Received: 19 March 2016 Revised: 13 February 2018 Accepted: 16 February 2018

DOI: 10.1002/job.2278

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Team learning from setbacks: A study in the context of start‐up

teams
Susanne Rauter | Matthias Weiss | Martin Hoegl

Munich School of Management/Institute for

Leadership and Organization, Ludwig‐
Maximilians University of Munich, Munich,
Germany
Correspondence
Matthias Weiss, Munich School of
Management/Institute for Leadership and
Organization, Ludwig‐Maximilians University
of Munich, Geschwister‐Scholl‐Platz 1, 80539
Munich, Germany.
Email: weiss@bwl.lmu.de
Summary
Although setbacks often happen as a collective experience, teams are an underresearched
organizational unit when it comes to learning from setbacks. Despite the popular view that
experiencing setbacks may facilitate learning, there are conflicting theoretical assumptions about
the influence of setbacks on learning. Whereas one theoretical perspective in this topic area is in
line with the proverbial learning from failure, a competing perspective argues that setbacks
impede learning processes. This study aims to reconcile these conflicting assumptions by propos-
ing team reflexivity as a moderator between team‐experienced setbacks and team learning.
Building on social cognitive theory, we develop a model of learning from experienced setbacks
at the team level. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 57 start‐up teams. Our results show
that the effects of team‐experienced setbacks differ depending on whether the focus is on
affective reactions to or cognitive perceptions of the setback experience. Although the cognitive
perception of setbacks generally shows a detrimental effect on team learning, the pattern of
results for an affective reaction to setbacks is more complex: The relationship between negative
affective reactions to setbacks and team learning is negative for teams with low reflexivity and
positive for teams with high reflexivity.

KEY W ORDS

experienced setback, negative affect, start‐up teams, team learning, team reflexivity

1 | I N T RO D U CT I O N something relevant for task accomplishment is in jeopardy or lost

Setbacks happen frequently, especially for teams working in knowl-
edge‐based organizations that operate in dynamic, complex, and high‐
velocity environments, such as entrepreneurial, innovation‐oriented,
or science‐based R&D teams (Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 2000;
McGrath, 1999; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Välikangas, Hoegl, &
Gibbert, 2009). In this context, setbacks are defined as an experienced
deviation from expected and desired results (Cannon & Edmondson,
2001; Jenkins, Wiklund, & Brundin, 2014; Shepherd, Haynie, & Patzelt,
2013). At the same time, setbacks are considered to be valuable
experiences that trigger learning (Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011;
Singh, Corner, & Pavlovich, 2007). As a consequence, there is an
ongoing controversial debate in the literature on how to characterize
the relationship between setbacks and learning (Zhao, 2011).
On the one hand, research points to setbacks' activating character
in terms of directing attention and resources to that setback
(Shepherd et al., 2013; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). In this
regard, a situation that is experienced as a setback signals that
(Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997). According to this argument, a setback
stimulates a search for further information and explanations, which in
turn triggers the information processing required to learn (Cacioppo,
Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Weick, 1988). On the other hand,
researchers have proposed that setbacks obstruct learning processes,
especially if teams are distracted from purposeful goal pursuit due to
the negative emotions associated with the setback (Frijda, 1988;
Lazarus, 1991b; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009). In this view, setbacks limit
attention and hinder creative or integrative thinking (Estrada, Isen, &
Young, 1997; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Isen, Daubman, &
Nowicki, 1987) and subsequently interfere with learning (Fredrickson
& Branigan, 2005; Masters, Barden, & Ford, 1979). Extant research
has been mostly concerned with learning from setbacks on behalf of
the individual (Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; Ucbasaran, Shepherd,
Lockett, & Lyon, 2013) and has rarely considered learning from set-
backs experienced by teams. For this context, team learning is defined
as “a change in the group's repertoire of potential behavior” (Wilson,
Goodman, & Cronin, 2007, p. 1043). Given that teams within

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organizations are the prevalent form of organizing work (Kozlowski &
Bell, 2013), especially for complex and important tasks that are
particularly prone to the occurrence of setbacks, teams also constitute
the fundamental unit in promoting learning generated from shared
experiences (Jiang, Jackson, & Colakoglu, 2016), such as project‐
related setbacks (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Senge, 1990;
Shepherd et al., 2011). Thus, understanding how teams collectively
learn from experienced setbacks is an important issue that needs to
be addressed in order to develop actionable theories on learning
from setbacks.
Building on Bandura's (1991) social cognitive theory (SCT), we
argue that the effect of setbacks on team learning is contingent on
the reflexivity of the team and develop a conceptual model of team
learning subsequent to setbacks. Team reflexivity is a key self‐regula-
tive metacognitive activity in teams. According to the SCT (Bandura,
1991), such self‐regulatory capacities determine how cognitive pro-
cessing systems, such as teams, operate (Yoon & Kayes, 2016), espe-
cially under challenging conditions such as setbacks (Schippers,
Homan, & van Knippenberg, 2013). As such, we take new steps to rec-
oncile the conflicting theoretical assumptions on the setback–team
learning relationship in the literature by pursuing the following
research question: What is the role of team reflexivity in determining
whether experienced setbacks are beneficial or detrimental for team
learning? In our model, we investigate how a team‐experienced set-
back, on the basis of affective reactions and cognitive perceptions,
influences team learning and how team reflexivity serves as a modera-
tor in this relationship.
We tested this model in a study with start‐up teams. The term
start‐up is commonly used for “nascent” companies in a very early
stage of their life cycle that desire significant growth in size and/or
revenues (Ripsas & Tröger, 2015). Most start‐ups are founded by
teams as opposed to individuals (Ripsas & Tröger, 2015). This also
applies to the start‐ups in our sample, which consist of genuine
start‐up teams in the nascent stages of business. As start‐up teams
are confronted with considerable uncertainty, ambiguity, and
novelty, they often face setbacks (Klotz, Hmieleski, Bradley, &
Busenitz, 2014; Shepherd et al., 2013). In this context, common rea-
sons for a setback are the failure of technology launches, competitors
reaching the market first, and progress that takes more time and
money than anticipated (Artinger & Powell, 2015; Gatewood, Shaver,
& Gartner, 1995). If such teams are not able to adequately respond
to setbacks, the continuation of their entrepreneurial project is endan-
gered (McGrath, 1999; Shepherd, Douglas, & Shanley, 2000). In the
United States, for instance, 33% of start‐ups do not survive the first
3 years after inception (Sadeghi, 2008), and the survival prospects
are even lower for highly innovative start‐ups (Hyytinen, Pajarinen, &
Rouvinen, 2015). Thus, we consider the start‐up context to be well
suited for investigating team learning from setbacks.
Our study contributes to the literature by taking a team‐level lens
and introducing a new theoretical perspective to research learning
from setbacks. This is important, especially for areas where teams are
prevalent and setbacks occur frequently, such as in (corporate) entre-
preneurship, research, innovation, and health care (e.g., Carmeli &
Gittell, 2009; Edmondson, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011, 2013).
Through a closer investigation of the setback–team learning
RAUTER ET AL.
relationship, we further develop recent conceptual and empirical work
that discusses the effects of setbacks on learning (e.g., Cannon &
Edmondson, 2001; Shepherd et al., 2013). More specifically, by intro-
ducing team reflexivity as a key moderator variable that determines
the extent to which teams are able to learn from the experience of
setbacks, this study aims to reduce disagreements in the literature
regarding the relationship between setbacks and learning (see, e.g.,
Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2013; Sitkin, 1992). In
so doing, we connect to recent conceptual and empirical work that dis-
cusses the effects of setbacks on learning (e.g., Schippers et al., 2013;
Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2013) and refine theoretical models
on learning from setbacks.
2 | THEORY
When it comes to explaining the consequences of team‐experienced
setbacks, the literature has mainly referred to teams involved in
innovation, science‐based, or entrepreneurial projects so far
(Moenkemeyer, Hoegl, & Weiss, 2012; Shepherd et al., 2011;
Välikangas et al., 2009). In this regard, researchers have identified
several events that constitute setbacks for such teams. For instance,
innovation projects often prematurely exit the process or fail once
launched onto the market (Välikangas et al., 2009). Likewise, within
entrepreneurship, Politis and Gabrielsson (2009) have mentioned diffi-
culties in acquiring necessary resources and businesses performing
under expectations; here, setbacks can also refer to interpersonal
conflict obstructing progress due to persistence in holding different
and incompatible views (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001).
To conceptualize what constitutes an experienced setback,
Jenkins et al. (2014) argue that the extent to which teams perceive a
certain encounter as a setback must be considered when analyzing
subsequent processes. This rationale on conceptualizing setbacks,
which is based on the appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991a; Smith &
Lazarus, 1993), sees events and their effects on an entity in terms of
their relation to this entity's well‐being. More specifically, an event is
regarded as a setback when it indicates that some form of adversity
is felt by the entity encountering the event (Jenkins et al., 2014).
Applying this theoretical basis to our context, we assume that certain
events are not necessarily experienced as setbacks equally by every
team. On the basis of previous research, we suggest that team‐experi-
enced setbacks trigger cognitive and affective responses (Cole, Walter,
& Bruch, 2008). In this vein, we specify the extent to which an event
constitutes a team‐experienced setback to be reflected in the affective
reactions and cognitive perceptions it triggered in the team, signaling
that an event appears relevant and harmful to a team's common goals
(Cole et al., 2008; George, 1990). We thus see team learning as a
construct that entails both cognitive and affective components in the
sense that team members' interactions and shared experiences bring
forward changes in the team's collective level of knowledge and
skills (Schaubroeck, Carmeli, Bhatia, & Paz, 2016; Sole &
Edmondson, 2002). The team's experience of setbacks can thus
influence learning. However, there are inconsistent theoretical
perspectives on the direction of the effects of setbacks on learning
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Zhao, 2011).
RAUTER ET AL. 785

2.1 | Team‐experienced setbacks and team learning objectives, strategies, and processes in a constructive manner
(West, 1996). Mirroring what Bandura (p. 250) describes as the
Much research indicates that setbacks negatively influence team learn-
“self‐monitoring subfunction,” team reflexivity plays a prominent role
ing, as the team is occupied with the negative affection of the setback
in our SCT‐based theoretical model, by assuming that motivations
and becomes distracted from searching for solutions to problems,
and actions can only be influenced if one's own thought patterns,
which thus obstructs the development of new knowledge and capabil-
emotional reactions, and behaviors are observed and interpreted in
ities to change problematic processes, strategies, or actions (Shepherd
order to gather the relevant information for consequent action
et al., 2013; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009). In this view, setbacks repre-
(Bandura, 1991; Wood & Bandura, 1989). In this respect, Bandura
sent emotionally painful events, especially for teams that strongly
(p. 250) writes about “self‐insights” gained through self‐monitoring
identify with their work and have made substantial investments of
that “can set in motion a process of corrective change,” with the latter
time and effort in their endeavors (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001;
representing team learning in the setting of this study. Thus, depending
Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2013). Consequently, setbacks dis-
on whether teams gain such relevant self‐insights through their
rupt ongoing goal pursuit activities and decrease motivation to engage
reflexivity or not is likely to substantially influence how teams react
in productive actions, such as the beneficial process of team learning
to an experienced setback.
(Seo, Barrett, & Bartunek, 2004). Instead of improving their strategy,
Specifically, in line with predictions of the SCT, empirical research
for instance, team members might be intensively concerned with
indicates that reflexive teams are able to stay focused on problems
accusing each other for what did or did not happen. This could prevent
and not easily become disturbed by unfavorable encounters
the team from learning in terms of not putting effort into working on
(Schippers et al., 2013; West, 1996) and that reflexive teams tend to
essential issues. Time and cognitive resources are focused on the
engage in systematic information processing by combining and inte-
occurrence of the setback itself, rather than on any information it
grating information into new solutions, resulting in learning better
might yield (Kiefer, 2005; McGrath, 1999).
strategies for a project (De Dreu, 2007). In the context of a team‐expe-
In contrast to this perspective, setbacks are also praised as an
rienced setback, teams are signaled that there is a negative discrep-
important source for learning in management and entrepreneurship
ancy between achieved performance and the team held aspirations.
(Carmeli & Gittell, 2009; McGrath, 1999; Tjosvold, Yu, & Hui, 2004;
As a consequence of such perceived discrepancies, SCT predicts
Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2015). They are considered valuable expe-
reactions aiming at reducing this discrepancy, which are subsumed
riences for teaching lessons and developing new knowledge, skills,
under the term “reactive control” in this theoretical framework
behaviors, and attitudes (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Cope, 2005).
(Bandura, 1991, p. 260). Being able to build on their self‐regulatory
Some literature also suggests that setbacks signal the importance of
capacity in order to notice and constructively interpret the feedback
the trigger event for the team and indicate that something important
cues provided by a setback, reflexive teams appear in a better position
is at stake (Luce et al., 1997) and thus function as a warning signal that
to actually learn from experienced setbacks.
can motivate fixing potential problems by taking appropriate actions
In line with our conceptualization of experienced setbacks
(Bandura, 1991; Snell, 1988; Wood & Bandura, 1989). Generally, the
outlined above, these signals might materialize through negative
motivation to learn can be expected to increase when there is a
affective reactions and/or negative cognitive perceptions of a team
perceived need to do so (Vancouver & Kendall, 2006), and a setback
(Bandura, 1991; Maitlis, Vogus, & Lawrence, 2013; Prussia & Kinicki,
is likely to create such a need. Setbacks focus attention on new
1996). Specifically, in a team‐level conceptualization of the SCT
information that might accompany the adverse event and activate
(Prussia & Kinicki, 1996), the team affective reactions to an experi-
the motivation to learn (Anderson, Krull, & Weiner, 1996; Postman &
enced setback represent a team's general sentiment with performance
Brown, 1952; Sitkin, 1992). As a result, a more comprehensive under-
accomplishments (Prussia & Kinicki, 1996). The team cognitive percep-
standing of the causes underlying the setback is cultivated, which is
tions of an experienced setback, in turn, reflect the team's cognitive
required as a starting point to improving the strategic direction of a
evaluation of the extent to which team goals have been met (Wood
business or to developing team members' skills (Ellis et al., 2006;
& Bandura, 1989). Generally, affective and cognitive aspects mark
Shepherd et al., 2013).
the commonly focused reactions on occurrences, in which there is a
discrepancy between expectations and reality (Maitlis & Christianson,
2014). In this regard, Maitlis et al. (2013) describe affective reactions
2.2 | The role of team reflexivity to take a key role in capturing the subjective meaning of an experi-
According to the SCT (Bandura, 1991), self‐regulatory factors have enced setbacks through signaling anomalies and threats. Equally
an impact on how well cognitive processing systems, such as team important, cognitive perceptions of experienced setbacks are a key
learning, operate (Yoon & Kayes, 2016). In the words of Bandura explanatory level with regard to how stimuli from the environment
(1991, p. 248), “self‐regulatory systems lie at the very heart of causal are noticed, processed, and interpreted (Maitlis & Christianson,
processes. They not only mediate the effects of most external influ- 2014). Therefore, in line with the SCT, we expect that a team's regula-
ences, but provide the very basis for purposeful action.” In the context tory capacity, reflected through its level of team reflexivity, determines
of collective endeavors, we argue that team reflexivity represents such the consequences of team affective reactions to and cognitive percep-
a regulatory capacity at the collective team level. Team reflexivity is a tions of experienced setbacks for learning, on which we elaborate in
team resource that encompasses the capability and tendency of a team the following. The theoretical model comprising the expected relation-
to constantly, overtly, and critically observe and question the team's ships in this regard is depicted in Figure 1.
786
FIGURE 1 Research model
2.2.1 | Team reflexivity and team affective reactions to
experienced setbacks
The SCT suggests that self‐regulatory metacognitive activity, which
tends to constantly happen in reflexive teams, can restore perceived
incongruity, such as in the case of a team‐experienced setback, by con-
trolling negative affect, which is then likely to result in a clearer picture
of necessary actions to reduce incongruity (Bandura, 1991; Yoon &
Kayes, 2016). In contrast, a lack of self‐regulatory capacities in
nonreflexive teams is likely to result in the defensive processing (i.e.,
denial, distortion, or avoidance) of information (e.g., provided by per-
formance feedback), which reinforces the negative affect or even
threatens one's identity (Ruttan & Nordgren, 2016). Specifically, empir-
ical evidence demonstrated self‐regulatory capacities to enhance the
perceived validity and importance of negative feedback and to
decrease the likelihood of denying the value of negative feedback
(Ruttan & Nordgren, 2016). If the team is not blocked by adversity or
defensive information processing, it is more likely that, through the
process of reflexive interaction, the team overcomes the emotional
barrier and interprets the negative affective reaction to experienced
setbacks as a signal for learning opportunities (Bandura & McClelland,
1977; Ng & Lucianetti, 2016). Thus viewing the situation from differ-
ent perspectives and creating new options for changing strategic direc-
tion point these teams to learning opportunities to be successful in the
future (Lee & Sukoco, 2011; Schippers, Edmondson, & West, 2014).
In contrast, due to their assumed tendency to defensively process
information provided through a team‐experienced setback,
nonreflexive teams are likely to overlook or actively ignore important
signals (Ruttan & Nordgren, 2016) and thus are not able to critically
deal with valuable information, hindering their ability to learn
(Schippers et al., 2014). Moreover, the SCT suggests that through their
more accurate and regular self‐monitoring (Bandura, 1991), reflexive
teams are more able to systemically and deliberately work through
unfavorable experiences, leading to a deeper and more elaborate
assessment of the reality the team faces (Schippers et al., 2013;
Stephens, Heaphy, Carmeli, Spreitzer, & Dutton, 2013). In contrast,
interaction within nonreflexive teams is generally characterized by
shallower, less critical processing of information and can, in case of
adversity, end in mutual accusations and conflicts (Kostopoulos &
Bozionelos, 2011; Schippers et al., 2014; Tjosvold et al., 2004). In
sum, on the basis of the SCT, we assume that reflexive teams tend to
RAUTER ET AL.
see their negative affective reaction to experienced setbacks as a
trigger for learning, whereas nonreflexive teams tend to be blocked
in their learning response by this negative affect. Therefore we posit
the following:
Hypothesis 1. Team reflexivity moderates the rela-
tionship between team affective reactions to setbacks
and team learning. When reflexivity is high, team affec-
tive reactions to setbacks enhance team learning,
whereas when reflexivity is low, team affective reac-
tions to setbacks hinder team learning.
2.2.2 | Team reflexivity and team cognitive perceptions of
experienced setbacks
With regard to team cognitive perceptions of experienced setbacks,
the SCT suggests that their effects on learning depend on the level
of reflexivity shown by the team during team member interactions as
well. From the above SCT‐based reasoning on the general role of team
reflexivity, we conclude that reflexive teams can approach the prob-
lems underlying the team‐experienced setbacks more systematically
and attentively (Bandura, 1991; Schippers et al., 2013; West, 1996),
resulting in the ability to cope with perceived setbacks in a more con-
structive and productive manner (Ellis, Carette, Anseel, & Lievens,
2014). In support of this expectation, empirical studies have shown
reflexive teams to be more effective in discovering better solutions
to problems and thus tend to have a better predisposition to learn from
adverse events (Hoegl & Parboteeah, 2006; Lee & Sukoco, 2011). The
higher quality of self‐monitoring activities within reflexive teams sup-
ports team learning as it helps a team in analyzing the situation after
a team‐experienced setback in order to identify the reasons underlying
the setback (Bandura, 1991; Bandura & McClelland, 1977; Schippers
et al., 2013). In this respect, team reflexivity is described as a “critical
information‐processing activity” within teams (Schippers et al., 2014),
which prevents information‐processing failures such as biased pro-
cessing of information within teams. This favorable function of team
reflexivity appears particularly helpful in the context of a cognitively
perceived setback, given that in such situations characterized by high
uncertainty and negative emotions, the likelihood of information‐pro-
cessing failures generally is elevated (Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams, &
Warnecke, 2014).
In contrast, the SCT suggests that the enhanced likelihood of team
information processing failures due to an insufficient quality of self‐
monitoring processes in nonreflexive teams makes it harder for these
teams to identify the actual causes for the cognitively perceived set-
backs to provide the informational foundation of effective reactive
control (Bandura, 1991). Specifically, Schippers et al. (2014) outline
three aspects of information processing that suffer from low levels of
team reflexivity. First, low levels of team reflexivity hamper the search
for and sharing of information within teams (Schippers et al., 2014).
Hence, nonreflexive teams are less likely to identify actual reasons
for the cognitively perceived setbacks and to gain a better common
understanding of such reasons (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Van Knippenberg,
2008; Schippers, West, & Dawson, 2015). These teams might even fol-
low misleading cues, due to the wrongful assumption that they possess
all the relevant information they need (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter,
RAUTER ET AL.
Mojzisch, & Schulz‐Hardt, 2007). Second, low levels of team reflexivity
are negatively associated with the elaboration of information
(Schippers et al., 2014). Hence, even if a nonreflexive team had gained
some (correct) insights about potential reasons behind the cognitively
perceived setback, these teams would be likely to struggle to effec-
tively compile, codify, and analyze this information. This essentially
does not allow the team to derive sound implications, that is, to learn,
from the stimuli provided by the cognitive perception of a setback
(Ellis et al., 2014). Third, low levels of team reflexivity tend to obstruct
the revision and updating of conclusions (Schippers et al., 2014).
One of the main reasons for this observation is that teams of low
reflexivity tend to follow habitual routines instead of thinking about
alternative interpretations of problems and situations (Gersick & Hack-
man, 1990; Schippers et al., 2014; Wood & Bandura, 1989). Clearly,
failing to see the necessity of, and options for, revising one's assump-
tion directly interferes with a team's need to learn from a cognitively
experienced setback. Finally, the tendency not to build their behavior
on clear plans, strategies, and objectives that build on high‐quality
self‐monitoring processes will distract nonreflexive teams even more
from systematically searching for solutions to problems that might
have surfaced through the negatively perceived performance feedback
(West, 1996), and thus to learn from them. Consequently, nonreflexive
teams are less likely to effectively use the informational cues of a
team cognitively perceived setback to learn from such an event
(Shepherd et al., 2013; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009). Instead, due to a
lack of adequate self‐regulation, they might even follow wrong cues
or misinterpret cues. In sum, our SCT‐based arguments suggest that
reflexive teams can process team cognitively perceived setbacks in a
more useful way than nonreflexive teams can, whereas the expected
information‐processing failures in nonreflexive teams are likely to
obstruct team learning processes. We therefore posit the following:
Hypothesis 2. Team reflexivity moderates the rela-
tionship between team cognitive perceptions of set-
backs and team learning. When reflexivity is high,
team cognitive perceptions of setbacks enhance team
learning, whereas when reflexivity is low, team cogni-
tive perceptions of setbacks hinder team learning.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Sample and research design
For this study, we surveyed start‐up teams that participated in a
regional business plan competition in 2014. This annual competition
is organized by a network that supports start‐up formation, financing,
and acceleration in Germany. Business plan competitions, in general,
aim at promoting entrepreneurial activities and providing an opportu-
nity for start‐up teams to win money, receive feedback on their entre-
preneurial projects, and develop their network. Participant start‐ups in
the business plan competition usually consist of 2–4 team members,
with the members being 30–40 years old on average and about 30%
of them being students. Moreover, the start‐up teams participating in
this competition represent nascent entrepreneurial ventures in the
early stages of their businesses. The participant teams received
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performance feedback (ranked on a 1–10 score) and written comments
on each part of the business plan (standardized feedback template),
which were provided by external jurors familiar with the industries
and start‐ups in general. Jurors are successful entrepreneurs,
managers, professional experts, and investors. There were at least five
different jurors, who evaluated each business plan. Feedback was
provided via e‐mail, but the teams had the opportunity to contact
the jurors and ask for further explanations and oral feedback.
Our data were taken from a larger data collection effort in the
context of this business plan competition, in which participants were
surveyed at two points in time, before and after receiving feedback
from the jurors. We contacted all 241 participating teams of the
competition in 2014 via e‐mail. Of these, 62 teams provided complete
information. The teams answered the survey containing the key con-
structs for this study shortly after they had received feedback for their
business plans from the external jurors, which was about 4 weeks after
handing in their business plans. In so doing, we could capture potential
affective and cognitive setback experiences pertaining to the perfor-
mance feedback and thus gauge the reactions of the teams to the
performance feedback. We had to remove 5 study participants whose
start‐up consisted of only one founding member and thus turned out
not to be team‐based start‐ups. This resulted in a final sample of 57
teams, corresponding to an overall response rate of 23.7%. The aver-
age age of participants was 33.53 years; 78.24% were male, and
95.0% of team members had a university degree. Of all team members
in our sample, 36.78% had previous founding experience. The average
team size in our final sample was 3.42. Regarding the type of business
the start‐ups in our sample represent, 36.84% of the start‐up teams
were from the area of information and communication technologies,
15.79% from other technologies, 29.82% from services, and 14.04%
from the life sciences. The participant teams in our study were thus
comparable with, and therefore representative of, the population of
teams within the competition.
3.2 | Measures
The unit of analysis in this investigation is the team. Unless stated
otherwise, all constructs were measured by using 5‐point Likert scales
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
3.2.1 | Team reactions to an experienced setback
Although setbacks are defined, as mentioned above, as an experienced
discrepancy and perturbation between the current status (e.g., a
certain performance outcome) and the expected status according to
an internal self‐evaluative standard, our research also defines a setback
as an event that evokes negative team affective reactions to and
negative cognitive perceptions of the experienced setback
(Bandura, 1991). To measure the team affective reaction to an
experienced setback, the team members rated the degree to which
they felt negatively affected by the performance feedback on a scale
that assessed team members' experience of four specific negative
emotional reactions (angry, confused, disappointed, and discouraged),
which we adapted from Brett and Atwater (2001). We adapted the
scale by leaving out the items “examined” and “judged,” which were
used in the original scale on the topic of 360° feedback within
788
companies and was therefore not suitable in our context of voluntarily
receiving feedback. Cronbach's α of the scale was .83. To measure the
team cognitive perception of an experienced setbacks, we built on the
definition of setbacks as a discrepancy between desired and actual
results (Moenkemeyer et al., 2012; Shepherd et al., 2013) and applied
a single‐question 5‐point semantic differential scale to capture the
team's cognitive perception of whether the performance feedback
was seen as a success or defeat (the more it was perceived as a
defeat, the higher the value of the differential, thus representing the
evaluation as a setback): “The performance feedback was a success
vs. defeat for us.”
3.2.2 | Team reflexivity
We measured team reflexivity with four items (Cronbach's α = .71)
from Schippers, Den Hartog, and Koopman (2007). For example, items
include “We regularly discuss whether the team is working effectively”
and “We often review our objectives.”
3.2.3 | Team learning
Team learning was measured with five items (Cronbach's α = .82)
adapted from Schippers et al. (2013). The items were as follows: “We
tried to increase our knowledge in the business plan creation,”
“We learned from our mistakes in the business plan creation,” “This
team demonstrates the ability to develop innovative solutions to
problems,” “This team discovered creative solutions to our problems,”
and “We discovered new techniques for performing well with our
business plan.”
3.2.4 | Control variables
We controlled for source credibility, as feedback from sources believed
to be high in expertise and trustworthiness will likely have more influ-
ence on learning than will feedback from sources not perceived as
being competent in evaluating performance (Giffin, 1967; Steelman,
Levy, & Snell, 2004). We applied a semantic differential scale to mea-
sure the team's perception of the overall credibility of the feedback
providers using the authoritativeness and character semantic differen-
tial scales outlined by Giffin (1967), which included 12 aspects (e.g.,
expert/inexpert, informed/uninformed, friendly/unfriendly, honest/
dishonest). Specifically, in these 12 semantic differential scales, we
asked start‐up team members to evaluate the sources of their feed-
back (“please indicate how you personally perceived the jurors based
on the feedback they gave you”) on the basis of a 5‐point scale
between the two extreme anchors of the semantic differential scale,
with 1 representing the value of the negative anchor (e.g., dishonest)
and 5 representing the value of the positive anchor (e.g., honest). Fur-
thermore, we controlled for team size, as the number of team members
can influence team member interaction (Hackman, 1987). A larger
number of team members could make communication more difficult
(Staats, Milkman, & Fox, 2012), whereas a team with a small number
of members might lack different perspectives and hence provide less
learning potential (Kostopoulos, Spanos, & Prastacos, 2013). Finally,
we controlled for longevity in terms of how long the entrepreneurial
team project had already existed by the time of participating in the
business plan competition. As Goodman and Leyden (1991) suggest,
RAUTER ET AL.
members need time to get familiar with each other to form a well‐func-
tioning team.
3.3 | Data aggregation
To test statistical adequacy for aggregating individual members'
responses to the team level, we evaluated interrater agreement using
the multiple‐item estimator (rwg(j); LeBreton & Senter, 2008). In line
with common practice for calculating rwg(j), we adopted a uniform
distribution with an expected error variance of 2.00 for our 5‐point
scale (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). We
further calculated the values of rwg(j) for a slightly skewed (SS) distribu-
tion of responses with an expected error variance of 1.34, following
LeBreton and Senter (2008). This analysis yielded values of median
rwg(j) = .90 (SS median rwg(j) = .82) for team reflexivity, median rwg(j) = .94
(SS median rwg(j) = .89) for team learning from mistakes, median
rwg(j) = .88 (SS median rwg(j) = .77) for team affective reactions to an
experienced setback, median rwg(j) = .84 (SS median rwg(j) = .73) for team
cognitive perceptions of a setback, and median rwg(j) = .97 (SS median
rwg(j) = .94) for source credibility. Furthermore, to specify interrater
reliability, we calculated the intraclass correlation coefficients
[ICC(2)], as recommended by Bliese (2000). We obtained the following
estimates: ICC(2) = .76 (F = 4.12, p < .01) for team reflexivity,
ICC(2) = .79 (F = 4.65, p < .01) for team learning from mistakes,
ICC(2) = .82 (F = 5.47, p < .01) for team affective reactions to an
experienced setback, ICC(2) = .67 (F = 3.41, p < .01) for team cognitive
perceptions of a setback, and ICC(2) = .91 (F = 10.69, p < .01) for
source credibility. We performed all calculations of rwg(j) and ICC(2)
values using the tool provided by Biemann, Cole, and Voelpel (2012).
Together, these results justified aggregation (Bliese, 2000;
Chen, Mathieu, & Bliese, 2004; LeBreton & Senter, 2008), which was
conducted by calculating the arithmetic mean.
4 | RESULTS
Performing a confirmatory factor analysis of our explanatory model var-
iables showed that all items loaded significantly on the factors of the cor-
responding scales, with all loadings greater than .40. Following Hu and
Bentler (1999), the factor structure of the explanatory latent constructs,
on the basis of multi‐item measures in our models without the cross‐
loading of items between latent constructs and with uncorrelated distur-
bance terms, also showed acceptable fit to the data (χ2 = 80.79, df = 62,
RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, SRMR = 0.05) and performed substantially
better than a one‐factor model (χ2 = 222.96, df = 65, RMSEA = 0.21,
CFI = 0.55, SRMR = 0.16). Moreover, multicollinearity does not seem
to pose a serious threat to our analysis, as all variance inflation factors
were below 4. Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, and
intercorrelations among the study variables.
4.1 | Analytical strategy
To test our hypotheses, we applied multiple regression analysis
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). To probe the patterns of the
interaction terms and thus test the hypothesized interaction effects,
we used the Johnson–Neyman technique in its extension by Bauer
RAUTER ET AL. 789

TABLE 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations

Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Team size 3.42 1.68 —
2. Source credibility 3.54 0.61 −.21 —
3. Longevity 1.07 0.89 .20 −14 —
4. Team affective reaction to setback 2.40 0.83 .21 −.76** .04 —
5. Team cognitive experience of setback 2.50 1.06 −.10 −.15 −.03 .51** —
6. Team reflexivity 3.84 0.68 −.22 .00 −.17 .17 −.02 —
7. Team learning 4.19 0.55 .01 .01 −.04 −.04 .32* .46** —

Note. N = 57 teams. *p < .05. **p < .01 (two‐tailed tests).

and Curran (2005). This technique mathematically derives the regions
of significance for the conditional effects within an interaction effect,
that is, the values within the range of the moderator in which the asso-
ciation between team affective reactions to an experienced setback
and team learning is significantly different from zero (Dawson, 2014;
Hayes, 2013). Moreover, this technique allows for plotting confidence
bands for the conditional effects (Bauer & Curran, 2005). In this vein,
this technique overcomes the general problem of the more popular
simple slope tests to probe interaction effects, which are based on
significance tests of the slopes for a limited number, and often arbi-
trarily chosen, values of the moderator (Bauer & Curran, 2005; Daw-
son, 2014). In contrast, the Johnson–Neyman technique allows for
systematically probing the strength of the conditional effects across
the moderator variable's complete range (Bauer & Curran, 2005).
4.2 | Hypothesis tests
Table 2 contains the results of our hypothesis tests. In the following,
we report the unstandardized regression coefficients for all results.
None of the control variables showed a statistically significant effect
on the outcome variable team learning.
Hypothesis 1 predicted the relationship between team affective
reactions to setbacks and team learning to be moderated by team reflex-
ivity. In line with this prediction, we did find a significant interaction
effect between team affective reactions to an experienced setback and
team reflexivity on team learning (Model 3: b = .33, t = 3.40, p < .01).
Moreover, adding the interaction of team affective reactions to an expe-
rienced setback and team reflexivity into the regression equation
resulted in a significant increase of R2. To test whether the nature of
the significant interaction effect between team affective reactions to
an experienced setback is in line with our predictions in Hypothesis 1
(i.e., high levels of team reflexivity result in a positive relationship
between team affective reactions to setbacks and team learning,
whereas low levels of team reflexivity result in a negative relationship
between team affective reactions to setbacks and team learning), we for-
mally probed the interaction with the Johnson–Neyman technique
(Bauer & Curran, 2005; Dawson, 2014; Hayes & Matthes, 2009).
Figure 2 plots the confidence bands around the conditional effect (the
dark line) of team affective reactions to an experienced setback on team
learning across the distribution of team reflexivity (on the horizontal
axis). The vertical axis represents the coefficient of the relationship
between team affective response to an experienced setback and team
learning (i.e., the conditional effect). The dashed lines in the diagram rep-
resent the upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval around
the conditional effect. We mean centered team reflexivity at zero for this
illustration. The points at which the confidence interval is wholly above
or below zero depict the range of values of the moderator team reflexiv-
ity for which there is a significant relationship between team affective
reactions to an experienced setback and team learning. Applying the
95% region to calculate the regions of significance, we calculated the

TABLE 2 Results of regression analysis

DV: Team learning
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable b SE t p b SE t p b SE t p
Team size .01 0.05 0.13 .90 −.01 0.04 −0.17 .87 −.02 0.03 −0.65 .52
Source credibility .01 0.13 0.05 .96 −.07 0.15 −0.47 .64 .01 0.14 0.07 .95
Longevity −.03 0.09 −0.29 .78 −.02 0.07 −0.29 .77 −.03 0.06 −0.46 .65
Team affective reaction to setback (TAS) −.06 0.12 −0.46 .65 −.05 0.11 −0.47 .64
Team cognitive perception of setback (TCS) −.15 0.06 −2.37* .02 −.13 0.06 −2.01 .05
Team reflexivity (TR) .50 0.09 5.82** .00 .51 0.08 6.19** .00
TCS × TR −.13 0.09 1.55 .13
TAS × TR .33 0.10 3.40** .00
ΔR2 .47** .10**
2
R .00 .47 .58
F .03 7.52** 8.15**

Note. N = 57 teams. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. *p < .05. **p < .01 (two‐tailed tests).
790
FIGURE 2 Johnson–Neyman regions of significance for the
conditional effect of team affective reaction to setback at values of
mean‐centered team reflexivity
lower bound estimate (i.e., the value of the moderator beyond which the
coefficient of the relationships between team affective reactions to an
experienced setback and team learning becomes significantly negative)
to be 3.21, whereas the upper bound estimate (i.e., the value beyond
which the coefficient becomes significantly positive) was 4.99. That
means that when the score of team reflexivity is .63 below the mean
or smaller, the effect of team affective reactions to an experienced set-
back is significantly negative, whereas when team reflexivity is at least
1.15 above the mean, this effect is significantly positive. In between
these two values, the relationship between team affective reactions to
an experienced setback and team learning is not significant. In sum,
these results support Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 predicted the relationship between team cognitive
perceptions of setbacks and team learning to be contingent upon team
reflexivity. Although our regression analysis yielded a marginally signif-
icant negative direct effect (Model 3: b = −.13, t = −2.01 p = .05) of
team cognitive perceptions of an experienced setback, we could
not identify a significant interaction effect between team cognitive
perceptions of an experienced setback and team reflexivity on team
learning (Model 3: b = −.13, t = 1.55, p = .13). Hypothesis 2 is thus
not supported by our results.
5 | DISCUSSION
In this study, we examined the role of team‐experienced setbacks for
team learning. Our results show that team reflexivity moderates the
relationship between team affective reactions to an experienced set-
backs and team learning, as this relationship is negative when team
reflexivity is low and positive when team reflexivity is high. For team
cognitive perceptions of a setback and team learning, our analyses
indicate a negative relationship that is not moderated by team reflexiv-
ity. These findings bear several implications for theory development on
team learning from setbacks.
5.1 | Theoretical implications
First, this study addressed a long‐standing disagreement in the
literature regarding the relationship between setbacks and learning
RAUTER ET AL.
(see, e.g., Ellis et al., 2006; Shepherd et al., 2013; Sitkin, 1992). Intro-
ducing team reflexivity as a moderating variable, we refine theory
and contribute to the ongoing discussion of the relationship between
setbacks and learning, which has not yet reached a consensus (Zhao,
2011). In line with our conceptual arguments based on the SCT
(Bandura, 1991), the results provide evidence for the moderating influ-
ence of team reflexivity when focusing on the affective experience
connected to a setback. Teams low in reflexivity displayed a negative
relationship between team‐experienced setbacks and team learning,
which is in line with theory suggesting that the negative affect con-
nected to a setback is likely to stifle learning processes (Fredrickson
& Branigan, 2005; Frijda, 1988; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009). At the
same time, teams high in reflexivity tended to show a positive relation-
ship between team affective reactions to experienced setbacks and
team learning. This is in accordance with the competing theoretical
perspective that the negative affect connected to a setback can direct
a team's attention to the need to revise and improve their practices
(Cacioppo et al., 1999; Shepherd et al., 2013; Weick et al., 2005).
Therefore, an important theoretical implication of our research derives
from the elaboration of the key role that team reflexivity plays in
determining the direction of the relationship between team‐experi-
enced setbacks and team learning when focusing on the affective
experience of a setback. In this vein, team reflexivity constitutes an
important team capability that helps a team to constructively face
the negative affective consequences of setbacks (Bandura, 1991; Ste-
phens et al., 2013). This emphasizes related evidence (Ruttan &
Nordgren, 2016) regarding the importance of self‐regulatory capacities
for constructively (vs. defensively) processing information transmitted
through negative feedback. As such, our findings imply that subse-
quent theorizing and research on team affect should consider the role
of team processes such as reflexivity.
Second, our SCT‐based theorizing and empirical evidence suggest
a general difference in the learning consequences of an affective reac-
tion versus a cognitive perception of a setback. This holds important
implications for future theorizing on learning from failure, given that
setback experiences are not only different in degree but also different
in kind. This is in line with research on the experience of situations in
which there is a discrepancy between expected and actual results.
In this literature, researchers have emphasized the pronounced signal-
ing character of negative affective reactions, which is seen as key to
understand why certain occurrences trigger learning processes at all
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). The same might apply for learning in
that without such an affective trigger, the attention of a team might
not be directed to the urgent need of adapting something. Irrespective
of the actual mechanisms that led to this generally negative relation-
ship between team cognitive perceptions of a setback and team learn-
ing, our results clearly point to the need to differentiate between the
affective and cognitive components of experienced setbacks in the
study of consequences of setbacks. Relatedly, Cannon and Edmondson
(2001) state that the size or scope of a setback is not necessarily pro-
portional to the amount or significance of learning. Instead, the team's
affection provides the baseline for making use of the setback's learning
potential. Without such a differentiation, more nuanced relationships
and mechanisms might be obscured. Due to these differences between
the affective and cognitive experiences of setbacks, our findings
RAUTER ET AL.
suggest that teams should not intentionally experience setbacks, which
is not in line with literature that praises setbacks as valuable
experiences that might even be strategically targeted (McGrath,
1999; Sitkin, 1992).
Third, given that the majority of studies on learning after setbacks
have focused on the individual level (e.g., Carmeli & Gittell, 2009;
Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003; Yamakawa et al., 2015), we extend this
theory by focusing on the team level. First, this view is relevant to
theory, as setbacks are often collectively experienced by team
members (Välikangas et al., 2009; Wang & Chugh, 2014), and learning
as a team is important for continuing a common endeavor and being
successful (Edmondson & Nembhard, 2009; Gatewood et al., 1995).
With our integration of team‐level constructs into the context of
setbacks, we also contribute to the general premise in the literature
that learning is socially bounded (Bandura & McClelland, 1977;
Wilson et al., 2007). This means that mutual reinforcement encourages
learning, which makes learning more likely after setbacks. This notion is
supported by the view that teams are the fundamental learning unit
within organizations (Jiang et al., 2016; Schippers et al., 2013).
Moreover, considering collective learning as a driver for entrepreneur-
ial processes (Wang & Chugh, 2014), we provide an investigation of
this construct in a context familiar to most entrepreneurial teams,
especially during early start‐up phases.
Finally, team reflexivity's moderating role was not found for the
cognitive portion of teams' setback experience. A possible reason
for this could be that benefiting from team cognitive perceptions of
setbacks in terms of learning might require more time. Possibly, if
team members engage in reflexivity a few days after a setback, com-
pared with during or immediately after, they can actually benefit more
from it (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). Corresponding to the time
factor of learning and given that learning often constitutes a continu-
ous process (Kolb, 2015), cognitive perceptions may lead to another
form of learning. For example, a team might initially only realize
where it lacks in strength and where it thus needs to develop their
skills. This might not lead to prompt learnings, but to knowledge on
a meta‐level about how to align future team development (Kayes,
Kayes, & Kolb, 2005). Alternatively, the activation following a cogni-
tive perception of a setback might not suffice to activate awareness
of the need to learn to the same extent as the affective experience
of a setback does. Consequently, even highly reflective teams would
not be more likely to learn after the cognitive perception of a setback
than they would generally (and as is indicated by the strong positive
direct effect between team reflexivity and team learning in our
models). Then, only the assumed negative effects of experienced set-
backs on learning, such as a decline of motivation or an enhanced fear
of failure following the setback, would apply in the case of team cog-
nitive perceptions of setbacks (e.g., Morgan & Sisak, 2016; Zingoni &
Byron, 2017), which would result in the observed negative
relationship.
5.2 | Limitations and future research
Our research has several limitations that could serve as starting points
for future research. The setting of our study was a business plan
competition, and therefore, the start‐up teams' experienced setbacks
791
also pertained to this setting. Future studies are needed to investigate
how teams react to experienced setbacks in other contexts, such as
innovation projects (Moenkemeyer et al., 2012), to replicate our
findings and to discover whether they are generalizable across many
contexts in which setbacks occur. Also, it might be a worthwhile
approach to specifically explore the nature of feedback in the context
of organizational teams and how feedback can be delivered without
creating a team setback.
Furthermore, future research might focus on long‐term effects of
setbacks in terms of how learning depends on the peculiar characteris-
tics of a setback situation. In this regard, a study with a third measure-
ment time would be helpful to investigate longer term outcomes,
which was not possible in our study. For instance, it would be interest-
ing to analyze how experienced setbacks influence the longevity of
start‐up teams. In this regard, it should be considered that setbacks
may create team conflicts, which can endanger entrepreneurial
projects. Applied to organizational teams, team conflicts arising from
experienced setbacks in one project could also obstruct further
teamwork on other projects (Välikangas et al., 2009).
Moreover, in our study, negative affective reaction to and cogni-
tive perception of the performance feedback as a win or defeat served
as indicators of a setback. Although these measures are appropriate
measures to capture the degree of the affective and cognitive
experience of an encounter as a setback (Bhanji & Delgado, 2014;
Jenkins et al., 2014; Pierce et al., 2001), the literature remains silent
on a unified definition of setbacks. Regarding learning, the literature
primarily concentrates on setbacks characterized as the termination
of projects and entrepreneurial ventures (Moenkemeyer et al., 2012;
Shepherd et al., 2011; Välikangas et al., 2009) and leaves out that
teams also experience setbacks that do not inevitably result in termina-
tion (Gatewood et al., 1995). Problem solving in the wake of setbacks
is an important task in preventing the termination of a project or
venture in the first place (Sitkin, 1992). In this regard, negative
emotions and subjective appraisals seem to be a promising starting
area to further explore setbacks and their effects (Bhanji &
Delgado, 2014; Jenkins et al., 2014).
Additionally, our study might have self‐selection bias regarding
the characteristics of the participating teams. Teams that agree to
collaborate with researchers could be more learning oriented than less
cooperative teams. Further information on respective team character-
istics in future studies may be helpful to completely rule out this
possibility. For example, given the nature of the sample, we did not
have information about the financial viability of the start‐ups, which
might result in different extents of pressure acting on the start‐up
teams and their learning orientation. As touched upon above, taking
into account our finding that even a high level of team reflexivity did
not result in a positive effect of team cognitive perceptions of a
setback on learning, it might be worthwhile to look at other team
resources that might help teams to learn from setbacks, such as emo-
tion‐focused responses to setbacks (Byrne & Shepherd, 2015; Singh
et al., 2007; Stephens et al., 2013) or the belief that ability can change
through effort (Zingoni & Byron, 2017). In this regard, there is a consid-
erable amount of research that concentrates on positive psychological
resources and resilience and their effects on processing adverse
experiences, which might be worthwhile to apply to the study of
792
team‐experienced setbacks (e.g., Bullough, Renko, & Myatt, 2014;
Newman, Ucbasaran, Zhu, & Hirst, 2014; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004).
5.3 | Practical implications
Our study has several practical implications. Our findings suggest that
team‐experienced setbacks should be carefully dealt with in order to
avoid negative influences on team learning. Considering the identified
moderating effect of team reflexivity, a team is well advised to train
reflexivity and hence strengthen the ability to systematically process
information and question current beliefs and working procedures.
Especially after adversity, teams often apply destructive behaviors to
work through underlying problems, such as mutual blaming or working
harder but not smarter (Schippers et al., 2013). Then, team reflexivity
could provide a constructive approach aimed at learning and improving
future performance (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005;
West, 2004). In this regard, leadership and training may be practical
interventions that support the development of team reflexivity
(Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, & Nägele, 2007; Schippers, Den Hartog,
Koopman, & van Knippenberg, 2008). Team reflexivity should thus
be fostered by supporting the team to constantly reassess goals and
think about the consequences of actions regarding its endeavor.
However, at the same time, our research shows that learning
from setbacks is not a trivial process and setbacks can obstruct team
learning. Hence, managers need to consider adequate measures to
support teams that have experienced setbacks. In this regard,
Edmondson (1999) mentions that context support and coaching on
behalf of the team leader can help foster team learning. In start‐up
teams, a clear leader is often not available, as leader roles are often
shared among team members (Kamm, Shuman, Seeger, & Nurick,
1990; Klotz et al., 2014). It could, however, be beneficial to assign
an external coach or a team member to be available for consultation
in the context of setbacks and to discuss negative feelings. These
conditions might help teams that experience setbacks on a daily basis,
such as entrepreneurial, health care, or innovation teams (e.g.,
Edmondson, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011; Välikangas et al., 2009),
to find a lever for dealing with emotional distress to encourage team
members' learning behaviors.
6 | C O N CL U S I O N
A structured understanding of factors that influence team learning
from setbacks remains elusive to both practitioners and scholars. The
current study provides a step towards reconciling conflicting views
on the consequences of teams' setback experiences for team learning
by identifying team reflexivity as an important moderator of this rela-
tionship. As such, our study demonstrates the need to distinguish
between the affective and cognitive experiences of a setback.
Although the affective portion of the setback experience does hold
positive potential for learning after a setback experience, depending
on a team's reflexivity, the cognitive portion of the setback experience
does not and tends to imply generally negative consequences for team
learning. We hope that our study stimulates further research in order
RAUTER ET AL.
to develop a comprehensive theory on the conditions that facilitate
or hamper team learning from setbacks.
ORCID
Matthias Weiss http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0447-760X
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Susanne Rauter is a research assistant and doctoral candidate at
Ludwig‐Maximilians‐Universität München (Munich, Germany) at
the Institute for Leadership and Organization. Her research
focuses on antecedents and outcomes of learning from failure
and setbacks in organizations.
Matthias Weiss is an assistant professor at Ludwig‐Maximilians‐
Universität München (Munich, Germany) at the Institute for Lead-
ership and Organization. Before joining LMU, he was postdoc at
WHU‐Otto Beisheim School of Management and visiting
researcher at Bocconi University Milan. His research focuses on
aspects such as resilience, teamwork, and leadership.
Martin Hoegl is a professor at Ludwig‐Maximilians‐Universität
München (Munich, Germany), where he heads the Institute for
Leadership and Organization. He has over 15 years of experience
in working with companies on matters of leadership, organization,
and innovation. His main research interests include leadership, col-
laboration, and innovation in organizations.
How to cite this article: Rauter S, Weiss M, Hoegl M. Team
learning from setbacks: A study in the context of start‐up teams.
J Organ Behav. 2018;39:783–795. https://doi.org/10.1002/
job.2278