EMILIO GRANDE vs. ATTY.

EVANGELINE DE SILVA [July 29, 2003]

Emilio Grande was the private offended party in criminal cases filed with RTC-Marikina for Estafa and Violation of BP22 (People v.
Sergio Natividad) During the proceedings, Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for Natividad, tendered to Grande a check in the
amount of P144,768 drawn against her account with PNB as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against Natividad.

Grande refused to accept the check, but Atty. De Silva assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to PNB. She
manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Convinced, Grande desisted from
participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of Natividad.
When Grande deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by PNB. (Account Closed). Grande wrote a letter to Atty. De
Silva demanding that she pay the face value of the check, but his demand was ignored.

Grande filed a criminal complaint against Atty. de Silva for Estafa and Violation of BP 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Marikina. Subsequently, Grande filed an administrative complaint for disbarment of Atty. De Silva for deceit and violation of
the Lawyer's Oath. (Complaint was referred to IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.) Resolutions were sent to Atty. De Silva, requiring her
comment on the complaint, but such are returned unserved; “Moved” or “Refused”

Investigating Commissioner Florimond Rous found Atty. De SIlva guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's
Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. IBP Board of Governors
passed a resolutiong which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two years.

SC: ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for Two Years, effective upon receipt hereof.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a
violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalty
for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.
1. for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
2. grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
3. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice,
4. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is
a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer's moral character in
serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment, because it is
important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality. Any wrongdoing which
indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a
lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well
of a member of the bar, for a lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful
character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her
profession.

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent's persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for
doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients. We cannot tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
FELIX E. EDQUIBAL vs. ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. [February 3, 2005]

Felix Edquibal engaged the services of Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr. to assist his mother, Ursula Edquibal, in the cases she filed against
his sister Delia Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable judgments
in 4 out 5 cases handled by Atty. Ferrer, but in one civil case, the judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother.

Atty. Ferrer advised Edquibal to appeal to CA and that the cost involved is P4,000. When Edquibal informed Atty. Ferrer that he
does not have enough money, the latter said P2,000 would be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money, Atty. Ferrer
told him just to wait for the result. When Edquibal failed to hear from Atty. Ferrer, he went to CA to follow-up the appealed case.
He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure of the appellant to file the required appellant's brief.

Thus, in a letter-complaint, Felix Edquibal charged Atty. Ferrer with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.

Atty. Ferrer: denied that he filed an appeal on behalf of Edquibal’s mother with the CA or received P2,000. What happened was
that Edquibal told him that there is someone in the CA who can help him regarding his appeal. Atty. Ferrer claimed that he "did
his best" for complainant's mother and did not even ask for attorney's fees. (referred to IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.)

IBP Commissioner Atty. Leland Villadolid: per records of the CA, Atty. Ferrer is the counsel of record of Edquibal’s mother. In a
resolution, it was explicitly noted that a notice was sent to Atty. Ferrer requiring him to file appellant's brief within 45 days. If
Atty. Ferrer never agreed to handle the appeal, he should have immediately manifested to the CA that he is not handling the
appeal. Section 2, Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: The counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively
considered as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals.' Accordingly, Atty. Ferrer’s failure to timely file the required
appellants' brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 171 and 182 of the CPR. "Thus, for failure to
act with reasonable diligence in representing the cause of complainant, it’s recommended that Atty. Ferrer be directed to "return
the amount of P2,000.00 as and by way of restitution to complainant."

IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation.

SC: sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty recommended. Atty. Ferrer is found guilty of
professional misconduct and neglect of duty. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. He is further DIRECTED to return immediately to the
complainant the amount of P2,000.00.

The lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully
informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy
the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.

DILIGENCE is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves
his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill,
and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in
the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.

The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights." All that is required
is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard,
respondent's failure to attend to his client's appeal is clearly wanting.

In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, we did not hesitate to suspend the
erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three months, six months, or even disbarment in severely aggravated
cases.

Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to scale the recommended penalty upward. Here,

1
Canon 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
2
Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to his client's request for information."
DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE IMBANG [August 23, 2007]

Diana Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Jose Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos. Ramos gave Atty. Imbang P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.

Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, Atty. Imbang never allowed her to
enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had
been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her P350.
Ramos became suspicious and personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro,
Laguna. She learned that Atty. Imbang never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the
Public Attorney's Office. Thus, Ramos filed a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Imbang for multiple violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Imbang: Ramos knew that he was in the government service from the very start. He first met the complainant when he was
still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's
daughter. When Ramos requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses, he declined because he
was with the PAO and was aware that Ramos was not an indigent. Nevertheless, he advised Ramos to consult Atty. Tim Ungson,
but the latter did not accept the case as Ramos was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. (P5,000 for
safekeeping with Atty. Imbang, ante-dated receipt) When Atty. Imbang resigned from the PAO, Ramos asked respondent to assist
her in suing the Jovellanoses. Atty. Imbang agreed to prepare the complaint, but was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with
the complainant.

Commission on Bar Discipline-IBP: It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from
accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries. 3 Thus, it recommended Atty. Imbang’s suspension
from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000.

IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of
the CPR; modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.

SC: adopted the findings of the IBP with modifications. Atty. Imbang is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are
expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the
bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. Government employees are expected to devote
themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited.4

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still
connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent clearly
violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free
legal assistance to indigent litigants. The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, respondent
should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent
violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one
occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of CPR. Respondent did not hold the money
for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees.
ALICE DAVILA vs. JUDGE JOSELITO GENEROSO [July 31, 2000]
3
Rule 1.01.A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01.A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service
if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
4
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
Alice Davila filed an administrative matter through a letter-complaint sent to the Court Administrator complaining of undue delay
in the disposition of a criminal case before Judge Joselito Generoso of MeTC-Quezon City. Davila alleged that subject criminal
case was deemed submitted for decision way back on February 16, 1993 but has remained undecided.

Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo Abesamis, in a 1 st Indorsement, required Judge Generoso to comment on the complaint.
Judge Generoso failed to do so and a First Tracer was sent, warning Judge Generoso that should he fail to comment, DCA
Reynaldo Suarez will recommend resolution of the Complaint without respondent's comment.

SC: issued a resolution ordering Judge Generoso to EXPLAIN his failure to decide the Crim. Case and to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be administratively dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the directive of the Office of the Court
Administrator.

In another case, Dr. Leticia Santos filed an administrative matter through a letter-complaint complaining of the delay in the
resolution of her case pending before Judge Generoso. She stressed that her Civil Case, a simple case of ejectment, was
submitted for decision on June 28, 1995 but as of June 17, 1996, the case had not been decided.

In a 1st Indorsement, DCA Suarez required Judge Generoso to comment on the said complaint within ten days from receipt
thereof. Absent any Comment filed, DCA Suarez sent a 1st Tracer, requiring Judge Generoso to comply with the 1st Indorsement,
otherwise, the case would be submitted for the consideration of the Court.

Court Administrator: recommended the dismissal from the service of respondent judge, with forfeiture of all benefits and leave
credits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporation.

SC: Judge Joselito Generoso is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits, and with
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any office in the government, including GOCCs.

After a careful study, and considering the failure of respondent judge to explain the undue delay in the disposition of subject
cases before his court and his repeated failure to comply with the orders issued in connection therewith, the Court finds merit in
the recommendation of the Court Administrator.

The failure of respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions aforecited constitutes "grave and serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office." It is noteworthy that
respondent judge was afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his
court and to comply with the directives of the Court, but he has failed, and continues to fail, to heed the orders of the Court, a
glaring proof that he has become disinterested in his position in the judicial system to which he belongs.

The office of a judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. A judge is required to decide cases before him
with dispatch, mindful that delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith of the people in the judicial system. A judge who
cannot comply with such a sworn duty should not serve the judiciary any longer.

It is beyond cavil that the inability of respondent judge to decide the cases in question within the reglementary period of ninety
days from their date of submission, constitutes gross inefficiency and is violative of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which provides that "a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods."

The separation of the respondent judge from the service is indeed warranted, if only to see to it that the people's trust in the
judiciary be maintained and speedy administration of justice be assured.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL [October 14, 2004]
In a Complaint filed with the IBP, Social Security Commission sought to disbar Atty. Napoleon Corral for preparing, notarizing, and
filing with the Commission's Regional Office in Bacolod City two complaints allegedly executed and verified by people who have
been long dead. The Commission claims that Atty. Corral was liable for misconduct and unethical practice of law

Atty. Corral filed the first spurious complaint on behalf of one Hermogenes Bareno. The complaint was signed by Atty. Corral
himself, but appeared to have been verified by Bareno with a thumbmark and acknowledged before Atty. Corral on 1986. Upon
investigation, it was discovered that Bareno had died two years earlier. The second spurious complaint was filed on behalf of one
Domingo Panadero, under similar circumstances. The Commission also filed a Supplemental Complaint regarding a third similarly
spurious complaint filed on behalf of one Catalino de la Cruz, who, upon being investigated, declared in an affidavit that he had
never been to Bacolod City for the last 10 years, that he had never verified any such complaint, and that he did not even know
who Atty. Corral was.

Atty. Corral: since Bareno's impostor had Bareno's SSS card, Panadero's impostor had Panadero's SSS FORM E-1, and de la Cruz's
impostor had an ID, he could not be faulted for not investigating further into their identities. He argued he had sufficiently
complied with his obligations as notary public when he relied only on what they had presented, especially since they sought only
the preparation of simple, but justified, complaints for remittance of unpaid SSS premiums.

IBP Board of Governors: issued a resolution recommending that respondent be disbarred, considering Atty. Corral’s violation of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR by failure to fulfill his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as a Notary Public. (The Resolution,
now before the Court for final action pursuant to Sec. 12 par. (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, is well taken.)

SC: For violating Public Act No. 2103, Section 1(a) and the CPR, Atty. Napoleon Corral's notarial commission, if still extant, is
INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. He is further DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within 10 days from receipt of copy of this Resolution why
he should not be disbarred.

Atty. Corral failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his duty under Section 1(a) of Public Act No. 2103, which
requires a party to any document notarized by a notary public to personally appear before the latter. Bareno, Panadero, and de
la Cruz did not personally appear before respondent. The death certificates presented show that both Bareno and Panadero had
long been dead, while de la Cruz's unrebutted affidavit proves he had never been to Bacolod City where he supposedly verified
the complaint.

Atty. Corral did not clarify whether the forms of identification presented to him and on which he relied were valid IDs. He never
expounded on what documents Bareno's impostor presented or on what kind of ID de la Cruz's impostor showed him. An
examination of said SSS Form E-1, presented to him by Panadero's impostor, also shows that it is only a statement of a
member's beneficiaries and does not, in any way, tend to prove that the bearer is the member whose name appears on said
form. Respondent did not even state what precautions he took to ascertain the identities of those who appeared before him.

Respondent failed to realize that the complaints he had prepared and carelessly notarized would haul the prospective
defendants in those complaints to the Commission and cause them to spend valuable time and incur expenses in their defense.
Such jaunty indifference betrays his deplorable failure to heed the importance of the notarial act and observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary public. A notary public is duty bound to require the person
executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person, and ask the latter if he has
voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Respondent is reminded that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat is sacrosanct. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Being a lawyer, respondent has a graver
responsibility because of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is
mandated to discharge his duties, which are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.

By recklessly notarizing the complaints without ascertaining that Hermogenes Bareno, Domingo Panadero, and Catalino de la
Cruz were indeed personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated in the complaints he
prepared, respondent undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents. He breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility5 and Rule 1.01 thereof6. Serious doubts exist in his fitness to continue as a member of an esteemed
and honorable profession.

PEDRO TOLENTINO, et. al. vs. ATTY. NORBERTO MENDOZA [October 19, 2004]

5
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
6
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Norberto Mendoza, a former MTC Judge, abandoned his legal wife,
Felicitas Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon Marcos. Judge Mendoza
and dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Oriental Mindoro and Judge Mendoza had
fathered two children by his paramour. Atty. Mendoza and dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters
that they were married, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in Atty. Mendoza’s Certificate of Candidacy
filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, he declared that his wife is Felicitas Valderia. In Atty. Mendoza’s certificate of
candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated. Such declarations in the birth certificates of his
children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents. Atty. Mendoza’s acts betray his
lack of good moral character and constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar. Thus, complainants filed a
complaint against Atty. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct. (Naujanews as evidence)

Atty. Mendoza: complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact
revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them. Complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of
his daughters in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in
evidence. Judge Mendoza did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of subject birth
certificates and he never declared that he had two wives. He has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife,
Felicitas Valderia. Complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the public's sense of morality. (The facts have not been denied
by respondent under oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the
documents presented.)

IBP Board of Governors: adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner; considering Atty.
Mendoza’s violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR, Atty. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until
he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral
course of conduct.

SC: respondent Atty. Mendoza is found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral character is a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining
in the practice of law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage".

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is only
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conviction.

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render
said records inadmissible in evidence. The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State
and its agents.

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.

The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children by
her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good
standing in the legal profession. This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of
the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.

VIOLETA TAHAW vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS VITAN [October 21, 2004]

A lawyer must at all times comport himself in a manner befitting a member of this noble profession and worthy of his esteemed
position in society. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the Bar. Thus, any indicia of erosion in the dignity of the profession will be dealt with accordingly by this Court.

Violeta Tahaw secured the services of Atty. Jeremias Vitan for filing the appropriate action for the partition of a real property
located in Makati City. Tahaw delivered to Vitan four checks in the total amount of P30,000 as Atty. Vitan’s professional fee. After
almost a year without Tahaw hearing from Atty. Vitan about the case, Tahaw sent Atty. Vitan a letter-inquiry as to the status of
the case. Atty. Vitan assured Tahaw that he had already filed the appropriate case in Makati. When Tahaw went to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of Makati City to check if a case was indeed filed by respondent for and in her behalf, she found that Atty. Vitan
did not file the case as agreed upon. Tahaw wrote to Atty. Vitan informing him that she is terminating the latter's services as
counsel and demanded the refund of the P30,000. Atty. Vitan failed to refund the aforesaid amount, and Tahaw was thus
prompted to seek the assistance of the IBP.

Atty. Vitan: the problem arose from a miscommunication between client and counsel. The case he was supposed to file for the
Tahaw was complicated by the filing of other earlier complaints which he was not privy to. He promised to refund the
complainant the P30,000.

IBP: instructed Atty. Vitan to issue six postdated checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 and dated a month apart, and to
deliver the same to the IBP's office to facilitate the return of the P30,000.00 to complainant. Atty. Vitan failed to refund the
amount to complainant. Tahaw then filed a complaint for disbarment or suspension with the IBP.

Atty. Vitan: denied that he obligated himself to file the partition case upon receipt of the P30,000; the said amount represents
consultation fees, research fees, and minimal acceptance fees. He stated that complainant failed to disclose to him circumstances
which would have adverse effects on the case sought to be filed.

IBP Commissioner Acerey Pacheco: Considering that the amount was paid by Tahaw for Atty. Vitan’s professional services which
he miserably failed to perform, the same must be returned to complainant without delay. The report recommended that Atty.
Vitan be reprimanded and admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. (IBP Board of Governors:
adopted IBP Commissioner’s report and recommendation.)

SC: Atty. Vitan is found GUILTY of violation of Canons 7 7 and 178 of the CPR for his failure to file the necessary pleading for his
client's case and for the failure to return and immediately deliver the funds of his client advanced for the purpose of filing the
said case, upon demand, and even after his commitment with the IBP to do so; he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six
months effective from the date of promulgation hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same and similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely. Atty. Vitan is ORDERED to immediately RETURN the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client save, by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.

Tahaw wanted to partition a parcel of residential land owned in part by her deceased husband, Simeon Tahaw, Sr. for sums of
money allegedly owed to her by her husband. The spouses entered into an agreement wherein Simeon and complainant agreed
that a specific forty (40) square meter portion of the same parcel of land "shall pass on to complainant as her exclusive property
to the exclusion of all other heirs." It is an elementary principle in civil law that every donation between the spouses during the
marriage is void. The agreement relied upon by complainant for the proposed partition case partakes the nature of a donation by
Simeon of a part of his undivided share in the property. Hence, the agreement is void and cannot be the source of any right in
favor of complainant. The partition case was premised on a void agreement and thus could not prosper.

Even if complainant did not disclose the previous litigation and agreements between her and her deceased husband, respondent
would eventually find out, as in fact he did, about it in the course of drafting the proposed complaint. Any lawyer worth his salt
would know that the partition case sought to be filed would have no basis and would not prosper. Respondent should have
immediately appraised complainant on the lack of merit of her case. Instead, he asked for money for filing fees, and worse,
pretended to have filed the complaint.

7
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
8
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
JUDGE MARIANO MACIAS vs. ATTY. ALANIXON SELDA [October 21, 2004]

Atty. Alanixon Selda withdrew as counsel for one Norma Lim, private protestee in an Election Case. Atty. Selda submitted as
ground for his withdrawal that he could not cope up with the pace of the proceedings in view of his workload. He claimed that
the hearings of the election protest case would run from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and he still had to attend to his other cases
including classes at Philippine Advent College, which start at 5:30 p.m. on Mondays and Wednesdays.

Judge Macias granted the Motion and ordered Atty. Selda relieved of all his responsibilities as counsel for private protestee.
However, Atty. Selda executed an affidavit disavowing his grounds for withdrawing as counsel for private protestee. He swore
that he only filed the Motion on account of the pre-judgment of the case by Judge Macias, who on several occasions insinuated
to him that his client would lose in the protest.

On the basis of Atty. Selda’s affidavit, Lim moved for the inhibition of Judge Macias. Judge Macias granted the motion for his
inhibition if only to disabuse any doubt on his impartiality, but SC set aside Judge Macias’ inhibition after finding no strong and
valid reason therefor, and directed him to continue hearing the case and to resolve it with reasonable dispatch.

Deploring the act of Atty. Selda as "serious deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct as a lawyer and in utter violation of the
lawyer's oath," Judge Macias requested the IBP to investigate the matter and recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty
against Atty. Selda. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required Atty. Selda to answer, but he failed to do so.

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala: recommended that Att. Selda be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
IBP Board of Governors: reduced the suspension of respondent to six months

SC: Atty. Selda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar
offense will call for a more severe consequence.

All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to "do no falsehood" and "conduct [themselves] as [lawyers] according
to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients." These particular
fundamental principles are reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 9

When Atty. Selda executed his affidavit retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel for Lim, he acknowledged, under oath,
his misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to abide by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

CANDOR TOWARDS THE COURTS is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact, this obligation to the bench for
candor and honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying one thing in his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and
another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment.

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court —

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court:
1. for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
2. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice,
3. for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
4. for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
5. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The circumstances in this case demand that respondent be imposed suspension from the practice of law for one year. This serves
the purpose of protecting the interest of the court, the legal profession and the public. For indeed, "if respect for the courts and
for judicial process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a society."

RASMUS ANDERSON, JR. vs. ATTY. REYNALDO CARDEÑO [January 17, 2005]

9
Canon 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.
Rasmus Anderson, Jr., an American citizen, filed an action before CFI-Rizal, to recover title and possession of a parcel of land
against the spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos.

CFI-Rizal: dismissed the case and declared the defendants the true and lawful owners of their respective portions of the land in question.
CA: modified the CFI decision and held that the Torrens Titles in the names of the defendants spouses are maintained but without prejudice on
the part of Anderson to institute an action for reconveyance thereof after determining his rightful share from the estate of his late father.

Anderson, Jr., through Atty. Cesar de Guzman, filed an Amended Complaint before RTC-Rizal. Atty. De Guzman died and, upon
referral by a friend, Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of Atty. Reynaldo Cardeño. Subsequently, Anderson, Jr., filed an
administrative complaint before the Court wherein he alleged that respondent Atty. Cardeño caused "the loss" or the adverse
ruling against him in the aforementioned case before the RTC. (1. Atty. Cardeño did not file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence filed by
respondent spouses; 2. He did not appear at the formal hearing set for the purpose of considering the merits of the demurrer; 3. Atty. Cardeño did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration to the demurrer, which in turn caused the same order to become final and executor)

Atty. Cardeño: as a client, complainant Anderson, Jr., did not give him full cooperation. He allegedly did his best to familiarize
himself with the case, although there were several questions left unanswered by the complainant's good friend; That it was a
"big surprise" for him later to discover that the taking of the deposition was irregular as it was done without the presence of
counsels and parties, and without the proper notices. This led the other party to file a demurrer to evidence; That the "biggest
blow and surprise" to him was when he was approached by "good friends" of the complainant and these friends told him that
"they have good access and have made arrangements with the Presiding Judge." He was asked by these friends to prepare the
motion for reconsideration, which he "obligingly did" and thereafter he gave said motion to these friends, for them to file.
However, these friends did not furnish or return a copy of said motion for his files and reference;

IBP Commissioner Victoria de los Reyes: there is apparent lack of interest on the part of the Complainant to further pursue his
case. However, Atty. Cardeño has indubitably failed to perform an obligation which he owed to his client. Atty. Cardeño allowed
the friends of Anderson to take over in the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and did not even bother to check with the
Court if the same has been filed or not. Clearly, Atty. Cardeño was guilty of neglect of duty and this is a violation of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Ethics. He likewise breached his duty to the Honorable Supreme Court to report "corrupt" judges for
appropriate disciplinary action with the aim of improving the quality of justice and in helping restore the people's faith in our
judicial system.

IBP Board of Governors: considering Atty. Cardeño’s violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is recommended that Atty.
Cardeño be suspended from the practice of law for six months and that he be warned that a graver penalty would be imposed
should he commit the same offense in future.

SC: Atty. Cardeño is found guilty of violating Canon 18 of the CPR 10 and his lawyer's oath. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six months and is WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

It is undisputed that Atty. Cardeño was engaged by the complainant as counsel. By accepting the case, respondent should have
known the attendant responsibilities that came with the lawyer-client relationship. As a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of
his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic
learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of
the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as
much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients' interests will suffer. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal work.

The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to practice law is a
guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage [his] cases.
The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family. Thus, respondent's
defenses that the complainant was "uncooperative" as a client, that the voluminous records turned over to him were in
disarray, and that the complainant did not disclose to him certain particulars of the case, are all unavailing.

Canon 18 of the Code is clear in its mandate that a lawyer should not undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to render,
nor should a lawyer handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. A lawyer has the duty to prepare for trial with
diligence and deliberate speed and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, for his negligence shall render him
liable.
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA LABRADOR vs. ATTY. ROBERTO ROMANILLOS
[June 15, 2005]
10
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Atty. Roberto Romanillos represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. before the Human Settlements Regulation
Commission in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protection Act (PD
957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of
Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.

While still the counsel for SJHAI, Atty. Romanillos represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI's
conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano. When the request was denied, Atty.
Romanillos applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board in behalf of Montealegre. SJHAI’s Board of
Directors terminated respondent's services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association.

Atty. Romanillos also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in a Civil Case (SJHAI v. DCI) filed
before RTC-Makati. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against Atty. Romanillos for representing conflicting interests.

Investigating Commissioner Lydia Navarro: Atty. Romanillos failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients,
knowing fully well that the Montealegre case was adverse to SJHAI wherein he had previously been not only an active board
member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise, and its counsel in handling the
implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and owner, DCI. (recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition
that Atty. Romanillos should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.)
IBP Board of Governors & SC: adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the CA and SC and even
moved for the execution of the decision. Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against Atty. Romanillos for violation of the
prior Resolution and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct.

Atty. Romanillos: he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI despite Resolution because it was still pending
when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from
which he was exonerated. Concerning the title "Judge", respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had
ceased to attach the title to his name.

Investigating Commissioner Leland Villadolid, Jr.: respondent did not violate the admonition because it referred to future cases
only. Besides, SJHAI never questioned the propriety of Atty. Romanillos’ continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on
appeal until the case was terminated. HOWEVER, Atty. Romanillos was deceitful when he used the title "Judge", thus creating a
false impression that he was an incumbent. (recommended a minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four months
suspension and a stern warning)

IBP Board of Governors: considering Atty. Romanillos’ violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the CPR, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall be imposed against him.

SC: Atty. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued representation of Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the CPR specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also
misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or
claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge
is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when
he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.

Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the
service had he not resigned. In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000 from a party
litigant. The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including GOCCs. Certainly, the use of the title 'Judge' is one of such privileges.

We have previously declared that the use of titles such as "Justice" is reserved to incumbent and retired members of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including
those given the rank of "Justice". By analogy, the title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, and not
to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the
right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to
those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be
overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is
imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in
the legal profession.

DISBARMENT is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.

This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his
retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition.
Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra fervor and
vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the
laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer
of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. —

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court:

1.) for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
2.) by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice,
3.) for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
4.) for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
5.) The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
[March 31, 2006]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001
and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another
entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001
issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and

3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension
of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T.
Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection
program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2
Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them
to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was
appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as
the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the
sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or
quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order
denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot
be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint
Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.
He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge
Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was
denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the
Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a
Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this
Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of
the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement
of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal
cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of
law over the body of the accused.

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that:

[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the
person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-
764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial
relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest." 4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required
only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before
the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired
by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to
dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused
for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the
Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which
eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. 6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez 7:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his
pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the
law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, 9 while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become
obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in
that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has
not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should
have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. 13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks
an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago,
seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the
accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and
the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in
civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that
failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of
the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in
a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However,
if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to
be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were
not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none
of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person,
nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from
further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.

3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even
before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to
quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many
persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law,
it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge
who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable
cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of
the case.

Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is
quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night. 22Furthermore, the continued
absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his
freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, 23 demanding
that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts
engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager
of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed
the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this
Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the
basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the
proceedings is but proper." 24

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and
oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future,
appeal the assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution
is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against
them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice.
Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same
ground.

The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the
Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:

In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2,
Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query
or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the
contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. 26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor
in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.

According to petitioners:

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order
itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and
not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order
since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification. 28

Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s
certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable
cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]

The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by supporting documents, following the
requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

 6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;

7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

8. Information dated 22 June 2001;

9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In
failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1)
it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge
from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge
Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of
probable cause. As we held in Webb33:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As
well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for review of the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s
resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn
statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct
perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn
Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely
linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the defense’s
views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and
adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the
Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.

xxxx

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of
the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et
al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in
that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed. 34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of
SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of
this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was
based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which
interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness:
Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had
been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." 35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to
the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable
cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of
a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after
the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad)
creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.

In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest
issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. 36 According to the
petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement
of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof
should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of
the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable
cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available
to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno
and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved
in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become
final and executory. According to petitioners:

It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those
Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the
private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:

1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;

 3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and

4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523
AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed
upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001. 38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the
Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19
November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001
Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion
to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court
when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21
November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order
within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court
in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to
avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a
bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and
abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should
be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed.40

As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to
disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in
this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of
People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and
raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within
ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten
(10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, vs. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the MeTC Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
[November 17, 2010]

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without
acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues
that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses
(e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as
the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by
the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to
death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia.
The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8
of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his
loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s
absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and
could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the
fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at
the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" 13protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15

We find for petitioner.

 Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused,
in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to
bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to
subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes
and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a
way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There
are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc.
In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it
would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to
person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands
on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22that "[r]eckless impudence is not a
crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated
Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-
crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-
offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was
based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied
to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same
accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier.
Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29(promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan 31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.),
and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical
injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade,
El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on
this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on
Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of
one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a
fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory
decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless
imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot
be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than
People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second
case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the
case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case
No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were
filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these
two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the
Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through
reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial
Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to
his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of
Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and
reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before
the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the
evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would
have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this
case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the
same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis
of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State,
thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which
the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the
Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46); and (2) when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not
falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and
property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is
obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried
separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single
quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied
Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony,
in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing
the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge
with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even
though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves
only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The
issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave
or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in
Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed,
but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into
two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x. 53(Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for
light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under
the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined
under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of
quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each
as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep
inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) anoffense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could
not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in
the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the
number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided,
not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of
the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, [February 11, 1992]

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car
along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way
street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and
Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner
then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of
live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to
one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they were
informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was
shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that
the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted
by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who
was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail
himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the victim,
Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for
murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion
itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail
recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted
by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation 8 and
prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had
been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor
attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the
arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991
Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16
July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for
bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17
July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of
Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner
into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a
plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19,
24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public
respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus
prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the
ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.

On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the
following grounds:

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had
been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up
at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan
Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right
to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had
the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by
the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of
the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution
directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had
been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right
to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly arrested
without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently
established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General
invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid
although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the
view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner
had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the
information for murder even without preliminary investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six
(6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed"
at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting
of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there
had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right
to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced.
In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one
(1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing
crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant
case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at
one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6)
days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the
basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
 However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for
bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
(Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by
two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering"
himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise
guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in
court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that
petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the
same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should
have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary
investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not
by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had
already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the
time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information
in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or
not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper
in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due
process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-
investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court,
on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching
to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed
with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day
that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later
apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the
 Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently
made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period
in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory rather
than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the
right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering
that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22In the instant case, petitioner Go had
vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was
already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation
before being forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation
because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have
the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and
for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the
Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while
constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of
the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an
acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we
consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to
surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and
certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his
order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has already
commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary
investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation
although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary
investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this
time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the
conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that
petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo
arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the
audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner
of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner,
and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely
because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and
objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with
counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated
his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing
objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the
procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. 30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he
cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only
test of truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a
matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor,
strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after
a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were
effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process
and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of
accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is
not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the
rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991
is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of
murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from
commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

Separate Opinions
 GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano but am at a loss for reasons why an experienced
Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary investigation inspite of the vigorous
and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendations of the Prosecutor
that those rights must be respected. If the Court had faithfully followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if
the accused is really guilty, then he may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to go back to square one.
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
detriment of the impartial administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about
events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful
not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present
in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those unfortunates who seem to
spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a
poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media coverage may be presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend
himself properly. Hence, the importance of the court always following the Rules.
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the foregoing observations because I feel they form
an integral part of the Court's decision.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had waived the right to preliminary investigation
because he freely participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. A closer study of the
record, however, particularly of the transcript of the proceedings footnoted in theponencia, reveals that he had from the start
demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court
threatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that there was no
waiver. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of
the petitioner vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one, so to speak, but that is not the petitioner's fault.
He had the right to insist that the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly observed. The delay entailed by the
procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the Government and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial
judge for his precipitate and illegal action.
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial
administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court
should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of
the law.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point, after four (4) prosecution witnesses have already
testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who shot Eldon Maguan inside his car in cold
blood, and a security guard who identified the plate number of the gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to
conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a
crime was committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the
prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably believed to be so).
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return the case to the Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be supererogatory.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage, led to the
identification of the suspect who, seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to verify news
reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering the station, he was positively identified as the gunman by an
eyewitness who was being interrogated by the police to ferret more clues and details about the crime. The police thereupon
arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July 8, 1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for
frustrated homicide against him. As the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, before an information could be filed, the First
Assistant Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on July 11, 1991 in
the Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion for preliminary investigation and release on bail
(which was erroneously filed with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of P100,000 for his release, and
submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly after he had issued: (a) his order of July 12, 1991
approving the petitioner's cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16, 1991 granting the Prosecutor leave to
conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu propio issued on July 17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders and
setting for hearing the petitioner's application for bail.
The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that the trial of the case should be suspended and that
the prosecutor should now conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with this case. In Doromal
vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA 1024, the trial of the criminal case had not yet
commenced because motions to quash the information were filed by the accused.Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil.
1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are also
inapplicable because in those cases preliminary investigations had in fact been conducted before the informations were filed in
court.
It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional
right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354). It does not affect the
court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an
infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on bail, just as the
conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail. The court's hearing
of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be
suspended, but should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The parties will have an opportunity to
show not only: (1) whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more
importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is
strong would naturally foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the
judge is under a legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether evidence of guilt is so strong as to
warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and Provincial
Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472; Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152
SCRA 123)
The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for persons charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution). In People
vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for having granted the motion for bail in a murder case without any
hearing and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections thereto.
Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to
present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of
the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued
upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of discretion that
would call for the remedy of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail for it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is not in the custody of the law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the "petitioner was not arrested at all" (p. 12) and that
"petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the person into the custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule
113, Rules of Court). When Go walked into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was
actually and effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest
and estops him from questioning its validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).
I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur