Ty vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in
a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church
wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab
initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before
the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein
petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April
1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991,
Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be
declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the
provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the
petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be
awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a
baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from
the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid
and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and
wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is
declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is
ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long
as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love
affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who
had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos
college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor
are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by
Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s
dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it
was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for
divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the
Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married
Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a
complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and
binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such
grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford
divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with
her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed
by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are
still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of
legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys'
fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by
way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the
Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also
in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos
when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner,
in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement
to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her
own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In
the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political
Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos,
her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ayala Investments vs CA
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to
pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC
rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses
of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May
1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its
order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the
only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the
husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”
and is it chargeable.
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt
was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money
or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted
only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching
only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was
clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for
the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code
must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by
product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Agapay vs Palang 87
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on
1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child
Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957,
Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972,
he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda
Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same
place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they
were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel
died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and
the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA
reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be
awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the
subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an
actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business
of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade
the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected
riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the
US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she
could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no
basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the
Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order
or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was
not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared
the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s
claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years
old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase
price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage
at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
FACTS:Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Mat
abuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the
death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of
the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the
donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and
were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the
spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent t
he possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one
spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the decease
d to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
BA Finance Corp vs. CA 94
FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59
as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of
A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his
wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was
registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the
promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their
children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due
and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses
were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the
rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the
spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial
court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of
attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient
to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the
husband.
HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily
Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were
also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part
of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations
contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and
left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by
his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly,
there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of
the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by
Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is
ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.
Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises v. Guiang, et al., 94
Facts: Under the agreement between Maris Trading and Marmont Resort Hotel,
Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to
install and complete a water supply facility to service the hotel. In fulfillment of its
contract, Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a
parcel of land, then occupied by the Guiang spouses. Five (5) months later, a
second agreement was executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang, with
Federico Guiang signing as witness whereby the Guiangs sell, transfer and cede all
possessory rights, interest and claims over the portion of the lot where the water
source is located in favor of Maris Trading.
After some time, the water supply of the hotel became inadequate to
meet the hotel's water requirements. It secured the services of another contractor,
which suggested that in addition to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be
installed to increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel.
Accordingly, the hotel manager sought permission from the Guiang spouses to
inspect the water pump which had been installed on the portion of the land
previously occupied by the spouses and to make the necessary additional
installations thereon. No such permission, however, was granted. For this refusal to
allow representatives of the hotel and its contractor to enter the water facility site, a
complaint for Damages was filed against the Guiangs to which the spouses denied
having knowledge of the first agreement and that the second agreement was invalid
for not having been executed in accordance with law.
Trial Court's Ruling: The RTC dismissed the complaint finding that
while Aurora Guiang had validly alienated her rights over the disputed portion of the
land to Maris Trading, no such transfer of rights was shown from Maris Trading to
Marmont.
Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The Memoranda of Agreement could not be
legally considered as the documents were not formally offered in evidence by either
party.
Issue: Whether the Memoranda of Agreement should be considered as they were
already admitted in the pre-trial order; and
Whether the ownership of rights belongs to Maris Trading; hence, Guiang can
prohibit Marmont Resort from entering the land
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Memoranda of Agreement should be considered
because these have been admiued during the pretrial. This constitutes judicial
admission, the veracity of which requires no further proof.
While the wife solely contracted the agreement, it was also signed by
the husband as a witness, indicating that the husband gave consent to the
execution of the agreement by his wife. Even if the land in dispute is public land, the
Guiang spouses chose to transfer such rights to Maris Trading, and in the same
agreement, the Guiang spouses therein had acknowledged the earlier agreement
and the obligations. The courts below failed to take account of the fact that the sole
purpose of Maris Trading in acquiring possessory rights over that specific portion of
the land where well and pump and piping had been installed, was to supply the
water requirements of Marmont Hotel.
Said stipulations in the agreements appear to have been designed
precisely to benefit the hotel and, thus, partake of the nature of stipulations pour
autrui, contemplated in Article 131 I of the Civil Code. A stipulation pour autrui is a
stipulation in favor of a third person conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon
him, which stipulation is found in a contract entered into by parties neither of whom
acted as agent of the beneficiary
Uy vs. CA 96
FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife
of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the
husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291
and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending
that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are
governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly
the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of
the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife”
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued
that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in
law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental
faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and
dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD: SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not
apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent
who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence,
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has
the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to
sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not
the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of
the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the
ground of lack of due process.
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz 101 135
FACTS: Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and
begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and
were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for
the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from
abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand,
Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided
support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise
the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling
instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the
conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband
had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of
property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in
favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON
there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD: The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations
and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the
conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and
perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere
separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as
admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal
abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the
wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given
personally by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of
the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to
exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
DEL MUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 109
FACTS: The Spouses Francisco are the owners of a parcel of land. Del Mundo, on
the other hand, is the operator of a dive camp resort adjacent to the property.
Sometime in June of 1980, Del Mundo proposed a corporate joint
venture with the Franciscos for the development of the latter's property. The
corporation (to be named the "Anilao Development Corporation") would have a
capital stock of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos to be subscribed equally
between Del Mundo and the Franciscos. To cover the proposed subscription of the
Franciscos, Del Mundo assured the couple that he could get from them a
P125,000.00 loan secured by the realty.
The Franciscos executed a special power of attorney ("SPA"), dated 25
July 1980, 4 in favor of Del Mundo authorizing him to obtain a bank loan.
Only the duplicate copy of the SPA was given to Del Mundo by the
Francisco. The latter kept the original copy but agreed to have it delivered to Del
Mundo once he would have been able to firm up the P125,000.00 financing to cover
their (the Franciscos) proposed subscription. Aside from the special power of
attorney, the Franciscos, who were then about to depart for abroad, turned over to
Del Mundo the physical possession of the real property along with its existing
facilities and equipment.
Del Mundo proceeded to the Republic Planters Bank ("RPB") to apply
for the loan. After the loan application was approved, Del Mundo executed a deed
of real estate mortgage over the Franciscos' property to secure a P265,000.00 loan.
The mortgage, however, could not be annotated on the owner's copy of OCT NO. 0-
3267 (lot of Franciscos), then in the possession of the Development Bank of the
Philippines ("DBP") which had a previous mortgage lien on it. To obtain said
owner's copy, the RPB agreed to assume, and thereafter paid, Franciscos'
outstanding indebtedness to the DBP. The latter, despite the payment, refused to
release the owner's copy of the certificate of title due to Franciscos' objection. In
order to allow the release of the loan proceeds, Del Mundo submitted additional
collaterals. The RPB then withdrew its previous payment to the DBP of P22,621.75,
and the P265,000.00 loan was forthwith released to Del Mundo.
The joint venture did not materialize. The Franciscos wrote a demand
letter addressed to Del Mundo for the payment of rentals for the use of their
property at the rate of P3,000.00 a month (totalling P42,000.00) and for the return of
the equipment taken by Del Mundo from the bodega of the Franciscos valued at
P15,000.00.
Since Del Mundo failed to settle with the Franciscos, the latter sued Del
Mundo, along with the RPB, for annulment of the mortgage, as well as for damages,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
RTC- ordered Del Mundo and RPB to pay jointly and severally the Franciscos the
sum of 200k by way of actual and moral damages.
CA- Affirmed trial court’s decision with certain modifications
ISSUE: W/N the award of moral and actual damages is correct.
HELD: NO, the court modified the decision of the CA by DELETING actual and
moral damages.
Actual Damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof,
but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have
emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an
award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
In this case, it fails to show that substantial legal basis was shown to
support the herein questioned collective award for the questioned damages. We
are, therefore, constrained to disregard them.
As regards the other issues raised by petitioner, the findings of the
appellate court, involving such as they do mainly factual matters that are not entirely
bereft of substantial basis, must be respected and held binding on this Court.
In passing, we have taken note of the fact that the RPB, itself a
judgment co-debtor in solidum with Del Mundo, did not join the latter in this appeal.
The Court, accordingly, cannot here and now make any pronouncement on the
effects of said bank's payment to Del Mundo under and by virtue of the appellate
court's appealed decision.
Villanueva vs. IAC 109
GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987
FACTS: Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his
father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed money
from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their father’s
property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute co-
owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the
highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share
pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the
mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the
name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed
a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the
cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-
owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987
and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and
Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said
Victoria’s shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modesto’s
interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties
bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint,
declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC
likewise affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon
made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property.
HELD:The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It
was Modesto’s exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover,
since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and
therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility
or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal
partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of
the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used
thereof in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. What is certain is that the land
on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that
where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no
showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is
belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the
improvements to be conjugal in character.
Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over the
property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect
whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and
clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently
arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their
assertion and ventilation.
BPI vs. Posadas 115
FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze,
appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from
the complaint filed against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209
paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of
P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing
and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in
Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was
named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real property situated
in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19
domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy
issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate
of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the
sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedent’s estate
and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the
inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other
half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal
and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal
in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable
to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter,
if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was
domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax
collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy
on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part
corresponding to the first premium.
JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS 116
FACTS: Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died
first intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their
children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by
Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale,
to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties,
including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson
assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the
only heirs of their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.
ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.
HELD: Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,
however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered
only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described
in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so
because the words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same
having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.
Wong vs. IAC 116
FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children
however, even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most
of the time living separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the
husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an
agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry
valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period
thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972,
check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita
Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against
Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in
behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution
was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico
Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to
Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such
redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ
and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be
satisfied through the conjugal property.
HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the
business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business
transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in
Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband
obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution
of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively
incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration
of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute
the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
Zulueta Vs. Pan American 117
Facts:
• Zulueta and his family were passengers of Pan American World
Airways travelling from Honolulu to Manila.
• In one stopover, they were advised that they could disembark for
about 30 minutes.
• However, Zulueta almost missed the flight because he came late
(due to the defective announcing system).
• He was asked to open his bags but the employees of the airlines
found nothing. Later on, he was asked to go out of the plane.
• He was left at Wake Island and was able to return to the Philippines
2 days after.
• He filed an action for damages.
Issue: WON there must be an award for damages. YES
Held: Award for exemplary damages:
It is urged by the defendant that exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-
delicts, pursuant to Article 2231 of our Civil Code, except when the defendant has
acted with "gross negligence," and that there is no specific finding that it had so
acted. It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the
circumstances heretofore adverted to, defendant's agents had acted with malice
aforethought and evident bad faith. If "gross negligence" warrants the award of
exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act
performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.
Thus, in Lopez v. PANAM, We held:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to
provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its
contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in
addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code.)
Award for moral damages:
In fact, Article 2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"(t)hough incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence,
"(n)o proof pecuniary loss necessary" — pursuant to Article 2216 of the same Code
— "in order that moral ... damages may be adjudicated." And "(t)he assessment of
such damages ... is left to the discretion of the court" - said article adds - "according
to the circumstances of each case."
From the 1972 case:
The records amply establish plaintiffs' right to recover both moral and exemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of
Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp ("what in the hell do
you think you are? Get on that plane"); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton
and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags ("open
your bag," and when told that a fourth bag was missing, "I don't give a damn"); the
abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of
PANAM's employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta remarked, "will
you pull these three monkeys out of here?"); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares
and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by
men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the
airline officials' refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was
hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave
him in Wake; Mrs. Zulueta's having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she
was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which
plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PANAM's employees; Miss Zulueta's
having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received
by her parents at the airport — all these justify an award for moral damages
resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs.
JOVELLANOS vs. CA – 210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164) 118
Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional
sale agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners.
Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private
respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st
marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel
Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to
Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated
to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow
thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court
that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of
the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their
parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional
sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
Issue: WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the
nature of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a
contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of
the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is
transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the
seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The
stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual
reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with
the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the
deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of
the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and,
under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights
of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H.
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his
said second wife.
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the
corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the
amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on
property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage,
such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
Ayala Investments vs CA 121
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent
Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and
March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness
to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses
filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent
spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the
only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone
is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC
failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate
entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as
surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family
may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment
(prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the
benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting
from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Johnson & Johnson vs CA 121
GR No. 102692, September 23, 1996
FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the
name of “Vinluan Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she
issued seven checks of varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Partial payments were
made after several demands. When no further payments were made to settle the
obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses for collection of the principal
obligation plus interest with damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and
found that there was no “privity of contract between J&J and defendant husband
Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the wife”. Husband was made a
co-owner of the enterprise afer the obligation involved in this action has been
incurred. The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute
judgment on the properties of the wife. However, the 2 notices of levy on execution
covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the properties of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses. This led the husband to file a third-party claim
seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the third-
party claim since Alejo’s consent became evident when he did not seek the
intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wife’s engaging business
coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the settlement of his
wife’s account. Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal
and paraphernal property. Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging
the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final
judgment. CA upheld private respondent. Hence this petition by J&J.
ISSUE: WON a husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife
without his consent and did not benefit the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise
of deciding the third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife and her
paraphernal property can be held liable. And since the pwer of the execution of
judgment extends only to properties belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the
conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. In any
event that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to bind the
conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by either the
husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the
husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business. The respondent court
already found that the husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation
incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.
Lacson vs. Diaz (Group 12) 122
Facts: In connection with a final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5790 (Soledad L. Lacson, et al. v s . Abelardo
G. Diaz), sentencing defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P97, 532.93 with
legal interest thereon from July 1, 1960 until fully paid, plus a sum equivalent to
25% of the total amount as attorney's fees, the court issued a writ of execution on
August 1, 1961. On August 7, 1961, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental sent
to the manager of Talisay- Silay Milling Company, wherein defendant Diaz was
employed, a notice to garnish one- third of his monthly salary and of any other
personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover the total amount of P132,
718.30. Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift
the notice of garnishment (of his salary), on the ground that the same are not
enforceable against his present family. It was claimed that since the money-
judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage, said
judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal
properties of the second marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the debt procured by the petitioner prior to the second
marriage may be enforced on the properties of her second marriage
Ruling: Yes, the court ruled that as the conjugal partnership resulting of the second
marriage is different from that of the first marriage, during which existence the
obligation arose, such obligation, as far as the second conjugal partnership is
concerned, is personal to the husband and cannot be charged against the
properties of the second union in pursuance to Article 163 of the Civil Code. And,
since his salaries form part of the conjugal assets, the same cannot be garnished to
satisfy his personal obligations. However, such obligations may be enforced
against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the
new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive
property or the same is insufficient. In the instant case, although it is not
controverted that there is due and owing the plaintiffs-appellees a certain sum of
money from the appellant debtor — a personal obligation — yet, it has not been
established that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are
not adequate to satisfy appellees' claim. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, in accordance with the aforestated observation.
Notes:
1. "ART. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership. "Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon them be charged to the partnership. "However, the payment of
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purposes above- mentioned."
2. "ART. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, . . ., (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage,
from obligations which constitute a charged upon property of either
spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the
husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the
partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the
children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of
the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a
professional, vocational or other course."
Manzano, Jr. (P) vs. Garcia ® 134
FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-25464, issued in the name of respondent Marcelino D. Garcia (Garcia).
The property was the subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale dated May 26, 1992
allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of Constancio Manzano, the predecessor-in-
interest and brother of petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr. (Vicente) for the amount of
eighty thousand five hundred pesos (P80,500.00). Under said contract, Garcia
purportedly reserved the right to repurchase the subject property for the same price
within three months from the date of the instrument.
On July 12, 1992, Constancio Manzano passed away. His properties,
including the subject of this case, were adjudicated to his heirs by virtue of a deed
of extrajudicial partition with special power of attorney executed by them. Vicente
was named the administrator of the intestate estate of Constancio Manzano.
Garcia did not redeem the subject property within the three-month period.
Consequently, Vicente instituted a petition for consolidation of ownership over the
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-610. Garcia filed an opposition and
answer, alleging that the document evidencing the pacto de retro sale was a
forgery. He claimed that he and his wife were in the United States of America (USA)
from June 1, 1988 to November 14, 1992, and therefore could not have possibly
executed the said pacto de retro sale on May 26, 1992.
During the trial, Vicente presented TCT No. T-25464 and Tax Declaration No.
41672 to prove the due execution of the pacto de retro sale, which was recorded in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
On the other hand, Garcia testified that he went to the USA on November 7, 1987.
A few months later, he returned to the Philippines. He went back to the USA on
June 1, 1988. His three children were left in the Philippines, while the titles to his
properties were left in the office of his business establishment in Tablon, Cagayan
de Oro City with two of their children. Garcia testified that the signatures appearing
in the pacto de retro sale were not his and his wifes. He presented his passport and
drivers license, both of which bear an entirely different signature than what
appeared in the pacto de retro sale document.
Atty. Demosthenes Mediante, Jr. (Atty. Mediante), the person who notarized the
deed of conveyance in question, and Perla Babano, one of the witnesses to the
execution of the pacto de retro sale, testified that the Marcelino Garcia who
appeared in his office and who executed the pacto de retro sale is not the same
Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the trial of the case.
ISSUE: I. Whether the pacto de retro sale between the parties was valid
HELD: From an assiduous examination of the records of the case, it is plainly
apparent to this Court that the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale
is utterly dissimilar from his customary signature appearing in the evidence on
record, as well as in the verifications of the pleadings before this Court and the
courts a quo. From this circumstance alone, we are constrained to affirm the ruling
of the Court of Appeals finding that the pacto de retro sale was forged and,
therefore, void ab initio.
the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale, on one
hand, and in the evidence on record and in the verifications of the pleadings before
this Court and the courts a quo, on the other hand, was enormous and obvious,
such that this Court can readily conclude that the pacto de retro sale was in all
likelihood made by someone who has not even seen the customary signature of
Garcia. Furthermore, the falsity of the signature on the pacto de retro sale was
affirmed by two persons present when the instrument was signed, one of which is
the very person who notarized the same.
Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to appreciate
that the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was entitled to the presumption of
regularity and should be given great weight. It is settled that while a notarized
document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents." The "presumption of regularity of notarized
documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary."
Irregularities in the notarization of the document may be established by oral
evidence of persons present in said proceeding. Here, the presumption of
regularity of the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was sufficiently
overcome by the testimony of Atty. Mediante.