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SPL - 2

Probation Law

1. Nature of Probation

Who are disqualified


Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following:

(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;

(c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos;

(d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; (meaning probation may only be availed
of ONCE)

(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33.

Villareal vs. People, 743 SCRA 351, G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Hazing case where the RTC allowed the probation of
December 1, 2014 some of the accused)
Probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an
act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not
enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation
rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law
should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or
remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms
of the law who is not clearly within them (Francisco v. CA).
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term


of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall
be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
Santos To vs. Paño, 120 SCRA 8, No. L-55130 January 17, 1983 Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the crime of
estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and
eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and
four months of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one
day of prision correccional as minimum, to one year and eight
months as maximum.

After CA decision became final, petitioner filed for probation but


the judge despite the favorable recommendation of the
Probation Office, denied the petition on the following grounds:

(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate


the seriousness of the offense committed, and

(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.

The OSG manifested that it is their opinion that the


probation should be approved because petitioner is
not among those disqualified by law from availing of
probation.

WON the petition for probation should be


granted. - YES.
Petitioner is not among those disqualified from
obtaining probation. If not under that provision,
another legal provision must be sought to deny the
petitioner probation, which atually has to be applied
with liberality to favor accused/convicts. The judge's
reasons for his denial of the petition for probation insufficient to
justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law
should be applied.

Discussion on nature of probation


For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to
is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether
probation will help the offender along the lines for which the
probation system has been established, such as giving the first-
time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society
through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at
least as to one who has not committed a very serious offense,
when he is not mixed with hardened criminals in an atmosphere
not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The
consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second
chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his
fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of
reformation in him.

If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely,


concerned with, not the prevention by means of punitive
measures, of the commission of the offense, it is readily seen
that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong obsession. He
would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa through
bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He
would thereby add to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law
which are not subject to probation. Thus, the only crimes
mentioned in the law based on the nature thereof are those
against national security (Section 9, paragraph b), the other
crimes being those punished by more than six years
imprisonment. Respondent judge would thus be writing into the
law a new ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the
benefits of probation, based on the nature of the crime, not on
the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid down by the law
in determining who may be granted probation. That crime would
be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms of
estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liability for
which is generally separated by a thin line from mere civil
liability.

For those who would commit the offense a second time or


oftener, or commit an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long
prison term which must be served that will act as deterrent to
protect society. In protecting society, the family of the offender
which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser
extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost
sight of, it being the basic unit of that society. By the relative
lightness of the offense, as measured by the penalty imposed,
more than by its nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is
not such a serious menace to society as to be wrested away
therefrom, as the more dangerous type of criminals should be.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Librado, 260 SCRA 624, A.M.
No. P-94-1089 August 22, 1996 Vicente P. Librado is deputy sheriff of the
Municipal Trial Court he was charged and
convicted with violation of R.A. No. 6425 for
selling and having in his possession certain
quantities of prohibited drugs known as
metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and
marijuana. He was subsequently found guilty and
sentenced to six (6) years of imprisonment.
The Office of the Court Administrator filed this
administrative complaint against him and on he
was suspended from office.

Respondent admits that he had been convicted of


violation of R.A. No. 6425 and claims that he is
now on probation and pleads for a second chance
on account of his house being demolished, his
wife leaving him, and his willigness to reform.
The Executive Judge tasked to investigate teh
case recommended that in view of respondents
probation, a penalty short of dismissal be meted
out against respondent to provide him with the
incentive and the will to rehabilitate himself and
apply his time to his work as a judicial employee.
WON the respondent should be granted a
penalty lower than Dismissal as an officer of
the court in light of his probation. - NO.

This case involves a conviction of a crime


involving moral turpitude as a ground for
disciplinary action under the Civil Service
Law. Under the rules of the Civil Service
]

Commission, conviction of a crime involving moral


turpitude is considered a grave offense
punishable, upon first commission, by
dismissal. The SC has held that such fact alone
suffices as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
service employee.
The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which
involves moral turpitude. While indeed the purpose of the
Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended) is to save
valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that
unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of
which the person under probation has been
convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer
cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may
seek to reenter government service, but only after he has
shown that he is fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated
too often that a public office is a public trust, which demands
of those in its service the highest degree of morality.
Amandy vs. People, 161 SCRA 436, No. L-76258 May 23, 1988 Petitioner was convicted of the Dangeroud Drug Act and was
sentenced to imprisonment for six years and one day.

The petitioner's counsel claims that his client is a good subject


for probation and can still be reformed and rehabilitated as
shown by the recommendation of the Probation Officer.

The petition, was however, denied by the respondent lower court


for the reason that P.D. 1990 removed from the purview of the
exceptions to the probation law those 'sentenced to serve a
maximum of imprisonment of more than 6 years.'

Whether or not the respondent lower court committed


reversible error in disallowing the petitioner's application
for probation notwithstanding the favorable
recommendation of the Probation Officer. - NO. Petitioner is
disqualified from Probation.
To base the grant of probation on this contention alone would be
erroneous because the law clearly declares who are entitled
to probation and who are not. Moreover, the grant or denial of
the application for probation does not rest solely on the
offender's potentiality to reform but also on the observance of
demands of justice and public interest
The trial court has merely complied with the express provision of
an amendatory law.

The original Probation Law of 1976, Presidential Decree No. 968


provided in its Section 9 that "(t)he benefits of this Decree shall
not be extended to those: (a) sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six years. ..."

Denial of the probation application in this particular case is


further justified by the gravity of the drug menace and by the
increase of the penalty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
which bring it outside the range of probationable offenses.

Important: It may also be stated that even if a convicted


person falls within the classes of those qualified for
probation, the grant of probation is not automatic of
ministerial. Probation is a privilege and its grant rests upon
the discretion of the court (Baclayon v. Mutia). The discretion
is exercised primarily for the benefit of society as a whole and
only secondarily for the personal advantage of the accused.
Llamado vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566, G.R. No. 84850 June Ricardo Llamado (Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corp) was
29, 1989 prosecutedfor violation of BP Blg. 22. He had co-signed (with the
President of the corp.) a post-dated check payable to private
respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500, which was
dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. Petitioner was sentenced to
imprisonment for a period of 1 year and to pay a fine of P200,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also
required to reimburse to respondent the amount of P186,500 plus
cost of suit.After the decision of the trial court was read to him,
petitioner through counsel orally manifested that he was taking
an appeal.TC forwarded records of the case to the CA.
Petitioner through his counsel received from CA a notice to file his
Appellant’s Brief within 30 days. He managed to secure several
extensions of time with which to file his brief, the last extension
expiring on 18 Nov 1987.
Llamado, even while his Appellant’s Brief was being finalized by his
then counsel of record, sought advice from another
counselor.Petitioner, with assistance of his new counsel, filed in
RTC a Petition for Probation invoking PD 968, as amended.

The petition was not accepted by the lower court since the
records of the case had already been forwarded to the CA.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a “Manifestation and Petition for
Probation” dated 16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the
Petition for Probation that he submitted to the trial court. He
asked the CA to grant his petition for Probation or to remand the
Petition back to the trial court.

The CA denied the Petition for Probation. Petitioner now asks


this court to review and reverse the opinion of the majority in the
CA .
WON petitioner’s application for probation in this situation is
barred under PD 968, as amended. - YES.
YES the application for probation is already barred. There were
two amendments that happened to the law, and the present law
allows applications for probation “after the TC shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant and—within the period of perfecting
an appeal”. It prohibits the grant of an application for probation if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction.

 ORIGINAL LAW:
o Under Section 4 of PD 968, the trial court could
grant an application for probation “at any time”
“after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant” and certainly “after an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction”.Thus,
the filing of the application for probation was
deemed to constitute automatic withdrawal of a
pending appeal.
 First Amendment by PD 1257
- It has established a prolonged but definite period
during which an application for probation may be
granted by the trial court :“After the trial court
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence.”
- The cut-off time—the commencement of service
of sentence—takes place not only after an appeal
has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but
even after judgment has been rendered by the
appellate court and after judgment has become
final.
- In this last situation, it provides that “the
application for probation shall be acted upon by
the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the
appellate court”

*Had the present case arisen while Section 4 of the


statute as amended by PD 1257 was still in effect,
Llamado’s application for probation would have had
to be granted as it was filed well before the cut-off
time.

 Second Amendment by PD 1990.


- This establishes a much narrower periodduring
which an application for probation may be filed
with the TC:
“after the TC shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and—within the period of perfecting an
appeal”
- It prohibits the grant of an application for
probation if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
TC has lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his
appeal. The oral manifestation made after judgment was rendered
was considered by the RTC as being equal to a written notice of
appeal.

2. Conditions of probation
Baclayon vs. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, No. L-59298 April 30, 1984 Baclayon is a school teacher who was convicted of the crime
of serious oral defamation after uttering defamatory words
against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central
School. He was sentenced with the maximum duration of
arresto mayor (one year, 8 months, 21 days) tot he minimum
of prision correcional (2 years, 4 months)

Baclayon appealed for probation which the RTC granted. The


initial grant was three years, however, RTC Judge Mutia
(respondent) extended it two five years with the condition that
petitioner cannot practice his profession during the period of
probation.

Baclayon appealed to the Court accusing the respondent


judge of committing grave abuse of discretion.

WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of


discretion - YES.
The Probation law provides judges the freedom to impose
special or discretionary conditions on probationers. However,
this freedom is not absolute and can be subject to review by
higher courts. These special conditions must be realistic,
purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-
abiding and self-respecting individual.

Court took into account the petitioner is an accomplished


teacher, and to order her to refrain from teaching would deprive
her students and the school from her services. Conditions of
probation must also be crafted to ensure that society will benefit
from it. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful
calling and occupation during the probation. To prohibit her form
teaching would prevent her from doing this.

The respondent’s argument that the petitioner is disqualified


from holding public office because of her sentence was not
entertained by the court. The grant of probation suspends the
sentence.

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence"


but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory
judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the
convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if
the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.

The SC ordered deletion of condition that petitioner may not


practice her profession.

Discussion on Conditions of Probation:


The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer
may be classified into general or mandatory and special or
discretionary. The mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section
10 of the Probation Law, require that the probationer should (a)
present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake
his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order
within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and (b) report to the
probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are
those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the
Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of
prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation
statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate
practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer's
constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There are innumerable
conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the
probationer when viewed in their specific individual context. It
should, however, be borne in mind that the special or
discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic,
purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-
abiding and self-respecting individual Conditions should be
interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case
should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the
problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. 4 The very
liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial
courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.
Soriano vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 231, G.R. No. 123936 Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of
March 4, 1999 reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical
injuries and damage to property after being involved in a
vehicular accident which killed Isidrino Daluyong. His
application for probation was granted and among the
terms and conditions imposed were: (a) he shall meet his
family responsibilities; (b) devoting to a specific
employment or pursuing a prescribed secular study or
vocational training; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim
Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.

A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure


to indemnify the heirs of the victim and a supplemental
motion alleging petitioner’s commission of another crime
while he was awaiting arraignment. The trial court denied the
motion and instead directed petitioner to submit a program of
payment of the civil liability imposed on him. Based on the
information provided by the heirs of Daluyong, petitioner still
failed to satisfy his civil liability. Soriano was made to explain
his non-compliance and to submit his program of payment
immediately otherwise he would be cited for contempt. For
continuous failure to comply with the orders, his probation
was revoked on October 1994 for his failure to: (a) meet his
family responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific employment,
(c) satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d)
cooperate with his program of supervision.

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the


Court of Appeals claiming that respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner contempt and
revoking his probation. The CA dismissed the petition holding
that Soriano’s “stubborn unwillingness” to comply with the
orders of the trial court “shows his refusal to reform himself
and to correct a wrong.”

Whether the revocation of petitioner’s probation is lawful


and proper. - YES.
privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial
court subject to certain terms and conditions. Having the
power to grant probation, the trial court also has the power to
revoke it in a proper case and under appropriate
circumstances. Since petitioner admitted in violating the terms
and conditions of his probation, he cannot anymore assail the
revocation of his probation.

Soriano claims that his non-compliance was due to his poor


financial condition and that it was impossible for him to
formulate a program as he only relies on his parents for
support and he was in no position to comply with the same.
He even questioned the constitutionality of the requirement
imposed as this harped on his alleged poverty. – This
requirement is NOT violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Payment of civil liability is not a condition
precedent to probation. The trial court could not have done
away with imposing civil liability as it is not an arbitrary
imposition but one required by law. Petitioner may be poor,
but this is precisely the reason why the trial court gave him
the chance to make his own program of payment in contrast to
the cited Salgado case where a program of payment was
already imposed upon the petitioner therein.

Petitioner also asserts that his non-compliance with the orders


of the trial court to submit a program of payment was not
deliberate as the notice was received by his counsel and did
not notify petitioner immediately. – NO MERIT. His refusal
to comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate
as petitioner had notice of both orders and refused to comply
with the trial court’s directive. Petitioner’s counsel has not
been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice
to petitioner’s rights. The fact that petitioner submitted a
motion for reconsideration of the said order, shows proof that
he received the notice but still failed to provide the required
program of payment.

3. Recommendation of Probation Officer


Bernardo vs. Balagot, 215 SCRA 526, G.R. No. 86561 November 10, Pablo Bernardo, the herein petitioner, was convicted of estafa
1992 and sentenced to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prision
correccional as minimum to 2 years, 11 months and 10 days
of prision correccional medium as maximum, with the accessory
and other penalties.

He appealed to the Regional Trial Court which affirmed the


decision. He lost the appeal and filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, which sustained the appealed decision
with modifications. He also filed a motion for new trial and
reconsideration then later on a petition for review with the SC -
all of which were denied.

While his motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was


pending in the Court of Appeals, Bernardo filed an
application for probation.
The petition was initially recommended for approval by the
probation officer but later on The denial was based on
Section 4 of P.D. 968 as amended by P.D. 1990, prohibiting
the grant of probation to an applicant who has appealed his
conviction, and also on Bernardo's unsatisfactory conduct.

Argument of petitioner: last amendment of probation law


cannot apply to him because at the time of his conviction in
1984, he was allowed to appeal without forfeiting his right to
apply for probation. As he had no fore-knowledge that P.D. 968
would be amended, he should not now be prejudiced for having
sought, before such amendment, a reversal of his conviction.

Argument of OSG: At the time Bernardo applied for probation,


P.D. 968 had already been amended by P.D. 1990. The purpose
of the amendment was, precisely, to prohibit an application for
probation if the accused has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Purpose of amendment:
P.D. 1990 was issued when it was observed that even if a
person's conviction was finally affirmed after he had exhausted
the appeal process (usually up to this Court), he nevertheless
could still apply for probation and thus in effect undo such
affirmance. To prevent loss of time, money, and effort on the
part of the State in this wasteful exercise, the law was amended
to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests upon the


discretion of the court. Even if a convicted person is not included
in the list of offenders disqualified from the benefits of the
decree, the grant of probation is nevertheless not automatic or
ministerial. The court should, before granting probation, consider
the potentiality of the offender to reform, together with the
demands of justice and public interest, along with other relevant
circumstances. In the case at bar, as the municipal judge noted,
the petitioner represented that he had earlier filed his application
for probation when he had not done so in fact.
Even if at the time of conviction the accused was qualified for probation
but at the time of his application for probation, he is no longer qualified,
he is not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation must be
determined as of the time the application is filed in court.

Effect of recommendation by probation officer:


The favorable recommendation of the probation officer is at best
merely persuasive upon the courts in the consideration of the
application for probation. Both the law and jurisprudence are
clear on this
point.

4. Temination of Probation
Bala vs. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459, G.R. No. 67301, January 29, 1990

5. Commission of Another Crime

6. Previous Conviction

7. Probation and Appeal

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