Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THEi 1
G.R. No. 229861
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,: Present:
i
'
x------------------------------------·. . -----~-------------
DE di SI ON
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: ·
See Notice of Appeal dated November 28, 201]6; rollo, pp. 21-23.
Id. at 4-20. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-
Yap and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi concJrring.
Records, pp. 212-221. Penned by PresidingJu~ge Leopoldo V. Cafiete.
The identity of the victim or any information ;}thich could establish or compromise her identity, as well
as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to RA 7610,
entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992;
RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING
FclR PROTECTIVE. MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND. FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,'' approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10·· ll-SC, otherwise known
as the "Rule on Violence. against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in
People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013].
See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS A.ND PROCEDURES IN
Decision 2 G.R. No. 229861
The Facts
That on or about the 10th day of October, 2001 at past 7:00 o'clock
in the evening, at
. ., Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeed in having carnal lrnowledge with [AAA], a minor, who is
only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the offense
against her will and consent and which act demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said minor as a hw11an being.
CONTRARY TO LA W. 7
The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in the evening
of October 10, 2001, AAA, then a fifteen (15) year old high school student,
was cleaning the chicken cage at the back of their house located in -
- when suddenly, she saw Ejercito pointing a gun at her saying, "Ato
ato Zang ni. Sabta Zang ko. Ayaw gyud saba para dili madamay imo
pamilya. ''AAA pleaded, "'Tang, don't do this to me'' but the latter replied,
"Do you want me· to Idll you? I will even include your mother and father."
Thereafter, Ejercito dragged AAA to a nearby barn, removed her shorts and
underwear, while he undressed and placed himself on top of her. He covered
her mouth with his right hand and used his left hand to point the gun at her,
as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth movements.
When he ·finished the sexual act, Ejercito casually walked away and warned
AAA not to tell anybody or else, her parents will get killed. Upon returning
to her house, AAA hurriedly went to .the bathroom \yhere she saw a bloody
discharge from her vagina. The following day, AAA absented herself from
school and headed to the house of her aunt, CCC, who asked if she was
okay. At that point, AAA tearfully narrated the incident and requested CCC
to remain silent, t<;> which the latter reluctantly obliged. 8
In his defense, Ejercito pleaded not guilty to the charge against him,
and maintained .that he had an illicit relationship with AAA. He averred that
during the existence of their affair from 2002 to 2004, he and AAA
frequently had consensual sex and the latter even abandoned her family in
order to live with him in various places in . He even insisted that
he and AAA were vocal about their choice to live together despite vehement
objections from his own wife and AAA's mother. Finally, he pointed out
that when AAA was forcibly taken from him by her mother, as well as
police authorities, no charges were filed against him. Thus, he was shocked
and dismayed when he was charged with the crime of Rape which
purportedly happened when they were lovers. 10
------------
See rollo, pp. 5-6.
9
See id. at 6-7.
10
See id. at: 7-8.
11
Records, pp. 212-221.
12
Seeid. at 221.
13
See ~otice of Appeal dated May 2, 2013; id. at 224-225.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 229861
The CA Ruling
Agreeing with the RTC' s findings, the CA held that through AAA' s
clear and straightforward testimony, the prosecution had established that
Ejercito raped her in 2001. On the other hand, it did not give credence to
Ejercito's sweetheart defense, pointing out that assuming arguendo that he
indeed eventually had a relationship with AAA, their first sexual encounter
in 2001 was without the latter's consent and was attended with force and
intimidation as he pointed a gun at her while satisfying his lustful desires. 16
Time and again, it has been held that in criminal cases, "an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law." 17
14
· Rollo, pp. 4-20.
15
Id. at 19-20.
16
See id. at 9-18.
17
See Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017, citing People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 225608,
March 13, 2017. ·
Decision 5 G.R. No. 229861
Based on this doctrine, the Court, upon careful review of this case,
deems it proper to correct the attribution of the crime for which Ejercito
should be convicted and, consequently, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed against him, as will be explained hereunder.
At the onset, the Court observes that the CA, in modifying the R TC
ruling, erroneously applied the old Rape Law, or Article 335 of the RPC,
since the same was already repealed upon the enactment of RA 8353 in
1997. To recount, the Information alleges "[t]hat on or about the 10th day o{
October 2001 xx x [Ejercito], with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor who is only
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the offense against
her will and consent x xx"; hence, in convicting Ejercito of Rape, the CA
should have applied the provisions of RA 8353, which enactment has
resulted in the new rape provisions of the RPC under Articles 266-A in
relation to 266-B, viz.:
xx xx
xx xx
./
Decision 6 G.R. No. 229861
10, 2001, AAA, then just a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was cleaning chicken
cages at the back of her house when suddenly, Ejercito threatened her,
removed her lower garments, covered her mouth, and proceeded to have
carnal knowledge of her without her consent. The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, ·found AAA's testimony to be credible, noting further that Ejercito
failed to establish any ill motive on her part which could have compelled her
to falsely accuse him of the aforesaid act. In this relation, case law states that
the trial court is in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of
the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should be
accorded to the same. 19 As there is no indication that the RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts
and circumstances of the case, the Court therefore finds no reason to deviate
from its factual findings.
xx xx
xx xx
19
See Peralta v. People, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017, citing People v. Matibag, 757 Phil. 286,
293 (2015). .
20
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION, AND 'DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION AND FOR
0THERPURPOSES,"appr6ved on June 17, 1992. ,
21
See G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.
\~
Decision 7 G.R. No. 229861
[T]he very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 7610 does
not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse
aside from the act· complained of. For it refers to ·the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5 (b)
of RA 7610' occurs even though the accused committed sexu~l abuse
against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual
affront. 23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
. '
The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is
broad enough to cover "(orce and intimidation" as used in the
Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as
"compulsion;force; duress" while "[undue] influence" is defined
as ''persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the
other hand, '~force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength
22
See id. (see ponencia in Quimvel, pp. 8-9), citing People v. Larin, 357 Phil. 987, 998-999 (1998) and
Ma/to v. People, 560 Phil. J 19, 135 (2007).
23
See id. (see ponencia in Quimvel, p. 15).
Decision ,8 G.R. No. 229861
In this cas~, it has 'been established that Ejercito committed the act of
sexual intercourse against and without the consent of AAA, who was only
fifteen ( 15) years 'old at that time. As such, she is c.onsidered under the law
as a ·child. who is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act may as well be classified as a violation of
Section 5 (b) ofR.A. 7610.
J
Decision 9 G.R. No. 229861
clarify that Ejercito should be convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws
are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws
may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more
special in natur~, regardless of .the time of enactment, should prevail. In
Teves v. Sandiganbayan: 26
It bears to emphasize that not only did RA 8353 re-classify the crime
of Rape from being a crime against chastity to a crime against persons, 30 it
also provided· for more particularized instances of rape and conjunctively, a
26
488 Phil. 311 (2004).
27
Id. at 332.
28
Article 335. When and How Rape is Committed.·- Rape is com.mitted by having carnal
knowledge ofa woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
menti9ned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The c.rime of rape shall be punished by reclusion temporal.
29
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
xx xx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; xx x
xx xx
30
See Section 2 of RA 8353:
a/
Decision 10 G.R. No. 229861
Moreover, RA 8353 provides for new penalties for Rape that may be
qualified under the following circumstances:
I) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
Decision 11 G.R. No. 229861
.I
Decision 12 G.R. No. 229861
On the other hand, the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610,
are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female,
is below 18 years of age. It is also stated there that children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse are those children, whether male or
female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.
In the recent case of Quimvel v. People, the Court ruled that the
term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to
cover "force ·and intimidation." Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion
as compulsion; force; duress, while undue influence is defined as
persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will. On the other
hand, force refers to constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to
an end; while jurisprudence defines intimidation as unlawful coercion;
extortion; duress; putting in fear. As can be gleaned, the terms are used
almost synonymously. Thus, it is not ·improbable that an· act of
committing carnal knowledge against a child, twelve (12) years old or
older, constitutes both rape under Section 266-A of the RPC and child
abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
In People v. Abay, the Court was faced with the same predicament.
In that case, both the elements of Section 266-A of the RPC and Section 5
(b) of R.A. No. 7610 were alleged in the information.' Nevertheless, these
provisions were harmonized, to wit:
31
See G.R. No. 220718, June 21, 2017.
32
599 Phil. 390 (2009).
33
676Phil.16(2011).
Decision 13 G.R. No. 229861
In Abay, the offended party was thirteen (13) years old at the time
of the rape incident. Again, the information therein contained all the
elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610. Nevertheless, the Court observed that the prosecution's evidence
only focused on the specific fact that accused therein sexually violated
the offended party through force and intimidation by threatening her
with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial
designs. Thus, accused therein was convicted of the crime of rape
under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC. Notably, the prosecution did not
tackle the broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section 5
(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
In the present case, the RTC convicted Tubillo for the crime of
rape because the prosecution proved that there was carnal knowledge
against by means of force or intimidation, particularly, with a bladed
weapon. On the other hand, the CA convicted Tubillo with violation of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 because the charge of rape under the
information was in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
Afte'r a judicious study of the records, the Court rules that Tubillo
should be convicted ofrape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC.
.I
Decision 14 G.R. No. 229861
34
See People v. Tubiilo, supra note 31.
35
See id.
36
See Quimvel v. People, supra note 21.
37
See id. (see ponencia in Quimvel, p. 10).
38
See id.
39
See id. (see ponencia in Quimvel, p. 11 ).
Decision 15 G.R. No. 229861
question of law - that is: in cases when the act of sexual intercourse against
a minor has been committed, do we apply RA 8353 amending the RPC or
Section 5 (b) of Ju 7610? Herein lies the critical flaw of the. "focus of
evidence" approach, which was· only compounded by the mistaken reading
of Quimvel in the cases of Tubillo, et al. as above-explained.
40
See Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017.
41
See G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 229861
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA. No. 7610."
Pursuant to the secondproviso in Section 5 (b) of RA. No. 7610, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Thus, being the more recent case, it may be concluded that Caoili
implicitly abandoned the "focus of evidence" approach used in the Tubillo,
et al. rulings. Likewise, it is apt to clarify that if there appears to be any
rational dissonance or perceived unfairness in the imposable penalties
between two applicable laws (say for instance, that a person who commits
rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the
RPC, 43 as amended by RA 8353 is punished less than a person who commits
lascivious conduct against a minor under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 44 ), then
the solution is through remedial legislation and not through judicial
interpretation. It is well-settled that the determination of penalties is a policy
matter that belongs to the legislative branch of govemment. 45 Thus, however
compelling the dictates of reason might be, our constitutional order
proscribes the Judiciary from adjusting the gradations of the penalties which
are fixed by Congress through its legislative function. As Associate Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta had instructively observed in his opinion in Caoli:
42
See id. (see ponencia in Caoili, p. 19).
43
The penalty is only prision mayor pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353.
44
The penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua if the child is under
eighteen years old but over twelve years old, while the penalty is actually lesser when the child is
under twelve years old, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period.
45
See Cahulogan v. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018.
Decision 17 G.R. No. 229861
~egislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious
mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to oversight, as
shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is
clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the law. To
my mind, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to address the
noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child.46 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it has been established that Ejercito had carnal knowledge
of AAA through force, threat, or intimidation. Hence, he should be
convicted of rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as·
amended by RA 8353. To note, although AAA was only fifteen (15) years
old and hence, a minor at that time, it was neither alleged nor proven that
Ejercito was her "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consan.guinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim" so as to qualify the crime and impose a
higher penalty. As such, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 266-B of
the same law, Ejercito should be meted with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as ruled by both the RTC and the CA. Further, the Court affirms
the monetary awards in AAA's favor in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and '?75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of this ruling until fully paid, since the same are in accord with
prevailing jurisprudence. 47
46
See Separate ConcmTing Opinion of Justice Peralta in People v. Caoili, supra note 41. See also
Separate Opinion of Justice Peralta in Quimvel v. Peop!e, supra note 21. · ·
~7 See People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 382-383 and 388.
1/
Decision 18 G.R. No. 229861
SO ORDERED.
Ii& kM/' ·
ESTELA 1\1· PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justi
Chairperson
ANDRE~YES, JR.
AssJci~feJ:stice
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CA
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, Republic Act No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)