NoKo Military

Eleanor Albert 17, online writer and editor at CFR covering Asia policy, “North Korea’s
Military Capabilities,” July 5, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved at:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities
Introduction
The United States and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat. It
has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, which, combined with its
escalating missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern
worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear
weapons. The North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, sees the nuclear program as the means to
sustain his regime. While it remains among the poorest countries in the world, North
Korea spends nearly a quarter of its GDP on its military, according to U.S. State
Department estimates. Its brinkmanship will continue to test regional and international
partnerships aimed at preserving stability and security.
What are North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?

North Korea is believed to have between fifteen to twenty nuclear bombs and has
successfully tested a series of different missiles, including short-, medium-,
intermediate-, and intercontinental-range, and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. On July 4, 2017, the regime claimed to have tested successfully
its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying a large nuclear
warhead. The Pentagon confirmed North Korea’s test as an ICBM and analysts estimate
that the new missile has a potential range of 6,700–8,000 kilometers (4,160–4,970
miles) and, if fired on a flatter trajectory, could be capable of reaching U.S.
territory. U.S. analysts and experts from other countries are still debating the
possible nuclear payload that the ICBM could carry. Prior to this test, North Korea
had conducted five nuclear tests: in October 2006 and May 2009 under Kim Jong-il;
and in February 2013 and January and September of 2016 under Kim Jong-un’s
leadership. Future nuclear tests are anticipated. North Korea possesses the know-how
to produce bombs with weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, the primary
elements required for making fissile material—the core component of nuclear weapons.

With each test, North Korea’s nuclear explosions have grown in power. The first
explosion in 2006 was a plutonium-fueled atomic bomb with a yield equivalent to two
kilotons of TNT, an energy unit used to measure the power of an explosive blast. The
2009 test had a yield of eight kilotons; the 2013 and January 2016 tests both had yields
of approximately seventeen kilotons; and the September 2016 test had a yield of thirty-
five kilotons, according to data from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington, DC-
based nonpartisan think tank. (For comparison, the U.S. bomb dropped on Hiroshima in
1945, the first atom bomb, had an estimated yield of sixteen kilotons.)
As the power of these explosions has intensified, so too has the pace of both the country’s
nuclear and missile tests. Under Kim Jong-un, who assumed leadership of North Korea
in late 2011, the nuclear program has markedly accelerated. In addition to three tests
under his regime, the country has carried out more than seventy-five missile tests,
far exceeding the trials of his father and grandfather before him.

There remain significant unknowns surrounding the accuracy of North Korea’s

ballistic missiles. Expert observers have said that these missiles are usually
inaccurate because of their reliance on early guidance systems acquired from the
Soviet Union. However, some defectors and experts say North Korea has begun using
GPS guidance, similar to that of China’s navigation system, raising questions
about the provenance of the system and whether North Korea’s arsenal of missiles is
more accurate and reliable than previously believed.

Has North Korea’s nuclear program been aided by other countries?

Though North Korea’s nuclear program has been predominantly indigenous, it has
received external assistance over the years. Pyongyang received Moscow’s help
from the late 1950s to the 1980s: it helped build a nuclear research reactor,
provided missile designs, light-water reactors, and some nuclear fuel. In the 1970s,
China and North Korea cooperated on defense, including the development[PDF]
and production of ballistic missiles. North Korean scientists also benefited from
academic exchanges with Soviet and Chinese counterparts. Though the
exchanges may not have been explicitly tied to weapons development, the information
learned from research sharing and visits to nuclear facilities can be applied to a
militarized nuclear program, according to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., an analyst of
North Korean defense and intelligence affairs.

Pakistan emerged as an important military collaborator with North Korea in the 1970s.
Bilateral nuclear assistance began when scientists from the two countries were both
in Iran working on ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). In the
1990s, North Korea acquired access to Pakistani centrifuge technology and
designs from scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who had directed the militarization of
Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pyongyang also received designs for a uranium
warhead that Pakistan had likely obtained from China. In exchange, Pakistan
received North Korean missile technology. It remains unclear whether Khan acted
directly or indirectly on the behalf of the Pakistani government. (Khan’s multinational
network also illicitly sold nuclear technology and material to buyers, including Iran and
Libya.) The nuclear know-how gained from Pakistan likely enabled North Korea to
pursue a uranium route to the bomb and operate centrifuges.

Third parties have also facilitated Pyongyang’s program through the illicit shipment
of metal components needed for centrifuge construction and nuclear weaponization.
North Korea has developed covert networks for the procurement of technology,
materials, and designs to boost its conventional and nuclear weapons programs since
the 1960s. Over time, North Korea’s networks have shifted from being concentrated in
Europe to Asia and Africa, and goods have often been traded multiple times before
reaching North Korean hands, says Bermudez.

What punitive steps has North Korea faced?

North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003
and its missile tests and first nuclear test in 2006 prompted the UN Security
Council to unanimously adopt resolutions condemning North Korea’s actions and
imposing sanctions against the country. The Security Council has steadily ratcheted
up sanctions through subsequent resolutions in the hopes of changing Pyongyang’s
behavior. These additional measures ban the sale of materials and technology that
would bolster North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, financial
assistance to these programs, and arms sales; they also impose restrictions on select
luxury goods and other foreign trade, and force the inspections of cargo bound for
North Korea.

Though sanctions have curtailed North Korea’s access to materials, it is difficult to

enforce and regulate all international cargo deliveries. More recently, there has
been a greater push to limit North Korean financial resources in a bid to stunt
funds directed to military and nuclear advancements. Some experts and officials
have condemned China’s earlier assistance to the North’s ballistic missile program,
ongoing trade relationship with North Korea, and lackluster enforcement of sanctions.
Separately, North Korea has a record of missile sales and nuclear technology sharing
with countries like Iran, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Vietnam, Yemen, United Arab Emirates,
and Myanmar. It has secretly transferred “nuclear-related and ballistic-missile-related
equipment, know-how, and technology.” Given North Korea’s economic constraints,
fears abound that more nuclear material and knowledge could be sold, enhancing the
potential for nuclear terrorism.
Does North Korea possess other weapons of mass destruction?
The North is believed to have an arsenal of chemical weapons, including sulfur mustard,
chlorine, phosgene, sarin, and VX nerve agents. The regime reportedly has the “capacity
to produce [PDF] nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents” and is estimated to
have stockpiled [PDF] between 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. Its chemical
toxins can be fired using a range of conventional shells, rockets, and missiles. The
Korean People’s Army undergoes training to prepare for potential combat in a
contaminated environment. North Korea is reported to have received early help from the
Soviet Union and China to develop its chemical weapons program.
North Korea is also believed to possess some biological weapons capabilities, although it
became party in 1987 to the Biological Weapons Convention, a treaty banning the
production, development, stockpiling, and attempts to acquire biological weapons. In
1988, it acceded to the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of asphyxiating,
poisonous, and other gases in warfare. The North allegedly has the ability
to produce [PDF] pathogens such as anthrax and smallpox, though it is unclear if these
bacteria can be deployed in combat.
What are North Korea’s conventional military capabilities?
North Korea ranks fourth among the world’s largest militaries with more than 1.1 million
personnel in the country’s armed forces, accounting for nearly 5 percent of its total
population. Article 86 of the North Korean constitution states “National defense is
the supreme duty and honor of citizens,” and it requires all citizens to serve in the
military. The regime spent an average of $3.5 billionannually on military expenditures
between 2004 and 2014, according to a U.S. State Department report. Although
Pyongyang is outspent by its neighbors and adversaries in dollar-to-dollar comparisons
and defense experts say it operates with aging equipment and technology, the regime’s
forward-deployed military position and missiles aimed at Seoul ensure that Pyongyang’s
conventional capabilities remain a constant threat to its southern neighbor. U.S.
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has cautioned that war on the Korean peninsula would
be “catastrophic” and he has described North Korea as “the most urgent and dangerous
threat [PDF] to peace and security.”
North Korea has deployed munitions near and along its border with the South and also
has conventional missiles aimed at its neighbor and Japan in a bid to deter potential
attacks. According to a 2015 U.S. Department of Defense report[PDF] and a 2016 South
Korean Ministry of National Defense report [PDF], the North Korean military has more
than 1,300 aircraft, nearly 300 helicopters, 430 combatant vessels, 250 amphibious
vessels, 70 submarines, 4,300 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, and 5,500 multiple-rocket
launchers. Experts also estimate that North Korea has upwards of one thousand missiles
of varying ranges.
Does it pose a cybersecurity threat?
North Korea has developed computer science know-how and cyberattack capabilities,
likely boosted by Chinese and Soviet assistance in the 1980s and 1990s. The majority of
North Korea’s earlier cyberattacks have been distributed denial of service (DDoS),
attempts to disrupt a website by flooding it with traffic from multiple sources, and web-
defacing in nature, indicating that its cyber operations were still not that sophisticated.
Much of the North’s cyber activities take advantage of using infrastructure outside of the
country, particularly China’s infrastructure and, to a certain extent, nodes in third
countries like Malaysia, boosting the regime’s deniability and ability to avoid retribution
for attacks. In recent years, responsibility for cyberattacks on South Korean banks and
media outlets as well as the 2014 Sony Pictures hack was attributed to groups with ties to
North Korea.
There is mounting evidence that North Korea was also involved in the February 2016
cyber theft of $81 million from the Bangladeshi central bank account at the Federal
Reserve in New York, the first instance of a state actor being identified for using cyber
operations to steal money. The North’s operations grow bolder still: researchers have
linked North Korea to an increasing number of cyber incidents on financial
institutions and South Korea said the North had breached its military cyber command in
December 2016. A Center for Strategic and International Studies report stated “North
Korea seems heavily invested in growing and developing its cyber capabilities for
both political and military purposes.” Pyongyang and government-linked cyber entities
view cyberattacks as a means of seeking financial gain, acting as a deterrent against
adversaries in the event of military conflict, and fulfilling the country’s desire of being
portrayed as a capable and dangerous actor, says Adam Segal, director of CFR’s Digital
and Cyberspace Policy Program.
What drives North Korea’s militarization?
North Korea’s guiding philosophical principles have been juche (self-reliance)
and songun (military-first politics). The military plays a central role in political affairs
and its position has been steadily elevated through the Kim dynasty. North Korean
leadership believes that hostile external forces could mount an attack, including its
democratic neighbor to the south and the United States. As a result, in Pyongyang’s eyes,
the only way to guarantee its national survival is to develop asymmetric military
capabilities to thwart its perceived threats.

In the decades since the Korean War armistice, the regime in Pyongyang has grown
increasingly isolated, in large part due to its ongoing nuclear pursuits and other military
provocations. The North’s economy and impoverished population of twenty-five million
are more and more cut off from the global economy, with limited means to acquire
much-needed hard currency. Despite Pyongyang’s reputation as a pariah state, Kim
Jong-un has embraced a national strategy to jointly build up the economy and its nuclear
forces.
Kim has struggled to deliver on his economic promises. Demonstrating unquestioned
military might, particularly of the nuclear variety, is the means by which the young
leader seeks to consolidate his rule and portray himself as powerful. The nuclear
program has a dual purpose: to deter external threats but also to bolster the
strength and image of Kim. “Kim Jong-un believes that nuclear weapons are his
guarantee of regime survival,” says Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at RAND
Corporation, a California-based think tank.
Since Kim Jong-un assumed power, the country has shed the ambiguous language
surrounding its nuclear and missile development, instead vowing to conduct
tests whenever it sees fit. “The regime’s nuclear arsenal could make it more aggressive in
dealings with South Korea and the rest of the region,” said Stanford University professor
Siegfried Hecker. Punitive measures taken against Pyongyang seem to have emboldened
Kim Jong-un’s commitment to strengthening his military.
 Sino-NoKo Relations
Economic
Eleanor Albert 17, online writer and editor at CFR covering Asia policy, “The China–
North Korea Relationship,” July 5, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved at:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship
Introduction
China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main
source of food and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-un’s regime, and has
historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in the hope of
avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-mile border.
Pyongyang’s fifth nuclear test and ongoing missile launches have complicated its
relationship with Beijing, which has continued to advocate for the resumption of the Six
Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge
of top North Korean officials since its young leader came to power and the
assassination of Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un’s exiled half brother, in Malaysia also
spurred renewed concern from China about the stability and direction of North
Korean leadership. Yet China’s policies have done little to deter its neighbor’s nuclear
ambitions.
Alliance Under Stress

China’s support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War (1950–1953),
when its troops flooded the Korean Peninsula to aid its northern ally. Since the
war, China has lent political and economic backing to North Korea’s leaders: Kim
Il-sung (estimated 1948–1994), Kim Jong-il (roughly 1994–2011), and Kim Jong-un
(2011–). But strains in the relationship began to surface when Pyongyang tested a
nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing supported UN Security Council
Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. With this resolution and
others (UNSC Resolutions 1874 [PDF], 2094[PDF], 2270, and 2321 [PDF]),
Beijing signaled a shift in tone from diplomacy to punishment. After North Korea’s
most recent nuclear test in September 2016, China called on North Korea to not take
action that would “worsen the situation.” Still, Beijing continues to have wide-
ranging ties with Pyongyang, including economic exchanges and high-level state
trips such as senior Chinese Communist Party member Liu Yunshan’s visit to attend the
seventieth anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party in October 2015.

Separately, China has stymied international punitive action against North Korea
over human rights violations. China criticized a February 2014 UN report that
detailed human rights abuses in North Korea, including torture, forced starvation, and
crimes against humanity, and attempted to block UN Security Council sessions held in
December 2014 and 2015 on the country’s human rights status.

Even China’s punitive steps have been restrained. Beijing only agreed to UN
Resolution 1718 after revisions removed requirements for tough economic
sanctions beyond those targeting luxury goods. It did agree to further sanctions,
some of which call for inspections of suspected nuclear or missile trade, but Western
officials and experts doubt how committed China is to implementing trade
restrictions.

China–North Korea trade has also steadily increased. Trade between the two
countries peaked at $6.86 billion in 2014. Bilateral trade increased tenfold
between 2000 and 2015, according to figures from the Seoul-based Korea Trade-
Investment Promotion Agency.

Yet Beijing has taken some limited measures to squeeze Pyongyang economically. In
February 2017, China’s commerce ministry temporarily suspended coal imports
from North Korea through the rest of the year, a move that enhances the effectiveness
of existing UN sanctions against North Korea. Beijing had previously banned coal
imports from North Korea in April 2016 but had allowed exceptions for “people’s well-
being.” Since the new ban, some vessels carrying coal have reportedly been turned
away at Chinese ports. The Global Times, a semi-official Chinese newspaper,
suggested in an April 2017 editorial that China may be supportive of measures banning
oil exports to North Korea should Pyongyang conduct further nuclear
tests, echoing similar calls from some Chinese experts. State-owned oil giant China
National Petroleum Corporation also suspended fuel sales to North Korea in June
2017, citing concerns that North Korea would fail to pay the company. Regional experts
say such actions may suggest that the Chinese regime is “losing patience” with
Pyongyang, while others say that these shifts by Beijing are merely tactical.

Aid and Trade for Pyongyang

China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and
accounts for upwards of 90 percent of North Korea’s total trade volume.
Conversely, China’s purchases from its neighbor include minerals, seafood, and
manufactured garments. In the first quarter of 2017, China–North Korea trade
was up 37.4 percent from the same period in 2016. “China is currently North Korea’s
only economic backer of any importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute.
In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container shipping
route to boost North Korea’s export of coal to China and China established a high-
speed rail route between the Chinese border city of Dandong and Shenyang, the
provincial capital of China’s northeastern Liaoning province. In October 2015,
the Guomenwan border trade zone opened in Dandong with the intention of
boosting bilateral economic linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the
Sinujiu special administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and
2002, respectively. Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and
tourism for the two neighbors—exchanges with North Korea make up 40 percent of the
city’s total trade and 70 percent of trade in and out of North Korea is conducted via
Dandong and Sinujiu. However, a new $350 million bridge over the Yalu River to
connect the two cities, intended to open in 2014, remains incomplete across the North
Korean border, a symbol of cooling relations between Beijing and Pyongyang. Still, due
to North Korea’s increasing isolation, its dependence on China continues to
grow.
Beijing also provides aid [PDF] directly to Pyongyang, primarily in food and
energy assistance. China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have provided
more than 75 percent of food aid to North Korea since 1995, but donations from all
countries except for China have shrunk significantly since the collapse of the Six Party
Talks in 2009. North Korea, whose famine in the 1990s killed between eight hundred
thousand and 2.4 million people, reported its worst drought in decades in June 2015
and extensive flooding in September 2016, which seriously damaged harvests. UN
agencies designated up to 60 percent of the population, or fifteen million
people, as food insecure. There is also concern about the distribution of aid in
North Korea, particularly since China has no system [PDF] to monitor shipments.
Recently, however, “Beijing has been trying to wean Pyongyang off pure aid in favor of
more commercially viable ties,” University of Sydney’s James Reilly writes.
China’s Priorities

China regards stability on the Korean peninsula as its primary interest. Its
support for North Korea ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border and
provides a buffer between China and the democratic South, which is home to
around twenty-nine thousand U.S. troops and marines. “Chinese leaders have no love for
Kim Jong-un’s regime or its nuclear weapons, but it dislikes even more the prospect of
North Korea’s collapse and the unification of the Korean Peninsula with Seoul as the
capital,” writes CFR President Richard N. Haass.

Beijing has consistently urged world powers not to push Pyongyang too hard, for
fear of precipitating regime collapse and triggering dangerous military
action. “Once a war really happens, the result will be nothing but multiple loss. No one
can become a winner,” said Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in April 2017, urging the
United States and North Korea to show restraint.

The specter of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into

China is also a huge worry for Beijing. “Instability generated on the peninsula could
cascade into China, making China’s challenge of providing for its own people that much
more difficult,” says Mike Mullen, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
refugee issue is already a problem for China: Beijing’s promise to repatriate North
Koreans escaping across the border has consistently triggered
condemnation from human rights groups. Beijing began constructing a barbed-
wire fence more than a decade ago to prevent migrants from crossing, but the
International Rescue Committee estimates thirty to sixty thousand North
Korean refugees live in China, though some nongovernmental organizations believe
the total to be more than two hundred thousand. The majority of refugees first
make their way to China before moving to other parts of Asia, including South Korea.
However, tightened border controls under Kim Jong-un have decreased the outflow of
refugees.
Though Beijing favors a stable relationship with Pyongyang, it has also sought to
bolster its relations with Seoul in the South. China’s Xi Jinping met several
times with now ousted South Korean President Park Geun-hye, while he has yet to
visit or receive the North’s Kim. China was the destination for a quarter of South
Korea’s exports in 2016, amounting to $124 million, but recently China has
taken retaliatory measures against South Korean businesses to oppose the deployment of
a U.S. missile defense system in South Korea’s eastern province of North Gyeongsang.

Experts say China has also been ambivalent on the question of its commitment
to defend North Korea in case of military conflict. The 1961 Sino-North Korean
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance says China is obliged to
intervene against unprovoked aggression. But Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies says the Chinese government has tried to persuade North
Korean leaders to revoke the clause that would force Beijing to come to Pyongyang’s
defense. Beijing has also said if conflict is initiated by Pyongyang it would not
abide by its treaty obligation.
Washington’s Role
The United States has pushed North Korea to irreversibly give up its nuclear weapons
program in return for aid, diplomatic benefits, and normalization of relations. But
experts say Washington and Beijing, while sharing the goal of denuclearizing North
Korea, have different views on how to reach it. “Washington believes in using pressure to
influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have
a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics,” says the International
Crisis Group’s Daniel Pinkston [PDF]. “They tend to see public measures as humiliating
and counterproductive.”
The United States has also tried to pressure China to lean more heavily on North Korea.
U.S. presidential executive orders [PDF] and congressional moves impose sanctions on
countries, firms, or individuals contributing to North Korea’s ability to finance nuclear
and missile development; some measures targeted North Korean funds in Chinese
banks, while others [PDF] focus on its mineral and metal export industries—these make
up an important part of trade with China— luxury goods, or arms and weapons materiel.
Washington began the deployment of a missile defense system known as the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, in March 2017 to boost regional security, though
Beijing strongly condemns the move and sees it as a threat to Chinese national security.
President Barack Obama’s administration eschewed direct talks with Pyongyang amid
rocket, missile, and nuclear tests, and adopted an approach described as “strategic
patience [PDF].” A 2016 report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service
described the policy as designed to pressure the regime in Pyongyang by insisting on a
commitment toward denuclearization, attempting to sway Beijing to toughen its stance
on Pyongyang, and ratcheting up sanctions. Despite pursuing rounds of dialogue
either bilaterally or under the auspices of the Six Party Talks, such efforts were
fruitless.
The administration of President Donald J. Trump has shaken up U.S. policy toward
North Korea. Trump aides have declared the end of “strategic patience” and stated that
“all options are on the table,” alluding to the possibility of preemptive military strikes to
thwart Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and development. President Trump has also warned
that Washington will be prepared to take unilateral action against Pyongyang if Beijing
remains unwilling to exert more pressure on its neighbor. “If China is not going to
solve North Korea, we will,” Trump said in an April 2017 interview with the Financial
Times. The U.S. military has stepped up joint exercises with its allies in Japan and South
Korea and has periodically dispatched U.S. carrier strike groups near North Korea as a
show of force.
Still, the United States appears more interested in leveraging China’s economic influence
over North Korea. Some experts, including David S. Cohen and Anthony Ruggiero, argue
that Washington should impose secondary sanctions that will penalize Chinese banks
that help finance North Korean front companies. The U.S. Treasury did just that in June
2017, imposing sanctions on a Chinese bank, a shipping company, and two citizens.
Meanwhile, other analysts worry that such economic pressures and further alienation of
Pyongyang could embolden the Kim regime to resort to rash military action. Others
question the effectiveness of sanctions in getting China to bring North Korea to the
negotiating table. Following North Korea’s successful test of its first intercontinental
ballistic missile on July 4, 2017, Kim Jong-un said that his country’s nuclear weapons
program would never be up for negotiation. The Kim regime’s posture and use of nuclear
development to sustain its survival may rule out the possibility of an effective deal.
Looking Forward
“North Korea is in a category all its own,” writes the Brookings Institution’s Jonathan D.
Pollack. “The North Korean leadership has thus convinced itself (if not others) that its
existence as an autonomous state derives directly from its possession of nuclear
weapons.” Though China may be unhappy about North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship,
analysts say it will avoid moves that could cause a sudden regime collapse.
For now, policy failure on the peninsula has dampened hopes for a de-escalation of
regional tensions. Though Beijing, Seoul, and Washington agree that a denuclearized
North Korea is a top priority, differences remain over how best to strip the country of its
nuclear threat. But “there’s an increasing understanding that North Korea does not
provide the kind of stable neighbor and element of the neighborhood that China likes,”
says former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher
R. Hill.
Still, “China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea
if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime,”
write Joshua Stanton, Sung-Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs. Whether
Chinese pressure can sway Pyongyang to alter its behavior remains to be seen, especially
amid a climate of mounting distrust in Northeast Asia, but North Korea’s nuclear
program is becoming increasingly problematic for China’s desire to maintain regional
stability.
 Deterrence Review Plank
Expanding capabilities good.
Masashi Murano 17, a research fellow at the Okazaki Institute and a member of the
working group that deals with crisis simulations and defense force planning at the Japan
Institute International Affairs (JIIA), “Deterring North Korea,” May 24, The Diplomat,
retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/deterring-north-korea/
With a fifth nuclear test and repeated ballistic missile launches, North Korea’s
provocations appear to be escalating to a new level. Several military exercises and
flyovers by U.S. strategic bombers over the Korean Peninsula after nuclear or missile
tests may offer meaningful reassurance to allies. But they have not deterred North
Korea’s provocations. Given this, the United States and its allies need to review and
reconstruct their multi-layered deterrence strategy.
Any such strategy must start with the North Korean leadership’s strategic thinking and
threat perceptions. During the Korean War, Japan was the logistical forward base for
U.S. intervention on the Korean Peninsula. If a contingency were to arise on the
peninsula, the United States would once again rely on Japan. The Korean Peninsula and
Japan have been a single-integrated operational theater since hostilities broke out in
1950. The U.S.-Japan defense guidelines and Japan’s new security legislation provide
clear evidence of support under these circumstances.
Using its nuclear and missile capabilities, North Korea has threatened Japan with the
intention of reducing public support for seemingly “antagonistic” U.S. forward bases in
Japan. In fact, the four ballistic missiles fired on March 6 were launched by the Hwasong
ballistic missile division, which, according to the Korean Central News Agency, is “tasked
to strike the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in Japan.” Furthermore, North
Korea continues to seek reliable ICBMs so it can threaten nuclear strikes on the United
States as a decoupling strategy.
Given all this, how should the United States and its allies respond? Although the
seriousness of the conversation is different in Japan and South Korea, one option is
nuclear-arming, or the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States. However,
it would seem to be premature to conclude that Japan and South Korea need to develop
their own nuclear weapons because North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments are
not a failure of nuclear extended deterrence.
For a similar reason, the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea or Japan
is not an effective option. Under the current U.S. nuclear posture, there is no way to
introduce nuclear weapons other than to deploy B-61 nuclear bombs that can be
delivered by dual-capable aircraft (DCAs). However, if there were deployed in South
Korea or Japan, they would be vulnerable to a North Korean first strike and therefore
would not be an effective deterrent.
Allied governments need to understand the utility and limitations of nuclear deterrence,
and explain them to their citizens. But more fundamentally, there are other
conventional military capabilities that will contribute more to the defense
from North Korea’s missile threats.
Some experts have suggested that the United States consider a preemptive strike to
eliminate North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities, arguing that this is necessary
before North Korea obtains a reliable nuclear ICBM. But it would be hard to eliminate
North Korea’s survivable road-mobile ballistic missiles targeting Japan, and substantial
artillery batteries targeting Seoul.
Some Japanese lawmakers are pushing for Japan to develop its own strike options. At
the end of March, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) study group –
comprised mostly of former defense ministers – submitted a recommendation for
acquiring “counter-attack capability.” Itsunori Onodera, chairman of the study group,
said that if a missile “will fly from North Korea in tens of minutes, Japan should also
consider its strike capability to prevent from the second shot.”
In fact, the study group’s recommendations are quite modest. It uses the expression
“counter-attack capability” and is not recommending that Japan seek a “preemptive
strike capability.” Moreover, it recommends that even if Japan has its own capabilities,
they will function within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s counter-
attack capabilities are intended to limit damage from a second and third wave of attack
from North Korea rather than be a deterrent. Even if Japan cannot prevent the first salvo
attack, it can reduce and suppress the number of remaining North Korea’s missiles
before the next wave, and the probability of interception by missile defense improves.
Therefore, to contribute to deterrence by denial and to limit damage if
deterrence fails, Japan must strengthen its missile defense capabilities.
According to the FY2017 defense budget, the Ministry of Defense plans to move forward
with many new programs. It will accelerate investment in BMD systems,
upgrade an Aegis destroyer, procure SM-3 Block2A, and PAC-3 MSE. In
addition, Defense Minister Tomomi Inada has suggested considering the introduction of
new BMD systems such as the Aegis Ashore. If Japan introduced additional BMD
systems, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) could better protect not only its own
assets and citizens, but also the assets, personnel, and dependents of U.S. Forces Japan.
The flexibility of Aegis Ashore would be a very tempting. This system would
significantly improve Japan’s integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) architecture.
A Mk41 multiple vertical launch system could use not only SM-3s to protect against
ballistic missiles, but other interceptors such as SM-6s to protect against aircraft and
cruise missiles. Through the development and acquisition process, the United States and
Japan will have several opportunities for collaboration, such as licensed
production of the Mk41 as well as a joint development project for a new advanced radar
system. Moreover, Mk41 could also launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. The U.S.
ground-launched intermediate range missile capability has been limited by the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. However, its potential deployment by
the JSDF may provide an option for Japan.
Some Republican senators, such as Tom Cotton and Ron Johnson, have submitted a bill
to consider additional deployment of Aegis Ashore in Europe and Asia as a counter to
Russia’s violation of INF treaty. This suggests that Aegis Ashore can respond to diverse
threats, and it is necessary to make efficient procurement adjustments in the United
States and Japan. In addition, it is also important that the Tomahawk and SM-6 are
being modified to provide for long-range ship attack capabilities.
If the Japanese government decides to acquire the Aegis Ashore, it may be difficult to
procure THAAD as well because of budgetary circumstances. However, from the
perspective of strengthening layered BMD, deploying the U.S. THAAD battery to Japan
will definitely be an effective measure for ballistic missile salvo attacks. Aegis
Ashore can increase the opportunities to intercept at mid-course along with
original “offshore” Aegis BMD already owned by JSDF, but it cannot fill the gap between
mid-course and terminal phase carried by PAC-3. THAAD can provide not only the
upper terminal defense capability, but also the ability to strengthen the point defense
capability against the hypersonic boost-glide vehicles that are difficult to mid-course
interception.
In addition, the PAC-3 MSE can be integrated with THAAD’s radar systems
(AN/TPY-2) and, with upgraded software, would extend PAC-3 MSE’s intercept
range. Japan’s BMD system should be further integrated with the U.S.
deployment system creating a U.S.-Japan ground based interceptor joint task force.
Furthermore, in the coming years, THAAD is expected to be upgraded to develop a
three-fold increase in range, a nine- to twelve-fold increase in the defended area, and a
hypersonic glide interception capability.

The General Security of Military Information Agreement ( GSOMIA) agreement

between Japan and South Korea is promising and opens the door to greater trust and
cooperation among allies. Since 2016, the Japanese, U.S., and ROK navies have
conducted four trilateral missile warnings and information sharing exercises.
If North Korea’s provocations continue, the three should conduct a practical field
training exercise, including a live missile intercept. More rapid, integrated, and
seamless response requires an effective allied sensor system including U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK)’s TPY-2 radars, Aegis systems, and interceptors through the C2BMC
(Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication) in Hawaii.
According to some U.S. officials, USFK’s THAAD and its TPY-2 radars will not be
integrated into other regional BMD networks, including the C2BMC. This was reportedly
undertaken to reassure China that the TPY-2 radar could not detect its ballistic missile
launches as a forward-based sensor. Even if the TPY-2 radar operated in forward-based
mode, it would not be able to detect ICBMs launched from the central Chinese missile
sites, as they would follow a trajectory far north and west of the Korean Peninsula en
route to the United States.
However, this BMD network would strengthen regional resiliency against China’s
regional strike capability. Thus, it could be additional leverage if China fails to deal
with North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. As the North Korean nuclear and
missile threat grows, Japan, the United States, and South Korea must work together to
take practical steps to contain and deter North Korean aggression. Improving Japanese
defense capabilities would be an important step in the right direction.
 North Korea Rational
Anna Fifield 17, bureau chief in Tokyo focusing on Japan and the Koreas, “North
Korea’s leader is a lot of things — but irrational is not one of them,” March 25, The
Washington Post, retrieved at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-koreas-leader-is-a-lot-of-
things--but-irrational-is-not-one-of-them/2017/03/25/67b458d8-0da8-11e7-aa57-
2ca1b05c41b8_story.html?utm_term=.840523dc6ed1
“North Korea has consistently been treated like a joke, but now the joke has nuclear
weapons,” said John Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the Harvard Kennedy
School. “If you deem Kim Jong Un to be irrational, then you’re implicitly
underestimating him.”
Leaders throughout the centuries have realized it can be advantageous to have your
enemies think you’re crazy. Machiavelli once wrote that it can be wise to pretend to be
mad, while President Richard Nixon wanted the North Vietnamese to think he was
unstable and prone to launch a nuclear attack on a whim.
Writing off Kim Jong Un as a lunatic could equally be playing into his hands.
Want proof that he’s no senseless madman?
Exhibit A: “He’s still in power,” said Benjamin Smith, an expert on regime change at
the University of Florida. “He and his father and grandfather have stayed in power
through a series of American presidents going back to Truman.”
Longevity, of course, is the preserve of dictators, not democrats. Indeed, the 33-year-old
has defied predictions that he would not be able to keep a grip on the authoritarian
state that has been in his family’s control since 1948. December marked his fifth
anniversary in power — a milestone that the democratically elected president in the
South did not reach.
In person, Kim is confident and well spoken, said Michael Spavor, a Canadian who
runs Paektu Cultural Exchange, which promotes business, sports and tourism with
North Korea. Spavor is one of the very few outsiders to have met Kim.
“He was acting very diplomatically and professionally,” said Spavor, who
accompanied Dennis Rodman, the basketball player, on his trips to North Korea. “He felt
old beyond his years. He could be serious at times and fun at times but by no means
did he seem weird or odd.”
Smith pointed out that saying Kim is rational isn’t the same as saying “he’s a perfect guy
who makes perfect decisions.”
Kim’s decisions to date have enabled him to achieve his primary goal — so far — of
staying in power by staving off threats, real or anticipated, from the elite.

“He has reasons to be afraid of conspiracies in the top levels of his government,
especially in the military and secret police,” said Andrei Lankov, a Russian scholar of
North Korea who once studied at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang. “You can buy
these people off, but they can still betray you. You have to terrify them, and that’s
what he’s doing.”
Kim has sent a message to the elites who keep him in power through a series of
executions and purges that keep everyone fearful that they will be next.
Kim has rid himself of 300-plus officials during his five years at the helm. He
notably had his own uncle, Jang Song Thaek, executed for disobeying orders
and building his own power base.
Other high-level figures have been killed — a defense minister was reportedly dispatched
with antiaircraft fire — or purged. The state security minister is said to be under house
arrest.
“What’s irrational about that? Irrational is going to the ICC and surrendering,” Lankov
said. A United Nations commission of inquiry has recommended referring Kim to the
International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.
The assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half brother, Kim Jong Nam, in
Malaysia with a chemical weapon was a message to outside rivals that the young
leader could hunt them down wherever they are, analysts say.

To deal with threats from “hostile powers,” in North Korean parlance, having nuclear
weapons makes sense for Kim, said Kongdan Oh of the Institute for Defense
Analyses. “Steadily pursuing nuclear weapons is a very rational thing for him to be
doing.”
Kim has ordered three nuclear tests since he took power — claiming that one was a
hydrogen bomb — and has overseen steady improvements in the missile program. North
Korea has “entered the final stage of preparation” for the test launch of an
intercontinental ballistic missile, Kim has said, referring to a missile capable of reaching
the U.S. mainland.
North Korea was established in vehement opposition to the American “imperialist
aggressors” and their “puppets” in South Korea. So maintaining a sense of threat
from both provides a rationale for the state’s existence and a shared menace to
unite the elite and the common people.

Then there’s the economy. The fact that it’s growing is a sign that the leadership
knows what it’s doing, said Park of Harvard.
“There’s a puzzle here: The regime is getting wealthier amid the increasing
implementation of sanctions,” he said.
While the North Korean economy is far from booming, it has been steadily expanding in
recent years, as evidenced by all the construction in Pyongyang despite increasingly tight
restrictions imposed by the outside world.
It has done this through state-run trading companies that form partnerships
with entities in China, enabling them to circumvent sanctions.

“Look at the web of elite North Korean state trading companies. You can’t be irrational
or somehow crazy to consistently run this system to either make money off it or procure
what you need for the nuclear weapons program,” Park said. “That objectively shows that
there is a game plan, and a pretty consistently implemented game plan.”
Kim = rational; actions are calculating and disciplined---key to maintaining
grip on power. They’re based on historical observations.
Zeeshan Aleem 17, staff writer covering economics and energy for the foreign affairs
team, “North Korea is more rational than you think,” May 9, Vox, retrieved at:
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/9/15516278/north-korea-more-rational-than-you-
think

But when I spoke to scholars and historians of North Korea, they uniformly rejected
the idea that Kim is a lunatic. His ruthlessness and fierce rhetoric should not be
confused with irrationality, they explained. Instead, he should be understood as
extremely calculating and disciplined when it comes to maintaining his grip on
power — just as his predecessors (his father, Kim Jong Il, and his grandfather and the
country’s founder, Kim Il Sung) were.
To most North Korea experts, Kim Jong Un is far from erratic. If anyone is
unpredictable in this scenario, it’s Donald Trump.
Rational doesn’t mean easy to get along with
When we talk about a country or a leader being “rational” in the context of international
relations, we’re not using it in the casual sense of “sensible.”

The term “rational” here means that a country’s government is capable of making
logical calculations about its goals and interests and determining how to achieve
them based on the resources — economic, military, diplomatic, etc. — at its disposal.

Countries have lots of different interests, but the most crucial one is self-
preservation. A rational leader can take risky actions, but they wouldn’t purposely do
something that would foreseeably lead to the total annihilation of their country.
And that’s really what we’re asking when we ask whether Kim Jong Un (or his father and
grandfather before him) is rational: Is he bound by that fundamental survival
instinct? Because if not, that essentially means he can’t be deterred.

Deterrence works by convincing your opponent that you can hurt them — and perhaps
even destroy them — if they hurt you. But if your opponent doesn’t care about
being destroyed, there’s nothing stopping them from hurting you.
So the fear is that North Korea’s leader, blinded by ideological zeal or illusions of
his own power, won’t be kept in check by the principle of deterrence and would
attempt a nuclear strike without regard for the retaliatory strikes that would
effectively eradicate it.
North Korea is a careful student of history

But here’s the thing: North Korea has been deterred by the US for decades.

In the 64 years since the end of the Korean War in 1953, North Korea hasn’t
launched a war to retake South Korea. And that’s largely because the US has tens
of thousands of troops and serious firepower parked in South Korea and Japan to
ensure that any attempt by North Korea to actually start a war would be catastrophically
costly for it.
Even when South Korea has shown extreme vulnerability — such as when it
underwent military coups in 1961 and 1980 and some of its military units were moved
away from the border with North Korea — North Korea has not launched a war. Clearly,
deterrence has worked.

The North has, however, taken other hostile actions against the US and its allies over
the decades, including shooting down American spy planes and killing people in the
demilitarized zone that marks the boundary between North and South Korea. And it’s
continued to develop a nuclear arsenal and the ballistic missiles needed to
deliver them, all while openly threatening the United States with nuclear war.

So how is that rational? Why pick a fight with a vastly more powerful country whose
nuclear arsenal makes yours look like child’s play?
According to James Person, a North Korea expert at the Wilson Center in Washington,
while this might seem at first glance to be completely irrational, it’s not: It’s actually an
effective way of getting America’s attention — and often, a way of gaining an
upper hand over it.

Person contends that Pyongyang “carefully studies” US responses to all its

actions and has learned that it can often get the US to yield when it carries out
some of its edgier provocations.

Here’s a good example: In 1968, North Korea seized the US naval intelligence ship USS
Pueblo with 83 crew members aboard. It was one of the most audacious actions the
North had ever taken against the US, and the crisis had the potential to erupt into a full-
on war.
But that’s not what ultimately happened. Not only did the Pueblo’s seizure not spark a
huge military clash, but the North was actually able to turn the move into a political
win.
The US sat down and negotiated with North Korea for nearly a year over the
imprisoned sailors. At the end of the negotiations, North Korea returned the 83 sailors
(who were tortured during their time in captivity) — but it also got the US to admit to
having hostile intentions toward North Korea. And it kept the ship. In other words, not
only did North Korea come out of the encounter unscathed, it got a trophy out of it.
Another incident just a year later highlights a similar dynamic. When in 1969 North
Korean fighter jets shot down an American spy plane, killing the 31 people aboard the
aircraft, the Nixon administration considered a variety of military options — including a
nuclear strike — but ultimately chose to refrain from using force altogether.
So North Korea got away with the attack without facing repercussions. The reason?
“The US was being prudent because of potential risks of retaliation against South Korea,”
Person said.
The US’s decision to not retaliate after both of these high-profile provocations
underscores something crucial to understanding why war hasn’t broken out on the
Korean Peninsula since the end of the first war in 1953: Both North Korea and its
opponents are deeply afraid of setting off a broader war that would wreak
havoc across the region. The smallness of the peninsula has a way of clarifying the
high stakes of any war: Millions of people are vulnerable to being massacred by either
side.
North Korea’s leaders — including Kim Jong Un — aren’t blind to this. In fact, they’re
exceptionally sensitive to it. They’re very mindful of the fact that their ability to
inflict huge damage on South Korea with great speed is a big deterrent to any major
US strike against the North. And because of that, they know they have a bit of
leeway in taking provocative action against South Korea and the US.

Nobody actually wants to go to war, so North Korea gets away with a lot of bad
behavior.
North Korea’s acts of belligerence aren’t insane outbursts, but deliberate gestures
grounded in careful observations about how the outside world responds to it. And
when it carries them out, it looks strong and powerful to its own population,
intimidates South Korea, and broadcasts to the global community a highly aggressive
posture that makes military intervention against it seem all the more daunting.

Nuclear weapons are key to maintaining power

So how do North Korea’s nuclear ambitions fit into all this? With nuclear weapons,
North Korea believes it will have license to act even more provocatively in the region
without fear of repercussions. If the US already lets North Korea get away with
adversarial behavior now because it fears provoking an all-out war, just imagine how
much more it will put up with to avoid an all-out nuclear war.
When North Korea looks at other authoritarian dictators that failed to secure nuclear
weapons, it sees a legacy of failure.
“They saw Iraq, which had an unrealized nuclear program, get taken out,” Person
explains. “They saw [Libyan dictator] Muammar Qaddafi voluntarily give up his nuclear
program in exchange for integration and improved relations with the world — only for
the NATO-backed rebels to take him out in the street in 2011.”
Pyongyang’s thoughts about the power of nuclear weapons are shaped by those
regime collapses. The North sees nuclear weapons as the one bulwark that can
prevent similar things from happening to them. “Kim thinks that the ‘treasured sword of
justice’ protects them and guarantees the survival of their system,” Jonathan
Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who specializes in US strategy in
Asia and the Pacific, tells me.
Person says the fact that the Trump administration has threatened to tear up the Iran
nuclear deal — in which Iran agreed to restrict many of its sensitive nuclear activities in
exchange for the lifting of sanctions — only makes North Korea more resolute about
clinging to its weapons. “It sends the signal to them, you may get an agreement today —
but then the next president may not agree with it,” Person says.
Kim is not just a “crazy fat kid”
Outside of nuclear program, Kim Jong Un has shocked many with some of his more
brutal actions in recent years. He had his uncle executed in 2013; he appears to have
assassinated his exiled half-brother in a Malaysian airport this year. From a distance,
this proclivity for violence against family members can come across as unhinged to
Western observers.

But analysts say that while Kim’s behavior is brutal, it’s not irrational. His
executions have been attempts at consolidating power and eliminating threats
decisively — a necessary kind of practice when you’re running a totalitarian state.
“If Kim was totally out of touch, there’s no way he could’ve lasted this long,” says David
Kang, a scholar at the University of Southern California who specializes in security in
East Asia. “You have to be good at figuring out what you want, how to reward friends, get
rid of enemies.”

None of this is to say that Kim’s actions are not morally abhorrent. But there’s a logic
to them that can be discerned quite clearly by experts.

“North Korea is remarkably predictable,” Pollack said. “Tactically they can surprise us
... but strategically, they rarely surprise me.”
Leads to better policies
Liubomir K. Topaloff 7-13-17, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at the
School of Political Science and Economics at Meiji University, “The North Korean
Endgame,” July 13, The Diplomat, retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-
north-korean-endgame/
In 2016, North Korea conducted the most missile tests ever, a total of 24. Since the
beginning of 2017, the regime in Pyongyang had only ratcheted up the number of tests,
currently at 17, with the promise of reaching a new all-time high, and surpassing last
year’s record. The last test, conducted symbolically on July 4, marked a new milestone by
introducing Pyongyang’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with a range that
could reach Alaska and potentially Seattle. It is now believed that North Korea will soon
be able to develop and mount miniaturized nuclear warheads on its ICBMs and become
an even greater threat to its neighbors, and the United States.
The urgency of the current developments, fast outpacing the expected timetable, has
raised the stakes in Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing, raising the demand
for new policies targeting the military belligerence of the rogue state. As Washington
considers its main policy options, it will have to consider both feasibility and the cost-
benefit analysis of their potential outcomes.
At the core of any meaningful policy vis-a-vis North Korean militarization sits one
simple, yet seminal and highly contested question: is the regime in Pyongyang
rational or not? The question is by no means simple, but it is asked in a simple, binary
way that requires a clear yes/no answer in order to move on to the scenarios. It is
essential, because its answer determines whether there is a way of engaging with
North Korea, and if so, what kind; it is contested, because there is no clear agreement
among the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon, the White House, and the major foreign
players on this question. Getting this question wrong could potentially lead to a far
greater calamity than the world has seen since World War II, if not ever: engaging with
an irrational actor, or attacking one that can be engaged rationally.

If the regime in Pyongyang is rational, then deterrence (nuclear deterrence in

particular) in combination also with other, more positive forms of engagement could
lead to a de-escalation of the current tensions both in short and long terms. If
Pyongyang regime, however, is irrational, there is little one can do but act, seizing
a moment of strategic and tactical advantage before the cost mounts even more. The
difficulty comes from the fact that rogue regimes often might pretend to be irrational
in order to keep up the aura of unpredictability as part of their strategic arsenal. Or
they may be mistakenly considered as irrational, when their history points
otherwise.
Rationality is an invented concept that does not exist in its absolute terms. But despite
its conditional nature, it is a useful shorthand that helps humans navigate the
complex web of social interactions and mitigate the consequences of
uncertainty. As much as it is helpful, the concept could also be highly misleading. In a
world of complete and unconditional rationality, predictability will replace uncertainty
and could potentially reduce risks of conflict. But it would also ultimately negate itself, as
in a completely predictable world, there will be no place for change. Even worse, in such
rational and predictable world, it may pay handsomely to suddenly act irrationally.
Despite its problems, rationality is a helpful approach to decision-making, especially in
situations of asymmetric information, or for policy cost-benefit analyses. It rests on a
number of assumptions, mainly on the fundamental utilitarian calculus that
individuals (in this case, policymakers) will try to increase utility and avoid loss.
It does not necessarily require complete symmetrical knowledge of intentions or
information, but when it comes to constructing strategic plans, it assumes certain
constants, such as the determination to avoid suicide and self-destruction in the
pursuit of one’s goals. Much of this could be contested in any given specific historical or
political context, of course, but when it comes to international politics, it is hard not to
agree with its basic premises. In other words, for a regime not to be rational would
essentially mean that under certain circumstances it will act in such a way as to lead to
its own destruction, blinded by the pursuit of yet more irrational or unattainable
goals.

Scenario 1: The North Korean Regime is Not Rational

Are Kim Jong-un and his regime irrational? If the answer is yes, as many warmongering
policymakers in the State Department and the Pentagon argue, nothing short of a swift
military intervention, with the possible goal of decapitation and regime change,
could stop a nuclear Pyongyang with its new ICBM capabilities from running over South
Korea, even while risking retaliation from the United States. It would be a highly risky
and challenging act, calling the United States’ nuclear umbrella over Japan and
South Korea a bluff. If the United States acts, the North Koreans would use their
missiles to target not just South Korean and Japanese cities, but also U.S. bases in South
Korea, Japan, Guam, and Alaska, and maybe even a major U.S. city like Seattle.
Such an act will surely lead to a massive retaliation by the United States and would
evoke the wrath of its formidable military capabilities. If it does not, the U.S. military
alliances in the region, or for that matter with NATO, would mean close to nothing — a
risk not even President Donald Trump can possibly take. The scale and intensity of
retaliation would, of course, depend on the immediate tactical calculations, as well as on
the more long-term strategies.
Among the possible scenarios for dealing with an irrational North Korea, almost
all invariably include some form of military action. They usually range from full-
scale massive war to a more limited surgical targeting that would “tighten the
screws” on the regime, to decapitation and limited tactical military intervention
that would help foster regime change. For any sound analyst, however, it must be clear
that none of the above-mentioned scenarios would have much chance to end up in
anything else but a devastating full-blown, and potentially nuclear, war.

If the regime is indeed irrational, and given the level of paranoia that exists among all its
ranks, any military action could be interpreted as an attempt at decapitation or
regime change or a full-blown attack. Either way, in the fog of war, it most likely would
lead to massive retaliation by the North.

But following the logic that the regime in Pyongyang is irrational anyway, even without a
preemptive intervention or a limited military intervention by U.S. and South Korean
forces, the region, if not a large part of the rest of the world, is doomed anyway. This
scenario assumes that the regime will inevitably invade South Korea, bomb Japan, and
perhaps send nuclear ICBMs to the United States, led by its divine and messianic
mission to fulfill the Kim dynasty’s destiny to unite Korea under its banner and, after
near 70 years of preparation, deliver a decisive victory against its greatest enemy, the
United States.
The line of argument above could acquire a number of analytical and policy nuances, but
its main structure would invariably remain the same. The policy options are also
relatively clear in this case. First, China obviously will prove unable to rein in its rogue
protege, even when it desires to do so. Therefore, only a unilateral action (with the
support of South Korea and potentially Japan) makes sense. This is precisely what
Trump is threatening to do, and soon. Among the biggest questions for the Trump
administration, in such a case, would be to find a way to deal with the aftermath of such
conflict, its scale, its consequences for the region, and the massive human suffering it
would cause. Let us briefly look at each of them.
Any military escalation with an irrational North Korea would result in the
materialization of Pyongyang’s threats to shower Seoul and Tokyo with a
barrage of missiles, likely carrying highly toxic sarin gas among other things. If U.S.
and South Korean intelligence is correct, hundreds of artillery cannons and cruise
missiles will pepper Seoul within minutes of the beginning of a military
confrontation, covering the capital, with its population of over 10 million, and
obliterating millions of lives, while also causing structural and economic damage
not seen since World War II. The same fate would await Tokyo, home to 36 million.
Millions of Koreans from both countries would storm China, Japan, and Russia, in an
attempt to escape from the impending nuclear holocaust, while millions more may
engage in a fraternal civil war. This will quickly lead to the largest humanitarian
crisis of the post-WWII world, making the current Syrian crisis look like a small
deal.

China would not sit and wait. It would not favor an American military presence next to
its borders, nor the prospect of united (albeit devastated) Korea under the banner of a
pro-American Republic of Korea. A conflict would also prompt a race between the
U.S.-ROK alliance on the one hand and China on the other (with possible
factions from the North military joining either side or remaining independent) to capture
and secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons. It will be a war replete with many tactical
traps: miscalculations, wrong beliefs, the rigidity of diplomatic negotiations
(or the lack thereof), offense favoring beliefs in the first-mover’s strategic advantage,
and the possibility of a blitzkrieg.

Russia will also not sit and wait. Moscow and Beijing already have military ties
that amount to a semi-military alliance. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not
NATO, and will probably never be, but it is also a suitable rudimentary platform for
military cooperation and security coordination that keeps developing. Moscow is a
concerned party in the region and would act in its own interest in an attempt to prevent
a greater American presence there, as well as the establishment of a pro-U.S.
united Korean state.

Accepting that the regime in Pyongyang is irrational, hence suicidal and self-
destructive in pursuit of a divinely chosen destiny to unite the two Koreas under its
banner and to defeat the United States, is a precarious and deterministic way of
assessing the current situation in the peninsula. It narrows the available policy
options, which are frequently trimmed down to exploiting strategic advantages while
the window of opportunity is still present. The irrationality theory rests on unstable
logic and hides a great deal of uncertainty, along with the potentially devastating
consequences for the region, for millions of innocent civilians, and for the global
economy and peace.

Scenario 2: North Korea Is a Rational Actor

Rationality suggests that given the knowledge of the potential costs and benefits
of each policy option, policymakers would pick the one that minimizes risk,
minimizes cost, and maximizes utility. Rationality suggests that self-destruction
carries very low if any utility but maximize both cost and risk, which means
this course must be avoided at all costs.
Accepting that Pyongyang is a rational actor, even when the regime shows signs of
apparent irrationality, is a crucial starting point for the crafting of a successful
deterrence policy that would prevent North Korea from causing a major regional if
not a global conflict. Such an approach would rest on traditional military
deterrence, coupled with gradual but active engagement with the regime.
The Kim dynasty and their supporters are engulfed by a long-standing fear that
Washington is out to topple them. This may not be completely removed from
reality, given the fact that the Korean conflict remains unresolved, after nearly 70 years
of armistice without a peace agreement. A horrible totalitarian system at its core, and
one that has brought only the greatest suffering to its population, the Pyongyang regime
is determined to remain in control, at all costs. Besieged on all fronts, and with a
small lifeline from China, the regime is slowly suffocating under the wide range of UN
and unilateral sanctions, the pressure of globalization and accompanying flow of
information about the outside world that undermines the brainwashing propaganda
of the regime, and its subsequent rapid loss of legitimacy inside the country.

The Kim regime may be totalitarian and cruel to the point of genocidal, but it serves no
purpose to assume that it is suicidal and self-destructive. If anything, it is
actually a survivalist. Such a point of departure for analysis and policymaking would
open a wide range of possibilities compared to the narrower policy options under
the “irrational regime” argument.
To start, it allows for a wider interpretation of the intentions behind Pyongyang’s
current provocative actions and intensified military development program. The rational
theory reveals the ransom mentality that drives the current North Korean politics,
according to which the Pyongyang regime acts just like a bandit desperate for money,
who has kidnapped a member of a rich family and is trying to turn its military might into
cash. North Korea has done this many times in the past and wants to do it again. It may
be a risky undertaking, but it is not suicidal. It is actually quite a rational decision
based on wrong engagements in the past, which rewarded bad and not good
behavior. Such behavior is also a sign that the regime is becoming increasingly
desperate for funds, and is betting all its chips on winning this hand. This is not
irrational behavior, but a survivalist one under dire conditions.

Two questions should be asked here: a) how far North Korea is prepared to go in
order to extract the concessions it pursues; and b) how much would be enough to
satisfy it. In other words, is there an attainable equilibrium between the concessions of
the West and the demands of North Korea?
Those who oppose this approach would argue that the more one gives up to Pyongyang,
the more it will strengthen its power, threaten the West, and demand yet more
concessions. It would also reward bad behavior. However, a brief review of the
history of engagement with the North Korean state would show that — at least in the
past — gradual engagement has worked, albeit not entirely satisfactory. However,
the alternatives are even more dire. At least trying engagement seems more like a
sensible option compared to the military options outlined above.

Next, accepting the rational actor thesis allows for addressing some of the
fears of the regime. Since the 1953 armistice, the United States has remained the main
source of paranoia for the Kim regime. In 1958 the United States abrogated Article
13(d) of the armistice, which mandated that neither side would introduce new
weapons into the peninsula, and deployed nuclear weapons — M65 atomic cannons
— in South Korea. Even though George H.W. Bush withdrew the nuclear weapons in
October of 1991, the new Trump administration is reportedly considering a new plan for
redeployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea, a move that would mark the first such
nuclear deployment by the United States since the end of the Cold War. In addition, the
U.S. is currently seeking ways to renew the process of deployment of the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), which was halted in the beginning of
June after the election of the new South Korean president, Moon Jae-in.
In more general terms, it is not just the regime in Pyongyang but also a large portion
of North Koreans who live in constant fear of invasion and occupation by the
United States. Admittedly, this is as much the result of decades of brain-washing and
state propaganda as a response to a real threat. Regardless of the cause, however, the
reality is such that only engagement could mitigate such fears. Providing
guarantees for the survival of a monstrous, totalitarian regime seems removed from
the high moral standards of human rights. But the risk of a nuclear holocaust that could
lead to the deaths of millions, the displacement of millions more, and the destabilization
of the entire Asia-Pacific region, if not beyond, is a prospect even more dreadful.

Finally, the role of China must be considered once again. Currently, Beijing is the
only lifeline to the regime in Pyongyang. The bilateral trade relationship between
China and North Korea accounts for over 90 percent of Pyongyang’s total trade
volume. China provides North Korea with energy and food supplies, and purchases
seafood, minerals and other raw materials, and manufactured garments. But China is
more than the last real economic backer of North Korea. It is also the actual moral and
economic owner of the North Korean problem. What happens in North Korea impacts
China in various ways, especially at a time when the Xi Jinping administration is
undertaking the most profound domestic reforms since Deng Xiaoping while also trying
to rebrand China as a responsible global player.
China, thus, has tremendous stakes in mitigating the current tensions and
lowering the risks North Korea poses to the world. The leadership in Beijing does
not hide its dislike for the Kim regime and seems genuinely worried by its nuclear
adventures. But it also fears any type of regime collapse, including an economic
collapse. China has signaled over the past six moths that it may be willing to work
together with the United States, Russia, and others on a common solution, and to back
oil sanctions on the regime if Pyongyang continues with its nuclear tests. In fact, as it is
widely believed that the North will inevitably conduct another test by the end of the year,
in anticipation of it, the Chinese state-owned oil producer, China National Petroleum
Corporation, suspended its sales to North Korea in June. The official rationale was
concerned that the regime will not be able to pay for the oil. But considering the sizable
energy and food aid China generously provides to the Kim regime in order to keep it
afloat, such concerns are doubtful to the least. It is rather a hard signal in a generally
nontransparent bilateral relationship, of which outsiders have little direct observational
knowledge.
Should the United States and South Korea destabilize Kim’s regime, or attack it, China’s
calculus may change drastically. As a starter, as mentioned earlier, it is extremely
unlikely that China will allow the unification of the two Koreas under the ROK.
That means China will either try to annex as much of North Korean territory as possible
— temporarily at least — in order to create buffer zone for itself, or it will directly
challenge U.S.-ROK forces for the control of North Korea. Given the fact that South
Korea will be locked near China for eternity, while the U.S. priorities may change, it is
questionable how much South Korean leadership would pick a war with China.
As much as certain circles in Washington may not like it, the only meaningful policy in
the current situation, and the only one that does not involve the risk of a full-blown
military confrontation with unpredictable consequences, is the policy of strategic
engagement with Pyongyang, working in closer cooperation with China, Russia, and
Japan on the issue. This may also require temporarily putting the THAAD program aside
and offering “ransom” to the Kim regime. Any other endgame may prove not only very
costly, but also very risky and without any positive outcomes — the hallmarks of an
irrational choice.
 Sanctions Don’t Solve
Loopholes abound
Jane Perlez 17, the bureau chief in Beijing who writes about China’s foreign policy,
Yufan Huang researcher in Beijing, and Paul Mozur, a technology reporter, “How North
Korea Managed to Defy Years of Sanctions,” May 12, The New York Times, retrieved at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/asia/north-korea-sanctions-loopholes-
china-united-states-garment-industry.html?
DANDONG, China — As the end of the fashion season approached, and the suits and
dresses arrived in her company’s warehouses here in the Chinese border town of
Dandong, the accountant crammed about $100,000 into a backpack, then boarded a
rickety train with several co-workers.
She asked to be identified only by her surname, Lang, given the sensitivity of their
destination: North Korea.
After a six-hour journey, she recalled, they arrived at a factory where hundreds of women
using high-end European machines sewed clothes with “Made in China” labels. Her boss
handed the money to the North Korean manager, all of it in American bills as required.
Despite seven rounds of United Nations sanctions over the past 11 years, including a ban
on “bulk cash” transfers, large avenues of trade remain open to North Korea,
allowing it to earn foreign currency to sustain its economy and finance its
program to build a nuclear weapon that can strike the United States.

Fraudulent labeling helps support its garment industry, which generated more
than $500 million for the isolated nation last year, according to Chinese trade data.

North Korea earned an additional $1.1 billion selling coal to China last year using a
loophole in the ban on such exports, and researchers say tens of thousands of North
Koreans who work overseas as laborers are forced to send back as much as $250
million annually. Diplomats estimate the country makes $70 million more selling
rights to harvest seafood from its waters.

China accounts for more than 80 percent of trade with North Korea, and the
Trump administration is counting on Beijing to use that leverage to pressure it into
giving up its nuclear arsenal. The Chinese government took a big step in February by
announcing that it was suspending imports of coal from the country through the end of
the year.

But China has a long record of shielding North Korea from more painful sanctions,
because it is afraid of a regime collapse that could send refugees streaming across
the border and leave it with a more hostile neighbor.

In addition, Beijing now has a sympathetic ear in South Korea, whose newly
elected president, Moon Jae-in, echoes its view that sanctions alone will not be enough to
persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program.
While North Korea remains impoverished and dependent on food aid, its
economy appears to be growing, partly because of a limited embrace of market forces
since its leader, Kim Jong-un, took power more than five years ago.

Foreign trade, primarily with China, has surged, too, more than doubling since
2000, though it has slipped in the past three years.

In theory, North Korea’s greater openness to trade makes it more vulnerable to

sanctions, with new potential targets and pressure points. But it also highlights
the limits of an approach to sanctions — defined largely by China at the United
Nations — that aims to punish North Korea’s military and ruling elite while
sparing its people. As trade expands, the lines have blurred.

North Korean Labor

Positioned near the mouth of the Yalu River, Dandong is China’s largest border town,
and much of North Korea’s trade with the world flows across its old bridges or
through its deepwater port.
Ms. Lang, 33, moved here more than a decade ago to study environmental protection.
She ended up like many with ambition in this city of more than three million: doing
business with North Korea.
She wears exquisite makeup and carries a Louis Vuitton handbag, and she said her role
in the garment trade was straightforward: Orders come in from Japan, Europe and other
parts of China, and she gets the clothes made.
For those with quick deadlines or detailed specifications, she turns to Chinese factories
in Dandong, where quality control is better. Yet even these factories employ North
Korean laborers, she said.

For decades, North Korea has been accused of sending workers abroad and
confiscating most of their wages, an arrangement that activists liken to slave
labor. Researchers say the practice has expanded since Mr. Kim took power, with
more than 50,000 workers now toiling in up to 40 countries.
In Dandong, the local government boasts that 10,000 North Koreans are employed in its
apparel factories, working 12- to 14-hour shifts, with just two to four days off each month
and a monthly wage of no more than $260.
“They are well disciplined and easy to manage,” says the website of the Dandong
commerce bureau, noting that the workers have been vetted before arrival. “There is no
such thing as absenteeism or interfering with management, no using illness to shun work
or procrastination and losing work time.”
Ms. Lang sends more-flexible orders to North Korea, where costs are lower but it is
impossible to guarantee delivery dates because of power failures and a shortage of
trucks.
Her company ships fabric, buttons and zippers to factories there, she said, because the
North lacks the materials, and they put “Made in China” labels in garments to make
them easier to sell overseas. That would most likely be considered fraud and a violation
of place-of-origin rules in countries that import the clothes, experts said.
Paul Tjia, managing director of GPI Consultancy, a Dutch company that offers advice on
doing business in North Korea, said that some European clients had ordered hundreds of
thousands of garments and that “Made in China” labels could be justified by additional
work put into the clothes inside China.
But he added: “I’m not a garment manufacturer. I just make the introductions.”
Loopholes Abound

China has kept North Korea’s garment sector off the list of industries targeted by
United Nations sanctions, arguing that punishing it would hurt ordinary people
and not military programs. It has protected North Korea’s seafood industry
using the same argument.

But it is difficult to say who benefits from this trade, in part because even private
enterprise in North Korea is overseen by state officials who extract taxes and
bribes.

“Whether the proceeds from the textile industry support the nuclear program is an open
question,” said Joseph M. DeThomas, a professor at Pennsylvania State University and a
former American ambassador involved in sanctions policy. “ Money is fungible.”

At least one North Korean enterprise controlled by the atomic energy bureau, the Korea
Kumsan Trading Corporation, ran a garment factory that added embroidery and beading
to clothing, according to a North Korean government trade website.
And South Korean officials say the millions paid by Chinese companies to fish in North
Korean waters go primarily to firms controlled by the North’s military.

Sanctions also do not cover the organized export of labor. The United States
has urged countries to eject North Korean workers, saying their remittances benefit the
military, not their families. But China, Russia and other nations continue to hire them.
American sanctions against North Korea began with a near-total economic
embargo adopted in 1950, at the start of the Korean War. Over the years, some
sanctions were eased and others added, including after the cyberattack on Sony
Pictures in 2014 that Washington attributed to the North.

The United Nations Security Council did not impose sanctions until July 2006,
when, after a series of missile tests, it banned countries from selling material for missiles
or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea.
The North detonated its first nuclear device months later, followed by additional tests in
2009 and 2013, and two in 2016. The Security Council tightened sanctions after each
test, as well as after a satellite launch in 2013. It targeted military supplies and
luxury goods, shut Pyongyang out of the international financial system and, most
recently, banned a range of mineral exports.
But loopholes abound. Resolutions called for searches of vessels carrying cargo to
North Korea but have failed to stop its use of ships sailing under foreign flags.
And when the Security Council banned its top export, coal, China insisted on an
exception for transactions judged to be for “livelihood purposes.”
New measures seek to limit North Korea’s ability to make money through its embassies.
In Berlin, for example, the authorities are closing a hostel run out of former diplomatic
quarters. But the North has responded to such crackdowns by shifting business to
countries with weaker enforcement.
“How much cooperation will the international community get from Cuba, Russia, Iran or
even Pakistan, Bangladesh or Laos?” asked Stephan Haggard, an expert on the North
Korean economy at the University of California, San Diego.
The United States has also urged a boycott of Air Koryo, the North Korean airline, but it
still flies to China and Russia. Chinese tourism to North Korea is booming, said
Cha Yong Hyok, whose company, Indprk, takes groups by train to Pyongyang and will
soon use new flights from Dandong.

The North often circumvents banking sanctions using front companies and
agents overseas, and North Koreans routinely send and receive payments using
Chinese intermediaries who take a commission, despite the ban on “bulk cash”
transfers.

“We can and should go after these targets, but turning this into a game of financial
cat-and-mouse will never achieve the level of pressure needed,” said Daniel L. Glaser,
a former Treasury Department official involved in sanctions enforcement.

Ultimately, he argued, that pressure will come only if China makes a strategic
decision to truly squeeze the North. “Though China has taken helpful steps at
times,” he said, “it has never been willing to go all in.”
In Business With the North

Many of China’s best-known companies have done business with North

Korea even as they have sought customers and investors in the United States or relied
on American-made parts and materials. ZTE, the mobile phone and electronics
manufacturer, for example, shipped about $15 million of goods to the North in 2015,
according to Chinese customs records viewed via the global trade database company
Panjiva.
The company agreed to pay $1.19 billion in March for violating American sanctions
against Iran and North Korea, in part by sending 283 shipments of electronics with
American-made components to the North. ZTE has pledged to improve oversight.

But many Chinese companies sell products to North Korea without such
problems. The electric car and battery maker BYD, in which Warren E. Buffett’s
Berkshire Hathaway owns a 10 percent stake, has shipped $14 million in goods to North
Korea since 2012, including rubber products in January and vehicles in December,
customs records show. BYD and Berkshire Hathaway didn’t immediately respond to a
request for comment.

Just about every big Chinese appliance maker does business with North
Korea, too, shipping refrigerators, air-conditioners, televisions and other electronics.
The major Chinese automakers sell vehicles to the North as well.
Even Tsingtao Brewery shows up in customs records, delivering $20,000 worth of beer
in the summer of 2014.

United Nations sanctions prohibit the sale of luxury goods to North Korea, but
countries are generally left to define what that means. The resolutions list
jewelry, luxury automobiles, sports equipment and snowmobiles but make no mention of
televisions, consumer electronics or home appliances.

In some cases, Chinese companies with access to advanced technology are

doing business with North Korea. Subsidiaries of the defense manufacturer
Norinco made seven shipments, mostly of electronic and optical goods, worth a total of
$1.5 million, in the second half of last year, records say. Norinco did not respond to a
request for comment.
Matthew Brazil, a security consultant and former diplomat for the United States who
investigated Chinese trade controls in the 1990s, said it was often impossible to get
China to follow up on leads suggesting Chinese firms were violating restrictions.
“Three months later, if you’re lucky, the visit is scheduled, and many times, visits weren’t
scheduled at all,” he said.
Mr. Brazil said the problem had persisted, and “any level of control of American
electronics has completely collapsed because this technology can be so easily
shipped from China to North Korea.”

On AliExpress, an e-commerce platform run by the Chinese internet giant Alibaba, six of
the nine shipping services list North Korea as a potential destination. Alibaba declined to
comment.
The manager of a shipping firm in Dandong who asked to be identified only by her
surname, Li, because of the nature of her work said shipping a package of electronics to
North Korea was straightforward “as long as it doesn’t have obvious labels” and
meets weight requirements.
In fact, a delivery is more likely to run into problems on the North Korean side of the
border than with customs inspectors in China. “The key,” she said, “is to make sure
everything is fine with the people on the other side.”
 Russia
Samuel Ramani 7-14-17, a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s
College, University of Oxford, “Russia's Korea Strategy,” July 15, The Diplomat, retrieved
at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/
On July 7, 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced that Washington
would increase diplomatic pressure on Russia, to ensure that Moscow helps the United
States contain North Korea’s belligerence toward Japan and South Korea. Ahead of the
much-anticipated G20 summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and his
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, Tillerson argued that diplomatic dialogue could
help ease the growing chasm between Washington and Moscow on North Korea.
Despite this optimistic rhetoric from Tillerson, Russia’s refutation of U.S. claims that
North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 4 and
opposition to expanded international sanctions against North Korea suggests that
diplomacy has done little to assuage Washington-Moscow tensions over North Korea.
The recent intensification of tensions between Russia and the United States over North
Korea can be explained by two factors. First, Russia’s preferred strategy to combat
the North Korean threat contrasts markedly with Washington’s use of coercive
diplomacy. Moscow has emphasized the importance of promoting inter-Korean
diplomacy and has urged South Korea to desist from participation in U.S.-led
security measures on the Korean peninsula, which antagonize North Korea. Second,
Russia is expanding its stake in the North Korean crisis to strengthen its
increasingly important strategic partnership with China.

Russia’s Strategy to Resolve the North Korean Crisis

Since North Korea accelerated the pace of its nuclear and ballistic missile tests in early
2016, Russia has emerged as the leading international advocate of a political
solution to the Korean Peninsula crisis. In contrast to Washington’s focus on
denuclearizing North Korea by any means necessary, Russia’s strategy has focused on
containing North Korean aggression through targeted diplomacy.

The first prong of Moscow’s containment strategy is the promotion of direct

diplomacy between Pyongyang and Seoul. To achieve this end, Putin has worked
concertedly to strengthen Moscow’s relationship with South Korea. On May 29,
new South Korean President Moon Jae-in emphasized the importance of cooperation
with Russia and expressed optimism that Moscow could facilitate an improvement
in Seoul-Pyongyang relations.

The Kremlin has responded to Moon’s statement and expressed willingness to

diplomatically engage with North Korea by laying out a blueprint for revived
inter-Korean diplomacy. On May 25, Putin offered to send an emissary to Pyongyang to
ascertain North Korea’s intentions, and relay North Korea’s conditions for
diplomacy back to Seoul.
In addition to deepening its engagement with Seoul, Russia has used diplomacy to press
North Korea to desist from further aggression towards Japan and South Korea.
During his April 30 meeting with North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Han Song Ryol,
Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora called on Pyongyang
to show restraint and to avoid provocative actions that increase tensions on
the Korean peninsula.

While Moscow’s leverage over North Korea remains limited, Russia’s attempts
to extract compromises from both Pyongyang and Seoul underscore the strength of
the Kremlin’s commitment to inter-Korean diplomacy. As Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov has called for the revival of Six Party Talks on the North Korean crisis
since April 2016, tangible progress towards inter-Korean diplomatic dialogue will
represent the fulfillment of a long-standing Russian goal.

The second prong of Russia’s containment strategy has focused on convincing South
Korea to withdraw from U.S.-led security measures that provoke Pyongyang. In
a recent joint statement with its Chinese counterparts, the Russian Foreign Ministry
announced its opposition to large-scale military exercises conducted by the United States
and South Korea on the Korean peninsula.
Even though South Korea has continued to participate in U.S.-led military drills, a recent
statement from Moon Chung-in, a major adviser to the South Korean presidential
administration, calling for downsized military exercises has captured the attention
of Russian policymakers. Putin has also taken advantage of frictions between South
Korea and the Trump administration over payments for the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system to reiterate his opposition to the missile defense system.
On June 1, Putin argued that THAAD threatens Russia’s security. Russia has
tried to convey its anti-THAAD opinions to South Korea by highlighting its limited
defensive capacity against North Korean artillery. While South Korea is unlikely to turn
its back on THAAD, Russia believes it can exploit periodic frictions between Seoul
and Washington, and eventually help convince South Korea to embrace a more dovish
foreign policy towards its increasingly belligerent northern neighbor.

Russia’s North Korea Strategy and the Moscow-Beijing Relationship

In addition to demonstrating that Moscow can advance constructive solutions to
international crises, Russia has expressed strident opposition to Washington’s North
Korea strategy to strengthen its relationship with China. Cooperation between
Russia and China on the North Korean crisis has strengthened, as both countries
strongly oppose a preemptive U.S. military strike against Pyongyang.
While China remains the leading international supporter of the North Korean regime,
Russia has deepened its relationship with Pyongyang, hoping to be perceived as an
equal arbitration partner alongside China, rather than a junior partner following
the Chinese official line. Chinese and Russian displays of solidarity, which have
taken the form of synchronized condemnations of U.S. and consultation meetings,
reinforce the message that China and Russia form a united front on the Korean
Peninsula issue.
Gaining China’s respect as an equal arbitration partner could have far-reaching
positive implications for Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy. By demonstrating that it can
project diplomatic influence in the Asia-Pacific region and act independently from China,
Russia increases its credibility as a strategic partner for Southeast Asia
countries seeking to hedge their alignments with Washington, like Vietnam, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
If Russia asserts its great power status in the Asia-Pacific through involvement in inter-
Korean diplomacy, Kremlin policymakers believe that China is likely to approve.
China has strongly supported Russia’s expanded involvement in the Korean
peninsula, as many Chinese policymakers are increasingly frustrated with the burdens
of supporting a North Korean regime that has publicly criticized Beijing’s intentions.
China’s positive view of Russia’s North Korea strategy could remain unchanged even if
Moscow flexes its military muscles on the Korean peninsula’s borders. As U.S. Naval War
College expert Lyle Goldstein recently noted, Chinese policymakers believe that a
Russian Pacific fleet deployment in the Sea of Japan will counter American and
Japanese military maneuvers, benefiting China’s regional military strategy. These
positive assessments of Russian involvement by Chinese officials suggest that Russia’s
expanded involvement in the Korean Peninsula could help transform its
partnership with Beijing from an axis of convenience into a genuine alliance.

While the scale of Russia’s commitment to countering Washington’s use of coercive

diplomacy against North Korea remains unclear, official rhetoric from the Kremlin
suggests that Russia’s strategy toward North Korea has become increasingly coherent.
Russia’s expanded involvement in the Korean Peninsula means that Moscow’s clash with
Washington over North Korea is unlikely to abate in the near future.
 Provocation Risk
Steven Denney 16, a doctoral student in the department of political science at the
University of Toronto, “Young South Koreans' Realpolitik Attitude Towards the North,”
January 16, The Diplomat, retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/young-south-
koreans-realpolitik-attitude-towards-the-north/
For many young South Koreans, North Korea’s latest nuclear test is “barely a blip.” Of
course, there are those who take notice, like males currently serving their mandatory two
years in the military and those yet to serve. But it is true that far greater immediate
impact is perceived outside of the peninsula than within. The latest provocative step
taken by North Korea is nothing new, and it isn’t exactly a pressing issue. But lurking
beneath the ambivalence and hidden in the shoulder shrugs is an increasingly hawkish
attitude toward a country whose members were once considered by many, if not most, to
be part of the same nation.
Those coming of age today (the 20s age cohort: university students and college-age
people) are doing so under political conditions very different from their barely older
compatriots (those in their 30s and 40s). There are many ways to describe these
conditions, but the simplest explanation might read as such: political conditions today
have been shaped by post-Sunshine Policy politics and the armed provocations of 2010.
The result, for young South Koreans, is a relatively more hawkish political attitude
towards North Korea.
The Sunshine Policy, South Korea’s decade-long engagement policy with North Korea,
was multifaceted but emphasized above all else diplomatic and economic engagement as
means of improving North-South relations and the internal conditions in North Korea.
The South also offered material assistance, more or less unconditionally. Originally
articulated and implemented by Kim Dae-jung’s administration (Kim would win the
Nobel Peace Prize for it), it was continued by Roh Moo-hyun.
The full impact of the Sunshine Policy is a matter of debate, but government
reports conclude that it failed to induce significant change in the North. More biting
critiques emphasize the deliberate misallocation of the humanitarian aid sent by the
South; those who needed it most never received any. Defenders of the policy — most
notably, scholar and adviser to both Kim and Roh administrations, Moon Chung-in —
blame an unfavorable security environment created by George W. Bush for the policy’s
failures. While certain positive developments can be located, the Sunshine Policy’s legacy
is uncertain, at best.
If support for engagement was spotty after the Sunshine years, the events of 2010
cemented the turn towards a more confrontational North Korea policy. On March 26,
2010 the Cheonan navel corvette sunk off the peninsula’s west coast. A subsequent
international investigation confirmed earlier speculation that the cause of the sinking
was a North Korean torpedo attack (this conclusion was and remains contested). In
response, the Lee Myong-bak administration implemented the May 24 measure, a policy
which barred basically all inter-Korean trade other than that taking place through the
Kaesong Industrial Complex. (The measure drove both South Korean capital and North
Korean labor to the Sino-Korean border region, especially the Chinese city of Dandong.)
With relations already tense, on November 23 of the same year North Korea shelled
Yeongpyeong Island, a small island located near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a
maritime border between the North and the South. The shelling killed two civilians and
two soldiers. Suggested motives vary, but the shelling took place following a U.S.-South
Korean joint exercise, which may have factored into the decision to attack. If the door for
further engagement was shut in March, it was bolted closed in December.
Five years later, not much has changed. There hasn’t been another Cheonan incident, but
North-South relations are no better today than they were in January 2011. Public opinion
reflects as much.
In a 2011 piece for the edited volume Understanding Korean Identity: Through the Lens
of Opinion Survey, Korea University professor of politics and diplomacy Lee Shin-hwa
shows that opinions of the North have taken a tumble. Looking at data gathered at two
different points in time (2005 & 2010), Lee finds that, when asked whether they think of
North Korea as “one of us,” “a brother,” “a neighbor,” “an other,” or “an enemy,”
(respondents were asked to pick two) 31.9 percent choose “enemy,” the same number
that answered “an other.” This represented a 16.6 and 13.5 percentage point increase,
respectively. “One of us” (33.6), “neighbor” (35.4), and “brother” (45.5) were all
technically higher, but each saw a decrease over time, by amounts of 11.9, 13.3, and 6.6
pp, respectively.
More recent survey work suggests this trend is more than transitory. A January
2015 Asan Public Opinion Report on “South Korean Attitudes toward North Korea and
Reunification” between 2010 and 2014 highlights “youth detachment from North Korea”
as “perhaps the most important recurring theme in public opinion data” over the period
considered. Notably, the report finds the 20s age cohort as “conservative on hard
security issues” (e.g., North Korea) and “far more conservative when it comes to North
Korea than are those currently in their thirties and forties.”
With regards to security issues, additional data suggest the 20s age cohort aligns with the
most conservative cohort in Korean society (the 60s+ group). While these cohorts
diverge significantly with regard to presidential approval and other wedge issues (e.g.,
the recent Japan-South Korea comfort women agreement), what unites them is
their realpolitik attitude toward foreign affairs, especially regarding North Korea.
The attitudes may align, but the reasons for aligning are likely very different. Older
South Koreans, some of who actually experienced national division and civil war, were
recipients of a strong anti-communist education under contentious, politically unstable
conditions. Young people today, while still subjected to some degree of anti-communist
propaganda, are coming of age under relatively liberal, pluralistic political conditions in
times of material abundance and political stability.
Further, young people today are becoming politically conscious at a time when South
Korea is economically powerful and an influential actor internationally — a “middle
power,” as certain IR discourses would have it. It means something to be
distinctively South Korean today, a sense of identity with the Republic that didn’t exist in
times past. Indeed, those in their 20s seem to have little sympathy for pan-Korean
nationalism, a sentiment easily found in older generations. Replacing it is a sense of
South Korean nationalism — a new nationalism.
With a new nationalism come new attitudes, especially regarding North Korea. Thus, the
events of 2010 can be seen as having a relatively more powerful, constitutive effect on the
attitudes of young South Koreans vis-à-vis the other age cohorts.
Others agree. In a August 2015 article on rising patriotism among those in their 20s,
professor of sociology at Seoul National University Kim Seok-ho is quoted as saying,
“People in their 20s did not receive an anti-communist education and are politically
apathetic. But because they experienced the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan and
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in their teens or early adulthood, they may have developed
conservative and nationalistic views.”
The observed attitudes are certainly conservative, and the professor is right to point this
out. But they are no less nationalistic than pan-Korean attitudes. Nationalism isn’t a new
phenomenon in South Korea today; it’s simply different than before. The difference is
that one type of nationalism is driven by an ethnic affinity (to the pan-Korean nation)
and the other an affinity for South Korea.
The latest nuclear test may not have significantly impacted attitudes toward North
Korea. But don’t let ambivalence toward one event blur the bigger picture; more
fundamental changes have already taken place. For many young Koreans, the well is
already spoiled. With a generational decrease in support for national reunification
coupled with a waning of ethnic nationalism, North Korea is increasingly just “another
country.” And when another country acts in violent or threatening ways, negative
attitudes tend to follow.
 Sanctions 🔥
How sanctions work and stuff pretty good
Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
I am going to spend a fair amount of time looking at some economic issues surrounding
the North Korean economy and how it might be vulnerable to sanctions. And then I
am going to talk about THAAD. THAAD has fundamentally changed the political
dynamics on the peninsula by altering China’s thinking about sanctions. And then I want
to suggest some very slim possibilities for how the three parties (the United States, China
and South Korea) might get around what North Korea is doing. North Korea is cleverly
dividing the United States from China, from South Korea, and South Korea from China;
their missile development program has a strategic political perspective.
I want to start with Iran. We think of North Korea as being a small closed economy, but
increasingly, it is actually a small open economy. North Korea is very integrated
and dependent on China. Because of that, it’s actually more exposed to sanctions
than it’s been in a long time. But the question is, how would those sanctions actually
unfold? If you look at some of the data on Iran (refer to the attached presentation
material), it’s actually quite revealing about how sanctions work. Our model on how the
sanctions work typically is that the sanctions squeeze particular sectors and therefore
those sectors respond by saying ‘we can’t operate under this environment’ and that
somehow puts pressure on the government.

But in small open economies, the way that sanctions work is that they actually have
an effect on exchange rate, which in turn affects every price in the economy.
And that’s really clear in Iranian case. Steve Hanke has collected a lot of data on
the black market exchange rate in what he calls distressed countries. And the data shows
you the path of the official and unofficial exchange rates after the sanctions started to
bite and particularly after the negotiations that led to the imposition of oil sanctions
against Iran. What you can see here is a dramatic depreciation in the exchange
rate fairly quickly following the imposition of those sanctions. That depreciation
of the exchange rate was associated with a dramatic increase in inflation.

My point is that “everything looks fine until it’s not fine.” In other words, the
effects of sanctions don’t necessarily happen gradually. It is very possible that
North Korea is subject to economic crisis. So what I want to paint a case for why
North Korea is vulnerable to such a sudden crisis. And I should add from the headline,
that defections we are seeing add to this risk, particularly if these individuals are
taking significant foreign exchange out of the North Korean orbit because it will
significantly reduce the ability of North Korea to import from the rest of the
world, including from

The first point to note is the growing dependence on China. This is stated
frequently but I want to emphasize how significant this has become. If you go back to
2000, the share of Japan, Korea and China in North Korea’s trade was about equal at
about 20%. And its trade with the US was zero and with Russia at very low levels. North
Korea had another 35-40% of its trade with the rest of the world. But what’s happened
since the onset of the crisis is the relentless increase in North Korea’s
dependence on China. Despite this dependence, when you look at the trend in the
China-North Korea trade in dollar terms, it’s been trending down.

What does North Korea export? One of the features about the North Korean
economy that isn’t fully appreciated is that over the last 10 years, it’s actually become like
a rentier state because its export economy has depended increasingly on raw
materials. North Korea has become like a hunter-gatherer economy with maritime
products, coal, steel and minerals as the most substantial exports. And that has big
implications because we know from a substantial comparative politics literature that
economies like these are vulnerable to corruption and predation. The other thing
that’s happening is the end of the commodities super cycle where prices in
commodities which have been high up until the last 3 or 4 years have started to fall, and
North Korea is vulnerable to that shock. They have basically thrown their luck
with China, and I think China quite strategically has sought to incorporate North
Korea into its orbit in a way which maximizes its potential leverage even though they
haven’t been willing to exercise that leverage.

In the past, North Korea has done a surprisingly good job in adjusting to the
sanctions regimes. UNSCR 2270 has, in principal, shut off coal exports. That hasn’t
in fact occurred, but there are other constraints beyond 2270. The United States has
instituted secondary sanctions or is in the process of implementing secondary sanctions
against North Korea by demanding that foreign banks exercise due diligence with respect
to their customers who might be accepting North Korean deposits or doing business with
North Korea. Foreign ministry officials from North Korea are being called on to
generate foreign exchange for the regime and they can’t figure out how to do
it. You have to have some means of investing or exporting, and these channels are
being squeezed. As Korea well knows from 1997, to repeat my expression, everything is
fine until it’s not fine. It was a couple of weeks in October when South Korea fell apart in
1997. And I think we have to be thinking about a North Korea that could collapse
in this way; not political collapse but something resembling an old-fashioned
financial crisis.

Most of you know that in 2009 there was a disastrous currency conversion. But
what a lot of people don’t realize is that in the aftermath of that currency conversion in
2009, the North Korean economy went through a period of what we call inertial
inflation from 2009 to about 2012, a problem similar to that faced by Iran. I have a
theory about why Kim Jong-un actually was a reformer and then ultimately did not prove
to be a reformer: because after the death of his father, he stepped into a situation in
which prices were rising very dramatically in North Korea making it hard both
politically and economically to undertake reforms. Sometime around 2012, North Korea
figured out how to stabilize its economy. And since that time, what’s surprising is that,
inflation has moderated, prices have moderated, the exchange rate has moderated and
everyone is trying to figure out how they did this. No one can figure it out; it’s really
the true puzzle. The only possible interpretation of this is that the Chinese really
have decided that they’re not interested in implementing sanctions. Coal
exports which under 2270 were supposed to be prescribed, basically haven’t changed
dramatically since the onset of sanctions, declining not much more than the country’s
overall trade. But if China were to get serious about coal, it’s pretty clear that
North Korea would have to come back to the bargaining table quickly. And
China is aware of that. And that gets us into the final topic which I am going to talk
about briefly so we can have a discussion, which is the politics.
2270 was a big surprise to everyone. When I read that resolution, I couldn’t believe it. It
was surprising that the Chinese would go so far. It was a very extensive resolution. It had
aviation fuel, shipping, finance, a whole series of things, but one provision of that
resolution on coal would have made the entire difference. But the negotiations over the
resolution involved three exemptions with respect to coal; the first was the Russian
exemption, allowing the Russians to continue to export coal out of Rason. And on two
other exemptions which I don’t think the Americans frankly paid too much attention to,
the Chinese out-negotiated us. The two other exemptions are called the livelihood
exemption--an exemption which permits exports from North Korea as long as they
would adversely affect the livelihood of the exporters. And there is a provision requiring
that the effects of any exports be traced back to the WMD programs.

The purpose of sanctions is to impose cost on people’s livelihood, so if this

trade is exempted how can the sanctions possibly have effect? When Kerry
went to Beijing and met with Wang Yi, he basically took a fairly relaxed stance on this
issue. And I think the U.S. calculation was (and I have this secondhand not first-hand)
that the U.S. would essentially trust the Chinese to implement the sanctions at their
discretion because the objective of the U.S., despite the fact that some people think
differently, is not to force a collapse of the North Korean regime. But it’s pretty clear that
the Chinese haven’t been doing that. If the Chinese are willing to prop up the
North Korean economy, why should the North Koreans go back to
bargaining table? There’s no reason to.

THAAD
Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
That takes us to THAAD. THAAD is in my view a fateful decision, reflecting the deep
frustration of the alliance partners. The US and ROK have absolutely every right to
deploy THAAD. There is no reason why we should be subject to a veto by the Chinese or
anyone else over the deployment of THAAD. And let me just remind you of the
developments under Kim Jong-un because one thing I’ve seen in the strategic
community was that the US and South Koreans have consistently underestimated North
Korea’s capacity to develop missile power.
The missile and the nuclear program are not only serving a strategic purpose and an
internal political purpose for the North Korean regime but they’re also serving a strategic
political purpose in shifting the game between the US, South Korea and China and North
Korea, in a way which is advantageous to North Korea. They see the benefits of THAAD
for them because THAAD deployment means that the Chinese are upset with the US
instead of being upset with the North Koreans. We’ve seen these games for years. We are
getting played and we really have to think very hard about how to respond to those.
I think it’s possible that we’re in the world in which North Korea has absolutely no
intention of negotiating on its nuclear program. The missile and nuclear programs are
becoming so central to his domestic legitimation strategy from the Moranbong band to
social media, its missiles and nuclear weapons programs are everywhere. That’s who Kim
Jong-un is. If this is true, then we’re in a containment world. If you want to see
what the Clinton administration would look like, you can look at Wendy Sherman’s
speech at the CSIS earlier in the year in which basically she says negotiation is
pointless and we just have to limit the damage, particularly if North Korea were
to collapse. In Sherman’s speech, there is no mention of the Six-Party Talks. And this is a
woman who could become secretary of the state, not just managing Korea affairs.

I think the way out of this is extremely narrow. So I don’t have much confidence
that this will take place. But I really think that the way forward is that China, the US
and South Korea have to figure out some way to enhance trilateral cooperation
on this issue. The more tension there is between South Korea and China and the US and
China, the more North Korea is protected both economically and strategically and the
less likelihood there is that it’s going to give up on its nuclear weapons program.
So, what do I mean by that? I mean two tracks. We need to encourage China to articulate
more clearly-- with more granular detail--the nature of the Wang Yi proposal of February
17 to undertake some kind of combined or phased or parallel peace regime and nuclear
negotiations. Obviously, the U.S. is not going to sit down and have peace regime
negotiations with North Korea when it’s continuing its nuclear development. But it’s not
impossible for the U.S. to entertain some kind of negotiating format that would include
all issues or perhaps separate tracks of negotiations on the peace regime and nuclear
weapons issues. But if China can’t get North Korea to discuss the nuclear issue, then
again, China is just not serious about this issue from the perspective of South Korea and
the US. So, I think one task or one entreaty to the Chinese is that China puts on the table
a more detailed version of the February proposal that Wang Yi made. And we tell the
Chinese that if you can get the North Koreans to come, then the US and South Koreans
will show up. What do I think of the likelihood of this? 2%. But I think that we can never
give up on diplomacy.
My views on THAAD are little bit more complicated. But let me just be clear on some
mythology here. The US policy since 2010 on Ballistic Missile Defence in Asia followed
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review that defined the approach as a “Phased
Adaptive Approach”. That term is typical Pentagon Speak but what it means is that the
U.S. will deploy Ballistic Missile Defense as they were necessary given the threat. It’s
just not true that the US has an intrinsic interest in BMD. We want BMD for a
particular purpose because there are threats the US faces. And the threats are
primarily North Korean. I know that the Chinese and Russians have concerns about
the integration of theatre Ballistic Missile Defenses and I think that’s a serious issue. But
the US policy is that this deployment of BMD is targeted at threats.

The purpose is not to contain China or contain Russia. And in fact, if you look at
the US strategic posture, it has always accepted mutual vulnerability with both
Russia and China. The US cannot defend itself against nuclear attack from either
Russia or China, and it doesn’t want to defend itself against strategic nuclear attack from
those two countries because in the paradox of nuclear weapons, it’s the mutual
vulnerability of the two sides that guarantees stability. That’s what we mean by
nuclear stability. Defense is destabilizing because its triggers arms races and
triggers efforts from both sides to defend. So, I think what the US needs to do is
to reiterate that THAAD is contingent on the development of North Korean
capabilities and that the US and South Korea should be willing to discuss THAAD
with the Chinese in the context of the Chinese doing something about North
Korea. Because if the Chinese are unwilling to do anything about North
Korea, why should we discuss THAAD? It makes no sense. The US and South
Korea have to defend themselves. It’s perfectly legitimate for us to do so. But it’s
also perfectly legitimate for us to say to the Chinese that if we can make progress on
scaling back, reducing, eliminating the North Korean nuclear missile threat then there’s
no reason for us to deploy THAAD. Put differently, the fact that the decision to deploy
has been made does not mean that we can’t consider ways in which we communicate
with our Chinese and Russian colleagues on trying to solve the problem on the Korean
Peninsula.

Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
Q&A Tae-hee Whang: Particularly for this issue on North Korea, you’ve talked about this
unclear aspect of China and the US, but I don’t think they have the same idea on the
purpose of UN sanctions—so when are we going to say ‘Yes, sanctions are effective’? For
China, if North Korea is coming to Six Party Talks, that’s enough, but South Korea and
the US are asking for more. It’s important to have the same purpose of economic
sanctions.
Can you also mention indirect effects? If you look at sanctions these days, people talk
about indirect effect on political and economic areas. Even though the regime itself is not
effected directly, the people there are suffering, which can create different situations
such as terrorism and civil war. Regarding the financial crisis, what I understand is that
people in North Korea don’t use North Korean currency. I met a lot of North Korean
refugees who use dollar or yuan after the failure of the 2009 currency reform. They don’t
believe in the stability of their currency. You mentioned the black market’s dollarization
– there will be crisis when they have short-term borrowing from abroad, somehow
inflation increases in the borrowing state and then they go bankrupt. Concerning
financial crisis in Argentina and elsewhere as well as in Asia in late 1990s, I’m not sure
how that can be related to North Korea’s black market. What I mean is that there is no
theory on how secondary black markets are affected.
Regarding the UN sanctions and especially the two exemptions you’ve pointed out on
coal exports. If I may add to what you said, it’s actually North Korean people who are
exporting coal to be responsible for reporting that it’s for everyday life of North Korean
people. The Chinese people don’t have to go and actually investigate on the use of the
money. It’s a big black hole. It’s not surprising that the implementation report on China
published a month ago says that they were doing a good job. Some people argue that the
import of coal from North Korea to China has been decreasing after sanctions. But
overall coal import of China is decreasing as well. The portion hasn’t changed. That’s the
problem of 2270, not the problem of implementation by China.
Regarding your point on the rentier state, there is a sanction research that talks about
regime type of the target country. If North Korea becomes a rentier state, the argument is
that sanctions are less likely to work. But some economists in South Korea argue that we
cannot call North Korea a rentier state because players are fixed. We cannot compare the
case of rentier states in Europe and Asia to North Korea.
Q1: How will China calculate that the negative consequences of North Korea’s collapse
outweigh its continued survival?
Q2: Beyond Wendy Sherman’s statements, what would a Clinton administration look like
around these issues?
Q3: Do you think THAAD is backfiring by making China uncomfortable, and how would
you go about having talks with China about THAAD?
Stephan Haggard: I think the stance the US should take with regard to China is to take
them at their word, which is that their policy is to see denuclearization of Korea. It’s a
mistake of the US to think otherwise. The appropriate way would be to say that we agree
with the ends but not with the tactics. It’s important that the US take a nuanced position
regarding North Korea collapse. We should not say it’s an objective of the US policy,
which should be a return to Six Party Talks. It’s what I think US policy actually has been.
Whether the US should engage China in the event of North Korean collapse is another
area, but the Chinese have shown no interest in talking about that openly.
We’ve announced THAAD deployment but that depends on the relevance on the Korean
Peninsula, so why aren’t we talking to China about it? THAAD is contingent on the
developments in the Korean peninsula. We should view THAAD as
instrumental to denuclearization, not for its own sake. We should offer to the
Chinese that if the threat is moderated to an adequate extent or if there is at least
progress, we can consider the deployment again. If the Chinese don’t agree, we won’t be
worse off. The US and South Korea are not going to have peace negotiations when North
Korea is pursuing missiles, and there will be no discussion on THAAD if there is no
prospect of a better security environment.
I have no idea how they’re going to address this in the next administration. There can be
a conception of the promise of negotiation as well as a robust statement of the
willingness of US and South Korea to defend themselves. Wendy Sherman treats Six
Party Talks as dead, which is a strategic mistake in my view because the 2005 Joint
Statement is a wonderful document. We don’t need a new statement. The question is to
say to the Chinese, how do we get to this? Are the North Koreans going to come? Why
should the US and South Korea commit to negotiations when North Korea doesn’t come?
That’s China’s responsibility.
Chung-in Moon: Sherman’s proposal was that North Korea will collapse, so we don’t
need to worry about the nuclear issue. That is the overall ambience in Washington, and I
think that was greatly influenced by the South Korean government’s position. All the
Clinton campaigns were trying to make was a harmonization with the current South
Korean government.
Provocation impact---nukes embolden NoKo
Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
Q4: What would be the position of the US one year from now with a Clinton
administration?

Stephan Haggard: No one knows. But let me make one point: The Korean peninsula
is stable. My concerns with North Korea is not to do with nuclear issue primarily, but
with their misconceptions that their second strike capability lets them undertake
asymmetrical actions via-a-vis the South and the US. I say misperceptions because
the tolerance and response to those asymmetric actions - Cheonan, Yeonpyeong, August
mine incident - from South Korea and US won’t be like in the past. They’re going to
escalate those kind of provocations in a way they haven’t in the past. What worries
me is not a nuclear imbalance, but miscalculations by North Korea that now that
they’re safe, they can do these other things.
Arms exports FYI
Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
Q5: Is the North Korean arms export still going on?

Stephan Haggard: The opportunities for missile exports have been substantially
curtailed for some time now. The only thing we don’t know is whether intelligence
sharing is generating anything. You don’t have to export parts and missiles to export
technology. A guy on the plane to Tehran with a flash drive can be equally dangerous.
Defections
Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
Q5: How destabilizing is the foreign currency loss by diplomats running away from the
regime?
Stephan Haggard: Regarding defections, historically, I’ve never thought that collapse of
North Korea in terms of a political collapse was likely. It’s a very strongly
institutionalized regime. But I do believe that the scenario I outline here with
financial crisis has a real probability. If the stabilization of North Korean won and
prices are caused partly by their activities offshore by diplomats, then it’s possible that
defections can accelerate the likelihood of a balance of payments crisis.
Defections that are accompanied by cash outflows reduce the capacity of the regime
to maintain internal loyalty. MOFA officials are not considered powerful officials
anywhere, because they are not in control of material assets. But to the extent those
people reflect preferences of other powerful actors in the regime, such as in the
security apparatus, it’s a big problem.

Sanctions effectiveness
Stephan Haggard 16, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies at
UC San Diego, “Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea,”
August 22, East Asia Foundation Seminar
Q6: Isn’t it too early to reach the conclusion that sanctions are ineffective? Even in the
Iranian case, it took a number of years. Also, how do you judge the effectiveness—
economic indicators, or changes in the regime’s calculations? If a financial crisis occurs,
would that change the calculations of the regime?
Stephan Haggard: I am not arguing that sanctions don’t work but that 2270 is not being
utilized. North Korea at this point, not in the previous years, is quite vulnerable to such
sanctions. If sanctions are not being implemented, they’re not going to work.
We have to say to the Chinese that they are the only party with leverage, and that we’re
not seeking regime downfall but for China to send signals to North Korea that
there will be change, and talks need to go on. If they undertake these actions, the
United States will have corresponding responsibilities. North Koreans have been issuing
a series of statements through back channels that describe their interest in negotiations.
Those haven’t been taken seriously enough because they talk about the need to negotiate
a peace agreement first. But there are indications that North Koreans are setting the
stage for Kim Jong-un to agree to negotiations because of serious distress, and we
have to watch for the willingness for bolder proposals. The initial proposals are nothing
like that. The crunch hasn’t come. If it does come, the five parties have to be willing
to say, “If you’re willing to consider the nuclear issue seriously, we can throw other
things on the table in line with the Joint Statement.” If denuclearization is not on the
table, no state will negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea.

Q7: US has responded to provocations in Iran that were less significant than Cheonan.
So why isn’t it consistently responding to North Korea in the same way?
Stephan Haggard: First, to give a standard answer, it takes nerves of steel to do what you
suggest because of the border with South Korea. As a more nuanced answer, Cheonan
and Yeongpyeong caught the two allies by surprise. But note that in the wake of that,
they formed a committee devoted specifically to outline rules of response. That’s why I’m
worried about miscalculation - South Korea and the US are more likely to respond in a
way you describe in the next asymmetric provocation On the other hand, the nuclear
situation is stable, and the US does not need nuclear weapons to deter North Korea. We
have perfectly adequate conventional weapons to respond if war breaks out.
Chung-in Moon: As to the sinking of Cheonan, we didn’t know who did it - it took 2
months. According to UN charter, retaliation should be immediate in the form of self-
defense, not revenge. In the case on Yeonpyeong, we had two constraints for our
immediate reasons: American possession of wartime operation control, and armistice
agreement. South Korea is not truly an independent country to take autonomous military
action.
Chung-in Moon: All countries are suffering from THAAD trauma. Maybe we can use it as
a bargaining leverage vis-à-vis china to pressure North Korea. But the Chinese leadership
understand that current sanctions do not work. Plus, even if China pressures North
Korea, it will respond with more provocations. China cannot resolve the dilemma of the
North Korea provocation. Furthermore, North Korea doesn’t think THAAD is big threat.
It’s a defensive interception mechanism. It can be a leverage vis-a-vis china, but not
North Korea. So there’s no reason for North Korea to listen to China.
Going back to January 9th last year, North Korea proposed an exchange: they will freeze
nuclear actions and missile testing, and even allow inspections by IAEA in return for
suspension of ROK-US joint military exercises and training. We turned it down. Going
back to July 6th this year, a spokesman for the DPRK government officially proposed 5
points: make sure there is no tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea; allow inspections
of suspected nuclear weapons sites; the US declares no first use of nuclear weapons;
assure North Korea that US will not deploy strategic weapons in the Korean peninsula;
and the US makes a declaration that they will withdraw troops from South Korea. If
these 5 conditions are met, it agreed to denuclearize. The US and South Korea dismissed
this. What is your take?
Stephan Haggard: All of this is poisonous. If the US were to take these proposals up
individually, it doesn’t get you anywhere. We should say something very bland: “We have
taken note of the proposals and in the course of negotiations we are willing to entertain
various possibilities.” Is the US making a statement that it would difficult to withdraw
forces from South Korea? Impossible. I’ve watched how difficult the Iranian deal is to sell
domestically - these things go far beyond that. We should keep our eye focused on
leaving the door open to negotiations which might lead to whatever. Negotiations are
better than no negotiations. But we can’t negotiate until we have some sense.
Chung-in Moon: I remember attending the 10th anniversary of Six Party Talks in Beijing.
That was September 17th, 2013. North Korea, Russia, Japan, and China sent official
delegations, but South Korea and US refused to. They only sent observers. Of course,
China must have twisted the arms of North Korea. North Korean official Kim Kye-gwan
came and announced that North Korea leaders all mandated denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula and they will return to six parties without any conditions to talk on any
agenda. Seoul and Washington just laughed. Wang Yi went to Washington the next day
but was revoked by John Kerry and Washington.
 1AC
Nicholas Eberstadt 17, the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research
(NBR), “From “engagement” to threat reduction: moving toward a North Korea policy
that works,” January 31, American Enterprise Institute, retrieved at:
http://www.aei.org/publication/from-engagement-to-threat-reduction-moving-toward-
a-north-korea-policy-that-works/
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
I am honored to be invited to discuss the gathering threat North Korea poses to the
United States, our allies, and the international community—and what we can respond to
it.
In my testimony I wish to make five main points:
First: North Korea is embarked on a steady, methodical, and relentless journey, whose
intended endpoint is a credible capacity to hit New York and Washington with nuclear
weapons.
Second: America’s policy for nuclear nonproliferation in North Korea is a prolonged, and
thoroughly bipartisan, failure.
Third: Our North Korea policy is a failure because our public and our leaders do not
understand our adversary and his intentions.
Fourth: We cannot hope to cope successfully with the North Korean threat until we do.
Fifth: Any successful effort to make the North Korean threat smaller will require not just
better understanding of this adversary, but also a coherent and sustained strategy of
threat reduction informed by such an understanding.
I
Our seemingly unending inability to fathom Pyongyang’s true objectives, and our
attendant proclivity for being taken by surprise over and over again by North Korean
actions, is not just a matter of succumbing to Pyongyang’s strategic deceptions,
assiduous as those efforts may be.
The trouble, rather, is that even our top foreign policy experts and our most
sophisticated diplomatists are creatures of our own cultural heritage and intellectual
environment. We Americans are, so to speak, children of the Enlightenment, steeped in
the precepts of our highly globalized era. Which is to say: we have absolutely no common
point of reference with the worldview, or moral compass, or first premises of the closed-
society decision makers who control the North Korean state. Americans’ first instincts
are to misunderstand practically everything the North Korean state is really about.
The DPRK is a project pulled by tides and shaped by sensibilities all but forgotten to the
contemporary West. North Korea is a hereditary Asian dynasty (currently on its third
Kim)—but one maintained by Marxist-Leninist police state powers unimaginable to
earlier epochs of Asian despots and supported by a recently invented and quasi-religious
ideology.[1]
And exactly what is that ideology? Along with its notorious variant of emperor worship,
“Juche thought” also extols an essentially messianic—and unapologetically racialist—
vision of history: one in which the long-abused Korean people finally assume their
rightful place in the universe by standing up against the foreign races that have long
oppressed them, at last reuniting the entire Korean peninsula under an independent
socialist state (i.e., the DPRK). Although highly redacted in broadcasts aimed at foreign
ears, this call for reunification of the mijnok (race), and for retribution against the enemy
races or powers (starting with America and Japan), constantly reverberates within North
Korea, sounded by the regime’s highest authorities.[2]
This is where its nuclear weapons program fits into North Korea’s designs. In
Pyongyang’s thinking, the indispensable instrument for achieving the DPRK’s grand
historical ambitions must be a supremely powerful military: more specifically, one
possessed of a nuclear arsenal that can imperil and break the foreign enemies who
protect and prop up what Pyongyang regards as the vile puppet state in the South, so
that the DPRK may consummate its unconditional unification and give birth to its
envisioned earthly Korean-race utopia.
In earlier decades, Pyongyang might have seen multiple paths to this Elysium, but with
the collapse of the Soviet empire, the long-term decline of the DPRK’s industrial
infrastructure, and the gradually accumulating evidence that South Korea was not going
to succumb on its own to the revolutionary upheaval Pyongyang so dearly wished of it,
the nuclear option increasingly looks to be the one and only trail by which to reach the
Promised Kingdom.
II
Like all other states, the North Korean regime relies at times upon diplomacy to pursue
its official aims—thus, for example, the abiding call for a “peace treaty” with the US to
bring a formal end to the Korean War (since 1953 only an armistice, or cease-fire, has
been in place).[3] Yet strangely few foreign policy specialists seem to understand why
Pyongyang is so fixated on this particular document. If the US agreed to a peace treaty,
Pyongyang insists, it would then also have to agree to a withdrawal of its forces from
South Korea and to a dissolution of its military alliance with Seoul—for the danger of
“external armed attack” upon which the Seoul-Washington Mutual Defense Treaty is
predicated would by definition no longer exist. If all this could come to pass, North
Korea would win a huge victory without firing a shot.
But with apologies to Clausewitz, diplomacy is merely war by other means for
Pyongyang. And for the dynasty the onetime anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter Kim Il Sung
established, policy and war are inseparable—this is why the DPRK is the most highly
militarized society on the planet. This is also why the answer to the unification question
that so preoccupies North Korean leadership appears to entail meticulous and incessant
preparations, already underway for decades, to fight and win a limited nuclear war
against the United States.
To almost any Western reader, the notion that North Korea might actually be planning to
stare down the USA in some future nuclear face-off will sound preposterous, if not
outright insane. And indeed it does—to us. Yet remember: as we already know from
press reports, North Korea has been diligently working on everything that would actually
be required for such a confrontation: miniaturization of nuclear warheads,
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and even cyberwarfare (per the Sony hacking episode).
Note further that while North Korean leadership may be highly tolerant of casualties (on
the part of others, that is) it most assuredly is not suicidal itself. Quite the contrary: its
acute interest in self-preservation is demonstrated prima facie by the fact of its very
survival, over 25 years after the demise of the USSR and Eastern European socialism. It
would be unwise of us to presume that only one of the two forces arrayed along the DMZ
is capable of thinking about what it would take to deter the other in a time of crisis on the
Peninsula.
Denuclearization through negotiations is impossible---nukes are key to
regime gospel,
Nicholas Eberstadt 17, the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research
(NBR), “From “engagement” to threat reduction: moving toward a North Korea policy
that works,” January 31, American Enterprise Institute, retrieved at:
http://www.aei.org/publication/from-engagement-to-threat-reduction-moving-toward-
a-north-korea-policy-that-works/
III
At this juncture, as so often in the past, serious people around the world are calling to
“bring North Korea back to the table” to try to settle the DPRK nuclear issue. However,
seeing the DPRK for what it is, rather than what we would like it to be, should oblige us
to recognize two highly unpleasant truths.
First, the real existing North Korean leadership (as opposed to the imaginary version
some Westerners would like to negotiate with) will never willingly give up their
nuclear option. Never. Acquiescing in denuclearization would be tantamount to
abandoning the sacred mission of Korean unification: which is to say,
disavowing the DPRK’s raison d’etre. Thus submitting to foreign demands to
denuclearize could well mean more than humiliation and disgrace for North Korean
leadership: it could mean delegitimization and destabilization for the regime as
well.

Second, international entreaties—summitry, conferencing, bargaining, and all the

rest—can never succeed in convincing the DPRK to relinquish its nuclear program.
Sovereign governments simply do not trade away their vital national
interests.

Now, this is not to say that Western nonproliferation parlays with the DPRK have no
results to show at all. We know they can result in blandishments (as per North Korea’s
custom of requiring “money for meetings”) and in resource transfers (as with the Clinton
Administration’s Agreed Framework shipments of heavy fuel oil). They can provide
external diplomatic cover for the DPRK the nuclear program, as was in effect afforded
under the intermittent 2003–07 Six Party Talks in Beijing. They can even lure North
Korea’s interlocutors into unexpected unilateral concessions, as witnessed in the final
years of the George W. Bush Administration, when Washington unfroze illicit North
Korean overseas funds and removed Pyongyang from the list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism in misbegotten hope of a “breakthrough.” The one thing “engagement” can
never produce, however, is North Korean denuclearization.

Note, too, that in every realm of international transaction, from commercial contracts to
security accords, the record shows that, even when Western bargainers think they have
made a deal with North Korea, the DPRK side never has any compunction about
violating the understanding if that should serve purposes of state. This may
outrage us, but it should not surprise us: for under North Korea’s moral code, if there
should be any advantage to gain from cheating against foreigners, then not cheating
would be patently unpatriotic, a disloyal blow against the Motherland.
Yes, things would be so easier for us if North Korea would simply agree to the deal we
want them to accept. But if we put the wishful thinking to one side, a clear-eyed view of
the North Korea problematik must be resigned to the grim reality that diplomacy can
only have a very limited and highly specific role in addressing our gathering
North Korean problem.
Diplomacy must have some role because it is barbaric not to talk with one’s opponent—
because communication can help both sides avoid needless and potentially disastrous
miscalculations. But the notion of a “grand bargain” with Pyongyang—in which all
mutual concerns are simultaneously settled, as the “Perry Process” conjectured back in
the 1990s and others have subsequently prophesied—is nothing but a dream.

It is time to set aside the illusion of “engaging” North Korea to effect nonproliferation
and to embrace instead a paradigm that has a chance of actually working: call this
“threat reduction.” Through a coherent long-term strategy, working with allies and
others but also acting unilaterally, the United States can blunt, then mitigate, and
eventually help eliminate the killing force of the North Korean state.
Thus, the plan---improve defenses against DPRK military capabilities while
simultaneously weakening those capabilities.
Nicholas Eberstadt 17, the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research
(NBR), “From “engagement” to threat reduction: moving toward a North Korea policy
that works,” January 31, American Enterprise Institute, retrieved at:
http://www.aei.org/publication/from-engagement-to-threat-reduction-moving-toward-
a-north-korea-policy-that-works/
IV

In broad outline, North Korean threat reduction requires progressive development

of more effective defenses against the DPRK’s means of destruction while
simultaneously weakening Pyongyang’s capabilities for supporting both
conventional and strategic offense.

A more effective defense against the North Korean threat would consist mainly,
though not entirely, of military measures. Restoring recently sacrificed US
capabilities would be essential. Likewise more and better missile defense: THAAD
systems (and more) for South Korea and Japan, and moving forward on missile defense
in earnest for the USA. It would be incumbent on South Korea to reduce its own
population’s exposure to North Korean death from the skies through
military modernization and civil defense. DPRK would be served notice that 60
years of zero-consequence rules of engagement for allied forces in the face of North
Korean “provocations” on the Peninsula had just come to an end. But diplomacy would
count here as well: most importantly, alliance strengthening throughout Asia in
general and repairing the currently frayed ROK-Japan relationship in
particular. Today’s ongoing bickering between Seoul and Tokyo reeks of interwar politics
at its worst; leaders who want to live in a postwar order need to rise above such petty
grievances.
As for weakening the DPRK’s military economy, the foundation for all its
offensive capabilities: reinvigorating current counterproliferation efforts, such
as PSI and MCTR, is a good place to start. But only a start. Given the “military
first” disposition of the North Korean economy,[4] restricting its overall potential
is necessary as well. South Korea’s subsidized trade with the North, for example,
should come to an end. And put Pyongyang back on the State Sponsors of
Terrorism list—it never should have been taken off. Sanctions with a genuine
bite should be implemented—the dysfunctional DPRK economy is uniquely
susceptible to these, and amazing as this may sound, the current sanctions strictures for
North Korea have long been weaker than, say, those enforced until recently for Iran. (We
can enforce such sanctions unilaterally, by the way.) And not least important: revive
efforts like the Illicit Activities Initiative, the brief, but tremendously successful Dubya-
era task force for tracking and freezing North Korea’s dirty money abroad.

Then there is the China question. Received wisdom in some quarters

notwithstanding, it is by no means impossible for America and her allies to pressure the
DPRK if China does not cooperate (see previous paragraph). That said: China has been
allowed to play a double game with North Korea for far too long, and it is time for
Beijing to pay a penalty for all its support for the most odious regime on the planet
today. We can begin by exacting it in diplomatic venues all around the world,
starting with the UN. NGOs can train a spotlight on Beijing’s complicity in the North
Korean regime’s crimes. And international humanitarian action should shame China
into opening a safe transit route to the free world for North Korean refugees attempting
to escape their oppressors.
If North Korean subjects enjoyed greater human rights, the DPRK killing machine could
not possibly operate as effectively as it does today.[5] Activists will always worry about
the instrumentalization of human rights concerns for other policy ends—and rightly so.
Today and for the foreseeable future, however, there is no contradiction between the
objectives of human rights promotion and nonproliferation in the DPRK. North Korea’s
human rights situation is vastly worse than in apartheid South Africa—why hasn’t the
international community (and South Korean civil society) found its voice on this real-
time, ongoing tragedy? The Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights has
already prepared a comprehensive Commission of Inquiry on the situation in the DPRK
[6]: let governments of conscience seek international criminal accountability for North
Korea’s leadership.
Many in the West talk of “isolating” North Korea as if this were an objective in its own
right. But a serious DPRK threat reduction strategy would not do so. The North Korean
regime depends on isolation from the outside world to maintain its grip and conduct
untrammeled pursuit of its international objectives. The regime is deadly afraid of what
it terms “ideological and cultural poisoning”: what we could call foreign media,
international information, cultural exchanges, and the like. We should be saying: bring
on the “poisoning”! The more external contact with that enslaved population, the
better. We should even consider technical training abroad for North Koreans in
accounting, law, economics, and the like—because some day, in a better future, that
nation will need a cadre of Western-style technocrats for rejoining our world.

This brings us to the last agenda item: preparing for a successful reunification in
a post-DPRK peninsula. The Kim regime is the North Korean nuclear threat; that threat
will not end until the DPRK disappears. We cannot tell when, or how, this will occur. But
it is not too soon to commence the wide-ranging and painstaking international planning
and preparations that will facilitate divided Korea’s long-awaited reunion as a single
peninsula, free and whole.
 1AC
Thesis---US should make clear commitments to allies and demonstrate
military capabilities---reserve preemptive action for an imminent attack.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is dire and worsening. There is a
disturbingly long list of reasons to be pessimistic about maintaining peace and stability
in northeast Asia.
North Korea’s decades-long quest for an unambiguous ability to target the U.S. with a
nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) may be entering endgame.
Pyongyang undertook a robust nuclear and missile test program in 2016, achieving
several breakthroughs.
Kim Jong-un has asserted that the regime has “reached the final stage of preparations to
test-launch an intercontinental ballistic missile” and will continue to increase “the
capability for preemptive strike.”
Pyongyang has declared that the “ICBM will be launched anytime and anywhere.”

Pyongyang has repeatedly vowed that it will never abandon its nuclear arsenal and
dismissed the potential for denuclearization negotiations. A senior-ranking
North Korea defector asserted, “As long as Kim Jong-un is in power, North Korea will
never give up its nuclear weapons, even if it’s offered $1 trillion or $10 trillion in
rewards.”1

U.S. policymakers, lawmakers, and experts predominantly assess that the time for
dialogue with Kim Jong-un has passed and that the U.S. must impose augmented
sanctions to tighten the economic noose on North Korea. Although such sanctions are
the proper policy, they do carry the risk of strong reactions from Pyongyang and Beijing.

South Korea has growing concerns about U.S. capability, resolve, and willingness
to defend their country, particularly once North Korea demonstrates an unambiguous
ability to threaten the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons.

Advocacy is growing for preemptive military actions against North Korea,

mimicking the regime’s comments about its own preemption plans. Preemptive action
raises the risk of military conflict, either intentionally or through miscalculation.

North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities are an existential

threat to South Korea and Japan and will soon be a direct threat to the continental
United States. Washington should make unambiguously clear that it will deter,
defend, and if necessary defeat the North Korean military threat to ourselves and our
allies. Such a policy requires repeated expressions of steadfast resolve coupled with
remedial steps to reverse declines in American military capabilities.

If it is determined that a North Korean missile flight might be directed at U.S. territory,
the U.S. Administration should take all necessary actions to defend U.S. sovereignty and
the American people. However, preemptive allied attacks should be reserved for
convincing signs of imminent North Korean attack, not launched to fulfill pundits’
oft-spoken vows to shoot down North Korean missiles during test flights or while on
launch gantries.

Preemptive attacks on test flights that do not clearly pose a security threat could trigger
a war with a nuclear-armed state that also has a large conventional military force
poised along the border with South Korea. While the U.S. should be steadfast in its
defense of its territory and its allies, it should not be overeager to “cry havoc and let slip
the dogs of war.”
Preemption---popularity inherency
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Growing Advocacy of Preemption
The imminence of Pyongyang’s crossing of the ICBM threshold has stimulated growing
calls for the U.S. to conduct a preemptive attack to prevent it. There have been
previous calls for such action, the most famous being in 2006 when former Secretary of
Defense William Perry and future Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter declared that since
“diplomacy has failed,” the U.S. should “strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong
missile before it can be launched” from its gantry on a test flight.2
Perry and Carter advocated the attack even against the vigorous opposition of South
Korea and dismissed an “all-out” North Korean military response as “unlikely.” Eleven
years later, however, Perry wrote that he would not recommend such a strike “because of
the very great risk for South Korea.”3

Since North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in September 2016, there have been widespread
calls for preemptive attacks in both Washington and Seoul. For example:

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Admiral Mike Mullen, has
emphasized the need to augment U.S. military capabilities to “theoretically take out
launch capabilities on the launch pad or take them out once they are launched.”4
In November 2016, General Walter Sharp, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea,
stated that in the event North Korea puts a three-stage Taepo Dong 2 on the launchpad,
and if the U.S. is unsure of its payload, then Washington should conduct a preemptive
attack and destroy the missile. Sharp commented that the U.S. cannot risk relying solely
on missile defense to counter North Korean long-range missiles.5
In December 2016, Senator Lindsey Graham (R–SC) commented that he would
introduce legislation to authorize the President to use military force preemptively to stop
Pyongyang from completing the development of its ICBM.6
In January 2017, Senator Bob Corker (R–TN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, suggested that the U.S. should be “be prepared to preemptively strike a
North Korean ICBM.”7

Polls show that a growing number of South Koreans support a preemptive strike
on North Korea “in case of emergency.” A September 2016 poll, for example, showed
that 43 percent of respondents supported a preemptive attack, up from 36 percent
in 2013.8
NoKo threat---NoKo invasion plans
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Growing North Korean Threat

North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities are already an existential threat to
South Korea and Japan. South Korean President Park Geun-hye described the
capabilities as a “dagger to our throats.”9
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is pushing forward rapidly to deploy missiles that
could target U.S. bases in Guam and continues to develop a nuclear-tipped ICBM to
threaten the American homeland.

Shortly after assuming power in late 2011, Kim Jong-un directed the creation of a new
war plan to complete an invasion of South Korea within a week using asymmetric
capabilities (including nuclear weapons and missiles). A senior North Korean military
defector has indicated that the North intends to occupy the entire South Korean
territory within seven days before U.S. reinforcements arrive.10
During Kim’s four-year reign, Pyongyang has conducted more than twice as many
missile tests as his father Kim Jong Il did during his 17 years in office. The accelerated
pace of North Korean nuclear and missile tests reflects Kim Jong-un’s intent to
deploy a spectrum of missile systems of complementary ranges to threaten the U.S. and
its allies with nuclear weapons.
SoKo needs anti-SLBM missile defense
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles. In August 2016, North Korea conducted its
most successful test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The
missile traveled 500 kilometers (300 miles) but with an unusually high trajectory. If
launched on a regular high trajectory, the missile might have traveled over 1,000
km.11

The South Korean Ministry of National Defense previously assessed that it would be
three to four years before North Korea would be able to deploy a submarine ballistic
missile force. However, after the successful SLBM test, some South Korean military
authorities warned that deployment could occur within a year.12

South Korea does not currently have defenses against submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs). The SM-2 missile currently deployed on South Korean destroyers
provides protection only against anti-ship missiles. South Korea has recently
expressed interest in the U.S.-developed SM-313 or SM-6 ship-borne systems to
provide anti-submarine-launched missile defense.
NoKo subs are a threat---empirics!
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

North Korea’s old and noisy submarines may not appear to be a submarine-based
ballistic missile threat. However, in 2010, a North Korean submarine sank the South
Korean naval corvette Cheonan in South Korean waters. In August 2015, 50 North
Korean submarines—70 percent of the fleet—left port and disappeared despite
allied monitoring efforts.

MIRBMs---bases in Guam at risk.

Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

Mobile Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles. In June 2016, North Korea

successfully tested a Musudan intermediate-range missile. North Korea
announced that the missile was flown at an unusually high trajectory so as not to overfly
Japan and also so as to verify “the heat-resistance capability of warhead in the re-entry
section and its flight stability,” including for strategic nuclear weapons.16

Had the missile been flown on a normal trajectory, it could have traveled 2,500
miles, putting U.S. bases in Guam at risk.17
Medium-Range---all of SoKo within range; focus = ports and airfields where
reinforcements would arrive.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles. Pyongyang conducted several successful No

Dong medium-range missile tests in 2016. North Korea state media announced
that the missile launches were practice drills for preemptive air-burst nuclear
attacks on South Korean ports and airfields where U.S. reinforcement forces
would arrive during a military crisis. A North Korean media-released photo showed that
the missile’s range would encompass all of South Korea, including the port of
Busan.19
ICBMs
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. In February 2016, North Korea again used a Taepo
Dong missile to put a satellite into orbit—the same technology needed to launch an
ICBM nuclear warhead. Assessments indicate that the satellite was approximately 450
pounds, twice as heavy a payload as the previous successful satellite launch in December
2012, and that the missile may have a range of 13,000 km, putting the entire continental
U.S. within range. Several U.S. four-star commanders have stated that North Korea
has—or the U.S. must assume that it has—a nuclear ICBM capability. Other experts
assess that Pyongyang will have an ICBM capability in one to two years.21
In April 2016, North Korea released photos of a successful static engine test of a “new
type high-power engine of inter-continental ballistic rocket.” Two non-government
experts assessed that the engines used higher-energy propellants than previously
assumed so that the road-mobile KN-08/14 ICBM could deliver a 500-kilogram
nuclear warhead to a target within a range of 10,000–13,000 km. The range is
greater than previously estimated, allowing North Korea to reach the east coast of the
U.S. The missile might also be deployable sooner than the two to three years of
previous estimates.22
Nuclear capacity---10-16 weapons; ability to miniaturize warheads on No
Dong medium-range ballistic missiles---can reach Japan and SoKo.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Nuclear Arsenal. North Korea has declared that it has achieved “standardized”
miniaturized nuclear warheads capable of being fitted to a variety of missiles.
U.S. experts estimate that Pyongyang currently has 10–16 nuclear weapons.23

Pyongyang has potentially developed boosted fission weapons and levitated pit
warheads, the latter allowing weapons requiring less fissile material per bomb.

In March 2015, Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified
that he believes North Korea has “already miniaturized” some of its nuclear
weapons.24
Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command,
stated that North Korea can put a nuclear warhead on the No Dong medium-range
ballistic missile, which is capable of reaching all of South Korea and Japan.

NoKo 2016 progress + strategic implications

Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Assessing Progress in 2016

In 2016, North Korea increased the frequency, sophistication, and success

rate of its nuclear and missile tests. In addition to two nuclear tests, North Korea:

-- Successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile;

-- Achieved breakthrough successes in the first flight tests of a road-mobile intermediate-
range missile and a submarine-launched ballistic missile;
-- Upgraded medium- and short-range missiles; and
-- Displayed and tested re-entry vehicle technology, a new solid-fuel rocket engine, and
an improved liquid-fuel ICBM engine.

Pyongyang is developing mobile land-based and sea-based missile systems that are
harder to detect and target. The success of its solid-fuel engine tests and launches
reduces the time necessary for launch, thereby constraining warning time.
Simultaneously launching multiple missiles from the field shows an enhanced
ability to guarantee survivability of nuclear forces, ensure regime survival, reduce
viability of allied preemptive attacks, launch surprise nuclear attacks,
engage in coercive diplomacy, and have a second-strike capability.

SoKo fears of alliance decoupling now---SoKo push for military options.

Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Growing Concerns Are Catalyst for New Military Options

The increasing North Korean threat has aggravated long-standing allied concerns
about U.S. abandonment that were exacerbated by perceptions of diminished
U.S. military capabilities and resolve during the Obama Administration. There are
greater South Korean fears of a decoupled alliance in which the U.S. “wouldn’t
trade Los Angeles for Seoul” once North Korea demonstrates an unambiguous capability
to threaten the continental U.S. with nuclear ICBMs.

These factors have caused more advocacy in South Korea for a range of military
options, including:

-- Reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that were withdrawn in the

1990s,

-- Development of an indigenous South Korean nuclear program, and

-- Greater reliance on preemption strategies.

SoKo nukes---either US-provided or indigenously produced are bad---are

bad and ineffective.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

Neither the reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea nor an
indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons program makes military sense. The
ground-based U.S. nuclear weapons that were withdrawn are no longer in the U.S.
inventory. There are U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific Theater, but they are
deployed on ships, submarines, and airplanes—all of which North Korea is
unable to target given their mobile, elusive nature.

To remove nuclear weapons from those platforms and put them into underground
bunkers in South Korea would be counterproductive. It would lengthen their
response time since they would need to be returned from the bunker to their delivery
platforms, would degrade their stealthy nature by putting them into an easily
identifiable fixed ground site, and thus would undermine their deterrent and
defense capabilities. Putting such high-value weapons in easily targetable bunkers
would increase the likelihood that North Korea might attempt a preemptive
attack during a crisis.

If South Korea were to begin developing nuclear weapons, it would become the target of
international sanctions, would be diplomatically isolated, and could suffer the
collapse of its alliance with the U.S. Moreover, an indigenous nuclear program
would divert excessive funding from South Korea’s defense budget away from
critical requirements simply to duplicate an existing capability provided by the
U.S.
Squo preemptive attack options---OPLAN 5015 and 3K Defense System.
SoKo is also expanding military capabilities.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Increasing Preemptive Capabilities

In recent years, the U.S.–South Korean alliance has altered its operational plan for
conflict on the Korean Peninsula to include preemptive attack scenarios. In 2015,
the U.S. and South Korea adopted a new war plan, Operational Plan 5015, which
reportedly includes options for a preemptive strike on the North’s nuclear and missile
facilities and decapitation attacks on North Korea’s leadership, including Kim Jong-
un. Joint U.S.–South Korean military exercises in 2016 reportedly practiced some of
these scenarios.26

Separately, South Korea has developed independent preemptive attack plans and
has acquired weapons capable of attacking North Korean weapons of mass
destruction. South Korea has adopted a “3K Defense System” consisting of the
following:

-- Kill Chain detection and preemptive attack system to attack North Korean
missiles prior to launch;

-- Korea Air and Missile Defense System ( KAMD) to intercept North Korean
missiles in mid-air; and

-- Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation ( KMPR) to attack nuclear, missile, and
leadership targets after attack or upon detection of signs of imminent North
Korean attack.

After North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear test, South Korean Defense Minister Han
Min-Koo announced the KMPR strategy. Han testified that Seoul was “considering
launching a Special Forces unit to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.” The
unit would take action if North Korea “shows clear signs of attacking South Korea.” A
South Korean defense official added, “Should the North threaten to use nuclear weapons,
we will use sophisticated guided weapon systems to strike its missile and launching
facilities.”27

South Korea has been adding military capabilities to improve its preemptive attack
abilities. Under a 2012 agreement with the U.S., Seoul was allowed to produce ballistic
missiles with an 800-km range (up from the previous limit of 300 km) with a 500-
kg payload. South Korea can produce cruise missiles with a range of up to 1,500
km and is currently developing the Hyunmoo-2 SSMs and Hyunmoo-3 cruise
missiles.

South Korea will also purchase additional long-range air-to-ground Taurus

missiles from Germany. The missiles would be launched from F-15Ks to a range of
500 km. If fired from near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the missiles could reach
all of North Korea. The original plan was for 177 missiles by 2017; an additional 90
now will be procured before the end of 2018. Seoul will also purchase the Small
Diameter Bomb-II, a U.S.-produced air-launched glide bomb, to target North Korea’s
mobile missile launchers.28
Impact to preemptive action---it’s an offensive action that triggers all-out
war with tremendous casualties.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Dangerous Ramifications of Preemptive Attack

There is a distinct difference between using military force to prevent North Korea
from attacking the U.S. with a nuclear-tipped missile and preventing Pyongyang
from building or testing such a missile. The U.S. President already has the
constitutional authority to take action against threats to the U.S., imminent or otherwise.
U.S. military action in cases of an inbound missile or imminent nuclear attack, however,
would be a defensive response.

By contrast, a U.S. military attack against production or test facilities of North

Korea’s nuclear or missile programs would be an offensive action that could trigger an
all-out war with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Pyongyang already has the ability to
target South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons and also has a million-man
army poised just across the DMZ from South Korea. Without moving any military units,
Pyongyang could unleash a devastating artillery attack on Seoul.

Questions to consider re: NoKo

Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Preventing North Korea from Completing ICBM Development. Some experts advocate
preemptive attack to prevent North Korea from completing the development of a nuclear
ICBM that can threaten the U.S. However, they have not identified what technological
milestone they would use military force to prevent, nor have they identified how the U.S.
would know Pyongyang was on the verge of progressing beyond that milestone. This
shortage of concrete information yields a number of pressing questions, including:
-- Given the opacity of North Korea, how likely is it that the U.S. Intelligence Community
could provide comprehensive, actionable information in sufficient time to
enable U.S. prior action?

-- What targets would need to be included to ensure that the capability is prevented—
only missile test facilities or also missile and nuclear weapons research, production, and
storage facilities?
-- Would military missile units also be included?

-- What mitigating actions would be taken to prevent a North Korean military

response, including a potentially cataclysmic attack on Seoul?

-- How would China respond to an attack on its ally?

These are not moot questions. When then President-elect Donald Trump was told
that North Korea had claimed it had reached the “final stage of preparations to test-
launch an intercontinental ballistic missile,” he declared, “It won’t happen.” Kellyanne
Conway, Counselor to the President, explained that Trump had sent a “clear warning” to
North Korea and put Pyongyang “on notice.” She further commented that “The president
of the United States will stand between them and missile capabilities.”29
Has President Trump drawn a red line to use all means necessary to prevent North Korea
from completing its ICBM program? Given the rapid pace of North Korea’s 2016 test
program and the regime’s tendency to conduct provocations early in new U.S. and South
Korean administrations, it might not be long before President Trump faces reports of
another North Korean long-range missile or nuclear test.
Shooting down missile test bad and not likely to be effective---arg applies
even if we know where the launch sites are.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

North Korean Missile Test. Flippant advocacy of shooting down a North Korean
missile during a test flight also has serious consequences. A lone North Korean
missile on a test flight the trajectory of which is determined by U.S. intelligence satellites
to be aimed only at open water does not pose an imminent or existential threat
to the U.S.

Intercepting such a test flight could redirect international focus and anger away
from North Korean violation of U.N. resolutions and toward the U.S. military
action. In addition, regardless of whether such a missile interception constituted a
formal act of war by the U.S., it would certainly be seen as provocative and could
trigger a North Korean military response. In October 2015, Foreign Minister Ri
Su-yong told the U.N. General Assembly that Pyongyang would respond “with all
available self-defensive measures” if anyone tried to stop its “peaceful satellite launch.”
Would an allied attack on the North Korean missile in flight be reserved only for a
situation in which the missile was assessed to be equipped with a nuclear weapon? What
if it was assessed to have only a test instrumentation package, a nonmilitary satellite, or
unknown payload?

Moreover, the U.S. and its allies likely could not intercept a North Korean missile
on a test flight trajectory since it would be traveling outside the intercept of any
allied ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Ground-based systems such as Patriot-
2/3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) can intercept incoming missiles
only during the terminal phase of their flight and within the parameters of the
radar and interceptor missiles. Ship-based systems such as SM-3 can intercept
missiles at a greater altitude and range, but again within narrow parameters. For
example, Japanese SM-3 missiles could not intercept North Korean missiles flying over—
rather than toward—Japan since that trajectory would exceed the altitude range of the
interceptor missiles.

Attacking a missile on its launch gantry at North Korea’s known fixed test
launch sites would have a far greater likelihood of success. This is the scenario
that William Perry and Ashton Carter advocated in 2006. However, what if the regime
were going to test a road-mobile KN-08 or KN-14 ICBM? Would the U.S. attack
missile launchers anywhere in North Korea based on the perception that they were going
to conduct a test launch? Both scenarios carry a commensurately increased risk of a
military response to attacks on North Korean soil.

Also, would such an attack be reserved for preventing test flights of ICBMs, or would it
also include Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles that can threaten U.S. bases
in Guam or No Dong medium-range missiles that can target South Korea, Japan, and
U.S. forces stationed in both countries?
Even preemptive attack with knowledge of an imminent nuclear strike is
risky---imperfect intelligence.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Imminent North Korean Attack. While the U.S. and South Korean presidents should
consider a preemptive attack if an imminent North Korean nuclear attack is
detected, such a scenario is also problematic. Such a preemptive allied attack, as
opposed to responding to notification of inbound missiles, would likely be based on
insufficient or imperfect intelligence collection and assessment. Imagine a U.S. or
South Korean president faced with an intelligence briefing like the following:
Reconnaissance satellites have detected some North Korean mobile missiles in the field
that are fueled and positioned for launch. We think we’ve identified them all, but since
they are mobile, there could be others. We assess that they are equipped with nuclear
warheads but can’t be sure. Based on the current tense situation, we believe that the
missiles are preparing for a nuclear strike, but the regime could be attempting to send a
political signal, or they may not have nuclear weapons and could just be out for routine
training exercises.
Based on such information, the President would then need to decide whether to conduct
a preemptive attack and possibly start another Korean War, this time with a nuclear
North Korea. It could well be like another Cuban missile crisis but with Soviet missiles
already fully operational in Cuba. Would the decision be made unilaterally or in
conjunction with allies?

Greater nuclear capability means NoKo preemptive attacks against US

strikes are also more likely.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack
Greater Risk of Miscalculation

North Korea’s Preemption Threats. As North Korea’s nuclear and missile prowess
has increased, so have its threats of a preemptive attack to forestall what it
depicts as the rising risk of an allied preemptive attack. In October 2016, Lee Yong-pil,
director of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Institute for American Studies,
declared, “A preemptive nuclear strike is not something the U.S. has a monopoly on. If
we see that the U.S. would do it to us, we would do it first.”30

In March 2016, the North Korean National Defense Commission warned of its “military
counter-action for preemptive attack” ahead of the annual U.S.–South Korean military
exercises. The military vowed to “launch an all-out offensive to decisively counter the
U.S. and its followers’ hysteric nuclear war moves [and] take military counteraction
for preemptive attack [and] offensive nuclear strike to [conduct] a sacred war of justice
for reunification.” The regime also boasted of its “powerful nuclear strike means
targeting the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces bases in the Asia-Pacific region and the
U.S. mainland.” Concurrently, the North Korean Foreign Ministry declared that “[a]
decisive preemptive attack is the only way for [North Korea] to beat back
the sudden surprise attack of the U.S….”31

SoKo will be particularly reliant on preemption---one nuclear on Seoul is

existentially devastating. Empirics prove military officials are penalized for
acting cautiously against the NoKo threat.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

South Korea Leaning Farther Forward. Seoul may become increasingly reliant on
a preemption strategy because North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities are an
existential threat. One nuclear weapon over Seoul would threaten one-third of
the nation’s entire population as well as its centralized government and
business sectors. The loss of Seoul could lead to the end of the Korean nation.

South Korean officials also have privately expressed a perception that the U.S. “sits on
its ally” by immediately trying to deescalate any situation before Seoul
responds. As a result, South Korea might see utility in acting quickly before
Washington intervenes and prevents action. All senior military commanders were
replaced for responding with insufficient vigor to North Korea’s 2010 attacks on
the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyeong Island. Being hesitant and cautious was
penalized.

The logic of preemption is destabilizing---emboldens actors to take

provocative steps that can easily escalate due to the likelihood of
miscalculation.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

Preemption Through Miscalculation. With the international community imposing

stronger sanctions, Kim Jong-un may perceive himself as painted into a corner
and consequently take even more provocative and desperate steps than have been
taken in the past. North Korea’s growing nuclear capability could give regime
leaders a sense of impunity. They might become emboldened to conduct not only
provocations, but also actual attacks, perceiving that they have undermined the
U.S.’s extended deterrence guarantee by decoupling U.S. security from South
Korea’s.

Advocacy of preemption both by North Korea and by U.S allies is destabilizing and
could lead to greater potential for either side to miscalculate. Pyongyang may not
realize that the more it achieves, demonstrates, and threatens to use its nuclear prowess,
the more likely an allied action during a crisis becomes.

Each side could misinterpret the other’s intentions, thus fueling tension,
intensifying a perceived need to escalate, and raising the risk of miscalculation,
including preemptive attack. Even a tactical military incident on the Korean Peninsula
always has the potential for escalating to a strategic clash. With no apparent off-ramp on
the highway to a crisis, the danger of a military clash on the Korean Peninsula is again
rising.
Thus, the plan:
-- Reserve preemptive attack for imminent North Korean attack, but make it clear we are
willing to use force to defend national interests---needlessly risking nuclear war is a
terrible strategy.
-- Reaffirm commitments to defending South Korea and Japan---forward-deployed
conventional forces, missile defense, and the nuclear umbrella.
- But, there is an upper limit to reassurances---we already have a mutual defense
treaty, integrated war plans, and almost 30,000 American troops deployed!
- Reassurance is also a two-way street---South Korea should also take steps in
improving its own military capabilities.
-- Improve US deterrence capabilities---expand deployments of nuclear-capable assets,
augment allied ballistic missile defense, and improve SoKo defense against SLBM threat.
This solves the impulse to pursue preemptive action---deterrence is only
effective through sufficient capabilities, unquestioned resolve, and your
enemy’s understanding of those capabilities and that resolve.
Bruce Klingner 17, a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation, “Save Preemption for Imminent North Korean Attack,” March
1, The Heritage Foundation, retrieved at: http://www.heritage.org/missile-
defense/report/save-preemption-imminent-north-korean-attack

What the U.S. Should Do

To reduce advocacy for preemptive action, the U.S. should enhance

perceptions of its commitment and capabilities. Specifically, the U.S. should:

-- Reserve preemptive attack for imminent North Korean attack. Neither the
U.S. nor South Korea should initiate an attack on North Korea for crossing yet another
technological threshold, such as an impending test launch of one missile or a successful
long-range test demonstrating reentry vehicle capability. Such an attack would risk
initiating a full-scale war with a nuclear nation. The more prudent course of
action is to reserve a preemptive attack for a situation in which the Intelligence
Community has strong evidence of imminent strategic nuclear attack on the
U.S. or its allies. Allies and opponents alike should be aware that the U.S. is willing
and able to use the means necessary to defend its national interests.
However, the U.S. need not needlessly precipitate a conflict.

-- Reassure South Korea of U.S. resolve. Comments made during the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign exacerbated allied concerns about the willingness of the U.S. to
fulfill treaty commitments to defend its allies. The Trump Administration should
continue to affirm unequivocal commitment to defending South Korea and Japan,
including the threefold U.S. promise of extended deterrence: forward-deployed
conventional forces, missile defense, and the nuclear umbrella. At a minimum,
the U.S. should pledge to maintain U.S. forward-deployed forces in South Korea and
Japan at current levels and augment those forces during a crisis to deter, defend,
and defeat security threats in the region.

-- Augment U.S. deterrence capabilities. Washington should explain how

reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea and South Korea’s
development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program are not viable policies.
However, the Trump Administration, in consultation with our allies, should consider the
following measures:

1. Reversing the devastating cuts in the U.S. defense budget by implementing

the recommendations in The Heritage Foundation’s 2017 Index of Military U.S. Military
Strength;32

2. Expanding rotational deployments of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

from Okinawa to South Korea;

3. Continuing U.S.–South Korean discussions of augmented rotational

deployments of U.S. strategic nuclear-capable assets to northeast Asia,
including B-52 and B-2 bombers, carrier battle groups, submarines, and dual-capable
aircraft;

4. Improving allied ballistic missile defense by:

- Deploying the THAAD missile defense system to South Korea, both to

improve protection against the North Korean missile threat and
potentially to lengthen the fuse of war by reducing the need for preemptive
attack;
- Urging South Korea to integrate its independent missile defense system into
the more comprehensive and effective allied network with the U.S. and
Japan;
- Implementing improvements to U.S. strategic missile defense as
separately recommended by The Heritage Foundation.33

5. Enhancing defense against the North Korean submarine-launched ballistic

missile threat by encouraging South Korea to procure and deploy the SM-6 ship-
based BMD system and enhancing anti-submarine capacities.

-- Beware the slippery slope of reassurance. Reducing allied doubts about U.S.
commitment is a critical, albeit Sisyphean, task. South Korean requests or even demands
for U.S. reassurance can seem endless. To date, Washington has already provided:
1. A mutual defense treaty,
2. An extended deterrence guarantee,
3. Bilateral integrated war plans,
4. Presidential pledges of commitment during successive Administrations, and
5. Repeated public affirmations by Secretaries of State and Defense.
Of course, the ultimate symbol of unwavering U.S. commitment is the presence of
28,500 American sons and daughters deployed in harm’s way in South Korea.
Yet despite all of these efforts, South Korean officials, legislators, and pundits still call for
greater reassurance measures, such as reintroduction of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons,
permanent deployment of nuclear-capable strategic assets in South Korea, and greater
knowledge of and say in U.S. nuclear strategy.

-- Remember that reassurance is a two-way street. Seoul can and should take
certain steps to enhance its own security capabilities. For a number of years,
South Korea underfunded its defense budget, and this has led to repeated delays in its
planned defense reform. To its credit, Seoul has increased its funding in recent years, but
the pace must be maintained over the long term. Steps for South Korea to take
toward reassurance include the following:

1. Improving C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities to enable integrated combat
capabilities down to the tactical level, an improvement requiring sensors, such as
AWACs and high-altitude UAVs, as well as integrated command and communication
systems;

2. Enhancing long-range precision-strike capabilities, including fifth-generation

fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, precision-guided munitions, extended-range surface-
to-surface missiles, and counterbattery radar and artillery systems;

3. Accelerating deployment of the THAAD BMD system and more vigorously

rebutting inaccuracies put forth by the South Korean media and the Chinese
government;

4. Compartmentalizing difficult historic issues with Japan so as not to continue

to impede augmentation of allied defense against common enemies. To this end, Seoul
should:

-- Reassure Washington that the many improvements in allied military capabilities

implemented in recent years will not be undone regardless of presidential election
outcomes in South Korea. (Progressive candidates have vowed to institute several
policies that could strain the alliance.)
-- Fully implement the recently signed General Security of Military Information
Agreement that enables more expeditious exchange of information on the North
Korea threat during a crisis;

-- Increase the pace and scope of military exercises with Japan and the U.S.,
including trilateral missile defense, anti-submarine, and mine-clearing operations;
Conclusion

Success in reducing the need for preemptive attack relies on creating more
credible deterrence. Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, “To win one hundred victories
in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.” The more modern, albeit fictional, strategist Dr.
Strangelove commented that deterrence was “the act of producing in the mind of the
enemy the fear to attack.” For an opponent to be deterred, the threatened
retaliatory response must consist of sufficient military capabilities,
unquestioned resolve to respond, and the communication of these capabilities
and resolve to the enemy.

Responding to the growing North Korean nuclear and missile threats is like a military
version of playing “whack a mole.” Unlike the arcade game, however, the real world
holds the very real danger that the mole will whack back.
 China
The plan solves---there are geopolitical incentives for Chinese cooperation.
Charles Krauthammer 17, opinion writer at the Washington Post, “With North Korea,
we do have cards to play,” April 20, The Washington Post, retrieved at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/with-north-korea-we-do-have-cards-to-
play/2017/04/20/8623985a-25fa-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html?
If not deterrence, then prevention. But how? The best hope is for China to exercise its
influence and induce North Korea to give up its programs.
For years, the Chinese made gestures, but never did anything remotely decisive. They
have their reasons. It’s not just that they fear a massive influx of refugees if the Kim
regime disintegrates. It’s also that Pyongyang is a perpetual thorn in the side of the
Americans, whereas regime collapse brings South Korea (and thus America) right up to
the Yalu River.
So why would the Chinese do our bidding now?
For a variety of reasons.

● They don’t mind tension but they don’t want war. And the risk of war is rising. They
know that the ICBM threat is totally unacceptable to the Americans. And that the current
administration appears particularly committed to enforcing this undeclared red line.

● Chinese interests are being significantly damaged by the erection of regional missile
defenses to counteract North Korea’s nukes. South Korea is racing to install a Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. Japan may follow. THAAD’s
mission is to track and shoot down incoming rockets from North Korea but, like any
missile shield, it necessarily reduces the power and penetration of the Chinese nuclear
arsenal.

● For China to do nothing risks the return of the American tactical nukes in
South Korea, withdrawn in 1991.

● If the crisis deepens, the possibility arises of South Korea and, more importantly,
Japan going nuclear themselves. The latter is the ultimate Chinese nightmare.

These are major cards America can play. Our objective should be clear. At a
minimum, a testing freeze. At the maximum, regime change.
 Sanctions
Ian Talley 7-10-17, writer for the Wall Street Journal covering international finance,
“U.S. Prepares to Act Alone Against North Korea,” July 10, The Wall Street Journal,
retrieved at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prepares-to-act-alone-against-north-
korea-1499707831?mg=prod/accounts-wsj

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration is moving toward unilaterally

tightening sanctions on North Korea, targeting Chinese companies and
banks the U.S. says are funneling cash into Pyongyang’s weapons program.

Sharper rhetoric from high-ranking U.S. officials since North Korea’s July 4 ballistic
missile test and recently unsealed court filings offer clues that the White House is ready
to use its own powers to constrict the flow of cash to Kim Jong Un’s regime. U.S. officials
have expressed a preference for collective action through the United Nations and support
from China.
The Justice Department, in a federal-court case that was partly unsealed last week,
pointed to “offshore U.S. dollar accounts” associated with a network of five
companies linked to Chinese national Chi Yupeng. That included one of the
largest importers of North Korean goods into China, Dandong Zhicheng
Metallic Material Co.
Citing sources that included two North Korean defectors, the Justice Department said
the so-called Chi Yupeng network hid transactions that helped finance North
Korea’s military and arms programs.

That network isn’t under U.S. sanctions, but analysts say it is a vital source of funds
that can be choked off, in the same way the U.S. targeted another Chinese company
late last year, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Some of the nearly two-
dozen Chinese banks that handled allegedly laundered money from Dangdong
Hongxiang also could be targeted, analysts said. The company declined to comment at
the time.
China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request to comment, and Mr. Chi and
Dandong Zhicheng couldn’t be reached.
North Korea has resisted pressure for years, and many experts question whether this
time would be any different. Pyongyang has become proficient at evading sanctions, U.S.
officials say, including by disguising its international trade and financial entities through
firms in China.
The U.S. itself has almost no direct ties to North Korea after imposing wide-ranging
bilateral sanctions in response to previous missile and nuclear tests.
China, North Korea’s chief trade partner, has resisted tightening the screws against its
neighbor, concerned that it could provoke Pyongyang to lash out against America’s allies
in the region or precipitate a collapse of the regime that sparks a flood of refugees,
analysts say. The status quo has also provided China a buffer against U.S. power in Asia.
Since raising the pressure on North Korea requires targeting more Chinese firms,
unilateral action risks fueling already strained tensions between Washington and
Beijing. It could complicate Washington’s efforts to expand access for U.S. companies
into the world’s most populous country and win Beijing’s support on other international
issues, such as on cyber security and resolving conflicts in the Middle East.
The George W. Bush administration brought North Korea back to the negotiating table in
2007 after escalating sanctions, but the administration then softened pressure and
Pyongyang resumed its nuclear-weapons program. The Obama administration
sanctioned North Korea, but the effort failed to halt the program.
U.S. officials say the stakes are greater after last week’s missile launch revealed
Pyongyang’s ability to put Alaska within reach and that current efforts will be more
stringent than in the past.
Even before the July 4 launch, the Trump administration began trying to tighten
sanctions to cut off “all illegal funds going to North Korea,” Treasury Secretary Steven
Mnuchin said just days before the test. “We will continue to look at these actions and
continue to roll out sanctions.”

Late last month the U.S. Treasury said it would cut off China’s Bank of
Dandong from U.S. financial markets, saying North Korea was using bank accounts
under false names and conducting transactions through banks in China, Hong Kong and
Southeast Asia. Neither the Chinese Embassy in Washington nor the Bank of Dandong
responded to requests for comment. The Treasury also added to its North Korea
sanctions list two Chinese citizens accused of working for front companies designed to
evade existing sanctions.
Sanctions/action good.
Ian Talley 7-10-17, writer for the Wall Street Journal covering international finance,
“U.S. Prepares to Act Alone Against North Korea,” July 10, The Wall Street Journal,
retrieved at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prepares-to-act-alone-against-north-
korea-1499707831?mg=prod/accounts-wsj
*internally quoting Bruce Klinger, a former Central Intelligence Agency deputy
division chief covering North Korea now at the Heritage Foundation think tank;
Nicholas Eberstadt, a North Korea security expert at the American Enterprise
Institute; and Bruce Bechtol, a former senior Defense Intelligence Agency officer
specializing in northeast Asia

Failure to act more aggressively could embolden Pyongyang and the entities
that help finance the regime, said Bruce Klingner, a former Central Intelligence
Agency deputy division chief covering North Korea now at the Heritage Foundation
think tank.
Many former U.S. diplomats, including Juan Zarate, the top sanctions diplomat in the
Bush administration, say Washington must ratchet up the pressure on Chinese
firms and banks. The U.S. has so far been wary of prodding Beijing too hard, given the
wealth of other vital geopolitical issues on which the two powers cooperate, former U.S.
officials and analysts said.
North Korea’s latest missile test changes the administration’s calculus, said Nicholas
Eberstadt, a North Korea security expert at the American Enterprise Institute. He
expects the White House to accelerate its sanctions against Chinese firms.

Sanctions experts say the Trump administration is looking to emulate the success of
Iranian sanctions, which forced Tehran to the negotiating table and halt its nuclear
weapons program.

Analysts and senior officials from two previous administrations say existing sanctions
against North Korea have been elementary compared with the thicket of actions
applied against Iran by the Obama administration. That pushed Iran into recession
and persuaded it to negotiate, although many foreign-policy experts question the
effectiveness of the subsequent deal the U.S. reached with Iran.

A central aim of the new strategy of freezing out a Chinese bank from the U.S.
financial system is to chill transactions by other Chinese institutions. Access
to U.S. financial markets and the dollar are critical for trade and finance around the
globe. But for that effort to be perceived as credible, said Mr. Eberstadt, the
administration will have to list other Chinese banks to instill broader fear.

“If I wanted to send a message, I’d probably send several postcards,” Mr. Eberstadt said.
But while enhanced pressure could complicate Washington’s already difficult diplomatic
relationship with Beijing, the administration can moderate the potential
political fallout, analysts say. Many of the banks facilitating financing for North Korea
are smaller Chinese banks. By carefully documenting how those firms are breaking
U.S. money-laundering and other illicit finance laws, the administration can show
China it is not going after the government, but criminal organizations,
analysts said.

“Nobody’s sanctioning Bank of China, the overwhelming majority are

smaller banks,” said Bruce Bechtol, a former senior Defense Intelligence Agency officer
specializing in northeast Asia. “It’s not going to break the Chinese and it’s not going to
ruin economic ties with the U.S.”
 US Bases
Robert Farley 7-11-17, a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce, “Securing US Bases in the Pacific: A New Era of Instability?”
July 11, The Diplomat, retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/securing-us-
bases-in-the-pacific-a-new-era-of-instability/
*internally citing a report by Commander Thomas Shugart and Commander
Javier Gonzalez at the Center for a New American Security

How vulnerable are U.S. bases in the Pacific? A new report by Commander Thomas
Shugart and Commander Javier Gonzalez at the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS) suggests that the constellation of U.S. bases in the region has become deeply
vulnerable to attack by Chinese ballistic missiles.

While the threat of anti-ship ballistic missiles has captured many of the headlines
regarding the changing balance of power in the Pacific, the authors of the report argue
that land-based installations are just as tenuous, if not more so. China’s PLA Rocket
Force (PLARF) enjoys a degree of independence that has no useful counterpart in the
American system. The report suggests that China currently deploys upwards of 1,600
conventionally armed ballistic missiles of various ranges. These missiles can carry
a variety of payloads, including submunitions designed to severely damage above-ground
military installations. Ground launched cruise missiles, flying on pre-determined
courses at low altitude, can also inflict considerable damage with little warning.
Built around a series of carefully delineated assumptions, Shugart and Gonzalez
simulated a preemptive Chinese attack against U.S. bases in Japan and
elsewhere in Asia. In the simulation, Chinese missiles destroyed nearly every
headquarters and logistical facility, along with virtually every U.S. ship in port, and some
two hundred U.S. combat aircraft. In short, depending on the degree of surprise, China
can cripple U.S. military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific while using only a fraction
of its conventional missile arsenal.

China’s missile strategy has historic and contemporary analogues. Late Soviet
doctrine envisioned precision ballistic missile strikes against NATO bases in the opening
hours of a general confrontation on the Central Front. North Korean military strategy
relies on attacking a wide range of civilian and military installations in South Korea and
elsewhere with conventional, and possibly nuclear and biochemical, payloads. The U.S.
pursuit of ballistic missile defense has, in significant part, been driven by the increasing
military threat that conventional missiles pose.

What can the United States do? Much depends on how effectively the U.S. ferrets out
notice of Chinese attack. While any war between the United States and China is highly
likely to begin with an attack by the latter, the damage caused by such an attack remains
subject to many variables. The U.S. can disperse aircraft, command and control assets,
and logistical support requirements in ways that would complicate Chinese
targeting, if the former receives sufficient warning of the latter’s attack. The analysis
also opens up the potential for inter-service competition. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S.
Army depend on bases in the Western Pacific to a greater extent than the U.S. Navy,
although the latter also requires considerable support for assets afloat. As Shugart and
Gonzalez point out, aircraft carriers can rely on speed and mobility to avoid
precision first-strikes in a way that fixed bases cannot.
Perhaps the most important factor in avoiding war between China and the United States
involves reducing the incentives for preemption. If victory determines or necessitates a
first strike, then crises become deeply unstable. Shugart and Gonzalez suggest that we
are very close to living in this reality.
 Sanctions Working Now
Ryan Pickrell 7-10-17, “North Korea Admits Sanctions Are Taking A Big Toll,” July 10,
The National Interest, retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/north-
korea-admits-sanctions-are-taking-big-toll-21485

North Korea offered a rare admission that international sanctions are having a
detrimental effect on society, but it remains to be seen whether the increased
pressure will deter the regime from continuing its weapons development programs.
Kim Chol, the director of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Social
Sciences, revealed in an interview with Kyodo News that petroleum prices have risen
sharply in recent months due to international sanctions. In response, the North Korean
regime is encouraging people to use public transportation and ride bikes.

“(Oil) imports have largely been restricted,” Kim Jong-guk, an official from the
institute in charge of external affairs, explained, adding that sanctions have made it
difficult for North Korea to make payments to China and other countries.

Gasoline prices first jumped in April, leading some to conclude that China might be
cutting shipments to North Korea, just as it did coal imports from North Korea earlier
this year.
 Moon
Ruediger Frank 7-10-17, a Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the
University of Vienna and Head of its Department of East Asian Studies, “Navigating
Difficult Waters: President Moon Jae-in’s Berlin Speech,” July 10, 38 North, retrieved at:
http://www.38north.org/2017/07/rfrank071017/

South Korea’s president Moon Jae-in unveiled his North Korea strategy in a long-
awaited speech in Berlin, Germany on July 6. Moon’s policy represents an
interesting mix of several of his predecessors’ approaches, which were regarded
largely as either too soft or too tough. In addition to a few general statements on
strategic positions, his speech also included a number of very specific and
detailed proposals about how to deal with North Korea.

Having witnessed the excitement in Seoul after Kim Dae-jung’s Berlin Declaration back
in 2000, and having been utterly disappointed by Park Geun-hye’s Dresden Speech of
2014, I find President Moon’s statements to be more difficult to categorize. He did not
offer unconditional cooperation to Pyongyang, but he also did not signal an intention to
colonize North Korea. He worked hard to emphasize the importance of the
alliance with the United States and explicitly mentioned complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the North’s nuclear weapons program. But he
also clearly stressed the need for Korea to be in the driver’s seat when it comes to
inter-Korean relations and an eventual unification, echoing the term “by our
nation itself” which is so popular in North Korea that it is even used as the name for
one of its official websites (www.uriminzokkiri.com).
Berlin location = implicit message of cooperation and respect towards North
Korea.
Ruediger Frank 7-10-17, a Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the
University of Vienna and Head of its Department of East Asian Studies, “Navigating
Difficult Waters: President Moon Jae-in’s Berlin Speech,” July 10, 38 North, retrieved at:
http://www.38north.org/2017/07/rfrank071017/
Location
The choice of Germany as a location for such a speech on unification policy is not ideal,
but it is certainly better than, for example, Washington or Beijing would have
been. The North Koreans are very wary of any South Korean attempt at
domination. Therefore, delivering such a programmatic speech in the capital of a
superpower would have been regarded as either threatening or sycophancy.
Germany is, at least for East Asians, a rather unsuspicious place from this perspective,
although we should not forget that West Germany actually DID take over East Germany
in 1990, no matter how friendly that act was.

The selection of Berlin, too, at first glance seems an uninspired but acceptable choice.
Berlin is, of course, a good choice because it represents both East and West
Germany; the city itself was divided and in many ways is like a mini-version of unified
Germany. At the same time, it is the most obvious option and thus lacks freshness,
especially given the fact that Kim Dae-jung had already spoken there on this topic.
Perhaps this particular parallel was intended, since Kim’s Berlin speech was the prelude
to the first and much celebrated inter-Korean summit.
On second thought, maybe the location chosen wasn’t so devoid of special meaning after
all. While Kim Dae-jung spoke at Free University in former West Berlin, Moon Jae-in
spoke in the Altes Stadthaus, which is located in former East Berlin. Assuming this
choice was made deliberately, and that it is understood as such by Pyongyang, it sends a
different and more positive and cooperative message to North Korea. President
Moon did not speak in the part of the city that was able to make its own set of values and
rules the new common standard; he spoke where the magistrate of unified Berlin
now actually resides, and where the biggest improvements and investments
of the last two decades have taken place.

Translated into plain English, the South Korean President told the North Koreans: I am
going to accept and respect you as equals, and you are going to benefit. This is
very smart; the North Koreans, with their knowledge of context and attention to detail
will get the message, while the political opposition in Seoul, which is waiting to criticize
Moon for being a clone of his two progressive predecessors, will most likely miss it.
Moon is more realistic about the long-term process of unification and
stressed the process leading up to it instead of what a post-unified Korea
ought to look like.
Ruediger Frank 7-10-17, a Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the
University of Vienna and Head of its Department of East Asian Studies, “Navigating
Difficult Waters: President Moon Jae-in’s Berlin Speech,” July 10, 38 North, retrieved at:
http://www.38north.org/2017/07/rfrank071017/
Interaction and Cooperation

President Moon rightly stressed the importance of the process leading to

unification rather than laying out detailed plans about how a post-unification Korea
should look like. He reminded us of the many successes of the Sunshine Policy, most
prominently the steps taken by Pyongyang towards a partial liberalization of the
domestic market. These are effects that I still see when I travel through North Korea
despite the many attempts by hardliners on both sides to undo what has been achieved.

A very important point was the explicit recognition that we talk about a long-term
project; Moon mentioned 20 years of Ostpolitik. One reason for the bad reputation
of Kim Dae-jung’s policy among many South Koreans today is that he created the
impression, albeit unwillingly, that unification was imminent and a matter of a few
years, if not months. Disappointment followed soon. Moon Jae-in offers a more
realistic and less ambitious perspective. This needs to be seen together with his
campaign pledge to reform the presidential system in South Korea, which, if
successful, would pave the way for a more consistent and longer-term policy that is
currently almost impossible with only a single five-year presidential term and a
parliament that mainly either supports or opposes the president but rarely launches
initiatives of its own.

Equally important is Moon’s remark on the regional context of unification. Helmut

Kohl responded to French and British fears over the potential and intentions of a strong,
unified Germany by deliberately sacrificing the powerful Deutschmark in exchange for a
multilaterally controlled Euro, and by shedding further elements of German national
sovereignty by actively integrating the country into the European Union. This came at a
price, but Kohl was willing to pay it. I am not so sure whether Korea would do the same,
but the concerns of its neighbors also differ much from the German case so other
measures will be required.
A regional approach will nevertheless be useful, not least in order to manage the
dilemma of being stuck between two allies—China and the United States—that each aim
for exclusive influence in a unified Korea. Looking beyond the Korean peninsula, we find
many countries in East Asia that are in a similar situation; closer institutional Korean
cooperation with ASEAN countries, for example, could offer new options. Entering an
enlarged ASEAN or a yet-to-be-founded Association of East Asian Nations might even be
attractive for North Korea, given the principle of non-interference and some rather good
bilateral relations with members of that group.
Being Tough and Soft

President Moon, in very clear words, condemned North Korea’s nuclear and
missile programs, called the ICBM test launch of July 4 a provocation and a reckless
choice, and reiterated the demand for CVID. In particular, the latter is
noteworthy. It is a term that symbolizes a school of thought that views engagement
and dialogue with North Korea as appeasement and rewarding bad
behavior. The use of the expression “last chance to make the right decision”
sounds much like a threat—something one would not expect a former member of the
Roh Moo-hyun administration to issue in such clarity.
But then Moon also expressed his regret that North Korea’s recent move hurt Seoul’s
plans to help Pyongyang receive the international community’s (read:
Washington’s) support and cooperation. He revealed that he had already secured
the support by China and the United States for inter-Korean dialogue. He supported
sanctions but also implied that these could be rescinded. Most importantly, he seems to
have offered the North Koreans a peace treaty to end the Korean War in exchange
for denuclearization—without talking about preconditions. The latter will not be
welcomed in Washington; Secretary Tillerson already said that a freeze at the current
level of capability is unacceptable for the United States. On the other hand, it is clear that
a freeze is the maximal concession North Korea would be willing to make at the moment,
because they do not trust the United States and want to keep the option of quickly
returning to the status quo as soon as they believe Washington is not honoring its
promises. This is the lesson they have learned from the fate of several now dead leaders
in the Middle East, and also how they see the fate of the 1994 Framework Agreement.
Interestingly, Moon also left it open who the, in his words, “relevant countries”
would be to work out a peace treaty. This looks like a nod towards Russia, which
so far is an underutilized factor from a South Korean perspective. But it is certainly
also a claim for South Korean participation which the North has refused to
accept thus far, pointing to the fact that formally, the Republic of Korea was not at war
and did not sign the armistice agreement.

Moon left no doubt over his determination not to surrender the future of Korea
to outside forces. Carefully avoiding the statement that Seoul wants to lead, he
stressed that “his country” must sit in the driver’s seat. This will neither fuel North
Korean concerns over South Korean dominance, nor will it provide substance to the
political opposition’s claims of the president’s alleged appeasement. On the other hand,
it leaves room for interpretation in any direction.

While stressing that active North Korean cooperation would be a prerequisite for any
progress, Moon repeatedly expressed his willingness to respect and accept North
Korea as it is. To make sure the message isn’t missed, he explicitly said that he neither
wishes for North Korea to collapse nor that he will work towards any kind of unification
through absorption. For now, these are only words, of course, but as a signal to both
Koreas they are very meaningful. Moon’s emphasis on an anticipated “return”
to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration was both a
blow at his two conservative predecessors and an olive branch to the North
Koreans who have in their official media stressed these two documents over and over
again. To Moon, “coexistence and co-prosperity” are the name of the game, even
though the latter term might trigger unhappy memories of imperial Japanese plans to
lead East Asia a few decades ago.
Lee Myung-bak in 2008 created outrage in Pyongyang when he offered to raise North
Korea’s GDP to 3,000 USD per capita. This was deliberately misunderstood as a clumsy
attempt at bribing North Koreans into becoming junior partners of South Korea. Moon
Jae-in therefore avoided any specific figures but nevertheless talked at length and
with great detail about the mutual economic benefits from cooperation,
specifically mentioning the energy field and transportation. However, obviously
acknowledging existing economic sanctions, a reopening of Kaesong was not part of his
speech.

Unlike the previous government, Moon stressed the need to separate various
issues from each other and to have humanitarian exchanges independent of
the political climate. Meetings of separated families, joint participation in sports
events including the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, cooperation on the sub-national
level, environmental protection and the improvement of human rights should not
become hostages of international politics. I could not agree more, but wonder how this
resonates in Washington where Congress is working hard at the moment to find a legal
way to ban American tourism to North Korea.
At the end of his speech, President Moon created one of the most visible parallels with
Kim Dae-jung’s Berlin Declaration by offering to meet Chairman Kim Jong Un “at
any time at any place,” but not without adding a somewhat ambiguous legal disclaimer:
“if the conditions are met.” No details on these conditions were provided.

Ruediger Frank 7-10-17, a Professor of East Asian Economy and Society at the
University of Vienna and Head of its Department of East Asian Studies, “Navigating
Difficult Waters: President Moon Jae-in’s Berlin Speech,” July 10, 38 North, retrieved at:
http://www.38north.org/2017/07/rfrank071017/

Conclusion: What is the Message?

As a scholar, I can see how this speech will be used in many university classes as a
textbook example of navigating through an ocean that seems to consist of more cliffs
than water. Moon Jae-in has a goal, but he also knows that he is watched closely and
with suspicion by the North Koreans, the Americans, the Chinese, and his own people,
some of whom expect progress on the inter-Korean front while others fear naivety and
weakness in dealing with a dangerous foe.
Moon is right to stress that Korean unification is a Korean affair, but he is also wise
enough to duly consider the interests of outside forces who, like it or not, can make or
break the future of Korea. South Korean presidents have learned the hard way that they
will get nowhere on North Korea if they act against the United States. China now
emerges as an equally difficult and increasingly assertive factor. While Korea can always
dream about active support from Washington and Beijing, a more modest goal would be
to at least avoid their opposition. This, it seems, was one of the key goals of the speech.
In the end, as often is the case, the most decisive factor for success or failure is North
Korea. President Moon knows that very well and therefore made offers to the North
while repeatedly reassuring Kim Jong Un of his sincere intentions. It now
remains to be seen how this message is received in Pyongyang, which has a long record
of missed opportunities.
 Policies Reading
“STABILITY OR INSTABILITY? The US Response to North Korean Nuclear Weapons,”
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt1ps318b.13.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab6eac4d50
2a8a1e4b50759df7a456f16
“THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT AND SOUTH KOREA’S DETERRENCE
STRATEGY,”
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt1ps318b.12.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab6eac4d50
2a8a1e4b50759df7a456f16
“BETWEEN THE BOMB AND THE UNITED STATES: China Faces the Nuclear North
Korea,”
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt1ps318b.14.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab6eac4d50
2a8a1e4b50759df7a456f16
“CONCLUSION: Deterrence and Beyond,”
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt1ps318b.16.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab6eac4d50
2a8a1e4b50759df7a456f16