Establishing Integrity Operating

Windows (IOW’s)*

Inspector Summit
January 27, 2006
Galveston, TX
*Based on article published
in Inspectioneering Journal, John Reynolds
April, 2005 Pro-Inspect, Inc.
Steamboat Springs, CO, USA
 Outline for this Presentation
• The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives (PSI)
• The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative
• Corrosion Control Documents (CCD)
• Integrity Operating Windows (IOW)
• Standard and Critical IOW’s
• Integration of IOW’s into the 10 PSI’s
• Training of Operators on IOW’s
• The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid

2
 Ten Process Safety Initiatives
(PSI) – Initiated in May, 2000
• Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) - IOW creation
process
• Ensure Safe Production (ESP) - IOW monitoring process
• Operator Training and Procedures - IOW knowledge
transfer
• Management Of Change (MOC) - IOW change process
• Investigations – 3 Levels up to RCA
• Protective Instrument Systems (IPF – “SIL”)
• Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
• Causal Learning
• Audits and Assessments
3
• Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
 Process Safety Initiative
•
Metrics
Each of the 10 PSI’s were required to have four
main metrics to track implementation progress (10
X 4 = 40 metrics total)
• For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked:
- Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s) completed
- Numbers of process units with RBI completed
- Numbers of process units with all IOW’s implemented
- Numbers of operators trained on their CCD & IOW’s
• But there was only one bottom line metric for the
aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives –>
numbers of process safety incidents per
year
4
Results of the Process Safety Initiatives
YTD Totals
Numbers of 1999
2002
2000
2003
2001
2004

Process Safety 25 23

Incidents 20 19
20

in 6 years after 15
15

implementation– 10 9

A real success
5
story 3

5
 Primary Aspects of the
Pressure Equipment Integrity
• (PEI)Integrity
Identify all necessary Initiative
Operating Windows
(IOW’s)
• Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering -
Maintenance - Inspection) in each operating area to
create and manage CCD’s and IOW’s
• Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s), which
document all process IOW’s
• Train operators on the CCD and IOW’s
• Implement IOW’s and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
• Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews (FAIR®)
to monitor progress of the PEI Initiative 6
PEI PSI RBI

Pyramid IOW’s

CCD’s
Management of
Change

101 Essential Elements

7
 Corrosion Control Documents –
•
Contents
Relatively comprehensive documents for managing equipment
degradation
• Description of the process unit and process conditions
• Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect corrosion and
degradation mechanisms, as well as normal operation
• Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and Corrosion Diagram
(modified PFD showing construction materials)
• Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar corrosion within the PFD) e.g.
overhead system, slurry system, reflux system, etc.
• All potential types of degradation (and fouling) in each process unit and
history of problem areas
• Quantitative and predictive models for degradation mechanisms
• Vital corrosion control procedures, injections, inhibitors, etc.
• Recommended inspection & corrosion monitoring, process changes,
construction materials changes, etc.
• Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) 8
 Corrosion Control Documents –
Construction
• Unit specific CCD’s completed by an OEMI
team which includes:
- Site corrosion engineer/specialist
- Unit process engineer
- Unit inspector
- One or more experienced unit operations representatives
- Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced corrosion engineer)
• Final document represents an agreement
between the OEMI Team involved and clearly
benefits by the synergistic interaction of all team
members
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 Establishing Integrity Operating
• Historical operating,Windows
maintenance & inspection
records
• Design data; lab data; operating data
• Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules
• Process chemistry and engineering knowledge
• Reactive chemistry knowledge
• Recommended practices (industry and company)
• Process and corrosion modeling tools
• Subject matter expertise and experience (heavy
dose)

Result: Reasonable, practical IOW’s – not too 10

conservative – not non-conservative

 Integrity Operating Windows

Operating
Operating
Window
Window

11
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Examples
• Typically fall into 2 categories:

• Physical
- Various limits on pressures and temperatures, including design,
operating, partial pressures, dew points, dry points, heating and
cooling rates, delta P, etc.
- Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage, amperage levels on
Alky contactor motors, slurry content, hydrogen flux, vibration
limits, corrosivity probes, etc.
• Chemical
- pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in
crude, NH4HS content, NH3 content, TAN, acid strength, amine
strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels,
oxygen content, etc.
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 IOW Example – Hot Hydrogen
• Service
Mechanical design window Temperature
set by the design code e.g. Mechanical Design Limits
ASME
• IOW set by material limit for EOR Process Temp IOW
high temperature hydrogen
attack in API RP 941
• SOR process temperature SOR Process Temp

definitely within the IOW

• EOR process temperature
possibly beyond the IOW –
need to know the hydrogen
partial pressure and Pressure
duration of EOR conditions
Based on H2 pp Based on
Total Pressure

13
 Integrity Operating Windows –
Typical Numbers per Operating Unit
(before & after an intensive review)

• Typically start with 5 -10 IOW’s that may

already be in place, along with other operating
quality variable limits
• Typically end up with 30 – 50 IOW’s with about
5 -10% being critical limits (requires drastic
and/or immediate action), and the rest being
standard limits (requires attention within a
specified timeframe to get back into control)
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Definitions: IOW Critical Limit
A limit at which the operator has one last
opportunity to return the process to a
safe condition and, if exceeded, could
result in one of the following in a fairly
short timeframe:
• A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or Hazardous
fluids
• Loss of Containment
• Non-orderly Shutdown
• Significant Environmental Impact
• Other Unacceptable Risk
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 Critical IOW Limit –
• Examples
Boiler Feed Water Level
- Lost of boiler feed water level could quickly cause boiler tube
rupture
• Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature
- Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give rise to brittle
fracture

• Heater Tube Skin Temperature

- Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused, for
example, by a no flow or hot spot condition.

• Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation

- Too low acid strength could cause runaway reaction

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 Definition: Standard Level
A limit that, if exceeded over a defined
period of time, could cause one of the
following to eventually occur:

• A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous fluids

• Loss of containment
• Non-orderly shutdown
• A negative impact to the long term unit performance and its
ability to meet turnaround run length
• Excessive financial impact

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 Standard Level Examples
• REAC NH4HS Concentration
- Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping
• Heater Tube Skin Temperature
- Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure.
• Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature
- Sustained operation below dew point could cause damage to
fractionator internals or potential loss of containment.
• pH of Crude Tower Overhead
- Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to
corrosion of tubing and piping and potential loss of containment.
• Desalter Outlet Salt Content
- Sustained operation above standard level could lead to corrosion
and potential loss of containment
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 Integrity Operating Windows –
• Successes
In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous
project had installed the wrong construction materials –
immediate inspection revealed significant HTHA damage
• An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process
engineer and said that “we actually operate much hotter
than you think because we use the by-pass” – immediate
inspection revealed significant localized damage
• A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS
in the REAC system of an HCU – immediate inspection
revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant
corrosion
• An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another
refinery, which then began to take routine lab samples –
soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high
and took steps to increase wash water and adjust
feedstock 19
 Operator Training on CCD’s and
IOW’s
• Level 1
- Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety Initiative
- SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training

• Level 2
- Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents
- What they contain; where they’re stored; how to use them

• Level 3
- Details contained within each operator’s unit-specific CCD
- Specific IOW’s and the reasoning behind them
- What can happen if the IOW is exceeded

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PEI PSI RBI

Pyramid IOW’s

CCD’s
Management of
Change

101 Essential Elements

21
 Implementing Risk-Based Inspection
• (RBI)
Another major part of our pressure equipment
integrity process safety initiative
• We use both a Shell developed more qualitative RBI
(S-RBI), as well as the more quantitative API RBI,
both successfully for different needs at different
sites
• But RBI will not be covered today – a topic for
another day, if you like
• Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be
it risk-based, condition-based, or time-based
may not be fully reliable without effective
identification and implementation of integrity
operating windows (IOW’s) 22
Integration of CCD’s, IOW’s &
RBI
Feedback
Confidence in plant integrity
Creating the CCD:
 Type of degradation RBI planning:
Method of inspection
 Location of degradation
Where to inspect
 Susceptibility to degradation
 Degradation rates Frequency of inspection

IOW limits:

 Determination & management of the operating limits to avoid degradation

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Integration of Multiple Work Processes
Leading To Sustained Asset Integrity

Long Term Asset Integrity

Focused Asset Integrity Reviews

Design and
Materials Selection Corrosion Risk-Based
Control & IOW’s Inspection

Asset integrity management is a balancing process

designed to achieve lowest total cost of ownership
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Along with Asset Integrity Comes
Proven Better Process Safety
Performance YTD Totals
Numbers of Process 1999
2002
2000
2003
2001
2004

Safety Incidents 25 23

in 6 years after 20 19
20

implementation in 15
15

Shell (US) Refining

Operations – Facts, 10 9

not just hopes for 5 3

the future 0
25
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 Experience with Integrity Operating
Windows (IOW’s)*

Time for Discussion

*Based on article
published
John.Reynolds@shell.com
In Inspectioneering
Journal, April, 2005 Recently retired from
Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.