Galvez vs.

Court of Appeals
Facts:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one
Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for
allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes
Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15,
1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos
on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued
an order denying the motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued
on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the
reinstatement of the original informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On
said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge
Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier stated, respondent court
dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that there was
no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed
in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be
no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal
of the original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the
fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for
the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss
filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their
real position.

Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones
substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that
had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be
deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off
with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital
offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a
new information.

Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority
to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss
despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot
deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”