FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119058. March 13, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDA VILLARAN y

FERNANDEZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO , J.:

ERLINDA VILLARAN y FERNANDEZ was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. She was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.[1]
The Information charged that in the evening of 10 October 1990 in Olongapo City the accused,
with intent to kill, feloniously induced one Danilo C. Ong, her live-in partner, to eat pan de
sal containing sodium cyanide, a poisonous substance, which caused his death.[2]
There was no eyewitness, nay, not a scintilla of proof, to the alleged inducement of Danilo by
Erlinda to eat the "poisoned" bread. The prosecution relied mainly on circumstantial evidence to
establish her guilt.
Through the testimonies of Francisco Ong, Richard Patilano and Felicisima Francisco the
prosecution tried to establish that on 10 October 1990, at about nine-thirty in the evening, Pat.
Francisco Ong, younger brother of Danilo, was relaxing in his house when the accused Erlinda
Villaran appeared and informed him that his brother was ill. Erlinda narrated to him that she was
awakened when Danilo arrived from work that evening. Since it was rather late she simply advised
him to lie down and sleep. Shortly thereafter she was surprised to see Danilo frothing,
shivering. Francisco asked why she did not rush Danilo to the hospital and she replied that she
could not carry him. When Francisco further asked why she did not seek help from her neighbors
instead of going all the way to his house, which was rather far, she answered that her neighbors
were reluctant and uncooperative.
Francisco then accompanied Erlinda back to her house where Danilo was. He checked the pulse
of Danilo. There was hardly any pulsebeat. With the help of Alfredo Lugto, a neighbor, they brought
Danilo to the hospital.
While in the emergency room a doctor asked Erlinda whether Danilo ate or took anything. She
replied that she did not see him take anything. As first aid was being administered to Danilo his
dentures were removed by Francisco upon request of one of the doctors. Franciso claimed that he
smelled a strong and distinct odor from the dentures and recalled smelling something strikingly
similar back at the house of Danilo and Erlinda.
Francisco claimed that Erlinda acted strangely at the hospital. According to him, it was odd for
Erlinda to remain outside the hospital all the while that Danilo was in the emergency room,
seemingly unaffected by the seriousness of his condition. Moreover, when Danilo died some thirty
(30) minutes after, she initially refused to keep watch over his body so that Francisco could leave
and notify his other brothers and sisters of Danilo's demise, although she relented upon Francisco's
insistence.
On their way home to get clothes for Danilo, Francisco asked Erlinda whether his brother had
eaten or taken anything before going to sleep that evening, as he believed that Danilo could not
have died without having taken something toxic. Erlinda told him later that she saw a big bag of pan
de sal on top of their table.
Upon reaching the house of the live-in partners, Francisco immediately proceeded to the sink
where he saw the bag of bread mentioned by Erlinda. He sniffed the bread and, according to him,
he noted the same pungent odor he sensed when he removed the dentures of Danilo. Francisco then
brought the pan de sal to Dr. Richard Patilano, medico-legal officer of the Olongapo City General
Hospital, who advised him to have the bread examined by the NBI. The following day, forensic
chemist Felicisima Francisco of the NBI conducted a laboratory examination of the pan de sal. The
examination revealed traces of sodium cyanide.[3]
Meanwhile, the cadaver of Danilo was autopsied by Dr. Richard Patilano. Samples of the pan de
sal were taken to the NBI which found that they contained sodium cyanide.[4] From the
particles of the pan de sal recovered from the victim's body, Dr. Patilano ascertained the cause of
death to be chemical poisoning.[5] The results of both tests confirmed the conclusion of Dr.
Patilano.[6]
Pat. Francisco Ong also testified that the last time he talked to Danilo was in the morning of the
day he died. On that occasion Danilo confided to him that he had several quarrels with Erlinda
because of her forthcoming tryst with her negro boyfriend who was supposed to arrive shortly.
Testifying in her defense Erlinda, without detracting much from the facts presented by the
prosecution, gave a more detailed account of what happened that night. She said she was asleep
when she was awakened by some noise coming from the lavatory. She sat on her bed and waited for
a while. A few minutes later, Danilo came out from the lavatory. He asked her where Jimmy Ong
was. She told Danilo that she had in fact fallen asleep waiting for Jimmy but he did not arrive. Jimmy
is a nephew of Danilo who was living with them. Then Danilo told her that he would just lie down
where Jimmy usually slept, which was not far from where Erlinda was.
After some five (5) minutes, Erlinda heard moans emanating from the direction of Danilo. She
did not mind the moaning at first. But he continued. It was only then that she moved closer to
Danilo. She found the latter already unconscious. She tried to revive him. She switched on the
light. She saw Danilo soaking wet and perspiring profusely. She ran out of the house to seek help
but no one responded including their landlord. When she noticed the tricycle of Alfredo Lugto
parked in front of his house she knocked at the door, opened it and went straight inside. But her
plea for assistance was met with a blank stare, an unconcerned attitude from the Lugto
household. She returned home and found Danilo momentarily regaining consciousness. She
repeated her appeal to Lugto, even just to call Danilo's brother Francisco, but sensing Alfredo's
reluctance she decided to go directly to Francisco.
At Francisco's residence, Erlinda explained to Francisco the condition of his brother. Hurriedly,
Erlinda returned to her house together with Francisco. Shocked to see Danilo almost lifeless,
Francisco started shouting, "shit, shit," as Erlinda went straight to the lavatory to urinate. They then
brought Danilo to the Olongapo City General Hospital.Erlinda stayed outside the emergency room
and prayed. She was uneasy; her knees were trembling. Then Francisco told her that Danilo was
dead.
 Erlinda denied that there was any feud between her and Danilo and that she was slapped by
Danilo during a supposed pot session, as claimed by Francisco. She asserted that everything was
fine with her and Danilo and so was her relationship with his brothers and sisters.
The crux of the controversy is whether the evidence of the prosecution - which was mainly
circumstantial - was sufficient to support the conviction of accused-appellant. She contends that the
trial court erred in convicting her of murder on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence since
the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.[7]
We agree with Erlinda; hence, we acquit her. Circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction
must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime, [8] i.e., the circumstances
proved must be congruent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused,
and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.[9] Logically it is
here - where the evidence is purely inferential - that there should be an even greater need than
usual to apply with vigor the rules that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the
defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty on the guilt of the
accused.[10] Likewise, it is also in the absence of direct evidence indubitably showing that accused-
appellant was the perpetrator of the killing that motive becomes important.[11]
Significantly, a key element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive, which the
prosecution vainly tried to establish.[12] The trial court merely relied on the testimony of Francisco
Ong in deducing that the reason for the killing of Danilo was that he stood in the way of the
relationship of accused-appellant and her boyfriend. But whatever testimony given in open court by
Francisco Ong regarding the quarrels between accused-appellant and Danilo could only be hearsay
hence inadmissible in evidence -
Q: Mr. Ong, when was the last time you saw your brother alive?
A: In the morning of October 10, 1980.
COURT:
Q: What particular time in the morning?
A: Around ten to eleven o'clock in the morning of October 10.
xxxx
ATTY. DE DIOS:
Q: What was the topic of your conversation?
A: He told me he had a problem and that he had a quarrel with Erlinda Villaran because I
heard that the negro boyfriend of Erlinda Villaran will (sic) be coming.
xxxx
ATTY. DE DIOS:
Q: You said you saw your brother in the morning of October 10 between ten to eleven
o'clock, you said you saw your brother and you said he had a problem, did he tell you
what was his problem about?
xxxx
 A: Yes, Ma'am, he told me that for the past few days, they had altercations because
Erlinda's negro boyfriend will (sic) be coming
xxxx
Q: Do you know if there was any occasion wherein your brother and Erlinda quarreled in
your presence?
xxxx
COURT:
Alright, witness may answer.
A: In my presence, no Ma'am. But I was informed by my brother personally that he caught
Erlinda Villaran having a pot session.[13]
Apparently, the alleged altercation between appellant and the deceased that was intended to
provide the motive was at best secondhand evidence, hence worthless. What was proved was the
colloquy between Francisco and the deceased, not the fact that an argument took place between the
latter and the accused. When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same
is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.[14]
In reaching its verdict, the trial court considered various circumstantial evidence culled almost
entirely from the testimony of the deceased's brother Francisco Ong, and from which the motive
behind the crime was apparently inferred. These circumstances, reiterated by the prosecution in its
Appellee's Brief, are (a) that Danilo died of poisoning as a result of having eaten pan de
sal containing sodium cyanide which was found on the table in the kitchen of appellant and the
victim; (b) that at the time the poisoning occurred only appellant and the deceased were in the
house; (c) that the victim was a tricycle driver who had no quarrel with his fellow tricycle drivers
nor with his neighbors, thereby ruling out any motive to kill him on the part of any third party; (d)
that prior to the poisoning, appellant and the victim had been quarrelling very often because of the
supposedarrival of her negro boyfriend; (e) that when the victim's mouth was already frothing
appellant did nothing to take him immediately to the hospital but resorted to delaying medical
attendance by first proceeding to the house of the victim's brother located at a far distance; (f) that
appellant's excuse that she could not take Danilo to the hospital because she could not carry him
was too shallow to justify her "strange" demeanor; (g) that while the victim was being given first
aid treatment at the hospital appellant seemed unperturbed; (h) that appellant showed lack of
concern for the victim when she displayed her reluctance to watch over his remains and enable his
brother to notify the other members of their family; and, (i) that appellant did not attend the wake
for a day because her boyfriend supposedly arrived and was seen with her, and that later she had
much money in her wallet.
We have carefully examined the records to determine, in the absence of direct evidence, if the
circumstances singled out by the court a quo indeed support its inference that Erlinda killed
Danilo. But, without much polemics, we conclude that the circumstances which the prosecution
capitalized on to establish the criminal liability of the accused are miserably inadequate in weight
and value required by the Rules.
This is especially true when the veracity of such circumstances is open to question, [15] which is
so in this case. The circumstances that the victim had no quarrel with his fellow tricycle drivers as
well as with his neighbors, and that prior to the poisoning the appellant and the victim had been
quarrelling over the expected arrival of appellant's boyfriend are plainly hearsay and consequently
cannot be admitted. Moreover, we are not at all convinced in the reasoning of the trial court that -
x x x x The victim and the accused were living alone in the said house at No. 77, 14th St., New
Kalalake, Olongapo City until two weeks before the victim's death and they were joined by the
victim's nephew Jimmy Ong. Strangely, however, on the evening of the incident, Jimmy Ong was not
in the house.

Immediately after the accused found the victim moaning and suffering and was seen with his mouth
frothing with saliva and convulsing, the accused instead of taking the victim to the hospital and
asking the neighbor's help for that purpose did not do anything of that sort claiming that the
caretaker of the house was not around and that the neighbor Alfredo Lugto or anybody else in the
immediate vicinity were not willing to help. Significantly, however, that it was the same Alfredo
Lugto who took her on board of his tricycle to the residence of Francisco Ong, a place which is quite
far from the place of the incident. And that must have been the reason why Francisco Ong was
asking the questions why he did not bring Danilo Ong to the hospital, why he did not ask for the
neighbors' help and why he did not insist that the neighbors help her in bringing Danilo Ong to the
hospital. The accused gave the lame excuse that he cannot (sic) bring Danilo Ong to thehospital
because she is (sic) only a woman and that the neighbors whose help she has (sic) asked all
refused to give help. But Alfredo Lugtu whom the accused claims was not willing to help was the
same person who took her in his tricycle in going to the house of Francisco Ong.

The actuations of the accused while in the hospital indicate her culpability and involvement in the
poisoning of Danilo Ong. While Danilo Ong was being treated in the emergency room of the
Olongapo City General hospital, the accused made herself scarce by staying outside of the premises
and was seen merely talking to the people outside. After Danilo Ong died, when she was asked by
Francisco Ong to watch over the deceased in the hospital so that Francisco Ong can fetch his
brothers and sisters, the accused refused to be near the deceased claiming that she was afraid. And
then again, during the wake of the deceased she was for one whole day nowhere to be found. And
when she came back on the day of the burial she has been seen with so much money in her
wallet. In the evening of the day of the wake she was according to the NBI report having
conversation in English with an unidentified man x x x x[16]

There is nothing unusual about the fact that no one else was present in the house that fateful
evening except the deceased and appellant, and that Danilo's nephew Jimmy Ong who was a
member of the household was not around. Anyone could have entered the premises since the door
of the house was always left open. Even if it were true that the deceased had no known friction with
his fellow tricycle drivers - although this was not sufficiently and competently established - it
cannot be discounted that Danilo may have unknown enemies who with some evil design enticed
him to eat pan de sal that was adulterated with sodium cyanide. In other words, the victim himself
could have brought the poisoned bread from outside, or even ate part of it on the way home, which
was not remote.
In attempting to pin down Erlinda, the prosecution would point out that she tarried in bringing
the deceased to the hospital; that she claimed that no one was willing to help her when in fact it was
the same neighbor Alfredo Lugto who took her to Francisco's house and that she behaved
indifferently and insensitively while Danilo was in the emergency room. In this regard, we can only
say that the workings of a human mind when under stress are unpredictable;[17] different people
react differently to different situations, and there is no standard norm of human response when one
is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[18] Some people may have the
presence of mind and immediately think of bringing the victim to the hospital, while others may feel
helpless and do nothing or be dependent on others. At that time, Erlinda's concern was to find out
what was wrong with the deceased. She believed that Pat. Francisco Ong being a police officer was
in a better position to know what to do under the circumstances.
The NBI report[19] showing that Erlinda was nowhere in sight for one whole day during the
wake, and that she was seen with so much cash and having a conversation in English with an
unidentified man should likewise be struck down for being hearsay as it could not be tested by
cross-examination.[20] The NBI agent who conducted the investigation should have been presented
in open court to testify on the report,[21] otherwise, the admission of the report would be a violation
of the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witness against her and to cross-examine
him.[22]
Indeed the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are too inadequate for conviction
having miserably failed to meet the criteria herein set forth. The presumption of innocence must be
overcome by the prosecution with proof beyond reasonable doubt, and every circumstance
favoring her innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against her must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant can be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only
did she perpetrate the act but that the act also amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.[23]
The only piece of evidence that would otherwise link the accused directly to the death of Danilo
was that which could prove that she killed him so that she could carry on a relationship with her
negro friend. But such was not proved at the trial and, as we have aptly held, where the weakest
link in the chain of evidence is at the same time the most vital circumstance, there can be no
alternative but to acquit the accused.[24]
We can only speculate at this stage on how Danilo Ong met his death for there is absolutely
nothing on record that can provide us with anything better than what has heretofore been
surmised. Nonetheless, we cannot write finis to this ponencia without addressing an appeal to law
enforcement agencies for the exercise of utmost diligence, extreme care and professionalism in
their investigatory work; to the prosecution, in the preparation, presentation and submission of
evidence; and, to the trial court, in its evaluation of the case before it. The lukewarm stance and
miniscule circumspection exhibited in this case hardly speak well of the manner in which this case
has been handled, starting from the initial phase of the investigation and even up to the court
proceedings stage.[25]
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from convicting accused-appellant ERLINDA VILLARAN
y FERNANDEZ of murder in Crim. Case No. 710-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered ACQUITTING her of the crime charged as her
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio.
It appearing that accused-appellant is presently detained, her IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM
CUSTODY is ordered unless she is being held for another cause.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43833 November 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SOTERO NAVARRETE Y LUCERO, defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Sotero Navarrete was charged on September 5, 1972 before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
for having raped his own daughter, Elizabeth Navarrete, allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in the third week of August, 1972, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, by means of force and intimidation to wit: by then and there
pulling the arms of Elizabeth Navarrete y de Guia, taking off her clothes and panty,
forcibly laying her on bed and touching and kissing her private parts, threatening to
kill her with a sharp pointed instrument should she resist, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Elizabeth
Navarrete y de Guia, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law (Exh, C, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits).

Upon arraignment on September 15, 1972, the accused entered a plea of "not guilty."

The Trial court, presided then by Honorable Juan L. Bocar, after due trial, rendered its judgment on
February 13, 1973, the dispositive portion of which is worded thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of
rape and sentences him to suffer imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P10,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs (p. 13, rec.).

From this judgment, the accused Sotero Navarrete inter-posed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On
May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which reads in part as follows:

We find that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable
doubt.

Article 335 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape. Under Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to impose this penalty.
 WHEREFORE, let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for
final determination. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to certify the case
immediately to the Supreme Court (p. 113, rec.).

In accordance with the aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to this
Court and the same was submitted for decision on May 26, 1976.

It must be noted at the outset that in the case of People vs. Daniel (L-40330, 86 SCRA 511, November
20, 1978), the Supreme Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, declared that:

... Henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death
or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case
appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion
perpetua, the said court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and
discussion of the law involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the
penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain
from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record
thereof to this court for review (emphasis supplied).

In that case, the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal on the accused for the crime of
rape. The Court of Appeals, however, recommended that the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed and certified the case to this Court. The accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by this Court.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated May 3, 1976, affirmed the decision of
the trial court finding the accused guilty of the crime charged but certified the case to this Court
with the recommendation that the penalty of reclusion perpetua be imposed. The case was
submitted for decision on May 26, 1976.

While the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in consonance with the procedural ruling of this
Tribunal in People vs. Daniel, nevertheless We assume jurisdiction rather than demand the case to
the Court of Appeals because the case was decided and certified to this Court on May 3, 1976,
before the ruling in the case of People vs. Daniel was made interpreting Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act. Besides, this would avoid the unnecessary and time-wasting shuttling of the case between the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals especially so if the right of the accused to speedy trial is to
be considered.

The ruling in People vs. Daniel should therefore be given prospective effect so that beginning
November 20, 1978, should the Court of Appeals in criminal cases pending before it be of the
opinion that the penalty of death orreclusion perpetua should be imposed where the penalty meted
by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, it should follow the directive of this Court in the
Daniel case as aforequoted. On the other hand, those certified criminal cases already pending
decision before this Court, like the present case, at the time People vs. Daniel was decided on
November 20, 1978, should be outrightly decided, rather than remanded to the Court of Appeals.

(Note: However, in People vs. Traya [89 SCRA 274 (1979)], a certified criminal case, decided on
March 30, 1979, per Justice Guerrero, this Court [1st Division], invoking the directive in People vs.
Daniel, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for rendition of the proper judgment. In that case,
the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal On appeal, the Court of Appeals, believing
that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, refrained from rendering judgment and certified the
case to this Court. As per records, the case was certified by the Court of Appeals on April 3, 1978
and submitted for decision on April 12, 1978; hence before the directive in the Daniel case).

II

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Elizabeth Navarrete — the rape
victim Caridad de Guia, the mother of the victim, Pat Vifedio Guillen, and Dr. Abelardo V. Lucero, the
Medico-Legal Officer, and Exhibits "A", the crime report; "A-1", the booking sheet and arrest report;
"A-2", the sworn statement of Elizabeth Navarrete; "B", medical certificate issued by Dr. Abelardo
Lucero; "C". complaint signed by Elizabeth Navarrete; "C-1", the signature of Elizabeth Navarrete
appearing on the complaint "C-2", the signature of Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles before whom the
complaint was sworn by the victim; "D", the Medico Legal report of Dr. Abelardo Lucero; "E", the
marriage contract of Sotero Navarrete and Caridad de Guia; and "E-1", the marriage license. The
evidence for the defense rested mainly on the testimony of the accused, Sotero Navarrete.

From the evidence, it appears that Elizabeth Navarrete is the daughter of the accused, Sotero
Navarrete and his wife, Caridad de Guia. Elizabeth, who was a first year high school student, was
only 15 years old when she became the victim of the crime alleged in the complaint. At the time of
her birth, her parents were merely living together in common-law relationship although they
subsequently got married on November 20, 1957 (Exh. "E", p. 36, Folder of Exhibits). Sometime in
1959, two years after their marriage, Elizabeth's parents separated. Her mother was then pregnant
and later gave birth to her other sister, Emma Navarrete. Thereafter, Elizabeth and her sister lived
with their mother at 310 Antipolo Street, Sampaloc Manila, while their father, the accused, lived
somewhere in Balic-Balic, Sampaloc, sometimes with his friends and sometimes with his parents
(pp. 9-11, 13, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972; p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 10, 1972). It appears also that the accused was
convicted of homicide sometime in 1959, for which he was imprisoned for eleven (11) years [pp. 8-
9, t.s.n., Dec. 8, 1972; p. 3, t.s.n. Jan. 29, 1973]. When he was released from prison in 1970 (p. 8, t.s.n.,
Dec. 8,1972), he discovered that his wife was living with another man (p. 4, t.s.n., Jan. 29, 1973), but
this notwithstanding, he occasionally visited his two daughters, E Elizabeth and Emma (pp. 11, 13,
t.s.n. November 3, 1972).

The evidence further revealed that in one of his visits which took place on or about the third week
of August, 1972, the accused invited his daughter Elizabeth to a birthday party somewhere in
Loreto Street: Sampaloc, Elizabeth gladly accepted the invitation and willingly went with her father,
unmindful of his evil designs. They rode in a passenger jeepney but they did not go down in Loreto
Street and instead proceeded to Quiapo. Upon reaching their destination, they got off the jeepney
and the accused brought his daughter to the New Star Hotel in Quiapo. When asked why they were
entering that hotel, the accused told his daughter that he was going to fetch a friend who is waiting
for him and who will also attend the party. Believing her father, Elizabeth followed him in going up
the stairs inside the hotel. Then the accused paid a Chinese woman after which he entered a room
and asked his daughter to come inside. Once inside, Elizabeth asked her father why they were there.
She also asked him about his friend whom he was going to fetch. Her father did not say anything but
simply laughed. After closing the door, the accused started to remove his clothes. At this point,
Elizabeth became apprehensive already. When the accused had removed his clothes, he approached
Elizabeth and told her to undress but she refused to do so. The accused became angry and
threatened to kill her, her sister and mother if she did not do as she was told. Then the accused held
her arms and pulled her towards the bed and removed her dress. Elizabeth cried and she lost her
strength and composure. The accused fondled her body and kissed her cheek, neck, breast and her
private parts. She struggled and resisted her father's advances but she could not do anything
because he was holding her hands. Elizabeth just kept on crying. He succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with his daughter and she felt pain in her private parts. Soon thereafter, he withdrew
his private part from hers when she continued to cry. Then both of them dressed up without talking
to each other and the accused brought his daughter back home. Elizabeth narrated the harrowing
incident to her aunt, Estrelia Navarrete, the next day. Her aunt, who is a half-sister of her father and
only 16 years old, could only shake her head. Elizabeth asked for advice but her aunt was also afraid
because the same thing might happen to her (pp. 13-17, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972; pp. 3-6, t.s.n., Dec. 4,
1972).

The accused visited Elizabeth on August 28, 1972 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening to ask if she
had informed anybody about the incident at the hotel and she answered in the negative. The
accused came again the next day at about 5:30 in the afternoon to inform Elizabeth that he was
going to rent a room so that he will not pay anymore for a hotel room. In the afternoon of the
following day, the accused came back to tell his daughter that he had rented a place near the Balic-
Balic church and invited her. He threatened his daughter that something drastic will happen to her
if she will not come to his place. That same afternoon, Elizabeth and her sister, Emma, went to the
aforesaid place accompanied by the accused. Arriving at the place, the accused and his two
daughters cleaned the surroundings. Afterwards, he brought them home and asked them to come
again on the 31st of August (pp. 18-20. t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972).

At about 10:30 in the evening of August 31, 1972, the accused fetched his two daughters and
brought them to his place. When the two were already asleep, Elizabeth was awakened by her
father as he was getting up and later she felt that he was inserting his hand inside her T-shirt. She
stood up and her father told her that he was again feeling the sex urge. The accused held her by the
arm and pulled her to a wooden bed. He undressed himself and Elizabeth started to cry knowing
what her father would do to her again. Then the accused removed the T-shirt and underwear of his
daughter. Thereafter, he held her hands and placed himself on top of her and succeeded in having
sexual intercourse. Elizabeth tried to resist by closing her legs but the accused was able to open her
legs by means of his legs also, Moreover, she could not do anything because she was afraid of the
knife that was shown to her by the accused and placed on top of the table. Elizabeth just kept on
crying throughout her ordeal. After satisfying his lust, the accused fell asleep and Elizabeth dressed
up and waited for morning. That following morning, Elizabeth and her sister were able to go home
(pp. 20-23, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972).

The accused invited Elizabeth again to his place and succeeded in abusing her in the afternoon of
September 1, 1972. As in the previous occasion, she went to his place because she was told that
something drastic would happen to her if she did not come. Subsequently, on September 3, 1972 at
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused came and asked his daughter to go to his place but
she refused. He became mad and left. At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of September 4,
1972, he returned drunk and with a companion. The accused asked Elizabeth why she did not like
to sleep anymore in his place. She told him that she was already having difficulty or moral conflict
because of what he was doing to her. But he told his daughter that he would come and drag her to
this place if she did not come at about 8:30 in the evening of that day. Then Elizabeth started crying.
Her mother noticed her but did not talk to her at that moment. When morning came, her mother
asked her why she was crying and she finally narrated what her father did to her. Upon learning
what happened, her mother became sad and declared that if it were not only a sin she would kill the
accused. In the afternoon of that day, September 4, 1972, Elizabeth and her mother went to Police
Precinct No. 3 to file a complaint. Elizabeth gave her statement in writing (pp. 23-26, t.s.n.,
November 3, 1972). She was later physically examined by Dr. Abelardo Lucero, Medico-Legal
Officer, who submitted his findings, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Newly healed laceration in the hymen at 6:00 o'clock position. The edges are
thin and reversible.

(3) Introitus vagina admits one adult finger easily but could hardly admit 2 fingers
(Exhs. "B", "D", pp. 35, 20, Folder of Exhibits).

The appellant, in his brief filed by his counsel de officio, Atty. Virgilio S. Castro, alleged that the trial
court committed an error in finding him guilty of the crime of rape.

There is no question that the appellant had carnal knowledge with his daughter, Elizabeth
Navarrete; but in avoidance, he claims that there was no force or intimidation employed and
therefore he is not guilty of the crime charged.

The contention of the appellant does not find support in the evidence on record. There is sufficient
evidence to establish the fact that the accused employed force in having sexual intercourse with his
daughter. The offended daughter testified in direct examination as to the manner the sexual
intercourse was consummated and the pertinent portions of her testimony are quoted below:

xxx xxx xxx

Q After your father had removed his clothings what happened next?

A He asked me to undress.

Q What did you tell your father when he asked you to do this?

A I refused to undress.

Q When you refused to undress, will you tell the Court what your
father did?

A He became angry.

Q Did he say anything when he became mad'?

A He told me if I will 'not do as I tell you,' he will be going to kill me

and also my sister and my mother.

Q At the time he said this, do you know whether he was holding

anything?
A No, sir.

Q Now what did you do after your father gave or made this threat to
you and your family?

A He held me by the arm and pulled me.

Q To what direction or place were you pulled you father?

A To the bed.

Q And what happened to you when your father pulled you towards
the bed?

A He forced me.

Q What do you mean. Will you tell the Court what you mean by your
father forcing you?

A He undressed me. He removed my clothes.

Q While your father was undressing you, what did you tell him, if you
told him anything?

A I was crying.

Q Did you not ask why he was doing this to you'?

ATTY. GAPUZ

Very leading.

COURT

The witness may answer.

WITNESS

A I lost my composure.

FISCAL

Q What happened after this?

A Then he started fondling my body.

Q When your father was doing this, to you, were you already
undressed?
A I am still dressed.

Q What were you doing at the time when he was as you said fondling
your body?

A Nothing.

Q Then what happened next?

A I was struggling.

Q Why were you struggling?

A Because I don't like what he was doing.

Q Why, what was your father doing when you were struggling?

A He was holding my body, my hands.

Q And what followed next after he was holding your two arms?

A He was able to succeed his desire.

FISCAL

Q Please tell the Court how he was able to get what he wanted'.

A He forced me.

Q How did he force you; in what manner?

A He hold my two hands and then he inserted his private part on

mine.

Q Will you tell the Court how he was able to do this when at the time
you had still your clothes on?

A He removed my clothes.

Q And after he was able to remove your clothes, what else did your
father do to you?

A He kissed me.

Q In what part of the body were you kissed?

A On the cheek; on the neck; and then on the breast, and then on my
private part.
Q When your father was doing these things to you, will you tell the
Court what you did, if any?

A I was crying.

Q Did you tell him anything?

A None, sir.

Q Will you tell the Court why you were not able to say anything while
your father was doing these things to you?

A Because I lost my composure.

Q Now after your father had done those things that you said to the
Court of caressing you in the different parts of your body, what did
he do next?

A When he saw me crying, he removed his private part from mine,

FISCAL

I would ask, your Honor, that the question be repeated to the

witness, because the (answer) is not responsive.

Q After your father had kissed you on different parts of your body, I
ask you what did he do to you?

A He inserted his private part on mine.

Q And at the time that you said you felt the pain in your private part,
will you tell the Court what was the position of your father?

A He was on top of me.

Q Now as you said when your father saw you crying, he stood up and
removed his private part from your organ. What did you do when he
did this?

A He dressed up and I also dressed up.

Q Did you notice anything on your private part as you were crying?

A None, sir.

Q Was there blood?

A There was.
 Q Was there any conversation that transpired at the time that you
were dressing and your father was dressing too?

WITNESS

A No, sir (pp. 15-17, t.s.n., November 3, 1972).

From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleaned that there was an appreciable degree of force
employed by the appellant upon his daughter. It appears that the appellant did not rebut in the
court below the testimony of his daughter because he denied having committed the act imputed to
him. He did not, therefore, deem it necessary to present at the trial any evidence at all to show that
the act of sexual intercourse was voluntary on the part of his daughter. On appeal, however, the
appellant apparently has abandoned the defense of denial interposed by him in the court below,
and now impliedly admits having had sexual intercourse with his own daughter; but he contends
that the prosecution has not shown satisfactorily that the same was done through force or
intimidation. Not having presented any evidence that the act of sexual intercourse was voluntary,
the unrebutted and uncontradicted testimony of the offended daughter now assumes more weight
and importance and to which We give full credence. This sudden change of attitude on the part of
the appellant militates against his claim of innocence.

Moreover, the fact of sexual intercourse was substantially corroborated by the medical report and
testimony of Dr. Abelardo Lucero who examined the offended party and found a newly healed
lacerated hymen. He opined that the offended party could have had sexual intercourse with a man
sometime during the month of August up to September 1, 1972 as alleged by her (pp. 29-31, t.s.n.,
Nov. 3, 1972).

It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and daughter, the
degree of force or intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties
involved have no relationship at all with each other; because the father exercises strong moral and
physical control over his daughter. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its May 3, 1976
decision certifying the case to Us, "indeed the kind of force and intimidation as between father and
daughter need not be of such nature and degree as would be required in cases where the parties
have no family relationship at all" (p. 5, C.A. decision, p. 111, rec.). And appellant admitted that "the
relationship between the complainant and the appellant herein has ample importance to show that
there was some kind of moral pressure on the complainant" (p. 21, Appellant's Brief; p. 72, rec.).
Likewise, this Court has ruled that: "The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative
term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other" (People
vs. Daniel, L-40330, 86, SCRA 511, 529, Nov. 20, 1978; People vs. Sarile, 71 SCRA 593, 58 [1976];
People vs. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320, 328 [1974], citing 75 C.J.S 475; emphasis supplied).

The claim of the appellant that his daughter practically submitted herself to him is hard to believe,
for no daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her own father unless there
was force or intimidation, as a sexual act between father and daughter is so revolting. It must be
noted that appellant himself admitted that consent was not previously given by the offended party
to the sexual intercourse (p. 17, Appellant's Brief: p. 68, rec.).

While it may be true that the resistance established in evidence by the prosecution may be wanting
in comparison with the resistance offered by victims in other rape cases that have reached this
Court, the fact is, there was resistance, and such, for purposes of this case, is sufficient to qualify the
sexual act as rape, considering that the offender is her own father, whose ruthless assertion of
parental authority accompanied by threats subjugated her will to resist. As aptly observed by the
Solicitor General: "In the present case, Elizabeth was not only afraid of her father. She must have
also been shocked into submission by an experience that was unnatural and uncommon and
certainly not normally supposed to happen to persons so closely related" (p. 9, Brief for the
Appellee; p. 100, rec.).

In addition, in a crime of rape, it is not necessary that the force used by the accused upon the victim
be irresistible. What is important is that through force, the accused is able to accomplish his evil
design. In the instant case, the appellant succeeded in the consummation of the sexual act against
the will of the victim and in spite of her resistance. As We have repeatedly declared:

It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence
of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it
be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the
force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had
in view (People vs. Daniel, supra; People vs. Sarile, supra; People vs.
Savellano, supra, citing United States vs. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434 L-1905]).

Along the same line, this Court has held that: "When force is an element of the crime of rape, it need
not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point" (People vs.
Daniel, supra; People vs. Sarile supra, citing People vs. Momo 56 Phil. 86, 87 [1931]).

It must also be noted that the offended party was intimidated by the threat of the appellant to kill
her, her mother and sister and create a real fear in her mind considering that the offended was an
ex-convict and she was just an immature teenager, let alone the fact that the offender is her own
father. This fear weakened whatever resistance she could muster at the time of the assault. It has
been held that: "Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter
submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety" (People vs.
Daniel, supra; People vs. Garcines, 57 SCRA 653 [1974]). And it is an accepted rule that: "Force or
violence threatened for the purpose of preventing or overcoming resistance, if of such character as
to create real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm or such as in any
manner to overpower the mind of the victim so that she does not resist, is in all respects equivalent
to physical force actually exerted for the same purpose" (People vs. Gan, 46 SCRA 667, 677 [1904]).

Furthermore, women may have different reactions when confronted with such heinous act. Some
would probably fight, while others inay assume a silent and fearful attitude because not all women
are of the same mettle (People vs. Olden, 47 SCRA 45,52 [1972]).

The appellant attempted to exculpate himself by showing that his daughter Elizabeth might have
denounced him as the perpetrator of a very serious crime committed upon her person because he
told her that he would take her and her sister Emma away from their mother (p. 6, t.s.n.. Jan. 29,
1972). The motive alleged is not strong enough to make a fifteen-year-old girl with a fair degree of
education, like Elizabeth who is a high school student, invent a charge that would only bring shame
and humiliation upon her and her family and make her an object of gossip among her classmates
and friends. It cannot be denied that she commenced the present case, impelled by the enormity of
the crime and solely for the purpose of stating the truth.
Counsel for the appellant also presents a starting allegation in his brief, thus:

..., the acts of the herein appellant and his daughter, complainant herein, can be ascribed to the
permissive character of the times and the circumstances which surround their own society. It must
be noted that appellant had spent already the substantial portion of his life in jail for a previous
crime. His moral education was molded by an abnormal atmosphere. His hunger of the loins is
stronger than his moral self-control, if he has any. While the complainant herein, in submitting
herself freely to the will of appellant as one is wont to believe, can be best explained by her own
parents morality where from she derives her own and which she has been subjected. It cannot be
expected therefore that the moral standard to which a free society imposed on its members can be
applicable to appellant and his daughter (pp. 23-24, Appellant's Brief; pp. 74-75, rec.).

Such an allegation is unwarranted under the circumstances and it is a disgrace to the Bar and an
affront to this Court. A lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. He should therefore be warned for making such cavalier statements.

The records further disclose that the information charges only one crime of rape committed
sometime in the third week of August. However, the evidence presented by the prosecution
established two other separate sexual intercourses on two subsequent dates.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information because
the Constitution guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right ...
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him ..." (Section 19, Art. IV, Bill of
Rights, 1973 Constitution). Likewise, "... it matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence
of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be convicted in the courts of these Islands of any offense,
unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged
before he is put on trial ..." (Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456, 461 [1975], citing U.S. vs. Campo,
23 Phil. 396 [1912]). Consequently, the appellant herein may only be convicted of one crime of
rape. In the case at bar, the offended girl is a daughter of the appellant, and because of the nature of
the crime, this relationship is an aggravating circumstance in accordance with Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, WE HEREBY FIND APPELLANT SOTERO NAVARRETE GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE AND HEREBY SENTENCE HIM TO SUFFER THE
PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, TO INDEMNIFY THE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE AMOUNT OF
P12,000.00 AND TO PAY THE COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
344 Phil. 653

REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal from three sentences of reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz,
alias Rodolfo Domingo or "Ompong," consistent with his negative pleas when arraigned on
November 5, 1992 and January 11, 1993,[1] impugns his conviction for multiple murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,[2] of Antipolo,
Rizal. He anchors his entreaty for the reversal thereof mainly on the ground that he was not fully
and appropriately apprised of or allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior to and while
undergoing custodial investigation.

In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children,
12-year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their
residence at 13 Emerald Street, Greenpark Village, Cainta, Rizal by their horrified neighbors. The
star-crossed trio were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a
knife still embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore
external signs of sexual assault.[3]

None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. Two of them later testified in
court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former merely recounted how,
while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he and his friends stumbled upon the
dead bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the other hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of
June 23, 1992, appellant, who was a brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some
candies at her store which is located inside the village.[4]

Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements just three days after the
incident, the assertions in which were of the same import as their respective testimonies in
court.[5] On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant at the house of his brother
in Fort Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal
interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was arrested.

This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned appellant as to his
participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to completely inform the latter of his rights
and this he did in the presence of appellant's supposed counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-
Villanueva. Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said counsel, an extrajudicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how he allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims. [6]

When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed by the trial court to be
afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo). By
appellant's own account, he only reached the fourth grade of elementary schooling and, although
conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his name. He bluntly
repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel
of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was interrogated at
the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Parenthetically, his answers to the questions appearing therein are in surprisingly fluent, flawless
and expressive Tagalog,[7] which could not have been done by him because of his defect in speech
and articulation.
He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities into signing the same, and
not that he did so voluntarily. While he admits having been at the residence of the victims on the
night that they were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well and alive
that same night when he proceeded to his brother's place in Fort Bonifacio.[8]

1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of Article III of the Constitution
requires that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Corollary thereto,
paragraph 3 thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained in violation of the same
shall be inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.

An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of Section 12 upon
being held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation by the police authorities. [9] As
explained by this Court in People vs. Marra,[10] custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed
upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating
officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.

The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the language or dialect
that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere characterized by
deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to which he is entitled would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law.[11]

2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony before the lower court that the
investigation of appellant in connection with the murders actually commenced at around 9:00 A.M.
on June 27, 1992 at the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal, at the time when appellant was still
without counsel.[12] The sworn statement containing appellant's extrajudicial confession itself
shows that it was taken at around 11:00 A.M.[13] Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed
appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used for or
against him in any court, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own choice, he
nonetheless failed to tell appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could
be provided with one.[14]

The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence
along these lines have all been too consistent - an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, could not be any clearer.
To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must perforce be
informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of his
choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall be provided with one. Without
this further safeguard, the cautionary right to counsel would merely impress upon the accused,
more so upon an impecunious person like appellant who is hardly educated, that his right thereto
would mean simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the financial capacity to obtain
legal services, and nothing more.

Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how appellant was able to engage
the services of Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel who was allegedly present when
appellant executed his confession and who was not even subpoenaed to testify thereon. This
significant circumstance lends credence to the latter's denial that he ever met in person, much less
executed the confession in the presence of, said counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the record
is that this counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law enforcers themselves, thus
putting into serious doubt her independence and competence in assisting appellant during the
investigation[15] as to affect its admissibility.

Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of such serious charge involved in the
cases, the failure of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. to fully apprise appellant of all his rights, particularly the
requirement that if he could not afford the services of a lawyer he shall be provided with one would
have been rectified by said counsel at that very stage of the investigation. Indeed, from our earliest
jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can be
made to act in protection of his rights,[16] and not by merely going through the motions of providing
him with anyone who possesses a law degree.

Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage of custodial
interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the
confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in which he conducted the
interrogation, yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his
rights under the Constitution.

In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al.,[17] this Court aptly emphasized these constitutional safeguards in this
wise:

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation
is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court.

x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins, a confrontation arises which
at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and
every person he meets, he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned
in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them
to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and
are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20
of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus delicti in this case, appellant's conviction
must be set aside for his extrajudicial confession is obviously inadmissible in evidence against him.
The rule is that an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of
the corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Both must co-exist. The insistence of the
Office of the Solicitor General that appellant's confession could nonetheless be treated as an
"admission" which could therefore be admitted in evidence is misplaced, for the Bill of Rights treats
of both "confessions" and "admissions" in the same light.[19] In addition, it should be stressed that in
appellant's case, no eyewitnesses to the actual killings were ever presented to testify in court, and
the prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to inculpate appellant in crimes
wherein he was meted three penalties of reclusion perpetua.

It is significant that, with the exception of appellant's putative extrajudicial confession, no other
evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. The proposition that the medical
findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into
the fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and
admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are
denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a finding.
Otherwise, it would assume that which has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or
circulo en probando.

Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences of the crimes
on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution. While
the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature a weak one by itself, it assumes
commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution itself is frail and
effete. For, needless to state, the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense but upon the vigor of its own.[20] In sum, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by
appellant has remained intact and impervious to the prosecution's assault thereon.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, of
Antipolo, Rizal in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or "Ompong," is
hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release is accordingly ordered unless there be any other lawful
cause for his continued incarceration.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74189

CRUZ, J.:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
Antonio Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for convicting him. [1] His co-accused,
Rogelio Abugatal, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and this appeal is dismissed as to him. [2] We
deal here only with Enrile.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the evening of October 25,
1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City
Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato
Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer.[3]
In their separate testimonies,[4] both policemen said that on that occasion they saw Polines hand
over to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left
with the money and returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The
two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time
confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana
with flowering tops weighing 22 grams.[5]
The prosecution also showed that, upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De
Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile.
Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana,
whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front
pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425.[6]
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above
narration.[7] Enrile refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer.
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers,
who he said simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied
any knowledge of the marijuana. He claimed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was
attending, as a dental technician, to a patient whom he was fitting for dentures.[8] The supposed
patient, Alicia Tiempo, corroborated him.[9]
Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that he had a pending
application for probation. He suggested that this could be the reason the policemen sought to
implicate him in the new charge and thus weaken his application.[10]
Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that he had not sold
any marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two male teenagers approached
him that evening and told him to buy marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said
he did not have any marijuana and did not know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's
house and to give him the marked money. He did so because they had a knife. Enrile handed
him a plastic bag which was later found to contain dried marijuana fruiting tops.[11]
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of Abugatal,
considering that it was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation,
including the right to the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not
follow the ruling of this Court in Morales v. Enrile,[12] promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated
in People v. Galit,[13] promulgated on March 20, 1985, where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid
down the correct procedure, thus:
"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means--by telephone if possible--or by letter
or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."

The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986, long after the
above-cited decisions had become effective.
Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without the assistance of
counsel could have been sustained. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his
constitutional rights. The trial court had to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood
the import and consequences of his confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do
so.[14] There is no showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision
that Abugatal had been informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of counsel.
If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible
against Enrile.
The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's house and buy
marijuana from him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial confession. With that confession
outlawed and the testimony disowned by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against
Enrile to tie him with Abugatal.
It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to
Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead
the policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even
assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and
search.
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the
policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source
of the marijuana.
According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave
him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's
house and immediately arrested him.[15]
What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information
supplied by Abugatal and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was
fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and
subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he
had been caught in flagrante delicto.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling
marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not
retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.
The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's house is
his castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all his forces, may violate. There were measures
available under the law to enable the authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was
found in possession of prohibited articles. The police did not employ these measures.
What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the slightest heed to
the injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of the police state,
where the minions of the government place little value on human rights and individual liberties and
are obsessed only with the maintenance of peace and the punishment of crime.
These are laudable objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the
cost of dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual from overzealous
law-enforcers who mistakenly believe that suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards
afforded them by the Constitution. Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to
apprehend and punish law-breakers. Such a practice only leads to further defiance of the law by
those who have been denied its protection.
In light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced that there is enough
evidence to establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of a doubt. The paucity of such evidence only
strengthens the suspicion that the marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police
officers who were probably worried that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction
as a drug pusher would be thwarted by his application for probation.
Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating Enrile is
inadmissible against Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found on him as a result of the
illegal search. The only remaining evidence against the appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this
has been questioned and discredited by the prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left
without a leg to stand on and must therefore be dismissed.
Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the discharge of their duties
is not enough to build a case against aperson charged with a crime. They should build it with
painstaking care, stone by stone of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the
accused, before they can hope to secure a conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately. It is so
ordered.
People v. Serzo Digest
People v. Serzo
Rights of the Accused

Facts:
1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of
Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.
2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared
without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the
arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the
arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by
the counsel de officio.
4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel

HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages
of the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible
dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the
offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is
also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has
the power to take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal.
RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the
state's and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right
is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.
People vs holgado
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously
and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero
Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He
pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no
evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our
Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record
does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had
reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was
opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of
the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had
investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of
the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to
overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the
accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
People vs ayson
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and theCollective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000.
The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds
of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos
pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and
statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not
reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged-
not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to
be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminatingquestions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness
knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
US V JAVIER

We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this

case to be as follows:Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of
October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his
corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of
Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to
the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He
reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the
Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now
deceased, on the 20th of November following, encountered
the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido
de Chavez leading thecarabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the
following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in
front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of
Santa Clara, municipality of SanPablo. The carabao was
identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been
taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and
by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the
accused .As corroborative of such evidence, we have the
well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of this
character is that, although the persons who unlawfully took
a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their
identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the
stolen animal is found in the possession of the accused
shortly after the commission of the crime and they make no
satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be
properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911],
18 Phil., 425.) In the present instance, the attempt of the
accused to insinuate that one of the Constabulary soldiers
testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly
believable. The foregoing statement of the facts and the law
disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the
lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution
as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant
Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before
the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas,
Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on
the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says,
"That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the
provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5),
which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled: . .. to be confronted at the trial by and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to
the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted,
Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine origin (Dowdell
vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S.,325) that it "intends to secure the
accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned,by only such witnesses as meet him
face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of
the accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of
cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is essential. A second
reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before
it the department and appearance of thewitness while
testifying. (U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this
constitutional provisions on behalf of accused persons in a
number of cases. (See for example U. S. vs. Tamjuanco[1902],
1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De
la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now to determine
whether the present facts entitle the accused to the
protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall
under some exception thereto. The sworn statement of Presa
was not made by question and answer under circumstances
which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to
confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement
again is not the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a
former action between the same parties relating to the same
matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298,
No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the
prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is
the statement of Presa a dying declaration or a deposition in
a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, not to burden the
opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can
rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281
[King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year 1696. It appears
that a deposition of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol
under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was
objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all
opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench
consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of
both courts that these deposition should not be given in
evidence, the defendant not being present when they were
taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a
cross-examination." Although we are faced with the
alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the
witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity
for cross-examination and the case is not one coming within
one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone accepting
the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court. With
such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been
done in other cases, further find this to be reversible error
and remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced,
however, that this would gain the accused nothing except
delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of
the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable
evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts come under
article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as
amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and
appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and
one day of presidio correccional, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of costs
of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo
Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
conde vs rivera
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared
with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see
the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and
now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was
filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally
charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free,
and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition
that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more
than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal
of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
Tatad vs sandiganbayan
Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing
charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of
1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974
complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after
petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the
CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS
report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982,
all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985,
all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for
receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in
1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information
was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for
preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by
the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law
(P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent
court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years
can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True
- but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a
device for setting back time.
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-
complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her
sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on
June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses
to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to
an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause
to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed
to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause
against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must
be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section
6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges
should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study
the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute
is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In
truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power
is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these
have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to
distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for
these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
346 Phil. 241

PUNO, J.:
On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamuswith writs of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the information for kidnapping
and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranagga
alias Paco, filed in the RTC[1] of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest
issued as a consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for
the annulment of the order[2] of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu
denying Larranagga's motion for a regular preliminary investigation and that
it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to
relieve her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.

It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the
Center for Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights,
Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer,
Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The,
police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be
brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for perlominary
investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation

conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he
moved that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation. He also
requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of the
complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of
twenty (20) days from their receipt to file the defense affidavit. The motion
was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be
treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest
investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He
was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his client's right to a
preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to
section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivit's verbal motion for
reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.
On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of
Appeals assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.[3] However, Larranaga's effort to stop
the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned out that on
September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the
RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997,
counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading
the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's arrest. The move again proved
fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu
City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed
by Larranaga's counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the
arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals' dismissed
Larranaga's petitions, hence, the case at bar.

On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated

comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On
October 16, 1997, we temporarily restrained the presiding judge of Branch 7
of the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from
becoming moot.

On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and motion in lieu of Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted
that "x x x it is within petitioner's constitutional and legal rights to demand
that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be
conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations
against him". He asked that "x x x the petition be given due course and
petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation." He further
recommended that "x x x during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released
from detention."

We agree.

Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular

preliminary investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify
petitioner's inquest investigation. Said section clearly provides that "when a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court, the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person."

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested". For one, the
petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded
the arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For
another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless
arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months before. So
we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz:[4]

"Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless 'arrest' or detention of

petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of the Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's 'arrest' took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
'arresting' officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section
5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
'arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected 'when (the shooting had) in fact just been committed' within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the 'arresting' officers had any
personal knowledge' of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who
had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute
'personal knowledge.'

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that
section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. x x x When the police filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of
Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the
erroneous supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was applicable and
required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation
and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions.
Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant,
he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at
the preliminary investigation."
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary
investigation pursuant to section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution.
Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in all
probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to
face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner's counsel was fart from being
unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be
furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be
given a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit.
As well pointed of his motion "x x x prevented petitioner from preparing and
submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and
security guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify
that:
"- during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his
classmates were all in their school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of
July 16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates took their mid-term
exams;

- following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at

petitioner's Quezon City apartment until about 9 o' clock in the evening, and
then repaired to a Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan Avenue where they
stayed on until 3 o'clock in the morning of July 17; they even had pictures
taken of their party;

- indeed petitioner's July 16 examination papers and that of a classmates are

ready for submission as evidence, along with petitioner's grades for the term's
end in September 1997;

- two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember
seeing petitioner at their Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;

- petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until
term's end in September 1997;

- petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment
since June 1997, particularly including July 16 and 17;

- petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No.
PR833, as shown by his plane ticket and boarding pass".
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a
capital offense case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In
Webb vs. de Leon,[5] we emphasized that "attuned to the times, our Rules have
discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead,
Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted
by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in
Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 'the right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right.' A preliminary investigation should
therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty
of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest
investigation of petitioner and to order the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation of the petitioner in accord
with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for Detention During The
Pendency of the Case issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against the
petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order the
immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4)
to order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist
from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No.
CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the result of petitioner's preliminary
investigation.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner,

vs.
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no
less than five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses
and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed,
has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of
more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a
definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons,
has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of
that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance
attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her
consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of
reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate information, could
have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We
thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and
finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the
one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a
persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The
Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and
that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as
in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding
in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334;
U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First
Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further
attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in
previous informations, and the charges now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena,
Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the
observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will
take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character
may not recur. So ordered.
People Vs. Alicando Case Digest
People Vs. Alicando

251 SCRA 293

G.R. No. 117487

December 2, 1995

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a
minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant
drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the parents and police were
informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house.
Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without
the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green
slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were
presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review
for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held:

No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the
English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither
is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his
plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged
that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When
life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no
presumption. The court must be sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said
section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial
court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant
when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late
body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with
bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its
bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were
gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where
appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel.