Service of Summons: Defective service of summons renders judgment void

G.R. No. 206653 – February 25, 2015

Ong vs Co
MENDOZA, J.

Ong and Co were married, but Co subsequently filed 2 annulment cases for psychological incapacity
against his wife, Ong. The RTC issued summons to Ong but only two days after the issuance of the
summons, the process server returned to the Court a Return of Summons stating that a substituted
service of summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same to Ong and that a
copy was received by a security guard in Ong’s residence. The RTC then rendered judgment
annulling their marriage. Ong petitioned for the annulment of the RTC’s judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over her person, arguing that the summons was invalidly served. The SC agreed
with Ong, pointing out multiple deficiencies in the Return of Summons of the process server.

DOCTRINE
A defective service of summons renders the judgment of the court void. For a valid substituted
service of summons to be made, there must be:
1. Several attempts made to serve the summons personally;
2. The Return of Summons must describe in detail why the attempts failed, the dates and
places of the attempts, the inquiries made and the names of the occupants of the
defendant’s house.
3. The sheriff must determine, and must clearly and specifically describe in his Return of
Summons, if the third person receiving the summons is of sufficient age, what his
relationship is with the defendant, his competence to receive the summons and his
comprehension of the duty to inform the defendant of the summons.
Absent these details, the substituted service of summons is invalid.

FACTS
1. Yuk Ling Ong, a Bristish-Hong Kong national, and Benjamin Co, Filipino, were married in 1982.
2. Co filed two annulment cases against Ong:
a. The first was in 2001, when he filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC.
i. Co stated in this petition that Ong’s address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila.
ii. There was no further showing of this case’s status, whether pending, withdrawn, or
terminated.
b. The other one was in 2002, when Co filed another petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC.
i. In this petition, Co stated that Ong’s address was in 23, Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City.
3. In the second annulment case, the RTC issued summons to Ong.
a. Two days after the issuance of the summons, the process server returned to the court a
Servicer’s Return, stating that:
i. substituted service of summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve
the same to ong.
ii. That the substituted service of summons were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a
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 security guard.
4. The RTC considered the summons served and considered Ong to have failed to file her
responsive pleading during the reglementary period, so it rendered a decision finding the
marriage void an initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
5. 6 years later (in 2008), Ong received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), directing her to appear before the BID because her permanent residence visa
was being subjected to cancellation proceedings.
a. Her marriage with Co being nullified by the court was apparently the ground for this.
b. The BID furnished her with copies of the petitions for declaration of nullity, the decision of
the court, and the marriage contract with the decision annotated on it.
6. Ong was perplexed that her marriage with Co had been declared void ab initio, so she filed a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 before the CA. She raised two grounds:
a. Extrinsic Fraud - because in the first case (Fact no. 2.a.), Co deliberately indicated a wrong
address to prevent her from participating in the trial; and
b. Lack of Jurisdiction - as jurisdiction over her person was never acquired by the court
because of the invalid substituted service of summons.
i. She argued that no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service,
was stated before resorting to the substituted service of summons
ii. She also argued that the substituted service was made on a security guard of their
townhouse, and was not a member of her household.
7. The CA dismissed her petition and held that the substituted service of summons was valid.
a. It relied on the case of Robinson vs Miralles.
b. The CA held that it was a customary practice in Ong’s townhouse that the security guard
would first entertain any visitors and receive any communication in behalf of the
homeowners.
i. With this set up, the CA held that it was impossible for the process server to
personally serve the summons upon Ong.
c. The CA also held that the server’s return carries with it the presumption of regularity.
8. Hence this petition for review with the CA, raising the same arguments.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. WoN a the service of summons was valid. NO.
a. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either:
i. Upon a valid service of summons; or
ii. The defendant’s voluntary appearance in court.
b. Service of summons could either be:
i. Personal, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person (Rule 14,
Sec. 6), or
ii. substituted, by leaving copies of the summons to some other recipient authorized
under Rule 14, Sec 7.
c. In the case of Manotoc vs CA, the Court discussed the rigorous requirements of a
substituted service of summons:
i. First, Impossibility of prompt personal service:
1. There must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted
in failure.
2. “Several attempts” means at least three tries, preferably on at least two
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 different dates.
3. The Sheriff must also cite why such efforts were unsuccessful.
ii. Second, Specific Details in the Return:
1. The sheriff must describe the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service in the Return of Summons.
2. This includes the efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind
the failure, which must be narrated in detail in the Return.
3. The date and time of the attempts, the inquiries made, the names of the
occupants of the alleged residence or house, must be included in the
Return.
iii. Third, a Person of Suitable Age and Discretion:
1. The sheriff must determine if the person found in the dwelling/residence of the
defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant
is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of
the summons, and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or to
notify said defendant.
2. These must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons.
d. In this case, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons only
after two days from the issuance of the summons.
e. The Return of Summons also utterly lacks sufficient details such as:
i. The specific number of attempts made
ii. the dates and corresponding time the attempts were made,
iii. the underlying reasons for each unsuccessful service
iv. There was no description in detail of the person who received the summons, only
that it was received by “Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the
Security Officer thereat” and did not expound on the competence of the security
officer to receive the summons.
f. The case of Robinson vs Miralles cited by the CA is not applicable in this case.
i. In that case, the Return described in great detail how the security guard refused the
sheriff’s entry despite several attempts. The defendant in that case specifically
instructed the guard to prevent anybody to proceed in her residence.
ii. In the present case, the attempts made by the process server were stated in a broad
and ambiguous statement.
g. The Presumption of Regularity does not apply in this case.
i. This is never intended to be applied in cases where there are no showing of
substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure.

2. WoN the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner Ong. NO.
a. First, a Rule 47 petition may only be raised on two grounds:
i. Extrinsic fraud; and
ii. Lack of jurisdiction.
b. Lack of jurisdiction, could either be over the subject matter, which is a matter of substantive
law, or over the person of the defendant, a matter of procedural law.
c. Since the Summons was invalidly served (issue no. 1), jurisdiction over the defendant was
never acquired and thus the RTC’s decision must be struck down for lack of jurisdiction.

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DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March 26, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002
Decision of the RTC is hereby declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.

DIGESTER: Xave Libardo.