Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services G.R. No.

167614 March 24, 2009 Non-impairment of Contract

Clause, OFW Employment Contract

FACTS:

For Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, does not magnify the contributions of OFWs to national development, but
exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal
dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract “or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” (subject clause). Petitioner
claims that the last clause violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their
contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

ISSUE:

Does the 5th paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the
Constitution?

RULING:

NO. The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws
already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the
non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted
that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that
R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties.
Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have
incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
MERALCO vs Lim G.R. No. 184769 Writ of Habeas Data
Oct 5 2010
FACTS:

Respondent Cherry Lim works as an administrative clerk at MERALCO. The HR directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa due to reports that there were accusations
and threats directed against her from unknown individuals, which could possibly compromise her
safety and security.

Lim appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings
on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process.
Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of
the provisions on job security of their CBA, respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats
to her security.

Lim filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners claiming petitioners’
unlawful act and omission consisting of the latter failing to inform her of the cause of her transfer
amounting to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.

Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return
containing the following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly
received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and
the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining petitioners from effecting her
transfer.

The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Writ of Habeas Data is the proper remedy.

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.

Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo
and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the
terms and conditions of ones employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-
quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real
intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue
is labor-related.
CASE DIGEST: DIAMOND TAXI V.
LLAMAS, JR. (G.R. NO. 190724; MARCH
12, 2014)

CASE DIGEST: DIAMOND TAXI and/or BRYAN ONG v. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.

FACTS: Respondent Llamas, a taxi driver for petitioner Diamond Taxi (owned and operated by
Petitioner Bryan Ong), filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.
Denying the charge against them, petitioners alleged that respondent has been absent without official
leave for several days from July 14, 2005 until August 1, 2005. They submitted a copy of the
attendance logbook showing that respondent has been absent on the said dates. They claimed that
respondent has violated several traffic regulations in the years of 2000-2005 and that they issued to
him several memoranda for insubordination and refusal to heed management instructions. They
further claimed that the aforementioned acts constituted as grounds for the termination of Llamas
Employment.

Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper. Hence, the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent
complaint for lack of merit. Respondent filed his position paper and claimed that he failed to
seasonably file his position paper because his previous counsel, despite his repeated pleas, had
continuously deferred compliance with the LA orders for its submission. Hence, he was forced to
secure the services of another counsel in order to comply with the LA directive.

In his position paper, Llamas alleged that he had a misunderstanding with Aljuver Ong, Bryan brother
and operations manager of Diamond Taxi, on July 13, 2005. He reported for work on July 14, 2005 but
Bryan refused to give him the key to his assigned taxi cab unless he would sign a prepared resignation
letter. He did not sign the resignation letter. He reported for work again on July 15 and 16, 2005, but
Bryan insisted that he sign the resignation letter prior to the release of the key to his assigned taxi cab.
Hence, the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint.

Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its decision dismissing his complaint. The LA
treated Llamas Motion as an appeal. The NLRC dismissed for non-perfection Llamas Motion. It pointed
out that Llamas failed to attach the required certification of non-forum shopping per Section 4, Rule VI
of the 2005 NLRC Rules. Llamas moved to reconsider NLRC resolution and attached the required
certification of non-forum shopping in his motion but the same was denied which impelled Llamas to
file a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA reversed and set aside the assailed NLRC resolution and ruled that the NLRC had acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Llamas' appeal purely on a technicality. The CA ruled
further that petitioners failed to prove overt acts showing Llamas' clear intention to abandon his job.
It was found, however, that petitioners placed Llamas in a situation where he was forced to quit as his
continued employment has been rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, i.e., making him sign
a resignation letter as a precondition for giving him the key to his assigned taxi cab. These acts
amounted to constructive dismissal. The CA additionally noted that Llamas immediately filed the
illegal dismissal case that proved his desire to return to work and negates the charge of abandonment.

ISSUES: [1] Whether or not the CA encroached on the NLRC exclusive jurisdiction to review the merits
of the LA decision?
[2] Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Llamas' appeal on
mere technicality?
[3] Whether or not Llamas abandoned his work?

HELD: The Court found no error in the course that the CA took in resolving Llamas' petition for
certiorari. The CA may resolve factual issues by express legal mandate and pursuant to its equity
jurisdiction.

The CA, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, can grant prerogative writs when it finds
that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at its factual conclusions. To make this
finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to determine if the NLRC ruling had basis in
evidence. It is in the sense and manner that the CA, in a Rule 65 certiorari petition before it, had to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion on factual issues attended the NLRC dismissal of Llamas'
appeal.

Dismissal of an appeal based on mere technicalities inconsistent to the constitutional mandate to

protect labor

The Court agreed with the CA in ruling that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Llamas' appeal.

Article 227 of the Labor Code mandates that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters
shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. A strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, should not be allowed.
The CA correctly regarded the respondent as constructively dismissed. Constructive dismissal exists
when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely.

Petitioners failed to establish the alleged abandonment of respondent. Mere absence of the employee
does not constitute abandonment. It was pointed out by the CA that Llamas filed the complaint two
days from the third time he was refused access to his assigned taxi cab. Respondent could not be
deemed to have abandoned his work.

Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506 laid down the elements of abandonment: 1) x x x
the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) x x x there must have been a clear intention [on the part of the employee]
to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act. DENIED.