Jackson 1969

T H E HISTORY OF FREUD’S
: STANLEY
W. JACKSON, M.D.
CONCEPTS O F REGRESSION :
HE SUGGESTION THAT the notion of regression is an important
T one in the writings of Sigmund Freud would come as no sur-

prise to psychoanalysts or to anyone reasonably familiar with
the theories of psychoanalysis, Nevertheless, there would be few
who would not be surprised to realize just how pervasively present
the idea is throughout those writings, if they were to examine
them in any detail.
T h e idea of regression is scattered throughout a wide variety
of Freud’s writings. One finds it in contexts where the economic
point of view is governing the discussion, and similarly in discus-
sions governed by the dynamic vieypoint, the topographical view-
point, and the structural viewpoint. It is at the very heart of the
genetic viewpoint, functioning in tandem with Freud’s develop-
mental notions and representing the undoing of their accomplish-
ments. It is a central notion in the theory of dream formation and
in the explanation of hallucinations. Together with the idea of
fixation, it is at the heart of the psychoanalytic theory of neurosis
and the theory of symptom formation in general.
In examining the historical backgrounds and portraying the
development of the idea of regression in Freud’s thought, it be-
comes clear that lie really worked with two concepts of regression,
despite his suggestion that there was a third distinct type of regres-
sion and despite his assertion that all three types were funda-
From the Department of Psychiatry, and the Department of History of Science

and Medicine, Yale University. This work was supported by Public Health Service
fellowship MH-24,871from the National Institute of Mental Health.
743
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744 STANLEY W. JACKSON
mentally “one” (12). T h e different historical origins of these two

notions and the distinctly different purposes that they served in
his theories both contribute to this conclusion. T h e first of these
two basic ideas was one which he explicitly acknowledged having
borrowed from J. Hughlings Jackson, which he employed for the
first time in his neurological study, On Aphasia, and which he
later developed into what he called temporal regression. T h e
second of these ideas was one for which he explicitly acknowledged
an indebtedness to Josef Breuer, which had been used by Breuer
in his theoretical chapter in the Sttidies otz Hysteria, which Freud
employed in the long-unpublished “Project for a Scientific Psy-
chology,” which he first used in print in Chapter VII of T h e In-
terpretation of Dreams, and which he came to refer to as topo-
graphical regression.’
In the interest of clarity I shall refer to these two ideas as
temporal and topographical regression, but it should be empha-
sized that, although they were conceptually distinct from one
another, they were not distinguished from one another by these
two terms for quite some time. In discussions of regression Freud
first employed the term “temporal” in 1909 (18) and the term
“topographical” in a paragraph added to .The Interpretation of
Dreams in 1914 (12).
Tempora 1 R egressio18
T h e concept of temporal regression is one with a heritage deeply

rooted in evolutionary thought, and it was to become inextricably
tied u p with the whole view of psychoanalysis as a developmental
psychology. At all times it functioned with the underlying assump-
tion that there had‘been a development over time (at least months,
1In the original edition of O n Afihusia Freud employed the word Riickbildung
to refer to Jackson’s notion of dissolution. This term had appeared in biological
contexts with. the implication of “rctrograde development.” Stengel translated it as
“retrogrcssion” and “regression.” In the original edition of Slirdies on Hysteria
Breiier used the related word riicklaufig, and Freud used the same word in the
“Project.” Strachcy et al. translated this word as “retrogressive.” \Vhile Freud used
thc German word Regression in some notes sent to.Fliess with a letter dated hIay
2, 1897, it first appeared in his published writings in Chapter \’I1 of The Interfireta-
l i o n of Dreams, where i t also xrved as the title of a section. Thereafter Regression
was the Geriiiaii word he employed for the various purposes under study here.

FREUD’S CONCEPTS OF REGRESSION 745
usually years) from a simpler, more primitive, less organized stage

toward a more complex, more advanced, more organized stage;
and it was conceived of as a process which involved the undoing
of those accomplishments. A detailed study of this concept makes
it clear that, while it came to have characteristics of its own, it was
derived from J. Hughlings Jackson’s notion of dissolution, which,
in turn, was a direct descendant of Herbert Spencer’s idea of the
same name.
Herbert Spencer
For Spencer, the idea of dissolution functioned in tandem with his
version of the idea of evolution as two phases of a cyclical pattern
which he employed as an explanatory system to account for change
(56). T h e background of his introduction of these notions was his
effort to formulate a law which would account for the changes
undergone by both matter and motion. Viewing change as imply-
ing the rearrangement of component parts, he considered that any
explanation of it must account for what happens to both the mat-
ter and the motion involved. Taking the position that change is
constant, and that rest and permanence are only relative, he stated
that the law he sought to formulate must be a law of “the continu-
ous redistri6ution of matter and motion” (56, p. 277).
H e considered the making of material objects from their com-
ponent ‘parts, and the earlier stages in the lives of living beings,
and he concluded that there must be a background of develop-
ment for every object or organism. Then he considered the
tendencies of objects to deteriorate and of organisms to die and
decompose, and concluded that there is a future stage of decay
for all objects and orgmisms.
From such data lie drew the further inference that there are
two opposite, natural processes of concentration and diffusion. He
then expanded this to a comprehensive formulation for all changes
- c h a n g e either (i) from a diffused state to a concentrated state,
with an integration of matter and dissipation of motion: or (ii)
from a concentrated state to a diffused state, with a gain of motion
and disintegration of matter. T o the view that “every aggregate is
at every moment progressing towards either greater concentration
or greater diffusion” (56, p. 282), he added the further point that

74 6 STANLEY W. JACKSON
there is always some disintegrative activity in any essentially inte-

grative process, and vice versa.
From there Spencer developed the notion of a cycle of
changes. During the earlier part of the cycle, integration predomi-
nates (called growth in the case of living organisms). During the
middle part, although he sometimes spoke of it as a phase of
equilibrium, the basic idea is rather that of alternate excesses
of integrating and disintegrating processes. And during the later
part, disintegration becomes predominant, undoing what integra-
tion has originally done. Then he concluded that this cycle con-
stituted his sought-for “universal law of redistribution of matter
and motion” (56, p. 285).
Finally, he applied the names, evolzction and dissolution, to
the integrative process and the disintegrative process respectively.
But Spencer did not leave the matter there. After categorizing
the process of integration as simple evolulion as the result of a
primary redistribution of matter and motion, he added that a
trend from lesser coherence to greater coherence is also a primary
feature of evolution. And he emphasized that, along with the
increased closeness of component parts, integration involves a
tendency of the parts toward being a cooperative assemblage. Then
he stated that there are other developmental processes associated
with secondary redistributions of matter and motion, and he em-
ployed the term “compound evolution” for those instances where
these additional processes are also involved. These other develop-
mental trends are from homogeneity to heterogeneity, or differen-
tiation, and from an indefinite state to a definite state. IVith these
additions the final formulation of his law became: “Evolution is
an integration of matter a n d concomitant dissipation of motion;
during which the matter .passes from an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during
which the retained motion tindergoes a parallel transformation”
(56, p. 396).
As previously indicated, dissolution is the predominating
trend in the later phase of Spencer’s cycle of changes, and is also
occurring, to however limited a degree, even when evolution is
the main trend. He defined it as “a disintegration of matter,
caused by the reception of additional motion from without” (56,

p. 522), and employed it as the reverse of evolution or as that

process which undoes those effects brought about by evolution.
Also, he thought in terms of forces of attraction and repulsion
which everywhere accounted for a rhythm in changes, for alternat-
ing periods of evolution and dissolution.
Many of the various terms which Spencer employed in out-
lining his cycle of changes sound as though they were borrowed
from the physical sciences. And, when one looks a t his core notions
-changes in the distribution of matter and mofion, in association
with his ultimately basic notion of force-one readily notes a
fundamental effort to conceptualize all changes in mechanical
terms. Nevertheless, there is much about his writings on evolution
and dissolution to suggest that his thought model was originally
a biological one. Although he employed his scheme at a level of
broadest generality, it retained overtones of biological ideas. Spe-
cifically, it seems to be a scheme of growth (or development) and
decay.
In this context it is oE interest that, in his autobiography,
Spencer compared a letter of his to a friend in 1886 with the
friend’s reply in which each of them had spoken of his own state
of mental functioning, deteriorated from their usual level of
functioning in each instance, during periods of “nervous dis-
order.” H e stated that their accounts illustrated “the truth that
under a lowered condition of the nervous system, failure is first
manifest in the highest intellectual co-ordinations and in the high-
est emotional co-ordinations. Speaking generally, each step in
mental evolution results in a faculty by which the simpler pre-
existing faculties have their respective actions so combined that
each aids in regulating or controlling the others, and the actions
of all are harmonized” (57, p. 487).
Although this is somewhat reminiscent of Spencer’s own
theories, there is nothing quite like it in any of his other writings.
Rather than Spencer having developed this view as a logical ex-
tension of his theory of evolution and dissolution, it seems to have
stemmed from reflection about his own “nervous disorder” and to
have been couched in terms characteristic of J. Hughlings Jack-
son’s developmental ideas and hierarchical organization of func-
tions and controls. It is much less likely that he was making an

application of his own notion of dissolution than that .he was

borrowing back from Jackson his own idea of dissolution as
adapted by the latter to nervous disorders. By 1886 Jackson had
already effected this adaptation. That Spencer was already quite
familiar with this use of his concept can be seen from a letter to
E. L. Youmans on January 9, 1883, in which he referred to Jack-
son as “years ago” having applied “the doctrine of dissolution to
interpretation of nervous disorders” (7, p. 335).
J . Hiighlings Jackson
Influenced by Spencer’s wide-ranging scheme rather than by Dar-
winian notions, Jackson developed an evolutionary framework for
his views on the organization and diseases of the nervous system.
He took u p the concepts of evolution and dissolution, acknowl-
edging a debt to Spencer in so doing. IVhile the latter had em-
ployed them to encompass inorganic, organic, and social change,
Jackson confined himself to human biology. More specifically, he
was concerned with the even narrower sphere of neurological de-
velopment and deterioration.
In view of the extensive influence enjoyed by Spencer in the
last half of the nineteenth century, and the many persons who
adapted his views for other disciplines, it comes as no surprise to
find Jackson employing his notion of evolution. IVhat is singular
about his use of Spencer’s views is that he borrowed the idea of
dissolution as well, employing the two notions in tandem. Most
Spencerians, or writers about Spencer then and since, never men-
tioned the idea of dissolution. Perhaps the attention to disease,
to the problems of things “going wrong,” account for this in Jack-
son’s case, in contrast to the optimistic overtones of evolution as
progress in most borrowings from Spencer.
For Spencer, his notion of evolution was one which he con-
sidered broadly applicable throughout a wide range of phenomena,
including neurological and psychological phenomena as is clearly
indicated in his Primiples of Psychology (55). Although the com-
panion concept of dissolution was usually applied, along with that
of evolution, to comprehend cycles of changes throughout many
fields, this was not done by Spencer in regard to neurological and
psychological data. IVhile the pervasive use of these concepts in a

complementary relationship to one another might seem to allow

the inference that he considered them both applicable to neuro-
logical and psychological phenomena, the notion of dissolution
was not employed in T h e Principles of Psychology.
In the biological sphere both phylogenetic and ontogenetic
sequences were comprehended by Spencer’s idea of evolution with
its associated feature of the inheritance of acquired character-
istics. On the other hand, where living organisms were concerned,
he took the view that dissolution entered in only after death. Thus,
for Spencer, it appears that the concept of dissolution found no
application within the limits of ontogenesis, whereas Jackson’s use
of both these terms was contained within ontogenetic boundaries.
TVhile Jackson acknowledged that he was introducing some
differences in terminology from the Spencerian scheme, he does
not seem to have recognized that, in the case of the idea of dissolu-
tion, he was effecting an application in an area where Spencer did
not apply it and, strictly speaking, did not consider it to be
applicable.
Jackson developed an evolutionary schema in which nervous
centers were ranged on a developmental continuum from the
lowest reflex centers to the highest voluntary centers with the latter
as the climax of the individual’s nervous evolution and as making
up “the ‘organ of the mind’ (or physical basis of consciousness)”
(41, p. 46). Then he looked upon the result of this development as
a hierarchical system of nervous centers which would constitute,
figuratively speaking, the cross-sectional situation at any particu-
lar time.
For Jackson, evolution was “an ascending development in a
particular order” (41, p. 46). H e viewed it as involving “a passage
from the most to the least organised,” “from the most simple to
the most complex,” and “from the most automatic to the most vol-
untary” (41, p. 46). That is to say, there are natural developmental
tendencies from the lowest nervous centers, which are well or-
ganized, simple, and automatic in their functioning, to the highest
.nervous centers, which are relatively unorganized, complex, and
voluntary in their functioning. H e considered the human orga-
nism at birth to be tightly organized with its functions being
highly automatic and relatively simple in nature. IVith the process

of growth and development the organism becomes progressively

less tightly organized with a resultant opening up of a wider
range of functional possibilities, which enhance the complexity of
functions and involve the tendency toward voluntary functions.
H e also described the developmental trend as being toward dif-
ferentiation with increasing specialization of the component units,
increasing integration of these components, and increasing co-
operation between them (42).
Then he employed the term “dissolution” to refer to the
reverse of the process of evolution as just described. He spoke of
it as always partial in his frame of reference, as total dissolution
would mean death. Therefore “to undergo dissolution” meant
“to be reduced to a lower level of evolution” (41, p. 46). TVhile
intimating that this process of dissolution is the essential nature of
disease in general (43), Jackson particularly applied the concept
to the explanation of neurological disorders and “insanities” (41,
44). He conceived of diseases of the nervous system as the effects of
varying degrees of such a reverse process upon various parts of
that system, with the most recently evolved functions tending to
be affected earlier and the older functions later (41). It was also
his view that there is “a rhythm of evolution and dissolution” in
normal states (44, p. 415n.). As a particular example of this, he
stated, “There is a big rhythm of evolution and dissolution in
healthy people, being awake in the day and asleep at night” (44,
p. 415n.). And he suggested that there are “several degrees of
normal dissolution of sleep: (1) sleepiness; (2) sleep with dreaming;
(3) sleep with actions (somnambulism); and (4) deep, so-called
dreamless, slumber” (44, p. 412).
Jackson saw this developmental process as “a gradual ‘adding
on’ of the more and more special, a continual adding on of new
organisations” (41, p. 58). Also, “this ‘adding on’ is at the same
time a ‘keeping down.’ T h e higher nervous arrangements evolved
out of the lower keep down those lower, just as a government
evolved out of a nation controls as well as directs that nation”
(41, p. 58). H e considered the result of this to be a hierarchy of
functional levels in which each level involved coordinations of
increasing complexity plus control and inhibition of the functions
of the lower levels. He viewed each center, or level, as sensorimotor

FREUD’S CONCEPTS OF REGRESSION 75 1
in nature, and suggested that the nervous system be thought of as

“a sensori-motor machine,” as “a co-ordinating system from top to
bottom” (40, pp. 29,41). Then he described the reverse process of
dissolution as *‘ ‘a taking off of the higher” and “at the very same
time a ‘letting go’ of the lower” (41, p. 58). Diseases of the nervous
system were said to involve damage to nervous centers with re-
sultant loss of their coordinating and controlling functions and
reversion to functional levels which are both lower in a hierar-
chical system and characteristic of earlier ontogenetic stages. Func-
tioning becomes simpler, more automatic, more organized.
Sigrn iind Freud

From Freud’s O n Aphasia it is clear that, by 1891, he was thor-
oughly familiar with the writings of J. Hughlings Jackson which
employed the notion of dissolution in very much the same way as
Freud came to employ the notion of temporal regression. I n that
work Freud stated that “the aphasias simply reproduce a state
which existed in the course of the normal process of learning to
speak” (1 1, p. 42). Then, further along, he made the origins of his
organizing idea explicit when he stated, “In assessing the functions
of the speech apparatus under pathological conditions we are
adopting as a guiding principle Hughlings Jackson’s doctrine that
all these modes of reaction represent instances of functional retro-
gression (dis-involution) of a highly organized apparatus, and
therefore correspond to earlier states of its functional develop-
ment. This means that under all circumstances an arrangement of
associations which, having been acquired later, belongs to a higher
level of functioning, will be lost, while an earlier and simpler one
will be preserved. From this point of view, a great number of
aphasic phenomena can be explained” (1 1, p. 87).
It should be noted here that Jackson considered the various
conditions that he studied to be essentially neurological in nature,
and, with a strict adherence to the law of concomitance, he viewed
his concept of dissolution as a physical notion with no application
in psychological matters. In fact, he thought that “dissolution of
the mind” would represent a contradiction in terms (42). In On
Aphasia Freud was using the concept to describe and explain
functional manifestations of neurological disorders, but it soon

joined the many other ideas of his which were carried over from
neurological and neurophysiological thinking to a psychological
framework. It remained a psychological concept after this trans-
formation with one brief exception in Introductory Lectures on
Psycho-Analysis. Freud stated there that, despite its “powerful
influence on mental life,” libidinal regression is not “a purely
psychical process,” but is rather a process in which “the most
..
prominent factor. is the organic one” (29, p. 342f.).
Although this idea of “retrogression (dis-involution)” was to
become of central importance in Freud’s thought, it was far from
prominent in his writings for the next fifteen years or so. It did not
find expression there again until 189g2when, in T h e Interpreta-
tion of Dreams, he used it briefly in one context. Having outlined
the idea of a hallucinatory wish fulfillment as an early mode of
mental functioning which the infant soon left behind as a super-
seded developmental stage, he referred to it as being returned to
regressively in dreams and psychoses (12). Hitherto in this work
the concept of regression which he had been using in his com-
ments on the formation of dreams and hallucinations was the one
which was eventually to be termed topographical regression. And,
when he introduced the idea of a hallucinatory wish fulfillment,
it was clearly a phenomenon that involved topographical regres-
sion. But then, viewing this notion as typical of human mental
functioning a t an early age and as occurring only under special
circumstances (i.e., dreams, psychoses) in later years, he now con-
ceived of the hallucinatory revival of perceptual images as both a
regression from thoughts to imagery arid a regression to an earlier
mode of mental functioning. That is, the same phenomenon in-
volved both topographical and temporal regression.
On December 9, 1899, in a letter to ’CVilhelm Fliess, Freud
also employed regression in this way when he wrote of regarding
paranoia as “a regression to a former state’’ when autoerotism was
the prevailing tendency (10, p. 304).
In 1901, in “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,”
the idea of temporal regression seems likely to have been what
Freud had in mind when he stated that ‘‘a stream of water which
2Cf. p. 222 for a somewhat ambiguous use of the concept of regression which
might call for a modification of this statement.

meets with an obstacle in the river-bed is dammed up and flows

back into old channels which had formerly seemed fated to run
dry” (15, p. 51). T h e notion was only given this metaphorical ex-
pression, it was somewhat cryptically mentioned in passing, and
the term “regression” was not used. On the other hand, it ap-
peared in a discussion of the operation in combination of con-
stitutional factors and accidental influences in the disturbances
of normal sexual development and the resultant causation of psy-
choneuroses. This latter set of ideas was to be gradually expanded
and developed, and was to be intimately associated with the de-
velopment of the concept of temporal regression. T h e term was
not used in the original edition of Three Essays on the Theory of
S e x t i d i l y (1905), but the idea is to be found there and the term
was introduced in several places in the third edition in 1915 (14).
T h e spirit of the brief allusions to the concept in this work is
conveyed by a reference to falling ill as “a turning back” of the
libido toward childhood love objects.
Again, although the term “regression” was not used, the idea
of temporal regression was briefly employed in 1909 in “.4nalysis
of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy” when Freud referred to anal
erotism as a childhood phenomenon which commonly made “its
appearance at the termination of processes of psychical involution”
(16, p. 108).
Also in 1909, in “Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis,”
he seems to have made use of the notion when he briefly men-
tioned a patient’s identification with his father as enabling “his
affects to regress on to the residues of his childhood” and making
possible “his flight into illness” (17, p. 199n.). Then, in a context
where he was employing the idea of topographical regression, he
added that obsessional acts, “by the aid of a new kind of regres-
sion,” tend to revert from any relationship to another person to
“auto-erotic acts such as occur in infancy” (17, p. 244). H e may
well have been implying here that, as he had made rather limited
use of temporal regression u p to this time, this was, relatively
speaking, “a new kind of regression.” Developmental notions had
been appearing in his writings with a gradually increasing fre-
quency, and a conceptual framework (i.e., that of a developmental

psychology) in which this particular idea of regression could func-

tion was now available.3
In Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis delivered at Clark Uni-
versity in 1909, Freud carried his developmental ideas a step
further, associating his evolving idea of fixation with that of
temporal regression in a way which indicated the important dual
role they were in the process of assuming in his theory oE patho-
genesis in psychological illness.. He stated that sexual development,
in those individuals for whom it did not occur smoothly, left
“behind it either abnormalities or a predisposition to fall ill later,
along the path of involution (i.e. regression)” (18, p. 45). In this
context he referred to “a dictum in general pathology” which
asserted that “every developmental process carries with it the seed
of a pathological disposition, in so far as that process may be
inhibited, delayed, or may run its course incompletely” (18, p. 45).
H e then referred to human beings falling ill as a result of frustra-
tion “of their erotic needs iti reality” and an associated failure to
find some alternative path to satisfaction in reality; and he con-
ceived of such illnesses as flights from unsatisfactory realities
“along the path oE involution, of regression . . to earlier phases .
of sexual life” with which satisfaction had originally been asso-
ciated, and as the results of the libido following “the path of
regression” and so reviving “infantile wishes” (18, p. 49f.). Here
the idea of frustration was now added to fixation and regression
in the way which was henceforth to be characteristic in Freud’s
pathogenetic views.
From about this time onward Freud employed the idea of
temporal regression with increased frequency and in an increased
variety of contexts in his writings. In Leoiinrdo dn Vinci and a
illemory of His Childhood, in 1910, he used it briefly when he
stated that religiousness was an attempt to deal with the relative
weakness and helplessness of the human condition-the individu-
al’s attempt “to deny his own despondency by a regressive revival
of, the forces which protected his infancy” (19, p. 123). And he
3Cf. p. 222 for a reference to evidence that Freud had been working on a
developmental schema in the 1890s. and thus that he may have been employing
such a framework much longer than the then-published record would suggest.

used it again when he explained da Vinci’s various vocational

changes as manifestations of regression.
I n 1911, in “The Case of Schreber,” Freud explicitly em-
ployed the concepts of fixation, frustration, and regression, and
their associated terms, in the way which was henceforth to be char-
acteristic and frequent in his discussions of the development of
psychological illness. H e hypothesized that paranoia resulted from
frustration, due either to external events or to intensification of
the libido beyond the possibilities of satisfaction, “that causes the
libido to flow backwards (i.e. that causes a ‘regression’)” from sub-
limated homosexuality to a dispositional point oE fixation at the
stage of narcissism (20, p. 62). JVith variations in the illness under
consideration, and with associated variations in the developmental
stage at which the fixation occurred and to which the regression
moved, this formula became standard. Symptom formation had
come to be viewed as both a regressively achieved substitute for
the frustrated satisfaction and a fixation to which the person had
returned, in part, because of its strong connections with early
satisfactions. While he tinkered with this formula in various ways
to be mentioned below, the basic framework remained the same.
I n 1912 the view of what occasioned a regression was en-
larged from a lessened “attraction of reality” (i.e., a frustration)
to a combination of this and an already existing attraction for the
libido of the portions of the person’s complexes belonging to the
unconscious (21). That is, points of fixation were considered to
exert an active attraction in addition to existing passively as de-
velopmental “way-stations” to which regression might tend to
occur.
I n T o t e m and Taboo Freud suggested that there might be an
alternative way in which a psychoneurosis could come about. It
might come about as the result of a chronic fixation, or “develop-
mental inhibition,” rather than there being a developmental ad-
vance beyond a point of fixation and a later regression to that
fixation (23). Then, in Introductory Lecttires on Psycho-Analysis,
he added that “a complemental relationship” existed between
these two factors in the causation of psychoneuroses. That is to
say, there are extrcmes of developmental inhibition in some in-
stances and extremes of later conflict resulting in regression in

other instances, “and between them every degree of co-operation

between the two factors” (29, p. 364). He further stated that hered-
itary constitutional factors were also important in determining
fixations, along with infantile experiences. And, about this same
time, he introduced a section of related import into the third
edition of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, indicating the
importance that temporal regression had come to have in his clin-
ical theory by stating that “all the factors that impair sexual de-
velopment show their effects by bringing about a regression, a re-
turn to an earlier phase of development” (14, p. 240).
By 1912 Freud had repeatedly written about unconscious
fantasies as crucial elements in the development of psychoneurotic
symptoms, with the associated idea that these fantasies involved
imagined fulfillment of cherished, but unacceptable, wishes. I n
“The Dynamics of Transference,” he borrowed Jung’s term “in-
troversion” and used it to mean a tendency of the libido, in the
face of frustration of satisfaction in the sphere of reality, to be
diminished toward reality and increased toward the unconscious
and the person’s fantasies. This was the beginning of an addition
to his formula for the formation of neurotic symptoms. H e stated
that introversion was “an invariable and indispensable precondi-
tion of every onset of a psychoneurosis” (21, p. 102). IVhiIe seem-
ing to imply that introversion either was an aspect of or was to be
equated with libidinal regression, he also implied that they were
two distinct processes. In “Types of Onset of Neurosis,” he re-
ferred briefly to introversion as turning “towards the life of
phantasy” (22, p. 232). Here it seems that he conceived of it as a
process distinct from regression, stating that “thenceforward” the
libido may “move on a backward course” and “may follow the
path of regression” (22,. p. 232). Then, in Introductory Lectures
on Psycho-Analysis, he outlined his notion of introversion at
greater length as an intermediate stage between frustration of
satisfaction and regression of the libido to a point of fixation, and
as a crucial step along the path toward the formation of neurotic
symptoms from unconscious fantasies. Here it seems that he might
have been conceiving of it as part of a larger process of regression.
Viewing “the objects and trends which the libido has given up”
as retained in fantasies, either in the form of their derivatives or

directly, he spoke of frustration resulting in “a backward flow of

libido on to phantasies” which he termed “an intermediate stage”
called “introversion” (29, p. 373f.). This would result in the
“energic cathexis” of these fantasies being sufficiently increased
that they would press for realization. This, in turn, would bring
them into conflict with the ego, repression would then occur, they
would become open to attraction from the unconscious, and the
libido would travel further back to a point of fixation. Thereafter
the term “introversion” was no longer used for this process in
Freud’s writings, while the notion of the regression of the libido
to unconscious fantasies continued on in the frustration-regres-
sion-fixation framework as an aspect of the process of symptom
formation.
At another point in the Introdtictory Lectures he elaborated
the frustration-regression-fixation scheme further by postulating
that this temporal regression might be either one of two subtypes,
both of which played a great part in the transference neuroses.
These were (i) “a return to the [incestuous] objects first cathected
by the libido,” and (ii) a “return of the sexual organization as a
whole to earlier stages” (29, p. 341). In view of the distinction
that gradually emerged between libidinal regression and ego re-
gression, it should be noted that each category mentioned here
was a type of libidinal regression. I n the former there was a regres-
sion in the nature of the object in relation to which the libido
found satisfaction, and in the latter there was a regression in the
mode of functioning by which the libido found satisfaction. These
two sorts of regression were considered to occur alone or in com-
bination, depending on the particular illness involved.
I n “Thoughts for the Times on JVar and Death” Freud re-
ferred to the earlier stages in mental development as imperishable,
however masked by later developments, and stated that “a special
capacity for involution-for regression-” makes it always possible
that these earlier stages might be re-established (28, p. 285f.). As
an example, he mentioned that “the essence of mental disease lies
in a return to earlier states of affective life and of functioning,”
in association with the destruction of “later acquisitions and de-
velopments” (28, p. 286). For the moment he had abandoned the
developments of his own clinical theory, and had reverted to the

‘158 STANLEY W. JACKSON
original Jacksonian formulation from which the idea of temporal

regression had stemmed. In this same context dreams were referred
to as a further instance of such an omnipresent regressive potential.
During the decade prior to the writing of T h e Ego and the Id,
a distinct structural theory did not exist, but, several times during
those years, Freud set down brief passages which foreshadowed a
structural theory with a developmental history for the structural
components. And the developmental accomplishments alluded to
were viewed as undergoing regression at times. Before the appear-
ance of these structural notions, temporal regression commonly
meant libidinal regression. But, with the advent of such ideas, the
temporal regression in his frustration-regression-fixation scheme
became dichotomized into ego regression and libidinal regression.
In 1914, Freud explained delusions of being watched as ‘Jaregres-
sive form” of the person’s “conscience” (later to be incorporated
into the concept of the superego) which ordinarily watches, discov-
ers, and criticizes all his intentions. He implied that this “censor-
ing agency” evolves by the internalization of the critical influence
of parents and other significant persons, and that this paranoid
symptom results from the regressive reproduction of the earlier
situation (24). Then, in 1915, he distinguished two types of tem-
poral regression: “one affecting the development of the ego and the
other that of the libido” (30, p. 222). In 1915-1917, he stated that,
like the libido, the ego has “its process of development” and un-
dergoes regressions “to earlier phases of its development” (29,
p. 357). And, in 1932, having outlined the development of the
divisions of the personality in his nowestablished structural the-
ory, he suggested that, at times, they “may change and go through
a temporary phase of involution,” and added that “the same thing
results from psychical illness” (36, p. 79). This use of the term
“involution” was clearly as a synonym for regression.
From 1909-1911 onward, in addition to the numerous in-
stances that reflect a constant tinkering witti his frustration-regres-
sion-fixation formula, Freud also made numerous, brief uses of
temporal regression in his established sense of a regression of
libido. They represent a steady increase of specific instances where
this type of temporal regression was finding application in ex-
planations of pathogenesis. In Totem and Taboo Freud described

neurotics as having retained, to a disproportionate degree, the

narcissism and omnipotence of thoughts which he associated with
an early, narcissistic stage of development, and he considered this
to be the result of either an inhibition of libidinal development
or a regression of the libido (23). In “Instincts and Their Vicissi-
tudes,” he postulated that the breaking off of a love relation pro-
vokes a hatred which is partly accounted for “by’a regression of
the love to the sadistic preliminary stage” when erotic inclinations
were characteristically admixed with hate” (26, p. 139). I n “Re-
pression,” he referred to obsessional neurosis as having “as its
basis a regression owing to which a sadistic trend has been substi-
tuted for an affectionate one” (27, p. 156). In “Mourning and
Melancholia,” he suggested that melancholia is a reaction to ob-
ject loss which involves regressive substitution of identification for
object love and a regression from a narcissistic object choice to
original narcissism. H e then added that “the melancholic’s erotic
cathexis in regard to his object” is also “carried back to the stage
of sadism” as a result of “the conflict due to ambivalence” (31,
p. 251f.). In “A Child is Being Beaten,” Freud discussed maso-
chism as a regression whereby sadism comes to be directed toward
the ego rather than an external object (32). In most cases this was
thought to involve a prior regression to the “sadistic-anal stage.”
After the establishment of his final form of dual drive theory,
and the ensuing assumption that instinctual drives became fused
as development progresses, Freud further elaborated the idea of
libidinal regression. In The Ego and the I d he stated that “the
essence of a regression of libido (e.g. from the genital to the
sadistic-anal phase) lies in a defusion of instincts” (34, p. 42), with
the result, in this particular instance, that destructive inclinations,
or hatred, are no longer controlled by their fusion with erotic
inclinations, or love.
In 1914, Freud introduced yet another application of the
idea of temporal regression when he incorporated it into the the-
ory of the psychoanalytic procedures. He spoke of the tendency
of the patient’s associations to move backward in time from the
problems of the present to earlier experiences and so to compel
“the analysis, which was supposed to correct the present, to occupy
itself with the past” (25, p. 10). This backward movement in the

psychoanalytic setting was called regression, and was described as

a crucial feature of psychoanalytic work due to the connections
regularly existing between latter-day pathogenic experiences and
significant earlier experiences. In this context, he further indi-
cated that it was this tendency of his patients which had brought
him to conceive of the psychoneuroses as characteristically in-
volving regression. Parenthetically, this context also contained a
pejorative aside to the effect that those who disproportionately
focus on the current conflicts of their patients are involved in a
“scientific regression” from more highly developed psychoanalytic
technique.
In “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of
Dreams” Freud implied that sleep is yet another human phenome-
non that involves regression. He referred to it as, figuratively
speaking, an undressing of the mind in which people “lay aside
most of their psychical acquisitions” and “approach remarkably
close to the situation in which they began life” (30, p. 222). Pur-
suing this further, he stated that, “somatically, sleep is a reactiva-
tion of intrauterine existence, fulfilling as it does the conditions
of repose, warmth and exclusion of stimulus: indeed, in sleep
many people resume the foetal posture” (30, p. 222).
As discussed so far, the idea of temporal regression is con-
fined to the undoing of developments that occur within the life
history of the individual. In Zntrodiictory Lecliires on Psycho-
Analysis, while portraying the dream work as a regression of in-
tellectual development to states characteristic of the individual’s
childhood, Freud added that, in so far as ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny, there is also an undoing of phylogenetic developments,
a moving backward into the prehistory of the race (29). In 1919,
in a paragraph added to T h e Interpretation of Dreams, he re-
peated this view that ontogenetic regression might also involve
phylogenetic regression, mentioning both dreams and neuroses
as contexts where this might occur (12).
I n 1921, Freud referred to a number of features of group
behavior (particularly in “common groups” as distinct from “or-
ganized and artificial groups”)-“the weakness of intellectual abil-
ity, the lack of emotional restraint, the incapacity for moderation
and delay, the inclination to exceed every limit in the expression

of emotion and to work it off completely in the form of action”--

as ‘‘a regression of mental activity to an earlier stage such as we
are not surprised to find among savages or children” (33, p. 117).
This also appears to be another instance of having construed re-
gression as being with ontogenetic and phylogenetic in nature,
and this impression is strengthened by his later discussion in the
same work of the group “as a revival of the primal horde” (33,
p. 123).
In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiely, Freud introduced still
another way of using the idea of temporal regression when he
stated that it is a “means which the ego can employ for the pur-
pose of defence against an unwelcome instinctual impulse” (35,
p. 105). In short, regression came to be viewed as one of the de-
fense mechanisms of the ego. This use is less a new function for
the idea of regression than it is a way of conceiving ol it that
became possible once the concept of the ego became crystallized
in 1923 and changed somewhat in its nature in 1926.
Other Historical Considerations

In addition to the Jacksonian idea of dissolution with its Spen-
cerian background, there have been other notions with certain
similarities to the idea of temporal regression. In contrast to the
clear-cut influence of the former, it is rather difficult to answer
the question of what roles, if any, these latter played in the de-
velopment of Freud’s concept.
As was pointed out by Riese, Plato held the view that “disease
may be due to a reversal of the formation of the structures” (54,
p. 8). Plato conceived of a class of structures, or bodily tissues
(marrow, bone, flesh, sinews), which are built u p from the blood
according to a particular sequence of natural processes. He further
thought that these processes, at times, undergo an unnatural re-
versal which cause a particular class of diseases (53). T h i s system
of thought may well have been the prototype of later ideas of de-
velopment and the undoing of development, but it is most un-
likely that it had any direct influence in the history of the concept
ol temporal regression.
T h e history of pathology tells us that a kindred idea was in
evidence as a theory of disease held by certain medical thinkers

762 STANLEY 1%‘.JACKSON
in the first half of the nineteenth century. IVhile others held this
view, it was particularly characteristic of the so-called Nutiirulistic
(or Ndiiral-Historical) School of Stark, Schoenlein, and Jahn.
They viewed lower animals as “comparable to the embryo in the
earlier stages of its development” (51, p. 32). For them, disease
meant “reversion to lower levels of life szich as those exhibited
by the embtyo or the infitsoria” (51, p. 33). They came to con-
ceive of diseases in man “as repetitions and copies of what is nor-
mal at lower stages of living beings” (51, p. 35). This resulted in
various human diseases being compared to various more “primi-
tive” animals whose physiology and anatomy are similar to the
pnthophysiology and pathological anatomy found in the particular
diseases. Similarly, various pathological findings were thought to
be “reminiscent of certain embryonic structures” (51, p. 36). Thus
this theory of disease encompassed both the idea of a phylogenetic
reversion and that of an ontogenetic reversion. It should be noted
that this theory of disease was associated with a general view of
the human body as “the highest stage of development which na-
ture has achieved” and as being composed of “all lower forms of
life . . . combined and integrated” within it (51, p. 35). Disease
then resulted from the undoing of this integrated state and en-
tailed making manifest some lower form of life.
There is no evidence to suggest that Freud was familiar with
these views and no indebtedness is suggested here. Nevertheless,
they were a part OE the nineteenth-century atmosphere in ex-
planations of human development and in theories of disease. Al-
though their kinship to his ontogenetic form of temporal regres-
sion is somewhat tenuous, they are particularly akin to Freud’s
notion of phylogenetic regression and perhaps belong somewhere
in its family tree. But it should be noted that phylogenetic regres-
sion was a minor theme in Freud’s idea of temporal regression,
and ontogenetic reversion was a minor theme in this reversion
theory of disease.
Darwin, too, occasionally employed a concept of reversion.
His notion referred to instances where the qualitative develop-
ment ol an organ or a part was thought to have been arrested and
then its quantitative growth to have continued until it came to
resemble a corresponding structure in “some lower or adult mem-

FREUD‘S COSCEPTS OF REGKESSION 763
ber of the same group” in ivliicli it would have been normal (5,
p. 361.). This idea of reversion clearly did not involve the prior
development and then the undoing of that development, which
are essential features of Freud’s temporal regression. It was rather
the reappearance of a characteristic of an orgainism’s ancestors due
to the failure of the organism, in regard to this characteristic. to
develop beyond that point. Furthermore, its locus as a concept is
within the larger boundaries of phylogenesis, whereas the primary
locus of Freud’s idea is within the narrower confines of on-
togenesis. Even his brief consideration of a notion of phylogenetic
regression is rather different from Darwin’s idea. Nevertheless, his
familiarity with Darwin and the manifold vagaries of concept de-
velopment make it difficult to rule out completely a role for this
idea of reversion in the evolution of the idea of phylogenetic
regression.
Prior to Darwin, and subsequently, considerable attention
was given to this particular idea of reversion, or atavism, as it
was also called. These “throwbacks” were characteristics in occa-
sional descendant organisms which more closely resembled charac-
teristics in their remote ancestors than those in their immediate
ancestors. Under these various terms this concept was fairly com-
mon in the writings of biologists in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century. For all the difference between the two concepts,
the view that such reversions shed light on the buried history of
various species surely sounds like Freud’s opinion of the high
potential of instances of phylogenetic regression for illuminating
the prehistory of man.
Thomas Laycock, in the first edition of his i\lind and Braiti
in 1860, conceived of human monsters as manifestations of “a de-
velopment in a retrograde direction-that is, a manifestation of
a lower type of organisation than the normal type, by arrest of
development or otherwise” (47,p. 399). In addition to explaining
“structural monstrosities” in this way, he also referred to func-
tional monstrosities-“individuals otherwise complete as to the
type of humanity, but who are as to their instincts and intellect on
a level with brutes”-with the implication that they were to be
similarly explained (47, p. 399). This concept seems to be quite
like that of reversion as employed by Darwin and others. That is

764 STANLEY 14. JACKSON
to say, in terms of the individual organism, it involves the failure

of development rather than the undoing of achieved development
characteristic of the ideas of dissolution and regression. On the
other hand, in terms of the species, it is akin to the notion of
phylogenetic regression. For Laycock, this concept was located in a
system of evolutionary thought which is quite distinct from Dar-
winian evolution, but which has some similarities to Spencer’s
views.
By the time of the second edition of this work in 1869, Dar-
win’s views had constituted a prominent version of evolutionary
thought for a decade, but Laycock’s views remained non-Darwin-
ian in nature. It is of special interest to note that the revisions in
that second edition included the introduction of a general theory
of disease referred to as “retrocession of evolution (or disvolu-
tion)” (48, p. 415). According to this law of relrocessiota, disease
and aging involve changes in the organism which are “the reverse
of those of evolution,” although, as with Spencer’s dissosoltrtion,
Laycock’s retrocessiotz is associated with a certain amount of
continuing evolution (48, p. 414). In aging and most illnesses, he
considered there to be a retrocession to “a lower normal type,”
by which he seems to have meant a phylogenetic retrocession to
conditions which would be normal in some “lower” type of ani-
mal. To this he added that “this law of retrocession applies very
strikingly to the encephalic tissue, when in the decay of the mental
powers there is a return to the earlier mnemonic syneses, and in-
fantile memories are manifested” (48, p. 415). This, and asso-
ciated comments, make it clear that he viewed “brain-disease” and
various psychological conditions as involving an ontogenetic retro-
cession.
Although these ideas had not appeared in the first edition,
except for their possible adumbration in his remarks about mon-
sters, in the preface to the second edition Laycock stated that he
“had long taught that [in addition to evolution] there is an
equally general inverse law of retrocession or disvolution” (48,
p. ii). There is a degree of similarity here to Spencer’s concept of
dissolution which appeared in print nine years prior to Laycock‘s
publication of his “retrocession” theory of disease, but, if we
accept Laycock’s assertion that, by 1860, he “had long taught” this

view, his theory may have been little more than sharpened in
formulation by the impact of Spencer’s ideas. Certainly, there is
little to suggest that these views were derived from Darwin as
even Laycock’s earlier idea of retrograde development, the only
point of similarity to ideas of Darwin’s, was not original with
either of them and so was probably drawn from an intellectual
environment common to both men. T h e prior existence of a “re-
version” theory of disease, as mentioned earlier, suggests that there
may have been a developing explanatory tradition in which Lay-
cock participated, owing a certain debt and making his own con-
tributions to its furtherance. As he was, in turn, an important
teacher of J. Hughlings Jackson (38), the latter’s “dissolution”
theory of disease might be considered a part of that same ex-
planatory tradition. Jackson was very likely influenced by both
Laycock and Spencer in formulating such a viewpoint.
From being actively considered in the field of biology the
concept of atavism spread into the field of criminal anthropology.
in the writings of Lombroso and others, where certain criminals,
on the basis of supposedly atavistic physical characteristics, were
thought to be criminal as a result of reversion. It spread also into
the field of social psychology, where it appeared in the work of
Le Bon to whom Freud was indebted for aspects of his views on
group psychology.
In 1895, Le Bon wrote that “man descends several rungs in
the ladder of civilisation” in his role as a member of a crowd and
that he demonstrates characteristics “of primitive beings” in his
feelings and behavior associated with that role (49, p. 36). H e re-
ferred to certain characteristics of crowds as usually “observed in
beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution” (49, p. 40). And
he stated that crowds tended toward exaggeration which they
“often brought to bear upon bad sentiments” which he conceived
of as “atavistic residuum of the instincts of the primitive man”
(49, p. 57). In Group Psychology arid the Analysis of the Ego,
Freud made it clear that that work had been considerably influ-
enced by Le Bon’s The Crowd on a number of counts (33). TVhile
he had, by that time, developed his concept of temporal regres-
sion to a considerable degree and had used it in a variety of
contexts, it is likely that his application of it in the explanation

of group behavior derived from both his own increasing use of

the idea and the views illustrated above. These passages from Le
Bon are quite suggestive of the idea of phylogenetic regression,
and, like Freud, he seems to have viewed group behavior as in-
volving both ontogenetic and phylogenetic regression.
In a passage referred to by Freud in the original edition of
The Inlerpretalion of Dreams, Havelock Ellis stated that “in our
dreams.we are taken back into.an earlier world” with the impli-
cation that dreams may provide clues to the understanding of the
mind of primitive man and our own phylogenetic past (8, p. 721).
In addition to this hint regarding phylogenetic regression, Ellis
may also have been alluding to ontogenetic regression when he
suggested that the world into which we are taken back in dreams
is similar to that of the child.
Another author who employed a notion akin to Freud’s
phylogenetic regression was Nietzsclie when he conceived OE man,
when dreaming, as “brought back to” modes of mental function-
ing characteristic of prehistoric times (50). Freud mentioned this
view of Nietzsche’s in a paragraph added to The Interpretation
of Dreams in 1919, but it is not clear whether his idea of phylo-
genetic regression had been influenced by Nietzsche’s thought or
whether he was merely acknowledging the discovery of a view
similar to his own.
By the 1890s a developmental orientation had become char-
acteristic for a number of members of the emergent discipline of
psychology. Darwinian influences were important in bringing this
about, but Spencer’s writings had no small role. An important
representative of this trend was James Sully in whose writings
both sources of influence are manifest. I n addition to his evolu-
tionism and his construction of a developmental psychology, Sully
employed the notion of “nervous dissolution” or “cerebro-psychi-
cal dissolution” in referring to insanity and senile decay as mani-
festations of a reverse process to that of nervous evolution (58,
59). For him, this was a physiological hypothesis as it had been for
Jackson, to whom he explicitly acknowledged an indebtedness for
this concept.
Of special interest here is an article of Sully’s on dreams in
1893 throughout which are scattered Jacksonian views and modes

FREUD’S COSCEPTS OF REGRESSlON 76i
of expression, including .several uses of “reversion,” “dissolution,”

and “retrogression” in the sense of temporal regression. He con-
ceived of sleep as permitting a reversal of the order of evolution
and the emerging of dreams which he thought of as primitive
phenomena akin to the experiences of the individual’s earliest
years. A particular statement of this view-“Our. dreams are a
means of conserving these [earlier] successive personalities. JVhen
asleep we go back to the old ways of looking at things and of
feeling about them, to impulses and activities which long ago
dominated us” (60, p. 362)-sufficiently impressed Freud that he
quoted it twice in T h e Interpretation of Dreams, but these quo-
tations were added only in 1914.
Topographical Regression
T h e idea of topographical regression also had its predecessors and
had been used by someone from whom Freud’s original use of it
was directly borrowed. It too was dependent on a larger concep-
tual framework, in this instance the system of the reflex arc bor-
rowed from neurology and physiology, which Freud took up and
made a part of his developing theoretical system. In contrast to
the other type of regression whose context of a psychoanalytic de-
velopmental psychology took form only slowly, the framework for
this type of regression had already been developed in considerable
detail by Freud by the end of the 1890s. Its context was his theory
of the mind, his theory of a hypothetical psychical apparatus, with
its topographical notions.
T h e eventual terminological differentiation of his two con-
cepts as temporal regression and topographical regression make it
clear that the variable of time was an important issue in their
differential development. For the former, time is a crucial factor.
T h e concept includes a background of prior events that constitute
a development that has occurred over a considerable period of
time. Its definition involves the undoing of that development.
IVhile the prior events standing as the background for an instance
of topographical regression clearly must also have happened over
a period of time, the amount of time is, comparatively speaking,
so brief that it can be ignored for most purposes. Thus its defini-

tion emphasizes the retracing of a pathway, making no direct ref-

erence to time. It is a spatial retrogression in a hypothetical
psychical apparatus, rather than a temporal retrogression.
It should also be noted that the prior progression implied in
these two notions is different in another way. T h e prior temporal
progression retains subtle overtones from its historical connection
with the value-laden idea of Progress, and so its associated regres-
sion is not free from related overtones. On the other hand, the
prior topographical progression is merely a sequence, or progres-
sion, of events following one upon the other, and so its associated
regression merely reverses a sequence.
Josef Breiier
This second concept oE regression first appeared in the psycho-
analytic literature in the theoretical chapter contributed by Josef
Breuer to Studies on Hysferia. Breuer stated that “what gives
hallucinations their objective character is an excitation of the
perceptual apparatus” (3, p. 189x1.). Then he added, “If the per-
ceptual organ is excited by a mnemic image [in contrast to a
sensation which would lead to a normal perception], we must s u p
pose that that organ’s excitability has been changed in an ab-
normal direction, and that this change is what makes halluci-
nation possible” (3, p. 189n.). This view involved the associated
assumption that the same apparatus cannot perform the functions
of both perception and memory. I t was his hypothesis that a hal-
lucination is brought about by a ‘‘ ‘retrogressive’ excitation, ema-
nating from the organ of memory and acting on the perceptual
apparatus by means of ideas” (3, p. 189). Implicit in this is the
notion of the reflex arc with the normal course of events being
the experience of a sensation which impinges upon the perceptual
apparatus and proceeds through to the motor end of the arc to
result in motor activity, with the associated process of the storing
of memory images occurring during this transmission of excitation.
T h e retrogression involves a movement OE excitation backward
toward the afferent end of this arc.
I n view of the prominent use here of the language of neuro-
physiology, it should be mentioned that Breuer emphasized that
he was writing about psychological events “in the language of

psychology” (3, p. 185). Thus, while the footnote which contained

much of the above seems to have been an aside about neurophysio-
logical events, the notion of retrogression proposed would seem
to represent an effort to develop a psychological concept modeled
on a physiological concept.
Sigmtitid Fretid
In 1895, in “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (lo), Freud bor-
rowed from Breuer the idea of excitation moving retrogressively
as an explanation of how a hallucination comes about. He likened
dreams to hallucinations and proceeded to explain them as mani-
festations of this same process. I n contrast to Breuer’s concept,
Freud’s notion was part of an endeavor to construct a strictly
physicalistic scheme to explain human mental functioning. Al-
though this work was published only many years later, it is useful
to introduce it here to illustrate the development of his ideas from
their origins in Breuer’s “retrogressive excitation” to his own
concept of regression as elaborated in The Interpretation of
Dreams.
Employing the model of the reflex arc and the notion of a
current of excitation being transmitted from the sensory end to
the motor end, and following Breuer’s assertion that perception
and memory cannot both be served by the same part of the ap-
paratus, Freud hypothesized two sets of neurones: (i) a system of
permeable neurones at the sensory end which serves the function
of perception, and which are left unchanged after excitation has
passed through them; (ii) a system of impermeable neurones far-
ther along the reflex arc which serve as “the vehicles of memory.”
and which are modified by excitation to provide a store of mem-
ories (10). H e considered that the normal course of events in
waking life is for “current” to be transmitted from the system of
permeable neurones to motility, and that this current is an ob-
stacle to any retrogressive transmission of current from the system
of impermeable neurones to the system of permeable neurones.
With sleep, the motor discharge from the system of impermenble
neurones is stopped, and this current ceases, and 50 a “retrogres-
sive” discharge to the permeable neurones becomes possible.
Dreams, conceived of as hallucinatory in nature, then occur as

the result of the permeable neurones becoming “retrogressively

cathected.”
Between the writing of the “Project” in September and Octo-
ber of 1895 and the completion of The Inferprefalion of Dreams
in September, 1899. this particular notion of regression appeared
in Freud’s unpublished writings on two occasions which have
since become pnrt of the published record. In some notes dated
May 2, 1897, he referred to the idea obliquely, when he con-
trasted the construction of fantasies to the construction of dreams,
implying that regression is a characteristic feature of the latter
and stating that, in the former, “there is no regression in the
form which they are given, but only progression” (10, p. 199).
On November 14, 1897, in a letter to IVilhelm Fliess, Freud
mentioned briefly the idea of regression, but in this instance it is
rather difficult to‘determine which of the two types is being used.
T h e context is an early version of his ideas on normal sexual de-
velopment, and its vicissitudes in perversions and neuroses, which
were not formulated in his published writings until some years
later. He stated that memories of pregenital sexual experiences
arouse “internal disgust: and the final result of this will be that
a certain amount of libido will be unable to make its way through,
as it normally would, to action or to translation into psychical
terms, but will be obliged to proceed in a regressive direction (as
happens in dreams)” (10, p. 233). H e considered that this might
lead to neurosis. T h e context suggests that this might be an early
version of his idea of temporal regression as a central aspect of
pathogenesis in psychoneuroses. On the other hand, he likened it
it to the regression that occurs in dreams. As the available evi-
dence indicates that, at that time, regression in dreams meant only
topographical regression, this would seem to be an instance where
this latter concept was used.
Freud’s first published use of this notion was in The Infer-
firefation of Dreams where he developed it, and its larger theo-
retical context, in considerable detail. As this larger context is
crucial to an understanding of his use of this type of regression,
it will be briefly outlined at this point.
In this work he employed the conceptual scheme of a psychic
apparatus which operates according to the model of a reflex arc

with excitation entering at the sensory end and being transmitted

through the apparatus until it reaches the motor end and eventu-
ates in action. In contrast to the earlier, unpublished form of this
scheme in the “Project,” he was by then working within a con-
ceptyal framework of a strictly psychological nature. This hypo-
thetical apparatus was viewed as being composed of components
termed systems through which the excitation passes. In explicit
agreement with Breuer he maintained that the same system could
not “accurately retain modifications of its elements [i.e., serve
memory] and yet remain perpetually open to the reception of
fresh occasions for modification [i.e., serve perception]” (12, p.
538). He therefore suggested a perceptual system “in the very
front of the apparatus” which “receives the perceptual stimuli but
retains no trace of them and thus has no memory” and “behind
it” a memory system (or systems) “which transforms the momen-
tary excitations of the first system into permanent traces” (12,
p. 538).
Then, as the next system in sequence, he added the tincon-
scious with a further, adjacent system, the preconsciotis, located
at the motor end of the apparatus. T h e preconscious functions as
a critical agency (or censor), directs waking life, and determines
voluntary, conscious actions. T h e contents of the unconscious were
viewed as not readily available to consciousness and as only having
such access “via the preconsciotis, in passing through which its
excitatory process is obliged to submit to modifications” (12,
p. 541). In contrast, the contents of the preconscious were con-
sidered to be able to “enter consciousness without further impedi-
ment” provided that they reach a certain intensity and that atten-
tion is directed to them (12, p. 541). Dream work was considered
to occur, for the most part, in the unconscious.
T h e direction in which excitation ordinarily moves in this
apparatus was termed progressive. Then, using the notion he had
borrowed from Breuer and had employed in the “Project,” he
spoke of dreams as “having a ‘regressive’ character.” That is, as
proposed by Breuer in the case of hallucinations, “the excitation
[in dreams] moves in a backward direction. Instead of being trans-
mitted towards the motor end of the apparatus it moves towards
the sensory end and finally reaches the perceptual system” (12,

p. 542). IVith this reverse process the thoughts in a dream were

conceived of as being resolved into the raw material, i.e., the
sensory imagery, from which they had originally been derived.
Similarly, Freud thought of hallucinations and visions as regres-
sions occurring in the waking state. And he further hypothesized
that “intentional recollection and other constituent processes of
our normal thinking” also involve “a retrogressive movement in
the psychical apparatus from a complex ideational act back to the
raw material of the memory-traces underlying it,” but he con-
sidered that this backward movement never extends beyond the
memory images and thus does not succeed in producing “a hallu-
cinatory revival of the perceptual images” (12, p. 543).
I n seeking to explain why such a reverse process is able to
take place, he stated that the continuous daytime current, flowing
from the perceptual system in the direction of motor activity,
ceases at night and so no longer presents an obstacle to a current
of excitation flowing in the opposite direction. And he thought it
probable that regression is further facilitated in dream states by a
change to a ready transfer of excitation from one idea to another,
in contrast to waking psychical procedure. But then there is the
question of how hallucinations and visions occur “in spite of a
sensory current flowing without interruption in a forward direc-
tion” (12, p. 544). Freud explained this by stating that the only
thoughts which undergo regression in the waking state are those
which are intimately linked with disturbing memories which have
been forbidden expression.
In another phrasing Freud stated that, during sleep, a wish
arises in the unconscious and “seeks to force its way along the
normal path taken by thought-processes, through the Pcs. . to ..
consciousness. . . . Its further advance is halted . . . by the sleeping
.
state of the preconscious. . . T h e dream-process consequently
enters on a regressive path, which lies open to it precisely owing
to the peculiar nature of the state of sleep, and it is led along that
path by the attraction exercised on it by groups of memories”
(12, p. 573).
Then Freud somewhat recast this conceptual scheme by the
addition of his ideas, and associated terminology, pertaining to
wishes and wish fulfillment. H e set u p a basic model in which the

FREUD’S
CONCEPTS OF REGRESSION 773
infant’s need and subsequent satisfaction lays down a memory

trace; in which a subsequent experience of this need involves an
impulse, or wish, that not only leads to a retrogressive arousal of
the memory image associated with satisfaction, but re-evokes the
perception itself to constitute a hallucinatory wish fulfillment;
a n i in which the limited value of this experience brings about
development to where the regressive movement of excitation is
halted at the memory image and efforts then made to re-establish
the reality which involved said satisfaction. This hallucinatory
wish fulfillment was thus viewed as “the psychical apparatus’s
primary method of working” and as being developmentally super-
seded (12, p. 567). This hypothetical mode of mental functioning
is clearly an example of topographical regression; but, when he
stated that it is returned to regressively in dreams and in psychoses,
he was saying that an instance of temporal regression reinstitutes
an early mode of functioning which in itself is an example of
topographical regression.
Two aspects of this conceptual scheme from T h e Ititerpre-
tation of Dreams merit separate mention at this point in order to
provide an orientation for discussing topographical regression in
Freud’s subsequent writings. First, the basic framework of the
scheme was the idea of the reflex arc. I n a manner of speaking.
Freud introduced the perceptual system, the mnemic systems, and
then the unconscious and the preconscious, locating them as “way-
stations” along a reflex pathway, in such a way that an excitatory
current entering at the sensory end passed through these systems
in sequence on its way to motor expression. This current was con-
ceived of as progressive in direction, and was considered to be
reversed in topographical regression. Although this framework of
the reflex arc was never explicitly abandoned, it soon fell into
disuse and disappeared from discussions involving the idea oE
topographical regression, ceasing to provide either a terminology
or an implied conceptual scaffolding. His classical topographical
systems (the unconscious and the preconscious), along with the
perceptual system, then came to serve as the basic conceptual struc-
ture for such discussions, providing the “pathway” along which
movement was retraced. While the term “excitation” did not com-
pletely disappear from such contexts, the terms “wish” and “im-

pulse” became more typical. IVhat had been briefly mentioned in

T h e Ztilerin-etalion of Dreams as another way of phrasing the
matter gradually became the common way of phrasing it. That is,
wishes were spoken of as arising in the unconscious and tending
to seek expression along a pathway to the preconscious and con-
sciousness. It was progressive movement in these terms which
came to be referred to as reversed in the case of topographical re-
gression (with the further movement back to the perceptual
system).
Second, with the disappearance of “excitatory currents” and
“reflex pathways,” another aspect of the original presentation
(Le., in The Ztzferpretation of Dreams) of topographical regres-
sion became central to later discussions. That context had also
referred to perceptual images having been progressively trans-
formed and integrated to form thoughts, with topographical re-
gression conceived of as involving the retrogressive transformation
of these thoughts back into perceptual imagery. This retrogressive
transformation became a typical feature of later discussions of
topographical regression.
I n an integrated summary of these two notions, it might be
said that wishes, or impulses, came to be thought of as moving
in a progressive direction to become manifested as thoughts: and
this type of regression came to be thought of as involving a move-
ment backward until wishes, or impulses, became transformed
from thoughts back into images, and then a further movement
backward to stimulate the perceptual apparatus in such a way
that hallucinations or dreams are produced.
Also, this is perhaps the optimal point at which to comment
upon formal regression, a purported third type of regression to
which Freud occasionally referred. This term was first used in
1909, where it is distinguished from temporal regression and is
defined as regression to “the original and primitive methods of
psychical expression” (18, p. 49). T h e context suggests that Freud
conceived of the form of expression of the erotic needs as having
retrogressively shifted to that which was characteristic of the stage
of development to which the person has “returned” as the result
of the temporal regression. In other words, this is not properly
another type of regression, but an aspect of the phenomena en-

FREUD’S COXCEPTS OF REGRESSION 775
compassed by the term, temporal regression. T h e term was used

again in a paragraph added to T h e Inlerpretation of Dreams in
1914 where Freud referred to formal regression as a third type of
regression (along with topographical and temporal) and defined
it, in terms of “primitive methods of expression and representa-
tion” taking “the pIace of the usual ones” (12, p. 548). IVhiIe one
cannot be certain, this phrasing suggests that he might again have
been referring to the form of expression associated with temporal
regression. Then, in 1915-1917, he contrasted formal regression to
material regression. Material regression refers to the revival of
“old mental impulses, wishes and character-traits” which have been
superseded, and appears to be equivalent to temporal regression
(29, p. 212). In this context formal regression refers to the trans-
lation of “thoughts into a primitive form of expression” (29,
p. 211), which seems to be equivalent to the transformation of
thoughts into imagery that is an aspect of topographical regres-
sion. This dicliotomy presents an awkward problem. On the one
hand, it could be viewed as a dichotomy of content and form, with
regression in content being temporal regression and regression in
form being topographical regression. O n the other hand, as Freud
seems to have used formal regression to refer to an aspect of
temporal regression in one place and to an aspect of topographical
regression in another place, one might conclude that the term is
a general one referring to the formal aspects of either of the two
basic types of regression.
In the years following the publication of The Interfiretation
of Dreams the notion of topographical regression continued to
have a role of some significance in psychoanalytic theory due to
its central position in the theory of dream formation, but its func-
tions were limited beyond that area. I n Jokes and Their Relation
to the Unconsciotts, Freud described topographical regression
briefly, indicating it to be a characteristic aspect of dream work.
He referred to it as a reverse movement along a path “from the
region of thought-structures to that of sensory perception’’ (13,
p. 162). This backward movement through the hypothetical ‘‘to-
pography of the mental apparatus” was considered LO be crucially
associated with the transformation of thoughts back into the per-
ceptual images from which they had originally been developed

(13, p. 162). I n “A Metapsycliological Supplement to the Theory

of Dreams,” topographical regression in dream formation was dis-
cussed in terms of a backward movement from the preconscious
to the unconscious to perception. It was stated to be a “reversal
of the course of excitation” and it was said that “in this process
thoughts are transformed into images” (30, p. 227f.). In the section
on dreams in Zntrodiictory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, the lan-
guage of “excitation moving backwards” had been abandoned,
and topographical regression was referred to entirely in terms of
the regressive transformation of thoughts into sensory images
(29). In N e w Zntrodiictory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, with ref-
erence to dream theory, “the backwards course” of topo,pphical
regression was agiin discussed in terms of the transformation of
thoughts into visual imagery (36).
Thus, while the idea of temporal regression developed con-
siderably, gradually became more prominent in Freud’s views,
and was applied to the explanation of an increasing range of
phenomena, the idea of topographical regression continued to be
used very much as it was in T h e Interpretation of Dreams. Al-
though the terminology associated with it changed somewhat and
different elements of its original conceptual complex became cen-
tral to its later discussions, it experienced a comparatively re-
stricted later development. Further, however complete or incom-
plete it may be said to have been, Freud’s gradual abandonment of
his topog~aphicaltheory in favor of his structural theory involved
a second loss of its conceptual framework for the idea of topo-
graphical regression. As the notion of a transformation of thoughts
into visual imagery continued to be useful for him in considering
dream formation, it remained on the scene as a concept without
a well-defined home among his other concepts.‘
Another use of the concept was made in 1909, when Freud
described “obsessional thinking” as a “regression from acting to
thinking,” against the background view that thoughts are prelimi-
nary to acts (17, p. 244). This is far from a typical use of the idea
4Cill’s discussion of this concept constitutes a recognition of both this con-
tinuing value and this incongruous position among Freud’s later views, and it
pursued in an effort “to integrate the hypothesis with the structural theory’’ (37.
p. 78).

and was not repeated in Freud’s later considerations of obsessional

thinking.
A third application of the idea of topographical regression
seems to have been alluded to in Introdtictory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis when Freud stated that “the mechanism of dream-con-
struction is the model of the manner in which neurotic symptoms
arise” (29, p. 183). This passage allows the inference that he con-
sidered topographical regression to play a crucial role in the forma-
tion of neurotic symptoms, and, as previously mentioned, a similar
inference might be drawn from his letter to Fliess on November
14, 1897 (10). On the other hand, he neither developed this idea
further nor employed it again, and, instead, it was temporal regres-
sion which became a crucial concept in his developing ideas about
symptom formation.6
I n “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of
Dreams” Freud elaborated upon the idea of the recall of memory
images as an instance of topographical regression, which he had
originally mentioned in The Interpretation of Dreams. As with
the development of hallucinations, he considered their recall to be
the result of a retrogressive movement through the mental appara-
tus, but without the further step of the imagery achieving the
character of a perception. To explain the difference, he here in-
troduced “reality testing” as a function which operates to deter-
mine that memory images are not actual perceptions and which
is “passed over” to allow the crucial additional step of perceptual
vividness in the case of hallucinations (30). It should be noted,
though, that this step was usually a part of his notion of topo-
graphical regression.
Other Historical Considerations

In a footnote added in 1914 to T h e Interpretation of Dreams,
Freud referred to Albertus Magnus and to Thomas Hobbes with
5 Gill takes a somewhat different view, stating that “topographic regression .. .

is an important feature of the mechanism of ...
symptom formation” (37, p. 76).
He bases this on Freud’s treatment of the process of delusion formation. but he
acknowledges that Freud’s “account of delusion formation . ..
would not, according
to his description, include a regressive step” (37, p. 83). His position seems to be
that, although Freud did not propound such an idea, it would logically follow
from certain of his views.

778 STANLEY 1%‘.JACKSON
the implication that they had preceded him in the use of a con-
cept akin to that of topographical regression. These references d o
not appear to represent sources which had influenced him in his
formulation of this idea, but rather to comprise a later recogni-
tion of possible conceptual parallels in the works of earlier authors.
In the case of Albertus, Freud quoted Diepgen (6) as the
basis for stating that Albertus had provided “the first hint at the
factor of [topographical] regression” in the thirteenth century.
From Diepgen he inferred that Albertus had conceived of the
imagitintio as constructing “dreams out of the stored-up images of
sensory objects” which process was viewed as being “carried out in
a reverse direction to that in waking life” (12, p. 542n.).
While this concept is implicit in the writings of Albertus (1,
2), it was not original with him, but rather was a notion held by
a number of medieval Aristotelians, Arabic and Christian. It was
a part of a system of physiological-psychological thought which
varied somewhat from author to author, but of which the follow-
ing, oversimplified outline is representative enough for our pur-
pose. T h e brain was viewed as being composed of three regions,
with certain of the faculties located in them. hlemory was thought
to occupy the rear, reason the middle, and imagination and the
common sense the front region. Sensory impressions from the out-
side world were conveyed from the external senses to the common
sense where they were assembled into composite images. These
images would then travel to the imagination where they might be
retained and considered, where they would eventually be stored,
and from where they might also be passed on to the reason. Ideas
from the reason were conveyed to the memory where they were
stored. For some authors, images were also stored in the memory,
so that there would then be two such storehouses. T h e imagination
was also viewed as being able to conceive oE situations other than
those actually existing at the moment, and as being a faculty
which never rested, having a stream of images flowing through it
even when the other faculties were at rest or when the person
was asleep. In contrast to the normal waking state in which the
process was thought to be from external senses to the common
sense to imagination, in sleep this process was considered to be

reversed with the imagination thus providing the stimuli and

images which led to the experience of dreaming (4).
IVith regard to Hobbes, Freud quoted a passage from Levin-
than from a footnote in a work of Havelock Ellis (9), with the im-
plication that it was similar to the idea of topographical regression.
This note was an aside in a discussion of emotions in dreams. Nei-
ther in his text nor in the footnote was Ellis concerned with the
direction of transmission of excitation or with mental topography
in any sense of the term.
T h e original context in Hobbes’s writings (39, p. 7f.) was a
discussion of dreams that employed a conceptual framework in
which “the motion [i.e., excitation] from the brain to the inner
parts and from the inner parts to the brain” were viewed as being
“reciprocal.” Several examples suggest that Hobbes conceived of
the various emotions, in the waking state, as beginning in the brain
and a s transmitting motion to “the inward parts of the body” with
a resultant stimulation of various physical sensations (a particular
emotion leading to a particular physical sensation). I n the sleep-
ing state, one or another physical sensation might be aroused in
“the inward parts of the body,” each such state occasioning the
transmission of a reverse motion to the brain with the resultant
stimulation of the emotional state characteristically connected
with it. These emotional states “raiseth up in the brain” visual
imagery associated with them, which constitutes the dream.
Hobbes concluded with the statement, which Ellis and Freud later
quoted: “In sum, our dreams are the reverse of our waking imagi-
nation; the motion when we are awake beginning a t one end,
and when we dream at another.”
With both Albertus and Hobbes the conceptual framework
of the reflex arc was absent, but in each case there was a topo-
graphical scheme of sorts involved, and each employed the idea
of a transmission of something akin to excitation which traveled
in one direction in the waking state and in the reverse direction
in the dreaming state. Hobbes’s notion is really quite different
from Freud’s, except for the reversal of a flow of excitation in
dreaming as contrasted to waking. On the other hand, the medi-
eval idea represented in Albertus’s writings is surprising for the

extent of its similarity to Freud’s concept of topographical regres-

sion.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century the idea of
retrogressive excitation in the causation of hallucinations was not
at all uncommon. Various “centrifugal theories” (45,52) explained
the physiology of hallucinations in terms of “an irritation” pro-
ceeding outward, “just as the reverse process normally causes a
true perception” (45, p. 439). Some who held to such a theory
considered that the centrifugally directed excitation reached only
as far as centrally located aspects of a perception-sensation appara-
tus, while others thought that it proceeded to the peripheral
sensory organs. While such views were strongly argued against by
others, Breuer, and then Freud, was employing an idea that had
some currency at that time. In contrast to Jones’s suggestion (46).
Aleynert does not seem to have subscribed to such a theory.
Summary and Conclusion
While Freud borrowed directly from Jackson in developing his

idea of temporal regression, by the 1890s various versions of the
notion of retrograde development were scattered hither and yon
in the works of a variety of authors, particularly biologists and
psychologists. Again, by the late nineteenth century, a number OE
writers were employing ideas akin to topographical regression.
While Freud borrowed directly from Breuer in developing this
notion, theories involving a concept of centrifugal flow of stimu-
lation in the nervous system constituted a well-established category
of explanations of hallucinations.
As can be seen from both the historical backgrounds and
Freud’s writings, there is much to support the conclusion that
we have here two distinct concepts. Temporal regression is firmly
rooted in a heritage oE developmental schemes of one sort or
another, and, during much of the nineteenth century, ideas akin
to it kept appearing, particularly in efforts to explain pathological
phenomena. While Spencer’s views make it clear that this type of
notion can readily become part of highly abstract systems of
thought, such ideas tended more to occur in explanatory efforts
brought to bear on significant collections of actual data. Concepts

of this sort depended to a large extent on direct observations of

physical and behavioral pathology. and they usually functioned in
contexts where the ratio of such direct observations to intcrpo-
lated theoretical constructs was relatively high.
Topographical regression is also rooted in a long-standing
conceptual tradition, but one of a rather different sort. It belongs
to a heritage of efforts to explain the human mind, usually with
an admixture of physiological overtones stemming more from the
language used than from the data drawn upon. These conceptual
schemes tended to be more speculative than those comprising the
historical background of temporal regression, and direct observa-
tions were usually relied upon to a significantly lesser extent.
In addition to these contrasting historical backgrounds, there
is a clear distinction between these two concepts in Freud’s works.
There were separate purposes for their introductions into his
writings, they had separate theoretical contexts, and these two
differences persisted. Further, they experienced separate develop-
mental histories as theoretical constructs. Rather than their being
essentially one as Freud suggested, what emerges in the study of
his use of these ideas is that, on occasion, a phenomenon can con-
stitute an example of temporal regression and an example of topo-
graphical regression at one and the same time. But it does not
follow from the fact of conceiving of the same phenomenon in two
different ways that these two types of regression are really one.
Temporal regression, along with fixation and, to some extent,
frustration, gradually assumed a central position in Freud’s clin-
ical theory, and these notions came to constitute a theory of patho-
genesis for the psychoneuroses and other syndromes. While re-
maining in a central role, temporal regression was duly modified
in accordance with developments in other aspects of psychoanalytic
theory. And the developmental theory which provided its larger
conceptual context gradually evolved, and became more important
in Freud’s thought. A steady accumulation of clinical data was
usefully explained by this concept, and these data, along with
extraclinical direct observations, tended to give support to it and
strengthen its position.
In contrast, topographical regression is a part of Freud’s gen-
eral theory. It remained relatively restricted in its application as

his theories developed. As the theory of the reflex arc and, later,
the theory of topographical systems gradually fell into relative
disuse, it became a concept deprived of its larger conceptual con-
text twice over, and thus was left somewhat adrift. Again in con-
trast to temporal regression, it was not found increasingly useful in
the explanation of accumulating data, nor was its position in
Freud's theories strengthened by accumulations 'of data which
tended to support it.
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Subinitfed July 27,1967

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333 Cedar Street
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Jackson 1969

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T H E HISTORY OF FREUD’S

HE SUGGESTION THAT the notion of regression is an important

T one in the writings of Sigmund Freud would come as no sur-

From the Department of Psychiatry, and the Department of History of Science

mentally “one” (12). T h e different historical origins of these two

T h e concept of temporal regression is one with a heritage deeply

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usually years) from a simpler, more primitive, less organized stage

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there is always some disintegrative activity in any essentially inte-

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p. 522), and employed it as the reverse of evolution or as that

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application of his own notion of dissolution than that .he was

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complementary relationship to one another might seem to allow

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of growth and development the organism becomes progressively

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in nature, and suggested that the nervous system be thought of as

Sigrn iind Freud

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meets with an obstacle in the river-bed is dammed up and flows

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psychology) in which this particular idea of regression could func-

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used it again when he explained da Vinci’s various vocational

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other instances, “and between them every degree of co-operation

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directly, he spoke of frustration resulting in “a backward flow of

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original Jacksonian formulation from which the idea of temporal

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neurotics as having retained, to a disproportionate degree, the

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psychoanalytic setting was called regression, and was described as

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of emotion and to work it off completely in the form of action”--

Other Historical Considerations

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to say, in terms of the individual organism, it involves the failure

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of group behavior derived from both his own increasing use of

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of expression, including .several uses of “reversion,” “dissolution,”

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tion emphasizes the retracing of a pathway, making no direct ref-

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psychology” (3, p. 185). Thus, while the footnote which contained

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the result of the permeable neurones becoming “retrogressively

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with excitation entering at the sensory end and being transmitted

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p. 542). IVith this reverse process the thoughts in a dream were

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infant’s need and subsequent satisfaction lays down a memory

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pulse” became more typical. IVhat had been briefly mentioned in