G.R. No.
134990 April 27, 2000
MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman,
UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA,
President, CIIF Oil Mills, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a
domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered
into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL),
Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut
Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk
through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are
owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF.
Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement
provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party.
However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF
companies with their new President, respondent Oscar A. Torralba, terminated
the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF companies engaged
the services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime
Corporation.
On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of
ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case
against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the
irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent
Torralba: (a) breach of contract - unilateral cancellation of valid and existing
contract; (b) bad faith - falsification of documents and reports to stop the
operation of MT Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to
disqualify MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e)
double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f) engaged and
entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner
of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only
P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions
of pesos to Cocochem. 1
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of
UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on
the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices.
On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its
finding that —
The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages
which should have been filed in the regular court. This Office
has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the
termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC.
Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over)
which this Office has no jurisdiction. 2
On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied.
The Ombudsman was unswayed in his finding that the present controversy
involved breach of contract as he also took into account the circumstance that
petitioner had already filed a collection case before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila-Br. 15, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-83354. Moreover, the Ombudsman
found that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on 31 March 1998 was
beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days from notice of the assailed
resolution on 19 March 1998. 3
Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent in
dismissing his complaint. He submits that inasmuch as Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG 4 and Republic
5
v.Sandiganbayan have declared that the coconut levy funds are public funds
then, conformably with Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 6 corporations formed and
organized from those funds or whose controlling stocks are from those funds
should be regarded as government owned and/or controlled corporations. As in
the present case, since the funding or controlling interest of the companies
being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the CIIF as shown
in the certification of their Corporate Secretary, 7 it follows that they are
government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily, petitioner
asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleges next that public respondent's conclusion that his complaint
refers to a breach of contract is whimsical, capricious and irresponsible
amounting to a total disregard of its main point, i. e., whether private
respondents violated The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when they
entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corporation which was grossly
disadvantageous to the government in general and to the CIIF in particular.
Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its rules
in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the delay was just a matter of
days and he, a layman not aware of technicalities, personally filed the
complaint.
Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized and
are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are private
individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that they are
not public officers as defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but
are private executives appointed by the Boards of Directors of the CIIF
companies. They asseverate that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
filed through the expert assistance of a learned counsel. They then charge
petitioner with forum shopping since he had similarly filed a case for collection
of a sum of money plus damages before the trial court.
1
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved
the recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the complaint
because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis for the criminal
indictment of private respondents.
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. COCOFED
v. PCGG referred to in Republic v. Sandiganbayan reviewed the history of the
coconut levy funds. These funds actually have four (4) general classes: (a) the
Coconut Investment Fund created under R. A. No. 6260; 8 (b) the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 276; 9 (c) the Coconut
Industry Development Fund created under P. D. No. 582; 10 and, (d) the
Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 1841. 11
The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On 21
October of that year, P. D. No. 961 12 was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was
amended by P. D. No. 1468 13 by inserting a new provision authorizing the use
of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the acquisition of
"shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the
establishment and operation of industries . . . commercial activities and other
allied business undertakings relating to coconut and other palm oil
indust(ries)." 14From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of stock in what
have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were purchased.
We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the
State's police and taxing powers such that the utilization and proper
management thereof were certainly the concern of the Government. These
funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a
government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell within
the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the
ratiocination that —
While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as
a government-owned or controlled corporation, after it was
acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus
shed-off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the
government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform functions
related to government programs and policies on oil, a vital
commodity in the economic life of the nation. It was acquired
not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform
essential government or government-related functions, as the
marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the latter in selling and
distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and maintain
an adequate and stable domestic supply.
But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that
the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are
incomplete without resorting to the definition of "government owned or
controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its
capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies
were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the
shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of
the shares of UNITED COCONUT. 15 Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in
LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and
UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in
this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no
showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike
PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are,
as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its
jurisdiction.
With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other
issues raised by petitioner.
A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive
Secretary v. Gordon 16 is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper
because the cause of action herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before
the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent
Office of the Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of
petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his
motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
XXOOXX
2
 WHEREFORE, finding no merit to [petitioners'] OMNIBUS MOTION TO
DISMISS, the same is hereby DENIED and petitioners are hereby
ordered to submit their answer within ten (10) days from receipt
G.R. No. 125296 July 20, 2006 hereof.6

ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. and WENCESLAO L. MALABANAN, petitioners, xxx xxx xxx
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS),
Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman. There, they raised the same
ROSAURO F. TORRALBA* and CELESTINO BANDALA**, respondents.
issues. Treating the appeal as a motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman
dismissed it on February 22, 1996. He held that petitioners were officers of a
DECISION GOCC, hence, he had jurisdiction over them.7 He also affirmed the Deputy
Ombudsman's ruling that Quimpo was applicable to petitioners' case.
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court addresses the order, petitioners assail the orders dated July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996
issue of whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the of the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman, respectively. They
Ombudsman have jurisdiction over petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and claim that public respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), for discretion in proceeding with the investigation of the case against them
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 30191 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices although they were officers of a private corporation and not "public officers."8
Act).
In support of their petition, petitioners argue that: (1) the Ombudsman's
In February 1989, private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and these do not include
charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA PAL, a private entity created under the general corporation law;
3019. In their complaint, private respondents accused petitioners of using their (2) Quimpo does not apply to the case at bar and (3) RA 3019 only concerns
positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a "public officers," thus, they cannot be investigated or prosecuted under that
corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were law.
shareholders.
We find merit in petitioners' arguments and hold that public respondents do not
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following have the authority to prosecute them for violation of RA 3019.
grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a
private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER GOCCS
application of RA 3019. IS CONFINED ONLY TO THOSE WITH ORIGINAL
CHARTERS
In a resolution dated July 13, 1989,2 the Deputy Ombudsman3 denied
petitioners' omnibus motion to dismiss. The 1987 Constitution states the powers and functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Specifically, Article XI, Section 13(2) provides:
On petitioners' first argument, he ruled that, although PAL was originally
organized as a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
the government through the Government Service Insurance System functions, and duties:
(GSIS).4 Therefore, it became a government-owned or controlled corporation
(GOCC) as enunciated in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan.5
xxx xxx xxx

On the second argument, the Deputy Ombudsman held that petitioners were
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
public officers within the definition of RA 3019, Section 2 (b). Under that
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
provision, public officers included "elective, appointive officials and employees,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the Government."
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
The dispositive portion of the Deputy Ombudsman's order read: performance of duties. (italics supplied)

3
 xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises
jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters.
This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the
officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the
government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains
that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees
could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.
In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission,9 we ruled that the phrase "with
original charter" means "chartered by special law as distinguished from
corporations organized under the Corporation Code." PAL, being originally a
private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general
corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the
Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently,
the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners.
Quimpo Not Applicable
to the Case at Bar
Quimpo10 is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, Felicito Quimpo
charged in 1984 two officers of PETROPHIL in the Tanodbayan (now
Ombudsman) for violation of RA 3019. These officers sought the dismissal of
the case on the ground that the Tanodbayan had no jurisdiction over them as
officers/employees of a private company. The Court declared that the
Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over them because PETROPHIL ceased to be a
private entity when Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired its
shares.
In hindsight, although Quimpo appears, on first impression, relevant to this
case (like PETROPHIL, PAL's shares were also acquired by the government),
closer scrutiny reveals that it is not actually on all fours with the facts here.
In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to "perform functions related
to government programs and policies on oil." 11 The fact that the purpose in
acquiring PETROPHIL was for it to undertake governmental functions related to
oil was decisive in sustaining the Tanodbayan's jurisdiction over it. This was
certainly not the case with PAL. The records indicate that the government
acquired the controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into
equity of its unpaid loans in GSIS. No governmental functions at all were
involved.
Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was
the 1973 Constitution which the Court relied on in concluding that the
Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over PETROPHIL's accused officers. Particularly,
the Court cited Article XIII, Section 6:
SEC. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the
Ombudsman, to be known as the Tanodbayan, which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law,
file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative
case before the proper court or body. (italics supplied)
The term "government-owned or controlled corporations" in the 1973
Constitution was qualified by the 1987 Constitution to refer only to those with
original charters.12
Petitioners, as then Officers of
PAL, were not Public Officers
Neither the 1987 Constitution nor RA 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
defines who "public officers" are. Instead, its varied definitions and concepts
are found in different statutes13 and jurisprudence.14 Usually quoted in our
decisions is Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject. In the 2002 case
of Laurel v. Desierto,15 the Court extensively quoted his exposition on the term
"public officers":
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a
public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the
delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by
contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties,
and the designation of the position as an office.
xxx xxx xxx
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign
functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in
determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from
an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an
office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public; − that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either
legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of
this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16 (italics supplied)
From the foregoing, it can be reasonably inferred that "public officers" are
those endowed with the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial
functions.17 The explication of the term is also consistent with the Court's
pronouncement in Quimpo that, in the case of officers/employees in GOCCs,
4
they are deemed "public officers" if their corporations are tasked to carry out
governmental functions.

In any event, PAL has since reverted to private ownership and we find it
pointless to scrutinize the implications of a legal issue that technically no
longer exists.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Deputy

Ombudsman (Visayas) and Office of the Ombudsman are restrained from
proceeding with the investigation or prosecution of the complaint against
petitioners for violation of RA 3019. Accordingly, their assailed orders of July 13,
1989 and February 22, 1996, respectively, are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

XXOOXX

5

G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ,
HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE
FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J.
LIWAG, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case requires us to determine the extent to which the
Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance in
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his
office and the conditions under which he may do so.
Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any
rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross
neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was
filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect
contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive
suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to
the two proceedings.
The background of this case is as follows:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of
Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an
administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and
grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and
OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.
The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after
an investigation, found no prima facieevidence and accordingly
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the
matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez,
disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor
Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial
Court. 2
Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu
Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate
information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case
was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.
It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the
basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been
committed. 4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she
filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against
Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and
July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action
taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the
directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with
attempted rape. 6
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's
Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey
the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7
For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and
the Provincial Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which
to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and
hearings were thereupon conducted.
It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed
against the two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an
administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and
P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10and another one was a criminal
complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of
the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged
refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the
Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on August 15,
1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor
Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6)
months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to
§24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado
6
M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting
Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of
Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G.
Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and
controverting evidence.
On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the following orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice:
(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders,
referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140,
entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo,
"for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted
Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman
Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and
Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to
explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt
why they should not be punished for indirect
Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for
refusing and failing . . . to file the appropriate
Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo.
(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of
Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the
directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a
charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent
Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of
said Office.
(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-
(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros
Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay.
(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of
Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion
(Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15,
1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the
Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension.
(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting
Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not
necessarily in the order they are stated in the petition.
I.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to
assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the Ombudsman
and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate
public officers or employees and that when the former first took
cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the
exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the Ombudsman's
office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by
filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation
and filing of the information were part and parcel of the preliminary
investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing
of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a
preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the
insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her
office.
In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime
involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this
reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority
to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect
contempt for such refusal.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has
the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include
the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his
official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a
public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public
7
official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A.
No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The
Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act
as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him as herein
provided shall be under his supervision and control.
(Emphasis added)
It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez
and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against
Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had
already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained
to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had
been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his
determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be
subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is
deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and
refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.
II.
The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman,
petitioner refused to file an information for attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the
case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the
power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court
and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt
because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than
judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner
herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case,
of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in
character.
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders
constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process,
order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for
respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is
important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the
Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.
III.
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to
discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave
misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the
Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive
suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
state:
§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may suspend any officer or employee under
his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the
case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman
but not more than six months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the
Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which
case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
8
A.
Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order
was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the
opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any
rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The
contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required,
such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before
he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was
not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting
his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is
the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in
suspending an officer pending his investigation and
before the opportunity to prove his innocence.
(Emphasis added).
It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the
preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against him
should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of
guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking
into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail
petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting
a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court
said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining
authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative
complaint. . . . 19
In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the
preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
on the following grounds:
A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances
of the herein cases and the records pertaining thereto
against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion
that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the
charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant
respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and
herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover,
considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in
openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to
justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful
directives of the Ombudsman as their official position
in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in
print and broadcast media, the probability is strong
that public service more particularly in the
prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office
will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of
said cases even be tampered with if respondents
[Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner]
are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's
Office during the pendency of these proceedings.
Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal
knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of
petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the
administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their
official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The
administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of
the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor
Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to
go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence
of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the
purpose of placing them under preventive suspension.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor
toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their
preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper
prosecution of that case may not be hampered. 20 In addition, because
the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct,
insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can
lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in
ordering their preventive suspension.
9
B.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months
without pay and contends that it should only be for ninety (90) days on
the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is
referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the
period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first
situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —
To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite
suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep.
Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best
for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set
forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension
under the aforementioned laws, as follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act
3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum
period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof,
and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in
Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged
under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres.
Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees
whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as
provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree
807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of
ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is
delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to
the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of delay shall both be counted
in computing the period of suspension herein stated;
provided that if the person suspended is a presidential
appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be
for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the
case may warrant.
On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were
placed under preventive suspension pursuant to §24 of the
Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their
preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according
to law.
C.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should
first be resolved before any action in the administrative complaint case
can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial
question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases
arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand,
or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will
not really matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion
to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on
the matter of the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend
petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which petitioner assails
in the case at bar.
It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the
provisions of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly
grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman. Conveniently, we
would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such
authority to suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive
of judicial legislation. But I will go a little further by essaying the
rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the
Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension,vis-a-vis the
provisions on preventive suspension in other enactments, and thereby
dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.
It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive
suspension of only ninety (90) days. 1However, a comparison of the
grounds therefor 2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman Act 3 will
readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the
evidence of guilt is strong and the additional ground that "the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
10
against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service
Decree, preventive suspension may be imposed on the mere simple
showing that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons
to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service: whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6770, it is required thatsuch charges must be supported by strong
evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed
in the Local Government Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for
the preventive suspension of local elective officials is justifiable and
deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected
by the people, but more precisely because such preventive suspension
may only be ordered "after the issues are joined." That means that
before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary
requirements and exchanges had been completed and the respondent
had already filed his counter-affidavits to the affidavits of the
complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready
for resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.
The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly
necessitate and consume a lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those
preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of preventive
suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive
suspension by the Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24
of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably include the service of
thesubpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits,
the usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the
same, the improvident recourse to the Supreme Court to suspend,
annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the
inhibition of the investigating officer, the denial of which motions is
often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions for certiorari.
An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such
procedural maneuvers is afforded by the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs.
Flavier, et al., 5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated by
this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned
through repeated resourceful submissions the order of preventive
suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January 7, 1992 and it took
more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be
reviewed on the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.
That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents
can easily resort to the same dilatory tactics usually employed by an
accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such stratagems can
obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his
office and, in the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed
against him."
The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under
Republic Act No. 6770 was evidently induced by a desire to more
meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve
as a deterrent against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct
on their part. As the agency mandated by the Constitution to
undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority
to enable it to perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible
from the pertinent constitutional provisions creating said office and
from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is
the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by
impeachment. 6
For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the
issue subject of this concurring opinion, it would be advisable to recall
what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:
The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. Such being the case, said statute,
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure,
should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objective of the
Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the
work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for
Department of which it was created (Cf. Department
of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, Co., 200
Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v.
Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).
On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial
and legislative experience, it is puerile for petitioner to impugn the
expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted by law to
the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable
period may even prove too short to subserve the intended purpose of
the law.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on
the matter of the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend
11
petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which petitioner assails
in the case at bar.
It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the
provisions of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly
grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman. Conveniently, we
would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such
authority to suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive
of judicial legislation. But I will go a little further by essaying the
rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the
Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension,vis-a-vis the
provisions on preventive suspension in other enactments, and thereby
dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.
It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive
suspension of only ninety (90) days. 1However, a comparison of the
grounds therefor 2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman Act 3 will
readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the
evidence of guilt is strong and the additional ground that "the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service
Decree, preventive suspension may be imposed on the mere simple
showing that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons
to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service: whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6770, it is required thatsuch charges must be supported by strong
evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed
in the Local Government Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for
the preventive suspension of local elective officials is justifiable and
deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected
by the people, but more precisely because such preventive suspension
may only be ordered "after the issues are joined." That means that
before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary
requirements and exchanges had been completed and the respondent
had already filed his counter-affidavits to the affidavits of the
complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready
for resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.
The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly
necessitate and consume a lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those
preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of preventive
suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive
suspension by the Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24
of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably include the service of
thesubpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits,
the usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the
same, the improvident recourse to the Supreme Court to suspend,
annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the
inhibition of the investigating officer, the denial of which motions is
often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions for certiorari.
An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such
procedural maneuvers is afforded by the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs.
Flavier, et al., 5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated by
this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned
through repeated resourceful submissions the order of preventive
suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January 7, 1992 and it took
more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be
reviewed on the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.
That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents
can easily resort to the same dilatory tactics usually employed by an
accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such stratagems can
obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his
office and, in the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed
against him."
The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under
Republic Act No. 6770 was evidently induced by a desire to more
meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve
as a deterrent against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct
on their part. As the agency mandated by the Constitution to
undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority
to enable it to perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible
from the pertinent constitutional provisions creating said office and
from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is
the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by
impeachment. 6
For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the
issue subject of this concurring opinion, it would be advisable to recall
what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:
The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. Such being the case, said statute,
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure,
should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objective of the
Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the
work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for
Department of which it was created (Cf. Department
of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, Co., 200
12
 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v.
Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).

On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial

and legislative experience, it is puerile for petitioner to impugn the
expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted by law to
the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable
period may even prove too short to subserve the intended purpose of
the law.

XXOOXX

13

G.R. No. 133715 February 23, 2000
DOUGLAS R. VILLAVERT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Region
VII, Cebu City, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Sec. 27 of RA 67701(The Ombudsman Act of 1989), seeking the
annulment of the Memorandum2 of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas dated 17
July 1997, in Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088, approved by the
Ombudsman, which recommended the dismissal of petitioner from the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Cebu, as well as the Order 3 dated
30 January 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu
Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets
withdrawn by him, which are already considered sold. As Villavert is not
expected to sell all withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to
consign tickets to ticket outlets and/or to engage the help of sales agents,
usually sidewalk peddlers and hawkers.
From 20 March to 12 June 1994, or for two (2) months of weekly draws,
petitioner Villavert incurred a total of P997,373.60 worth of unpaid PCSO
tickets. On 13 October 1994 he wrote the Chairman and Acting General
Manager of PCSO, Manuel L. Morato, proposing to settle his unpaid ticket
accounts.4 His proposal involved the payment of P50,000.00 in cash as down
payment; payment of the remaining amount in equal monthly installments of
P5,000.00; application of all his per diems and commissions to his account as
they became due; and, sale of fifty (50) booklets or more per draws.5
On 11 January 1995 Lorna H. Muñez, COA State Auditor III, wrote petitioner
demanding the immediate settlement of the latter's past due ticket accounts
with PCSO in the total amount of P997,373.60 with interest at the rate of
fourteen percent (14%) per annum. Muñez also required petitioner to submit
within seventy-two (72) hours a written explanation for the delay.6 In response,
petitioner informed Muñez that he had already submitted a proposal for the
settlement of his past due accounts and that pending its approval he had
already made a total payment of P23,920.68.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995 the PCSO Board of Directors 7 approved
Resolution No. 059, Series of 1995, which adopted the recommendation of the
Management Committee to reinstate sales supervisors Rene de Guia and Luis
Renolla, Jr., and rehabilitate their accounts. By reason of the Resolution, OIC
Manager of the Sales Department, Carlos M. Castillo, requested Chairman
Morato to give petitioner the same terms and conditions given to de Guia and
Renolla, Jr.
On 20 February 1995 Santos M. Alquizalas, COA Director IV, recommended to
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo C. Mojica that the shortage in
the ticket accounts of petitioner should be properly treated under Art. 217 8 of
the Revised Penal Code, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, 9 and RA 6713.10 Taken as a letter-
complaint, it was docketed as Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088.
On 27 February 1995 petitioner submitted an amended proposal of settlement
for his accounts: a down payment of ten percent (10%) of the total unpaid
account or P97,345.29, and the balance to be paid on equal monthly
installments equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the down payment or
P9,734.52. Petitioner likewise bound himself from then on to purchase all his
tickets in cash; to have a ticket quota of no less than fifty (50) booklets for the
small draws, and twenty-five (25) booklets for the big draws; and, not to be
entitled to his salary for the month if he failed to meet his quota in any draw
within that month. The amended proposal was favorably indorsed and
recommended for approval by Regional Manager of PCSO-Cebu, William H.
Medici, and by PCSO OIC-Manager of the Sales Department, Carlos M. Castillo.11
On 19 April 1995 petitioner filed his counter-affidavit where he explained the
circumstances which led him to incur subject unpaid ticket accounts. He
emphasized his proposal to settle his liability and underscored the favorable
indorsement of the Regional Manager of PCSO-Cebu as well as by the PCSO
OIC-Manager of the Sales Department.12
On 4 June 1996 petitioner filed a Manifestation13 with respondent Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas informing the latter of the approval by PCSO Chairman
and Acting General Manager of his amended proposal for settlement. However,
in an Order dated 14 August 1996 respondent Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas
required petitioner to secure further approval from the PCSO Board of
Directors.14
In compliance, petitioner submitted inter alia a copy of the Affidavit of
Desistance15 executed by the Regional Director of PCSO-Cebu manifesting the
disinterest of the PCSO in further prosecuting the case against petitioner. On 20
December 1996 the PCSO Board of Directors approved petitioner's proposed
settlement of 13 October 1994 in its Resolution No. 1491, Series of 1996.16
Graft Investigation Officer II Edgemelo C. Rosales, after due consideration of
the evidence submitted by petitioner, rendered a resolution recommending the
dismissal of Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088 in view of: (a) the approval
of petitioner's proposal of settlement by the PCSO Chairman-Acting General
Manager; (b) the findings that petitioner did not mismanage his responsibilities
in the sale of sweepstakes tickets; and, (c) the Affidavit of Desistance executed
by the PCSO through its authorized representative. Despite the
14
recommendation, however, the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas through Director SO ORDERED.
Virginia Palanca-Santiago issued a Memorandum dated 17 July 1997 finding
petitioner "liable for administrative sanction for Grave Misconduct and/or Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Dishonesty." Consequently, petitioner was recommended for dismissal from the Buena, J., is on leave.
public service with all the accessory penalties provided under Memorandum
Circular No. 30, Series of 1989, of the Civil Service Commission.17 On 7
November 1997 respondent Ombudsman approved the Memorandum. On 4 XXOOXX
December 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas in an Order dated 30 January 1998 and
approved by the Ombudsman on 3 April 1998. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA
6770.

This petition for review was filed on 18 June 1998. Thereafter, on 16 September
1998 we promulgated Fabian v.Desierto18 where the basis for the filing of this
petition before this Court, i.e., Sec. 27, RA 6770,19 insofar as it allows appeals to
the Supreme Court in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared invalid,
thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction.

In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases,
was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the
Constitution20 against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as
reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.21

In both Fabian and Namuhe, the petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals
for final disposition and considered as petitions for review under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On 9 February 1999 this Court promulgated A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC thus —

In light of the decision in Fabian v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 129742, 16

September 1998), any appeal by way of petition for review from a
decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision,
resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999shall no
longer be referred to the Court of Appeals but must be forthwith
DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively.

As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, its referral for final
disposition to the Court of Appeals is still in order.

ACCORDINGLY, let this case be REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a petition

for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to be disposed of
in accordance with law.1âwphi1.nêt

15

G.R. No. 159747 April 13, 2004
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,
vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F. DACANAY,
EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.),
CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO MATILLANO, and HON.
OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in
part:
… 5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in
2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat
was indeed committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood on
the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan, II …
3. …
4. The said crime was committed as follows:
4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San
Juan, Metro Manila, a meeting was held and presided by Senator
Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the affidavit of Perfecto Ragil
and made an integral part of this complaint.
… 9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the
4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo
Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on nation television,
stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of
the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve
the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they
believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. .
. . (Emphasis supplied).
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director
Matillano is quoted verbatim, to wit:
1. That I am a member of the Communication –Electronics and
Information Systems Services, Armed Forces of the Philippines with the
rank of Major;
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security
Guard (PSG) during our Very Important Person (VIP) Protection Course
sometime in last week of March 2003;
3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of the
pamphlet of the National Recovery Program (NRP) and told me that:
"Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya mo na walang bahid ng
corruption kaya basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took the
pamphlet but never had the time to read it;
4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano
invited me to join him in a meeting where the NRP would be discussed
and that there would be a special guest;
the evening of June 4, 2003 in a house located somewhere in San Juan,
Metro Manila;
6. That upon arrival we were given a document consisting of about 3-4
pages containing discussion of issues and concerns within the
framework of NRP and we were likewise served with dinner;
7. That while we were still having dinner at about past 11 o'clock in the
evening, Sen. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan arrived together with another
fellow who was later introduced as Capt. Turingan;
8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting proper
started presided by Sen. Honasan;
government including the military institution, the judiciary, the
executive branch and the like;
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and
armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP. At this point, I raised the
argument that it is my belief that reforms will be achieved through the
democratic processes and not thru force and violence and/or armed
16
struggle. Sen. Honasan countered that "we will never achieve reforms
through the democratic processes because the people who are in power
will not give up their positions as they have their vested interests to
protect." After a few more exchanges of views, Sen. Honasan appeared
irritated and asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then
asked whether all those present numbering 30 people, more or less, are
really committed, Sen. Honasan replied: "Kung kaya nating pumatay sa
ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang
magtataksil." I decided not to pursue further questions;
11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action
to achieve the goals of NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under
the present leadership thru armed revolution and after which, a junta
will be constituted and that junta will run the new government. He
further said that some of us will resign from the military service and
occupy civilian positions in the new government. He also said that there
is urgency that we implement this plan and that we would be notified of
the next activities.
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the
rites that we were to undergo-some sort of "blood compact". He read a
prayer that sounded more like a pledge and we all recited it with raised
arms and clenched fists. He then took a knife and demonstrated how to
make a cut on the left upper inner arm until it bleeds. The cut was in
form of the letter "I" in the old alphabet but was done in a way that it
actually looked like letter "H". Then, he pressed his right thumb against
the blood and pressed the thumb on the lower middle portion of the
copy of the Prayer. He then covered his thumb mark in blood with tape.
He then pressed the cut on his left arm against the NRP flag and left
mark of letter "I" on it. Everybody else followed;
13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner
arm and pricked a portion of it to let it bleed and I followed what
Senator HONASAN did;
14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my
life with what Senator HONASAN said that "…kaya nating pumatay ng
kasamahan";
15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the
place;
16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra
cautious that he would not notice it for fear of my life due to the threat
made by Senator HONASAN during the meeting on June 4, 2003 and the
information relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their group had
already deeply established their network inside the intelligence
community;
17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came
to see me to return the rifle that he borrowed and told me that when
the group arrives at the Malacañang Compound for "D-DAY", my task is
to switch off the telephone PABX that serves the Malacañang complex. I
told him that I could not do it. No further conversation ensued and he
left;
18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw
flashed on the screen Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo
Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during
the June 4th meeting that I attended, having a press conference about
their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw that the letter "I" on
the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner which
was displayed and on which we pressed our wound to leave the imprint
of the letter "I";
19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity
of the foregoing and in order to charge SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO"
HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN, Capt. GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO
TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others for violation of Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of "coup d'etat".
(Emphasis supplied)
The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity)
sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ.
He filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case,
asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction
to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge
be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally
take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the group of public
officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that the proceedings be suspended
until final resolution of his motion.
Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner
filed a reply.
On September 10, 2003, the DOJ Panel issued an Order, to wit:
On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through
counsel a "Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction". On September 1, 2003,
complainant filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion.
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be
passed upon in the resolution of this case.
In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional
17
 affidavits/evidence and to afford respondents ample opportunity to
controvert the same, respondents, thru counsel are hereby directed to
file their respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on or
before September 23, 2003.1
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its
members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in
issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on the ground that the
DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representation of
respondents DOJ Panel, and Director Matillano submitted their respective
comments.
The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues:
1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the charge
of coup d'etat against petitioner;
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989;
and
3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave
abuse of discretion in deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion
to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim of the petitioner that the DOJ
Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
The arguments of petitioner are:
1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation over all public officials, including petitioner.
2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary
investigation involving Honasan.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority
since OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative
of the Constitution, beyond the powers granted to the Ombudsman by
R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of publication, hence null and
void.
4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office,
it is the Office of the Ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of
petitioner's Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction since the issue involved therein
is determinative of the validity of the preliminary investigation.
6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's
Motion in the guise of directing him to submit Counter-Affidavit and yet
refused and/or failed to perform its duties to resolve petitioner's Motion
stating its legal and factual bases.
The arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:
1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on
petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as
amended by P.D. No. 1513.
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately
related to his public office as a Senator. The factual allegations in the
complaint and the supporting affidavits are bereft of the requisite nexus
between petitioner's office and the acts complained of.
3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular, as a ground to question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the
complaint below, is misplaced. The jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory
grant under the Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from any
provision of the joint circular which embodies the guidelines governing
the authority of both the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation on offenses charged in relation to
public office.
4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion
to clarify jurisdiction which, for all intents and purposes, is actually a
motion to dismiss that is a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ Panel is not
required to act or even recognize it since a preliminary investigation is
required solely for the purpose of determining whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. The DOJ panel did not outrightly reject the
motion of petitioner but ruled to pass upon the same in the
determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not violated any law or
rule or any norm of discretion.
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are:
1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct
18
 preliminary investigation over the petitioner for the reason that the
crime of coup d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) may fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the
same is committed "in relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to
Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No.
8249.
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to
conduct preliminary investigation over cases involving public officers
solely from the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is misplaced because
the DOJ's concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases involving public officials has been recognized
in Sanchez vs. Demetriou (227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ
cannot be deputized by the Ombudsman en masse but must be given in
reference to specific cases has no factual or legal basis. There is no rule
or law which requires the Ombudsman to write out individualized
authorities to deputize prosecutors on a per case basis. The power of
the Ombudsman to deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the
Constitutional grant of power to request assistance from any
government agency necessary to discharge its functions, as well as
from the statutory authority to so deputize said DOJ prosecutors under
Sec. 31 of RA 6770.
4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ
and the Office of the Ombudsman need not be published since it
neither contains a penal provision nor does it prescribe a mandatory act
or prohibit any under pain or penalty. It does not regulate the conduct
of persons or the public, in general.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ
Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under
Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to
provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be both
its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; …
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following powers and functions:
…
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders
and administer the probation and correction system; (Emphasis
supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision
and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and
established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution
Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's
Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases
involving violations of penal laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction
to conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner
rationalizes that the 1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2
The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
19
 act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive
conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the
same Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
…. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of
the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8,
1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, to wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the
Ombudsman charging any public officer or employee including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission
alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman
case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative
proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman
cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two
classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
(2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The difference between the two, aside from the category of the
courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate
as distinguished from the authority to prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation
on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator
or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any
Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their
regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of
the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the
regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined
above. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction
between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative
agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly
differentiated the authority to investigate cases from the authority to prosecute
cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the nature or extent of
the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed
to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act
which specifically provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state
prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court.
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in
1990, the Court expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show
that the power of investigation including preliminary investigation
vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.3
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of
the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include
the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their
20
 assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies
of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation
in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied)
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo,5 pronounced that
the Ombudsman, under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution,
has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official,
elucidating thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power,
function and duty to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any
act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The
Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this
case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public
official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law
does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public
official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution
and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate
said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the
prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official
pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was
deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of
whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or
arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16,
R.A. 6770).
.........
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the
Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring public officials
would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of
minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of
public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that
spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the
investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless,
and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.6
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in
the Cojuangco, Jr. case and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more
apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of
the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,7 that while it may be true that
the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is
merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1)
of RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of
any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case
of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,8 this authority "is not an exclusive authority
but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information
filed in this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not
disputed that the information and amended information here did not
have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that
such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA
545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public
official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however,
be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official"
(191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the
office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any
adverse legal consequence upon the authority of the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as
the Department of Justice in connection with the charge of
21
 sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the
investigation.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor
contended that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged
Murder, the Court held:
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases,
namely Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou. However,
by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the
legislation relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the
Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases
cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with
reference to the subject matter, has been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree
No. 1486, -- the first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No.
1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres.
Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861
reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
...
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law
is higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must
concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the
public officer must be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed
be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or
a fine of P6,000.00.11
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second
requirement has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of
these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would
reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees must
be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No.
1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement
before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to
investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari
materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as
earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is
dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same
person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or
object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be
interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to
form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and
interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No.
1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed
that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in
mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In
the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in
accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No.
1861.12 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan
Law (P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those
enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or
employees in relation to their office.
22
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public
officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government
investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However,
the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws
but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take
over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective
heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the
proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their
investigations, to wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
Series of 1995
TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS,
PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE
PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION,
PREPARATION OF RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS AND
PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND
THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----x
In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest
pronouncement of the supreme court on the extent to which the
ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance
in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his
office and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was
Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise known as "an act to strengthen the
functional and structural organization of the sandiganbayan, amending
for the purpose presidential decree no. 1606, as amended" and its
implications on the jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman on
criminal offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused
by discussions on jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
and the department of justice, and by procedural conflicts in the filing
of complaints against public officers and employees, the conduct of
preliminary investigations, the preparation of resolutions and
informations, and the prosecution of cases by provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants as deputized prosecutors of the
ombudsman.
Recognizing the concerns, the office of the ombudsman and the
department of justice, in a series of consultations, have agreed on the
following guidelines to be observed in the investigation and prosecution
of cases against public officers and employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by
public officers and employees in relation to office whether cognizable
by the sandiganbayan or the regular courts, and whether filed with the
office of the ombudsman or with the office of the provincial/city
prosecutor shall be under the control and supervision of the office of
the ombudsman.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds
reason to believe otherwise, offenses not in relation to office and
cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted
by the office of the provincial/city prosecutor, which shall rule thereon
with finality.
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the
investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation.
Resolutions recommending prosecution together with the duly
accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the
appropriate approving authority.
4. Considering that the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over
public officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all
investigations and prosecutions of cases involving public officers and
employees, the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall submit to
the office of the ombudsman a monthly list of complaints filed with their
respective offices against public officers and employees.
Manila, Philippines, October 5, 1995.
23
 (signed) (signed)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
Secretary Ombudsman
Department of Justice Office of the Ombudsman
A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent
Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and
the DOJ.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on
Preliminary Investigation, effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations-
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall
include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information, He shall certify under oath
in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized
officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal
of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of
the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of
offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties
of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the
complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by
himself file the information against the respondent, or direct another
assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting
another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department
of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice
reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall
apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the
Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary
investigation of criminal complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by
the proper court within their respective territorial jurisdictions, including those
offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; but
with the qualification that in offenses falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit
the records and their resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for
appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot dismiss the complaint without
the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can the
prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized
by, and without prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Next, petitioner contends that under OMB-Joint Circular No. 95-001, there is no
showing that the Office of the Ombudsman has deputized the prosecutors of the
DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charge filed against him.
We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the
Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation
on charges filed against public officers and employees.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may be
24
exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their
assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel
need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority
to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the
commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised
Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being
contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the
conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction
to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.14
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade
31 so that the case against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner
holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel
the authority to investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him.

Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on
the ground that it was not published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt
the Ombudsman's dissertation on the matter, to wit:
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a
proper reading and application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001, an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the
Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is
one of those enumerated in the Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the present
petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by
the DOJ Panel as to the questions whether or not probable cause exists to
warrant the filing of the information against the petitioner; and to which court
should the information be filed considering the presence of other respondents in
the subject complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in
the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only
circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation SO ORDERED.
should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
especially its penal provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
published and the people officially and specifically informed of said Puno, J., joins J. Ynares-Santiago.
contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been Vitug, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent.
contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
any, under pain or penalty. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.

What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986),
the Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular
between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority
and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of
the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Preliminary investigation is an initial step in the indictment of an accused; it is a
substantive right, not merely a formal or a technical requirement, 1 which an
accused can avail himself of in full measure. Thus, an accused is entitled to
rightly assail the conduct of an investigation that does not accord with the law.
He may also question the jurisdiction or the authority of the person or agency
conducting that investigation and, if bereft of such jurisdiction or authority, to
demand that it be undertaken strictly in conformity with the legal prescription.2
25
The Ombudsman is empowered3 to, among other things, investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may, at any stage, take over from any agency of Government the
investigation of such cases. This statutory provision, by and large, is a
restatement of the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to
investigate and prosecute "any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal x x
x."4
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, in taking
cognizance of the preliminary investigation on charges of coup d'etat against
petitioner Gregorio Honasan, relies on OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001. That joint
circular must be understood as being merely a working arrangement between
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that
must not be meant to be such a blanket delegation to the DOJ as to generally
allow it to conduct preliminary investigation over any case cognizable by the
OMB.
While Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6770 states that the Ombudsman may
"designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases," the provision cannot be assumed, however,
to be an undefined and broad entrustment of authority. If it were otherwise, it
would be unable to either withstand the weight of burden to be within
constitutional parameters or the proscription against undue delegation of
powers. The deputized fiscal, state prosecutor or government lawyer must in
each instance be named; the case to which the deputized official is assigned
must be specified; and the investigation must be conducted under the
supervision and control of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman remains to have
the basic responsibility, direct or incidental, in the investigation and prosecution
of such cases.
The Sandiganbayan law5 grants to the Sandiganbayan exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, committed by the public officials, including members of Congress, in
relation to their office. The crime of coup d'etat, with which petitioner, a
member of the Senate, has been charged, is said to be closely linked to his
"National Recovery Program," a publication which encapsules the bills and
resolutions authored or sponsored by him on the senate floor. I see the charge
as being then related to and bearing on his official function.
On the above score, I vote to grant the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The first question to answer is which court has jurisdiction to try a Senator who
is accused of coup d'etat. Behind the simple issue is a more salient question -
Should this Court allow an all too restrictive and limiting interpretation of the
law rather than take a more judicious approach of interpreting the law by the
spirit, which vivifies, and not by the letter, which killeth?
The elemental thrust of the Majority view is that the Department of
Justice (DOJ), not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the jurisdiction to
investigate the petitioner, a Senator, for the crime of coup
d'etat pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249 (Sandiganbayan Law). The Majority
maintains that since the crime for which petitioner is charged falls
under Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law, it is
imperative to show that petitioner committed the offense in relation
to his office as Senator. It reasoned that since petitioner committed the
felonious acts, as alleged in the complaint, not in connection with or in
relation to his public office, it is the DOJ, and not the Office of the
Ombudsman, which is legally tasked to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
In light of the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the instant case and
in consideration of the policies relied upon by the Majority, specifically,
the Sandiganbayan Law and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989), I submit that the posture taken by the Majority seriously
deviates from and renders nugatory the very intent for which the laws
were enacted.
The crime of coup d'etat, if committed by members of Congress or by a
public officer with a salary grade above 27, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27"
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
26
 x x x x x x x x x.
In the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,1 we clarified the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Presidential Decree ("PD") No.
1606, as amended by Republic Act ("RA") Nos. 7975 and 8249, and made the
following definitive pronouncements:
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged
with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised
Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not
paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b
pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their
office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to
include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to
the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or
rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers
or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make
any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer
as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions
of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the
public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
As worded, the Sandiganbayan Law requires that for a felony, coup d'etat in this
case, to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, two
requisites must concur, namely: (1) that the public officer or employee occupies
the position corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher; and (2) that the crime
is committed by the public officer or employee in relation to his office. Applying
the law to the case at bar, the Majority found that although the first requirement
has been met, the second requirement is wanting. I disagree.
Following its definition, coup d'etat can only be committed by members of the
military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or without
civilian support. Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 134-A. Coup d'etat. – How committed. – The crime of coup
d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communications network, public utilities or other facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or
simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or
persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office
or employment, with or without civilian support or participation for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.
A coup consists mainly of the military personnel and public officers and
employees seizing the controlling levers of the state, which is then used to
displace the government from its control of the remainder. As defined, it is a
swift attack directed against the duly constituted authorities or vital facilities
and installations to seize state power. It is therefore inherent in coup d'etat that
the crime be committed "in relation to" the office of a public officer or
employee. The violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth which are
inherent in the crime can only be accomplished by those who possess a degree
of trust reposed on such person in that position by the Republic of the
Philippines. It is by exploiting this trust that the swift attack can be made. Since
the perpetrators take advantage of their official positions, it follows that coup
d'etat can be committed only through acts directly or intimately related to the
performance of official functions, and the same need not be proved since it
inheres in the very nature of the crime itself.
It is contended by public respondent that the crime of coup d'etat cannot be
committed "in relation" to petitioner's office, since the performance of
legislative functions does not include its commission as part of the job
description. To accommodate this reasoning would be to render erroneous this
Court's ruling in People v. Montejo2 that "although public office is not an element
of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show
that ". . . the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the
accuseds'] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions." Simply
put, if murder can be committed in the performance of official
functions, so can the crime of coup d'etat.
The Ombudsman is wrong when he says that legislative function is only "to
make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The growing complexity of our
society and governmental structure has so revolutionized the powers and duties
of the legislative body such that its members are no longer confined to making
laws. They can perform such other functions, which are, strictly speaking, not
within the ambit of the traditional legislative powers, for instance, to canvass
presidential elections, give concurrence to treaties, to propose constitutional
amendments as well as oversight functions. As an incident thereto and in
pursuance thereof, members of Congress may deliver privilege speeches,
interpellations, or simply inform and educate the public in respect to certain
proposed legislative measures.
The complaint alleges that the meeting on June 4, 2003 of the alleged coup
plotters involved a discussion on the issues and concerns within the framework
of the National Recovery Program (NRP), a bill which petitioner authored in the
Senate. The act of the petitioner in ventilating the ails of the society and
extolling the merits of the NRP is part of his duties as legislator not only to
inform the public of his legislative measures but also, as a component of the
national leadership, to find answers to the many problems of our society. One
can see therefore that Senator Honasan's acts were "in relation to his office."
It is true that not every crime committed by a high-ranking public officer falls
27
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is also true
that there is no public office or employment that includes the commission of a
crime as part of its job description. However, to follow this latter argument
would mean that there would be no crime falling under Section 4, paragraph (b)
PD No. 1606, as amended. This would be an undue truncation of the
Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction and contrary to the plain
language of the provision.
Only by a reasonable interpretation of the scope and breadth of the term
"offense committed in relation to [an accused's] office" in light of the broad
powers and functions of the office of Senator, can we subserve the very purpose
for which the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman were created.
The raison d' etre for the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution and for the grant of its broad investigative authority, is to insulate
said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate
judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence,
quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances, and misfeasances
committed by public officers.3
In similar vein, the Constitution provides for the creation of the Sandiganbayan
to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees. It is a special court that tries cases involving public officers and
employees that fall within specific salary levels. Thus, section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law makes it a requirement that for offenses to fall under the
exlusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the public officer involved must
occupy a position equivalent to Salary Grade 27 or higher. This salary grade
requirement is not a product of whim or an empty expression of fancy, but a
way to ensure that offenses which spring from official abuse will be tried by a
judicial body insulated from official pressure and unsusceptible to the
blandishments, influence and intimidation from those who seek to subvert the
ends of justice.
If we were to give our assent to respondent's restrictive interpretation of the
term "in relation to his office," we would be creating an awkward situation
wherein a powerful member of Congress will be investigated by the DOJ which is
an adjunct of the executive department, and tried by a regular court which is
much vulnerable to outside pressure. Contrarily, a more liberal approach would
bring the case to be investigated and tried by specialized Constitutional bodies
and, thus ensure the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Second, the "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation of an offense within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan operates as a mandate on the Office of the
Ombudsman, especially when the person under investigation is a member of
Congress. The Ombudsman's refusal to exercise such authority, relegating the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2003-1120 to the respondent
Investigating Panel appointed by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") under DOJ
Department Order No. 279, s. 2003, is a dereliction of a duty imposed by no less
than the Constitution.
Insofar as the investigation of said crimes is concerned, I submit that the same
belongs to the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. R.A. No. 6770 or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to conduct the
investigation of cases involving illegal acts or omissions committed by any
public officer or employee. Section 15, paragraph (1) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 provides:
SECTION 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases; x x x.4
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan,5 the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman to conduct investigations was described as:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining
the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.
The "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan was reiterated in Laurel v. Desierto:6
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman
28
 of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature
to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.
"Primary Jurisdiction" usually refers to cases involving specialized disputes
where the practice is to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence in observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court has
said that it cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the question
is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. 7 The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising
in the proceeding before the court."8 It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.9
Where the concurrent authority is vested in both the Department of Justice and
the Office of the Ombudsman, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should
operate to restrain the Department of Justice from exercising its investigative
authority if the case will likely be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In such
cases, the Office of the Ombudsman should be the proper agency to conduct
the preliminary investigation over such an offense, it being vested with the
specialized competence and undoubted probity to conduct the investigation.
The urgent need to follow the doctrine is more heightened in this case where
the accused is a member of Congress. The DOJ is under the supervision and
control of the Office of the President; in effect, therefore, the investigation
would be conducted by the executive over a member of a co-equal branch of
government. It is precisely for this reason that the independent constitutional
Office of the Ombudsman should conduct the preliminary investigation. Senator
Honasan is a member of the political opposition. His right to a preliminary
investigation by a fair and uninfluenced body is sacred and should not be
denied. As we stated in the Uy case:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman.
In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the
Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring accountability n public office. A review
of the development of our Ombudsman laws reveals this intent.
These pronouncements are in harmony with the constitutional mandate of he
Office of the Ombudsman, as expressed in Article XI of the Constitution.
SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any agency,
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the actions taken and the result thereof. (Underscoring
supplied.)
SECTION 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. x x
x.
Coupled with these provisions, Section 13 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
provides:
SECTION 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies,
as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government,
or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people. (Underscoring supplied)
The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 both mention, unequivocally,
that the Office of the Ombudsman has the duty and mandate to act on the
complaints filed against officers or employees of the Government. It is
imperative that this duty be exercised in order to make real the role of the
Office of the Ombudsman as a defender of the people's interest specially in
cases like these which have partisan political taint.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
29
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons:
(1) it evades the consequence of the statutory definition of the crime of coup
d'etat; (2) it violates the principle of stare decisis without a clear explanation
why the established doctrine has to be re-examined and reversed; and (3) it
trivializes the importance of two constitutional offices – the Ombudsman and the
Senate – and in the process, petitioner's right to due process has been impaired.
I 5. The crime of coup d'etat was committed on 27 July 2003 by military
It is an established principle that an act no matter how offensive, destructive, or
reprehensible, is not a crime unless it is defined, prohibited, and punished by
law. The prosecution and punishment of any criminal offense are necessarily
circumscribed by the specific provision of law which defines it.
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code defines coup d'etat, thus:
"Article 134-A. Coup d'etat. – How committed. – The crime of coup
d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
communications networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or
simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or
persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office
or employment with or without civilian support or participation for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state power."
There is no question that Senator Honasan, herein petitioner, holds a high public
office. If he is charged with coup d'etat, it has to be in his capacity as a public
officer committing the alleged offense in relation to his public office.
The complaint filed with the Department of Justice alleges the events
supposedly constituting the crime of coup d'etat, thus:
1. On 04 June 2003, Senator Honasan presided over a meeting held
"somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila."
2. After dinner, Senator Honasan, as presiding officer, "discussed the
NRP (National Recovery Program), the graft and corruption in the
government, including the military institutions, the judiciary, the
executive department, and the like."
3. "The discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and
armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP. x x x Senator Honasan
countered that 'we will never achieve reforms through the democratic
processes because the people who are in power will not give up their
positions as they have their vested interests to protect.' x x x Senator
Honasan replied 'kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban,
kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.' x x x."
4. In the course of the meeting, Senator Honasan presented the plan of
action to achieve the goals of the NRP, i.e., overthrow of the
government under the present leadership thru armed revolution and
after which, a junta will be constituted to run the new government.
personnel who occupied Oakwood. Senator Honasan and various
military officers, one member of his staff, and several John Does and
Jane Does were involved in the Oakwood incident.
The above allegations determine whether or not petitioner committed the
alleged crime as a public officer "in relation to his office." If it was in relation to
his office, the crime falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It is the Ombudsman who has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute the complaint for coup d'etat, thus:
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as follows:
"SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensations and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 67 58), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers , assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
30
 (c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified
as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade '27' or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986."
Section 15 of Republic Act 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
"1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of such cases; x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above provisions, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
is the official position or rank of the offender, that is, whether he is one of those
public officers enumerated therein.
Petitioner, being a Senator, occupies a government position higher than Grade
27 of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. In fact, he holds
the third highest position and rank in the Government. At the apex, the
President stands alone. At the second level, we have the Vice-President,
Speaker of the House, Senate President and Chief Justice. Clearly, he is
embraced in the above provisions.
Following the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," it is the Ombudsman who should
conduct the preliminary investigation of the charge of coup d'etat against
petitioner. The DOJ should refrain from exercising such function.
The crux of the jurisdiction of the DOJ lies in the meaning of "in relation to their
office."
The respondents start their discussion of "in relation to public office" with a
peculiar presentation. They contend that the duties of a Senator are to make
laws, to appropriate, to tax, to expropriate, to canvass presidential elections, to
declare the existence of a state war, to give concurrence to treaties and
amnesties, to propose constitutional amendments, to impeach, to investigate in
aid of legislation, and to determine the Senate rules of proceedings and
discipline of its members. They maintain that the "alleged acts done to
overthrow the incumbent government and authorities by arms and with
violence" cannot be qualified as "acts reminiscent of the discharge of
petitioner's legislative duties as Senator."1
The allegations in the complaint and in the pleadings of the DOJ, the Solicitor
General, and the Ombudsman (who is taking their side) charging petitioner
with coup d'etat show hat he was engaged in a discussion of his National
Recovery Program (NRP), corruption in government, and the need for reform.
The NRP is a summary of what he has introduced and intended to introduce into
legislation by Congress. There is no doubt, therefore, that the alleged coup
d'etat was committed in relation to the performance of his official duty as a
Senator.
II
The ponencia is a departure or reversion from established doctrine. Under the
principle of stare decisis, the Court should, for the sake of certainty, apply a
conclusion reached in one case to decisions which follow, if the facts are
31
substantially similar. As stated in Santiago vs. Valenzuela2, stare decisi et non
quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
In Deloso vs. Domingo3, where the Governor of Zambales and his military and
police escorts ambushed the victims who were passing by in a car, we held that
the multiple murders were committed in relation to public office. In Cunanan vs.
Arceo4, the mayor ordered his co-accused to shoot the victims. We ruled that
the murder was in relation to public office. In Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan5, the
town mayor aimed a gun and threatened to kill a councilor of the municipality
during a public hearing. We concluded that the grave threats were in relation to
the mayor's office. Following these precedents, I am convinced that petitioner's
discourse on his National Recovery Program is in relation to his office.
III
The respondents state that the DOJ is vested with jurisdiction to
conduct all investigations and prosecution of all crimes. They cite PD 1275, as
amended by PD 1513, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of this plenary power.
While the DOJ has a broad general jurisdiction over crimes found in the Revised
Penal Code and special laws, however, this jurisdiction is not plenary or total.
Whenever the Constitution or statute vests jurisdiction over the investigation
and prosecution of certain crimes in an office, the DOJ has no jurisdiction over
those crimes. In election offenses, the Constitution vests the power to
investigate and prosecute in the Commission on Elections. 6 In crimes committed
by public officers in relation to their office, the Ombudsman is given by both the
Constitution and the statute the same power of investigation and
prosecution.7 These powers may not be exercised by the DOJ.
The DOJ cannot pretend to have investigatory and prosecutorial powers above
those of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer with a rank
equivalent to that of an Associate Justice of this Court. The respondent's
Prosecution Office investigates and prosecutes all kinds of offenses from petty
crimes, like vagrancy or theft, to more serious crimes, such as those found in
the Revised Penal Code. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, prosecutes
offenses in relation to public office committed by public officers with the rank
and position classification of Grade 27 or higher. It is a special kind of
jurisdiction which excludes general powers of other prosecutory offices.
I agree with the petitioner that a becoming sense of courtesy, respect, and
propriety requires that the constitutional officer should conduct the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of the complaint against him and not a fifth
assistant city prosecutor or even a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ National
Prosecution Service.
I do not believe that a mere agreement, such as OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001, can fully transfer the prosecutory powers of the Ombudsman to the DOJ
without need fordeputization in specific cases. As stated by the petitioner,
the DOJ cannot be given a roving commission or authority to investigate and
prosecute cases falling under the Ombudsman's powers anytime the DOJ
pleases without any special and explicit deputization. On this point, I agree with
Justice Jose C. Vitug that the Joint Circular must be understood as a mere
working arrangement between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ that
must not be meant to be such a blanket delegation to the DOJ as to generally
allow it to conduct preliminary investigation over any case cognizable by the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner further raises a due process question. He accuses the DOJ of bias,
partiality, and prejudgment. He states that he has absolutely no chance of being
cleared by the respondent DOJ panel because it has already decided, before any
presentation of proof, that he must be charged and arrested without bail.
As stated by the petitioner, there are precedents to the effect that where bias
exists, jurisdiction has to be assumed by a more objective office. In Panlilio vs.
Sandiganbayan,8 we recognized that the PCGG has the authority to investigate
the case, yet we ordered the transfer of the case to the Ombudsman because of
the PCGG's "marked bias" against the petitioner.
In Conjuangco vs. PCGG,9 we held that there is a denial of due process where
the PCGG showed "marked bias" in handling the investigation. In Salonga vs.
Cruz Paño,10 where the preliminary investigation was tainted by bias and
partiality, we emphasized the right of an accused to be free, not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and biased
prosecution.
The petitioner's pleadings show the proofs of alleged bias. They may be
summarized as follows:
First, on July 27, 2003 when the Oakwood incident was just starting,
DILG Secretary Lina and National Security Adviser Roilo Golez went on a
media barrage accusing petitioner of complicity without a shred of
evidence.
Second, petitioner was approached by Palace emissaries, Velasco,
Defensor, Tiglao, and Afable to help defuse the incident and ask
mutineers to surrender. Then the request was distorted to make it
appear that he went there to save his own skin.
Third, even before any charge was filed, officials of the DOJ were on an
almost daily media program prematurely proclaiming petitioner's guilt.
How can the DOJ conduct an impartial and fair investigation when it has
already found him guilty?
Fourth, petitioner was given five days to answer Matillano's complaint
but later on, it was shortened to three days.
Fifth, petitioner filed a 30 page Reply but the DOJ Order was issued at
once, or only after two days, or on Sept. 10, 2003. The Order did not
32
 discuss the Reply, but perfunctorily glossed over and disregarded it.

The petitioner states that the DOJ is constitutionally and factually under the
control of the President. He argues that:

"No questionable prosecution of an opposition Senator who has

declared himself available for the Presidency would be initiated without
the instigation, encouragement or approval of officials at the highest
levels of the Administration. Justice requires that the Ombudsman, an
independent constitutional office, handle the investigation and
prosecution of this case. The DOJ cannot act fairly and independently in
this case. In fact, all of the actions the DOJ has taken so far have been
marked by bias, hounding and persecution.

And finally, the charges laid against Senator Honasan are unfounded
concoctions of fertile imaginations. The petitioner had no role in the
Oakwood mutiny except the quell and pacify the angry young men
fighting for a just cause. Inspiration perhaps, from his National
Recovery Program, but no marching orders whatsoever."

Prosecutors, like Caesar's wife, must be beyond suspicion. Where the test of the
cold neutrality required of them cannot be met, they must yield to another
office especially where their jurisdiction is under question. The tenacious
insistence of respondents in handling the investigation of the case and their
unwillingness to transfer it to the Ombudsman in the face of their questionable
jurisdiction are indications of marked bias.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the Department of

Justice to refrain from conducting preliminary investigation of the complaint
for coup d'etat against petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.
XXOOXX

33

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA
IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN,
LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR
ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR.,
CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA,
ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,
CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO
BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE
SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO
MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO
ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,
JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI
AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT,
ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH
SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX
SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON,
34
JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO,
JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.
BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO,
JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER
JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO
N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA,respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
35
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T.
RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO,
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO
TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP
OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED
THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN
OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,
MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT
OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
36
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope
and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches.
This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the
judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a
few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is
ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting
and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided
only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus
populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
37
 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
be, is not sufficient in substance.
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
In cases where a verified complaint o
a resolution of impeachment is file
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
or endorsed, as the case may be, b
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
at least one-third (1/3) of th
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless
Members of th
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to
House, impeachment proceeding
law.
are deemed initiated at the tim
of the filing of such verifie
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to complaint or resolution o
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and impeachment with the Secretar
underscoring supplied) General.

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th

Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiatio
November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Of Impeachment Proceedings.
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. Therelevant distinctions between these Within a period of one (1) year from
two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
the date impeachment proceeding
tabulation: are deemed initiated as provided i
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No Section 16 hereof, no impeachmen
impeachment proceedings shall be proceedings, as such, can be initiate
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES initiated against the same official more against the same official. (Italics i
than once within the period of one (1) the original; emphasis an
RULE II RULE V year. underscoring supplied)

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified complaint
for impeachment filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof or
by a verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House.
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Section 16. – Impeachment Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
Proceedings Deemed Initiated.
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint On of June 2, 4
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
impeachment or a citizen files complaint
a (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
verified complaint that is endorsed by
a Member of the House through Constitution,
a betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint
resolution of endorsement against anwas endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
impeachable officer, impeachment Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the Constitution which reads:
Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
against such official, as the case may Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
be, is sufficient in substance, or on resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
the date the House votes to overturn included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
or affirm the finding of the said to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee that the verified complaint Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
and/or resolution, as the case may shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
38
 be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines
Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment
Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III,
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court
issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et.
al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to
return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the
House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with
the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for
the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang,
as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial
on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an
order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that
(1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well
as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this
Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of,
hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a
writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist
from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer
and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
39
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a
member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it
is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment
Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al.,
in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit
filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf
of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of
respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation
of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate
and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint
due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time
they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any
legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse
the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded
on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition
"To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters
of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that
(1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3)
respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment
and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the
first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260
(calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the
JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
40
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because
the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected
above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28,
2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed
him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution
of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00
a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo,
enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,
which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in
his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and
Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to
the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved
to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned,
the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was
presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003
on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
"constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra
filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit
the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
41
 g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising
from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue
of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in
the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution.
In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in
their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if
not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII
of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the
proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
42
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to
the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the
1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to
invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this
power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other.The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
"x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review
is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of
intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into
its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of
this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
43
 controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on
the question whether or not a branch of government or any of
its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute
a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court
must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to
a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking
through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
44
whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also
affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted,
if not willed, that said provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction,
the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from
the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character.
Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power
to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial
review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings
are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et.
al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities,
principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus,
they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to
different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the
system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative
check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in
fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor
can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the
Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that
45
of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In
the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in
nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives
the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and
the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity
of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the
petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for
being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. InCoseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject
to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it
ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of
the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
46
 the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and
will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion,
citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that,
when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the
same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons,
cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and
the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the
latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from
real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest
has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings,
is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff
is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating
to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether
he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners
before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as
taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and
members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this
Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
47
general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's
suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate
of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. 82 Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests,85the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests
of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved
in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the class, is, under the res judicataprinciple, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court. 89 Where it clearly appears that not
all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues
raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class
suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and
taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397,
is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90Applying
these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are
indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean
that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case,
they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save
for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and
no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed,
this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.
al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as
citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of
the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court
found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the
Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will
sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted
to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
48
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was
granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied
for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that
the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in
public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality
of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been
complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions
are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines
that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this
time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be
exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures
and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate.
The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the
Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by
way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI
of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or
both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that,
as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section
I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is
bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any
rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of
cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature
of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
49
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and
took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application
on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the
usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive
the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after
all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to
pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was
not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people,
but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during
the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a
decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21.
The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September
22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in
their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the
ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1,
1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it
had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to
say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that
1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One
of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives
of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for
about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to
the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of
some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions,
much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The
purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January
1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople,
during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was
analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt
the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But
the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced
until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays
came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released
with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to
hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should
be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion
was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
50
referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before
the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in
the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note
that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective
places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority
of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big
difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a
political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is
not the only major case in which the plea of "political question"
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the
past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What
is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by
law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a
husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties
as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such
are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her
physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are
some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce
them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme
Court has, also another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each
one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether
a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on
the question whether or not a branch of government or any of
its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power"
but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but
also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
51
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems
to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the
extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is
not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to
decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by
the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the
definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called
the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect
of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College
of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over
questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla,
this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means
does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
52
 supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these
two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept
of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance
with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement
of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public
trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better
way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114Clearly, the
issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.
Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.116[Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
53
 essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted
from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in
general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said
petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would
not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,
as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and
filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives
signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro
and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified
the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro
and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
54
 to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that
for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or
more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is notthe resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have
raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of
judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is
a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has
a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which
may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no
other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and,
as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to
the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence
that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to
be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking
in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that
case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This
Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution
of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
55
 To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be
not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect,
six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed,
such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be
at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices
and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the
Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as
such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself
of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification
of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the
one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his
court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of
his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
"seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a
party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision
of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen
who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).
56
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander
v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required
by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in
judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating
and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of
this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by
the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is
not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon
the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in
the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted
which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law
of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.
If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise
of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought
"to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments
by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues
that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
57
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the
House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides,
only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3
of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
"initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of
this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act
of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the
word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and
that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking
into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure
and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there
have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee
a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience
as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed
before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by
the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that
we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the
body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates
it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that
score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these
words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S.
Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case
of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the
Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate
58
 this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the
approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete
the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution
WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far
as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the
Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing
of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I
will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary
the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and
the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in
the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by
a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in
that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the
Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in
the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing
of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or
by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded
to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-
third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate.
It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachmentcase." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated
when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the
trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
59
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not
found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution
is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it;
and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not
abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs
of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term
"to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral
or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not
use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citingVera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances
of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions.
There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the
1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna.
Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious
reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions
now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its
power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for
other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
60
 together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it
would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning
of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United
States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while
the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are
open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De
Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was
even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even
more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a
window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US
Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary
to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of
this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its
rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker,
the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the
House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of
a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods
the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of
their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters
for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained.But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force
for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute
and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
61
powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense
when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section
1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the
US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed
it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts
of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which
taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there
is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not
do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty
by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to
this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us
to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules
of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the
Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as
basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the
U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives
shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no
clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating
how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
62
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict
or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy
over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven
to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both
sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society -
from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith –
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of
the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting
instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment
had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued
to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak
at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made
through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability,"
and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained,
the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its
exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an
issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of
action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy,
is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where
it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the
raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive
and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of
the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this
Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal
rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood
to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations
could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and
the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these
petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when
it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the
judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.
63
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the
law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience
to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The
law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to
test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search
for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But
though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate
concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of
J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
XXOOXX

64
 execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel
of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs,
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999 Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved
from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate
police operation. 1

vs.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa
modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the
JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those
charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner- Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
intervenors. Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories
after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan

allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
MARTINEZ, J.:

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act
eleven (11) amended informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein
which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being
petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and
challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo
Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr.,
also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
documentary proofs, are as follows:
where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with
Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector,
syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements
of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996),
Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring,
ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco
admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon;
Superintendent or higher.
and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor
Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC,
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary
65
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No.
1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and
Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said
bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by
the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor,
ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5,
1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice
Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr.
rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature
enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines
approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are
now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has
already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases
are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson,
Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not
yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance
of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the
vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in
these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither
concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and
decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval
hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by
the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely
suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the
Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby
violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way
the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the
resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the
cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may
have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the
issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that
it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which
petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not
yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that
those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial
of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which
actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan
law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if
their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due
process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal
to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to
the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate
pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the
law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-
intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended
informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the
commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning
66
Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. time of the commission of the offense:

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
nonextendible reglementary period. "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of including:
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in and provincial treasurers, assessors,
the present case. engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution, which provides: (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to assessors, engineers, and other city
be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over department heads;
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and (c) Officials of the diplomatic service
employees including those in government-owned or controlled occupying the position of consul and higher;
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined
by law. (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the
following provisions in Article XI, Section 4: (e) Officers of the Philippines National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the director and those holding the rank of senior
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its superintendent or higher.
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in Office of the Ombudsman and special
chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas prosecutor;
Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and
R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. (g) Presidents, directors or trustees or
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as institutions or foundations;
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: Classification Act of 1989;

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
67
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27"
or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection
with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well
as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office
of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in
1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employee, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
68
 (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as
Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27"
or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or
orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by
the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before
the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and
c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal"
that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject
criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended
information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to
represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain
cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on
ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses
in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with
murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code,
the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b,
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in
69
relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as
to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the
accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
— that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of
the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of
the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored
the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate
their right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan,
is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions.
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public
officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A.
8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval
of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the
first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can
be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now
claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those
similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it
shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that
Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those
cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision
under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised
on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions.
In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments
against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the
hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator.
Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he
claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D.
1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249,
while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute
sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and
participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is
the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress,
in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution
to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post
facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as
they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.
In Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before
the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such
action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed; or
70
 (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence
and recieves less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense on order to convict
the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense
or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of
some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249
is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a
penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal
which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A.
8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure,
and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of
an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of
evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may
be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the
Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the
intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject
provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the
title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it
allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only
have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since
the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the
provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in
employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to
"define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory
provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as
provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under
the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors
falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including
those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office
as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in
the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
71
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple
murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected"
with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged
and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied
of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and
concise language without repetition not necessarily in the
terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge
is the actual recital of the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish
the accused with such a descretion of the charge against him
as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be
had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts
must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact andcircumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the
amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors
wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder
reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON,
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA,
PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of
the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his
Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their
public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein
alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent
to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation
and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and
there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused
his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said victim.
72
 That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT.
ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO,
CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES,
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing
the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories
after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by
among others falsely representing that there where no
arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein
at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about
the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal
accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there
is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the
latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner
and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories
concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about
the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no
indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those
arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but,
as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended
information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in
Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while
there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an
essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe
that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient.
That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment
that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the
discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial
Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the
amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as
such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of
regular policeman and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him with pistols
and higher power guns and then established
a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his
command . . . supervision and control where
his co-defendants were stationed entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain
person without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court,
and that in line with this set-up established by
said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting
upon his orders his co-defendants arrested
and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to
the office of the accused because it was perpetreated while
they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of
their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no
personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an
intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the
accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed
the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations
merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or
extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and
detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose
they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall
73
 control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at
the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information,
which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in
the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge
of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge
of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby

sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said
cases.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

74

[G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]
FELICITO S. MACALINO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan to take cognizance of two criminal
cases[2] against petitioner and his wife Liwayway S. Tan, contending that he is
not a public officer within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[3]
On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the
Sandiganbayan two informations against petitioner and Liwayway S. Tan
charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents (Criminal
Case No. 18022) and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile
documents (Criminal Case No. 19268), as follows:
“CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18022
“That on or about the 15th day of March, 1989 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury
Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled
corporation with offices at EDSA corner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, and hence,
a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions, taking
advantage of his position, committing the offense in relation to his office and
conspiring and confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the
owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine National Construction
Corporation in the following manner: in preparing the application with the
Philippine National Bank, Buendia Branch for the issuance of a demand draft in
the amount of NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
EIGHTY-TWO & 11/100 PESOS (P983,682.11), Philippine Currency, in favor of
Bankers Trust Company, accused FELICITO S. MACALINO superimposed the
name “Wacker Marketing” as payee to make it appear that the demand draft
was payable to it, when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well knew,
it was the Bankers Trust Company which was the real payee as indicated in
Check Voucher No. 3-800-89 and PNB Check No. B236746 supporting said
application for demand draft; subsequently accused FELICITO S. MACALINO
likewise inserted into the letter of PNCC to PNB Buendia Branch the words
“payable to Wacker Marketing” to make it appear that the demand drafts to be
picked up by the designated messenger were payable to Wacker Marketing
when in truth and in fact the real payee was Bankers Trust Company; and as a
result of such acts of falsification, PNB Buendia issued 19 demand drafts
for P50,000.00 each and another demand draft for P33,682.11, all, payable to
Wacker Marketing, which were subsequently delivered to accused Felicitor
S. Macalino and which accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter exchanged with
PNB Balanga Branch for 19 checks at P50,000.00 each and another
for P33,682.11 and all of which she later deposited into Account No. 0042-
0282-6 of Wacker Marketing at Philtrust Cubao, thereby causing pecuniary
damage and prejudice to Philippine National Construction Corporation in the
amount of P983,682.11.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.
“Manila, Philippines, August 24, 1992.”[4]
“CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19268
“That on or about the 4th day of April, 1990, and subsequently thereafter, in
the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being
then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans
Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, a government-controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner
Reliance St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and hence, a public officer, while in
the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position,
committing the offense in relation to his office, and conspiring and
confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the owner of
Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by
means of deceit defraud the Philippine National Construction Corporation in the
following manner: after receiving Check Voucher No. 04-422-90 covering the
partial payment by PNCC of the sinking fund to International Corporate Bank
(Interbank) as well as Check No. 552312 for TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P2,250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable to
Interbank for the purpose, accused FELICITO S. MACALINO falsified PNB Check
No. 552312 by altering the payee indicated therein to make it appear that the
aforesaid check was payable to Wacker Marketing instead of Interbank and
further falsified the schedule of check disbursements sent to PNB Buendia by
making it appear therein that the payee of Check No. 552312 was Wacker
Marketing when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well knew, it was
Interbank which was the real payee; accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter
deposited Check No. 552312 into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker
Marketing at Philtrust Cubao and Wacker Marketing subsequently issued
Philtrust Check No. 148039 for P100,000.00 in favor of accused FELICITO
S.MACALINO; which acts of falsification performed by the accused would have
defrauded the Philippine National Construction Corporation of P2,250,000.00
had not PNB Buendia ordered the dishonor of Check No. 552312 after noting
the alteration/erasures thereon, thereby failing to produce the felony by reason
of causes independent of the will of the accused.
75
“CONTRARY TO LAW.
“Manila, Philippines, May 28, 1993.”[5]
Upon arraignment on November 9, 1992, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the charges. Hence, trial proceeded.[6]
However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense,
petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer
because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. [7] The People
of the Philippines opposed the motion.[8]
On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
The Issue
The sole issue raised is whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a
public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that an employee of the PNCC is not a public officer as
defined under Republic Act No. 3019, as follows:
“Sec. 2. (a) xxx xxx xxx.
“(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the unclassified or classified or exempted
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined
in the preceding paragraph.”
We agree.
To resolve the issue, we resort to the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, on the
Accountability of Public Officers, provides:
“Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations x x x.”
“Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
“1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. x x x
“2. Direct, upon complaint or at its instance, any public official or employee of
the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well
as of any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.”
(underscoring supplied)
Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters.” (underscoring supplied)
Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
“Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties -The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:
“1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.
“2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well
as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.”
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under
the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a
public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint
charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer
who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.[11]
The cases[12] cited by respondent People of the Philippines are inapplicable
because they were decided under the provisions of the 1973 Constitution which
included as public officers, officials and employees of corporations owned and
controlled by the government though organized and existing under the general
corporation law. The 1987 Constitution excluded such corporations.
The crimes charged against petitioner were committed in 1989 and 1990.
[13]
The criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled that “the
76
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at
the institution of the action.”[14]

The Fallo

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS
ASIDE the order dated July 29, 1999 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 18022 and 19268 and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the two (2) cases against
petitioner and his wife.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,

JJ., concur.
XXOOXX

77

G.R. Nos. 120681-83 October 1, 1999
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,respondents.
G.R. No. 128136 October 1, 1999
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA
D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY
and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its
PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE
PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and
GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree
No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has undergone various
changes, 1 the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos.
7975 2 and 8249. 3 Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors
accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 4 and Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code 5 is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others,
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case
Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and
declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22,
1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996
which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No 23278 in deference to
whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.1âwphi1.nêt
The, facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay,
one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, 6 and two for
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. 7 The informations, which were
subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner's
incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contented that the
six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due
process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the
resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was
opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before
petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the motion for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a "Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite." The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated
April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for
ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites
for suspensionpendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of
the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 8and the informations
containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution
denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set aside the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied
due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspensionpendente
lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to his motion for
reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution
dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other
things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioner's reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6,
1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the
Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending
petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
took effect on May 16, 1995. 10
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer
his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the
78
two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court,
it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a
Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioner's motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as
Grade "27" under the Compensation & Position Classification
Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the
offenses charged in the above-entitled cases, the accused
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an
acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under
Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed
against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have
been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade "27",
because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged
he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade
"27" does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses
were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From
the very definition of the very Act itself, it is evident that the
Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The
Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of
the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by
his classification under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor
Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the
commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade
"27", it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect,
Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a
monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade
"28" under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the
said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the
position titles and salary grades of the Compensation &
Position Classification system prepared by the Department of
Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic
[A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been
classified as Grade "27." 11
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal
Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court
annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6,
1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to
quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating
the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC.
Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order
preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7,
1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed
for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to Petition (To allow the
introduction of alternative reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against
him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the
informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover,
there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay's co-
petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San
Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C.
Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent
municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the
landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This case was docketed
in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A.
Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and
Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of
the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco
A. Villa with the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to
cause the preparation of the information and to approve the
same for filing with the proper court. 12
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) was
filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per
the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The
information was signed by Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation
Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San
Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners,
and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The
complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping
project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-
0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos
recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended "with the proper court." The
resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-
79
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-
1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e)of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the
landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was
subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime
was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts
as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the
Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial
jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors
estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the
case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier
of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating
it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to
respondent court?

On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash III
the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were
charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same
the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The offense violated the rule on duplicity of information?
Sandiganbayan denied the accused's motion to quash in a Resolution dated
June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the IV
Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
involved in the Binay petition.
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court,
if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in V
abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of
jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and
the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping? 13
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Order dated June 21, 1996. On On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the
August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment.
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution
common question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.

I
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.

The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
subject cases.
to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of
the Sandiganbayan.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July
7, 1994 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606, 14 as amended by
The petition raises the following issues:
Presidential Decree No. 1861, 15 the pertinent provisions of which state:

I
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No.
7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the
80
 (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccionalor
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by
law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not
yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975
was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al.,
was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlunsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
81
 occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx xxx xxx
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court.
This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days
after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya,
two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606
now reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
position of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlunsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
82
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner
municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors
to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A that differences in pay are to be based"upon substantive differences in duties
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor
Binay argues:
. . . The new law's consistent and repeated reference to salary
grades show[s] an intention to base the separation of
jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts
on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The
essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales
determine grades. 16
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification 17 from the City Personnel Officer
of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only
P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was
supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification 18
from the
Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
. . . that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C.
Magsaysay Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with
Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of
November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA
6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Sec. 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented
due to budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to
Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San
Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes
it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify
Grades.
The Constitution 19 states that in providing for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take "into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for their positions," thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758 20 provides in Section 2 thereof
and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." In
short, the nature of an official's position should be the determining factor in the
fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by
logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the
"grade" defined in Presidential Decree No. 985 21 as including
. . . all classes of positions which, although different with
respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level
of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the
inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic
compensation. 22
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one's position — the level of
difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof — relative to
that of another position. It is the official's Grade that determines his or her
salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that
prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial
capability of his or her respective local government unit. 23Nevertheless, it is
the law which fixes the official's grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-
President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as
the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also
authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to "determine
the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where
applicable" and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set
of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the
DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by the Benchmark
Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
83
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and
the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary
level is not determinative. An official's grade is not a matter of proof, but a
matter of law, of which the Court must take judicial notice. 24
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades list the Municipal Mayor under Salary Grade
27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade "27"
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,"
under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are "[o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975. 25
B officials from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in
Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius
est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed
excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive
original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is
clear and unambiguous. 26 The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier,
Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of
"[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989."
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain
meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners' argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is
exclusive. It is not. The phrase "specifically including" after "[o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989" necessarily conveys the very idea of non-
exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, 27 or where the enumeration is
by way of example only. 28 In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in
Section 4a(5) was "necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for
Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to
Grades 27 and above." The same rationale applies to the enumeration in
Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an
exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubt as to whether petitioner mayors are under the
category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the
matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven
(27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing
guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Court's Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as "confirmatory of the Salary
Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors."
C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills 29 in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal
these officials, especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden
brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the
law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort
to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner
may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it
is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And
even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as
a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654
[1986]). 30
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
. . . that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since
the witnesses in their case would come from Baguio City and
84
 San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would
defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the
convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and
standard by which to implement its intent, and courts have no
choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with
Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the
congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was
established up to the present, the Court has been confronted
with the problem of those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry" —
the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees,
postal clerks and letter carriers and the like — who are
involved with "nickel-and-dime" cases and money-related
cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. . . .1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions
in the Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction
of the court. 31
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials
are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts
are not bound by a legislator's opinion in congressional debates regarding the
interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion
of the legislator. 32Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the
entire Congress. 33
D Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay
cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975,
which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which
trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to
the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the
guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: 34
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a
court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case
that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the
rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's
intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions
are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 There is no
reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent
jurisdiction," and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but
construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to
"regular courts," but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the
intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to
the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or
"regular courts" instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than salary grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration. [emphasis supplied.]
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already
begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does
not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as
of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
85
 case before it, then the cases shall be
referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a
case before it, the case shall be referred to
the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of
the approval of R.A. No. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains
jurisdiction over said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249,
which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. — This Act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in
any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A.
No. 7975.
36
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., the Court explained
the purpose of the foregoing provision.
. . . it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [the
Sandiganbayan's] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending
cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. . . . . The transitory provision does not
only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in
"any court." . . . . Moreover, those cases where trial had
already begun are not affected by the transitory provision
under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the
original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature.
Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the
crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or
lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. No.
8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already
devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other
hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to
apply to cases the trials of which have yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has
already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law
does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court
has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said
law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
a case pending before it, then it retains
jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over a case pending before it, the case shall
be referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
a case pending before a regular court, the
latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be
referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a
case pending before it, then said court retains
jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains
jurisdiction over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy
disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the
subject cases by the Ombudsman.
Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including
civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. 37 Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice. 38
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, 39 is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
86
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a John Does of the following offenses: (a)
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b)
tried. 40 Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a Multiple Falsification of Public Documents; (c)
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation
a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e)
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons of R.A. 3019.
for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and
the prejudice caused by the delay. 41 The concept of speedy disposition is a 1.1. Brillante's complaint was
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. 42 based on the initial findings
and observations of the COA
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be on the examination of the
sufficient. 43 In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to cash and accounts covering
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts transactions from April 1,
and circumstances peculiar to each case. 44 1987 to January 4, 1988 and
Post-Audit of Selected
In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 45 the Court held that the length of delay and the Accounts for the last quarter
simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases of 1987 of the Municipality of
therein. The "unexplained inaction" 46 of the prosecutors called for the dismissal Makati contained in its
of the cases against petitioner Tatad. Report dated January 11,
1988. The COA furnished the
Tanodbayan a copy of this
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 47 the Court also ruled that there was no violation report on August 1, 1988
of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for upon request of the latter.
the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential
decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and
the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, 1.2. In the letter of the COA
preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. transmitting a copy of the
The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, report, the Tanodbayan was
and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused. informed that this COA audit
report of January 11, 1988 is
not yet released since the
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 48 the complexity of the issues and the failure of Mayor of Makati was given
the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time thirty days within which to
spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee. explain/clarify the findings in
the report and is subject to
In Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 49 the Court, considering also the change or modification
complexity of the cases ("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the depending upon the
parties' lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated explanation/clarification to
therein. be submitted by the Mayor
of Makati. Because of this
the information from the
In petitioner Binay's case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the COA the preliminary
disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office investigation was held in
of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately abeyance until the
explains the length of the delay: submission of the final
report.
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed
with the Office of the Tanodbayan an 1.3. On March 1, 1989, the
affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, first part of the Final Report
Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, on Audit of Makati was
Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano received by the Office of the
Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Ombudsman and was
Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, transmitted for purposes of
87
 the ensuring preliminary
investigation to the
Tanodbayan which received
the same on March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the
Final Report contained the
fifteen (15) adverse findings,
above elsewhere stated as
the basis of Bobby Brillante's
complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA
auditors participated in the
documentation and analysis
of its findings and
preparation of the final
report.
1.6. The first part of the final
report was followed by a
Supplemental Report on
Findings No. 1 and 3. This
Supplemental Report is
dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the
voluminous documents supporting the COA
findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman
of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the
corresponding subpoena directing the
respondents to submit their respective
counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the
subpoena, Mayor Jejomar
Binay submitted his counter-
affidavit on May 18, 1990,
Marissa Chan, Feliciano
Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr.
on June 19, 1990, Renato
Manrique on June 4, 1990,
Alfredo Ignacio on June 6,
1990, Roberto Chang on
August 27, 1990. Feliciano
Bascon submitted his
Supplemental Affidavit on
November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory
examinations were
conducted on September 27,
1990, October 26, 1990,
November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay
submitted a copy of this Petition
forCertiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and
the municipality of Makati filed with the
Supreme Court against COA Chairman,
Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on
Audit, with a manifestation that said petition
is submitted to support Binay's stand as
regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan
filed an affidavit containing allegations
incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the
said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan,
Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto
on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel
submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor
its Resolution disposing the preliminary
investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the
said Resolution was
approved by the Special
Prosecutor, who forwarded
the same and the entire
records to the Office of the
Ombudsman for review
and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the
Review Panel of the
Ombudsman submitted to
the latter its review action
for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994; the
Ombudsman approved some
of the recommendations of
the Review Panel and
directed the preparation and
filing of the informations. 50
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission
on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the
88
determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct
its own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the
cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their
resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29,
1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases
and the prosecution, unable to rely on the
raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15
reports caused the investigation and
examination of thousands of vouchers,
payrolls, and supporting documents
considering that no less than the Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team
supervisor and 10 team members had to take
part in the conduct of a final audit consisting
of evaluation and analysis of the initial
findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must
have involved complicated legal and factual
issues which do warrant or justify a longer
period of time for preliminary investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary
investigation was resolved close to three (3)
years from the time all the counter-affidavits
were submitted to the Tanodbayan,
notwithstanding the fact that very few
documentary and testimonial evidence were
involved. In the above-entitled cases, the
preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases
was terminated in merely two (2) years and
four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay
filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992. 51
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his
suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him
were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our
pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in
violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in
question are valid and petitioner's suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the
subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman.
Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the
exercise thereof. 52 Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse
on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will
now dispose of the following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an
information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the
Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information
alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double
jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions
of duplicity of information and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance." 53 They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan
was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the
information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and,
under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined
by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. 54 As a
consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of
Appeals 55 that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court
which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff
from filing the same complaint later with the competent court.
The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it
made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In
such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise
is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so
as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the
competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or
even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases 56 that estoppel prevents a
party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself
invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the
rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law. 57 Even in those instances where
the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the
jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning
89
such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case
here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the
RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the
Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous
motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's jurisdiction. There
were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the
motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the
motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered
any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not
themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the
plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus,
the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name
of the "People of the Philippines." 58 Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does
not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.59 Violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, 60 is a public
offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender;
hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned,
much less barred by the rules of estoppel. 61
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in
double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the
information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first
place, the RTC not being not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can
be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. 62 The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the
quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground
of double jeopardy. 63 Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the
information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 64
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated
the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule
presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one
offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. — A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses;
xxx xxx xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one
offense but with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly
speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal orcertiorari) in
another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. 65 We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing
two informations in two different courts, to "gamble that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition."
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after
investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another
complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among
others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding
probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action,
charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first,
this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas,
respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes
and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Quizumbing, J., concur in the separate opinion of Justice Panganiban.
Separate Opinions
90

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur with the majority that, as a rule, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction
over criminal cases involving municipal mayors.
Due to their peculiar factual circumstances, however, Petitioner Binay's cases, I
believe, should be deemedexceptions and referred to the "proper courts," that
is, the regional trial courts. These factual circumstances are simple: (1) the
Informations charging Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994,
prior the enactment of RA 7975; and (2) when RA 7975 took effect on May 16,
1995, trial in the anti-graft court had not yet commenced. In fact, Binay had not
been arraigned yet. These undisputed facts are plainly governed by the
unambiguous provision of Section 7, RA 7975, which reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
The majority, however, complicates the above syllogistic application of the law
by ruling that before Section 7 could be used, a prior determination as to which
court has jurisdiction over the cases should first be undertaken. Since the
aforesaid general rule states that the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over
municipal mayors, then Binay's cases should be referred by the anti-graft court
to itself, not to the regional trial courts.
With due respect, I believe this rather circumlocutory interpretation renders
Section 7 useless. In fact, I daresay that said interpretation or explanation is
much more difficult to understand than the provision itself. Indeed, why should
the words "proper courts" be deemed to include the Sandiganbayan? The
majority's ruling leads to the absurdity of the Sandiganbayan's being required
to refer to itself a criminal case already pending before it, one in which trial has
not yet begun. I would rather rest on the most fundamental rule in statutory
construction: Interpretation is needed only when the law is vague, not when it
is clear and unambiguous, 1 as in the case of Section 7, RA 7975.
Consequently, I vote (1) to GRANT the Petition in G.R. Nos. 120681-83, because
Binay's cases fall under the exception stated in Section 7, RA 7975; and (2) to
DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 128136, because Petitioner Magsaysay's cases
were filed after RA 7975 had taken effect; they are thus covered by the general
rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over municipal mayors.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur with the majority that, as a rule, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction
over criminal cases involving municipal mayors.
Due to their peculiar factual circumstances, however, Petitioner Binay's cases, I
believe, should be deemedexceptions and referred to the "proper courts," that
is, the regional trial courts. These factual circumstances are simple: (1) the
Informations charging Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994,
prior the enactment of RA 7975; and (2) when RA 7975 took effect on May 16,
1995, trial in the anti-graft court had not yet commenced. In fact, Binay had not
been arraigned yet. These undisputed facts are plainly governed by the
unambiguous provision of Section 7, RA 7975, which reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
The majority, however, complicates the above syllogistic application of the law
by ruling that before Section 7 could be used, a prior determination as to which
court has jurisdiction over the cases should first be undertaken. Since the
aforesaid general rule states that the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over
municipal mayors, then Binay's cases should be referred by the anti-graft court
to itself, not to the regional trial courts.
With due respect, I believe this rather circumlocutory interpretation renders
Section 7 useless. In fact, I daresay that said interpretation or explanation is
much more difficult to understand than the provision itself. Indeed, why should
the words "proper courts" be deemed to include the Sandiganbayan? The
majority's ruling leads to the absurdity of the Sandiganbayan's being required
to refer to itself a criminal case already pending before it, one in which trial has
not yet begun. I would rather rest on the most fundamental rule in statutory
construction: Interpretation is needed only when the law is vague, not when it
is clear and unambiguous, 1 as in the case of Section 7, RA 7975.
Consequently, I vote (1) to GRANT the Petition in G.R. Nos. 120681-83, because
Binay's cases fall under the exception stated in Section 7, RA 7975; and (2) to
DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 128136, because Petitioner Magsaysay's cases
were filed after RA 7975 had taken effect; they are thus covered by the general
rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over municipal mayors.1âwphi1.nê
XXOOXX
91

G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and
The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of
the Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he
was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of
final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod. 1
His appeal was denied by the UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek
relief from the Merit Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree
No. 1409. Under Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and
decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil
service."
The University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the MSB. UP relied heavily on the case of University of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 2 where it was held that administrative matters
involving the discipline of UP employees properly fall under the Jurisdiction of
the state university and the UP Board of Regents.
The motion was denied. Thereafter, in its decision dated July 5, 1985, the MSB
exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. 3 UP,
represented by its Office of Legal Services, moved for reconsideration, but this
was denied on January l0, 1986.
UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987,
issued Resolution No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB. 4 The motion for
reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.
On June 10, 1988, the petitioners, through their new counsel of record, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a second motion for reconsideration.
This was also denied on August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD
807, providing in part that "only one petition for reconsideration shall be
entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.
Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the
Commission, copy of which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General
on October 4, 1988. 5 This was opposed by the petitioners, but in an order
dated November 7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless,
Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the
Commission had not yet become final and executory.
Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November
11, 1988. Judge Teodoro P. Regino of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
granted the petition on April 27, 1989. The respondents (herein petitioners)
were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina "to his former position as
mimeograph operator without change of status as permanent employee with
back wages from June 22, 1982, up to his reinstatement, plus salaries for the
period of his preventive suspension covering December 15, 1981 to March 15,
1982." 6
On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to
seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the orders of the
Commission directing the reinstatement of Pamplina. The petitioners also pray
that the decision of the UP President and Board of Regents ordering Pamplina's
dismissal be upheld.
UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1906,
it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section
6(e) of the said Act grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on
recommendation of the president of the university, professors, instructors,
lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation and
to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been
had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate
jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil
Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to
"hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a),
provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office."
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,
regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil
Service. 7 Under the 1967 Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service
pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l), which states:
92
 The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part
of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so
because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a
component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 607 and
administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Coming now to the petition itself, we note that the petitioners received a copy
of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.
In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect
at that time, it is provided that:
. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision was reproduced almost verbatim in Section 28 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22,
1988, within which to elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and
instead filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed under
Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for
reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day
reglementary period. 8
and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of
the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil
Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals," Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied on
the Civil Service Law of 1959, which then empowered the Civil Service
Commission:
Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all
permanent officers and employees in the competitive or
classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and
to prebcribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing
the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied)
Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to "har
and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal," without the qualifiying
phrase appearing in the above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke
that phrase to justify the special power they claim under Act 1870.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the assailed
decision of respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino dated April 27, 1989, and the
challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission, are AFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., took no part.
XXOOXX

In this connection, it is stressed that where a motion for reconsideration of a

decision, order or ruling of any Constitutional Commission is denied, the 30-day
reglementary period does not begin anew. The petitioner has only the balance
of that period (after deducting the time elapsed before the motion was filed) to
come to this Court on certiorari.

The assailed orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every
right to seek mandamus to compel their execution. Respondent Judge Regino
was quite correct when he issued the questioned writ.

The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, 9 cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is
that at the time it was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet
been enacted. PD 807 took affect only in 1975.

In ruling in that case "that the President and Board of Regents of the University
of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension
93

G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL
HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the
Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R Caday, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent
National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been
implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
NHC with the Department of Labor.
On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. 1
Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on
December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 2
Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before
this Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is
REINSTATED. 3
On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. 4
On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the
case. 5
On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:
The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss
meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a government
corporation without an original charter but organized/created
under the Corporation Code.
Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the Government, including government
owned and controlled corporations with
original charters. (emphasis supplied)
From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that
respondent NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and
is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. Moreover, it
is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified
and became effective on February 2, 1987.
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is
hereby dismissed. 6
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC. 7
On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled
that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as
there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely
fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence,
he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or
factual.
He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering
that the period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years
should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service
Commission promulgated on April 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:
It appears . . . complainant filed the complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Civil Service Commission on January 6, 1989
and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on
April 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to
that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on
January 17, 1985 which enjoined the complainant to go to the
Civil Service Commission which in fact, complainant did. Under
the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the
running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was
suspended with the filing of the complaint with the said
Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent for
94
 failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but
due to, in the words of the complainant, a "legal knot" that has
to be untangled. 8
Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and ordering the
respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position
without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of
allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent computed
from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed
on March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated. 9
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on
March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision
of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10
The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed
by the Labor Code.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or
controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the
Labor Code. Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
The terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government-owned and
controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations . . . .
The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other
hand provided:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision
and instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v.
Juco, 11 that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations,
whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general
Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor
Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said
Constitution now provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government owned or controlled corporations with original
charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])
In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 12 we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in
deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil
Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time
when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987
Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of
the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase "with original charter"
means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to
corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations
organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been
organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the
National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary
of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service
Commission.
We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.
In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399,
otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated
January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent
(100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the
former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock
are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and
Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation. 13 Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under
Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a
government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent
case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National
Housing
Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held
that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the
right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no
impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are
covered by the Labor Code.
Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction
because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 15 Having been
incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are
governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
95
One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a
simple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemna in
the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March

14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May
21, 1990 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

XXOOXX

96

G.R. No. 147402 January 14, 2004
ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO, in his capacity as General
Manager of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD),
Tacloban City, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Chairman CELSO D. GANGAN,
Commissioners RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M.
DALMAN, and Regional Director of COA Region
VIII,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 to annul the Commission on Audit’s ("COA")
Resolution dated 3 January 2000 and the Decision dated 30 January 2001
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The COA denied petitioner Ranulfo C.
Feliciano’s request for COA to cease all audit services, and to stop charging
auditing fees, to Leyte Metropolitan Water District ("LMWD"). The COA also
denied petitioner’s request for COA to refund all auditing fees previously paid
by LMWD.
Antecedent Facts
A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of
LMWD. Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999
requesting payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, petitioner
sent a reply dated 12 October 1999 informing COA’s Regional Director that the
water district could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his
action Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree 198 ("PD 198")2, as well as
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 ("RA 6758"). The Regional Director referred
petitioner’s reply to the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999.
On 19 October 1999, petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director asking
for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA.
On 16 March 2000, petitioner received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan’s
Resolution dated 3 January 2000 denying his requests. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on 30 January 2001.
On 13 March 2001, petitioner filed this instant petition. Attached to the petition
were resolutions of the Visayas Association of Water Districts (VAWD) and the
Philippine Association of Water Districts (PAWD) supporting the petition.
The Ruling of the Commission on Audit
The COA ruled that this Court has already settled COA’s audit jurisdiction over
local water districts in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service
Commission and Commission on Audit,3 as follows:
The above-quoted provision [referring to Section 3(b) PD 198]
definitely sets to naught petitioner’s contention that they are private
corporations. It is clear therefrom that the power to appoint the
members who will comprise the members of the Board of Directors
belong to the local executives of the local subdivision unit where such
districts are located. In contrast, the members of the Board of Directors
or the trustees of a private corporation are elected from among
members or stockholders thereof. It would not be amiss at this point to
emphasize that a private corporation is created for the private
purpose, benefit, aim and end of its members or stockholders.
Necessarily, said members or stockholders should be given a free hand
to choose who will compose the governing body of their corporation.
But this is not the case here and this clearly indicates that petitioners
are not private corporations.
The COA also denied petitioner’s request for COA to stop charging auditing fees
as well as petitioner’s request for COA to refund all auditing fees already paid.
The Issues
Petitioner contends that COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by auditing LMWD and requiring it to pay
auditing fees. Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether a Local Water District ("LWD") created under PD 198, as
amended, is a government-owned or controlled corporation subject to
the audit jurisdiction of COA;
2. Whether Section 20 of PD 198, as amended, prohibits COA’s certified
public accountants from auditing local water districts; and
3. Whether Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits the COA from charging
government-owned and controlled corporations auditing fees.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
97
The Constitution and existing laws4 mandate COA to audit all government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations ("GOCCs")
with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1),
Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for COA’s audit jurisdiction, as follows:
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under
this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c)
other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which
are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit
as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control
system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers
pertaining thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The COA’s audit jurisdiction extends not only to government "agencies or
instrumentalities," but also to "government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters" as well as "other government-owned or controlled
corporations" without original charters.
Whether LWDs are Private or Government-Owned
and Controlled Corporations with Original Charters
Petitioner seeks to revive a well-settled issue. Petitioner asks for a re-
examination of a doctrine backed by a long line of cases culminating in Davao
City Water District v. Civil Service Commission5 and just recently
reiterated in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit.6 Petitioner maintains that
LWDs are not government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters. Petitioner even argues that LWDs are private corporations. Petitioner
asks the Court to consider certain interpretations of the applicable laws, which
would give a "new perspective to the issue of the true character of water
districts."7
Petitioner theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters Utilities
Administration ("LWUA") and not the LWDs. Petitioner claims that LWDs are
created "pursuant to" and not created directly by PD 198. Thus, petitioner
concludes that PD 198 is not an "original charter" that would place LWDs within
the audit jurisdiction of COA as defined in Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
Constitution. Petitioner elaborates that PD 198 does not create LWDs since it
does not expressly direct the creation of such entities, but only provides for
their formation on an optional or voluntary basis.8 Petitioner adds that the
operative act that creates an LWD is the approval of the Sanggunian Resolution
as specified in PD 198.
Petitioner’s contention deserves scant consideration.
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-
owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16,
Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-
owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations
except by a general law applicable to all citizens.9 The purpose of this
constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special
charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.10
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a
special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations
created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing
laws, that general law is the Corporation Code,11 except that the Cooperative
Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.12
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or
controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations
cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations
with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created
under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that "[A]ll
corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of
incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no
stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of
all corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a
fixed term of office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the
Corporation Code, thus:
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been
excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created
98
 pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not
created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were
created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily
by its provision.13 (Emphasis supplied)
LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter. Since
under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may
have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are government-
owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a special
charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm.
Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from
the Corporation Code, LWDs derive their legal existence and power from PD
198. Sections 6 and 25 of PD 19814 provide:
Section 6. Formation of District. — This Act is the source of
authorization and power to form and maintain a district. For
purposes of this Act, a district shall be considered as a quasi-
public corporation performing public service and supplying
public wants. As such, a district shall exercise the powers,
rights and privileges given to private corporations under
existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and subject
to such restrictions imposed, under this Act.
(a) The name of the local water district, which shall include the name
of the city, municipality, or province, or region thereof, served by said
system, followed by the words "Water District".
(b) A description of the boundary of the district. In the case of a city or
municipality, such boundary may include all lands within the city or
municipality. A district may include one or more municipalities, cities or
provinces, or portions thereof.
(c) A statement completely transferring any and all waterworks and/or
sewerage facilities managed, operated by or under the control of such
city, municipality or province to such district upon the filing of
resolution forming the district.
(d) A statement identifying the purpose for which the district is formed,
which shall include those purposes outlined in Section 5 above.
(e) The names of the initial directors of the district with the date of
expiration of term of office for each.
(f) A statement that the district may only be dissolved on the grounds
and under the conditions set forth in Section 44 of this Title.
(g) A statement acknowledging the powers, rights and obligations as
set forth in Section 36 of this Title.
Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local
legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district
beyond that specifically provided for in this Act.
If two or more cities, municipalities or provinces, or any combination
thereof, desire to form a single district, a similar resolution shall be
adopted in each city, municipality and province.
xxx
Sec. 25. Authorization. — The district may exercise all the powers
which are expressly granted by this Title or which are
necessarily implied from or incidental to the powers and
purposes herein stated. For the purpose of carrying out the
objectives of this Act, a district is hereby granted the power of eminent
domain, the exercise thereof shall, however, be subject to review by
the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198, which expressly
confers on LWDs corporate powers. Section 6 of PD 198 provides that
LWDs "shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private
corporations under existing laws." Without PD 198, LWDs would have no
corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special enabling charter of
LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are government-owned and
controlled corporations with a special charter.
The phrase "government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters" means GOCCs created under special laws and not under the general
incorporation law. There is no difference between the term "original charters"
and "special charters." The Court clarified this in National Service
Corporation v. NLRC15 by citing the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, as follows:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Romulo is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am amending my original
proposed amendment to now read as follows: "including government-
owned or controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS." The
purpose of this amendment is to indicate that government
corporations such as the GSIS and SSS, which have original charters,
fall within the ambit of the civil service. However, corporations which
are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies such as the Philippine
Airlines, Manila Hotel and Hyatt are excluded from the coverage of the
civil service.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the Committee
say?
99
 MR. FOZ. Just one question, Mr. Presiding Officer. By the term
"original charters," what exactly do we mean?
MR. ROMULO. We mean that they were created by law, by an
act of Congress, or by special law.
MR. FOZ. And not under the general corporation law.
MR. ROMULO. That is correct. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. FOZ. With that understanding and clarification, the Committee
accepts the amendment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Mr. Presiding Officer, so those created by the
general corporation law are out.
MR. ROMULO. That is correct. (Emphasis supplied)
Again, in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission,16 the
Court reiterated the meaning of the phrase "government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters" in this wise:
By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter," We mean government owned or controlled
corporation created by a special law and not under the
Corporation Code of the Philippines. Thus, in the case of Lumanta
v. NLRC (G.R. No. 82819, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 79, 82), We
held:
"The Court, in National Service Corporation (NASECO) v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 69870,
promulgated on 29 November 1988, quoting
extensively from the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in respect of the intent and
meaning of the new phrase ‘with original charter,’ in
effect held that government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charter refer to corporations
chartered by special law as distinguished from
corporations organized under our general incorporation
statute — the Corporation Code. In NASECO, the company
involved had been organized under the general incorporation
statute and was a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation (NIDC) which in turn was a
subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, a bank chartered by
a special statute. Thus, government-owned or controlled
corporations like NASECO are effectively, excluded from the
scope of the Civil Service." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s contention that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution creates the
LWDs assumes that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create
corporations. This is a patently baseless assumption. The Local Government
Code17 does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to create
corporations.18 What the Local Government Code empowers the Sangguniang
Bayan to do is to provide for the establishment of a waterworks system
"subject to existing laws." Thus, Section 447(5)(vii) of the Local Government
Code provides:
SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The
sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
xxx
(vii) Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment,
operation, maintenance, and repair of an efficient waterworks
system to supply water for the inhabitants; regulate the
construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps,
cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and quantity of the
water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extend
the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within
the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred
(100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the
water service; and regulate the consumption, use or wastage
of water;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in
accordance with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan has no
power to create a corporate entity that will operate its waterworks system.
However, the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like PD
198, to form and incorporate a water district. Besides, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create
corporations, the LWDs would remain government-owned or controlled
corporations subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. The resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan would constitute an LWD’s special charter, making the
LWD a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter.
In any event, the Court has already ruled in Baguio Water District v.
Trajano19 that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the special charter of
LWDs, thus:
While it is true that a resolution of a local sanggunian is still necessary
for the final creation of a district, this Court is of the opinion that said
resolution cannot be considered as its charter, the same being
intended only to implement the provisions of said decree.
100
Petitioner further contends that a law must create directly and explicitly a
GOCC in order that it may have an original charter. In short, petitioner argues
that one special law cannot serve as enabling law for several GOCCs but only
for one GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that
"Congress shall not, except by general law,"20provide for the creation of
private corporations. Thus, the Constitution prohibits one special law to create
one private corporation, requiring instead a "general law" to create private
corporations. In contrast, the same Section 16 states that "Government-owned
or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters."
Thus, the Constitution permits Congress to create a GOCC with a special
charter. There is, however, no prohibition on Congress to create several GOCCs
of the same class under one special enabling charter.
The rationale behind the prohibition on private corporations having special
charters does not apply to GOCCs. There is no danger of creating special
privileges to certain individuals, families or groups if there is one special law
creating each GOCC. Certainly, such danger will not exist whether one special
law creates one GOCC, or one special enabling law creates several GOCCs.
Thus, Congress may create GOCCs either by special charters specific to each
GOCC, or by one special enabling charter applicable to a class of GOCCs, like
PD 198 which applies only to LWDs.
Petitioner also contends that LWDs are private corporations because Section 6
of PD 19821 declares that LWDs "shall be considered quasi-public" in nature.
Petitioner’s rationale is that only private corporations may be deemed "quasi-
public" and not public corporations. Put differently, petitioner rationalizes that a
public corporation cannot be deemed "quasi-public" because such corporation
is already public. Petitioner concludes that the term "quasi-public" can only
apply to private corporations. Petitioner’s argument is inconsequential.
Petitioner forgets that the constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA’s audit
jurisdiction depends on the government’s ownership or control of a corporation.
The nature of the corporation, whether it is private, quasi-public, or public is
immaterial.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over "government-owned
and controlled corporations with original charters," as well as "government-
owned or controlled corporations" without original charters. GOCCs with
original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs without original
charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters refer to
corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled
by the government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in
determining COA’s audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a
corporation, whether under a general or special law.
The determining factor of COA’s audit jurisdiction is government ownership
or control of the corporation. In Philippine Veterans Bank Employees
Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank,22 the Court even ruled that the
criterion of ownership and control is more important than the issue of original
charter, thus:
This point is important because the Constitution provides in its Article
IX-B, Section 2(1) that "the Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." As the Bank is not owned or controlled by the
Government although it does have an original charter in the
form of R.A. No. 3518,23 it clearly does not fall under the Civil
Service and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial
corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides. The consequence
is that the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed
by the labor laws, under which in fact they have already been paid
some of their claims. (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. The government organizes
LWDs in accordance with a specific law, PD 198. There is no private party
involved as co-owner in the creation of an LWD. Just prior to the creation of
LWDs, the national or local government owns and controls all their assets. The
government controls LWDs because under PD 198 the municipal or city mayor,
or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of an LWD for a
fixed term of six years.24 The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the
LWDs. LWDs have no private stockholders or members. The board directors and
other personnel of LWDs are government employees subject to civil service
laws25 and anti-graft laws.26
While Section 8 of PD 198 states that "[N]o public official shall serve as
director" of an LWD, it only means that the appointees to the board of directors
of LWDs shall come from the private sector. Once such private sector
representatives assume office as directors, they become public officials
governed by the civil service law and anti-graft laws. Otherwise, Section 8 of PD
198 would contravene Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution declaring
that the civil service includes "government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters."
If LWDs are neither GOCCs with original charters nor GOCCs without original
charters, then they would fall under the term "agencies or instrumentalities" of
the government and thus still subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. However, the
stark and undeniable fact is that the government owns LWDs. Section 4527 of
PD 198 recognizes government ownership of LWDs when Section 45 states that
the board of directors may dissolve an LWD only on the condition that
"another public entity has acquired the assets of the district and has
assumed all obligations and liabilities attached thereto." The implication is clear
that an LWD is a public and not a private entity.
Petitioner does not allege that some entity other than the government owns or
controls LWDs. Instead, petitioner advances the theory that the "Water
District’s owner is the District itself."28 Assuming for the sake of argument that
an LWD is "self-owned,"29 as petitioner describes an LWD, the government in
any event controls all LWDs. First, government officials appoint all LWD
directors to a fixed term of office. Second, any per diem of LWD directors in
excess of P50 is subject to the approval of the Local Water Utilities
Administration, and directors can receive no other compensation for their
services to the LWD.30 Third, the Local Water Utilities Administration can
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require LWDs to merge or consolidate their facilities or operations. 31 This
element of government control subjects LWDs to COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that upon the enactment of PD 198, LWDs became private
entities through the transfer of ownership of water facilities from local
government units to their respective water districts as mandated by PD 198.
Petitioner is grasping at straws. Privatization involves the transfer of
government assets to a private entity. Petitioner concedes that the owner of
the assets transferred under Section 6 (c) of PD 198 is no other than the LWD
itself.32 The transfer of assets mandated by PD 198 is a transfer of the water
systems facilities "managed, operated by or under the control of such city,
municipality or province to such (water) district."33 In short, the transfer is from
one government entity to another government entity. PD 198 is bereft of any
indication that the transfer is to privatize the operation and control of water
systems.
Finally, petitioner claims that even on the assumption that the government
owns and controls LWDs, Section 20 of PD 198 prevents COA from auditing
LWDs. 34 Section 20 of PD 198 provides:
Sec. 20. System of Business Administration. — The Board shall, as soon
as practicable, prescribe and define by resolution a system of business
administration and accounting for the district, which shall be patterned
upon and conform to the standards established by the
Administration. Auditing shall be performed by a certified public
accountant not in the government service. The Administration
may, however, conduct annual audits of the fiscal operations of the
district to be performed by an auditor retained by the Administration.
Expenses incurred in connection therewith shall be borne equally by
the water district concerned and the Administration.35(Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner argues that PD 198 expressly prohibits COA auditors, or any
government auditor for that matter, from auditing LWDs. Petitioner asserts that
this is the import of the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 when it states
that "[A]uditing shall be performed by a certified public accountant not in the
government service."36
PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No amount of clever legislation
can exclude GOCCs like LWDs from COA’s audit jurisdiction. Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any scheme or devise to escape COA’s audit
jurisdiction, thus:
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
precisely to annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like that of Section 20 of
PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from COA audit. The following exchange in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission elucidates this intent of the
framers:
MR. OPLE: I propose to add a new section on line 9, page 2 of the
amended committee report which reads: NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED
EXEMPTING ANY ENTITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS SUBSIDIARY IN
ANY GUISE WHATEVER, OR ANY INVESTMENTS OF PUBLIC FUNDS,
FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT.
May I explain my reasons on record.
We know that a number of entities of the government took
advantage of the absence of a legislature in the past to obtain
presidential decrees exempting themselves from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, one notable example of
which is the Philippine National Oil Company which is really an empty
shell. It is a holding corporation by itself, and strictly on its own
account. Its funds were not very impressive in quantity but underneath
that shell there were billions of pesos in a multiplicity of companies.
The PNOC — the empty shell — under a presidential decree was
covered by the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, but the billions
of pesos invested in different corporations underneath it were
exempted from the coverage of the Commission on Audit.
Another example is the United Coconut Planters Bank. The Commission
on Audit has determined that the coconut levy is a form of taxation;
and that, therefore, these funds attributed to the shares of 1,400,000
coconut farmers are, in effect, public funds. And that was, I think, the
basis of the PCGG in undertaking that last major sequestration of up to
94 percent of all the shares in the United Coconut Planters Bank. The
charter of the UCPB, through a presidential decree, exempted it from
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, it being a private
organization.
So these are the fetuses of future abuse that we are slaying right here
with this additional section.
May I repeat the amendment, Madam President: NO LAW SHALL BE
PASSED EXEMPTING ANY ENTITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS
SUBSIDIARY IN ANY GUISE WHATEVER, OR ANY INVESTMENTS OF
PUBLIC FUNDS, FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT.
THE PRESIDENT: May we know the position of the Committee on the
proposed amendment of Commissioner Ople?
MR. JAMIR: If the honorable Commissioner will change the number of
the section to 4, we will accept the amendment.
MR. OPLE: Gladly, Madam President. Thank you.
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 MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, point of inquiry on the new
amendment.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. May I just ask a few questions of
Commissioner Ople.
Is that not included in Section 2 (1) where it states: "(c) government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries"? So that if
these government-owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries are subjected to the audit of the COA, any law exempting
certain government corporations or subsidiaries will be already
unconstitutional.
So I believe, Madam President, that the proposed amendment is
unnecessary.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, since this has been accepted, we
would like to reply to the point raised by Commissioner de Castro.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Monsod will please proceed.
MR. MONSOD: I think the Commissioner is trying to avoid the
situation that happened in the past, because the same provision was in
the 1973 Constitution and yet somehow a law or a decree was passed
where certain institutions were exempted from audit. We are just
reaffirming, emphasizing, the role of the Commission on Audit so that
this problem will never arise in the future.37
There is an irreconcilable conflict between the second sentence of Section 20 of
PD 198 prohibiting COA auditors from auditing LWDs and Sections 2(1) and 3,
Article IX-D of the Constitution vesting in COA the power to audit all GOCCs. We
rule that the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 is unconstitutional since
it violates Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution.
On the Legality of COA’s
Practice of Charging Auditing Fees
Petitioner claims that the auditing fees COA charges LWDs for audit services
violate the prohibition in Section 18 of RA 6758,38 which states:
Sec. 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel
and of other Agencies. – In order to preserve the independence and
integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees
are prohibited from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances
or other emoluments from any government entity, local government
unit, government-owned or controlled corporations, and government
financial institutions, except those compensation paid directly by
COA out of its appropriations and contributions.
Government entities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations including financial institutions and local government units
are hereby prohibited from assessing or billing other government
entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
including financial institutions or local government units for services
rendered by its officials and employees as part of their regular
functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to said
officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)
Claiming that Section 18 is "absolute and leaves no doubt," 39 petitioner asks
COA to discontinue its practice of charging auditing fees to LWDs since such
practice allegedly violates the law.
Petitioner’s claim has no basis.
Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of
compensation from any government entity except "compensation paid
directly by COA out of its appropriations and contributions." Thus, RA
6758 itself recognizes an exception to the statutory ban on COA personnel
receiving compensation from GOCCs. In Tejada v. Domingo,40 the Court
declared:
There can be no question that Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 is
designed to strengthen further the policy x x x to preserve the
independence and integrity of the COA, by explicitly PROHIBITING: (1)
COA officials and employees from receiving salaries, honoraria,
bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government
entity, local government unit, GOCCs and government financial
institutions, except such compensation paid directly by the COA
out of its appropriations and contributions, and (2) government
entities, including GOCCs, government financial institutions and local
government units from assessing or billing other government entities,
GOCCs, government financial institutions or local government units for
services rendered by the latter’s officials and employees as part of
their regular functions for purposes of paying additional compensation
to said officials and employees.
xxx
The first aspect of the strategy is directed to the COA itself, while the
second aspect is addressed directly against the GOCCs and
government financial institutions. Under the first, COA personnel
assigned to auditing units of GOCCs or government financial
institutions can receive only such salaries, allowances or fringe
benefits paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and
contributions. The contributions referred to are the cost of
audit services earlier mentioned which cannot include the
extra emoluments or benefits now claimed by petitioners. The
COA is further barred from assessing or billing GOCCs and government
financial institutions for services rendered by its personnel as part of
their regular audit functions for purposes of paying additional
compensation to such personnel. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
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In Tejada, the Court explained the meaning of the word "contributions" in
Section 18 of RA 6758, which allows COA to charge GOCCs the cost of its audit
services:

x x x the contributions from the GOCCs are limited to the cost of audit
services which are based on the actual cost of the audit function in the
corporation concerned plus a reasonable rate to cover overhead
expenses. The actual audit cost shall include personnel services,
maintenance and other operating expenses, depreciation on capital
and equipment and out-of-pocket expenses. In respect to the
allowances and fringe benefits granted by the GOCCs to the COA
personnel assigned to the former’s auditing units, the same shall be
directly defrayed by COA from its own appropriations x x x. 41

COA may charge GOCCs "actual audit cost" but GOCCs must pay the same
directly to COA and not to COA auditors. Petitioner has not alleged that COA
charges LWDs auditing fees in excess of COA’s "actual audit cost." Neither has
petitioner alleged that the auditing fees are paid by LWDs directly to individual
COA auditors. Thus, petitioner’s contention must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Commission on Audit dated 3 January

2000 and the Decision dated 30 January 2001 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration are AFFIRMED. The second sentence of Section 20 of
Presidential Decree No. 198 is declared VOID for being inconsistent with
Sections 2 (1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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