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Antecedents
Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same
On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a
case and may be using the same arguments. (emphasis supplied)
Letter-Resolution,1 advising respondent Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required
freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea
MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153). Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently,
unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to
some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the
For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213
Supreme Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
(EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by
innuendo"9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994. 2
influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that
the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is
On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC at least 3 to 6 months."10 They averred that the respondents’ purpose,
153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision,
the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or influenced!"11
temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29,
2001,3 however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
In their comment dated January 20, 2003,12 the respondents denied any
prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the
intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court. 13 They explained that
Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001.4 Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA
their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month time
denied DMAP’s motion for reconsideration.5
only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" 14 was not per se
contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the
DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, resolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the
2002,6 the Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petition was to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to
petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period six months, if the petition was to be given due course; that what made
of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to the petitioners describe the statement as contemptuous was not the real
Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' or actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners’ false,
motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit malicious, scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and
for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of ₱202.00 in that the petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had
accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule no basis to assert that the DMAP’s presentor, the author of the material,
56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court." or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made
any malicious insinuations.15
On August 12, 2002,7 the Court denied with finality DMAP’s motion for
reconsideration. The respondents further stated that the term time frame was layman’s
parlance to explain to DMAP members that the petition had been
dismissed due to a technicality, considering that the appeals process in
In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the case before the Court had taken only a month instead of the
the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo expected three to six months;16 that the term lead time, although not
Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, the proper legal term to describe the process that the respondents’
publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update,8 which is reproduced as petition had undergone in the Court, was common parlance in the
follows: business sector in which the respondents belonged; that the discussions
during the presentation focused on the legal options of DMAP with
respect to the 20% increase, i.e., to go back to MARINA for the
SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE
resolution of the propriety and reasonableness of the 20%
Oct. 2002 GMM
increase;17 that a lead time was indicated in the presentation material
20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE
simply to tell DMAP members that the lead time to go back to MARINA
1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was
had been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for review; and
denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
that, on the other hand, had the Court given due course to the petition,
presented.
the expected time for the Court to resolve the appeal on the merits
Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the
would have been from three to six months, a normal expectation. 18
amount of filing fee lacking & failure to indicate date of receipt of court
resolution)
> Some technical matters that could cause denial Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of
- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings the decision of the CA, which the Court affirmed, revealed that the
Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court
amount to indirect contempt of court? proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence
are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require normal
adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what
Ruling procedures must attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with
contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate
We dismiss the petition. contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court
contempts that interfere with the judicial process. 37
I
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without
further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt
committed directly under its eye or within its view. 38 But there must be
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a of the court.39 The exercise of the summary power to imprison for
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior oppressive conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. 21 The phrase contempt of court is its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage. 41
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different
acts.22
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, 23 and need action.42 They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or
not be specifically granted by statute. 24 It lies at the core of the remedial.
administration of a judicial system.25 Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to
impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in
from the approach and insults of pollution.26The power to punish for unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court
contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be
justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without party therein.43 It is at times difficult to determine whether the
such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very proceedings are civil or criminal.
shaky foundation.28
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a) branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or
disrespect.48 There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the
gravamen of the offense.49 Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
alleged contemnor should be considered.50 Where the act complained of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the
presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held
to be determinative of its character. 51 A person should not be xxx
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be
right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. 52 To constitute only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
improper purpose.53 for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the
court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their xxx
employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute
direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when
committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
II. unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Utterances in Sea Transport Update, such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (bold
Not Contemptuous emphasis supplied)60
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the
punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the
supra. Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and
did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the
The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard,
the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and then, we need to remind that the power to punish for contempt of court
baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and
by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to
leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter
issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 or fail.61 As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds, namely: direct and indirect
contempt.1âwphi1 Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that
which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper Before Us is a special civil action for Injunction to enjoin public
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade respondents from implementing the National Power Board (NPB)
the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.51 Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, both dated 18 November
2002, directing, among other things, the termination of all employees of
the National Power Corporation (NPC) on 31 January 2003 in line with
The indirect contempt charges in this case involve an invocation of the restructuring of the NPC.
paragraphs b, c, and d, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
read as follows:
On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA Law), was approved and
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and took effect on
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the 26 June 2001. Section 2(i) and Section 3 of the EPIRA Law states:
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the
policy of the State:
xxxx
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
To serve as the overall organizational framework for the realigned
functions of the NPC mandated under the EPIRA Law, the Restructuring
Committee proposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was
#3 G.R. No. 156208 September 26, 2006 approved by the NPB through NPB Resolution No. 2002-53 dated 11
April 2002. Likewise, the Restructuring Committee reviewed the
proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan and assisted in the
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), implementation of Phase I (Realignment) of said Plan, and thereafter
represented by Its President ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC recommended to the NPB for approval the adoption of measures
EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU) – NORTHERN LUZON pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPC personnel. The NPB,
REGIONAL CENTER, represented by its Regional President JIMMY taking into consideration the recommendation of the Restructuring
D. SALMAN, in their own individual capacities and in behalf of the Committee, thus amended the Restructuring Plan approved under NPB
members of the associations and all affected officers and Resolution No. 2002-53.
employees of National Power Corporation (NPC), ZOL D. MEDINA,
NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR., NECITAS B.
CAMAMA, in their individual capacities as employees of National On 18 November 2002, pursuant to Section 634 of the EPIRA Law and
Power Corporation, petitioners, Rule 335 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which
vs. provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of
BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as Organization. Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be legally
Chairman of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB), terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation
ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President – Officer-in-charge/CEO of benefits. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution No. 2002-
National Power Corporation and Member of National Power 125, whereby a Transition Team was constituted to manage and
Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, implement the NPC's Separation Program.
From the arguments put forward by herein parties, it is evident that the
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions are void and without force pivotal issue to be resolved in this Petition for Injunction is whether or
and effect, herein petitioners, in their individual and representative not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly
capacities, filed the present Petition for Injunction to restrain enacted. It is petitioners' contention that the failure of the four
respondents from implementing NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. specifically identified department heads7 under Section 48 of the EPIRA
2002-125. In support thereof, petitioners invoke Section 78 of the EPIRA Law to personally approve and sign the assailed Resolutions invalidates
Law, to wit: the adoption of said Resolutions. Petitioners maintain that there was
undue delegation of delegated power when only the representatives of
certain members of the NPB attended the board meetings and passed
Section 78. Injunction and Restraining Order. – The and signed the questioned Resolutions.
implementation of the provisions of this Act shall not be
restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who
shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has
vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and
In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002- discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as
125, petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were not passed and "the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and
issued by a majority of the members of the duly constituted Board of one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without
Directors since only three of its members, as provided under Section willfulness or favor.8 Discretion, when applied to public functionaries,
486 of the EPIRA Law, were present, namely: DOE Secretary Vincent S. means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in
Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T. certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment
Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala. According to and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of
petitioners, the other four members who were present at the meeting others.9 It is to be presumed that in naming the respective department
and signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these
departments but were merely representatives or designated alternates secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their
of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy
of the NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department
violative of the well-settled principle that "delegated power cannot be secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much
further delegated." Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is
Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such
constituted board since no quorum existed because only three of the responsibility.
nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were
present and qualified to sit and vote.
There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions
involves the exercise of discretion and not merely a ministerial act that
It is petitioners' submission that even assuming arguendo that there was could be validly performed by a delegate, thus, the rule enunciated in
no undue delegation of power to the four representatives who signed the the case of Binamira v. Garrucho10 is relevant in the present
assailed Resolutions, said Resolutions cannot still be given legal effect controversy, to wit:
because the same did not comply with the mandatory requirement of
endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power Commission and approval
of the President of the Philippines, as provided under Section 47 of the An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it
EPIRA Law which states that: to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because
he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in
Section 47. NPC Privatization. – Except for the assets of SPUG, his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties
the generation assets, real estate, and other disposable assets to another.
as well as IPP contracts of NPC shall be privatized in
accordance with this Act. Within six (6) months from
effectivity of this Act, the PSALM Corp. shall submit a plan for In those cases in which the proper execution of the office
the endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or
Commission and the approval of the President of the discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he
Philippines, on the total privatization of the generation assets, was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
real estate, other disposable assets as well as existing IPP discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place
contracts of NPC and thereafter, implement the same, in has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to
accordance with the following guidelines, except as provided another.
for in paragraph (f) herein: x x x.
Respondents' assertion to the contrary is not tenable. The ruling in the
Petitioners insist that if ever there exists a valid wholesale abolition of case cited by respondents to support their contention is not applicable in
their positions and their concomitant separation form the service, such a the case at bar. While it is true that the Court has determined in the
process is an integral part of "privatization" and "restructuring" as case of American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents 11 that a
defined under the EPIRA Law and, therefore, must comply with the delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to
above-quoted provision requiring the endorsement of the Joint assist him in his functions, it must be stressed that the Court explicitly
Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of stated in the same case that said practice is permissible only when the
the Philippines. Furthermore, petitioner highlight the fact that said judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
Resolutions will have an adverse effect on about 5,648 employees of the authorized by law. According to the Court, the rule that requires an
NPC and will result in the displacement of some 2,370 employees, which, administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does
petitioners argue, is contrary to the mandate of the Constitution to not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
promote full employment and security of tenure. procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally authorized
official who makes the final decisionthrough the use of his own personal
judgment.
Respondents, on the other hand, uphold the validity of the assailed
Resolutions by arguing that while it is true that four members of the
National Power Board of Directors, particularly the respective Secretaries In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB
of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of
SO ORDERED.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against
a Judge to the proper authorities only.
#4 A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY of influencing the court.
OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT" Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when
lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn
oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular,
DECISION avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any
court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation
of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here
but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by
respondent law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the
19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case.
therein. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves
who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement, 2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of
dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it
indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this
dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
(Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in
Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own
and the present decision. non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if
purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly glossed over by this Court.
in mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it
member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly
unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this
Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and
academics in our free and democratic republic. Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
case are as follows: (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for Vinuya, et
al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the decision, raising solely the following grounds:
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L.
Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), Your Honours:
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230,
where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in
the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other the last few days.
arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to
Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. the issues raised by this letter.
Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling
on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article
appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010. 13 With respect,
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and (Sgd.)
Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today. 14 In the said column, Dr. Mark Ellis20
Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court
that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics
Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the
international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the
entry in this wise:
Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and
yesterday. The motion is available here:
Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo. 21
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring
plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s
sentences and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement
my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox- also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News
Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
until after the motion was filed today. likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s
bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s
website.27
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the
Your Honors: original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This
cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’
writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of
signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates,
of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence
Court en banc. of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of
organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
Respectfully,
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
(Sgd.) because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It
Dean and Professor of Law is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of
the Highest Court of the Land.
(Emphases supplied.)
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers,
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court
contain the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary
the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture,
faculty Statement is reproduced here: and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status
of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the
RESTORING INTEGRITY same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the
intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution
by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
order to mislead and deceive.
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it
deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and
damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage.
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and
impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered
suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the
the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of
government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial
acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
(28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided
Court of the land.
this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court
added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false
Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for
Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only even the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of
affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal
without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest
misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar
writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power
taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the
and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear
writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of
judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of
dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered
to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis
of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and (SGD.) SOLOMON F.
trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the (SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
LUMBA
opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law Assistant Professor
Assistant Professor
that:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the (2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same
charge in par. (1);
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points: In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted
that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are
legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to
the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism,
specifically:
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to
legal processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence,
or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the (i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo
issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their and Purple Romero;56
intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its
integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in
the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly (ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for
the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench (iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research published on July 25, 2010;58
and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with
strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law (iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo
reform and in the improvement of the administration of published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal
processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, (v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office
they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in
guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47 (vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue on August 8, 2010;61
the Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x
x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They (vii) News report regarding Senator Francis
further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice Del
drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the
not going to take any action on the grave and startling Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According
to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news
article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily (viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean
Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University
was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not School of Law on the calls for the resignation of
order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin,
letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on
but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and August 11, 2010;63
misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was
their perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers
(ix) News report on expressions of support for
posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo
that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine
issue.
Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of
Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines –
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on
Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable August 16, 2010;64 and
in accordance with the standards of academic writing
(d) Freedom of expression 1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, 2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to
respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing refute and/or address the findings and conclusions
their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of
court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy malicious intent), and in that connection, that
who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United adopted and defined that will allow them the full and
States v. Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In fair opportunity to require the production of and to
the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: present testimonial, documentary, and object
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
Commission on Elections.69 misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In
the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
(e) Academic freedom Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC); and
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents
asserted that their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their 3. respondents be given fair and full access to the
academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions
relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to
which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and cross-examine the witnesses who were or could
responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C.
Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and
communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of
reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised
[their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have
created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria
lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the
public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s
conduct."71 Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly
entitled her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be
consider the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit: Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect good faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by
for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista
exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.
their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do
well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited
regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. 73 jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach,
entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus: what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be
admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the
schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave
WHEREFORE: abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the
academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other
universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law,
members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray
that: Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise
of respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can
only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public
1. the foregoing be noted; and safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its
conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached
their "obligation as law professors and officers of the On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In
authority of this Court, … and not to promote said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite
drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as or above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant
follows: public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to
secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that
"[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the and pranksters."90
faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the
actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members
subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the
the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign
2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his
Compliance, he narrated that:
"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual
physical signature, but which reflects as signatories the names
of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation 2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity
"(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed
physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the
Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those
received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his
the filing of Restoring Integrity I. staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)"
signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that
Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar
before he left for the U.S. the following week. of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting
professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the
same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United
Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94 sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to
According to the Dean: speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting
opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio,
Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he
of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression,
Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of
Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous
arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for
become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did
circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to
Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring
aggravate the situation by signing the Statement. 95(Emphases supplied.) to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he
"has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature
the same reasons they did."110
page of Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of
Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s
August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to ISSUES
the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was
explained in the Compliance that:
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I follows:
when it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left
out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in
Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still 1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their
included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover freedom of expression?
note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed
(the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96 2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors?
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a
dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of 3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain
the same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was why they should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar
unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] Code of Professional Responsibility?
essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw
adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving
and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be 4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a
more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in 10.03?
a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter did
not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members
of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring 5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are
signatories thereto."99 respondents entitled to require the production or presentation
of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation
issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to
violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to nor necessary and further held that:
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and
the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason
and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means
v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x. their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene
and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations
of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on
the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J.
cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.) the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that
they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
freedom of expression when it stated that: predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the
an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it
may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez
then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so Compliance, observed that:
that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer [T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
that
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending
cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior,
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST
persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to
with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
practice of the noblest profession."121
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right
to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the
right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must
good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten
conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an
the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
xxxx
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward
the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect conduct by others.
to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot
criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of
the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and
it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to
declared: advance the interests of their clients.
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
Dec. 657, 665).
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar
xxxx to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
in Almacen: pleadings must be dignified.128
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common
such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. Compliance, held that:
xxxx
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is
the threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements
this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to
re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In wit:
re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive
language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of
disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]). interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the (1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the
conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary
reason for their request for access to the records and evidence (2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely,
presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn
the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan
happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario
proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña,
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case. Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo,
Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with language that Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent
the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain
versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence
supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
that are already of public knowledge. the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
GARCIA, J.: Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the
most palpably meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the
Supreme Court, or any court of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt
In a letter1 to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with
that were it not for the Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents
copies thereof furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other
that ensued from it, at least some of these ten cases would have met
government entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty.
with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to
Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as "member, Philippine Bar",
any reasonable and impartial mind.
expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the
manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to
wit: In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has
taken it personally against me. To the detriment of my innocent
clients. And of justice.
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against
4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al. me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that.
5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al. As I had stated in one communication-
6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations [I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Court’s position, it is that
Commission, et al. x x x if indeed I had wronged the Court in the way it had described,
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al. and if indeed my explanations and arguments "lack merit," I should
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al. indeed be disciplined; and surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It
should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of the
charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to
surrounding the dismissal on February 7, 20002of the very first case he deny to the undersigned the "full opportunity" for self-defense that he
filed with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of request … therefore he is now left without any defense, and he can only
Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda wonder why no sanction has come down until the present time.
Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda, in
cowardice, to deal with an adversary like that. It is not his letter of May 10, 200512, again with copies thereof furnished the
something I would have expected from the supreme judges of Justices, judges and lawyers thereunder listed, states that he "does not
the land. see the need to say any more" because the "cause" has "already been
shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter of 21 February 2005, adding
that "[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. swiftly and decisively". While admitting "the great seriousness of the
The same verifications that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became statements and imputations I have leveled against the Court", he dared
course for dismissal. What other interpretation can I give it, than that the Court whether "it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the
the court had run out of excuses to dismiss, since I was being careful not ‘Supreme Judge’".
to repeat the same adjudged "shortcomings"; and was now scrounging
every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get my
"comeuppance." After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses
the Court of being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by
its rulings thereon. Atty. Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- not know how to count when it dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of
only either to the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. failure to file the petition therein within the reglementary period. For the
Bellosillo, which handled the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition
by the Chief Justice, to whom I have directly written afterwards. Could it in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the period fixed in
be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely explanation that the powers- Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or
that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get favorable ruling? certified true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals
Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillo’s dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule
retirement on November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56.13 In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs.
nation’s judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was dismissed on the mere
beyond the constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be
much mystery and intrigue has surrounded the appointment of his reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective
successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a
sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new retirement took substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.14 We see no need to belabor the
place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this latest grounds for the dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said
retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions which
other than the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, were plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even
then Chairman of the Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile to those who do not have a formal education in law. Suffice it to say that
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable reputations for the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation
independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in the court exercised among members of this Court.
their utmost influence to at least prevent the both of them sitting in the
bench at the same time, lest together they should "buck the system"
and divide the Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably rule Atty. Sorreda’s imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle
on the undersigned counsel’s cases before it? of cases is utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his
imagination.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment,
we hold Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to
its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard
On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations or disobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct tending to bring
Commission (NLRC) denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
of the labor arbiter with modification. Thus: in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. 11 Under the
Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either direct or indirect
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
merit and the Decision dated September 29, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
with MODIFICATION in [that Mariano Y. Siy] should be made jointly and same.12 Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a
severally liable together with Phil. Agri Trading Center and that court.13 It is an act done at a distance which tends to belittle, degrade,
[Embang] is entitled only [to] the ten (10%) percent of his awarded obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.14
13th month pay as attorney’s fees.
Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect
SO ORDERED.4 contempt is committed by a person who commits the following acts,
among others: disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order
or judgment of a court;15 any abuse of or any unlawful interference with
After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution, the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a contempt;16 and any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
petition for certiorari. Finding the petition to be without merit, the impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. 17
appellate court dismissed the same.5 The motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner was likewise denied.6
We denied with finality the petitioner’s petition for review
on certiorari almost two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this
Court questioning the CA’s decision (dismissing his petition) and Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo’s sly
resolution (denying his motion for reconsideration). Since we found no maneuvers on behalf of his client.
reversible error on the part of the appellate court, we denied the petition
in our September 22, 2003 resolution. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of our resolution but we resolved to deny the same with Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the
finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made on December 30, 2003. matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits
of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s
verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement
In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang’s in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:18
counsel filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated
February 16, 2004 before the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo
entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a comment to the …well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
motion for writ of execution.7 He alleged that Embang rejected the becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
various offers of reinstatement extended to her by petitioner; hence, she any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
date of the promulgation of the labor arbiter’s decision. rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and motions The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime
between the parties.8 Finding that his office was never informed by and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention on their administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
part to reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
an order dated July 30, 20049 granting the February 16, 2004 motion guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must
and directing that a writ of execution be issued. frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.
Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical
on August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order that the backwages any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
should be computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
backwages should accrue thereafter because of Embang’s refusal to be and inequitable.
reinstated.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Contrary
Embang’s counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the to Atty. Quevedo’s contention, there existed no supervening event that
appeal was not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading would have brought the case outside the ambit of the general rule on the
Center did not post the required cash or surety bond. Pending the immutability of final and executory decisions.
resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite Atty.
Quevedo in contempt of court. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment
becomes final and executory or to new circumstances which
By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the develop after judgment acquires finality.19 The "refusal" of Embang to be
execution of the decision but only sought the consideration of Embang’s reinstated happened, assuming it really happened, before the finality of
refusal to be reinstated in any writ of execution that may be issued. He our September 22, 2003 resolution, i.e., before the decision of the labor
claims that such refusal on Embang’s part constituted a supervening arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final and executory.
event that justified the filing of an appeal ― notwithstanding the finality
of the decision. He also asserts that an appeal was the proper remedy to In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embang’s
question the July 30, 2004 order of the labor arbiter. rejection of the same was not a new one and had already been passed
upon by the courts. Atty. Quevedo himself admits that petitioner brought
Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution10 on the issue before the CA in his June 6, 2002 petition for certiorari and
February 28, 2005 resolving not to give due course to the appeal and to December 3, 2002 memorandum. The appellate court brushed it aside
remand the case to the regional arbitration branch for further and found neither factual nor legal merit in the petition. The matter was
proceedings. The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order was not again raised in petitioner’s June 3, 2003 motion for reconsideration
appealable. Despite the denial of the appeal, however, Atty. Quevedo which was denied on the ground that the basic issues had already been
x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are RESOLUTION
separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the
exercise of the other. A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is TINGA, J.:
designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the
object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court This administrative case arose when a Complaint-Affidavit dated 31 May
and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy 2004 of Pilar Barredo-Fuentes, Lourdes J. Estrellado, Clarita Estrellado-
to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to Mainar and Florenda Estrellado-Diaz (complainants) charged Judge
cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court [while that] Romeo C. Albarracin (respondent judge) of MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City,
of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to with Gross Ignorance of the Law and/or Procedure and Grave Abuse of
assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as Discretion. The charges refer to respondent judge’s acting on an
judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion without hearing and without the motion served
on the complainants.1 The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion sought the issuance of
an order specifically directing Sheriff Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a writ of execution and special writ of demolition, including the demolition
contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent of defendants’ buildings and other improvements filed by plaintiffs in the
charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner, an attorney’s following cases:
conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor
on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise been (1) Special Civil Case No. 6, 298-C-98 entitled "Heirs of Dr.
the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be Jovito S. Francisco, et al. v. Pilar E. Barredo-Fuentes" for
punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause Forcible Entry;
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering
that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
(2) Special Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98 entitled "JS Franciso
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the
and Sons, Inc. v. Nicolas Estrellado and Narcisa Trono-
procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
Estrellado" for Forcible Entry; and
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and
139 thereof.
(3) Special Civil Case No. 6, 296-C-98 entitled "JS Francisco &
Sons, Inc. v. Lourdes J. Estrellado" for Forcible Entry.
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for
contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme
Court and are equally incidents of the court’s basic power to oversee the As gleaned from the complaint, complainants are the defendants in the
proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial aforementioned cases. After trial on the forcible entry cases, judgments
functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et were rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Thus, complainants filed with
al.: the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a petition for annulment of
judgments under Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court. The case was
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play raffled to RTC Branch 13 and is pending resolution.2
in cases like that before us here: the Court’s inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the On 4 March 2004, respondent judge issued a writ of demolition despite
Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for the pendency of the case for annulment of judgments. Complainants
contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and requested respondent judge to await the result of the annulment of
Respondent judge further contends that on 24 March 2004, upon motion SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be
of the plaintiff corporation and after several hearings, he issued an order addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
granting plaintiff corporation’s prayer for the issuance of a special order and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10)
of demolition. However, Sheriff Del Campo failed to fully implement the days after the filing of the motion.
demolition. Plaintiff corporation thus filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
which was eventually granted in an Order dated 26 May 2004.7
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion
set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof
Subsequently, complainants filed a consolidated motion seeking to of service thereof.
expunge the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. Respondent judge inhibited himself
from further handling the ejectment cases since complainants had
already filed the present administrative case. In view of the inhibition, The evidence reveals that respondent judge notified complainants and
the cases were raffled to MTCC Branch 6, Davao City. The consolidated conducted a hearing before the issuance of the writ of execution and
motion was eventually denied.8 special writ of demolition.16 It was only when the execution and
demolition were not implemented that, upon ex-parte motion of the
plaintiffs, respondent judge directed Sheriff del Campo to enforce the
Respondent judge denies complainants’ charge that the granting of writ of execution and special writ of demolition despite the absence of
plaintiff’s corporations motion which directed Sheriff Del Campo to notice and hearing considering that these rights had already been
enforce the special writ of demolition despite the pendency of the case availed of by complainants. It is worthy to note that the second order
for annulment of judgments at the RTC Branch 13 reflects gross was a mere implementation of a prior order implementing execution and
ignorance of the law. He argues that the RTC where the forcible entry demolition. Even Section 10(d) of Rule 39 is silent as to the need for a
cases were elevated did not issue any TRO or any injunctive relief to second hearing in case the first motion for the issuance of writ of
restrain him from granting the motion to enforce/implement the writ of execution and special order of demolition was not fully implemented:
demolition. He contends that the granting of the motion was incidental
to the motion for execution which has long been granted. In addition,
the Court of Appeals in its decisions affirmed the decisions of the lower SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.⎯
court.9
(d). Removal of improvements on property
On the charge that he granted without hearing plaintiff corporation’s subject of execution. – When the property subject of
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, respondent judge asserts that a hearing is not the execution contains improvements constructed or
necessary because the special writ of demolition had already been planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
granted after several hearings and the ex-parte motion was merely for officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
the enforcement or implementation of said writ.10 improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after due hearing and after the former has failed to
After a perusal of the evidence on record, the Office of the Court remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by
Administrator (OCA) ruled that complainants have no basis for their the court.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-
Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect CBN news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, as
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the follows:
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect contempt Atty. Diokno
proceedings against complainants for the injury was not committed
against this tribunal, but against respondent judge.
So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is
very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa
There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a
condemn the complainants to suffer the penalty for contempt, shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
considering that the "contemptuous" act was not directed against the
Court itself. The penalty as recommended by the OCA cannot be
Ernesto Manzano
sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be
penalized for filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate
proceeding, if warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the Revised Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga
Rules of Court. mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo
na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we modify the conclusion
reached by the OCA. The administrative case filed against Judge Romeo Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
C. Albarracin is hereby DISMISSED.
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice. The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of
the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration
of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the
exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that
Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with
the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the
us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered. administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat.11
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the
making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim
administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered
malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the
by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No.
Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the
199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from
criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his
homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said
co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position that the press
statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition
conference was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of
cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.
influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed before it and the
outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by drawing an ostensible
parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments
reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any
of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of
action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of
their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and
the Court either.
did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice
in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances
were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of "A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
public interest and concern; and that this petition is intended to stifle protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a
legitimate speech. judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in
such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the
The petition must fail.
respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments
judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing of the respondents.
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this
rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh
71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads: heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 13 The
power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for justice.14 In the present case, such necessity is wanting.
indirect contempt:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
xxx
x-----------------------x
After a few days or on April 9, 2002, the RTC granted the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction preventing SLU and Dean Dacanay from enforcing
G.R. No. 174758 the Revised COWE.14
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, SHI ERYL A. REBUCAL, JENNY RIZA A. In their Fourth Amended Complaint,15 the Olairez group disclosed that
BANTA, and BRANDO B. BADECAO,Petitioners, they had completed, passed and received their final grades in all the
vs. subjects required for the conferment of the degree of doctor of medicine.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., DEAN ELIZABETH FE-DACANA Y, They were allowed to march and attend the commencement exercises.
ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, DR. ROBERTO LEGASPI, DR. They received the symbolic diploma and were eventually conferred with
ANASTACIO AQUINO, LOURDES JACINTO, DR. JOHN ANTHONY the degree, Doctor of Medicine. Similarly, the Association of Philippine
DOMANTAY, and NORA PONOC, Respondents. Medical Colleges permitted them to attend the twelve-month post
graduate internship at the Baguio General Hospital. Subsequently, they
DECISION obtained clearances from various departments except for two
departments, the Administrative Secretary and the Training Officer of
SLU. Still, Dean Dacanay refused to issue certifications in their favor. To
MENDOZA, J.: them, it was unacceptable.
For assessment and disposition before the Court are the following Thus, the Olairez group prayed that Dean Dacanay and SLU be ordered
consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules to forward their final grades (SLU Form No. 4) to the Registrar’s Office
of Court. for recording; to issue their clearances, certificate of graduation, diploma
and include them in the SLU Registry of Graduates; to cease and desist
from exerting pressure on the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges
In G.R. No. 162299, Saint Louis University (SLU), along with co-
(APMC) to recall their certifications granting their internship and on
petitioners Dean Elizabeth Fe-Dacanay (Dean Dacanay), Rev. Father Paul
Baguio General Hospital to pull them out from their internship; to
Van Parijs, Dr. Robert Legaspi, Dr. Anastacio Aquino, Lourdes Jacinto,
declare the Revised COWE as moot and academic insofar as they were
Dr. John Anthony Domantay, and Nora Ponoc, are challenging the
concerned; and to pay them ₱2,000,000.00 as moral damages,
Resolutions, dated November 18, 20031 and February 10, 2004,2 of the ₱100,000.00 as nominal damages, ₱250,000.00 as exemplary damages
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. No. SP. 78127, dismissing SLU’s
and ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.16
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which sought the reversal of the
orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Baguio City (RTC), to wit:
1] Order,3 dated July 18, 2003, directing the petitioners to show cause Decision of the RTC
why they should not be held in contempt of court; 2] Order, 4 dated June
6, 2003,5 directing compliance with the July 16, 2003 RTC decision; 3]
Writ of Execution,6 dated July 18, 2003, signed by the Branch Clerk of On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Olairez
Court, without any motion for its issuance; and 4] Order, 7 dated July 18, group as graduates of the College of Medicine, SLU. 17 It explained that
2003, signed by Judge Ayson directing the issuance of a writ of the Revised COWE became moot and academic for the following reasons:
execution pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the 1] the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
reason that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the RTC. issued a certification that the Olairez group had completed all the
requirements for the Degree of Medicine, notwithstanding the grant of
autonomy to SLU by the CHED; and 2] SLU allowed the Olairez group to
In G.R. No. 174758, Baby Nellie Olairez, Shieryl A. Rebucal, Jenny Riza participate in the graduation rites. The decretal portion of the RTC
A. Banta, and Brando B. Badecao (Olairez group) are assailing the April decision reads:
7, 2006 Decision8 and the September 11, 2006 Resolution9 of the CA, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27861, setting aside the July 23, 2003 RTC Order and
dismissing the contempt charges against SLU. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs Baby Nellie Olairez and Shieryl Rebucal and intervenors
Jenny Rizza Banta and Brando Badecao and against the defendants, as
The Factual Antecedents follows:
SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City offering various 1. Ordering the Administrative Secretary, Training Officer,
diploma courses in different fields of study. Hospital Administrator and Medical Director of Saint Louis
University Hospital to sign the clearance of plaintiffs and
intervenors.
Baby Nellie M. Olairez (Olairez), Shieryl A. Rebucal (Rebucal), Jenny Riza
Banta (Banta), and Brando Badecao (Badecao), were fourth-year
graduating students of SLU’s College of Medicine Batch 2002. On March 2. Ordering defendants Dean Elizabeth Fe Dacanay and Saint
18, 2002, Olairez and Rebucal filed their Complaint for Mandatory Louis University to issue the Certificate of Graduation to
Injunction with Damages and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary plaintiffs and intervenors;
Restraining Order before the RTC, against Dean Dacanay, a certain April
Lily Bangaoet and other unidentified individuals, referred to as "John
Does," challenging the implementation of the revised version of the 3. Ordering defendant Dean Dacanay to forward the Final
Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for Grades (SLU Form No. 4) of plaintiffs and intervenors
graduation from SLU’s medicine course.10 The case was docketed as Civil submitted to her office to the Office of the Registrar of Saint
Case No. 5191-R. In their complaint, Olairez and Rebucal alleged that as Louis University for proper recording in the Transcript of
a condition for graduation, SLU required their students to complete and Records;
pass the COWE and, and if a student would fail, the student concerned
may take another remedial exam.11 Olairez alleged that the then newly
designated Dean Dacanay, suddenly devised and revised the COWE by
5. Ordering defendants Dean Dacanay and Saint Louis On July 19, 2003, the RTC sheriff served SLU with the said writ of
University and all those acting for and in their behalf to cease execution.
and desist permanently from exercising pressure on the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges (APMC) to recall the
permit issued by it to plaintiffs and intervenors for their On July 21, 2003, SLU moved for the inhibition of Presiding Judge
internship. Ayson,26 but its motion was denied in the Order, dated July 22,
2003.27 Thereafter, the hearing of the motion to cite SLU in contempt
proceeded on the same day without any participation of SLU and its
6. Ordering defendants Dean Dacanay and Saint Louis officials.
University and all those acting for and in their behalf to cease
and desist permanently from exerting pressure on the Baguio
General Hospital (BGH) to pull out plaintiffs and intervenors On the next day, or on July 23, 2003, the RTC found SLU guilty of
from their internship at BGH or from recalling the same. indirect contempt.28 The decretal portion of the order reads:
7. Declaring the plaintiffs and intervenors as having graduated WHEREFORE, the Court finds defendant Dean Elizabeth Dacanay guilty of
with the Degree of Doctor of Medicine having completed all the Indirect Contempt of Court under Sections 3 letter (b) and 7 of Rule 71
requirements leading to the Degree of Doctor of Medicine as in relation to Section 4 and 11 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and
certified to by the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) sentences her to pay a Fine of Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos.
Director Joseph de los Santos;
Likewise, the Court finds those acting for and in behalf of Dean Elizabeth
8. Declaring the Revised COWE with Orals 1 and 2 with Dacanay, namely, Administrative Secretary Nora Ponoc, Hospital
additional two to four months of medical clerkship as moot and Administrator Lourdes Jacinto, Training Officer Dr. Anastacio Aquino and
academic insofar as plaintiffs and intervenors are concerned Medical Director Dr. Roberto Legaspi, Dr. John Domantay and Acting
since they have already graduated with the Degree of Doctor President Atty. Arnulfo Soriano guilty of Indirect Contempt of Court
of Medicine as certified to by the CHED Director Joseph de los under Sections 3 letter (b) and 7 of Rule 71 in relation to Sections 4 and
Santos; 11 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and hereby sentences them to pay a
fine of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED.18 On November 18, 2003, the CA dismissed SLU’s petition outright for its
failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration.30 The CA explained that
"a special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party
The next day or, on July 17, 2003, the Olairez group trooped to SLU and
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
insisted on its immediate compliance with the RTC ruling. Unable to get
of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration so as to allow
a favorable reply from SLU, the Olairez group filed, on the same day, a
"Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt" setting the hearing the lower court to correct the alleged error."31
of the motion for July 18, 2003.19 Meanwhile, SLU filed its Notice of
Appeal20 before the RTC. SLU moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution,32 dated February 10, 2004.
In its Order, dated July 18, 2003, the RTC cited Section 4, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court specifying that a judgment in an action for injunction was Unsatisfied, SLU elevated the disputed CA resolutions before the Court
immediately executory, but reset the hearing on the motion to cite SLU via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R.
in contempt of court to July 22, 2003 to allow compliance with a No. 162299.33
technical defect in the motion.21 In the order22 read in open court, it was
mentioned that SLU had already filed a notice of appeal. The RTC,
however, stressed that its judgment of injunction was immediately The Appeal Proper
enforceable even though SLU interposed an appeal.
The CA observed that the second element was lacking as there was
haste in the conduct of the proceedings and in issuing orders which The Court’s Ruling
deprived SLU of the opportunity to explain the reason for not complying
with the mandatory injunction. The CA then stated that "in order for a G.R. No. 162299
party to be guilty of indirect contempt, the rules require that he be given
enough and reasonable opportunity to explain his side against the
alluded contemptuous act. Deprive the party of such opportunity would SLU contends that the CA erred in dismissing its petition for certiorari for
be to deprive him of due process of law. It is in that non-observance of filing it without a prior motion for reconsideration which, according to it,
the constitutional right to due process that we find the order citing the constituted a fatal infirmity.
appellants in contempt to be unsustainable due to the unprocedural
process and the precipitate issuance of the contempt order."36 The
dispositive portion of the April 7, 2006 CA decision reads: The petition is bereft of merit.
IN VIEW OF ALL FOREGOING, THE INSTANT APPEAL is hereby GRANTED, The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.44 Its purpose is to grant
the challenged order dated July 23, 2003 in Civil Case No. 5191-R,
RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING the an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
assailed contempt charge against herein appellants. No pronouncement
circumstances of the case.45 It is not, however, an ironclad rule. There
as to cost.
are recognized exceptions such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
SO ORDERED.37 raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
Unperturbed, the Olairez group moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
ruling.38 On September 11, 2006, the CA denied their motion for interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
reconsideration.39 the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
Thus, the Olairez group filed a petition review on certiorari under Rule of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
45, docketed as G.R. No. 174758.40 criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
In the Resolution of April 16, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
two cases.41 to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.46
The Issues
Under the circumstances, the Court is not convinced that SLU’s
explanation constitutes sufficient ground for the application of the
G.R. No. 162299 exception to the rule. In the same vein, petitioners may not arrogate to
themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR necessary or not.47 It should be emphasized that procedural rules are
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
EXCLUDES THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI. alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. Although the
Court, in some cases, permits a relaxation in the application of the rules,
this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR the rules with impunity. It is true that litigation is not a game of
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO FILE technicalities, but it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted
A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
TRIAL COURT.42 speedy administration of justice.48
G.R. No. 174758 In this case, a liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may
not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or
cause needless delay in the administration of justice. For it is equally
I. settled that, except for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance
is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. 49
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FORMER THIRD DIVISION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IT SERIOUSLY ERRED
G.R. No. 174758
IN ITS FINDING THAT THE THREE-DAY NOTICE RULE WAS VIOLATED,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THE LEAD
COUNSEL ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SLU The Olairez group argues that the CA erred in ruling that SLU and its
VICE-PRESIDENT FOR ADM[I]NISTRATION AND ALSO THEN ACTING officials were denied of due process as they were not given the
PRESIDENT OF THE PRINCIPAL RESPONDENT SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, opportunity to comment and be heard on the contempt charges against
INC., WERE PERSONALLY SERVED COPIES ON JULY 19, 2003 OF THE them.50
NOTICE OF HEARING SET ON JULY 22, 2003 AT 8:30 A.M.
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the CA decision
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct to absolve SLU and its officials from the contempt charges filed against
contempt under section 1 of this Rule; them.1âwphi1
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 162299, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly,
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; the Resolutions, dated November 18, 2003 and February 10, 2004, of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. SP 78127, are AFFIRMED.
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority; In G.R. No. 174758, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the April 7,
2006 Decision and the September 11, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 27861, are AFFIRMED.
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
SO ORDERED.
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him.
#10 G.R. No. 189949 March 25, 2015
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a) (CASCONA), Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ISIAS Q. VIDUA, VICENTE M. BARRETO,
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. 51 Thus, the JOSE M. SANTIAGO, JOSE NASERIV C. DOLOJAN, JUAN
good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered.52 Where FERNANDEZ, HONORARIO DILAG, JR., FIDEL CORREA, ALICIA
the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face MERCADO, LECIRA JUAREZ,ATTY.FULGENCIO VIGARE, JR.,
that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, ANGELITO U. SACRO, MILDRED ESGUERRA, ANTONIO APALISOK,
is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, SALAMAN D. MANGCA, DANILO S. SEGOBRE, EDMUNDO D.
in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. 53 A person ENGAO, P/SUPT. ROLAND FELIX, P/SUPT. JERRY SUMBAD,
should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he P/INSP. GERRY HADUCA, P/INSP. ROBIN FUGIRAN,
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (CDA), BARTOLOME
purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. 54 To GALARITA, JR., WILFREDO JIMENEZ, HITLER UNTAL, JOEL JOHN
constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate PACTORES, ROLLY CADORNA, RUDY ELIPSE, IBRAHIM LAHI,
or improper purpose.55 RODOLFO BONIFACIO, JR., ANECITO VIEJO, JR., JONARD IRAN,
ANGELITO BALDONAZA, NIKKO DAJAY, ROLANDO ASPA, JESON
The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group CABATINGAN, JOBERT UGANG (SECURITY GUARDS), JOHN DOES
visited the school on July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the (MEMBERS OF THE ZAMBALES PROVINCIAL MOBILE GROUP OF
decision was not borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE), Respondents.
or indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to
be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent DECISION
to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary,
SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately
heed the demand of the Olairez group. MENDOZA, J.:
Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule This is a verified petition for indirect contempt with application for
on hearing of motions as provided in Section 4,56 Rule 15 of the Rules of preliminary injunction filed by Castillejos Consumers Association, Inc.
Court when they scheduled the hearing on their "Very Urgent Motion to (CASCONA) against several respondents for disobeying the March 13,
Cite Defendants In Contempt" on July 18, 2003 or just one day after 2009 Decision1 of this Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-36, entitled ZAMECO II
they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that Board of Directors v. CASCONA, et al.2
does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received
for filing57 and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, 58 subject
only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid application of the rule will The Facts
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice59 or if there was
substantial compliance.60 Petitioner CASCONA is an organization of electric consumers from
Castillejos, Zambales, under the coverage area of Zambales II Electric
Under the attendant circumstances, there was no substantial compliance Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II). Acting on a letter-complaint filed by
with procedural due process because although the hearing on the said CASCONA, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) issued its
motion was reset to July 22, 2003, the disputed writ of execution was Resolution, dated November 24, 2004, removing respondents Jose
actually issued on July 18, 2003 and served on SLU and its officials on Dominguez, Isias Vidua, Vicente Barreto, Jose Santiago, Jose Naseriv
July 19, 2003 before the rescheduled hearing date. while their counsels Dolojan, Juan Fernandez, and Honorario Dilag, Jr., (Dominguez, et al.)
on record received their copies on July 21, 2003. In due process, the and all incumbent members of the Board of Directors of ZAMECO II for
mismanagement of funds and expiration of their term of office. 3
On February 3, 2010, the Court granted the motion of Dominguez, et al. CASCONA contends that, with the intent of reinstating Dominguez, et al.
and recalled the Entry of Judgment. The March 13, 2009 Decision was and under the guise of the purported authority of the CDA over ZAMECO
indeed interlocutory in character as there was still something to be done II, the respondents acted in conspiracy, took the law into their own
by the CA because it would still determine whether the proceedings hands, and attempted to take control of ZAMECO II.
outlined in the EPIRA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR),
for the conversion of an electric cooperative into a stock cooperative
under the CDA, had been complied with. In this sense, the March 13, On February 10, 2011, Dominguez, et al., filed their Comment to
2009 Decision could not have attained a final and executory character. 11 Petition.19 They argue, first, that the March 13, 2009 Decision of the
Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-36 was not yet final and executory, thus,
they had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing any act. Second,
Meanwhile, by virtue of the November 24, 2004 Resolution of the NEA, R.A. No. 9520 or the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, which took
ZAMECO II was managed and operated by an interim board of directors effect on March 22, 2009, divested the NEA of its authority over electric
under the authority and supervision of NEA.12 cooperatives in favor of the CDA. Lastly, the respondents cited the CA
decision, Abdon v. NEA,20 which held that it was the CDA, and not the
On September 1, 2009, respondent Atty. Fulgencio Vigare (Atty. Vigare), NEA, that had regulatory powers over ZAMECO II.
as CDA Administrator for Luzon, issued the Memorandum, 13 declaring
that the CDA should assume jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. It stated, On May 31, 2011, respondents Mildred Esguerra (Esguerra) and Antonio
among others, that in the August 26, 2009 hearing of the House of Apalisok (Apalisok), as officials of the CDA, filed their compliance with
Representatives Committee on Cooperative Development (August 26, urgent request not to be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
2009 House Committee Hearing), the NEA readily acceded that the CDA contempt.21 They professed that they excluded themselves from the
should assume jurisdiction over ZAMECO II.14 Also, a task force was team created by Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009-
created primarily to reinstate the duly-recognized incumbent members 304 because the creation of this team would place them at a grave risk
of the board of directors who should perform their functions until such of being punished for contempt by the Court.22
Before proceeding with the Court’s ruling on the indirect contempt (c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
charge, several developments in the main case of ZAMECO II v. proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1
CASCONA, docketed as G.R. Nos. 176935-36, must be noted. of this Rule;
On March 25, 2010, the CA submitted its Report pursuant to the March (d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
13, 2009 decision of the Court. The CA found that the registration of obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
ZAMECO II with the CDA did not comply with the referendum
requirement under the IRR of EPIRA. In the absence of a referendum,
ZAMECO II failed to obtain the required simple majority vote in order to xxxx
validly convert it into either a stock cooperative or a stock corporation. 25
The respondents argue that the March 13, 2009 decision in G.R. Nos.
On October 20, 2014, the Court promulgated the decision in G.R. Nos. 176935-36 did not order them to do any act or refrain from doing an
176935-36. It finally ruled that ZAMECO II was an electric cooperative act. Hence, they did not, in any manner, disobey or resist a lawful writ,
and remained under the jurisdiction of the NEA, and not the CDA, based process, order or judgment.
on (1) R.A. No. 6939 or Cooperative Code of 1990, (2) R.A. No. 9136 or
EPIRA, The defense of the respondents does not persuade. The March 13, 2009
decision should not be taken in isolation. A perusal of the said decision
(3) R.A. No. 9520 or Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and (4) R.A. shows that there were several pronouncements which must be respected
No. 10531, or the National Electrification Administration Reform Act of and obeyed, to wit: first, the CA shall make a factual determination as to
2013. the propriety of ZAMECO II’s registration with the CDA; second, the
continuing jurisdiction of the Court, as the case is not yet final and
executory; and lastly, that there is substantial evidence to justify the
The Court also declared that the CDA’s issuance of a certificate of removal from office of respondents Dominguez, et al.
registration in favor of ZAMECO II in December 2007 did not operate to
divest the NEA of its jurisdiction because Dominguez, et al. failed to
comply with the statutory requirement of conversion outlined under the Precisely, the Court remanded the case to the CA to determine whether
EPIRA. ZAMECO II was properly registered as a stock cooperative under the
CDA. Until the CA properly had ascertained such fact, the Court could
not determine conclusively that the CDA had supervisory powers over
The Court’s Ruling ZAMECO II. The parties were then expected to maintain status quo and
refrain from doing any act that would pre-empt the final decision of the
Court. Hence, the Court continued to exercise its jurisdiction in G.R. Nos.
The petition is meritorious. 176935-36 until a final decision was promulgated. The respondents,
however, unreasonably interfered with the proper procedure mandated
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or by the Court when they decided for themselves that the CDA had
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a jurisdiction over ZAMECO II. This constituted a contemptuous act
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or because it unlawfully interfered with the processes or proceedings of a
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior court.
or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted Worse, the respondent-officials of the CDA, fully aware of the Court’s
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the pronouncement,30 attempted to reinstate respondents Dominguez, et al.
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. 26 despite the existence of substantial evidence that warrant the latter’s
removal from office. Glaringly, this grave allegation was never refuted by
There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and the respondents. Dominguez, et al. were found unfit to hold office yet
indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is the respondents relentlessly endeavoured to return them to the seat of
committed out of the presence of the court.27 A person who is guilty of power in ZAMECO II. This blatant disregard of the March 13, 2009
disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits decision of the Court is an improper conduct that impedes, obstructs, or
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, degrades the administration of justice.
or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt.28 The respondents justify their acts by stating that in the August 26, 2009
House Committee Hearing, the NEA acceded to the jurisdiction of the
Also, a contempt charge can either be criminal or civil in nature. A CDA over ZAMECO II. This contention, however, is completely
criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity unsubstantiated. Notably, respondents Esguerra and Apalisok admitted
and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act that the creation of a task force to take over ZAMECO II would place dire
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court consequences against the CDA. Even CDA Regional Director Manuel A.
into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists Mar doubted that the NEA consented to the authority of the CDA over
in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action ZAMECO II.31
for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. 29 Indeed, the October 20, 2014 decision of the Court in G.R. Nos. 176935-
36 conclusively settled that it is NEA, and not the CDA, that has
In the case at bench, the respondents committed several acts which jurisdiction and disciplinary authority over ZAMECO II. The substantial
constituted indirect contempt. The CDA issued the September 1, 2009 issues of the case have now been laid to rest. The Court, however,
Memorandum stating that it had jurisdiction over ZAMECO II and could cannot turn a blind eye to the contemptuous acts of the respondents
reinstate the former members of the Board of Directors. The CDA during the pendency of the case. If the Court condones these acts of
officials also issued Resolution No. 262, S-2009 and Special Order 2009- interference and improper conduct, it would set a dangerous precedent
304 to interfere with the management and control of ZAMECO II. Armed to future litigants in disregarding the interlocutory orders and processes
with these issuances, the other respondents even tried to physically of the Court.
takeover ZAMECO II on October 22, 2013. These acts were evidently
against the March 13, 2009 decision of this Court and, thus, constituted
If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees came
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, into a disagreement regarding the school's administrative structure and
hebymay be punished a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or La Salle's supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro.
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he guilty is Magbanua wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's supervision to
adjudged of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be includematters relating to the school's finances, administration, and
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment operations.14
not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the
violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status
quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the This was opposed by Custodio.15 After several incidents relating to the
party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount disagreement, Custodio filed a complaint against St. Francis School, Bro.
as may be alleged and proved. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua on June 7, 2002 with Branch 23, Regional Trial
Court, Trece Martires, Cavite. She alleged that Bro. Oca and Bro.
Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees. 16 She also
xxxx prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent Bro. Oca from
calling a special membership meeting to remove her from the Board of
Trustees.17
Based on the circumstances of the case, a fine amounting to Ten
Thousand Pesos (I!l0,000.00) is a sufficient penalty to be imposed
against each liable contemnor. This case was dismissed.18 Custodio was subsequently removed from the
Board of Trustees and as Curriculum Administrator. 19
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles, Ms. Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from
Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court to act as cashier of receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect all fees Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all accounts. Said
authority shall continue until the matter of the application for temporary (1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings
restraining order and preliminary injunction is heard and resolved. This Deposit No. 239 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
is hereby ordered so that an orderly operation of the school will be
achieved.
(2) ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings
Deposit No. 459 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom, (3) ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the
and the dates collected Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia school canteen;
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
(4) Other fees collected from January 2003 to
disbursements made.
Febrnary 19, 2003; and
Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that
only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts On the contrary, the court found out that defendants have not complied
of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary payments to four with the order of the court dated March 24, 2003 directing defendants
(4) employees who had resigned. 40 and Mr. Al Mojica to submit a report and to turn over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
The motion sprung from the Order dated March 24, 2003 and again
After a thorough review of all the evidences presented by both parties, reiterated in the Order of August 5, 2003 which required the defendants
the Court is inclined to rule in favor of the plaintiff. The [pieces of] and Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all the money
evidence of both parties are convincing. But, the factor that convinced which [is] in their possession enumerated in the aforesaid orders.
the Court to rule in favor of plaintiff was the information conveyed to the
court by plaintiff and admitted by defendants, through their counsel, that
another school named Academy of St. John, a new La Sallian Supervised Considering that the bulk of the money pertains to the teacher[s']
School in Sta. Clara, General Tria[s], Cavite, was opened by defendants retirement funds, defendants seek to clarify (1) for what purpose the
Josefina A. Pascual and Cirila N. Mojica and their respective families. In a funds will be used by the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante; (2) whether the
brochure handed by plaintiff's counsel to the court during the hearing on funds will be turned-over to the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante without them
June 17, 2003 with a heading of Academy of Saint John, De La Salle[-] having to put up a bond as a security for the protection of the teachers;
Supervised, General Tria[s], Cavite, it said that "such idea was and (3) whether defendants will be held liable civilly and criminally, in
conceived as a result of the corporate problems and the never ending case of unlawful use and disbursement of the funds.
dispute in a former La Salle[-]supervised school that finally brought
confusion and havoc in the said community." Teachers' retirement funds are funds principally set aside for the purpose
of the retirement of the teachers. As such, these funds cannot be used
It further said that "alarmed with the impending loss of the La Salle for any other purpose other than that for which it is intended. Thus,
Supervision which they both thought of leaving it as a legacy to the neither the plaintiff nor Ms. Reynante may use this amount for the
youth, Mrs. Pascual and Mrs. Mojica together with their respective operation of the school. They should hold the same in trust for the
families were convinced to continue their mission of spreading quality beneficiaries of the same.
education etc."
As to whether the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante shall be required to put up
It appears from the brochure that defendants Pascual and Mojica have a bond as a security for the protection of the teachers before they
set up another school in the same municipality where the St. Francis receive the teachers' retirement funds, the same is not only correct but
School is located. The name of the school is Academy of St. John. The also proper. Considering that they will hold these funds in trust for the
Academy of St. John likewise offers the same courses as th[ose] offered retiring teachers, they should be required to file a bond to guarantee
by St. Francis [S]chool. Needless to state, this action of defendants their obligations as trustees of these funds. Accordingly, the plaintiff and
As to whether the defendants will be held liable, civilly and criminally, in The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated
case of unlawful use and disbursement of the teachers' retirement funds, December 19, 2011.73
the answer is in the negative. A person cannot be held liable for his
action when such was done in compliance with the lawful order of the
court. Besides, considering that the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante are Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing that they
required to file a bond, the bond shall guarantee for whatever damage complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith and that the
the retiring teachers may incur by reason of the unlawful use and validity of the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders were being
disbursement of the funds. assailed in a separate case with this Court.74 Likewise, they contended
that there was reasonable doubt on their guilt and that the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to dismiss the petition with respect to petitioners
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre Pascual (Atty. Silvestre) who were not
ordered to comply with the mandate contained in the order dated March parties in SEC Case No. 024-02 where the assailed orders were issued.75
24 and August 5, 2003.
Custodio argued that petitioners did not refute the evidence she SO ORDERED.109
presented but merely attested that the orders only pertained to
matriculation fees.97
For resolution is whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.
Custodio claimed that petitioners' Explanation, Manifestation and Second, whether petitioners can refuse to follow the orders of the
Compliance dated February 19, 2003 was heard by the trial court. Thus, Regional Trial Court on the premise that their legality is being questioned
petitioners were not denied due process when she filed her Comment. If in this Court; and
petitioners wanted to assail the Comment, they could have easily filed a
Reply.99
Finally, whether Alejandro N. Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual are
equally guilty of indirect contempt despite the fact that they are not
Custodio insisted that the trial court March 24, 2003 Order was a parties to the complaint.
clarification, not an expanded version, of its October 21, 2002 Order.
Custodio reasoned that the March 24, 2003 Order was not even among
the orders they questioned in G.R. No. 174996; thus, showing that they I
were not acting in good faith. She insisted that their claim of lack of due
process was merely an afterthought after they were directed several
This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are
times to comply with the trial court orders.100
guilty of indirect contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part
to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.
Similarly, Custodio claimed that the August 5, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court was not a violation of petitioners' right to due
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or
process. It was issued in connection with their motion to set aside the
March 24, 2003 Order, which was heard. Moreover, the August 5, 2003 defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity. 110It constitutes conduct
which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
Order was a mere reiteration of the March 24, 2003 Order.101
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties['] litigant or their
Custodio held that the trial court orders are deemed valid and are witnesses during litigation."111
entitled to respect while they are not yet reversed by a higher court. 102
All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt. 112 This
Custodio averred that despite the trial court's rulings on the issues power is an essential necessity to preserve order in judicial proceedings
raised, petitioners insisted on filing prohibited pleadings under A.M. No. and to enforce the due administration of justice and the court's
01- 2-04-SC, or the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate mandates, orders, and judgments.113 It safeguards the respect due to
Controversies. These pleadings by petitioners were their (i) Motion for the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the judicial
Reconsideration dated November 8, 2002, (ii) Explanation, institution.114
Manifestation, and Compliance dated February 19, 2003, (iii)
Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion dated
April 18, 2003, and (iv) Motion for Clarification dated September 1, In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.:115
2003.103
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing
Custodio posited that in filing these pleadings, petitioners abused court with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to
be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
processes as they served no purpose other than to avoid compliance
solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice
with the trial court orders.104
from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious
refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is
She claimed that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre were equally guilty of power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish
indirect contempt. Despite the fact that they were not parties to the disobedience, disrespect or interference with the court's orderly process
complaint, Alejandro collected the matriculation fees for the school while by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given to the
Atty. Silvestre, as a member of the Board of Trustees, was empowered courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as
to cause compliance of court orders.105 respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which
are necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for
the laws themselves.116(Citations omitted)
Lastly, Custodio pointed out that petitioners' raising of factual issues was
not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.106
There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii)
107
indirect contempt.
Petitioners filed their Reply.
This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order as petitioners argue.
such without authority; The October 21, 2002 Order itself already directed that all fees be turned
over to Reynante.
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
Furthermore, Custodio's Comment dated February 26, 2003 simply
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the argued that petitioners did not comply with the October 21, 2002 Order
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by because they did not remit the following amounts:
him [or her].119 (Emphasis supplied)
1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 of the
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged. 120
2) ₱5,639,856.ll deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of the
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
orjudgment of a court." 3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen; and
II 4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003. 131
Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002 Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other
Order in good faith as they have already turned over the matriculation employees who had already resigned, violating the court order that only
fees to Reynante.121 They claim that this Order pertained to the Reynante and Custodio were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts
matriculation fees only, excluding any other fees, as it was issued in of St. Francis School.132
connection with Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14,
2002, which requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to
Reynante.122 Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 Thus, it cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious prayer for
allegedly did not cover other fees.123 the turnover of funds not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. She
simply stated that petitioners failed to substantially comply with the
October 21, 2002 Order and specified the other amounts that petitioners
However, the October 21, 2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation needed to turn over.133 When she prayed for the turnover of the other
fees only: amounts, she merely sought petitioners' compliance of the trial court
October 21, 2002 Order.134
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles, Ms.
Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court to act as cashier of The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified
the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect all fees more particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted. It stated:
and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all accounts. Said
authority shall continue until the matter of the application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction is heard and resolved. This A perusal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
is hereby ordered so that an orderly operation of the school will be merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64
achieved. representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn- Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on what
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates collected.
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom
and the dates collected. Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
disbursements made. Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied) 1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do
not pertain only to the matriculation fees but 2. ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of (Rural
to all collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also states that petitioners Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
were to render a report and turn over all the amounts they had
previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were
to be handed over. 3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen;
Likewise, the subject of Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003;
14, 2002 did not solely cover matriculation fees. Her prayer sought to
clarify "where the matriculation fees and other fees should be paid
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court did not unduly expand the scope In Oca vs. Custodio,147 this Court ruled on the validity of the trial court
of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its March 24, 2003 Order. August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders:
However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in
the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation, jurisprudence that while it is true that the right to due process
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one
praying that the trial court exclude the other amounts, which were may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has time and
allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. 136 again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its side"
The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation, or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due process
Observation,Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5, 2003 because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.
Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is
a prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due process
for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). 137 The trial by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated August 5,
court noted that petitioners still had not complied with its March 24, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records would show
2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn over that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate their arguments
all the money they had collected.138 through pleadings and that the same pleadings were acknowledged in
the text of the questioned rulings. Thus, petitioners cannot claim grave
Still, petitioners refused to comply. abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on the basis of denial of
dueprocess.148(Citation omitted)
On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation and
Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a status quo order allowing Thus, the question of whether petitioners were denied due process has
Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and curriculum already been settled.
administrator because it found that petitioners had already established a
new school.139 This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over
the stated amounts was that the amounts constituted teachers'
However, petitioners still did not comply despite this Order. Instead, retirement fund, which consequently did not belong to St. Francis School
they filed their September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising and was not covered by the assailed Orders.149 However, the trial court
questions on Custodio's use of the turned over money, Custodio's and lent credence to Joseph's testimony that the amounts deposited in the
Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the money's exclusive use as teachers' Special Savings Accounts were funds for the operations of the school. 150
retirement fund, and petitioners' liability in case of Custodio's misuse of
this amount.140 In any case, whether the amounts are for the teachers' retirement fund
or the school's operation fund, the trial court had determined who was to
This prompted Custodio to petition the trial court to cite petitioners in have custody over these amounts during the pendency of the intra-
indirect contempt.141 corporate case. Thus, it is not for petitioners to choose which amounts to
turn over.
Nonetheless, petitioners still did not comply. Instead, they argued in the
contempt proceeding that the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Section 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. - All decisions and
Orders were unlawful and were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996. orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory except
They claimed that their availment of legal remedies showed their good the awards for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
faith.144 if any. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the enforcement
or implementation of the decision or order, unless restrained by an
appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal.
All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the
orders of the trial court.
Questioning the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or
implementation. There is no showing that the trial court orders were
Again, the trial court did not exclude any other kind of money in its restrained by the appellate court.
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003 Orders, all of
which directed petitioners to turn over all monies.145 Petitioners,
however, still insisted that they had complied because they had remitted Hence, petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court orders
the matriculation fees. Even after clarification, petitioners were defiant. just because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the parties
to decide whether they should or should not comply with a court order.
Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the implementation of
The trial court also noted that even after petitioners had already the trial court orders nor was there an injunction to prevent the trial
established another competitor school and Custodio and Reynante had court from hearing and ruling on the contempt case.152 Petitioners'
already posted bond, petitioners still refused to comply. 146 stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because they were convinced of
its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of questioning the orders does
The trial court reiterated the orders to turn over the amounts at least not show that they are in good faith.
thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous pleadings reveals their
contumacious refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes. Petitioners likewise cannot invoke the principle of judicial courtesy.
This Court has acknowledged the trial court's power to cite parties in In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:163
indirect contempt for their refusal to follow its orders, although the
validity of the orders is being questioned in another proceeding. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them,
contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure
In Roxas v. Tipon,157 this Court found a party guilty of contempt to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit
although the disobeyed order was the subject of a pending petition of the opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct
before the Court of Appeals: directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in
unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or
judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment imposed,
The issue of indirect contempt needs further discussion because while whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to
the Order of the RTC to allow audit of books of HEVRI has been rendered protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine
moot, it does not change the fact that at the time that the Order was a payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a
standing pronouncement, petitioners refused to heed it ... judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to
be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by
imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the performance of some
.... act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree
rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made before final
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in decree, be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on
willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of the review of judgments in civil cases. . . . The question of whether the
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the jurisdiction
of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or or the power of a Court to punish the same ....164 (Emphasis supplied)
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further
parties-litigant or their witnesses during litigation. The asseverations elaborated in People v. Godoy:165
made by petitioners to justify their refusal to allow inspection or audit
were rejected by the trial court.
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be
determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
.... proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
The RTC initiated the contempt charge. In the Order dated 9 January remedial.
2002, petitioners were directed to appear in court and to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of court for their refusal to Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of
allow Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit the books of HEVRI. Petitioners criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration claiming that said order was Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
the subject of a pending petition before the Court of Appeals and that prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
they can only be cited for contempt by the filing of a verified authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
petition. The RTC denied the motion and reiterated in its Order on 26 orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or
April 2002 explaining that it chose to initiate the contempt charge. prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a
crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking
The RTC acted on the basis of the unjustified refusal of petitioners to of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but
abide by its lawful order. It is of no moment that private respondents really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings
may have filed several pleadings to urge the R TC to cite petitioners in should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
contempt. Petitioners utterly violated an order issued by the trial court applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent
which act is considered contemptuous. Thus, in Leonidas v. Judge with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held
Supnet, the MTC's order to the bank to show cause why it should not be that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a
held in contempt, was adjudged as a legitimate exercise of the MTC's prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded
judicial discretion to determine whether the bank should be sanctioned many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
for disregarding its previous orders.158 (Emphasis supplied, citations proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
omitted) However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular
form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The powerto
the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms. punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica, Atty. Silvestre judiciously."173 Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that the
Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, GUILTY of non-litigants are guilty of contempt.
INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial Court, Branch
21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the Orders of the Court
dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and they are hereby This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold
ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the amount of both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt.
Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court and to
comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated cashier
24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this judgment. who worked in the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. He neither exercised
power over the money nor had the authority to order how it would be
.... kept or disposed. Moreover, it has been established that the
matriculation fees had already been turned over to Reynante.
SO ORDERED.168
Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees. However,
decisions of the Board of Trustees are not subject to the control of just
While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both one (1) person. While a board member may protest, the majority of the
criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than board may overrule him or her. Thus, it is not correct to say that a board
criminal. member is empowered to cause compliance of the trial court orders. It
does not matter if Atty. Silvestre was unable to prove his intention to
comply with the orders. The burden of proving contempt is upon
The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in contempt
show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in proceedings such that the party accused of contempt must prove that he
the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply. is innocent.174
Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the absence of proof of conspiracy, it cannot be said that Alejandro
and Atty. Silvestre are guilty of contempt.
This Court has ruled that while the power to cite parties in contempt
should be used sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its power of
contempt to maintain the respect due to it and to ensure the infallibility WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 25, 2011
of justice where the defiance is so clear and contumacious and there is Decision175 and December 19, 2011 Resolution176 of the Court of
an evident refusal to obey.169 Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985 are AFFIRMED. However, the
complaint against Alejandro Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual is
hereby DISMISSED.
This Court finds that it was sufficiently proven that there was willful
disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to
be cited in contempt. SO ORDERED.
However, this Court rues that the charges against Alejandro and Atty. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner
Silvestre ought to be dismissed. vs.
FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES EDUARDO and HENEDINA
ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA, MR. JO VITO· C. SORIANO,
ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA, ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO
In an Order dated 14 May 2014,11 the RTC-Makati granted the motion for
The Case execution and dismissed the opposition of Andueza. The RTC-Makati held
that the real estate mortgage is inferior to RCBC's right since the
Before the Court is a petition for indirect. contempt 1 with prayer for the mortgage was constituted when Serra no longer had ownership and free
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) filed by petitioner Rizal disposal of the subject property. Accordingly, the RTC-Makati ordered
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) against respondents Federico the issuance of a writ of execution.
A. Serra, et al., for acts allegedly disregarding this Court's final and
executory decisions in G.R. Nos. 103338,2 182478,3182664,4 and Andueza did not file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Makati's
203241.5 execution order. Neither did he file an appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Thus, the Order of 14 May 2014 became final.
The Facts
On 23 June 2014, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of execution.12
On 25 August 2011, RCBC filed a motion for execution before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 134 (RTC-Makati), in Civil Case No. Based on his Report,13 Sheriff Roberto V. Harina (Sheriff Harina) of the
10054. RCBC sought to execute the RTC-Makati's Order dated 5 January RTC-Makati attempted to serve on Serra a copy of the Notice to Comply
1989, which directed respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) to sell to and a copy of the Writ of Execution. However, Serra was not in his office
RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate covered by Original Certificate of Title so Sheriff Harina left with Serra's caretaker copies of the Notice to
(OCT) No. 0-232 on which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC is Comply and the Writ of Execution, who returned such copies by leaving
located (subject property). them at the information table of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Masbate
City.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 10054, Serra mortgaged the
subject property to respondent Spouses Eduardo M. Andueza and Meanwhile, acting on the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure,
Henedina V. Andueza (Spouses Andueza) on 21 September 2011. On 26 respondents Atty. Leomar R. Lanuza (Atty. Lanuza), Clerk of Court and
September 2011, Spouses Andueza had the real estate mortgage Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, and Jovito C. Soriano
annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No. 2011000513.6 (Soriano), Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, scheduled the public auction of
the subject property on 26 June 2014 at 2:00 in the aftemoon.14
In an Order dated 16 February 2012,7 the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's
motion for execution for lack of basis. The RTC-Makati found that it had On 14 June 2014, RCBC filed a petition for injunction15 before the RTC-
been almost 18 years after the 5 January 1989 Order had become final Masbate, docketed as Civil Case No. 6971, to enjoin the extrajudicial
and executory that RCBC filed the motion for execution. Neither did foreclosure sale and public auction of the subject property. Respondent
RCBC file an action to revive judgment within ten years from the date Judge Maximina R. Ables (Judge Ables), as Executive Judge of the RTC
the Order became final. Masbate, issued a 72-hour TRO on 25 June 2014.
In an Order dated 26 July 2012, the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's motion In a Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure and Sale of Real Estate Mortgage
for reconsideration. dated 18 August 2014,16 Soriano scheduled anew the public auction sale
of the subject property on 24 September 2014 at 2:00 in the afternoon.
On 11 October 2012, RCBC filed a petition for review with this Court
assailing the RTC-Makati's Orders dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July In the meantime, RCBC filed before the RTC-Makati a motion to divest
2012. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 203241. In its petition, Serra of his title, invoking Section 10(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 17
RCBC prayed for the issuance of a TRO to prevent any attempt to
remove it from the subject property, since Serra and Atty. Gina Besa-
Serra had already caused the service of a notice to vacate and demand In a Resolution dated 23 September 2014,18 the RTC-Masbate denied
for the payment of accrued back rentals, dated 6 September 2012, on RCBC's motion for the issuance of a 20-day TRO.
RCBC.
Meanwhile, Andueza filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real In his Comment dated 7 October 2014,23 Serra asserted that due to the
estate mortgage,10 dated 13 August 2013, with the Provincial Sheriff of public auction sale on 24 September 2014, where the subject property
Masbate since Serra defaulted on his loan obligation.
Serra further claimed that he did not collude with Spouses Andueza in The Ruling of the Court
having the subject property mortgaged in 2011. Serra alleged he was a The petition is granted in part.
mortgagor in good faith and the Spouses Andueza were mortgagees in
good faith when they executed a real estate mortgage over the subject Indirect Contempt
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, As a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the
or judgment of a court, including. the act of a person who, after being Court's decision and restraining order in that case. The TRO was issued
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or on 3 December 2012 while the decision was promulgated on 10 July
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or 2013. By virtue of the TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the subject property.
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with Andueza, and Andueza's
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in effect allowed the
removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to
impede the administration of justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be
xxxx removed from the premises of the subject property, in contravention of
the clear directive in the decision and restraining order in G.R. No.
203241. Therefore, Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and accordingly
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to fined ₱30,000.
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
Serra also claims that "he can no longer execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
xxxx in favor of [RCBC] because the subject property was already foreclosed
and sold in public auction in favor of Spouses Eduardo and Dina Andueza
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court x x x."44In other words, Serra alleges that a supervening event - the
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding foreclosure sale in favor of Spouses Andueza - occurred precluding the
him in custody pending such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) execution of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 203241.
RCBC alleges that respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for InAbrigo v. Flores,45 the Court held:
disregarding this Court's final and executory decisions in G.R. Nos.
103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, which essentially upheld RCBC's A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment
superior right over the subject property. became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after
the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were
In G.R. No. 103338, which became final and executory on 15 April 1994, not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not
the Court found that "the contract of 'LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY' yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may
between [Serra] and [RCBC] is valid, effective and enforceable, the price properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
being certain and that there was consideration distinct from the price to execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in
support the option given to the lessee."40 order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party
who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should
necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it
In G.R. Nos. 182478 and 182664, the Court issued separate Resolutions would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final
dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final and and immutable judgment.
executory on 27 August 2008 and 3 March 2009, respectively, finding
neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals which held that Serra's donation of the subject property The Court is not convinced that a supervening event occurred which
to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serra's obligation would effectively prevent the execution of the decision in G.R. No.
of selling the subject property to RCBC. Consequently, the deed of 203241. While the foreclosure sale proceeded on 24 September 2014,
donation was null and void.41 after the finality of the decision in G.R. No. 203241, the real estate
mortgage in favor of Spouses Andueza was executed on 21 September
2011 while G.R. No. 203241 was pending. Serra could not possibly be
The Decision and TRO in G.R. No. 203241 unaware that a foreclosure sale would likely transpire since he was the
mortgagor who defaulted on his loan obligation. Clearly, Serra
performed acts intended to defeat and circumvent the conclusive effects
The TRO earlier issued in this case must be lifted. The Court notes that
RCBC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 137314, assailing the denial by Judge Jose C. Fortuno of
RTC-Masbate, Branch 48 of its motion for issuance of a TRO, and praying
for a writ of injunction to enjoin "respondent Clerk of Court and
Ex Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Mas bate City, Deputy
Sheriff Soriano, respondent Spouses Andueza, the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Masbate, and respondent-intervenor Federico A. Serra, x
x x from further performing any act done pursuant to or resulting from
the illegal foreclosure sale of the subject property, x x x and any other
act pursuant to or resulting from the foreclosure sale that has the effect
of ousting petitioner RCBC from the subject property, x x
x."46 RCBC's certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals questions the
proceedings resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
subject property and similarly involves the respondents impleaded in this
contempt petition. Since the certiorari petition before the Court of
Appeals likewise prays for an injunction writ and clearly involves the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property, the Court of Appeals
must be given the opportunity to resolve the propriety of such prayer for
injunction, and ultimately the validity of RCBC's claims over the subject
property. This petition for indirect contempt is not the proper action to
determine the validity of the mortgage between Serra and the Spouses
Andueza, and the foreclosure proceedings resulting from such mortgage.
SO ORDERED.