 1964, Villaluz filed a petition before the
Court for his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with payment of
back salaries. One of his contentions was that the President has no jurisdiction to
investigate and remove him since the power belongs to Civil Service Commission.

Issue:
Whether or not the removal from office of Villaluz was improper as the procedure
was undertaken by the Office of the President

Held:
No. The Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, being a presidential
appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and
as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the
President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint" as can be implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
Consequently, the Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and
decide the administrative charges filed against said official, because his authority to pass
upon questions of suspension, separation or removal can only be exercised with
reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service to which
classification the administrator does not belong.
 Palma-Fernandez v. De La Paz
G.R. No. 78946
April 15, 1998

Facts:
On 1 May 1985, Dr. Palma-Fernandez was extended a permanent appointment
to the position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue
Medical Center) by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center
retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. On
30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the
Ministry of Health" was promulgated. On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as
Medical Center Chief, designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical
Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services "vice Dr. Nenita Palma
Fernandez, who will be transferred to the Research Office." Said order was purportedly
issued "in the interest of the hospital service." Dr. Palma-Fernandez then filed a letter-
protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz
and Aguila, as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the
Government Reorganization Commission but no action was taken by any of them.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the removal of Dr. Palma-Fernandez from the position of
Assistant Director for Professional Services and her subsequent transfer to another
office was valid

Held:
No. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities
attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate
officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the
Medical Center Chief. Respondent Medical Center Chief's argument that petitioner was
not appointed but was merely transferred in the interest of the public service to the
Research Office pursuant toSection 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines will not alter the situation. Even a transfer requires an
appointment, which is beyond theauthority of respondent Medical Center Chief to
extend. Besides, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was tantamount to
removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any legal effect. A
removal without cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law" (Article IX, B, Section 2(3), 1987 Constitution).
 De la Llana v. Alba
G.R. No. 57883
March 12, 1982

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes) was assailed before the Court by Gualberto de
la Llana of Olongapo City. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. De la Llana
takes issue with the law because it supposedly contravenes the time honored principle
of independent judiciary as protected and safeguarded in Section 11 of Article VIII of the
Constitution (Article X Section 7 of the 1973 Constitution). The main contention of the
petitioners is that it is only the SC that can remove judges from their designated posts
and not the legislature and that such act results to the violation of the security of tenure
afforded by the Constitution to the members of the Judiciary.

Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of BP 129 results to the impairment of the security
of tenure enjoyed by the incumbent Justices and judges under Art 10 Sec 7 of the
Constitution

Held:
No. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
Judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure
to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions.
No question of law is involved. Moreover, BP 129 was passed in good faith. The
abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith
suffers from no infirmity. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the abolition is void, the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does
not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent has a requisite principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. It is observed that the volume
containing the minutes of the proceedings for BP 129 has 590 pages devoted to its
discussion. It shows that considerable time, effort and exhaustive study was made
before the act was signed by the President. It can be surmised that good faith may be
ascertained due to the process involved.
 Dario v. Mison
G.R. No. 81954
August 8, 1989

Facts:
On January 30, 1987, President Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 127,
"Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance".Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127
provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customsandprescribed a new staffing
pattern therefor. On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador
Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders,"prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. On
the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board
charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum.On
January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to 279 Customs
officials regarding their removal from office. On June 30, 1988, however, the Civil
Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the said 279
employees. Bringing a petition for certiorari against the CSC before the Court, Mison
posited that claims of violation of security of tenure were allegedly no defense. He
further stated that the deadline prescribed by the Provisional Constitution (February 25,
1987) had been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory
provisions thereof,which allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987).

Issue:
Whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a
license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done
under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason

Held:
No. If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said
so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith.As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab
initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature
of positions,or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
After February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy — except
for the change of personnel — has occurred, which would have justified (all things being
equal) the contested dismissals. There is no showing that legitimate structural changes
have been made — or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at the
Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted
him to hire and fire employees. There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak
of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personal pure
and simple. Thus, the reinstatement by the CSC of the terminated Bureau of Customs
employees was valid.
 Cabagnot v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 93511
June 3, 1993

Facts:
On September 21, 1988, the new organizational structure and staffing pattern of
the provincial government of Aklan was approved by the Joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration (JCLGPA) thru the Director of the Bureau of Local
Government Supervision. The reorganization provided three hundred sixty-four (364)
regular plantilla positions from the previous three hundred thirty-nine (339) with the
Office of the Governor allocated one hundred forty-four (144) from the previous sixty (60)
positions. Governor Cabagnot then issued a Memorandum dated November 2, 1988
inviting all provincial officials and employees to apply for any of the authorized positions
in the new staffing pattern for the evaluation and assessment of the Provincial
Placement Committee which petitioner subsequently created thru Executive Order No.
0II-88. On January 5, 1989, the list of employees newly appointed and re-appointed was
posted. On January 17, 1989, twenty-one (21) supposedly aggrieved employees jointly
appealed to petitioner praying for reconsideration of their new appointments to positions
lower in rank than their positions prior to the reorganization. In denying their appeal,
Governor Cabagnot explained that since reorganization renders all positions vacant, the
employees have no vested right to their original positions. Also, she argued that the
appointments of private respondents did not violate the Civil Service Law on security of
tenure as the items offered them carried the same rate and salary they were receiving
prior to the reorganization, i.e., there was no diminution or reduction of their salary.

Issue:
Whether or not the reappointment of the private respondents to positions lower in
rank than what they previously held is valid

Held:
No. Section I of Rep. Act No. 6656 declares as the policy of the State, the
protection of the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the
reorganization of the various agencies of the government. Section 2 requires prior
determination of a valid cause after due notice and hearing before any officer or
employee in the career service can be removed, or demoted, which in effect is a
removal. Assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a
lower rate of compensation is a clear case of demotion tantamount to removal when no
cause is shown for it or when it is not a part of any disciplinary action. Thus, petitioner
stresses the fact that since private respondents would be receiving the same rate of
salary they were receiving before the reorganization, therefore they are not demoted. In
the case of Floreza, the Court ruled that there was demotion even if Floreza was allowed
to receive the same salary as his previous higher position. Similarly, we find that private
respondents, notwithstanding non-diminution of their salary, have been demoted. This
arbitrariness has no place in a government that nurtures the constitutional mandates of
security of tenure and due process. Hence, the CSC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the immediate appointment and restoration of the 16 private
respondents (excluding Oczon) to their positions or positions of comparable rank without
loss of seniority rights with back salaries.
 Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy
G.R. No. 135805
April 29, 1999

Facts:
On November 29, 1995, Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen
Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a
complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and
nepotism. On January 28, 1997, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution
finding no substantial evidence to support thecharge of habitual drunkenness and
misconduct. However, the Civil ServiceCommission found respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts asa result of the appointment of his two sons,
Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utilityworker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
the service. On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing
and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent
did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of
nepotism. The Court further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who
should be sanctioned as it is he who performs the prohibited act." Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the order of the CSC to
remove from Dacoycoy from office for being guilty of nepotism

Held:
No. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment
is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
ofany of the following: (a) appointing authority, (b) recommending authority, (c) chief of
the bureau or office, and (d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended
or issued in favor of arelative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
the chief of the bureauor office or the person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee. Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades,Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or
recommend his two sons to thepositions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades. In fact, itwas Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational
Department of the BCAT, whorecommended the appointment of Rito. On the other hand,
his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was "his next higher
supervisor." The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably,
Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level
employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the
appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate
supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career
positions. The unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the
appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is
guilty of nepotism. In this case, it is worthy to also note that the Court clarified that the
Civil Service Commission may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating
public official from charges thereof.
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896
February 22, 1991

Facts:
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987
dictates that “a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may… not hold more than two positions
in the government and government corporations.” On the other hand, Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution dictates that “The President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.” Petitioners seek
the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the said Executive Order as it runs counter to
Sec 13, Art. VII of the Constitution. Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines seeks
issuance of extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as temporary
restraining order to cease and desist public respondents from holding their dual or
multiply positions, and compel them to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts
or benefits that they may have received from such positions. Respondents argue that
“unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” refers to Sec 7 (par 2), Art. IX-B states
that “Unless otherwise allowed by law, or by the primary functions of his positions, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government…”
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, construing the two passages above, rendered an
opinion declaring that cabinet members may hold other public office. Including
membership in the boards of government corporations: a) when directly provided for in
the constitution, b) if allowed by law or c) if allowed by the primary functions of their
respective positions.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition in Sec 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Sec. 7 par (2) Article IX-B

Held:
No. The practice of designating members of the Cabinet became prevalent in the
Marcos regime, and the proliferation of new agencies gave way to the practice of holding
multiple positions which was taken advantage of for purposes of self-enrichment.The
provisions under consideration were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that
flow from holding multiple governmental offices. Sec 13, Art VII, specifically prohibiting
the President, the VP, and the members of Cabinet, is proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose on said class stricter prohibitions. The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” in Sec 13, Art VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided
under Sec. 7, Art IX B. The latter is meant to lay down the general rule to the elective
and appointive public officials while the former is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, VP, and Cabinet members. However, the prohibition under Sec 13,
Art VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions of ex-officio capacities which officials
hold without compensation. As provided by law, ex-officioofficers are required as part of
the primary functions of the concerned official’s office.
 Canonizado v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133132
February 15, 2001

Facts:
On the Court’s January 2000 decision, it declared section 8 of Republic Act No.
8551 (RA 8551) to be violative of petitioners' constitutionally mandated right to security
of tenure. As a consequence, it held that petitioners' removal as Commissioners of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the appointment of new Commissioners
in their stead were nullities and ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and the payment
of full backwages to be computed from the date they were removed from office.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of this decision on the ground that by
accepting President Estrada’s appointment to him to the position of Inspector General of
the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 30 June
1998, Canonizado is deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the
NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of
the IAS are incompatible.

Issue:
Whether or not Canonizado's appointment to and acceptance of the position of
Inspector General result in an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the
NAPOLCOM

Held:
No. It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts
another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is
thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. Public policy considerations
dictate against allowing the same individual to perform inconsistent and incompatible
duties. The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical impossibility of one
person's performing the duties of the two offices due to a lack of time or the inability to
be in two places at the same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and
relations of the two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and antagonism
should one person attempt to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward
the incumbent of the other. There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible with each other.
However, the rule on incompatibility of duties does not apply to the present case
because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices
simultaneously. As stated, Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as
Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law.
A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only
a right to earn a living, as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and
productive life. Furthermore, prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position
during the pendency of his petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the
consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstance can be attributed
to him. However, before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he
should first resign as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.
 Cailles v. Bonifacio
G.R. No. 45937
February 25, 1938

Facts:
Cailles instituted this action in the nature of quo warranto under the provisions of
section 408 of the Election Law for the purpose of ousting the respondent Bonifacio from
the office of provincial governor of Laguna. He contended that at the time Bonifacio filed
his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office, the respondent was a captain in
the reserve force of the Philippine Army and, for this reason, is ineligible to that office.
The contention was anchored on section 431 of the Election Law and section 2071 of
the Administrative Code and the prohibition against member of the armed forces under
member of the armed forces under section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution and section
449 of the Election Law.

Issue:
Whether or not Bonifacio is ineligible to hold office as the provincial governor of
Laguna

Held:
No. Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution prohibits members of the armed
forces from engaging in any partisan political activity, or otherwise taking part in any
election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of
suffrage. It prohibits partisan political activity or the taking part in any election except to
vote, but permits the exercise of the right to vote only if such right is granted by law. As
section 431 of the Election Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233,
disqualifies from voting only members in the active service of the Philippine Army and no
claim is made that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the
respondent, being in the reserve force, is not disqualified from voting. Stated otherwise,
the respondent being a qualified elector and the possession by him of the other
qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not
ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been elected. Moreover, a
contrary interpretation would lead to the disqualification of all able-bodied male citizens
between the ages of 20 and 50 years — not specifically exempted by the National
Defense Act — from holding elective public offices or otherwise taking part in any
election except to vote and this result, for obvious reasons, should be avoided.
 De Los Santos v. Yatco
G.R. No. L-13932
December 24, 1959

Facts:
In Civil Case No. Q-2664 of Quezon City Court of First Instance, the parties
submitted on December 9, 1957, a compromise agreement whereby, referring to the
sale by installment of a parcel of land made by plaintiffs Pacita V. de los Santos and
Jose V. de los Santos to defendant Francisco Mendoñez, they asked the court to render
a judgment subject to several conditions. Wherefore, the court issued on December 10,
1957, a decision approving the agreement. On March 10, 1958, plaintiffs in the same
case filed a motion for execution, because defendant had allegedly neglected to pay
monthly installments since January 1958. However, defendant Mendoñez filed on April
17, 1958, an urgent motion to quash the writ of execution, asserting under oath that
"immediately after the execution of the compromise agreement . . . plaintiff Pacita V. de
los Santos and defendant Francisco Mendoñez entered into a verbal agreement
whereby the former assured and led defendant to believe that provided he could pay in
full and at one time the balance of his indebtedness to her through a GSIS (Government
Service Insurance System) loan which she is willing to facilitate for defendant, she would
execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in favor of the defendant for Lot No. 4,
Block No. 13-C, Pcs-3312-AMD of T.C.T. No. 25094 of Quezon City and would consider
the terms and conditions favorable to her in their compromise agreement unenforceable
against defendant. . . .." Wherefore, convinced that there was no justification for the
issuance of the writ of execution, the Hon. Nicasio Yatco, Judge, quashed it by his order
of June 4, 1958.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Yatco committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding to
quash the writ of execution issued by him for lack of justification

Held:
No. The court had jurisdiction and committed no grave abuse of discretion. In the
first place, there being opposition on the part of the defendant, who alleged and proved a
subsequent verbal agreement amending the compromise, execution could not validly be
decreed without a hearing. As the Court ruled in Co v. Lucero, when under similar
circumstances a breach of the compromise agreement is alleged, "there arises a cause
of action which must be passed upon by the court requiring a hearing to determine
whether such breach had really taken place." In the second place, the allegations proved
by Mendoñez about their verbal agreement, his having secured a loan from the GSIS
and his consequent ability to discharge his obligation seemingly justified the court's
refusal to eject defendant from the premises (on execution) with the consequent
forfeiture in favor of the plaintiffs of more than P12,000.00 already paid by defendant as
previous installments of the purchase price, not to mention the loss of defendant's use of
the house and theatre erected on that parcel of land.
 SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989

Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work;
and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. On July 22, 1987the court a
quo denied the motion to dismiss filed by the SSS employees and converted
therestraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike
wasillegal.

Issue:
Whether or not the employees of the SSS have the right to strike

Held:
None. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" (Article IX-B Section
2(1)) and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Moreover, there is a rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector
and government employees with regard to the right to strike. Since the terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to
the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the
terms andconditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through
theprocess of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is
thelegislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads
ofgovernment which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, notthrough collective
bargaining agreements. The remedy of government employees, therefore, is either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law through their unions or
associations.
 Jacinto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124540
November 14, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan
Manila. Between the period of Sept 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences
in connection with the mass actions then staged. On Sept 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Cariño immediately issued a return-to-work. The directive was ignored by petitioners.
Consequently, Secretary Cariño issued formal charges and preventive suspension
orders against them. They were administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross
neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work
directives; unjustified abandonment of teaching posts; non-observance of Civil Service
law, rules and regulations; non-compliance with reasonable office rules and regulations;
and incurring unauthorized absences without leave, etc. During the investigation,
petitioners did not file their answers. As a consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions
found them guilty as charged. The decisions were appealed to the MSPB which
dismissed the appeals for lack of merit and then to the CSC which set aside the Orders
of the MSPB in the contested resolutions. The CSC then found the petitioners (except
Merlinda and Jacinto) guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
imposed upon them the penalty 6 months suspension without pay, and automatically
reinstated them to the service without payment of back salaries.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
upheld the resolutions of the CSC
in
Held:
No. The mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-
holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners
do not dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress concernedthe alleged
failure of public authorities — essentially, their "employers" — to fully and justly
implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially. However, as
inthe, case of Balingasan v.. Court of Appeals, this Court said that the fact that
theconventional term "strike" was not used by the participants to describe their common
course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, was deemed controlling. Petitioners here were not penalized for the
exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves
without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to
participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of
classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible.
Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time — recess, after classes, weekends
or holidays — todramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
within the bounds oflaw, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court — could
have held them liable forthe valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As
it was, the temporarystoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily
disrupted public services, thevery evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against
strikes by governmentworkers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations,for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.
 Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 10013
September 3, 1991

Facts:
Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years as stated in Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years

Held:
Yes. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the
interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in
the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their
legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the
January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of
their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These
days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect
since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience for more than 10 years as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman.
 Gaminde v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 140335
December 13, 2000

Facts:
President Ramos appointed Thelma Gaminde as ad interim Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission on June 11, 1993. Her appointment paper states that she has
“a term expiring on Feb 2, 1999”. On Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from
the Office of the President as to the expiry of her term. Chief Pres. Legal Counsel,
through Corona, opined that it was on Feb. 2, 2000 and so, she remained in office after
Feb 2, 1999. On Feb 4, 1999, Chairman de Leon wrote the COA requesting opinion on
whether or not Commissioner Gaminde may be paid her salary. The General Counsel,
COA issued an opinion that “the term has expired on Feb 2, 1999. CSC Felipe issued
notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to the
petitioner. PET appealed the disallowance to the COA en banc which dismissed the
same.

Issue:
Whether or not the term of Atty. Thelma Gaminde as Commissioner of CSC
expired on Feb 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper

Held:
Yes. The beginning of the term of office of those first appointed to the Civil
Service Commission is deemed to coincide with the ratification of the Constitution on
Feb 2, 1987 regardless of when they actually started holding office. These first
appointees’ terms shall be on a staggered 7-5-3 year terms. Subsequent appointees
would then be given the full 7-year term pursuant to Art. IX-B Sec 1(2). The start of their
term would then depend on the end of their predecessor’s term. Even if their
predecessor exceeded serving the term originally granted to them, the starting point of
their (subsequent appointees) terms would still be the end of their predecessors’ term
(not tenure). Thus, Gaminde’s term is deemed to have started on February 2, 1992,
which is the date her predecessor’s 5-year term ended, even if she only assumed office
on June 22, 1993 (her predecessor served until March 4, 1993). Also, she is bound by
the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring on February 2, 1999, and not
February 2, 2000. However, since she served as a de facto officer in good faith until
February 2, 2000, she is still entitled to receive her salary and other emolument
corresponding to the actual services she has rendered.
 Estrella v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 160465
May 27. 2004

Facts:
Salvador was the declared winner for the mayoralty race in Baliwag, Bulacan.
This was contested by Estrella before the RTC of Malolos which then declared petitioner
as the duly elected mayor of Baliwag, Bulacan. Consequently, the RTC of Malolos
issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision. Upon Salvador’s appeal
before the COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc issued a Status Quo Ante Order directing
the "parties to maintain the status quo ante order, which is the condition prevailing
before the issuance" by the RTC of Malolos of a writ ofexecution. Estrella then sought
before the SC the nullification of the said order. On April 28, 2004, the Court granted the
petition on the ground that Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary inhibition in the division
level made him incapacitated to vote in the en banc level. Consequently, since
Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned
order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four
(4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed
to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or
order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Salvador then sought the reconsideration of said resolution, citing Cua v. COMELEC
wherein the Court ruled that the “the three members who voted to affirm the First
Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon
en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision.”

Issue:
Whether or not three votes are sufficient to constitute a majority to carry out the
decision of the COMELEC en banc where only 5 participated in the discussions

Held:
No. The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of
all its members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. In
the case at bar, following the clear provision of the Constitution, counting out
Commissioner Lantion's vote from the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would
leave just three (3) votes out of "all" seven (7) members of the COMELEC. Had the
framers intended that it should be the majority of the members who participated or
deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to the
Supreme Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons
then, the Court abandoned the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC
En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of "all its
members," and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.
 Dumayas v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 141952-53
April 20, 2001

Facts:
Dumayas, Jr. and Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of mayor in
Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized elections.During the canvassing on 13 May
1998, election returns for precincts nos. 61A,62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan
were protested for inclusion in thecanvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) by Dumayas Jr on the ground that terrorism, intimidation, and coercion attended
the counting and casting of votes in said precincts. In the afternoon of May 14, 1998, the
MBC denied petitioner's objection and proceeded with the canvass. The appeal was
given due course by the COMELEC Second Division which rendered a
resolutiondirecting the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or
uncontested returns and thereafter, proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate of Carles,
Iloilo. On August 10, 1998, Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-
cited resolution with the COMELEC en banc. On August 17, 1998, despite presentation
of the August 12, 1998 order, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after
excluding from the canvass the election returnsfrom the three contested precincts in
accordance with the COMELEC Second DivisionResolution. The COMELEC en banc,
however, reversed the decision of the 2nd Division, annulled Dumayas’ proclamation, and
ordered the creation of a new MBC which later on proclaimed Bernal as the winner,
thereby unseating Dumayas.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in ordering the inclusion of the contested
election returns in the canvassing of ballots

Held:
No. Findings of fact by the COMELEC, or any other administrative agency
exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on this Court. 18 In a
pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not
required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face regular
and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would
necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie
regular, the proper remedy is a regular election protest, not a pre-proclamation
controversy. Absent any evidence appearing on the face of the returns that they are
indeed spurious, manufactured or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by
petitioner would require the reception of evidence aliunde which cannot be done in a
pre-proclamation controversy such as the one initiated by petitioner. Returns cannot be
excluded on mere allegation that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the
returns, on their face, appear regular and without any physical signs of tampering,
alteration or other similar vice. If there had been sham voting or minimal voting which
was made to appear as normal through falsification of the election returns, such grounds
are properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation controversy
which is only summary in nature.
 Sevilla v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203833
March 19, 2013

Facts:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of
BarangaySucat, Muntinlupa City. the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the
winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning marginof 628 votes over So's 6,726 total
votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed anelection protest with the MeTC on the ground
that Sevilla committed electoralfraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested
precincts.Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC
issued an Order dated May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. However, in its May
14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So's petition. The Comelec
en banc, by a vote of 3-3,affirmed the Comelec Second Division's ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the vote of 3-3 is sufficient for the COMELEC en banc to affirm
the ruling of the Second Division

Held:
No. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "[e]ach Commission
shall decide by a majority vote of all its members. A majority vote requires a vote of
fourmembers of the COMELECen banc. Thus, for all intents and purposes, theassailed
October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effectwhatsoever
except to convey that the Comelec failed to reach a decision and thatfurther action is
required. To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among
themembers of the Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules
ofProcedure mandates a rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anewto
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the membersof the
COMELECen banc of the merit of their case. Thus, the case was remanded to the
COMELEC en banc.
 Ibrahim v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192289
January 8, 2013

Facts:
On December 1, 2009, Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-
Mayor of Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections. Thereafter, Buagas, then Acting
Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELEC's Law Department
(Law Department) the names of 20 candidates who were not registered voters therein.
The listincluded Ibrahim's name. In a Memorandumdated December 10, 2009, the Law
Department brought to the attention of the COMELEC en banc the names of 56
candidates running for various posts in Maguindanao and Davao del Sur who were not
registered voters of the municipalities where they sought to be elected. The Law
Department recommended the retention of the said names in the Certified List of
Candidates, but for the COMELEC to motu propio institute actions against them for
disqualification and for violation of election laws. Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc
issued the herein assailed December 22, 2009 Resolution approving, but with
modification, the Law Department's recommendation. The COMELEC en banc denied
the Petition/Opposition filed by Ibrahim and others through a Resolution dated May 6,
2010. In the May 10, 2010 elections, Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number
cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay. However, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahim's
proclamation on the basis of Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the Resolutions dated Dec 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010

Held:
Yes. The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay. Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that all such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. In the present case, the COMELEC en banc,
through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim's disqualification even when no
complaintor petition was filed against him yet. Moreover, even if we were to assume that
a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription
and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
 Jaramilla v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 155717
October 23, 2003

Facts:
Suyat and Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. In the
tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat obtained 4,779 votes and was ranked
no. 9. Upon review by Suyat, he discovered that Jaramilla was credited with only 23
votes per Election Return from Precinct No. 34A1. However, when the figures were
forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes for
Precinct No. 34A1 or 50 votes more than what he actually obtained. If the entry were to
be corrected, Jaramilla will rank 9th and Suyat 8th. On June 13, 2001, respondent Suyat
filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to
Reconvene, which the latter treated as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. The
COMELEC en banc granted the motion/petition. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for taking
cognizance of the case despite its having been filed beyond the 5-day reglamentary
period, its lack of certification against forum-shopping, and Suyat’s failure to pay the
prescribe filing fees

Held:
No. COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in
the interest of justice. Also, the COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it
by reason of non-payment of filing fees. Moreover, with regard to the contention that
COMELEC division must first hear the case pursuant to Sec 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled that yes, election cases including pre-
proclamation controversies should first be heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC, and then by the Commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the
decision is filed. However, this rule applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions. Accordingly, when the case demands only the exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative functions, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in
the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting the elections. The
Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleged an erroneous copying
of figures from the election return to the Statements of Votes by Precinct. Such an error
merely requires a clerical correction and demands only the exercise of the administrative
Power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc properly assumed original
jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
 Typoco v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 186359
March 5, 2010

Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, Typoco and Tallado vied for
the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes,
Typoco was proclaimed winner with80,830 votes, as opposed to respondent Edgardo A.
Tallado's 78,287 votes. Tallado the filed before the COMELEC a petition for correction of
manifest error. He claimed that errors were committed in the transposition of votes from
the SOVP to the COC. Respondent contended that if the errors were corrected, he
would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner, 79,904 votes; thus, he would be the
true winner in thegubernatorial race in the province. After due proceedings, the
COMELEC First Division, on April 30, 2008, rendered the assailed Resolution granting
respondent Tallado’s petition. It ruled that, based onthe COMELEC copies of the
concerned SOVPs and COCs, the votes in Labo, as recorded in the said documents, did
not correspond; while those in Jose Panganibanactually tallied. Correcting the figures in
Labo, while retaining those in the lattermunicipality, led to the following results: Tallado,
79,969 votes ; and Typoco,79,904 votes. The COMELEC en banc denied the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner and subsequently appointed members of a new
municipal board of canvassers in the subject locality and members of a new provincial
board of canvassers for purposes of, respectively, tabulating thevotes for Governor for
the municipality of Labo, and proclaiming Tallado.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its issuances
ordering: (1) the correction of the manifest error in the pertinent election documents; (2)
the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner; and (3) the subsequent proclamation of
the winning gubernatorial candidate in Camarines Norte

Held:
No. The appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to
the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. In
this case, the COMELEC's decision to correct the manifest error is supported by
substantial evidence. The COMELEC copies of the SOVP (in the custody of the ERSD)
revealed discrepancies in the transposition of the votes from the said documents to the
COC. It may be noted that the COMELEC used its own copies of the SOVP, not the
copies provided by the parties. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC (ERSD)
copies of the SOVP were found by the NBI to be spurious. Petitioner thus wants the
Court to accept the NBI reports without hesitation and to disregard the COMELEC
findings. The Court, however, found petitioner's reliance on the NBI reports misplaced.
As stated earlier, the COMELEC, not the NBI, is the agency that has the competence to
determine the genuineness of election documents. The issue involves election
documents and there is no other body more competent in handling these documents
than the COMELEC.
 Villarosa v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 212953
August 5, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de Mesa
Festin (Festin) were two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15,
2013, private respondent was proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes,
edging out petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. As a consequence of
the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the 92 clustered precincts of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, private respondent, so petitioner claimed, was illegally
proclaimed.

In his answer, private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in
the precincts, particularly the number of votes credited to petitioner.

Issue:
Concisely stated, the issue in this case is the legality of the formation of the
Special First Division

Held:
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC
when the Special First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special
First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the
case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate
Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies inboth of its Divisions. The
additional term "special," in this case, merelyindicates that the commissioners sitting
therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. The COMELEC
First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before the
substitution was made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014.

This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First
Division since this only entailed a change in the Division’s composition of magistrates. If
anything, it was only petitioner’s naivety that misled him into interpreting the designation
of the division as a "special" one, meaning it is distinct from the first. Corollarily,
petitioner is also mistaken in claiming that the jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired"
by the First Division from the Special First Division by ruling on the motion to quash
since the First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.
 Hayudini v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207900
April 22, 2014

Facts:
A Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Mustapha Omar against Gamal Hayudini with regard to the mayoralty of South Ubian,
Tawi Tawi citing that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation
regarding his residence – declaring that he is a resident of the Municipality of South
Ubian when in fact, he, resides in Zamboanga City.Thereafter, Hayudini filed a petition
for inclusion in the permanent list of voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, before
the MTCT, which was granted. On that same day, the COMELEC’s first division
dismissed Omar’s petition for lack of substantial evidence.
The case was elevated to Bongao RTC which reversed the MTCT ruling and
ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of
voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Gamal Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening event. Hayudini
appealed the decision to the CA but the same was denied. Hayudini eventually won the
mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi. He was proclaimed and took his oath.
However, the COMELEC Second division granted Omar’s petition and cancelled
Hayudini’s COC. Hayudini moved to reconsider but the same was denied for lack of
merit – thus this instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for Certiorari be given due course?

Held:

Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the

COMELEC’s liberal treatment of Omar’s petition.

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally

construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in
office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious,
and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with
public interest.
 ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
380 Phil 780
January 28, 2000

Facts:
Comelec Resolution No. 98-1419 restraining “ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same” was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an]
exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President
and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately.” The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). On May
9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We
directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the
assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the
exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.

Issue:
May the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls?

Held:
No.An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals
or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election
by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for,
immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. Admittedly, no law prohibits the
holding and the reporting of exit polls.

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press. There are two theoretical tests in determining the
validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows: The first is the ‘clear and present
danger’, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The second is the 'dangerous
tendency' rule, where if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. Unquestionably, this Court
adheres to the "clear and present danger" test.

Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and
any restriction is treated an exemption. COMELEC then contends that "an exit poll has
the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees,
which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. First, by the very nature of a survey,
the interviewees or participants are selected at random, Second, the survey result is not
meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count.

Exit polls do not indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot.
Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The reason behind the
principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification.
 Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 205720
January 21, 2015

Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH
Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading
"Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law.6Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay". Tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election
offense against petitioners.

Issue:
Whether the tarpaulins are a form or expression (protected speech), or election
propaganda/political advertisement.

Held:
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken
as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during
elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of
according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including
those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the
choice of a candidate.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches

into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech
that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to
meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and
considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the
least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect
to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored © basis of its content. For this purpose, it will
notmatter whether the speech is made with or on private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as
discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social
advocacy. Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio,
the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6© of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability.
 Lokin v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808
June 26, 2012

Facts:
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly
registered under the party-list system of representation for May 14, 2007 synchronized
national and local elections. Its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list
of five nominees, namely: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K.
Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7,
2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted
Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly
through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The
motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the
validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The COMELEC en
banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC
were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such. As a result, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office. Lokin seeks through mandamus to
compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

Issue:
Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing
rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list
1
nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.

Held:
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the
extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee
once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-
list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has
been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to
all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions. Lokin insists that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for
substituting a nominee. We agree. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing
arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the
COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the
IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
 Cagas v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 209185
October 25, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the

position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated
national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by
May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the
petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering
159,527 votes.Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of
election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010
(EPC No. 2010-42).The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010, the petitioner averred as his special
affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and
that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained
of. On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order
denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The petitioner moved to
reconsider. In his opposition, Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling
in Panlilio v. COMELEC;that the rules of the COMELEC required the initiatory petition to
specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral frauds, anomalies and election
irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was
based. On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed
order, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first
order was contrary to law. Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil
action directly in this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

Held:
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit. The governing provision is Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: “Section 7. Each Commission shall
decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First
Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the
petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits,
and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative
defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the
Division upon the merits.
 National Press Club v. COMELEC
207 SCRA 1
March 5, 1992

Facts:
Representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating
space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for
office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

Held:
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible
bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the

character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being
assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations.
It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of
the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations. Firstly,
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. Secondly,
and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of
Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including
purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for "campaign or
other political purposes."

Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to
candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such
comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates
covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or
commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for
political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
 Chavez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162777
August 31, 2004

Facts:
Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its
Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004. The assailed provision is, as follows:
“Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings
on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the
name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these
implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station
shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code.”
On December 30, 2003, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political
parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which
contained Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was
directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELECs Law Department. He
wrote to COMELEC asking that he be exempted from the application of Section 32,
considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot
be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules. COMELEC
denies, hence this petition.

Issue:
Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police
power?

Held:
Yes. Police power, is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. To determine the
validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the
public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise
of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives
are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of
public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand,
and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from
enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power. The obvious
intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and
poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by
huge campaign war chests. This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special
importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme
disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and
by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty
line.
 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC
224 SCRA 272
May 22, 1995

Facts:
Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers
to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The
COMELEC space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of

newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held:
The Resolution is unconstitutional. To compel print media companies to
donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for
public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March
1995) until 12 May 1995? or every day or once a week? or as often as Comelec may
direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the
use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by
the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in
non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under
the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold
requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here:
one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The
element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec.
 SWS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571
May 5, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides
that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven
(7) days before an election”.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion
among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support
the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process
posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from
explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and
publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend
that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election
surveys, which are relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No.

9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process
by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press.

Held:
Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression,
speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that Section 5.4 of RA.
No.9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.

It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
 Sanidad v. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
October 12, 1976

Facts:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was
enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which
consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite
for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which
was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226
dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct
of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims
to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER,
a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167,
Issue:
Whether or not said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution.

Held:
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or
other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a
leave of absence from his work during the campaign period”) can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise
by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no
statutory basis.
 GMA Network v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205357
September 2, 2014

FACTS:
Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and
local elections dealing with political advertisements. Specifically, the petitions question
the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates
and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to
report the same, and the sanctions imposed for violations.
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality
of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast
and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on
allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.
The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the
limitation on the number of minutes that candidates may use for television and radio
advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006),
otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:
Yes. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing
the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom
of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms
and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis
for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based

time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really
reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that
he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself –
a form of suppression of his political speech.
 Sison v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134096
March 3, 1999

Facts:
While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced
suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes
and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said
petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 6[3] of the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of massive and orchestrated
fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the
preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a
failure to elect.

While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate
for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged
resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein
were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were not
among the pre-proclamation issues set fourth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC overstepped the limits of reasonable exercise of
discretion in when it did not declare failure of elections.

Held:
Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only
three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election
in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling
place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes.[9] (Underscoring
supplied). We have painstakingly examined petitioners petition before the COMELEC
but found nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of
elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or
suspended. Furthermore, petitioners claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion
bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came
about.
 Soliva V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 141723
April 20, 2001

Facts:
Herein petitioners and private respondents vied for the local posts in RTR during
the local elections of May 11, 1998. Petitioners belonged to the Lakas-NUCD party while
private respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP)
banner.
On May 12, 1998, all the LAKAS candidates (herein petitioners) were proclaimed
as the winning candidates. Six days after, or on May 18, 1998, respondent Alexander
Bacquial filed a petition to declare a failure of election due to alleged massive fraud,
terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes
and other anomalies.
Private respondents also submitted in evidence the Order of the Provincial
Election Supervisor, Atty. Roland Edayan, dated May 12, 1998, directing Col. Felix P.
Ayaay, the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police, to investigate reports of
grave threats, intimidation and coercion directed against the supporters of mayoralty
candidate respondent Bacquial. Copies of several election returns which did not bear the
signatures of the LAMMP pollwatchers were likewise presented to prove that such
watchers were not allowed inside the municipal gymnasium where the canvassing of
votes was conducted. Petitioners, on the other hand, tried to disprove private
respondents’ allegations.
On February 11, 2000, the COMELEC rendered the assailed resolution declaring
a failure of election in the municipality of RTR.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared a failure of elections in the entire
municipality of RTR.

Held:
We dismiss the petition. The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the
broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections
as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the
question as to the right to vote.
We agree with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of election
in the municipality of RTR, as the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the
election returns was clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism and
harassment. Findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with a specific field of
expertise are afforded great weight and respect by the courts, and in the absence of
substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the
evidence presented, they are conclusive and should not be disturbed. The COMELEC,
as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in
its field that its findings and conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.
 Brillantes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193
June 15, 2004

Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing
the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms
and printing materials.

On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. On May 4, 2004, the petition was filed by
Jose Concepcion, Jr., et al, urging the Court to declare as null and void the assailed
resolution and permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from implementing the
same. The Court granted the motion of the petitioners-in-intervention and admitted their
petition. In assailing the validity of the questioned resolution, the petitioner avers in his
petition that there is no provision under Rep. Act No. 8436 which authorizes the
COMELEC to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of voters
(Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of election results (Phase III).

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 is void.

Held:
It is void. First. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial”
tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and
Vice-President. Second. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the
constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Third. The assailed resolution disregards
existing laws which authorize NAMFREL as the solely the duly-accredited citizens’ arm
to conduct the “unofficial” counting of votes. Fourth. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed
resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for
“unofficial” tabulations of votes. Fifth. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for
the respondent COMELEC to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of
results, whether manually or electronically. Indeed, by conducting such “unofficial”
tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private
organization, spending public funds for the purpose. Sixth. As correctly observed by the
petitioner, there is a great possibility that the “unofficial” results reflected in the electronic
transmission under the supervision and control of the COMELEC would significantly vary
from the results reflected in the COMELEC official count. The latter follows the
procedure prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code, which is markedly different from
the procedure envisioned in the assailed resolution.
 Cerafica v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205136
December 2, 2014

Facts:
On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the
2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will
be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the
requirement that one must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the
elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of
Taguig). As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age
qualification.
Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17 December
2012. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly.
In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra (Director
Amora-Ladra) of the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of
Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia.
Relying on Comelec Resolution No. 9551, Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if no
COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted.

Issue:
Whether or not, COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing assailed minute resolution.

Held:
In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed
a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the
Comelec gravely abused its discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny
due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the
Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. In
Cipriano v. Comelec, we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give
due couse to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to
COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may look
into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face.
The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the Comelec.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but
only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be
substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal
Party; thus, she can be validly substituted.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions.31 We thus caution the Comelec against its practice of
impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations
of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a
Division for summary hearing.
 Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066
March 26, 2001

Facts:
Invoking their right to suffrage, herein petitioners — representing the youth sector
— seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189.

Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional

heads and representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director
Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director
Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of
voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-
election activities.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a
special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

Held:
No. The right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in
our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.

Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in

addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law
to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known
as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996."

Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the

right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process.

As to petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that
this Court cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same
without transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer

to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because
it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
 Goh v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 212584
November 25, 2014

Facts:
On 17 March 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, against
Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of
pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of
pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials,
Incompetence, and other related gross inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty,
intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."

On 1 April 2014, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution

No. 9864 found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but suspended the
funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue.

On 27 May 2014, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882, which says that
the recall elections cannot proceed as it does not have an appropriation or legal
authority to commit public funds for the purpose.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 9882 is valid.

Held:
The Resolution is not valid. We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line
item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize
the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.

Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of
recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to
perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of . . . recall." 45 Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA
be deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to
augment such line item appropriation from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this
augmentation is expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA.
 Jalosjos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192474, 192704, 193566
June 26, 2012

Facts:
In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. NO. 192474, ran for
Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan
Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, renovated, furnished and occupied the same. On May 6,
2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, for the transfer of his voter's registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village. Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent in G.R. NO. 192474, opposed the
application. ERB approved Jalosjos' application. Erasmo filed a petition to
exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters of Precinct 0051F before the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim (MCTC). After hearing, the
MCTC rendered judgment on August 14, 2009, excluding Jalosjos from the list of
registered voters in question. RTC affirmed.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10,
2010 National Elections which was contested by Erasmo. While Erasmo's motion for
reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, Jalosjos won the elections.
In G.R. NO. 192704, Erasmo assails the COMELEC En Banc's failure to
annul Jalosjos' proclamation as elected Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay despite his declared ineligibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the
question of Jalosjos' residency qualification for running for the position of Representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed
winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.
Held:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections, it does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3,
2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.
Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
 Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264
June 25, 2013

Facts:
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that
petitioner made in her COC, she is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure
to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In
addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to
run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining
and using an American passport. As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency
requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a
naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution 15 denying

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Four days thereafter or on 18
May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional
qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives
as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines.

Held:
The petition must fail.

Anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives other than those enumerated in the Constitution, is
unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the
House of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the
candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year
residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err
when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to
determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied
the constitutional provision and nothing more.
 Sahali v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201796
June 15, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Sadikul Sahali and respondent Hadja Jubaida H. Matba were two of
the contending gubernatorial candidates in Tawi-Tawi in the elections of May 11, 1998.
On May 13, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly
elected governor of Tawi-Tawi. The counting of votes, canvassing of returns and
consolidation of results of the elections were conducted using the Automated Election
System, authorized under Republic Act No. 8436.
Before petitioner could assume office on June 30, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 dated June 29, 1998, directing the
immediate manual recounting of ballots in the province of Tawi-Tawi; and in the
meantime, suspending the effects of the proclamation as a logical consequence of the
manual counting due to allegations that the automated counting machines utilized in said
province suffered massive and total systems breakdown.
On July 3, 1998, petitioner brought this special civil action for certiorari seeking
the annulment of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 98-1959. The Minute Resolution, he
argues, is also void ab initio in as much as no pre-proclamation controversy was filed
during the canvassing, and there can be no suspension of the effects of a proclamation
or a recounting of ballots where there is no pre-proclamation controversy.

Issue:
Whether or not the promulgation by respondent COMELEC of the assailed
Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 amounted to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Held:
Clearly, the COMELEC, motu proprio, reconsidered its earlier Minute Resolution
No. 98-1959, as it was within its power to do, before it became final and executory. As
argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to amend and control its process
and order. Within the thirty-day period from its promulgation, therefore, the questioned
Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 was still under the control of the COMELEC and may
thus be recalled or set aside.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a
court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by
timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari.
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to show that the promulgation by
respondent COMELEC of the assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 amounted to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or that
its act was exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility towards petitioner. On the contrary, the COMELEC, perhaps realizing
the precipitousness of the issuance of Minute Resolution No. 98-1959, lost no time in
recalling the same and promulgating Minute Resolution No. 98-2145 in its stead. To be
sure, this negates any indication of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.
 Galang v. Geronimo
G.R. No. 192793
February 22, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner won as mayor of Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon on
May 10, 2010 Automated Elections. Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos,
who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The
COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 8923, granting said request. As for the COCP
for the previously proclaimed mayoralty and vice-mayoralty candidates, the total number
of votes for each of the candidates remained the same even after the manual
reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to read May 20, 2010 to
correspond with the date of the manual reconciliation.

On May 27, 2010, private respondent filed an election protest case against
petitioner before the RTC. The following day, the court sheriff went to petitioner's
residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summon
stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and
the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's
residence.

The trial court then issued the assailed Order dated June 24, 2010, finding the
service of Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.
On the other hand, respondents pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be
filed with this Court but with the COMELEC.

Issue:
Whether or not taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari questioning an
interlocutory order of the regional trial court in an electoral protest case be considered in
aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Held:
The Court finds in the affirmative.

Interpreting the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court held in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court
or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was
reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue
a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review,
by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal

from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective
municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this
Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
 Flores v. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
April 20, 1990

Facts:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as having received the highest number
of votes for kagawad in the elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay Poblacion,
Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 6679. However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, who placed
second in the election with 463 votes. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra,
sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after
deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total.
Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which affirmed the
challenged decision in toto. The judge held that the original total credited to the petitioner
was correctly reduced by 2, to 462, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the decision
of the regional trial court. This ruling, embodied in its resolution dated 3 August 1989,
was presumably based on Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC’s opinion that it could not entertain the petitioner's
appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the regional
trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in
barangay elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable." is correct.
Held:
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the
regional trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.
Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner's appeal was validly made to
the Commission on Elections under its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests .
. . involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." Its
decision was in turn also properly elevated to us pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7, of
the Constitution, stating that "unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."
Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that
"decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable"
applies only to questions of fact and not of law. The issue the petitioner was raising was
one of law, viz., whether he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the incumbent
rule, and so subject to our review.
 Lloren v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196355
September 18, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 elections. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate.
Alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the
clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-related manipulations, petitioner
filed protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Hilongos, Leyte. The RTC dismissed
the election protest for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to pay the
required cash deposit.
On November 17, 2010, petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the RTC, and paid
the appeal fee of P1,000.00 to the same court. The RTC granted due course to the
appeal on November 24, 2010. On December 2, 2010, the fifteenth day from the filing of
the notice of appeal, petitioner remitted the appeal fee of P3,200.00 to
the COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) by postal money
order. Through the first assailed order of January 31, 2011, however,
the COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal on the ground of petitioner's failure to
pay the appeal fee. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration through the second assailed order.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner timely paid the appeal fee and motion fee under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and, substantively, whether or not the appeal may
still proceed.

Held:
The petition is meritorious as to the procedural question, but not as to the
substantive question.
The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two
different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice
of appeal within five days from notice of the decision, and the other to be paid in
the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of
appeal.
As to the order issued on March 16, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc, the Court
finds that the COMELEC En Banc was capricious and arbitrary in thereby denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that he did not simultaneously pay
the motion fee of P300.00 prescribed by Section 7 (f), Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of
Procedure.
However, for the substantial issue, as the findings of the RTC show, petitioner
did not indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest.
The omission rendered the election protest insufficient in form and content, and
warranted its summary dismissal, in accordance with Section 12, Rule 2 of the Rules
in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC. Likewise, the RTC found that the cash deposit made by
petitioner was insufficient. Considering that the Court cannot disturb the findings on the
insufficiency of petitioner's cash deposit made by the trial court, that finding was another
basis for the summary dismissal of the election protest under Section 12.
We note that the summary dismissal of the election protest upon any of the
grounds mentioned in Section 12 is mandatory.
 Nollen v. Comelec
G.R. No. 196355
January 11, 2010

Facts:
Respondent Susana M. Caballes and petitioner Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. were
candidates for punong barangay of Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in the October 29,
2007 barangay elections. Having garnered four hundred and fifty-six (456) votes as
against the four hundred and forty-eight (448) votes Caballes obtained, Nollen was
declared as the punongbarangay-elect.

Dissatisfied with the result, Caballes instituted an election protest with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sariaya, Quezon. On June 3, 2008, the MTC rendered a
decision declaring protestant Caballes as punong barangay-elect, having garnered four
hundred fifty-six (456) votes, or five (5) votes more than the four hundred fifty-one (451)
votes of Nollen. Nollen filed on June 5, 2008 his notice of appeal and paid the MTC the
appeal fee of PhP 1,000. However, Comelec First Division dismissed her appeal for
nonpayment of appeal fee. Nollen moved for reconsideration, praying for the liberal
interpretation of the rules, but stating in the same breath that his PhP 1,000 appeal fee
payment was sufficient to perfect his appeal. To still require him to pay the additional
amount of PhP 3,000 as appeal fee and a bailiff fee of PhP 200 on top of what he
already paid the MTC, would amount, so he claimed, to a denial of his right to due
process. On October 6, 2008, Nollen, despite his earlier avowal to pay his deficiency
only if theCOMELEC En Banc would reconsider the dismissal order of the First Division,
paid the poll bodys Cash Division the amount of PhP 3,200. Comelec en Banc also
dismissed her petition. Hence, this review.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC in first dismissing Nollens appeal from the MTC
and then denying his motion for reconsiderationacted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in excess, of
jurisdiction

Held:
Yes. In Divinagracia ruling, the rule contained the following final caveat: that for
notice of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter of non-
payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no
longer excusable. However, that the warning given in Divinagracia is inapplicable to the
case at bar, since the notice of appeal in the instant case was filed on June 5, 2008. In
the strict legal viewpoint, Divinagracia contextually finds applicability only in cases where
notices of appeal were filed at least after the promulgation of the Divinagracia decision
on July 27, 2009. Since petitioner paid the appeal fee of PhP 1,000 simultaneously with
his filing of his notice of appeal on June 5, 2008, the appeal is considered perfected
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8654, taking it beyond the ambit
of Divinagracia. Again, petitioners’ failure to pay the remaining PhP 3,200 within the
prescribed period cannot be taken against him, since the COMELEC failed to notify him
regarding the additional appeal fee, as provided by Resolution No. 8654. Although
Nollen, following superseded jurisprudence, failed to pay the filing fee on time, he
nonetheless voluntarily paid the remaining PhP 3,200 appeal fee on October 6, 2008.
 Relampagos v. Cumba
G.R. NO. 118861
April 27, 1995
Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position
of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. When Cumba was
proclaimed the winner, petitioner filed an election protest with the trial court, which found
the latter to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent. Cumba
appealed to the COMELEC. The trial court gave due course to the appeal. Petitioner
moved for execution pending appeal, which was granted. The corresponding writ of
execution was thus issued. Since her motion for reconsideration was denied, Cumba
filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the assailed order of the trial
court. COMELEC promulgated its resolution, declaring null and void the order and the
writ of execution issued by the lower court. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored
to her position as Municipality Mayor. Respondents contend that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697
was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), citing jurisprudent where it
was declared that, indeed, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to issue special writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether the Commission has theauthority to hear and decide petitions

forcertiorari in election cases.

Held:

Yes. Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to

Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power
includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. In abandoning the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases,
the Court held that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force
and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has
the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
 Balajonda v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 166032
February 28, 2005

Facts:
Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay
Chairman (Punong Barangay), having won the office in the barangay elections held the
previous day. Her margin of victory over private respondent Maricel Francisco
(Francisco) was four-hundred twenty (420) votes. Francisco duly filed a petition for
election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of proclamation, lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35. In answer to the protest,
Balajonda alleged that Franciscos petition stated no cause of action and that the
allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were baseless, conjectural, flimsy,
frivolous, preposterous and mere figments of the latters wild imagination. She also laid
stress on the fact that although the grounds relied upon by Francisco were violations of
election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted for violation of the same. The
MeTC ordered the revision of the ballots. MeTC dismissed the protect. But the ruling
was reversed by Comelec First Division ordering Balajonda to vacate the post. Hence
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections has power to order the immediate
execution of its judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay chairmanship is at
the heart of the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Held:
No. Public interest is best served if the herein Protestant who actually received
the highest number of votes should be immediately be installed. It is likewise true that
the remaining period or the unexpired term is too short that to further prolong the tenure
of the protestee is a virtual denial of the right of the protestant, the duly elected barangay
captain, to assume office. The judgments which may be executed pending appeal are
not only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well.
Considering that there are good reasons for the issuance of an Order of
Execution, to wit: dictates of public policy and the shortness of the remaining period, the
court granted the motion.
 Cawasa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 150469
July 3,2002

Facts:
During the May 14,2001 elections in the Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del
Norte, Jun Rascal Cawasa and Abdulmalik Manamparan were among the candidates for
Mayor. Only thirty-six out othe the forty precints functioned due to a failure of election in
the remaining four precincts. The Municipal Board of Canvassers deferred the
proclamation of the winners due to the failure of elections in the four precincts since it
would affect election results. COMELEC promulgated Resolution no. 4360 on May 21,
2001, authorizing the conduct of special elections in the affected areas. The special
elections were conducted on May 30, 2001. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the winners using the election returns of the 36 precincts from the regular
elections and the 4 from the special elections. During the regular elections, Cawasa had
more votes against Manamparan by eighty-six votes. However, Manamparan overcame
the margin with a lead of 297 votes. Cawasa was proclaimed Mayor. Manamparan then
filed for a petition for Annulment of Election Results during the special elections and
Annulment of Canvass and Proclamation with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The COMELEC en banc later
overturned the proclamation.

Issue:
Whether or not the call for special elections was valid.

Held:
Yes. According to Sec. 4 of R.A. 7166 or the Synchronized Elections Law of
1991, the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote of all its members may decide,
among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as
provided in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The conditions for declaring a failure
of elections are: 1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous case, and 2) that the votes
not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the elections. These two
circumstances should occur for a failure of elections. In this case, the court found that
the elections were vitiated by fraud due to illegal transfer of polling places and the
appointment of military personnel as Board of Election Inspectors. The entire electoral
process was not worthy of faith and credit, hence no election was held.
 Dumarpa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 1922249
April 2, 2013

Facts:
10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in
seven (7) municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao
and Kapai, which are situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del
Sur. The conduct of special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was
originally scheduled for 29 May 2010. On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3 June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC
issued the herein assailed resolution which provided, among others, the constitution of
Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts in
Section 12. Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and
12 thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur.
A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the
instant petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12)
and constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the
Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat,
if its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court." A
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus, the
special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded as scheduled.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 8965 was valid.

Held:

Yes. COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the exercise of its plenary
powers in the conduct of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it
accepts no argument that the COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take into account that COMELEC

Resolution No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-clustering of the precincts
and the designation of special board of election inspectors, was issued precisely
because of the total failure of elections in seven Municipalities in the Province of Lanao
del Sur, a total of fifteen Municipalities where there was a failure of elections. Notably,
Dumarpa is not questioning the COMELEC’s declaration of a failure of elections. In fact,
he confines his objections on the re-clustering of precincts, and only as regards the
Municipality of Masiu.

Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in the fifteen

(15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the
assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field,
is in the best position to assess the actual condition prevailing in that area and to make
judgment calls based thereon.
 Orocio v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 75959
August 31, 1992
Facts:
An accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), when the plug from the leaking tube gave way, thereby releasing
steam and hot water which hit two of the employees working on the tube leak. The NPC
initially advanced this amount by setting it up as an account receivable from OPLGS
(employees’ agency) and deducted on a staggered basis from the latter's billings against
NPC until the same was fully satisfied. OPLGS requested for a refund of the total
amount deducted from their billings representing payment of the advances made by the
NPC. Petitioner, as officer-in-charge, recommended favorable action on OPLGS'
request. Thus, the amount for the hospitalization expenses was refunded to the
contractor OPLGS. In Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB) No. 01-04-83
prepared by respondent Jose M. Agustin, Unit Auditor of the COA assigned to the NPC-
MRRC, the refund of the hospitalization expenses was disallowed for "under the NPC-
O.P. Landrito contract, there is no employer-employee relationship between the
Corporation and the latter's employees." Hence, the NPC is not answerable for such
expenses. A Debit Memorandum was issued in petitioner's name debiting his account
with the NPC for the amount of the hospitalization expenses. Petitioner claims that he
prepared the questioned legal opinion in the performance of his official functions as
mandated by law. At the time he rendered it, he was the officer-in-charge of the NPC's
Office of the General Counsel. Section 15-A of its charter provides that all legal matters
shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation. As such, he provides legal
advice and/or renders legal opinions on legal matters involving the NPC. Since this
function is quasi-judicial in nature, the discretion exercised in the discharge thereof is not
subject to reexamination or controversion by the respondents; when the latter did what
was proscribed, they in effect usurped the statutory function of the General Counsel of
the NPC. There is no law which expressly authorizes the respondents to re-examine or
controvert the General Counsel's opinion. Petitioner additionally stresses that he is not
personally liable for the amount disallowed as he was merely performing his official
functions. Besides, his questioned opinion is not alleged to have been rendered with
malice and bad faith.

Issues:
(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the
disbursement in question, preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in postaudit such
disbursement? (2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to decide a motion
to reconsider the disallowance in question? (3) Is the petitioner personally liable for the
disallowance on the theory that the disbursement was made on the basis thereof?
Held:
1. Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more active
role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These were not meant to
make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient and independent watchdog of
the Government. In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or
instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel of
said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned
disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless
tiger and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon
lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
 Osmena v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 110045
November 29, 1994

Facts:
Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna Spouses was stabbed by an
unknown assailant. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center but later died due to
severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not
for the "ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the
medical staff" of the hospital. The Spouses thus filed suit for damages against the city of
Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Medical
Center. The parties entered into a compromise agreement, which included a provision
for the payment of the sum of P30, 000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu.
The agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City, which ratified
the same. The sanggunian authorized "the City Budget Officer, Cebu City, to include in
Supplemental Budget No. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30, 000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to the parents of the late
Reynaldo de la Cerna, all of Cebu City. Respondent COA disallowed the "financial
assistance" thus granted to the Spouses, averring that it is not within the powers of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general welfare clause or
even on humanitarian grounds, monetary assistance that would promote the economic
condition and private interests of certain individuals only.

Issue:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between the City of Cebu and
Spouses de la Cerna which involves monetary consideration constitutional?

Held:
Yes. The Compromise Agreement entered between the City of Cebu and Sps.
De la Cerna was constitutional. The participation by the City in negotiations for an
amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise
relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation;
and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate
transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law. That the City of Cebu
complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The
compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure,
particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30, 000.00 to the de la Cerna family.
Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the
power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as
the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.
 TESDA v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 204869
March 11, 2014

Facts:
Upon post audit, the TESDA audit team leader discovered that for the calendar
years 2004–2007, TESDA paid EME twice each year to its officials from two sources: (1)
the General Fund for locally–funded projects, and (2) the Technical Education and Skills
Development Project (TESDP) Fund for the foreign–assisted projects. The payment of
EME was authorized under the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of
2004, 2005,3 2006 and 2007 (2004–2007 GAAs), subject to certain conditions: he
following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, not
exceeding: not exceeding Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) for each of the offices under
the above named officials are authorized.
On 15 May 2008, the audit team issued Notice of Disallowance No. 08–002–
101 (04–06)5 disallowing the payment of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in
excess of the amount allowed in the 2004–2007 GAAs. In addition, the EME were
disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized
by the Department of. Also indicated are the persons liable for the excessive payment of
EME: the approving officers, payees and the accountants. TESDA appealed but was
denied for lack of merit by the COA cluster director. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not COA committed grave abuse for the disallowance of payment for
TESDA officers.
Held:
No. The court did not find any grave abuse of discretion when COA disallowed
the disbursement of EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by
law, specifically the 2004–2007 GAAs, The GAA provisions are clear that the EME
shall not exceed the amounts fixed in the GAA. The GAA provisions are also clear that
only the officials named in the GAA, the officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized
by the DBM, and the offices under them are entitled to claim EME not exceeding the
amount provided in the GAA. The COA faithfully implemented the GAA provisions. COA
Circular No. 2012–00117 states that the amount fixed under the GAA for the National
Government offices and officials shall be the ceiling in the disbursement of EME. COA
Circular No. 89–300,18 prescribing the guidelines in the disbursement of EME, likewise
states that the amount fixed by the GAA shall be the basis for the control in the
disbursement of these funds.
The COA merely complied with its mandate when it disallowed the EME that
were reimbursed to officers who were not entitled to the EME, or who received EME in
excess of the allowable amount. When the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
there should be no room for interpretation but only its application.
 Gonzales v. Provincial Board of Ilo-ilo
G.R. No. L-20568
December 28, 1964

Facts:
Ramon Gonzales was appointed Assistant on Complaints and Investigation, Office of the
Governor, by Governor Jose C. Zulueta of Iloilo, effective July 1, 1961, with
compensation at the rate of P250.00 a month. At the time of his appointment the
petitioner was holding the office of Municipal Councilor of Lambunao, Iloilo, and he had
not resigned from said office to accept the appointment in the Office of the Governor.

On July 31, 1961, the petitioner presented a voucher covering his salary as
Assistant on Complaints and Investigation for July 1961 in the amount of P250.00 to the
respondent Provincial Auditor of Iloilo for audit. The respondent Provincial Auditor
reasoned out that said appointment was in violation of the provisions of Sec. 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code as construes by the Secretary of Justice in his Opinion No.
121, Series of 1951. Gonzales continued to serve as such Assistant until December 31,
1961, when he resigned. Upon his resignation, the petitioner prepared a salary voucher
for P1,500.00 covering his salary for six months from July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1961
and presented to the respondent the said voucher but the respondent verbally informed
the petitioner that he (respondent) would deny audit of the voucher for the same reason
that he denied audit of the salary voucher for P250.00 covering the salary for July 1961.
The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on
August 31, 1962 against the respondent herein but was denied by the court on the
ground of no cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in not declaring that the respondent Provincial Auditor has
no authority to declare petitioner's appointment as Governor's assistant as illegal and
void;
Held: No. The Auditor General exercises a discretion or a quasi-judicial power when he
acts on whether to pass a salary voucher in audit or not. Certainly the Auditor General
has the power to look into the question of whether the person claiming salary payment is
entitled to the salary or not. The Auditor General may err. The decision of the Auditor
General is appealable to the President of the, Philippines. When the Auditor General
sustained the action of the respondent Provincial Auditor of Iloilo in refusing to pass in
audit the salary voucher of the petitioner, what he should have done, being then a
government employee, was to appeal to the President from the decision of the Auditor
General. This the petitioner did not do. Instead he filed the present action
for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The step taken by the petitioner
was not in accordance with the procedure provided by law. The petitioner had still a
recourse open to him, and that was to appeal to the President of the Philippines. And the
Constitution and the law empower the President to grant relief to him.
 Guevara v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-17115
November 30, 1962

Facts:
Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines,
acting for and in behalf thereof, asked petitioner to cooperate with the legal counsel of
the Central Bank in defending the same and its Monetary Board in a civil case.
Accordingly, petitioner entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents in said
case and argued therein, verbally and in writing. The Governor presented to the Board
and the latter approved by unanimous vote, the designation of Judge Guillermo Guevara
as counsel to collaborate with the Legal Counsel of the Central Bank. The Board also
authorized the Governor to arrange with Judge Guevera the amount of fee which the
latter will charge the Central Bank for handling the said cases. Prior thereto the latter
had sent to the Central Bank his bill for the retainer's fee of P10, 000. The Bank Auditor
sought advice thereon from the Auditor General, who stated that he would not object to
the retainer's fees, provided that its payment was made in installments. With the
understanding that, "in case there is no appeal from the CFI decision, the balance will be
paid in full", once, presumably, the decision has become final. As regards the P300 per
diem, the Auditor General express however, the belief that it is "excessive and may be
allowed in audit". Hence, the present action for mandamus to compel respondent to
approve payment of petitioner's retainer fee and his per diem aggregating P3,300, for
the 11 hearings attended by him.

Issue:
Whether or not the Auditor General has the authority to disapprove the
expenditures he deemed unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable?

Held:
The Auditor General has no mandate to disapprove expenditures which in his
opinion excessive and extravagant. Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor
General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of
expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust by the Government or the
provinces or municipalities thereof. Such function is limited to a determination of whether
there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the
proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said appropriation law; whether
the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in
pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether
payment therefore has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department
or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the
Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said
payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground
that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is
unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do so more than discharge the duty
imposed upon him by the Constitution "to bring to the attention of the proper
administrative officer expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty implies a negation of the
power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he
had authority therefore, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative
officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and,
hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary.
 Feliciano v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 147402
January 14, 2004

Facts:
COA assessed Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) auditing fees.
Petitioner Feliciano, as General Manager of LMWD, contended that the water district
could not pay the said fees on the basis of Sections 6 and 20 of P.D. No. 198 as well as
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6758. He primarily claimed that LMWD is a private corporation
not covered by COA's jurisdiction. Petitioner also asked for refund of all auditing fees
LMWD previously paid to COA. COA Chairman denied petitioner’s requests. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which COA denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether a Local Water District (“LWD”) created under PD 198, as amended, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA or a
private corporation which is outside of COA’s audit jurisdiction.

Held:
Petition lacks merit. The Constitution under Sec. 2(1), Article IX-D and existing
laws mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original
charter.
The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to
private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-
owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Under existing laws, that
general law is the Corporation Code.
Obviously, LWD’s are not private corporations because they are not created
under the Corporation Code. LWD’s are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that “all corporations organized
under this code shall file with the SEC articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no
articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no
stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all
corporations registered with the SEC. The local mayor or the provincial governor
appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. The board directors of LWDs
are not co-owners of the LWDs. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are
government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, an LWD
is a public and not a private entity, hence, subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.
 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 88435
January 15, 2002
Facts:
On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a
private auditing firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP
Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any
payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and
unnecessary.
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the
DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months earlier on March 5,
1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA's concurrence to
the contract.
During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the
DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14 despite
the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued a
Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons personally
liable for such payment:
Issue:
Whether or not public corporations under the jurisdiction of the COA employ
private auditors.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the power of the commission to define the
scope of its audit and to promulgate auditing rules and regulations and the power to
disallow unnecessary expenditures, is exclusive, but its power to examine and audit is
not exclusive.
 Sambeli v. Province of Isabela
G.R. No. 92279
June 18, 1992

Facts:
An agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela and ECS
Enterprises for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1
set of radio communication equipment. Out of the items delivered, a partial delivery was
made. The Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% ―pending receipt of
reply to the query to Price Evaluation Division of COA. A second delivery was made and
payment of 50% was allowed by the Provincial Auditor. Based on the findings of the
Price Evaluation Division of COA, there has been an overpricing. The President/GM of
ECS Enterprises made no comment on the overpricing but instead proposed a 10%
deduction on the unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor forwarded the matter to the
COA Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand of the Provincial Auditor. ECS
Enterprises appealed to COA, which denied the appeal. Hence the present petition.

Issue:
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
Provincial Auditor and the Regional Director?
Held:
No. In the exercise of its regulatory powervested upon it by the Constitution, COA
adheresto the policy that government funds and propertyshould be full protected and
conserved and thatirregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagantexpenditures or
uses of funds owned by, orpertaining to, the Government or any of itssubdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities(Article IX (D-1) Section 2(1), 1987 Constitution) .That
authority extends to the accounts of allpersons respecting funds or properties receivedor
held by them in any accountable capacity.(Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of
itsjurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscalresponsibility that rests directly with
the head andwhether or not there has been loss or wastage ofgovernment
resources.Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petitionis dismissed.
 Bustamante v. Commissioner on Audit
G.R. No. 103309
November 27, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) for the Northern Luzon Regional Center covering the provinces of Rizal up to
Batanes. As such he was issued a government vehicle. Pursuant to NPC policy as
reflected in the Board Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of
transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of government vehicle,
claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. Petitioner received
an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana
Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Regional Auditor denied. Petitioner
appealed to COA, which denied the appeal.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Did the COA grave abuse of discretion in its denial to give due course to the
petitioner’s appeal? Did the COA, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, usurp the
statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors?

Held:
No. It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the denial of the appeal is
within the power of the Commission on Audit as it is provided in the Constitution: Sec. 2.
States that the Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and functions: (1)
Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds and
property. . . . (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution). The court added, “If We will not sustain
the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to
these particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, we will be rendering inutile this
Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property”.
Wherefor, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
 De Jesus v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 149154
June 10 2013

Facts:
An auditing team from the COA Regional Office No. VIII in Candahug, Palo, Leyte,
audited the accounts of the Catbalogan Water District (CWD) in Catbalogan, Samar. The
auditing team discovered that between May to December 1997 and April to June 1998,
members of CWDs interim Board of Directors (Board) granted themselves the following
benefits: Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA), Rice Allowance,
Productivity Incentive Bonus, Anniversary Bonus, Year-End Bonus and cash gifts. These
allowances and bonuses were authorized under Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
During the audit, the COA audit team issued two notices of disallowance dated 1
October 1998 disallowing payment of the allowances and bonuses received by
petitioners, namely: Rodolfo S. De Jesus, Edelwina DG. Parungao, Hermilo S. Balucan,
Avelino C. Castillo and Danilo B. De Leon as members of the CWD Board as well as
Alice Marie C. Osorio as the Boards secretary (collectively petitioners). The audit team
disallowed the allowances and bonuses on the ground that they run counter to Section
13 of Presidential Decree No. 198 (PD 198).
Petitioners appealed to the COA Regional Office No. VIII but COA Regional Director
Dominador T. Tersol denied the appeal. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review
with the COA which in a decision dated 12 September 2000 denied the petition. The
COA also denied on 5 July 2001 petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in

Held:
Under Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly
provides: Sec. 2(1). The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters …
The Constitution and existing laws mandate the COA to audit all government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters. Indeed, the Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to determine
whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government
funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. This
independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the governments, and ultimately, the peoples’ property;
that a water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special
charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, PD 198.
 Funa v. Manila Economic Cultural Office
G.R. No. 193462
February 4, 2014

Facts:

On 23 August 2010, petitioner sent a letter18 to the COA requesting for a “copy
of the latest financial and audit report” of the MECO invoking, for that purpose, his
“constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.” The petitioner made the
request on the belief that the MECO, being under the “operational supervision” of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.19
Petitioner’s letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P.
Naranjo, the following day.
On 25 August 2010, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo issued
a memorandum20 referring the petitioner’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner
Emma M. Espina for “further disposition.” In this memorandum, however, Assistant
Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was “not among the agencies audited
by any of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.”21
On 7 September 2010, petitioner learned about the 25 August
2010 memorandum and its content
Issue:
Whether or not COA has jurisdiction over MECO
Held:
No. The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis
private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-
governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
“verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects
under section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of
the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and “consular fees”
should be audited by COA.
 Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 177131
June 7, 2011

Facts:
COA issued Resolution No. 99-0115 on August 19, 1999 with the subject
"Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was
created as a public corporation under CA No. 111, as amended by PD No. 460 and
Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. NLRC, the Supreme
Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a "government-controlled
corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that "the
BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987
Administrative Code." The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under
Section 2(1), Article IX (D).

COA General Counsel, Director Sunico wrote BSP that latter have to comply with
COA Resolution No. 99-011, among which is to conduct an annual financial audit
therein.
Upon the BSPs request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP
then filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order before the COA. This was denied by the COA in its questioned
Decision, which held that the BSP is under its audit jurisdiction. The BSP moved for
reconsideration but this was likewise denied under its questioned Resolution.
This led to the filing by the BSP of this petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order against the COA.

Issue:
Whether the BSP falls under the COAs audit jurisdiction.

Held:
The BSP is under the COAs audit jurisdiction.
The court says that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality"
under the 1987 Administrative Code.
It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled
corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within
the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution .The existence of public or
government corporate or juridical entities or chartered institutions by legislative fiat
distinct from private corporations and government owned or controlled corporation is
best exemplified by the 1987 Administrative Code cited above.
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a
whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
(10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. 
.
 Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatizations
G.R. No. 112399
July 14, 1995

Facts:
Petron is a government acquired company aimed to provide for a buffer against
the vagaries of oil prices in the international market by serving as a counterfoil against
price manipulation that may go uncheck if all oil companies were foreign-owned. It owns
the largest, most modern complex refinery in the Philippines and is also the country's
biggest combined retail and wholesale market of refined petroleum products. Following
President Corazon Aquino’s desire to raise revenue for the government and the ideal of
leaving business to private sector, the privatization of Petron was initiated. This
privatization was subsequently approved by President Fidel V. Ramos as recommended
by PNOC and the Committee on Privatization. 40 % was to be sold to a strategic
partner, 40% was to be retained by the government and the remaining 20% was to be
offered to the public. The floor bid price was finally set at $440 million. The bidding for
the 40% block share was participated by PETRONAS, ARAMCO and WESTMONT.
WESTMONT’s proposal was rejected for not having met the pre-qualification criteria of
financial capability and lack of technical and management expertise. The bid of
ARAMCO was for US$502 million while the bid of PETRONAS was for US$421 million.
ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder. Petitioner argues that there was a failed
bidding as provided for in COA circular No. 89- 296. It provides that there is a failure of
public auction when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are non-
complying or unacceptable.

Issue:
Whether or not the public bidding was tainted with haste and arbitrariness
because there was a failed bidding for having only one offeror?

Held:
No. While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below
the floor price and WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the offerors were
disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must
be disqualified. Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and that it
cannot be said that there was a competition on "an equal footing. But the COA Circular
does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they
were disqualified. The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding
procedure to be followed by government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity
and legality of the questioned bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules
should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely
tasked to administer.
 Nacion v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 204757
March 17, 2015

Facts:
From October 16, 2001 to September 15, 2003, Nacion was assigned by the
COA to the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS) as State Auditor V. On
June 27, 2011, when Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA,
National Government Sector, a formal chargeagainst her was issued by COA
Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan (Chairperson Tan) for acts found to be committed
when she was still with the MWSS. The pertinent portions of the charge Receiving
benefits and/or bonuses from MWSS in the total amount of P73,542.00 from 1999-
2003[;] Availing of the MWSS Housing Availing of the Multi-Purpose Loan Program –
Car Loan. Nacion admitted availing the housing project and loan program. Nacion,
however, denied having received bonuses and benefits from MWSS. She argued that
the MWSS claims control index and journal vouchers upon which the charge was based
were not conclusive proof of her receipt of the benefits, absent payrolls showing her
signature. In any case, as a sign of good faith, Nacion offered to, first, restitute the full
amount of P73,542.00 to save government time and expenses in hearing the case and
put to rest the issues that arose from it, and second, give up her right over the MWSS lot
provided she would get back her investment on the property. On June 14, 2012, the
COA rendered its Decision finding Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and violation of
reasonable rules and regulations. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion
guilty of grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

Held:

No. Section 18, R.A. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989), prohibits officials and employees of COA from receiving salaries, honoraria,
bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, except
compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations. This prohibition is
mandatory, given their mandate to look after compliance with laws and standards in the
handling of funds by the government agencies where they are assigned.
 Accountability of Public Officers
Impeachment
Corona v. Senate G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul A.M. No. 88-4- April 15, 1988
M. Gonzales 5344
Francisco v. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives G.R. No. 193459 February 11, 2011
Committee on Justice
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. November 10, 2015
217126-27

Sandiganbayan
Macalino v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. February 6, 2002
140199-200
Lacson v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
Binay v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. October 1, 1999
120281-83
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103

Ombudsman
Gonzales v. Office of the President G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
Gonzales v. Office of the President G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014
Camanag v. Guerrero G.R. No. 121017 February 17, 2997
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan 146 SCRA 137
Leyson v. Ombudsman G.R. No. 134990 April 29, 2000
Khan v. Office of the Ombudsman G.R. No. 148944 July 20, 2006
Orap v. Sandiganbayan 139 SCRA 352
Inting v. Tanodbayan 97 SCRA 494
Garcia v. Miro G.R. No. 148944 February 5, 2005
Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 219 SCRA 675
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman 248 SCRA 566
Vasquez v. Alino 271 SCRA 67
Lastimosa v. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497
Fabian v. Desierto G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
Coronel v. Desierto G.R. No. 149022 April 8, 2003
Uy v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. March 20, 2001
105965-70
Laurel v. Desierto G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002
Honasan v. Panel of Investigating G.R. No. 159747 April 13. 2004
Prosecutors
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148030 March 10, 2003
People v. Velez G.R. No. 138093 February 13, 2003
Marquez v. Desierto G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of G.R. No. 168079 June 16, 2006
 Appeals
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of G.R. No. 168075 July 17, 2007
Appeals
Office of the Ombudsman v. Madriaga G.R. No. 164316 September 27, 2006
Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio G.R. No. 165132 March 7, 2012
Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo G.R. No. 173777 February 25, 2015
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013

The Special Prosecutor

Zaldivar v. Gonzales 160 SCRA 843
Perez v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 166062 September 26, 2006

Ill-gotten Wealth
Presidential Ad-hoc Fact Finding G.R. No. 130140 October 25, 1999
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
Disini v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 180564 June 22, 2010
 Corona v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 200242
July 17, 2012

Facts:
Former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assails the impeachment
case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and
trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines. arguing that the
Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by
respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for
lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the
complaint which, aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple charges, do not
constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion
and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of
the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence
under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was
nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the
presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which
violates petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II does not mention “graft and
corruption” or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is
clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that “graft and corruption” is a separate
and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution” and “betrayal of public
trust”; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank
accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal
act (“fruit of the poisonous tree”) considering that those documents submitted by the
prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A.
No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act)which is also penalized under Sec. 10
thereof.Respondent averred that impeachment case is not a justiciable topic hence,
must be left on the discretion of the impeachment body.

Issue:
Whether or not the Judiciary has jurisdiction over grave abuse of discretion
Impeachment cases.

Held:
Yes. Given the concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning
of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts ofany branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are
proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness. In the first
impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,Inc.we ruled that the power of judicial
review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee onJustice,the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous
referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was
allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one year bar provision.”
However, the case became moot and academic since a judgment had already been
rendered against Corona and that Corona acceded to the decision.
 In Re: Raul M. Gonzales
A.M. No. 88-4-5433
April 15, 1988

Facts:
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-
complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the
SC .The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for
disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him
(Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the percuriam Resolution of the SC,
dismissing the charges made by Cuencoagainst Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that
resolution, Cuencowas asked to show cause why he should not be held administratively
liable for making serious accusations against Fernan.

Issue:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of
office

Held:
No. Justices of Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment. The
above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow
such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally
while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office,
would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The court,however, does not posit that the members and other constitutional
officers are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that
there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such
liability may be determined. A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via
the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either
criminally or administratively, for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.
 Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003

Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and DidagenPiangDilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted
to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year
bar provided in the Constitution

Held:
Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
G.R. No. 193459
February 15, 2011
Facts:

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as
the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. The
Secretary General of the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment
complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business. Another group known as the Reyes group
filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement
by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.The Secretary General
transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who also directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.After hearing, public
respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on
July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010,
no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the simultaneous impeachment complaints violate the one-year
bar rule.

Held:
No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and
take initial action on it:“Filing and referral.” It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. This means that
a number of initiative cases may be filed however, only that referred to the proper
committee will proceed the hearing. What is important is that there should only be one
candle that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent
matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
 Macalino v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 140199-140200
February 6, 2002

Facts:

On September 16, 1992, two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner,being then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the
Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation, and his wife,
Liwayway S. Tan, charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents
and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. Upon arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.

However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner
moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter.

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying

petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer within the

coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.

Ruling:

Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the
general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan.
 Lacson v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 128096
20 January 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven
persons, believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was
one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what happened was a rub-
out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.)
8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and is plan
from the facts and was made to suit the petitioner’s case, thus, making it an ex-post
facto law that would affect the right of the accused to procedural due process. Hence,
the issue.

Issue:
Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto law
that may affect the petitioner’s right to due process?

Held:
No. There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 – an ex post facto law generally
provides for a retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is
not a penal law. As the Court defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or those that defines crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment’. Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex post facto
law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive
effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
 Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan
235 SCRA 103

Facts:
Antonio M. Bolastig is the governor of the province of Samar. Information was
filed against him and two others. Pedro Ason, the provincial treasurer and Prudencio
Macabenta, the property officer of the province for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of
onioin skin paper in violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Sandiganbayan acting upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor suspended the
Petitioner for 90 days with the strength of the provision of sec. 13 of the anti graft and
corrupt practices act which provides for the preventive suspension of public officers if
they are under criminal prosecution under valid information under the same act or under
title 7, book II of the RPC, or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property as basis. However, herin petitioner contends that his suspension was a
mindless and meaningless exercise and it was imposed without regard to the spirit and
intent of the law in which it is based. He further contends that his suspension may
deprive his contituents of the services an elected official elected by them.
Sandiganbayan rejected the motion of the accused hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending herein petitioner as
Governor with the strength of Sec. 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held:
Yes, it is now settled that sec. 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the SB to
suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of the
law, book II, title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property is filed. The fact that an elected official’s preventive suspension may
deprive his constituents of the official elected by them is not a suffiecient basis for
reducing what is otherwise a mandatory suspension provided by law.
 Gonzales v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231

Facts:
The Office of the President, directed the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of
the incident regarding the Manila Hostage Crisis creating an Incident Investigation and
Review Committee and reported the petitioner and the Ombudsman accountable for
their gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza.

The Office of the President (OP) found Gonzales guilty as charged and
dismissed him from service stating that the inordinante and unjustified delay in the
resolution of Medoza’s Motion for Reconsideration that spanned for nine months
amounted to gross neglect of duty and constituted a flagran disregard of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s own Rules of Procedure.

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary

jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy
Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from
GIPO Garcia on April 27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft,
approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since
the draft order on Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels
of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be
unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars days
from his receipt of the order

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President has administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.

Held:
The Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as
petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a
Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The decision of the OP is Reversed and set aside. Petitioner Gonzalez is ordered
reinstated.
 Gonzales v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231

Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2)
of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling
that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.

Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the
disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to
subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the
proceedings against her after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President has administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.

Held:
The Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling
renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an
administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and
regulations.
 Camanag v. Guerrero
G.R. No. 121017
17 February 1997

Facts:
This case asks for and includes: (1) a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule
64 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the declaration of nullity of Sections 15
and 17 of the Ombudsman Act (R.A. No. 6770), insofar as it empowers the Ombudsman
to conduct preliminary investigations and to directly undertake criminal prosecutions; (2)
a Petition for Certiorari to declare as null and void, for allegedly having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion, the Resolution dated June 21, 1995 rendered in I.S. No.
95-D-12930 by respondent Assistant City Prosecutor Nestor D. Gonzales and approved
by respondent City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero; (3) a Petition for Mandamus to
compel respondents City Prosecutor and Assistant City Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the complaint for Falsification of Public Documents filed
against petitioner; and (4) a Petition for Prohibition to enjoin respondent judge of the City
of Manila from further proceeding with the cases stemming from the information charging
petitioner with three (3) counts of falsification lodged with the trial court and to order the
dismissal thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the information filed before the court without the benefit of a
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent city prosecutor are characterize by
each fatal defects as to warrant a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondent judge from
taking any further action?

Held:
An injunction will not generally lie to restrain action, except in the exceptions
mentioned in the case of Brocka vs Enrile.
Petitioner has not shown that her case falls within any of the recognized exceptions.
Perforce, her prayer for injunction to restrain the criminal actions against her must be
denied.
 Quimpo v. Tanodbayan
146, SCRA 137

Facts:
Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan charging Dimaano and Remo,
manager and analyst of Petrophil, with violation of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay
Quimpo’s fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground
that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. Organized under a special law,
Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the
government to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for
certiorari, questiong the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed judgement

Issue:
Whether or not Petrophil is a government owned or controlled corporation whose
employees fall within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held:
Yes. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that Petrophil was not
originally “created” as a GOCC, Petrophil became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed
off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as in fact it was
acquired to perform functions related to governmental programs and policies on oil. It
was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential
government related functions.
 Leyson v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 134990
29 April 2000

Facts:
Oscar A. Toralba, the new president of the CIIF companies, committed a breach
in his contract with Petitioner Manuel Leyson Jr. Petitioner charged Toralba et.al with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. Petitioner
also filed a collection case before the RTC against D.

Issue:
Whether UCPB-CIIF is a government owned and or controlled corporation
therefore under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Held:
No. "Government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2,
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The
definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. With the
foregoing conclusion, the Supreme Court find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues
raised by petitioner.
 Khan v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 125296
20 July 2006

Facts:
Petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners assailing the orders of the
Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman, respectively. They claim
that public respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the investigation of the case against them althouth they were officers of
a private corporation and not “public officers”

Issue:
Whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman
have jurisdiction over petitioners for violation of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act)

Held:
No. The Ombudsman’s jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and
these do not include PAL, a private entity created under the general corporation law and
the case at bar RA 3019 only concerns public officers
 Orap v. Sandiganbayan
139 SCRA 352

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. It is the
petitioner’s position that the Tanodbayan has no power to conduct preliminary
investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their
appurtenant judicial staff. He contended that under the Section 9(a) of the Tanodbayan
Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant judicial staff, among others, are
beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan, and that only administrative acts of agencies of
the government, whether or not criminal in character, are within the powers of said
official.

Issue:
Has the Tanodbayan the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a
complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the
corresponding information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same?

Held:
Yes. Petitioner’s argument overlooks the fact that under the decree, the
Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well.

If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the
investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be
brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of
proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints
of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended,
considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to “give effect to
the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances
and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service.”
 Inting v. Tanodbayan
97 SCRA 494

Facts:
Inting filed complaints for perjury at the City Fiscal of Davao’s office, against
Angelina S. Salcedo (in latter’s personal data sheets, she indicated that she completed
the 1- year Secretarial Science course at USC in Cebu although she never enrolled in,
and neither did she complete the course) Salcedo is an appurtenant of the judicial staff
of the City Court of Davao.City Fiscal of Davao thru Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte
conducted preliminary investigation. The is found prima facie case for perjury and filed 3
separate counts of perjury under article 183 of RPC. Salcedo interposed appeal to the
ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice forwarded records to Tanodbayan, pursuant
to Section 10 (f) of the PD No. 1630, which vests on the latter the power to file and
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office.Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta reversed decision of City Fiscal. He Directed city fiscal
to move for dismissal of the 3 criminal cases for perjury against Salcedo.

Issue:
Whether or not Tanodbayan has jurisdiction and authority to review and nullify
the resolutions of the City of Davao.

Held:
Yes. Tanodbayan has authority to file and prosecute Salcedo’s case even if it
does not involve graft and corrupt offices because it falls under such other offenses
covered by section 10 (f) of PD 1630. Act of perjury was in relation to Salcedo’s office.
Section 18 of PD 1630 gives Tanodbayan authority to conduct investigations and file
case for such occurrence.
 Garcia v. Miro
G.R. No. 148944

Facts:
City Mayor Garcia was charged by Ombudsman Special Prosecution Officer
Jesus Rodrigo Tagaan for violation of the Anti-Graft Law as a result of his having
entered into a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt batching plant for three
years. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada alleged that petitioner
entered into the contract without available funds appropriated to cover the expenditure in
violation of Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Phil.; that
petitioner exceeded the authority granted him by the Sangguniang Panlungsod; and that
the contract is manifestly disadvantageous to the City. Note however that thereafter,
Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan resigned from his office and his name was
withdrawn as complainant in the case. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, Garcia filed
with the Supreme Court a petition to prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting the
preliminary investigation on the ground that there is no sufficient complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed against Garcia is sufficient in form or
manner.

Held:
For purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a complaint in any form or manner is sufficient. The Constitution states
that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government. In Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, we held that even unverified and
anonymous letters may suffice to start an investigation. The Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure
and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations against them. The joint
affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada contain allegations specific enough for
petitioner to prepare his evidence and counter-arguments.
 Diaz v. Sandiganbayan
219 SCRA 675

Facts:
Milagros L. Diaz, erstwhile postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds defined by
Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, in a decision rendered by the
Sandiganbayan on 15 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 11295. n her petition for review
before this Court, Milagros Diaz assails her conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
continues to profess her innocence.

The case against petitioner sprung from the implementation of Office Order No.
83-15, dated 03 March 1983, issued by Provincial Auditor Diosdado Lagunday, Surigao
del Sur, that directed Auditor II Dominico L. Quijada and Auditing Examiners I Victor B.
Tecson and Zenaida C. Cueto to examine the cash and other accounts of petitioner
Milagros L. Diaz, then postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur. The following day of 04
March 1983, Quijada required petitioner Diaz to produce all cash, treasury warrants,
checks, money orders, paid vouchers, payrolls and other cash items that she was
officially accountable for. Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was found to
have made cash payments in the total amount of six thousand one hundred seventy-one
pesos and twenty three centavos (P6,171.23).

Issue:
Whether or not Diaz should be acquitted of the crime of malversation of public
funds.

Held:
The decision of the Sandiganbayan appealed from is set aside, and petitioner
Milagros Diaz acquitted of the crime of malversation of public funds for insufficiency of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
are conclusive upon this Court but there are established exceptions to that rule, such as,
sans preclusion, when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a
mistake; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of
evidence are contradicted by evidence on record.In these instances, this Court is bound
to review the facts in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The case at bar, as may be
gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, is one such instance.
 Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman
248 SCRA 566

Facts:
Government agencies, NCR Command, Traffic Management Command (PACC),
Presidential Central Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation
Command (CIC) were accused of summary killing 11 members of the “Kuratong
Baleleng” gang by S/PO de los Reyes of Central Intelligence Commission. He stated
that there was no “shootout” but a “summary killing instead”.

The complaint went up to the Office of the Ombudsman of the Military. The Ombudsman
addressed the PNP concerned to submit an “After Operations Report” to the Panel of
Investigators, also created by the Ombudsman. The panel recommended for a
preliminary investigation on a list of officers presented by the PNP. In effect, the
Ombudsman ordered the officers listed to submit their counter affidavit.

Issue:
Petitioners questioned the conduct, stating that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to take preliminary investigations but the Tanodbayan has and that they pre-
empted the Court on ruling on the issue whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
the case in the first place.

Held:
The Ombudsman has jurisdiction as stated in SEC. 31 of RA 6770. It states that
the word “cases” includes “non-military cases” and the Ombudsman has jurisdiction on
Preliminary Investigation as stated in A.O no.7 Sec 2 thus there is no abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman.
 Vasquez v. Alino
271 SCRA 67

Facts:
Seeking justice for the killing of her husband Dionesio Odelmo and her father-in-law
Jose Odelmo on 31 December 1992, Corazon Odelmo appeared before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on 12 February 1993 and filed a complaint for murder
against respondents.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) found that two (2) separate crimes of murder were
committed but the commission thereof was not in relation to the performance of the duties of
private respondents. In view thereof it recommended on 14 December 1993 the filing of two (2)
separate Informations before the Regional Trial Court of Bago City and correspond
warrants/orders of arrest issued.

The private respondents filed a motion to recall warrants/orders on the ground that they had not
yet received copy of the complaint. They posited that the Ombudsman had no authority to file
the informations in view of its own finding that the crime was not committed by the accused in
relation to their office and filed a motion to quash the informations on lack of authority.
Respondent Judge ordered the execution of the warrants/orders of arrest to be held in
abeyance and also granted the motion to quash the informations.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman can investigate criminal offenses committed by public
officers which have no relation to their office

Held:
Yes. Any [illegal] act or omission of any public official' is broad enough to embrace any
crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or
omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance
of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
 Lastimosa V. Vasquez
243 SCRA 497

Facts:
Petitioner Lastimosa has urged the wisdom of this court to decide on the validity of the of
the preventive suspension order issued by the Honorable Ombudsman and his Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas against her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for allegedly failing to
act on the Ombudsman order to file “ Attempted rape charges” against the Mayor of Santa Fe
Rogelio Ilustrisimo in Cebu based on complaint filed by Jessica Villacarlos-Dayon, a public
health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral
acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct. The complaint was assigned to a graft
investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the
Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed
that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court.

The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Gloria G. Lastimosa. However, the petitioner refused the order of the Ombudsman to file
attempted rape because based on her preliminary investigation it is only an act of
lasciviousness that the Mayor of Santa Fe will be charged accordingly. The Ombudsman by the
continuous acts of defiant by the petitioner issued preventive suspension order for grave
misconduct and to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and
failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to ask assistance or to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo.

Held:
The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty; it is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official.
 Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742
16 September 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business.
Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects,
and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner
into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private
respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private
respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against private
respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of
suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate and
close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner
appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is valid

Held:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals
may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies are now

Coronel V. Desierto
 Uy v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 105965-10970
20 March 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification
of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing
that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman
and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that:

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

Held:
No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad
enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by
public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
 Laurel V. Desierto
G.R. No. 145368
12 April 2002

Facts
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a
Committee which was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the said Committee and renamed it as the "National
Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents
Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.

Vice President Laurel by virtue of his chairmanship also became the chairman of
EXPOCORP, a corporation organized to undertake the Freedom Ring Project in relation to the
centennial celebration. Later in 1999, investigation was conducted by an independent
committed due to allegations of graft and corruption against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP
chair. The committee recommended the filing of charges by the Ombudsman upon which the
Office of the Ombudsman took cognizance of the case. Laurel then questioned the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman by filing this petition, saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a private corporation,
(2) that NCC is not a public office and (3) that he is not a public officer as defined in the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue:
Whether or not the contentions of Vice President Laurel are correct.

Held:
No. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. However, is
NCC a public office? Yes, it is because it exercises executive functions by implementing the
policies set forth in the Constitution regarding history and cultural heritage, thus satisfying an
important element of public office: the delegation of sovereign functions. It also follows that
Laurel is a public officer. That he did not receive compensation is of no consequence. A salary
is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office.
 Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors.
G.R. No. 159747
13 April 2004

Facts:
Senator Gringo Honasa was charged with the crime of coup d’état before DOJ. , Capt.
Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public
statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of
command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroy and they are
willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan,
which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. Subpoena was issued
for preliminary investigation.

Petitioner filed a Motion of Clarification questioning DOJ’s jurisdiction over the case,
asserting that since the imptuted acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the
Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding
preliminary investigationl that should the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, no the
regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the
group of public officials with Salary Grade 31.

He is directed to file a counter-affidavit, but instead Senator Honasan filed the herein
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its
members attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the afore
quoted Order on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the charge
of coup d’etat against Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II

Held:
The Court finds the petition without merit. The jurisdiction of DOJ is derived from the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter 1, Tittle III, Book IV, governing the
DOJ. Sec. 1. As a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution
arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereog
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system; and investigate the commissions of crimes, prosecute offenders and
administer the probation and correction system.
 Olairez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148030
10 March 2003

Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution, dated 30 April 2001,
of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) which has denied the motion for
reinvestigation/reconsideration filed by herein petitioner Executive Labor Arbiter Ricardo N.
Olairez.

It would be useful to trace the origin of the case. Alicia Abad Tenoria instituted an action
for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Combate
Clinic, St. Peter Thelmo Drug, Mercury Drug Aparri Branch, Dr. Valeriano Combate and Mrs.
Hedy Combate, hereinafter collectively referred to as Mercury Drug, et al. The case, docketed
NLRC Case No. RAB II CN-11-00300-92, was initially assigned to Executive Labor Arbiter
Adrian Pagalilawan. When Pagalilawan was appointed to the position of a Regional Trial Court
judge, the case was assigned to Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez. In a decision, dated 10 August
1994, Olairez dismissed Tenorias complaint for lack of merit. Tenoria appealed to the NLRC
which, in a decision promulgated on 25 May 1995, vacated the order of dismissal and entered
another judgment.

Issue:
Can the Court be compelled to review the exercise of discernment in prosecuting or
dismissing a case before the Ombudsman?

Held:
The petition is given due course. It might be noted that the pre-execution hearing was
necessary because, in its 25th May 1995 decision, the NLRC remanded the money claims of
the complainant to the Executive Labor Arbiter for appropriate proceedings. Finally, on 07
March 2000, a day after Tenorias complaint before the Ombudsman and prior to the receipt by
Olairez of an order directing him to file his counter-affidavit,[16] as well as long before the filing
of the assailed Information before the Sandiganbayan, Olairez had already issued an order
directing Mercury Drug, et al., to pay Tenoria the amount of P310,000.00 representing her full
back salaries and separation pay. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner was
charged, would require that the public officer should have caused undue injury to any party, or
should have given any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
 People v. Velez
G.R. No. 138093
19 February 2003

Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) grating the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Resolution of the SB denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner
Ignacio J. Salmingo of said resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not Salmingo is the proper party to file the present petition

Held:

The Court notes that Salmingo was not a party in the main case. While it is true that he
initiated the criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for
various offenses, however, under the Information filed with the SB, the parties are the People of
the Philippines as plaintiff and the respondents as the accused. The private complainant is the
City of Silay while Salmingo is merely a witness for the plaintiff.

The SB did not violate Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it treated the Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation of respondents as a motion for reconsideration under Section
27 of Republic Act 6770 which reads:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing:
Provided, that only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
 Marquez v. Desierto
G.R. No 135882
27 June 2001

Facts:
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at
Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against
Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint
Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. Petitioner wanted to be
clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law,
particularly RA. No. 1405.

Issue:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

Held:
No. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be
present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 160675
2006 June 16

Facts:
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code
against herein Edmondo Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos
Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Miñoza, Nelson Obeso, Senen Seriño, Ernesto Naraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City.
It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the
Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and despite the big "NO
TRESPASSING" sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.
Except for Arregadas, who executed his own affidavit, Armilla, et al. executed a joint counter-affidavit
decrying the charge against them as malicious, unfounded and untrue.
By way of refutation, they alleged that they entered the Corominas landholding pursuant to the Order dated
September 14, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9 thereof, in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-17639 (entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Larrazabal, et al.), involving a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of title. They maintained that they were merely acting in the performance of their official functions and
complying with a court order. Moreover, they could not defy the said court order and the travel orders, lest they be
punished for contempt of court or subjected to disciplinary action.Office of the Ombudsman, dismissed the criminal
complaint in OMBVIS-CRIM-99-1227 for lack of probable cause. The said resolution was recommended for approval
by Virginia Palanca-Santiago, GIO III, and approved by the Primo C. Miro, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
However, in the administrative case (OMB-VIS-ADM-99-1044), the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the Decision
8 dated October 24, 2001, finding that, except for Arregadas, the other named DENR employees are guilty of simple
misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of suspension for one month.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by Armilla, et al. but the same was denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman.Armilla, et al. thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Office of the Ombudsman in finding them guilty of simple misconduct and imposing on them the penalty of one-
month suspension.In its Decision dated October 30, 2003, the appellate court granted the petition of Armilla, et al. It
affirmed the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman that Armilla, et al. were guilty of simple misconduct. However, it
ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. Citing the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, the appellate court declared that
the Office of the Ombudsman's power is limited only to the recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. Accordingly, it has no
power to impose the penalty of suspension on Armilla, et al.Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman forthwith sought
recourse to this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault.

Held:
In declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement made by the Court in Tapiador, thus: . . . Besides,
assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss
the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph 3, of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the
public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. Reliance by the appellate court on the
foregoing statement is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the foregoing statement is mere obiter
dictum. In fact, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 25 the Court categorically pronounced that the statement in Tapiador
on the Ombudsman's power "is, at best, merely an obiter dictum". The Court upholds the Office of the Ombudsman's
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 168079
2007 July 17
Facts:
Respondent Ma. Melly Jaud Magbanue was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City
Treasurer's Office in Bacolod City. On 27 February 1998, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
examination of respondent's cash and account. The examination disclosed a shortage of P265,450. Upon
demand, Magbanua failed to produce the missing amount. Respondent alleged that the shortage was due
to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash Clerk I Monina Baja (Baja). Respondent alleged that
Baja, acting as Paymaster, received payroll funds for distribution to specific offices. In her liquidation
report, Baja reflected twice the missing amount of P265,450 representing cash advances for 26
September 1997 under Voucher No. 6205 to four persons.Baja was impleaded in the case before the
Ombudsman Visayas. Baja denied that respondent designated her as Paymaster. She also denied that
she received the payroll funds. Baja alleged that her assigned task was only to take charge of the listing
of payrolls and vouchers to be included in the respective cash advances of the disbursing
officers.Respondent and Baja failed to appear during the preliminary conference conducted on 26 July
1999. Despite their non-appearance, they were given time to submit their respective Memoranda or
Position Papers before the case was considered submitted for decision. In a Decision dated 3 May 2000,
the Ombudsman Visayas found respondent guilty of Neglect of Duty, and Baja guilty of Dishonesty.
The Office of the Ombudsman reviewed the Decision of the Ombudsman Visayas. In a
Memorandum dated 6 June 2000, Petitioner Office of the Ombudsman imposed upon both respondent
and Baja the penalty of dismissal from the service. Magbanua filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not commit any reversible error in finding
respondent guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent was an
accountable officer. Petitioner Office of the Ombudsman challenges before this Court the ruling of the
Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees

Held:
Yes. The powers of the Ombudsman are found in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states
in part that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other powers or performs such functions or duties as
may be provided by law." While Section 15 (3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to
"recommend . . . removal, suspension, demotion . . ." of government officials and employees, the same
Section 15 (3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA 6770. The word "or" in Section 15 (3) before the phrase "enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" grants the Ombudsman this alternative power. Section 21
of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman "disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government," except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and the Judiciary. And under Section
25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings the "penalty ranging from
suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a ne ranging from five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the
discretion of the Ombudsman . . .." Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to impose
directly administrative penalty on public officials or employees. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that petitioner has no power to impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or
employees. The Petition is GRANTED.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Madriaga
G.R. No. 164316
September 27, 2006

Facts:
The Court of Appeals having declared, by Decision of May 28, 2004, that the six-month
suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to respondent Gertrudes Madriaga
(Gertrudes), school principal of San Juan Elementary School, San Juan, Metro Manila, and her
co-respondent Ana Marie Bernardo (Ana Marie), a classroom teacher who was designated as
Canteen Manager of the same school, is merely recommendatory to the Department of
Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. In a
letter-complaint filed before the OMB, the San Juan School Club (Club) through its President
Teresa Nuque, charged respondents with a violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of
Rule VI of the IRR of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). Respondents were found guilty by Graft Investigation officer Helen Acuña for
violation of Section 5a and imposed upon them the penalty of Reprimand. Thereafter, they were
meted with 6 month suspension, setting aside Acuña’s decision. Respondents elevated the
case to the CA via petition for certiorari. CA said that the penalty of the OMB was merely
recommendatory to the DepEd, having only the power to investigate possible misconduct of a
government official or employee in the performance of his functions, and thereafter recommend
to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out; and that it is the disciplining
authority that has the power or prerogative to impose such penalty.

Issue:
Whether or not the penalty was merely recommendatory

Held:
No. Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitutiongrants petitioner administrative
disciplinary power to (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, [and] xxx xxx xxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to
take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner of the power
to "recommend" the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure
compliance therewith. The proper interpretation of the Court's statement should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the
questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to
comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a
ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is
not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio
G.R. No. 165132
March 7, 2012
Facts:
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Ofcer of the National Book Development Board (NBDB)
from 1996 to August 26, 2002. NBDB's Governing Board approved the conduct of a Team Building
Seminar Workshop for its officers and employees. On March 29, 1995, the Department of Budget and
Management issued National Budget Circular No. 442 66 prescribing a P900.00 limit for each participant
per day in any seminar/workshop/conference undertaken by any government agency. In compliance with
the circular, the NBDB disbursed the amount of P108,000.00 to cover the P1,800.00 allowance of the 60
employees for the two-day event. Prior to the conduct of the workshop, some of the
employees/participants approached Dr. Apolonio to ask whether a part of their allowance, instead of
spending the entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as cash. Concluding the proposal to
be legally sound and in the spirit of the yuletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. Thus, after
the end of the workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their
approved allowance. Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, led a complaint against Dr. Apolonio and Mr.
Montealto before the Ombudsman alleging that petitioner committed grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase and disbursement of
the gift cheques. Also that the disbursement of the furnds for the purchase of the gift cheques were not
authoirized and unstated in Dr. Apolonio’s liquidation report.Petitioner invoked good faith and that the
purchase was made in the best welfare of te employees who requested the use of part of the budget for
distribution.Graft Investigation Ofcer Plaridel Oscar J. Bohol found Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto
administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but exonerated them from
the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. GIO Bohol recommended the imposition of suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.The decision was not acted favorably by Acting
Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio stating that they should be dismissed from the service. GIO Calderon
found that Dr. Apolonio illegally converted the use of her cash advance, which was solely intended for the
workshop, for the purchase of the gift cheques. In doing so, she "abused her authority as the Executive
Director of NBDB [and] disregarded the authority of the Board. Acting Ombudsman approved the findings
and imposed the penalty of removal. Petitioner contends that Ombudsman does not possess the power to
directly impose the penalty of removal against a public official and that Dr. Apolonio undeniably realigned
a portion of the budget allotted for the workshop for the purchase of the gift cheques.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may directly impose the penalty of removal from office against
public officials

Held:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
ne, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman's power to impose these penalties, on the
allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this
Court. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but
also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers and employees in
every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
The framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman,
independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that are not merely
persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the Ombudsman
with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo
G.R. No. 173277
25 February 2015

Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from the administrative complaint lodged by Gilda D.
Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar, against private
respondent Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo,Provincial Engineer of Samar, with the Office of the
Ombudsman- Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual Harassment and Oppression. On July
19, 1996, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the Motor Pool Division of the Provincial
Engineering Department, Catbalogan, Samar, Quimbo asked her to massage his forehead and
nape. In the course thereof, he said, "You had been lying to me you have already seen my
manhood. When shall I have to see yours?" After that, on August 6, 1996, Quimbo ordered her
detail to the Civil Service Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male
utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial
Engineering Office from August 16-31, 1996 because of her refusal to submit to his sexual
advances.Quimbo denied the allegations. On March 26, 1996, Daradal filed a motion for
withdrawal of the complaint. The motion, however, was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas.
After due proceedings, the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution dismissing the case of
sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of oppression. The Ombudsman-
Visayas imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay. Quimbo filed motion
for reconsideration. It was denied. Quimbo elevated to CA. CA reversed decision of
Ombudsman stating that: The Office of the Ombudsman has no power to directly impose
sanctions against government officials and employees who are subject of its investigation as its
power is only limited to recommend the appropriate sanctions but not directly to impose the
same.Ombudsman filed an omnibus motion for intervention and reconsideration of the CA
decision. CA denied the motion. Ombudsman instituted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties
against erring public officials or employees

Held:
Yes. Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties against public
officials or employees. In Ombudsman v Apolonio, the Ombudsman has the power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the
Ombudsman's power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only
grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on
complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government
officers and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service
by the Government to the people. The current Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 6770, is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft
and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.
 Coscollela v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191411
July 15, 2013

Facts:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3) full terms
which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division
Head, Amugod as Nacionales' subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. The Office of the
Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint from People's
Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural
equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month
before Coscolluela stepped down from office. Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of
the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation
Report which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners
filed their respective counter-affidavits.Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a
Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section
3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and
recommended the ling of the corresponding information. Coscolluela led a Motion to Quash, arguing,
among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal
charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.
Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela's motion. SB denied petitioners' Motion to
Quash for lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioners led their respective Motions for Reconsideration however
was once again denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners' right to speedy
disposition of cases was not violated

Held:
Yes. It is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time
to complete. In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB's position that the conduct of
preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when Cañares prepared
the Resolution recommending the ling of the Information. This is belied by Section 4, Rule II of the
Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the "Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman.The provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case
under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer's recommendation
to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the
preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares'
preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally
approved the same for ling with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21,
2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint. The above-discussed delay in the
Ombudsman's resolution of the case largely remains unjustified. To this end, the Court equally denies the
SB's ratiocination that the delay in proceedings could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo
careful review and revision through the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally
approved, in addition to the steady stream of cases which it had to resolve. Precisely, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to
resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by
the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring
any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or
any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity — any of which have not been
adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar — there appears to be no justifiable basis as to
why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation
proceedings against the petitioners.
 Zaldivar v. Gonzales
160 SCRA 843

Facts:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule
65.Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution
and hearing of Criminal Cases on the ground that said cases were filed by said
Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority.In the present Constitution, it is
only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority
to file cases with the Sandiganbayan.He also asked that the Tanodbayan be restrained
from conducting preliminary investigations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the power to file cases in the Sandiganbayan

Held:
No. The Tanodbayan is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman in the present constitution. The special prosecutor is a subordinate of the
ombudsman.Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section
10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it
in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the
Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although
concededly some of the powers of the two offices are identical or similar. The tanodbayan
(special prosecutor) was never the ombudsman.
 Perez v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 166062
September 26, 2001

Facts:
On April 24, 2001, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon resolved to file
charges of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against San Miguel, Pangasinan Mayor
Salvador Perez and Municipal Treasurer Juanita Apostol. It was alleged in the information that
the accused committed the crime charged in relation to and taking advantage of their official
functions, and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Perez and Apostol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for leave of court to file a motion for
reconsideration alleging the discovery of the new evidence which was at first denied by the
former, but was later on granted. The Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation, and a Memorandum was prepared recommending the withdrawal of the
Information. Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio, however, recommends that further fact-
finding be conducted, and an administrative case be filed against accused after withdrawing the
Information. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo crossed out both actions: approved/disapproved,
and ordered that the resolution of the case is deferred to the OSP. Assistant Special Prosecutor
Warlito Galisanao issued a Supplemental Memorandum which provides for the recommendation
of the Hon. Tanodbayan, Simeon Marcelo to amend the information instead of withdrawing the
same. The Supplemental Memorandum was granted and Assistant Special Prosecutor
Galisanao filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Information which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan. Perez filed for a motion for reconsideration against the granting of the
Amended Information but was denied. Perez contends that the amended information and the
admission of such is premature since the Ombudsman has not yet acted with the finality on the
Memorandum.

Issue:
Whether or not the Special Prosecutor can rightly file the Amended Information without
the order of the Ombudsman

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s
authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only
conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.Section 4 of RA 6770 provides for
that The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon the
authority of the Ombudsman, have among others, the powers to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Respondents invoke the Doctrine of qualified political agency, wherein the acts of a subordinate
bears the implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by the latter. By arguing
that “what is important is that the amended Information has not been withdrawn, and or recalled
by the Honorable Ombudsman, a clear showing that the latter acknowledged/upheld the act of
the Special Prosecutor in signing the Amended Information.” The Court maintained that the
quantity of work in the hands of the Office of the Ombudsman does not measure up to the
workload of the President as to necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the
Ombudsman. Therefore, the doctrine of qualified political agency is not applicable.
 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
GR No. 130140
October 25, 1999

Facts:
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. The Committee was
directed to inventory all behest loans, identify the borrowers who were granted “friendly
waivers”, and determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those
loans and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within 60 days from
the date hereof. In 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the
committee to include in its investigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans with shall
embrace both behest and non-behest loans.

Committee reported that the Philippine Seeds Inc., (PSI) of which the respondents were
Directors, was one of the 21 corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the
committee through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the committee, filed
with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint 7 against the Directors of PSI. In the resolution 8
dated 14 May 1996 and approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the complaint
in on the ground of prescription.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution of offenses arising from, or incident to, or involving ill-
gotten wealth in the said provision may be barred by prescription

Held:
Yes. Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution which states that “The right of the State
to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel”, applies
only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the
complaint against the respondents. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986. What is now Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution was originally
Section 13 of the proposed Article on Accountability of Public Officers in Committee Report No.
17 submitted to the Constitutional Commission by its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers. At the plenary session, Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., succeeded in having that
Section amended. The amendment made the provision applicable as well to criminal actions
arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth. However, on motion for
reconsideration by Commissioner Christian Monsod, who explained that the intention of the
Committee was to limit the proposed Section 13 to civil actions, and without objection on the
part of Commissioner Davide, the motion for reconsideration was granted. As a consequence,
the amendment of Commissioner Davide regarding the applicability of the Section to criminal
actions was deleted
 Disini v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 180564
June 22, 2010

Facts:
In 1989 respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), wanted petitioner Jesus P. Disini to
testify for his government in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation
(Westinghouse). Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini, as an executive in the
latter’s companies. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of
the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminio's companies, had been attended
by anomalies. Republic and petitioner Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which
Disini undertook to testify for his government and provide its lawyers with the information,
affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting the said cases. Republic guaranteed
among others that, apart from the cases, it shall not compel Disini to testify in any other
domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio.

Desini complied with his undertaking, but 18 years later, upon application of respondent
Republic, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum
against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before the court in an action
that the Republic led against Herminio. Disini invoked his immunity agreement with the
Republic, but Sandiganbayan issued a new subpoena, directing him to testify before it. PCGG
then issued a resolution revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited
the latter from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Respondent contends that the power
to grant immunity given to PCGG covers only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and
does not cover immunity from providing evidence in court.

Issue:
Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the
Immunity Agreement

Held:
No. Section 5 of Executive Order 14 which vests on the PCGG the power to grant
immunity to witnesses provides that it “is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution
to any person who provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such
Commission xxx”. The scope of immunity offered by the PCGG may vary as it exercises its
discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the
witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. In the case at
bar, Disini was offered not only criminal and civil liability but also immunity against being
compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration
cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. The grant,
therefore, of immunity to petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify is ultimately a grant
of immunity from being criminally prosecuted by the State for refusal to testify, something that
falls within the express coverage of the immunity given him. A contract is the law between the
parties. It cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with more reason in
this case where petitioner Disini had already complied with the terms and conditions of the
Immunity Agreement. Thus, the immunity agreement cannot be revoked.