VITness Leadership Summit 2018

The League of Arab States

(Arab League)
Comprehensive review of the Treaty of Joint Defence and
Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League

Aditya Tamar Jaivignesh J Suporno C

Co-Chairperson Co-Chairperson Director
 Table of Contents

Letter from the Executive Board (EB) ............................................................................ 2

Introduction to the committee ......................................................................................... 3
Mandate ....................................................................................................................... 3
Procedure..................................................................................................................... 3
Foreign policy ............................................................................................................. 3
Role of the EB ............................................................................................................. 3
The Arab League ............................................................................................................. 4
Overview and history .................................................................................................. 4
Introduction to the Charter .......................................................................................... 5
Challenges ................................................................................................................... 6
The Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty.................................................. 8
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 8
The Joint Defence Council .......................................................................................... 8
The Economic Council ................................................................................................ 9
Challenges ................................................................................................................. 10
Questions a resolution must answer (QARMA) ........................................................... 11
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 12

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Letter from the Executive Board (EB)

Greetings, delegates!
We are proud to welcome you to the Arab League simulation at VITness Leadership
Summit 2018. The quality of the council depends on the quality of your contribution to
it, and if that is to be ensured, then reading this guide is a must. We hope that you’ve
done your part in preparing for the three days of intense debate that lies ahead. At this
juncture, we’d also like to inform that this is a policy-based committee and we shall
not be accepting any form of directives/ action orders.
Ahead of this kind of a committee, we expect you to have significant knowledge of your
country and the policies your country has adopted over the years. Knowing the friends,
enemies and geopolitical dynamics of your country goes a long way in being a key
player in the committee. Seeing as this is a committee concerning economics and
security, we expect you to have fundamental knowledge about regional cooperation,
peacekeeping, joint defence, and economic arrangement. This agenda has been
strategically chosen to keep in mind the impact it has on the international community.
Even though this is a non-United Nations (UN) double-delegation committee, it is
a realistic one and we expect the delegates to be pragmatic in their debate.
However, this guide is nothing more than a starting point in your research and will in
no way hold as a viable source in committee. If you choose to back up your research
with substantial sources, please note that we will only be accepting reports from Arab
League offices or bodies as credible sources of proof. Others will be treated as
persuasive proof, depending on their legitimacy.
Seeing as this is a double-delegation simulation, you shall be serving in the capacity
of diplomats from the executive branch of your government. Over the two days of
the conference, we expect you to display adequate diplomatic capabilities and come up
with innovative and feasible solutions to the agenda under discussion. We’re pretty sure
that by the end of this simulation, you’ll have tapped the diplomatic potential and the
speaking prowess in you. We hope that you will enjoy this experience and demonstrate
a greater interest in international politics.

Godspeed, y’all!

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Introduction to the committee

Mandate
Every committee that is simulated in a conference has a very specific mandate. The
discussion of an agenda and proposal of solutions should be within the mandate of
the committee. The Arab League is a regional arrangement between 22 Arab states in
the Middle East. The committee aims to consolidate and strengthen the relations
between the members as well as coordinate the collaboration that exists between them.
One of the main intentions of the committee is to safeguard the interests, independence,
and sovereignty of its member-states.
This committee derives its power from Articles 1 to 20 of the Pact of the League of
Arab States.

Procedure
The purpose of putting in procedural rules in any committee is to ensure a more
organised and efficient flow of debate. Kindly take note that the committee shall follow
the United Nations Association-United States of America (UNA-USA) Rules of
Procedure. Although the Executive Board shall be strict with the Rules of Procedure,
the discussion of the agenda will be the main priority. So, delegates are advised not to
restrict their statements due to hesitation regarding the procedure.

Foreign policy
Following the foreign policy of one’s country is the most important aspect of a Model
UN Conference. This is what essentially differentiates a Model UN from other debating
formats. To violate one’s existing foreign policy without adequate reason is one of the
worst mistakes a delegate can make. However, a delegate must understand that certain
justified compromises or extensions in foreign policy have to be made in order to reach
a middle ground.

Role of the EB
The EB is appointed to facilitate debate. The direction and flow of debate shall be
decided by the committee. The delegates are the ones who constitute the committee
and hence will be uninhibited while presenting their opinions/stance on any issue. The
EB will only intervene, in a limited and strategic manner, in case of loss of focus and/or
direction of the committee.

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The Arab League

Overview and history

The League of Arab States, or Arab League, is a voluntary association of countries
whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking or where Arabic is an official language. Its
stated aims are to strengthen ties among member states, coordinate their policies and
direct them towards a common good. It has 22 members including Palestine, which the
League regards as an independent state. However, it has suspended Syria’s participation
as a consequence of government repression during the Syrian Civil War. Its monitoring
mission to Damascus fell apart over divisions between member-states who support a
UN resolution against the Assad government and those that shy away from
"internationalising" an Arab matter.

Figure 1: Geographic representation of the members of the Arab League [BBC]

The idea of the Arab League was mooted in 1942 by the British, who wanted to rally
Arab countries against the Axis powers. However, the league did not take off until
March 1945, just before the end of the Second World War. At that time the issues that
dominated the league's agenda were freeing those Arab countries still under colonial
rule, and preventing the Jewish community in Palestine from creating a Jewish state.
The Arab League's effectiveness has been severely hampered by divisions among
member states. For example, during the Cold War, some members were Soviet-oriented
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while others fell within the Western camp. There has been rivalry over leadership,
notably between Egypt and Iraq. Then there have been the hostilities between traditional
monarchies - such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco - and new republics, or
"revolutionary" states such as Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Baathist Syria and
Iraq, and Libya under Muammar Gaddafi. The league was severely tested by the US-
led attack on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, with some backing the war, some opposing it and
others standing on the sidelines.
More recently the League has shown a greater sense of purpose since the "Arab spring"
uprisings in early 2011. It backed UN action against Muammar Gaddafi's forces in
Libya. Where members do agree on a common position, such as support for the
Palestinians under Israeli occupation, this rarely if ever goes beyond the issuing of
declarations. Perhaps the sole exception has been the economic boycott of Israel, which
between 1948 and 1993 was almost total. However, the Arab League has been a little
more effective at lower levels, such as shaping school curricula, preserving manuscripts
and translating modern technical terminology. It has helped to create a regional
telecommunications union.

Introduction to the Charter

The Pact of the League of Arab States (Charter of the Arab League) is the founding
treaty of the Arab League. Concluded in 1945, the agreement endorses the principle of
an Arab homeland while respecting the sovereignty of the individual member states
[Article II]. Since then, governance of the Arab League has been based on the duality
of supra-national institutions and the sovereignty of its member states [Article III].
According to its charter, the founding members of the Arab League (Egypt, Syria,
Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen) agreed to seek "close
cooperation" on matters of economics, communication, culture, nationality, social
welfare, and health. They renounced violence for the settlement of conflicts between
members and empowered League offices to mediate in such disputes, as well as in those
with non-members [Article V & Article VI]. Signatories agreed to collaborate in
military affairs; this accord was strengthened with a 1950 pact committing members to
treat acts of aggression on any member state as an act against all [Article IX].
The Charter established the Arab League headquarters in Cairo [Article X], created a
permanent General Secretariat, and scheduled sessions to meet biannually, or at the
request of two members in extraordinary circumstances [Article XI]. A formal
commitment to international human rights law entered League conventions in 2004 (it
was ratified in 2008) when some members adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights.
The charter has an annex on the issue of Palestine. It affirms Palestinian independence

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and states that "even though the outward signs of this independence have remained
veiled as a result of force majeure," an Arab delegate from Palestine should "participate
in [the League’s] work until this country enjoys actual independence" [Article IV].
One of the main drawbacks of the Arab League is that it has no mechanism to compel
members’ compliance with its resolutions [Article VII]. Because decisions made by the
Arab League are binding only on members who voted for them, these divisions have in
effect crippled the league in the sphere of "high politics". Thus, it failed to coordinate
foreign, defence or economic policies, rendering core league documents such as the
Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation and key bodies such as the Joint
Defence Council completely ineffectual.
The highest body of the league is the Council, composed of representatives of member
states, usually foreign ministers, their representatives or permanent delegates. Each
member state has one vote, irrespective of its size. The council meets twice a year, in
March and September, and may convene a special session at the request of two
members. Day-to-day, the league is run by the General Secretariat. Headed by a
Secretary-General, it is the administrative body of the league and the executive body of
the council and the specialised ministerial councils [Article XII].

Challenges
Preservation of individual statehood derived its strengths from the natural preference of
ruling elites to maintain their power and independence in decision making. Moreover,
the fear of the richer that the poorer may share their wealth in the name of Arab
nationalism, the feuds among Arab rulers, and the influence of external powers that
might oppose Arab unity can be seen as obstacles towards a deeper integration of the
league. The Arab League continues to struggle with disunity and dysfunction, and critics
question whether the organization has any relevance in its current form. Though it
achieved notable consensus over the Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, the
League failed to coordinate its policy over both the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the 2003
Iraq War.
The Arab revolts throughout the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 offered the
League a new opportunity to reform. Some critics see the appointment of al-Araby as a
step toward this end. After rare action to topple Qaddafi in 2011, the Arab League turned
its focus to the conflict in Syria. It suspended Syrian membership in November 2011,
brokered an ill-fated peace agreement with the Assad regime, and, for the first time in
its history, assembled a team of observers to monitor the implementation of its plan.
Frustrated with a lack of compliance by Syria, the Arab League officially called for
Assad to step down in January 2012 and requested a resolution from the UN Security

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Council to support this proposal. The Arab League eventually recognized the Syrian
opposition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, but Assad regime allies
in the organization such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Algeria blocked the oppositions’ full
assumption of the role.

Figure 2: Region affected by the Arab Spring [Wikimedia Commons]

Tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, exacerbated by wars in Syria and Iraq, are
creating new fissures among Arabs. Sunni leaders largely snubbed a 2012 summit in
Baghdad, reflecting their rejection of a Shia-led Iraq with close ties to Iran. Those who
did attend traded barbs during their speeches, dashing an opportunity to foster closer
between Iraq and its Sunni-majority neighbours. Even as the Arab League condemns
the Sunni extremist group known as the Islamic State (ISIS), and Sunni powers such as
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates launch air strikes on the
terrorist organization, few Arab countries are willing to coordinate efforts with the Iraqi
government. Iraq, for its part, has invited Iranian military advisers and deployed Tehran-
funded Shia militias in its battle against ISIS.
Interviews conducted by al-Jazeera in 2009 illustrated the Arab public’s frustration with
the organization. Even the League’s secretary-general, Nabil al-Araby, joined the
chorus of criticism in September 2011, describing the organization as "impotent."
Multiple Middle-Eastern experts say the Arab League is likely to improve little on its
record of collective action until members agree to sacrifice some sovereignty and
comply with resolutions. And until democracy is the mainstay of the Arab world, the
League will continue to struggle with issues of legitimacy.
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The Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty

Introduction
The Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation of the League of Arab States
was signed on 18th June, 1950 between the members of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt
by the original six members of the Arab League, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and North Yemen (now Yemen). Currently, all twenty-two members of
the Arab League are the signatories to this treaty.
The treaty was a collaborative effort by all the contracting parties to partake in the effort
to maintain peace and security confirming their desire to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves
or with powers outside the Arab League as mentioned in Article 1 of the treaty. Also,
the signatories will consider any act of aggression against any of the states to be an act
of aggression against all of them and to rush to the aid of the victim state without delay.
A permanent military commission was also asked to be formed of the representatives of
the General Staffs of the armies of the all the signatories to draw up plans for joint
defence and to oversee the implementation of the same. It also included the aims to
corroborate and bring about prosperity in the Arab states and to increase the living
standards of the citizens living in them, this was to be brought about through
coordination between the economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab
agreements to realise such aims.
Thus, the treaty led to the formation of two principal institutions of the Arab League.
The Article 6 of the treaty called for the formation of a Joint Defense Council under the
supervision of the Arab League Council to deal with the security matters of the Arab
League Nations. The article 8 of the same treaty called for the formation of the
Economic Council to work in cooperation with the Committee for the Financial and
Economic Affairs.

The Joint Defence Council

Article VI of the Treaty called for the formation of the Joint Defense Council under the
supervision of the Arab League Council to oversee the collective security matters of the
signatories and to arrange for the provisions of a joint umbrella military operation in
case any signatory member requires. The member states consider the attack against any
one of them as an attack against all the member states and undertake not to sign any
international agreement which goes in violation of the treaty.

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The military annexure of the treaty carries details about the formation of the Permanent
Military Commission which would consist of the Defence Ministers and the head of
Military of the contracting states. Under the treaty, the PMC has to work in close
coordination with the Joint Defence Council for the creation of various organs and
institutions overseeing the security of the contracting parties.

The Economic Council

Later renamed to Economic and Social Council (ESC) in 1980, the Economic Council
was established in 1950 under the terms laid down by the Joint Defence and Economic
Cooperation treaty in fulfilment of the promise made in the Article II and Article IV of
the Arab League’s Charter. According to Article VIII of the Treaty of Joint Defence and
Economic Cooperation of the Arab League, the council will be consisting of the
Ministers in charge of the economic affairs of the individual signatory countries or their
representatives if necessary. They will work in unison and will work to submit a
recommendation for the realisation of a better standard of living for the Arabic citizens,
to undertake cooperation in the development of their economies, exploitation of their
natural resources, to facilitate the exchange of their economic activities.
The first meeting of the council was held on 1953 and since then has worked actively to
bring about a closer economic integration of the Arabic nations through measures such
as the establishment of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) in 1957, the
adoption of the Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Trade Among Arab Countries in
1981, and has also worked for the establishment of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area
(GAFTA).
One of the notable achievements of the ESC is the GAFTA, a pan-Arab free trade zone
that was created in 1971 by fourteen countries under the ESC. In 209, Algeria joined as
the eighteenth member for the GFTA and the members participate in 96 per cent of the
internal trade between the Arabic Nations and 95 per cent of the trade with the outside
world. Another notable achievement of the ESC is the formation of the Kuwait based
pan-Arab development financing institute known as the Arab Fund for Economic and
Social Development which holds about 7.3 billion dollars in the asset as of 2003.
In the more recent 2011 summit, the discussions ranged around the proposed Arab Plan
of Action for Science and Technology and its implementation by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and its Arabic
counterpart, ALECSCO (Arab League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific
Organisation).

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Challenges
The practical aspects of military unity remain in question even 70 years after the treaty
of Joint Defence and Economic cooperation was signed. At the moments of military
crisis, there is hardly any military cooperation between the members of Arab League.
And even in the case of Six Day War, the cooperation between the states of Egypt,
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq could not stop the decisive Israeli victory from
happening. Even during the times of the Six-day war, the countries of Saudi Arabia and
Yemen were engaged in a civil war in Northern Yemen.
In the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as well, the contractors of the treaty were
bound in lethargy to come to the support of Kuwait as according to the obligations of
the treaty. Only after two days of the invasion, the members condemned the actions of
Iraq. Even a month after the invasion, the Arab league was divided with multiple
members siding with Iraq and in unison of the condemnation of the foreign intervention.
Probably the biggest failure of the contracting parties has been their inability to form
the Joint Arab Military Force. Despite ongoing efforts by the member states, the
formation of a Joint Military Force has seemed increasingly difficult because of the
different foreign policies, interest and national capabilities of the contracting parties.
The Egyptian led the initiative at the formation of the Unified Arab Command in 1964
staggered due to issues of poor cooperation. Even in the modern times, the rift between
Egypt and Qatar has made the formation of a Joint Military Force very difficult.
One of the biggest challenges that the Economic and Social Council faces is the disparity
between the foreign policies and outlooks of the Arabic Nations. A parallel case of
which can be found in the failure of the Arab Maghreb Union.
Added to this is the Economic near-stagnancy of the Arab Nations, the slower Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) growth combined with the population boom has increased
difficulties for the ESC, added to this is the virtual stagnancy in the increase of the
private capital and real per capita income of the Arab Nations. There has been almost
zero surges in the export of the Arab Nations as well, stagnating at around 11-12 per
cent per year for the last five years. Experts from all over the world have lamented at
the lack of transparency in the Arab financial institutions, with lacklustre statistical
systems and almost no dissemination of key data to the public on a timely and regular
basis.

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Questions a resolution must answer (QARMA)

There are a number of questions that the committee must answer, in comprehension
before delving into the documentation procedure. Some of them (non-exhaustive) are
as follows.

1. To what extent can the Arab League afford to have a collective military response
in a particular situation of interest.
2. Can the Arab countries afford to have their Economic Union and regulatory
standards for trade and development?
3. Should the Arab League as an organisation become more inclusive with regard
to a partnership with other regional organisations in the area of military, trade and
policy orientation?
4. Should the Arab League move towards a reform in the voting procedure?
5. Do we require a reform in the Membership of Arab League?

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Conclusion

As with all topics that the Arab League addresses, this issue can be viewed from a
technical, political, legal, social, and economic perspective. While considering each
perspective is vital to solving the problem at hand, it is important that delegates view
the issue primarily from a security and economic lens.
A reasonable knowledge of theoretical approaches to international relations will, thus,
be useful in preparing for this council. Realism, liberal internationalism, constructivism,
and so on, are a few ideas to brush up on because delegates will have to create a
resolution from scratch.
These approaches, when informed by the tools, technical feasibility and the context of
the nation you are representing, should help you narrow down the kind of policy that
you will want to pursue because of this council. Delegates should also brush up on
historical regional cooperation issues and how they were resolved.
Ideological clashes between nations must also be understood to attain a clearer picture
of why countries cannot often easily surmount their rivalries even when they stand to
gain from them.
For further clarification, feel free to contact any of us!

Jaivignesh Jayakumar – jaivignesh.jayakumar@gmail.com; +91 89393 19119

Aditya Tamar – adityatamar@gmail.com; +91 98717 21764
Suporno Chaudhury – suporno.chaudhury@gmail.com; +91 86376 26110

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