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    13 views30 pages

    FoPo 2017 - Strategy Docs

    Uploaded by

    aesopw
    strat

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
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    20 ocrosan 23,2006 » raz Naw anrUDLIC Cowboy Nation BY ROBERT KAGAN zs Davs, wa are having a national de- bate over the direction of foreign policy. ‘Beyond the obvious difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan there ise broader sense ‘that our nation has gone astray. We have ‘become to militaristic, 100 idealistic, 100 arrogant; we have become an “eanpire.” ‘Much ofthe world views us as dangerous In response, many call fr the United States to retura to its foreign policy tra- There's an eetfe connection be- tween these events and those of September 11, 2001, for It's likely that the intended target of United Fight 93, which crashed in Penn- _syvania after the passengers overwhelmed the hijackers, was one Wn of those two bulldings. History rarely repeats itself, but on this oc- ‘asion it came damn close, ‘Sowhy doesn’t August 23th have a place in our memories sim- lar to that of December 7th, or November 22nd, ot now September 1uth? I's partly, | think, because the casualties on bath sides that day were relatively light, because the attack didn't lead to anything ‘worse, and because it was quickly overshadowed by Andrew lack- ‘Son's decisive defeat of the British at the Battle of New Orleans ‘early in 1815, Yet another reason is that the invasion came at the end of the war, not at its beginning: peace negotiations had been ‘underway for several months, and on Christmas Eve, 1814, they Produced the Treaty of Ghent, which acknowledged victory for nei- ‘ther side but simply restored the status quo. Jackson's victory, however satisfying, had been unnecessary—the word simply ‘hacn't gotten there in time. So if anyone these days remembers the buming of Washington, what tends to come to mind is the omic-opera character ofthe event: te farcical defense of the city, President James Madison's ignominious departure from it, and of ‘course the intrepid Dolley snatching George Washington's portrait ‘Off the White House wall as she made her own exit, thereby saving. atleast a national symbol, if not national dignity, For Americans at the time, though, the humillation was sharp. To sense how much so, consider the now thankfully never sung 12 third verse of The Star-Spangled Banner, composed by Francis ‘scott Key to celebrate the failure of the British to take Fort McHenry in Baltimore harbor after thelr withdrawal from Washington: ‘And where is that band who so hauntingly swore ‘That the havoc of war and the battle’s confusion ‘Ahome and country, shall leave us no more? ‘Their blood has washed out their foul foot step’s pollution No refuge could save the hireling and slave From the terror of Right or the gloom of the grave.t ‘twas a sang intended. rather in the spirit of Dolley Madison, to salvage something from a national embarrassment, and it oughtto remind us that security and the self-confidence that comes with have not always been part of the American experience. it would be difficult to overestimate the effect,” historians, James Chace and Caleb Carrhave written of the attack on Washing: ‘ton in 3814. “The threats from abroad that had so long perplexed ‘American leaders had proved grimly real. Thus mindful of the dan ‘gets confronting their nation, Americans prepared to commit them- ‘selves to the enlarged task of providing for their own safety."s The word “enlarged” here Is critical, For the pattem set by this now barely remembered violation of homeland security is one thathas B persisted ever since: that for the United States, safety comes from Siti ‘rather than from contracting, its sphere of responsibil Most nations seek safety inthe way most animals do: by with- ‘daning behind defenses, or making themselves inconspicuous, or ‘otherwise avoiding whatever dangers there may be. Americans, in contrast, have generally responded to threats—and particularly to surprise attacks—by taking the offensive, by becoming more con- splcious, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelm ‘ng the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expan- sion, we have assumed, is the path to security. ‘This was by no means a new idea in 18:4. Benjamin Franktin had had something like it in mind as early as 1751 when he ex: pressed confidence that a high bith rate would in time produce ‘more Englishmen on his side of the ocean than on the other: the Implication was that an istand could not indefinitely rule a con- tinent James Madison had argued, in the soth Federalist, that ‘ttowth would ensure the safety of republlcanism-a form of gow femment previously not thought possible in a large tertory—by enerating the contending interests necessary to balance one an- ‘other Thomas Jefferson surely had security through expansion in mind when he overcame his strict constructionist principles and 4 Jumped atthe opportunity to purchase the Lousiana Tertory fom France in 1803, instantaneously doubling the size ofthe United States Prlorto the War of 1812, however, there was no long-term strat ny linking securty to expansion. Even a8 he was acquiring Lous ana, Jefferson was reducing the sizeof the army and navy while ‘maintaining a policy of neutrality toward Great Britain and France, When the Napoleonic Wars began to endanger American maritime rights, he had litle choice but to respond-—through the Embargo ‘Act~by contracting American interests, The United States would refuse to trade, lest it be forced to defend its right to trade. The ef- fects, though, were so humiliating that by the end of 1811 the mood in Congress had tumed around, insisting on the defense of ail interests including reputation, despite the fact that neither that body nor the recently installed Madison administration had done ‘much more than Jefferson to provde the means of accompli ‘such a task.** With foreign policy oscillating between appeasement and belligerence, with such glaring gaps between proclaimed ends and available means, it’s hardly surprising that the United States stumbled Into an unnecessary war thatthe war itself was so badly ‘managed, or that, once peace had retumed, Americans began to take the requitements ofnational securty and grand strategy more 5 for Ifthe British coutd occupy and bum Washington almost as an afterthought while winding up a war against France that had lasted for almost a quarter ofa century, what did that imply about ‘American wulnerablity once the fighting in Europe had ended? To ‘the continental monarchies that had vanquished Napoleon, the historian George Dangerfield has emphasized, the United States was “tle more than a gcimy republican thumbprint” upon the ‘Pages of history." Great Britain was only slightly more sympathetic: ‘had grudgingly reconcited itself to American independence, but 'ts naval superiority gave it the means of challenging that indepen- dence again if it should ever choose tn do so. Jefferson's prewar preference for hiding—for securing interests by contracting them-—

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