1. G.R. No.

139250 August 15, 2000

GABRIEL CAPILI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA G.R. CR No. 19336 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Gabriel Capili, et. al." affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court2 of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 34, finding
Gabriel Capili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Presidential Decree 1612.
Gabriel Capili y Recto (GABRIEL) together with his wife Ferma Capili y Inot were charged with violation of Presidential Decree 1612, otherwise known
as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information that reads:
"That on or about November 5, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other. With intent to gain for themselves or for another, did then and there willfully and knowingly receive, possess, keep, acquire and sell or dispose of the
following, to wit:
Assorted pieces of jewelry
Several pieces of old coins (U.S. dollar)
all valued at ₱3,000,000.00, which they knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of a (sic) crime of theft.
Contrary to law."3
On December 3, 1993, both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged with the assistance of counsel.4 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
"x x x xxx xxx
Christine Diokno testified that at 4:00 P.M. on November 4, 1993, when she went home from her office, she discovered that some of her (sic) items at (sic)
her closet and the jewelries (sic) and money at (sic) her mother’s room were taken. Upon call, two Makati police responded and surveyed the room where
the robbery took place. The police officer took her statement (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-2") and then investigated the theft case. Police prepared the police
report and concluded that Michael Manzo, her former houseboy, committed the offense so a case against Manzo was filed. She described all the properties
that were taken as those reflected in the police report because according to her she gave the police a list of the items and is part of her statement (tsn, p. 11,
May 11, 1994). Allegedly the value is about 3 Million pesos, some were of 20 years and some were of 30 years vintage, acquired by her parents since their
wedding in 1945. Some from abroad, States or Hongkong acquired during trips.
On November 27, 1993, Quiapo sub-station informed her that Michael Manzo was there. She talked to Michael Manzo who admitted the commission of
the stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili and his wife for ₱50,000.00. Likewise Michael Manzo admitted that on two occasions Gabriel
Capili returned some of the items. The first was before he went to Isabela. That Capili returned to him (Manzo) the memorabilia taken from her room
consisting of (sic) school ring, bracelets, key chain and some custom jewelries (sic) and some other items. That three days before the apprehension Gabriel
returned the Raymond Wiel watch and two cast rings with diamonds. The first ring is valued at ₱3,000.00 the second watch was (sic) cost ₱20,000.00 to
₱60,000.00 and the two cast rings about P80,000.00. Then Manzo informed her that he sold those items returned to other buyers, near Claro M. Recto, who
paid ₱1,500.00 and ₱1,000.00 for the ring which police officer (sic) failed to recover because the stand was no longer there. She was shown by the police
officer the items recovered from Gabriel Capili and his wife which she identified as her property. Shown with Exhs. "A", "B", "C", she said those are her
properties and that the coins (sic) were acquired during the trips to the States. She kept John F. Kennedy dollar coins contained in a small box. She further
relayed that the coins, Exh. "A" came from a brooch owned by her mother. The chain with medal of our Lady was bought by her mother and was given to
her together with other belongings.
That before the discovery of the incident her mother had the list of all the items by counting them physically because her mother used to check the jewelry
every week in her presence. That all is worth three (3) Million Pesos because the jewelries (sic) were sometimes brought to a jeweler for a change or for
removal of stones or replacement that is why she considered that all the jewelries (sic) were appraised. She does not know, however, what exactly were
brought by her mother. That she was present during the last inventory of the items and the land titles by her mother, presenting the alleged inventory on
August 1, 1993 (Exh. "S"), after her father died on July 15, 1993. While her mother was checking them, she was in the room writing the description of the
jewelries (sic), the cost and date when bought. That the corresponding value stated came from her mother kept inside the vault.
That on November 2, 1993, she took out all the items because November 9 was her mother’s birthday and would like to select the items she and her mother
were going to wear for the occasion then check the jewelries (sic) against the prepared list. The list included the items lost but did not include the box of
memorabilia which was taken from her room. She claimed that the records including the receipts from where the list was taken were lost together with the
jewelries (sic) that were taken.
xxx xxx xxx
To support the allegation in the Information Michael Manzo testified that after he asked his friend Emilio Benitez where he can sell his jewelries (sic) he
was brought to Boy Recto’s (accused) house at 1260 Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, to whom he gave one bag of jewelries (sic) with the information that he
stole them while he was a house boy. Recto agreed to pay him ₱50,000.00 (p. 3, tsn, March 3, 1994). He left and went back after a week or on November 5,
as he needed the money. He was paid ₱1,500.00. He left again and went back after two weeks and was paid again ₱6,000.00. He left again but in his return
he was not paid anymore.
When he visited his friend Emilio Benitez at the precinct, having been charged with vagrancy, he was caught by the police asking him where he brought
the jewelries (sic), so he pointed to Boy Recto, who was picked-up and brought to the station and investigated. During the frisking and searching at the
station, police officers found pearls and old coins from Gabriel Capili. The following day, Mrs. Ferma Capili was investigated at sub-station 3, Quiapo,
WPD.
He identified the pearl earring with copper (sic) with diamond (Exh. "A"). He likewise identified the old coin 4 pieces of dollars marked as Exhs. "B-1",
"B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"; "B-1", "B-2" dimes, "B-3" and "B-4" quarter cents; pendant with inscription Boy Recto, Exh. "C". He admitted that the statement
marked as Exh. "D" and sub-markings is his.
Describing the contents of the bag, he said that there were more or less 20 pieces of rings, some with pearls and some with diamonds and birthstones; more
or less 20 pairs of earrings, diamond with pearls; more or less 10 pieces of necklaces of plain gold with pendant with the replica of God and cast with
diamond. There were Quartz watches; 3 pieces Bulova watches; 5 pieces of Seiko watches, Raymond Wiel. That per complainant’s information, all of them
costs (sic) 3 Million Pesos which he merely gave to the accused without counting them. He however, claims that they will cost only one to two million
pesos. Despite which value, he entrusted them to Boy Recto without counting the pieces.
Defense adopted Exhibit "B" as Exhibit "1" and sub-markings, Exhibit "D" as their Exhibit "2" and "2-a".
That during the investigation, when he was given another lawyer, he stated that he told the accused to sell the jewelries (sic) he stole. (p. 6, tsn, March 16,
1994)
That witness explained that only the fancy ones were returned to him.
That three days after he left the jewelries (sic) to (sic) Recto, they had drinking session somewhere at Recto, on which occasion, he did not ask for the
jewelries (sic).
That the ₱1,500.00 was given to him near the bus terminal at Sampaloc near UST and when the fancies (sic) were returned, which he came to know as such
because he had it appraised in a pawnshop when they arrived from Roxas, Isabela. When the jewelries (sic) were returned contained in the bag, he
accepted, opened (sic) for a couple of minutes without counting. That Emilio Benitez glanced on (sic) them because the bus was about leave. Recto gave
the instruction that he can come back within two weeks because Boy Recto will pay.
The witness admitted that he is facing a charge of Qualified Theft in Makati pending before a court where he posted his bail. That he is testifying before
this Court out of his own volition. He explained that they went to Isabela per instruction of Gabriel Capili that they should lie low because the police were
hunting for them and that Emilio Benitez is from Roxas, Isabela.
After more or less two weeks when (sic) they arrived from Isabela, he was requested by Boy Recto (Gabriel Capili) to sign a blank document somewhere at
Espana (Document Exh. "3" to "3-A"). He was not, however, forced. That upon arrival from Isabela, they went to the house of the accused then proceeded
to wait at a hotel in Sta. Cruz. After three hours of waiting, the accused arrived and gave him ₱6,000.00 in the presence of Emilio Benitez without receipt.
He declared that he himself is not sure whether all the jewelries (sic) inside the bag are (sic) genuine or not.
Having admitted to the police that he is Michael Manzo, he was asked where he brought the jewelries (sic) so he pointed to Boy Recto. He admitted to
have signed a blank document, Exhibit "4" and "3", his signature, Exh. "4-1" and Exh."3-A", but do (sic) not know where the originals were, but later said
that the originals are in the hands of the police officers.
SPO3 Ernesto Ramirez testified that as police officer of Station 3, on November 27, 1993 he investigated Michael Manzo who was accused of Qualified
Theft at Makati and who admitted to him having committed said offense and pointed to the house of Gabriel Capili at Sampaloc, Manila where he sold the
jewelries (sic). Thereafter, he and his companions SPO2 Reyes, SPO3 Salalia and SPO3 Fuentes with Michael Manzo went to the place and saw the wife of
Gabriel Capili wearing the pair of earrings, one of the jewelries (sic) stolen. They were allowed by Gabriel Capili to get (sic) inside the residence where
Gabriel Capili showed him the signed document of Michael Manzo, Exh. "4" and said he returned the jewelries (sic). It was however, denied by Manzo
although he admitted the signature. Gabriel Capili went with them to the police precinct where he (Gabriel Capili) was referred to the investigator and
found (sic) from his pockets 4 pieces of coins. Allegedly while the wife was then being investigated, Manzo pointed to the earrings worn by the (sic) wife
as part of those stolen properties. The same was taken by the investigator. He pointed to both accused inside the courtroom.
SPO1 Eduardo San Diego also from Station 3, Quiapo, Manila, investigator, investigated the case of Qualified Theft that happened at the house of Cristine
Diokno. Both accused were positively identified by Michael Manzo so he took the latter’s statement. That during his investigation he recovered a necklace
with pendant, US dollar coins with different denominations and one pair of earrings (Exh. "A", "B" and "C"). In their investigation they tried to recover the
other items but failed because the establishment of the other buyer pointed to them by Michael Manzo was no longer existing. He prepared the booking
sheet and arrest report Exhs. "D" and "E" and sub-markings.
xxx xxx xxx
Gabriel Capili denied any knowledge about the charge against him and declared that what Michael Manzo stated in court that he agreed to pay ₱50,000.00
but paid only ₱1,800.00 is not true. He was at home on November 10, 1993 selling junk foods (sic) when he was called by Emil, companion of Michael
Manzo, through the phone which number he gave to Emil when the latter bought something on credit from him a week before that date. Emil asked him if
he would like to buy jewelry to whom he relayed if he will see the jewelry. Emil arrived at 2:00 o’clock P.M. together with Michael Manzo, the first time
he saw the latter and showed him two (2) pieces of jewelry, one birthstone and an old coin with a price of ₱2,000.00. He inquired from (sic) where the
jewelries (sic) came from and was answered by Michael Manzo that it came from and (sic) being sold by his mother. He declined because he cannot pay
for it. Michael Manzo handed to Emil something wrapped of which he was asked to appraise. Michael Manzo asked him if he knew somebody who can
buy. He said he has but hard to see because he seldom see the man already but was invited to see the person at Recto. After boarding the taxi they did not
proceed immediately to the place. Michael Manzo ordered the taxi cab to go back to Sta. Mesa Love Hotel where he was told to wait. Michael Manzo went
up the hotel while Emil went towards Aurora Boulevard walking carrying some items but did not know what happened. After one hour of waiting at the
taxicab and worried about the taxi fare, he went inside the hotel and after inquiring from the counter where his companion was, Michael Manzo went down
with two women companions. Fifteen minutes after the two women left, Emil arrived and said he went to Cubao selling the jewelries (sic). Thereafter, they
went to Recto at (sic) a business establishment near the Galaxy Theater. He was offered to drink from almost dark until dawn asking him if he had already
find (sic) his friend buyer. They parted ways and went home.
On November 15, Manzo and Emil called him up again asking if it was possible to see him which he positively answered. He went to UST somewhere
near Mambusco station where he saw Emil with Michael Manzo about 5 meters from Emil standing talking to someone. He asked Emil if he was able to
sell the jewelries (sic) and was answered "not yet". Emil was borrowing ₱700.00 but he has no such amount, so Emil gave him the jewelries (sic) formerly
offered to him, the birthstone and watch allegedly as a gift from Michael Manzo. Emil informed him that he and Michael Manzo together with two others
were going to Isabela so he gave the ₱700.00. After they (Emil and his friend) boarded the bus he went home.
On November 21, he was fetched by Emil, brought to a place near the UST along Dapitan Street where he found Michael Manzo retrieving the gift given
to him. Because of Manzo’s insistence, he returned them but asked Manzo to sign Exh. "3". They failed to return his ₱700.00 so he asked Manzo to sign
another documents (sic), Exhs. "4" and "4-A", the original of which was given to the policeman and which was not returned to him.
After several days Pat. Ramirez arrived informing him that Michael Manzo sold him jewelries (sic). Invited (sic) he went to the police at the Hidalgo sub-
station 3. Michael Manzo was not immediately investigated but Michael Manzo and Emil were incarcerated. After fifteen (15) minutes from the second
floor he was brought to the ground floor inside the cell and detained for several days. He alleged that on the same day he was brought in a room at the
second floor where he was mauled by Pat. Ramirez (sic) not convinced with what he said about the paper (Exh. "4"), he gave them then brought back to the
cell. He told the police that the jewelries (sic) they are looking for are in the possession of Michael Manzo. He further claimed that Michael Manzo talked
to a certain Go and pointed to some other buyers who were brought to the precinct. He, however, did not know if they were released. On November 27
when his wife visited him at 7:00 P.M. she was likewise incarcerated because Michael Manzo pointed to the earrings of his wife.
He further declared that prior to his wife’s arrival, policeman and Michael planned that when his wife arrived, Michael will point to her earrings, allegedly
because Emil gave ₱500.00 to the police officer while planning to include his wife. His wife was then brought to the second floor but did not know what
happened, thereafter was incarcerated.
He testified that the earrings of his wife was given by her brother and that the old coin, Exh. "B" is his acquired when he helped, per order of Pat. Nick
Golahan, in carrying dead body (sic) when MV Nucnucan sank in Cebu where the son of one he carried gave him coin. The other coin belongs to him
which he picked up in Cebu. That the necklace with print Boy Recto on the pendant belongs to him and which was taken at the precinct from the dancer to
whom he gave it. Further stating that the same came from Pat. Alex Aguirre when he was still single.
That upon inquest, the Fiscal told the police that they should be released but were not and (sic) brought back to the cell. The following morning they were
brought to the City Hall. There again, the Fiscal ordered that they be released but were not and (sic) brought back to the cell once more. On the third time
when he was brought to the Fiscal, the latter allegedly told him that San Diego altered the testimony that is why they will be incarcerated.
He denied that Manzo signed Exh. "3" without any writing and pointed to the typewritten statement therein as his relaying that the same was thru Michael’s
suggestion at the time when they were already quarreling while accusing Manzo to have stolen the properties subject matter of this case and even
questioned that there is something wrongly written, the giving as a gift.
That although they did not know the accused Michael Manzo and did not know of any reason why he pointed to him and his wife as buyers of the jewelries
(sic) worth 3 Million Pesos, he believed that it was because of the quarrel when he started accusing Manzo of stealing of which he was being blamed.
He now claims that the he came to know Emilio Benitez only on November 5, the same time he came to know Michael. (tsn, p. 22, Aug. 8, 1994), hence,
there is no reason why Benitez will approach him selling the property. There is no quarrel with the police officers and so he has no knowledge why these
people would like to implicate him and his wife. He likewise did not know of any reason why the police officer stated in their affidavit of arrest that the
items "US Dollars" were recovered from him at the time of the investigation. He admitted that only one of the coins belongs to him, picked-up from Cebu
(Exh. "B-4") and his two (2) LRT coins are still missing so with P20.00 and two more Abraham Lincoln coins. Although he claimed that San Diego did not
release them after the Fiscal’s order he did not file any action against San Diego. That on December 1, 1993, the Prosecutor ordered the police to release
them and was present asking the Fiscal if he can be allowed to go home but since they did not have any document, the Fiscal said the policemen will take
care of them. They did not execute any statement because according to him he was not given any chance.
SPO1 Beinvenido Inot testified that he is a member of the National Police Force of Precinct 1, Olongapo City and that the accused Ferma Capili, wife of
Gabriel, is his sister. He was asked by his sister to testify about the pair of earring (sic) that he gave Ferma on June 24, 1990, a U. S. Fancy jewel which
was given by her sister from abroad. It has brillantitos which is the same as a base of the glass. The same was confiscated from Ferma by the police.
The last time he saw the pair of earring was on the date his sister celebrated her birthday. Showing all the exhibits of the prosecution to the witness, at first
he answered "There are no brillantitos pair of earrings, sir.". And later witness answered: "Ay ito pala." (holding the pair of earrings marked as Exh. "A-1",
tsn p. 5, Oct. 14, 1994). He later claimed that the pair of earrings is actually for his wife sent by her sister abroad to Olongapo. He cannot remember having
seen Ferma Capili on December 1993 to September 9, 1994, they saw each other two times and that they talked about those jewelries (sic) thru the phone
at that time when the accused was apprehended and incarcerated. However, despite the information of Ferma Capili that she was apprehended because of
the pair of earrings he did not do anything because allegedly he was too busy and they have operation. He admitted that this is the first time he declared
that the earrings came from him without executing any written statement. (Defense marked Exh. "A-1" pair of earring (sic) as their Exh. "8") (Decision, pp.
1-15; Rollo, pp. 31-45)."5
On August 17, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting Ferma Capili but finding the accused, Gabriel Capili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction beyond moral certainty, for violation of P.D. 1612 in relation to
Sec. 3 par. A of the same law which required that the penalty to be imposed shall be in the maximum period if the value of the property is more than
₱22,000.00, adding one (1) year for its additional ₱10,000.00, the total penalty of which shall not exceed twenty (20) years, further considering that the
consideration of the purchase is ₱50,000.00, accused Gabriel Capili is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of said law. Without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to its commission, but granting the accused with the benefit of the indeterminate sentence law, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium and to suffer the additional penalty of three years (one
for every ₱10,000.00) and to further suffer the accessory penalty thereof.
The accused shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the claim of P3 Million has not been sufficiently proven but the agreed price between the seller and herein accused is only ₱50,000.00, the accused is
hereby directed to indemnify the complainant Christined Diokno the sum of ₱50,000.00, less the value of the jewelries (sic) presented in Court, Exhibits
"A". "B" and "C" and its sub-markings, to be returned to the owner upon proper receipt and photograph.
The bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
The body of the accused is hereby committed to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, through the
City Warden of Manila.
Considering that there is no evidence to show complicity and/or that Ferma Capili conspired and confederated with her husband Gabriel Capili, she is
hereby acquitted from the offense charged in the Information.
The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED."6
GABRIEL appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC the dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated August 17, 1995 convicting the appellant for violation of P.D. 1612 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED."7
Motion for reconsideration was denied8 , hence this appeal where the accused assigns the following error:
"THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REMANDING THE CASE TO THE
COURT A QUO FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DESPITE OF (SIC) THE FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL CONSIDERING THAT THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FENCED ARTICLES WERE NOT CORRECTLY
ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION."9
The petitioner maintains that even for the sake of argument that the prosecution has established that the petitioner committed the crime of fencing
(violation of P.D. 1612) beyond reasonable doubt, there is no legal basis for him to suffer the entire penalty imposed by the trial court. Petitioner claims
that the Office of the Solicitor General, in its appellee’s brief filed with the Court of Appeals, agrees that basis of the penalty for the offense of fencing is
the value of the property actually involved and not the agreed selling price of the stolen item. The petitioner also maintains that since the prosecution failed
to prove the value of the stolen goods, the guilt of the petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner therefore prays that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and a new one be issued either acquitting the petitioner or remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.10
The respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that on April 25, 1997, it filed a Manifestation/Clarification modifying the
recommendation it made in its appellee’s brief to the effect that a remand of the case would unduly delay the disposition of the case. Therefore, to expedite
the final resolution of the case, the OSG recommended that as an alternative to a remand that the assessment and findings of the trial court on the value of
the subject articles, which is ₱50,000.00 be adopted and used instead. 11 It is therefore the contention of the OSG that there is no merit in the petitioner’s
claim that the OSG agreed to the remand of the case for further reception of evidence to determine the value of the stolen goods inasmuch as this would be
prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. The OSG also opines that the petitioner is not entitled to an acquittal since the value of the stolen property is not
determinative of the guilt of the accused and is not an element of the crime but is only determinative of the penalty therefor.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.12 The essential elements of the crime of fencing are:
"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another."13
All these elements are present in the case at bench.
The first element or the fact of theft was proved by prosecution witness, Christine Diokno (DIOKNO) who testified that several pieces of jewelry, watches
and money were stolen from her mother’s bedroom. She reported the theft to the police who after conducting an investigation, concluded that her
houseboy, Michael Manzo (MANZO), committed the offense. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. In her testimony, DIOKNO stated
that the major items that were taken consisted of two diamond rings each having a diamond solitaire of three (3) carats each, a pair of diamond earrings
each having a diamond solitaire of two point five (2.5) carats, a diamond cross with twelve (12) half (1/2) carat diamond, her mother’s wedding band, an
emerald set consisting of an emerald ring set with diamonds with a pair of matching earrings, a sapphire set consisting of two sapphire rings set with
diamonds and matching earrings, a South Sea pearl set consisting of a ring and two pairs of matching earrings also set with diamonds, three cultured pearl
necklaces with matching cultured pearl earrings set with diamonds, a topaz set consisting of two rings with diamonds and one with rubies with a set of
matching earrings, a cameo set consisting of a ring, matching earrings and a brooch all set with diamonds and four solid gold watches, a Rolex, Piaget,
Universal Geneve and a Gabriel Peregaux. She alleged that the total value of the items amounted to approximately three million ( ₱3,000,000.00) pesos. In
court, DIOKNO identified some of the recovered stolen items consisting of a set of pearl earrings with two small diamonds (Exhibit "A"), a gold chain
with pendant (Exhibit "B") and old United States dollar coins (Exhibit "C").14
DIOKNO’s testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole the jewelry from DIOKNO. And that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered
them to the petitioner, GABRIEL with the information that the jewelry was stolen and for the purpose of selling the same. He identified GABRIEL in court
as the person to whom he delivered the stolen jewelry.15 MANZO testified that GABRIEL was not a participant in the theft of the jewelry and that he told
GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He also established the fact that the petitioner agreed to pay fifty thousand ( ₱50,000.00) pesos for the stolen jewelry
which clearly manifests intent to gain on the part of the petitioner. Consequently, MANZO’s testimony proves the second, third and fourth elements of the
crime of fencing.
At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the accused as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a
presumption of fencing.16 GABRIEL, who was in possession of at least two of the stolen items, has not rebutted this presumption.
We also disagree with the petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the value of the stolen items.
Although DIOKNO’s testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of determining the value of the stolen items inasmuch as her testimony was not
based on her own personal knowledge but on the appraisals made by jewelers and what her mother told her, MANZO’s testimony remains unrebutted.
MANZO established that he sold the stolen items to GABRIEL for ₱50,000.00 and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, said amount is presumed
to be the value thereof as it is the only value established by the prosecution. Besides, the valuation of the stolen items made by the trial court is a factual
issue and factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and generally should not be
disturbed on appeal.17
We note however that the trial court was mistaken in imposing the penalty. A person found guilty of fencing property the value of which exceeds
₱22,000.00 is punished under Presidential Decree 1612 as follows:
"Sec. 3. Penalties – Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such
property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided for in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and
the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law18 , the court shall sentence an accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence an accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.19
Applying the foregoing, the petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor maximum. The fact that the value of the fenced items
exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not, like in cases of estafa, be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty. 20 In the absence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, this should be imposed in its medium period which ranges from ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to eleven (11) years and four (4) months. Adding the additional two (2) year sentence, one for each ₱10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty is anywhere within ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal21 . On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower which
is prision correcional maximum22 which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioner, Gabriel Capili guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Presidential Decree 1612 otherwise known as the Anti-fencing law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to thirteen (13)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. 128369 December 22, 1997

RODOLFO CAOILI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RUSTICO V. PANGANIBAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 51, respondents.
RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Rodolfo Caoili seeks a reconsideration of the Court's 18th June 1997 resolution dismissing his petition for review on certiorari. The
petition assails the resolution, dated 14 January 1997, of the Court of Appeals finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in refusing to exclude petitioner from a pending criminal case and to correspondingly amend the information theretofore filed with it.
The instant controversy, as well as the antecedent circumstances leading to the petition, could be said to have started when, in an
Information filed on 15 March 1995 with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")of Manila, Branch 51 (Criminal Case No. 95141750), petitioner,
Rodolfo "Rudy" Caoili, was charged, along with a certain Tony Yip, with violation of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1612. On 24 March 1995,
petitioner sought a review by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution, dated 16 February 1995, of Assistant Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay
that had found a prima facie case against petitioner that served as the basis for the information. In his ruling, dated 18 August 1995, the
Secretary of Justice directed the exclusion of petitioner Rodolfo Caoili from the Information. The Secretary opined:
The only issue posed in the petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to indict Caoili. To be liable for violation
of P.D. 1612, Section 2 thereof requires that the offender buys or otherwise acquires and then sells or disposes of any
object of value which he knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The allegations of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired the skiving machines
in question knowing that the same were stolen property. The prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of
stolen property does not apply to Caoili as complainant reacquired the subject skiving machines not from respondent
Caoili but from Yip. It is difficult to give credence to the claim of Atule and Azuela that respondent Caoili told them that he
purchased the stolen skiving machines which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply contrary to common human behavior that
a person would intimate to another or others an unlawful act, that he purchased stolen items and then dispose of it at a
profit. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.1
In declining to grant the corresponding motion of the prosecutor to exclude petitioner from the information in consonance with the ruling of
the Secretary of Justice, the trial court ratiocinated:
Considering the records of this case and it appearing that the Information was already filed in Court, the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused is now with this Court and the prosecution may no longer interfere with the judge's
disposition of the case.
The accused has to prove his allegations when his turn to present defense evidence comes because this allegations are
matters of defense to be proven in Court.
It is also noted that the Prosecutor has conducted the necessary preliminary investigation in this case; examined the
complaining witnesses; and there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and
accused are probably guilty thereof. In fact accused Rodolfo Caoili filed his counter-affidavit before
the Investigating Prosecutor during the Preliminary Investigation of this case.2
Petitioner now insists, following the rebuff by the Court of Appeals, that the determination of a prima facie case of an investigating prosecutor
after the examination of declarants and his evaluation of the evidence cannot be considered as attaining finality while still subject to review
by the Secretary of Justice who retains the power and authority to either affirm or reverse the findings of subordinate prosecutors. That
prerogative, petitioner contends, is all up to the Secretary of Justice to take up so long as the accused has not yet been arraigned. Petitioner
concludes that respondent Court of Appeals has erred in affirming the trial court in its questioned order considering that the rule laid down in
Crespo vs. Mogul3 has already been abandoned by the pronouncements in Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals4 and Roberts, Jr., et al. vs. Court
of Appeals,
et al.5
It is too much of an exaggeration to say that Crespo vs. Mogul no longer holds. The Solicitor General correctly points out that Roberts did not
overturn or abandon but simply sustained the authority of the Secretary of Justice, recognized under Rule 112, Section 4, of the Rules of
Court, to review resolutions of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper party even while the
criminal case is already pending with the courts. It did, understandably, caution the Secretary of Justice from being indiscriminate on this
matter; thus, reiterating Marcelo, the Court has said:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any
case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.6
Roberts went on to quote with approval the Crespo rule in explaining the doctrine; thus:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
[to] its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.7
Evidently then, the appellate court viewed and appreciated correctly the now prevailing Crespo-Marcelo-Roberts rule.
Needless to say, the holding of this Court, or of the appellate court, in this instance is not to be taken as having any bearing on the ultimate
disposition by the trial court of the case on its merits.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision 2 dated 06 January 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential
Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to
FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10
years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a
Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount
of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private
complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires
specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720
San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker
of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate
of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On
February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private
complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant
brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking
and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative.
Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was
composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza
was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila.
The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves
across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire
from his display, which Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck
tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on
their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same
tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest
and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00
in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able
to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen
from his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24)
years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain
Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold
Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and
came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were
stolen tires.7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie
evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. 8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of
prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in
this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the
warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to
prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List. 12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise
testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay 13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. 14 The report led to
the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught
in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight
(38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. 15
Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past
twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and
offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the
delivery of tires happened in just one day. 20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of
robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The
nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the
illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession
of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption
that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.1âwphi1 Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities
dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure
the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity
is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some
used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales
invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this
case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. 24 Ong
failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie
presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his
store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire recovered, or in the total amount of ₱65,975. Records show
that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of ₱223,40 1.81. 26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of
business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA
affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of
prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor
AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly
obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or
 concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's
Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD
No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the
Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator
Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is
absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged
co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts of
rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary
investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on
the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently
repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile
case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be
applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed
in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort
on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday
party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on
"or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by
about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of
about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed
December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the
charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only
one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions
for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily
apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly
a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a
separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature
partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed
is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion
case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable
under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the
crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are
absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all
acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also
to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion
punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
(People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case
which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in
the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he
pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)
 xxx xxx xxx
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed
in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a
nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the
petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court,
however, clarified, to wit:
... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez
find no application in this case.
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for
subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone
or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex
the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in
Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored
or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if
the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of
rebellion instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case.
With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment
of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on
December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent Orlando V.
Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P.
Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground
that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result
of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. 1 However, criminal charges were filed later against the two
student suspects.2
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the
Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that:
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU — Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU
LAMBINO — Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN — Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official duties
and committing the crime in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did
then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and
RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and
Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by
harboring and concealing said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal suspect JOEL CARLO
DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were
implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But the recommendation was disapproved. In a
memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of
petitioners.
Petitioners contend that:
I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS
COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON
MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER,
THE DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE
CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS
NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.5
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and
(2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The
exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, §5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed.
Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a
crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students
sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime.6 They invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr. 7 in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however,
was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in
the course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused.
Upon reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the
admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went
with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded
that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime
was committed. In the words of Rule 113, §5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime. They had no personal
knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means
an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.8
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to
arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing
anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the
violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The determination of the existence
of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary
citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the
determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can
order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without
a warrant was illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c), the Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated
September 8, 1997:
From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated
in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively
identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification. In fact, respondents do not dispute
the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina.
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless
arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an
illegal arrest. While this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had reasonable ground to
suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two
eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct,
frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified.
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting
the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule
on this matter. Of course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to
secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have
filed against the arresting NBI agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed and delayed
the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by
eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina.9
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. The question is whether the suspects could be
arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases
provided in Rule 113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the students or even
effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As
the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:
All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that
the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus
that night, legal. The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of
violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court
has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of
an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence
of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of
Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.10
Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:
SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;
The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined.11 But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to
general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution."12 As we held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:13
Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of
prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA
95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs.
Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
 i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa
vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs.
Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez
vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c) without rendering it
unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could
not have interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in investigating the death
of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to
disregard constitutional requirements.
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and
Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day.14 Hence, the information against them charged that petitioners
willfully obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students and another principal suspect, a
certain Joel Carlo Denosta.15 The student suspect mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta,
was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas
surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial. In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be
held to their undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police
Station as they did not have a warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag.
If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted
arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their
responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize
the pressures faced by law enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that
the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable cause for the filing of an information against
petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other recourse but
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge to P.D. No. 1829, §1(c). For a cardinal rule of
constitutional adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No.
1829 §1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in
Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. 144261-62 May 9, 2001

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING,
and ROMMEL M. LUARCA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises the issue of the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan 1
in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina
Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca" wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders
as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners' Motion to Quash the Informations against them are that only petitioner Prudente
D. Soller occupied a position classified as Grade 27 and higher and because the offenses charged were not committed by him in violation of his office as
Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.1âwphi1.nêt
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with petitioner Soller's son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house
of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. The incident was reported to
and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller
with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing
his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report
that there was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their
private medical clinic because it was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor,
was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved
sawing which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabael's consent was obtained before the autopsy. The two (2) police officers denied having planted
three (3) shells at the place where the shooting took place.

The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations 2
were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2) informations respectively read as follows:
 "Criminal Case No. 25521
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA
SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829,
committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health
Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of JERRY
MACABAEL with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for
murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"Criminal Case No. 25522
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER,
PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense
of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829,
committed as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal health
Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminal give false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police
report to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agency, from apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot
wounds in the body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening) around the wound of the said
victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot wound and there is tattooing (blackening) around the wound which would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this motion was opposed
by respondent People. In its assailed Order dated April 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation
involves the performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that
official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused. The Order stated that "the accused is the Mayor of the
municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal offense
committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before
this Court."
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise that it is not among the functions of the mayor to conduct autopsies so that any
misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be an offense which would put him under the jurisdiction of the court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
the Sandiganbyan ruling that:
"The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that he is the primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the primary
peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action on his part which deviates from that function is an office-related offense. In this
particular instance, the accused is charged for having cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower rank in the same
municipality in the supposed falsification of the results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy were totally unrelated to
any of the administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have supervision and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter
is that the jurisdiction of the Court covers not only the offenses committed by the officials of Grade Level 27 or higher as the principal accused
but even where such officials are also accused together with some other public officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27 in
connection with the performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal
Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that, necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer elevates the
entire case to this Court primarily because somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with the lower
ranking officer."3
Hence, this petition alleging that-
"RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and 25522."4
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an offense to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) "in relation to their office", i.e. it
should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the Informations do not
contain factual averments showing that they committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged are intimately connected with their
respective offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, posits
that even if the offense charged was not committed by the accused while in the performance of his official functions, the same could still be considered
done in relation to his office if the acts were committed in line of duty. Respondent's position is that an offense may be considered committed in relation to
office if it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-performance of an official duty or function; thus the offense of falsifying autopsy and
police reports is office-related considering that among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in the exercise of general supervision and control
over all programs, projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that he shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the
municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact that the informations do not allege that the acts charged were committed by petitioner
Prudente Soller while he was in the performance of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law that his acts are in violation
of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the Information were fatally defective in view of the absence of any specific allegation that
would indicate that the crimes charged were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official functions.
The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into. 5 Furthermore, the jurisdiction
of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.6
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension
and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The applicable statutory provisions are those of
P.D. No. 1606 as last amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as pertinent:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
xxx xxx xxx"

In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,7 this Court held that the Municipal Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in the government
under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as committed "in relation to their office" as this phrase is employed in the
above-quoted Section 4.

As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,8 this Court has interpreted the requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that "the offense
cannot exist without the office "or" that the office must be a constituent element of the crime" as defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven
of the Revised Penal Code (referring to the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs. Montejo9 enunciated the principle that the offense must be
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his official functions.
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the) abstract, the facts
in a particular case may show that -
"xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the accused's) respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his instructions
because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City."10

The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,11 Republic vs. Asuncion,12 and Cunanan vs.
Arceo.13 The case of Republic vs. Asuncion categorically pronounced that the fact that offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in
the information:
"That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office, must, however, be alleged in the information for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2). This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information."14
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase "committed in violation to public office" appears in the information; what determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. 15
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses
charged in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between the commission of the
offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders
was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as
amended. Although the petitioners were described as being "all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife", there was no allegation that the offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair
the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and
fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender
(Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person
whether a public officer or a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No.
25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy report "would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of
herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller". Thus there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to
commit the offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or
Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily show that
the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such
duties and functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner
Mayor fall under his functions as Municipal Mayor. 16 What is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and
if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused
Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

7. G.R. No. 165276 November 25, 2009

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs; HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary, Office of the President; Former DOJ SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ (now substituted by the Incumbent DOJ Secretary RAUL
GONZALES); Former PROV. PROS. AMANDO C. VICENTE (now substituted by the Incumbent PROV. PROS. ALFREDO L. GERONIMO);
PROS. BENJAMIN R. CARAIG, Malolos, Bulacan; and MICHAEL T. VISTAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review, 1 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the February 13, 2004 Decision 2 and September
16, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019.
The facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner and likewise adopted by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was
entrusted to the care of the former by the girl’s grandmother and petitioner’s sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the
tender age of four.
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9)
memorable and happy years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter’s family
who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned’s generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day
to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely
reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at
petitioner’s residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner’s
custody. Michael used to have free access to the undersigned’s house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office.
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz,
Guiguinto, Bulacan to confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal relatives
in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective
Group Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez accompanied petitioner and
her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated with police officers from the said place. The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they were given
the run-around as the spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria
Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter’s wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home)
against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with
him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in
Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her recite a
concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for
him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had
deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which
were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five
counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD
1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but
recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution
to uphold the petitioner’s complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for
Violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was denied in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She also filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of Justice, denied the petition for review. The
undersigned’s Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15
October 2001.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The petition was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. 4

On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review 5 before the CA assailing the Order of the Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of
the President erred in not addressing the merits of her petition by relying on Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the
power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. 6 Moreover, petitioner
contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree
No. 18297 (PD No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 76108 (RA No. 7610).9
On February 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.10
The CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine of qualified political agency, to wit:
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to
exempt petitioner’s case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself. 11
Moreover, the CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e)
of PD No. 1829.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ did not err when it dismissed the complaint for violation for RA No. 7610 as the same was not
attended by grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 16, 2004.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE
PROVISIONS OF MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE
COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MICHAEL VISTAN.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF
R.A. 7610 (CHILD ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN. 14
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without any basis in law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum
Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. 15 This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of
said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."16 The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance
on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
As early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,17 this Court has recognized and adopted from American jurisprudence this doctrine of qualified
political agency, to wit:
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing
with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's
bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers
v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).18

Memorandum Circular No. 58,19 promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by
the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are
reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases
shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately
preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to
the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion 20 is
purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he
deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary –
his own alter ego.
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution provides for restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
x x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative
acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3,
sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).21
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. 22 The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. 23 The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.24
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be
considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose
upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important
duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter.

In Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,25 this Court discussed the predicament of imposing upon the President duties which ordinarily should be delegated to a
cabinet member, to wit:
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by
the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from
running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the
concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective
expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.26
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s position asking this Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the
President, notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges respondent are not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the Department of Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of
Justice, is the government’s principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the government’s prosecution arm and administers the government’s
criminal justice system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional system, which are deep within the realm of its
expertise.27 These are known functions of the Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch and, thus, within the Chief Executive's power of
control.
Petitioner’s contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving
the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was
promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 28 Memorandum Circular
No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President.
Anent the second ground raised by petitioner, the same is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as follows:
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x

Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground obstructed the service of a court process, particularly the warrant of arrest. 29
This Court does not agree.
There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had
disposed of the said issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on
"obstruction of justice," in the wise:
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re:
"obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of "obstruction of justice" if and when
the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life – and that the accused should be
charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved during its life or
returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused.
And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed
against the accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and
until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and spirit of the
law on "obstruction of justice." x x x30
As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section
1(e) of PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to
arrest the person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission of another offense of obstruction of justice. 31

Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide that it is applicable only to another person and not to the offender himself. 32
Petitioner thus contends that where the "law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish."33
Again, this Court does not agree.

Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. 34
Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly
made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them. 35 Any reasonable doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused.36
Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not the offender himself, this Court must resolve the same in favor of the
accused. In any case, this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it may be, is nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the
case at bar.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of RA
No. 7610. Said Section reads:
Any person who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development,
including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
On this note, the Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor to file the information for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of RA No. 7610, gave the following reasons:
APPROVED for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The recommendation to file an information for viol. of Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied. The
affidavit of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved, is to the effect that she found happiness and peace of mind away from the complainant and in the
company of her relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael Vistan. How can her joining the brother be prejudicial to her with such statement? 37
Said finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.

This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation and Shig Katamaya v. Hon. Hernando B. Perez et. al,38 where this Court emphasized the
executive nature of preliminary investigations, to wit:
x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to
the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in
the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of
Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will prevail only if
they can show that the CA erred in not holding that public respondent’s resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 391avvphi1
Were the acts of the Provincial Prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
not at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 40
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion, as their
conclusion of lack of probable cause was based on the affidavit of the alleged victim herself. The reasons for the cause of action were stated clearly and
sufficiently. Was their reliance on the victim's affidavit constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? This Court does not think so.

While petitioner would argue that the victim was "brainwashed" by respondent into executing the affidavit, 41 this Court finds no conclusive proof thereof.
Besides, even if their reliance on the victim’s affidavit may be wrong, it is elementary that not every erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of
discretion.42 As such, this Court will not interfere with the said findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the prosecutor and
ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that this Court will not pass upon
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision and September 16, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76019 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

8. G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015

JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Jackson Padieraos y Quejada (Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German (Roxas) and
Rolando Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The petitioners seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision 1 dated May 10, 2007 and resolution 2 dated
December 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC), Branch
66, Baler, Aurora in Criminal Case No. 3122.

The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of Presidential Decree ( P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry
Reform Code of the Philippines. According to the Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows:
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully have in their possession and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at
P133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago Castillo y Cruz without any
permit, license or documents from the proper authority and that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the following day,
November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not
be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime , [emphasis and
italics supplied]

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera) remain at large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula)
pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime; while petitioners Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.

Prosecution's evidence

The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO)
Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora ( Dingalan)3 The truck bore
the name "JEROME" with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber's supporting
documents but they failed to produce any.

Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident.
Some of the DENROs represented that the transportation of the seized lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any supporting
document.

The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) - and the policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit,
guarded the truck loaded with lumber. 4

The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They transferred the lumber first from November 15 to
November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers. 5

On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at the place where the truck was being held in
custody.6

Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck, 7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the truck to the police station. Santiago gave the
truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck; while Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were. 8

Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of the truck. The DENRO group also got on board at
the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza (Mendoza) and his companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.

Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that Mesina would maneuver the truck so that they could
proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the truck's speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their
two policemen escorts9 who chased the truck and fired three warning shots. 10

As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2 Mendoza corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo
saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear what they were saying.

When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck anymore and simply reported the incident to the
Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.

The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. 11

As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. 12

Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza 13 immediately proceeded to Brgy. Bagting where they found the DENRO
group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police
station compound.

Evidence for the defense

Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when his former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked
him to bring the latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He refused Santiago's request because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities;
particularly, the truck had been previously loaded with lumber that were confiscated. 14

Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really no problem with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode
in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to accompany them. 15

Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he could drive his truck to Cabanatuan City. 16 Roxas refused
because he had already heard of the truck's apprehension, 17 but he finally relented after Santiago assured him that there was no problem with the truck.
They proceeded to Caragsacan, Dingalan where the truck was parked. 18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he knew very well that the vehicle was
a "hot" truck but he relied on Santiago's claim that the problem already been settled. 19

On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki, Dingalan. 20 According to Padiernos, he had been
waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. but only Santiago's group came by. 21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that
they would bring Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City. 22

Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached Caragsacan. 23

On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked towards the back of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street.
Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and several other persons for about 25 to 30 minutes. 24

Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina. 25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of the truck with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took
the driver's seat.26 Mesina drove the car towards Cabanatuan City upon Santiago's instruction. 27

The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to stop them. 28 They also did not notice any motorcycle
following them as the truck's side mirrors were broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged them down. 29

After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while Roxas and Mesina boarded a jeepney bound for Dingalan. 30
The RTC's ruling

The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705. 31

The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform
Code.32

The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical, straightforward, and consistent; they had no improper motive to testify
falsely against the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck. 34

The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their prior knowledge that the truck had been previously confiscated for
illegal transport of forest products. This explains the reluctance of Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago in getting the truck. 35

The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's testimony that Padiernos gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they
had no right to apprehend the truck and its cargo.36 Padiernos' knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity
with the townsfolk of Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products. The RTC concluded that the incident and the personalities
involved could not have escaped Padiernos' notice, yet he still went with them to get the truck. 37

Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the policemen's warning shots and the DENROs' shouts because of the noisy
engine and the defective windows of the truck. The RTC had observed during its ocular inspection of the truck that both windows were in order and sounds
outside could be clearly heard even with a running engine.38
The CA's ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty imposed on the petitioners. 39

The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the meaning of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already been unloaded and placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of
the loaded undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in proving the commission of the offense of violation of P.D. 705, as
amended.40

The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their
defense of denial must fail in view of the evidence on record and their own admissions that they were aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity
at the time that they drove it towards Nueva Ecija. 41

The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with Santiago, Roxas, and Mesina. Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's
application for mayor's permit as a lumber dealer; Roxas is a family friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and Padiernos'
are long-time acquaintances.42
The Parties' Arguments

The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because the DENROs and the police authorities had already
discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the truck when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija. 43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes
accessories who prevent the discovery of the crime.44

On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the discovery of the crime. The respondent alleges that
without the truck, the accused in the present case could easily produce the necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the
confiscated lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who tried to make it appear that the seized lumber
had the proper transportation permit for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, with the actual
volume of the confiscated lumber of 10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46
The Court's Ruling

We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even
obligates, the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is likewise settled that
when an accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new trial. 47

The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the appealing accused, and from imposing the corresponding
punishment in accordance with the charges in the Information and the crime proved during trial.

Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case contained a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessarily constituting both the crimes of illegal possession of firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple murder may be validly taken into
account49 in the resolution of the appeal before the Court, although the appellants have been acquitted of illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled
that the appellants in that case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of multiple murder and granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves.

Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case
do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.

The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime

The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not the technical name that the public prosecutor
assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his interest should be on the facts
alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law with some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the acts alleged in
the body of the information in the manner therein set forth."50

In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence
and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.

Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were accessories to the crime, which is merely the
public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual
charges against them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.

These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and carry away the subject truck so that it could not be used as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been
sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations, against which they should defend themselves.

Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of "accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we
find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.

Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery.

Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime.52

In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been discovered at the time the petitioners
took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on
November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.

In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories"
does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.

The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829

The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed by accessories under
Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829
entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."

P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.

Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity,
legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in
the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]

The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners' acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b)
above.

First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b).

The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence
and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.

In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and
prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the
seized lumber as the permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio
Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter.

Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term "suppress" means to subdue or end by force. 54

Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use as evidence in
the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.

It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of the seized lumber. Santiago had every reason
and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck, Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming criminal investigation or
proceedings for violation of P.D. 705 would be frustrated.

The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the status of the truck and their commission of the crime at
Santiago's prompting.

Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the petitioners' admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew
that the truck had been involved in the illegal transportation/possession of the seized lumber.

Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had been previously loaded with lumber that was confiscated.

According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news of the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted
that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being assured that there was no problem with the truck.
Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's involvement with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad
words at the DENROs, saying they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close association with the other
petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial.

The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners deliberately drove the truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident
knowledge of the policemen's warning shots, tapping, and the DENROs shouting for help from the back of the truck.

Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate the petitioners' defense of denial of their intent to take the
truck and their knowledge of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity.

The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close association with each other, their flimsy defense of denial of their
intent to take away the truck, and the totality of their acts showing their common design to take the truck - lead us to conclude that the petitioners had
indeed mutually conspired with one another to take away the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding
for violation of P.D. 705.

Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the petitioners' violation of P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings
and find the petitioners guilty of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.

Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or both.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 10, 2007, and its resolution dated December 20,
2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiernos y Quejada, Jackie Roxas y German, and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section 1(b) of
P.D. 1829. They are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlib

9. G.R. No. L-3565 April 20, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NANG KAY alias SY KEE, defendant-appellant.
Andres F. Santos for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged with illegal possession of firearms in that in his possession were found three
grease guns and two Thompson Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the necessary license. In court he appeared without counsel and upon
being arraigned, he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day, with the accessories of the law, and to pay costs.
The firearms and ammunition in question were ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. He now appeals to this Court on the ground that the trial
court failed to inform him at the arraignment of his right to be assisted by counsel. The Solicitor General also questions the correctness of the penalty
imposed, expressing the opinion and making the recommendation that the law on indeterminate sentence should have been applied.
Counsel for the appellant makes citations of authorities to the effect that it is the duty of the court to inform the defendant in a criminal case of his right to
have counsel, and that should the court fail to do so, its action constitutes a reversible error. In this, we agree with the said counsel. However, contrary to
the claim of said counsel that the record in this case shows that the court failed to inform the appellant of his right to have counsel, we believe that the
record merely fails to show that the court complied with this duty. In other words, the record of the case is silent on this point. Both the minutes of the court
session during which appellant was arraigned as well as the certificate of arraignment signed by the Clerk of Court merely show that the case was called for
arraignment, the accused appeared without counsel, and that upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The transcript of the stenographic notes
taken down by the stenographer further states that the court instructed the Clerk of Court to read the information which was translated to the accused after
which, the court asked the defendant for his plea. The accused then pleaded guilty.
As we have already stated, the record of the case does not show whether or not the court informed the appellant of his right to have counsel, but of course
this cannot be interpreted in the sense that the court failed to so inform him of such right. On the contrary, because of the presumption that the law has been
complied with, it is to be presumed in this case that the court has complied with its duty and that it has informed the appellant that he may have counsel,
even a counsel de oficio if he wanted to. In the case of People vs. Miranda, 78 Phil., 418; 44 Off. Gaz., No. 9, p. 3307, involving a similar case of illegal
possession of firearm, namely, a carbine with ammunition, this Court passing upon the same point now raised, said:
This precise issue was determine in United States vs. Labial, 27 Phil. 87, 88, in the sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will
be presumed, that the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel; "if we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded
before a citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbriddled license to crime. Much
must be left to intendment and presumption for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly," [People vs.
Labial]. The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen, 52 Phil., 722 and in United States vs. Custan, 28 Phil., 19. We see no reason to
modify it now. . . .
See also the case of People vs. Javier, 64 Phil., 413, wherein it was stated that this Tribunal has repeatedly held that failure to state in the record that an
accused has been informed of his right to have counsel, does not warrant reversal of the judgment if it does not affirmatively appear that he has not been
informed thereof.
Moreover, it has been held in the case of U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 746, that when the appellant fails to raise the question of his right to have an attorney
in the trial court, that question will not be considered when raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. In the present case, it does not appear that this
point was ever raised in the court below.
As to the application of the law on indeterminate sentence, the Solicitor General merely says that the trial court failed to apply said law, and he
recommends that it be applied, without giving his reasons for said recommendation. We agree with the Solicitor General that the letter of the law on
indetermine sentence (Act No. 4103) as amended by Act No. 4225, particularly the latter part of section 1 thereof, supports his contention, the offense in
the present case being penalized by special law. Said legal provision states that:
. . . and if the offense is punished by any other law (not the Revised Penal Code or its amendments), the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4 penalizes the criminal act of the appellant
with imprisonment of not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10)years. So, if we applied the law on indeterminate sentence, the penalty as
recommended by the Solicitor General would be not less than five (5) years and not more than a period exceeding ten (10) years. That penalty could hardly
be regarded as favorable to the accused, considering his plea of guilty. We should not lose sight of the fact that the law on indeterminate sentence as a rule
is intended to favor the defendant ina criminal case particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental,
and moral record as a prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence. Upon favorable recommendation by that Board, the prisoner may
be released on parole upon the expiration of his minimum sentence. In fact the Governor General in his message published in 31 Off. Gaz., No. 92, August
3, 1933, issued in connection with the promulgation of the present law on indeterminate sentence, said that one of the purposes of the law was to prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.
Under the special law on illegal possession of firearms applicable to this case, already referred to, if we had no law on indeterminate sentence in this
jurisdiction, considering the plea of guilty entered by the appellant, the trial court could well and lawfully have given him a prison sentence of five (5)
years. If we are now to apply the law on indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the prison term would to be more than five (5) years for the reason that
the minimum could not be less than five (5) years and the maximum necessarily would have to be more than five (5) years but not more than ten (10)
years. That would certainly be not in accordance with the purpose of the law on indeterminate sentence; in fact it would run counter to its spirit.
Moreover, there are authorities to the effect that where the statute under which an accused was convicted fixes the maximum and minimum punishment, or
either of them, it has been held that it is not necessary, under the indeterminate sentence law, for the court to specify in the sentence such maximum and
minimum punishment. . . . (24 C. J. S. p. 109, Sec. 1582). Besides, it has also been held that the law on indeterminate sentence being penal in character
must receive a strict construction in favor of the one to whom the penalty is exacted. (24 C. J. S. p. 1219, Sec. 1993).
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused,
resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious that the trial
court did not err in sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

10. G.R. No. 181571 December 16, 2009

JUNO BATISTIS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On January 23, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, in Manila convicted Juno Batistis for violations of Section 155 (infringement of
trademark) and Section 168 (unfair competition) of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293). 1
On September 13, 2007, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for infringement of trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair
competition for failure of the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.2
Batistis now appeals via petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA’s affirmance of his conviction for infringement of trademark.
We affirm the conviction, but we modify the penalty by imposing an indeterminate sentence, conformably with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
pertinent jurisprudence.
Antecedents

The Fundador trademark characterized the brandy products manufactured by Pedro Domecq, S.A. of Cadiz, Spain. 3 It was duly registered in the Principal
Register of the Philippines Patent Office on July 12, 1968 under Certificate of Registration No. 15987, 4 for a term of 20 years from November 5, 1970. The
registration was renewed for another 20 years effective November 5, 1990.5

Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized 6 to distribute Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in
finished form,7 initiated this case against Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a test-buy in the
premises of Batistis, and thereby confirmed that he was actively engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of counterfeit Fundador brandy
products.8 Upon application of the NBI agents based on the positive results of the test-buy, 9 Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Manila RTC issued on
December 20, 2001 Search Warrant No. 01-2576, 10 authorizing the search of the premises of Batistis located at No.1664 Onyx St., San Andres Bukid, Sta.
Ana, Manila. The search yielded 20 empty Carlos I bottles, 10 empty bottles of Black Label whiskey, two empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an empty
bottle of Remy Martin XO, an empty bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador bottles, 163 boxes of Fundador, a half sack of Fundador plastic caps, two filled
bottles of Fundador brandy, and eight cartons of empty Jose Cuervo bottles.11
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila formally charged Batistis in the RTC in Manila with two separate offenses, namely, infringement of trademark
and unfair competition, through the following information, to wit:
That on or about December 20, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then in possession of two hundred forty one (241) empty
Fundador bottles, one hundred sixty three Fundador boxes, one half (1/2) sack of Fundador plastic caps, and two (2) Fundador bottles with intention of
deceiving and defrauding the public in general and Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines and Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Leonardo P.
Salvador, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and engaged in manufacturing of Fundador Brandy
under license of Pedro Domecq, S.A. Cadiz, Spain, and/or copyright owner of the said product, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
reproduce, sell and offer for sale, without prior authority and consent of said manufacturing company, the accused giving their own low quality product the
general appearance and other features of the original Fundador Brandy of the said manufacturing company which would be likely induce the public to
believe that the said fake Fundador Brandy reproduced and/or sold are the real Fundador Brandy produced or distributed by the Allied Domecq Spirits and
Wines Limited, U.K. and Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter and the public.

Contrary to law.12

With Batistis pleading not guilty on June 3, 2003,13 the RTC proceeded to trial. On January 23, 2006, the RTC found Batistis guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of infringement of trademark and unfair competition, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds the accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 155 of the
Intellectual Property Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS.
This Court likewise finds accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 168 (sic) penalty of
imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (Php50,000.00) PESOS.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of TWENTY-FIVE (Php25,000.00) PESOS as actual damages.
The following items recovered from the premises of the accused and subject of the case are hereby ordered destroyed, pursuant to existing rules and
regulations:
Twenty (20) empty Carlos 1 bottles
Ten (10) Black Label empty bottles
Two (2) empty bottles of Jhonny (sic) Walker Swing
One(1) empty bottle of Remy Martin XO
One (1) empty bottle of Chabot
Two hundred forty-one (241) empty Fundador bottles
One hundred sixty-three (163) Fundador boxes
One half (1/2 sack of Fundador plastic caps, and
Two (2) filled Fundador bottles
Eight (8) boxes of empty Jose Cuervo bottles
WITH COSTS AGAINST ACCUSED

SO ORDERED.14
Batistis appealed to the CA, which, on September 13, 2007, affirmed his conviction for infringement of trademark, but acquitted him of unfair
competition,15 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal of Appellant JUNO BATISTIS is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED in so far as the charge against him for Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code is concerned.
However, for failure of the prosecution to prove to a moral certainty the guilt of the said Appellant, for violation of Section 168 of the same code a
judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby rendered in his favor.

SO ORDERED.16
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, Batistis brought this appeal.
Issue
Batistis contends that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WHO CONDUCTED THE RAID ON THE HOUSE OF THE
ACCUSED.

He submits that the only direct proofs of his guilt were the self-serving testimonies of the NBI raiding team; that he was not present during the search; that
one of the NBI raiding agents failed to immediately identify him in court; and that aside from the two bottles of Fundador brandy, the rest of the
confiscated items were not found in his house.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
1.
Appeal confined only to Questions of Law

Pursuant to Section 3,17 Rule 122, and Section 9,18 Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA
imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Accordingly, we reject the appeal for the following reasons:

Firstly: The petition for review replicates Batistis’ appellant's brief filed in the CA, 19 a true indication that the errors he submits for our review and reversal
are those he had attributed to the RTC. He thereby rests his appeal on his rehashed arguments that the CA already discarded. His appeal is, therefore,
improper, considering that his petition for review on certiorari should raise only the errors committed by the CA as the appellate court, not the errors of the
RTC.
Secondly: Batistis’ assigned errors stated in the petition for review on certiorari require a re-appreciation and re-examination of the trial evidence. As such,
they raise issues evidentiary and factual in nature. The appeal is dismissible on that basis, because, one, the petition for review thereby violates the
limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they
were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin. 20

Whether a question of law or a question of fact is involved is explained in Belgica v. Belgica:21

xxx [t]here exists a question of law when there is doubt on what the law applicable to a certain set of facts is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise
when there is an issue regarding the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. Questions on whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded probative
value or whether the proofs presented by one party are clear, convincing and adequate to establish a proposition are issues of fact. Such questions are not
subject to review by this Court. As a general rule, we review cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law raised and distinctly set forth in
the petition.22
Thirdly: The factual findings of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given high
respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were
ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted.23
To accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s findings of fact, we do not disturb such findings of fact of the RTC,
particularly after their affirmance by the CA, for Batistis, as appellant, did not sufficiently prove any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure
from such doctrine.
2.
Findings of fact were even correct
A review of the decision of the CA, assuming that the appeal is permissible, even indicates that both the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the
evidence against the accused, and correctly applied the pertinent law to their findings of fact.
Article 155 of the Intellectual Property Code identifies the acts constituting infringement of trademark, viz:
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the
sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the
infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual
sale of goods or services using the infringing material.
Harvey Tan, Operations Manager of Pedro Domecq, S.A. whose task involved the detection of counterfeit products in the Philippines, testified that the
seized Fundador brandy, when compared with the genuine product, revealed several characteristics of counterfeiting, namely: (a) the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) seal label attached to the confiscated products did not reflect the word tunay when he flashed a black light against the BIR label; (b) the
"tamper evident ring" on the confiscated item did not contain the word Fundador; and (c) the word Fundador on the label was printed flat with sharper
edges, unlike the raised, actually embossed, and finely printed genuine Fundador trademark.24
There is no question, therefore, that Batistis exerted the effort to make the counterfeit products look genuine to deceive the unwary public into regarding
the products as genuine. The buying public would be easy to fall for the counterfeit products due to their having been given the appearance of the genuine
products, particularly with the difficulty of detecting whether the products were fake or real if the buyers had no experience and the tools for detection, like
black light. He thereby infringed the registered Fundador trademark by the colorable imitation of it through applying the dominant features of the
trademark on the fake products, particularly the two bottles filled with Fundador brandy. 25 His acts constituted infringement of trademark as set forth in
Section 155, supra.
3.
Penalty Imposed should be an
Indeterminate Penalty and Fine
Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code provides the penalty for infringement of trademark, to wit:
Section 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to
five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos(P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is
found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code).
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC imposing the "the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND
(₱50,000.00) PESOS."

We rule that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,26 as amended by Act No. 4225. We modify the penalty.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be
an indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr., 27 the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and
minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 2 28 is mandatory, viz:
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior
and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

Indeed, the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. For instance, in Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, 29 three persons were prosecuted for and
found guilty of illegal fishing (with the use of explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1058, for which the prescribed penalty was imprisonment from 20 years to life imprisonment. The trial court imposed on each of the accused a straight
penalty of 20 years imprisonment, and the CA affirmed the trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the straight penalty to be erroneous, and
modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum.

We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,30 a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is,
Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five years
nor more than ten years. There, the Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial court (Court of First Instance of
Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence. Yet, we cannot
apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a prosecution under a special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay
could well and lawfully have given the accused the lowest prison sentence of five years because of the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary plea of
guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly, the large number
of Fundador articles confiscated from his house (namely, 241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of Fundador plastic caps,
and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that Batistis had been committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby
deserving for him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision dated September 13, 2007 rendered in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 30392 entitled People of the Philippines v. Juno
Batistis, but modify the penalty to imprisonment ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as maximum, and a fine of ₱50,000.00.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

11. G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA, accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO
SUYO, and FRANCO BRILLANTES, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
plaintiff-appellee.
Sixto P. Dimaisip for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
which convicted them of robbery with homicide, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the sum of
six thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of fighting cocks
(Criminal Case No. 11082).
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come from
Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde
Building on J. M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck.
Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta)
was on his way home.
Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So,
Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.
Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla,
Suyo and Brillantes alighted from the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the plaza. After
an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.
Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the city)
on the same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the
extreme left. Next to him on his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road
Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had
fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction
of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened
Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city. Jaranilla kept on firing
towards Jabatan.
Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta
not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to
come down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that he decided to
come down. His uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He recounted the
incident to a police investigator.
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before
midnight of January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao. As
he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford pickup
truck parked about fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying roosters. He
immediately repaired to the police station at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just witnessed. The two
policemen requested him to take them in his car to the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival thereat, the men
and the truck were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen
left the car and crossed the runway which was a shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his car around in order
to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated.
A few moments later, Patrolman Castro came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was
wounded. Patrolman Castro and Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital. Trespeces learned later that Jabatan
was dead.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of
Patrolman Jabatan. He found:
(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.
(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right,
perforating the left upper lobe of the lungs through and through, bitting the left pulmonary artery and was recovered at
the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity was full of blood.
Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.
Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that
the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground. Upon
investigation he found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood
with nipa roofing. Each coop had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his house, about two
meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of detectives came to his house together with the police
photographer who took pictures of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he was
summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as
one of the six roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop (Exh. B).
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle,
nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness. Hence, the
case was dismissed as to him.
On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the presentation of its evidence,
Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. The record does not show that he has been apprehended.
The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court.
They signed at the bottom of the last page of the decision.
There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not been
promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of defendants
Suyo and Brillantes will be considered.
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery
and that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that
Jaranilla was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the
taking of roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was
already consummated when Jabatan was killed.
After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the truck and who shot policeman, this Court finds that the
trial court did not err in giving credence to Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.
The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had
the obligation to return it to his sister in the same condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo
and when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.
The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck
because he (Gorriceta) was drunk then that circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being
supposedly intoxicated, Gorriceta would have been dozing when Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have thought
of killing Jabatan in his inebriated state. He would not have been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first shot hit
Jabatan. So, the one who shot him must have been a sober person like Jaranilla.
Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would have
the motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently, the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck appears to be
plausible.
Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of
Baylon's house violence against or intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked.
Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house ( casa habitada),
public building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the meaning
of article 301 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having shown the inapplicability of Articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.—Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than
those mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be
broken open elsewhere.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original
reads:
ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.—El robo cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio
que no sea de los comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, ... . (Tomo 26, Leyes Publicas 479).
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term which may be confounded with the expression
"uninhabited place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different from the
term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency, where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building
(casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. (See
Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition, p. 688).
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches
therefrom, the crime was theft and not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People vs.
Adorno, CA 40 O. G. 567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member of this Court). *
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article 302.
Not being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five
circumstances enumerated in article 302.
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299
(meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and
safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The
unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force within
the meaning of article 512, now article 302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).
The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain that a railroad employee who, by force, opens a
sealed or locked receptacle deposited in a freight car, does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is neither a house
nor a building within the meaning of article 302 which corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article 302 refers to
houses or buildings which, while not actually inhabited, are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of article 302. The
stealing of hogs from a pig sty is theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to habitable buildings. (Guevara,
Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition, pages 555-6, citing II Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish
Supreme Court dated March 2, 1886 and April 25, 1887). **
As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1) Baylon's coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about five
yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a
person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A
person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that compartment. The
taking was effected by forcibly opening the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused
were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes of theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13, 1894 and 36 C. J.
799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320; People vs. Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally
sought the cover of night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 647,
660; People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the
information. They admitted their previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3],
Revised Penal Code). That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present (Art.
64[3], Revised Penal Code).
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act
No. 4103).
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the
malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The
treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob, 83
Phil. 738; People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).
The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing
should be characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with homicide.
The two offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil.
390).
The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They
conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the scene of
the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by
Gorriceta.
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the
thief carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S
vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754).
It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the
fruits of the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the
circumstance that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything
when Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled
his revolver which he did not fire (47, 53-55 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a co-principal
thereof.
Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking the witness stand to refute the testimony of Gorriceta,
Jaranilla escaped from jail. That circumstance is an admission of guilt.
The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim was killed on the occasion when the accused took his
chickens under the house. It is distinguishable from the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both
cited by the Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. As
already noted, theft, not robbery, was committed in this case.
The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a
member of the band was not a part of the common plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable for
robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As
already stated, no robbery with homicide was committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any responsibility
for Jabatan's death. Their complicity in the homicide committed by Jaranilla has not been established.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed.
They are acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a) each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to indemnify
solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an agent of authority, trial court should render a new
judgment consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution).
So ordered.

12.
G.R. No. 92020 October 19, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON, HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON and JOHN DOE, alias "ROLLY", accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City, in Criminal Case No. C-27858,
promulgated on 2 February 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON and HERMOGENES
MARTINADO y AGUILLON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as defined and
penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There being no appreciable
aggravating nor (sic) mitigating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment
under the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The two accused are also directed to indemnify the heirs of Juan Matias jointly
and severally the (sic) amount of P30,000.00; to return the money and the pieces of jewelry, subject matter of the
robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the entire value thereof in the total amount of P5,100.00 to the legal heirs of the
victim and to pay the costs.
The accused HERMOGENES MARTINADO shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time that he has
undergone preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code provided the conditions prescribed
thereon have been complied with.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, this Court, has to resolve the propriety of the interposed appeal insofar as accused Eliseo Martinado is concerned.
The promulgation of the decision on 22 February 1989 was made in his absence because he had earlier escaped on 6 August 1988, 2
exactly five (5) days after the defense rested its case, from the Kalookan City Jail. The escape, however, was reported to the trial court only
on 8 August 1988. 3 Consequently, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest on 10 February 1988 4 which was returned unserved on 28
February 1989 because "per information gathered from the resident (sic) thereat revealed that accused cannot (sic) be seen for long (sic)
period of time." 5
It was only on 10 April 1989 that Eliseo was re-arrested in Palo, Leyte by a Special Action Team of the Kalookan Police Station. 6
On March 1989, Atty. Domingo M. Ballon, counsel of record for Hermogenes and Eliseo, filed a notice of appeal for both accused. It reads:
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Accused, by their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court hereby gives (sic) notice that they are appealing the
decision of this Honorable Court, dated February 2, 1989, and promulgated on Feb. 22, 1989, convicting the accused to
suffer and undergo an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to the Supreme Court, for the reason that said decision is
contrary to law and evidence. 7
In view of such appeal, the trial court issued on the same date an order directing the transmittal to this Court of the records of the case
together with the transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits. 8
In promulgating judgment in absentia with respect to Eliseo, and in giving due course to the appeal of both accused, the trial court must have
had in mind the third paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the
promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served
upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision to him or his counsel. (6a).
Indeed, no cause for non-appearance during promulgation is more justified than the escape of the accused from the city jail where he was
confined during the trial of the case. However, in the recent case of People vs. Mapalao, 9 decided on 14 may 1991, this Court, applying by
analogy Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules, of Criminal Procedure, held that an accused who had escaped from confinement during trial
on the merits and who merits at large at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses his right to appeal therefrom unless he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment. The reason therefor
is that an accused who escapes from detention, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country loses his standing in court; unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. This Court then took the opportunity to
suggest a modification of the last sentence of the aforequoted third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120. Thus:
To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:
If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause,
the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision to him or his counsel.
It should provide instead that it upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appear without justifiable cause,
despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal.
However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested,
then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been apprehended or
otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by
the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested. 10
If We were to apply this ruling to the case of Eliseo, his appeal should not be given due course. Considering, however, that Mapalao
announces a new doctrine by making the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
apply by analogy to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120, and that application thereof to Eliseo would be
prejudicial to him, this Court, guided by the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided 11 and judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of our legal system 12 and, further taking into account the
principle that once a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
not retroactively to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, 13 hereby declares that the rule enunciated in
Mapalao should not be applied to Eliseo. Thus, his appeal is hereby given due course.
Having cleared the way for the appeal of both accused, We shall now take up the appeal proper.
Accused Hermogenes Martinado and Eliseo Martinado, together with a certain John Doe alias "Rolly" who remains to be at large, were
originally charged with the crime of murder in an Information prepared and filed by Assistant City Fiscal Arturo A. Rojas on 17 November
1986. 14 The information fails to mention anything about robbery. Consequently, a motion for reinvestigation was filed by the offended party.
On 4 March 1987, an Amended Information 15 was filed by 1st Assistant City Fiscal Rogelio M. de Leon charging the accused with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide. This was further amended on 10 March 1987 by a 2nd Amended Information, 16 the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1986 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, with intent of
(sic) gain and with intent to kill, by means of violence and intimidation employed upon the person of JUAN MATIAS y
REYES that is by attacking and stabbing the latter with a sharp pointed instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:
1. Seiko men's watch (5) worth — P 800.00
2. Men's ring worth — P1,800.00
3. Wallet containing cash in the amount of — P2,500.00
Total — P5,100.00
all belonging to the said Juan Matias y Reyes, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned total
amount of P5,100.00; and as a result thereof, Juan Matias sustained serious physical injuries, which injuries caused his
death (DOA) at the Quezon City General Hospital.
Contrary to Law.
Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were arraigned with the assistance of counsel on 22 September 1987; 17 both entered pleas of "Not
Guilty". The other accused, John Doe @ Rolly, has not been formally identified and is still at large. Immediately after arraignment, a motion
for bail was heard by the trial court; the same was eventually denied. 18
Trial subsequently ensued with the prosecution presenting Margarita Padrinao, Elizabeth C. Carillo, Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. (Medico-Legal
Officer), Nicanor Matias, Angel Nieto, Gerardo Arellano, P/Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra and David Nerza; for the defense, both accused were
presented.
On 22 February 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision based on the prosecution's version of the incident summarized as follows:
The following is the version as shown by the evidence adduced by the Prosecution:
At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986, Margarita Padrinao, a maid, was watching television at the
house of her master, Juan Matias. She then entered the sari-sari store of her master which is three arms' length away
from the place where she was watching television in order to feed the pigs. She saw Juan Matias tending the sari-sari
store. She also saw two customers drinking softdrinks outside the window grills of the store. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M.
Padrinao, pp. 6-7). She identified them as Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado.
At about this time, Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government employee (sic), passed by the same sari-sari store on
her way to make a phone call at a house located at nearby Villa Maria Subdivision. She saw Juan Matias attending to
three customers drinking softdrinks at the sari-sari store. She identified them as Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes
Martinado and "Rolly". (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 6-8).
A short while later, Margarita who had just feed the pigs heard a loud snore coming from the store. She hurriedly went
back to the store she saw Eliseo and Hermogenes helping one another in stabbing Juan Matias. (TSN, Nov. 10, 1987, M.
Padriano, pp. 8; 32). Each of these accused was armed with pointed, thin instruments which each used in the stabbing.
The stabbing took place inside the store near the place where rice was being kept. Margarita then shouted in a loud
voice, "Tulungan ninyo po kami." The two accused then fled thru the gate at the fence of the house. After she shouted,
some people approached the store but Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado had already fled. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987 M.
Padrinao, pp. 9-10). She then approached Juan Matias who lay on the flooring of the store. Mrs. Dominga Matias, the
wife of Juan, likewise approached Juan Matias whom they found to be bloodied with several stab wounds at ( sic) the
neck, breast and abdomen. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 11).
In the meantime, Elizabeth Carillo had to pass the said store on her way back to her residence, having failed to contact a
friend thru the phone. She heard somebody shouting "saklolo" and she saw three persons running from the sari-sari
store of Juan Matias. These were the same three persons she previously saw drinking softdrinks. "Rolly" was running
ahead of the other two, Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado. The she saw Rolly stop and retrace his steps to pick up a
watch near the gate of the fence surrounding the house of Juan Matias before resuming his flight. The two brothers
continued to run away. Eliseo was seen holding something in his bloodied hand and Hermogenes was also seen holding
something in his hand which was bloodied. Elizabeth then entered the sari-sari store and she saw Juan Matias lying
down, face upward, inside the sari-sari store and had (sic) stab wounds on (sic) his bloodied neck. He was still snorting,
so Elizabeth called for help to bring Juan to the hospital. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 8-11). Juan was brought to
the Quezon City General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
At about the same time, Angel Nieto, the Tanod executive officer of the Barangay, was at the house of his brother also at
Deparo street when he heard people shouting "Harangin, harangin." He went out of the house into the street and he was
able to see three men coming from the direction of the house of Juan Matias and being chased by the residents. He was
able to observe two of the said three men. These two men had bloodied hands and bloodied clothes. He then asked the
residents why they were chasing the three men and they replied that these men had just stabbed Juan Matias. (TSN-
Dec. 22, 1987, A. Nieto, pp. 4-5)
Gerardo Arellano, a Barangay tanod of the place where the incident occurred, also heard the aforesaid shouting from his
house which is located also at Deparo street. He came to know Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao that Juan
Matias was stabbed to death. Together with other tanods and residents of the place, they began looking for Eliseo
Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado and Rolly as these were the suspects mentioned by Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita
Padrinao. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, G. Arellano, pp. 5-6).
Gerardo Arellano and his companions proceeded to the house of "Rolly" at the Sterling compound and after they were
granted permission by the wife of "Rolly" they enter. They found Hermogenes Martinado under a lavatory trembling.
Then they went to the Visayan Motors and after obtaining permission from the owner thereof, they went inside the
premises and found Eliseo Martinado who was packing his clothes ready to leave. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, Arellano, pp. 9-
13). Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were invited to go to the house of Juan Matias and both were identified by
Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao as two of the persons (sic) who barged into the house of Juan Matias. (TSN-
Feb. 9, 1988, Arellano, p. 14). The two suspects were then brought to the Urduja Police Sub-Station and were then
turned over to Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra of the Caloocan City Police Station. They were later brought to the Caloocan City
Police Headquarters by Sgt. Buenaobra. (TSN-Feb. 15, 1988, M. Buenaobra, p.8).
During the investigation conducted at the house of Juan Matias by the police on November 14, 1986, Margarita Padrinao
discovered that the Seiko V watch worn everyday by Juan Matias was no longer in his wrist. She also found that the
wallet which Juan Matias kept at the back pocket of his pants was missing. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 16-17).
This robbery was reported by Dominga Matias, the widow of the victim, to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters on
November 16, 1986. (TSN-Feb. 15, 1988, M. Buenaobra, p. 16). (See Police Blotter, page 188 of the Caloocan City
Police Station dated November 16, 1986, EXHIBIT "J"). Mrs. Dominga Matias listed the articles found missing from their
store at Deparo street, Caloocan City, after the death of Juan Matias, as follows:
Seiko wristwatch –– P 800.00
Gold ring –– P1,800.00
Cash contained in missing wallet –– P2,500.00
Nicolas Matias, a son of Juan Matias, corroborated the loss of the above articles and estimated their value in his
testimony of December 21, 1987. He discovered the loss on the night of November 14, 1986, after reaching the Quezon
City General Hospital where his mother told him that these articles could no longer be found in the body of the victim.
When he returned to his father's residence at Deparo street, Caloocan City, also on the evening of November 14, 1986,
he verified after a search of the sari-sari store and the house that those articles were indeed missing. (TSN. Dec. 21,
1987, N. Matias, pp. 4-6). 19
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that Juan Matias, 70 years old, died on November 14, 1986. The cause of death was hemorrhage
secondary to stab wounds, neck and chest. (EXHIBIT "E"). Dr. Mariano Cueva, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, stated that he
found contusions on the front portion of the neck of the victim; 4 incised wounds, one on the left arm and three on the left
forearm; four stab wounds, one over left front of the neck and three at the left front chest. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, Dr.
Cueva, pp. 7-8). (EXHIBITS "F" and "G"). The most mortal of the wounds was that found over the left front chest. (TSN.
Nov. 20, 1987, pp. 8-9). 20
 xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Cueva narrated that the incised wounds found on the body of the victim could have been brought about by contact
with a sharp cutting edge like the edge of a knife or sharp metal object. He also said that the stab wounds could have
been produced by a pointed, single-edged or single-bladed instrument like a kitchen knife or dagger. He added that the
number of wounds inflicted on the victim does not preclude the fact that there was more than one assailant using similar
instruments. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, pp. 9-10; 20). 21
The trial court concluded that the prosecution established convincingly that Juan Matias was robbed at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of
14 November 1986 by the accused Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado who conspired with each other and with Rolly. Under the
circumstances above narrated, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code was committed. The motive of the accused was to rob Juan Matias.
As earlier adverted to, the accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 March 1989. Despite the trial court's order to forward the
records of the case to this Court, the clerk of court of the court a quo erroneously transmitted the same to the Court of Appeals on 19
February 1990. 22 The latter subsequently forwarded the records to this Court on 22 February 1990. 23
In a Resolution dated 12 March 1990, We accepted the appeal interposed by the accused. 24
The accused filed their Appellants' Brief on 20 December 1990 25 while the Office of the Solicitor General filed the Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee on 30 January 1991. 26
The appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO
ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO
MARTINADO CONSPIRED WITH A CERTAIN "ROLLY" TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. 27
In discussing the first error, appellants focus on the arguments that proof of robbery is wanting that their guilt for the homicide has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the first, the appellants underscore the fact that it was only two (2) days after the alleged killing that the loss of the victim's personal
belongings was reported to the police authorities. They then suggest that "[t]he wristwatch and the money contained in the wallet could have
been stolen when the cadaver was already in the Hospital or probably in the Morgue;" 28 that Elizabeth Carillo's declaration on the witness
stand that she saw a certain "Rolly" return and pick up a watch as he, together with the accused, were fleeing from the victim's house, is not
sufficient to support the conclusion that a robbery was committed as the watch could have been Rolly's; and that the loss of money was not
proven and the witness who claims to have seen the alleged killing, Margarita Padrinao, did not testify on the actual taking of property.
We have closely perused through the entire records of the case and are convinced that the crime of robbery was not proven to have been
committed. No conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused themselves was presented by the
prosecution. 29 This Court takes note of the fact that the original information filed three (3) days after the incident in question was for Murder
and no hint whatsoever of robbery was made therein. The evidence further discloses that it was only at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening
of 16 November 1986 that the widow of Juan Matias reported to the Investigation Division of the Kalookan City Police Station that "they
found out that the Seiko wristwatch worth P800.00; GOLD ring worth P1,800.00 and the amount of P2,500.00 contained in the wallet of his
(sic) slain husband, JUAN MATIAS were missing presumably (sic) taken by suspects (sic)." 30
It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as
conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only be simple homicide
or murder, depending on the absence or presence of qualifying circumstances. 31
The trial court based its finding of the existence of robbery on Margarita Padrinao's and Elizabeth Carillo's respective testimonies. There is
also the testimony of the victim's son, Nicanor Matias, a substantial part of which is hearsay as he constantly alluded to the information his
mother had given him. While Padrinao gave the following statements during her direct examination:
FISCAL SILVERIO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what did the police find out during the investigation, if any?
A Things were missing, sir.
Q Did you come to know what were those missing things?
A Watches (sic), wallet.
Q How did you come to know that?
A Because he was not wearing his wristwatch and his wallet was missing.
Q Whose wallet was missing?
A Juan Matias, sir.
Q Do you know what kind of watch is owned or being worn by Juan Matias?
A Seiko V, sir.
 Q How did you come to know that?
A I used to see that watch because I have been staying there for a long time.
Q You said that wallets (sic) was missing, do you know if there are (sic) money contained in that
wallet?
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
How did you know that a wallet was missing?
A Because the wallet was no longer at the back pocket of his pants.32
Carillo declared that:
FISCAL SILVERIO:
Q When you said that you saw Rolly, Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado running out from the sari-
sari store, what happened next, if nay?
A I saw Rolly returned (sic) and picked (sic) up something, sir.
Q Did you see what Rolly picked up at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A A watch, sir.
Q Could you describe the watch picked up by Rolly at that time?
A I cannot describe the make, sir, the trademark but it is a watch. 33
It is at once apparent that nobody was able to observe that immediately before the incident, Juan Matias was wearing a wristwatch and a
gold ring and had a wallet in his pocket which contained money; moreover, nobody witnessed the actual taking by the accused of Juan
Matias' personal belongings. While Margarita Padrinao saw Matias being repeatedly stabbed, she failed to notice the latter being actually
divested of his personal effects. Further scrutiny of Padrinao's testimony reveals that at the time she declared that "things were missing," the
victim was no longer in front of her for she had likewise testified that latter was rushed to the hospital soon after the stabbing. The
investigation during which she uttered such statements was conducted by police authorities who arrived at the crime scene long after the
victim had been removed. It would thus be highly doubtful that Padrinao could credibly assert right then and there that the said items were
missing as, presumably, she was not able to get a clear glimpse of the victim as he was being brought to the hospital. In fact, if there was
any person who could have testified about the missing items, it would have been Elizabeth Carillo. Together with a neighbor, the victim's wife
and brother, she brought Juan Matias to the hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. 34
With respect to Carillo's testimony, the fact that Rolly returned and picked up a watch is no proof at all that the watch belonged to the victim
for unfortunately, the prosecution failed to elicit from her any information about the precise place where the watch was picked up in relation to
the place where Juan Matias was stabbed, or the person possessing the same before it was picked up. In short, she did not testify that the
said watch belonged to and was taken from the victim. Absent such proof, it is highly possible that the watch could have been, as suggested
by the accused Rolly's.
The testimony of Nicanor Matias, on the other hand, merely recounts his own discovery that certain items were missing when he arrived at
his parents' house after the incident; he also described these missing items and estimated their respective values. As earlier observed, much
of the information he volunteered was based on what his mother had told him, thus making the same objectionable on the ground of hearsay.
As basis for the assertion that the crime of homicide has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, both accused emphasize that "the
contradiction between the statement of Ms. Margarita Padrinao in her Affidavit to the effect that "Rolly" was the last person to leave the sari-
sari store and was in fact seen by her "INANG" holding a knife, and that of her testimony in Court to the effect that she did not see "Rolly"
anymore for she immediately went outside the store shouting for help, had created a semblance of falsehood." 35
The suggested flaw, more apparent than real, betrays strained and tenuous reasoning. Padrinao's aforesaid statement does not at all clash
with her testimony during cross-examination. All that she declared during the latter was that:
ATTY. BALLON:
Q I am going to quote your answer: "Oho, ito hong dalawang ito (affiant pointing to the persons
inside the Investigation Office, who gave their names as Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon alias ELISEO,
20 years old, single, helper, native of Dagami, Leyte, resident of Visayan Auto Repair Shop, Deparo,
Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES MARTINADO y Aguillon, 23 years old, single, laborer, native of
Dagami, Leyte, resident of Sterling Subd., Caloocan City) at isa pa na magbobote ang pangalan ay
Rolly", did you give that answer?
A Yes, sir, because they were three but I did not see the third man because I only reached ( sic)
inside the store the two (referring to the two accused).
Q Now, could you say now, Miss Padrinao, that there were three inside the store?
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was this Rolly inside the store when you saw him?
 A I did not see him inside the store but the ones I reached (sic) inside the store were Eliseo and
Hermogenes Martinado, because right after I saw it (sic) I immediately went out and shouted.
Q And so it is clear that you did not see the actual stabbing of Mang Juan, during the stabbing of
Mang Juan you did not see this Rolly?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this Rolly was not inside the store before Mang Juan was stabbed?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Why did you mention in your affidavit that the three who killed Juan Matias were Eliseo, Hermogenes
and this Rolly who was magbobote (sic)?
A I did not see that Rolly anymore because as I have said when I saw the two (referring to Eliseo and
Hermogenes) helping one another in stabbing Mang Juan, I ran away and shouted for help.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BALLON:
Q While (sic) ago, during your direct testimony and even on the cross examination by this
representation you stated categorically that you only saw two people drinking softdrinks in the store
of Mang Juan on November 14, 1986, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon and in your statement
Exhibit "A" you stated that also a certain Rolly magbobote who (sic) was with the two drinking
softdrinks, which of them is now correct? There seems to be a conflict.
A I only saw the two of them drinking softdrinks, that is what I saw. 36
Padrinao's failure to notice Rolly inside the store could be explained by the fact that she immediately left upon seeing Juan Matias being
stabbed by the two (2) accused. 37 It is very likely that this third person, Rolly, could have just been hidden or covered by the other two.
Thus, it was only when the stabbing was consummated that she saw all three because they naturally had to leave the scene of the crime. It
is to be observed that Rolly's presence was confirmed by two (2) other witnesses, namely Elizabeth Carillo 38 and Angel Nieto. 39
Besides, such a minor contradiction does not effect the credibility of a witness. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to
minor and insignificant details cannot destroy their credibility. In fact, such minor inconsistencies guarantee sincere and candid evidence of
what actually transpired. 40 Discrepancies in minor details do not impair the credibility of a witness. In the course of a prolonged direct
examination, more so during cross-examination, the witness is usually subjected to unfriendly questioning. As a result thereof, it is usually
the case that the witness, uncomfortable and fidgety in a courtroom scene, may often fall into lapses. It is not infrequent for a witness to
commit minor mistakes in his narration of the facts. 41 Rather than effect the credibility of the witnesses, they are badges of truthfulness and
candor. 42
Margarita Padrinao's narration of the incident is coherent in its essential parts and intrinsically believable; hence, it must be accorded due
deference. 43
In any event, even if We are to give weight to the implication suggested by the said discrepancy, only Rolly's liability would be put in doubt as
it is only as to his participation that there would exist any reservation or question. As to the accused-appellants, Padrinao was firm in her
identification of them.
Coming to the second assigned error, this Court is hard put at giving the same any credence. For one, counsel for the accused harps once
again on the alleged inconsistencies that supposedly plague the testimonies of the witnesses; this issue has already been resolved and
needs no further elaboration.
Furthermore, the accused capitalize on the Medico-Legal Officer's statement that "the wounds would have been inflicted by one person
because of the nature of the wounds." 44 The accused would attempt to mislead this Court by such conclusion because they deliberately
omitted the phrase immediately preceding the quoted declaration — "It is possible . . ." 45 Thus, all that the said witness did was to suggest
that there could have been one (1) assailant. It was only the accused who made the categorical declaration to that effect.
Finally, the accused suggest that the evidence necessary to prove conspiracy was not established because "at the time the Martinado
Brothers were accounted for, Hermogenes Martinado was at the house of Aling Espie, while Eliseo was at Visayan Auto Repair Shop at
Reparo (sic) Street, Kalookan City." 46
We have time and again ruled that alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication. 47 It cannot prevail over a positive identification
made by a prosecution witness. 48 For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed but that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. 49
As found by the trial court, both accused were apprehended in the vicinity of the crime scene shortly after the felony was committed. While
Hermogenes was found trembling under the lavatory in Rolly's house, Eliseo was accosted in the premises of the Visayan Auto Repair Shop
in the act of packing his clothes. Such deportment on the part of the two accused displays guilty consciences. On the part of Eliseo
Martinado, such a conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that the escape from the Kalookan City Jail on 6 August 1988. 50 Flight of the
accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. 51
As to conspiracy, the trial court correctly declared that:
The conspiracy was shown by the fact that the two accused were seen buying and drinking softdrinks together with
"Rolly" at the store of the victim and by the fact that they fled together. (People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 139). The
 Prosecution has also established that the same two accused and "Rolly" helped each other in stabbing the accused (sic),
each using a pointed and bladed instrument in stabbing the same victim to death. 52
This Court hereby adopts the aforequoted exposition. These facts prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had a common purpose
and were united in its execution. There is conspiracy when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 53 Conspiracy to exists does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it
exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 54 Direct proof of
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, 55 or inferred from acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. 56 Conspiracy having been adequately established by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, all the conspirators
— the accused herein — are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective individual participation for in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 57
As We have earlier declared, however, the finding that robbery was committed on the occasion of the killing cannot be sustained. Hence, the
accused are liable only for homicide. This Court, nevertheless, appreciates against both accused the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength 58 which although not alleged in the second amended information, was duly proven by the prosecution and may
therefore be properly taken into consideration. 59 The victim, Juan Matias, a septuagenarian, was unarmed at the time he was assaulted;
Eliseo Martinado was about 21 years old 60 while Hermogenes Martinado was only 28 years old. 61 They both ganged up on the old man
who never had the slightest inkling that the accused, who pretended to be his customers, would attack him simultaneously with bladed
instruments. It is obvious that they took advantage of their individual and collective strength. The penalty then for the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in its maximum period pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 64 of said Code.
Conformably with the policy of this Court enunciated in several cases, the indemnity for the death of Juan Matias should be increased to
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. C-27858 finding both accused
Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon and Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby modified. As modified, the two accused are
found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset it, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day
of prision mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as
maximum.
Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from
confinement. 62 Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum.
The indemnity for the death of the deceased Juan Matias is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

13. G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014

MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the
penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or
the total value of the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds malversed, or the value of
the property embezzled.
The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated on August 16, 2006, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the
consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos.
4651, inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in
San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.3
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:
Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La
Union from 1993-1995. Among his duties was toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official receipts (ROR)
were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.

Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued
RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC with the attached
triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).
 The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR) relating to the real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR, its date,
name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax paid.

On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and
Norma Duran, all from the central office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the appellant.

Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of
the RORs attached to the MRCs submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance Division of the BIR. The
audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). A comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to 18 RORs with the same serial number,
i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, (c) 1513718, (d) 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) 2023438, (j) 2023837,
(k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) 3096955, (p) 3097386, (q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name
of the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser
amounts of taxes reported in appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s RORs.

The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos. 1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and
2023438 totalled Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the taxes collected
was only Php227.00, or a difference of Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued to taxpayers
and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled receipts.

Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837, 2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955,
3097386, 3503336, and 4534412, show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet, appellant’s MRCs
yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a difference of Php499,491.15.

The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16
(A). The MRA contains, among others, the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as well as those
issued by him for a certain month.

In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is
Ph₱615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to COA and
in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute the total
amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public funds
through falsification of public document against him."4

On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:

Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he
never accepted payments from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin and Rebecca
Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the corresponding RORs. To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who
testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam Fernando, La Union, it was a female BIR employee who
received the payment and issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to 1994, testified that when
he made the payments to the same BIR office, it was not appellant who received the payments nor issued the corresponding receipts but
another unidentified BIR employee."5

Decision of the RTC

On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents,6 decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccionalas
minimum up to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱4,869.00;
3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;
4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10
years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10
years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;
 8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;
9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;
10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;
11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;
12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;
13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱47,902.60;
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 one day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱52,740.66;
15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76;
16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;
17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay fine of ₱45,330.18; 18)
Criminal Case No. 4651and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;
And to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows:
I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE AND PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO COULD HAVE
POSSIBLY COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED ARE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction of the petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC,8 observing
that he had committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and COA; 9 that he
was presumed to be the forger by virtue of his being in the possession of such public documents; 10 and that he had certified to the MRAs and had actually
issued the tampered receipts.11
Anent the malversation, the CA opined:
All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated
collection clerks, hecollected taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax payments made by taxpayers. He was accountable for the proper and
authorized use and application of the blank RORs issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for the tax payments received in the performance of his
duties. The unexplained shortage in his remittances of the taxes collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even in the absence of direct proof
of misappropriation, made him liable for malversation. The audit team’s demand letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie
presumption that he put to his personal use the missing funds.12
The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that it had been his assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and
issued the RORs, he was nonetheless liable,13 because his duty as an accountable officer had been to strictly supervise his assistants;14 and that by failing
to strictly supervise them he was responsible for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance of the actual amounts collected.15
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution16 promulgated on January 11, 2007, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on
certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner claims that the CA erred:
I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS].
II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A COMPLEX CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC
FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents on the basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as Revenue District Officer; 18 that the acts
imputed to him did not constitute negligence; and that he could not be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation through negligence at the
same time.19
Ruling
We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit.
The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz:
The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based her examination to determine the discrepancies in the Official Receipts
listed by the accused therein, bore only the typewritten name of the accused without any signature. However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed
that those individual pages were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a particular month, and she showed that the last pages of the related
reports were duly signed by the accused. Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages of the questioned monthly reports and demonstrated to the
Court the sequence of the pagination and the last pages ofthe monthly reports bearing the signature of accused Zafra x x x. By these the prosecution
demonstrated that the individual pages of the Monthly Collection Report which listed receipts for lesser amounts were part of official reports regularly
submitted by the accused in his capacity as Collection Agent of the BIR in San Fernando City, La Union. While counsel for accused called attention to the
absence of accused (sic) signatures on Exhibit "A", accused did not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits as he chose to remain silent.
In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of Accountabilities (Exhibit "D") which the accused, as Collection Officer
submits on the first week of the following month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria Domagas establishes that the questionable receipts were
within the series of receipts accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The testimony of State Auditor Domagas established the link of accused
accountable receipts, with the receipts numbers reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the receipts issued to the taxpayers. Thereby
prosecution showed that while the receipts issued to the taxpayer were not signed by the accused, these receipts were his accountable forms. Such that the
use thereof is presumed to be sourced from him. Even the defense witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the office of the accused.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24 issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number
appearing in the Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less
than what was collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the auditors." 20 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact
by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner had beenthe forger of the falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications
of the public documents had been necessary to committhe malversations of the collected taxes.
Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the
RTC fittingly ruminated:
x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were done by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of
negligence by the accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the
government loss.21 (Italics supplied)
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His
reliance is grossly misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief
forensic discourse on the legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was notthe basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue
significance to such discourse is to divert attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that the RTC did not give
any weight to his position.
Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same tenor as that of the RTC’s,22 and later on even went to the extent of
opining that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence.23 But such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his
several convictions for the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. As can be seen, both lower courts
unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our attention any fact or
circumstance that either lower court had not properly appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in his favor. At any
rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred
from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the
convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed
by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on
the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00.25 Prision mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment. 26 In contrast, the penalty for
malversation ranges from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled, to wit:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation
of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does
not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed
 six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion temporalin its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is morethan twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal tothe total value of the property embezzled. x x x x
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the petitioner, therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the
penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Codeare not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each
portion forming one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being
the penalty properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for falsification would be greater than such penalties for
malversation. The tabulation of the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code follows, to wit:
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176317.pdf]]
TABLE 1

Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum

Misappropriated prescribed Medium

Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years,

₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 days
medium and to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to to 6 years.
maximum 6 months 4 years,
periods and 20 days 9 months
and 10
days

More than ₱200 Prision 6 years and 6 years and 7 years, 8 years,
pesos but not mayorin its 1 day to 10 1 day to 4 months 8 months
exceeding minimum years 7 years and and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 4 months to 8 years to 10 years
periods and 8
Months

More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years,

₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month
less than maximum to 14 years to 11 years, and 21 and 11 days
₱12,000.00 period to and 6 months days to to 14 years
reclusion 8 months and 20 days 13 years, and
temporal in 1 month 8 months
its minimum and
period 10 days

More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,

₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11 days to
and to 20 years to 16 years, 18 years,
maximum 5 months 2 months
periods. and 10 days and
20 days

18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days
to 20 years/td>

More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion

₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
its maximum and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
period to to to 18 years to 20 years
reclusion reclusion and
perpetua perpetua 8 months
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum
term.28 The maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each
count was a complex crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty for each count is the maximum period as shown in
Table 1, supra, except for the count dealt with in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the corresponding
penalty for malversation as stated in Table 1 was prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, because such penalty for malversation was
lower than the penalty of prision mayor imposable on falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period that was applicable.
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should come from the penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower is prision correccional in its full range, to wit:
TABLE 2

Penalty prescribed Penalty next Range of minimum term

under Art. 217 lower in degree

Prision correccional in Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and

its medium and its maximum 4 months
maximum periods period to prision
correccional in
its minimum
period

Prision mayor in its Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years

minimum and medium correccional in
period its medium and
maximum
periods

Prision mayor in its Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years

maximum period to its minimum and
reclusion temporal in medium periods
its minimum period

Reclusion temporal in Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and

its medium and its maximum 8 months
maximum periods. period to
reclusion
temporal in its
minimum period

Reclusion temporal in Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty to be imposed upon the accused in
its maximum period to already reclusion
reclusion perpetua perpetua

Penalty prescribed Penalty next Range of minimum term

under Art. 171 lower in degree

Prision mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years

correccional
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused totaling ₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more
serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua.
There is even one completely incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its being the higher penalty.
The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
TABLE 3

Amount Indeterminate sentence

misappropriated
Minimum term Maximum term

₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

prision mayor of reclusion temporal

₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of

correccional prision mayor29

₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

mayor of reclusion temporal

₱17,419.00 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

mayor of reclusion temporal
 ₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
mayor prision mayor

₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of

mayor prision mayor

₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua

₱38,878.55 - Reclusion perpetua

₱20,286.88 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

mayor of reclusion temporal

₱42,573.97 - Reclusion perpetua

₱40,598.40 - Reclusion perpetua

₱42,140.45 - Reclusion perpetua

₱47,902.60 - Reclusion perpetua

₱52,740.66 - Reclusion perpetua

₱75,489.76 - Reclusion perpetua

₱54,984.47 - Reclusion perpetua

₱45,330.18 - Reclusion perpetua

₱37,842.05 - Reclusion perpetua

One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the
amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in
the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting
the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a
waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the
judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their
disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the
established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all.
Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is
what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done
without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex
delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless
the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.31
In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the accused in each count shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties
imposed as stated in this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is hereby AMENDED to
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is charged in:

1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;

2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00;

3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;
 4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00;

5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;

6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;

7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;

8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;

9) Criminal Case No. 4642 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as m inimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;

10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;

11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;

12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;

13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60;

14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66;

15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76;

16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;

17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱45,330.18;

18) Criminal Case No. 4651 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;

In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of ₱614,268.73, plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment, by way of his civil liability.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the
Omnibus Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba,
who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the
purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan
City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo
saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter
gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police
officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the
appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by the
appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant
which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and
(3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso ( ₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as
well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia
Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The
laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline
substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the
following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two
(0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3

Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three one
(0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In its Omnibus Judgment 5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive
portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling
shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos ( ₱500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu,
a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant
Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized
shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo,
there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling
shabu. And after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be
used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to
the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that
time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel.
(sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the
suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and
informed us that the shabu was already given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the
suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the
attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso bills as marked moneys. 8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the
offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.9 From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met.
The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also
satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic
chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and
that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange
ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and
proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. 11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. 12 In People v. Roa,13 this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and
importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is
true that Section 8614 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for
every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 15 of the Rules of the Court, which
police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. 16 A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.

Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:

In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-
bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer.
Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense
with the need for prior surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA
9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the
arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of
shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial
was not convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have
none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested
positively for the presence of the said powder?

A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common
and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to
him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in
the buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. 25 Its non-compliance will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 26 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 27 In this particular case, it
is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who
signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper
chain of custody had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the
suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the
attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present,
what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of ₱100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other
one during the search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?

A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory. 28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking 29 of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The
appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said
appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 31
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 32 the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its
retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same
law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge
the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence,
when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of
minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction
and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it
is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances
whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where
there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61
of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty
shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty
by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty
under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs
thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in
their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule
were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction
by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the
scale.1avvphi1
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce
the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this
reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the
lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be
forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. 38

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority 39 can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having
been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40 The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible
penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment
dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant
Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.