Havard 1977 Notes On Voegelin's Contribution To Political Theory

Notes on Voegelin's Contributions to Political Theory
Author(s): William C. Havard

Source: Polity, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 33-64
Published by: University of Chicago Press
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Noteson Voegelin's
Contributionsto
PoliticalTheory
WilliamC. Havard
Virginia Institute
Polytechnic andStateUniversity
Despitehisrejectionof thediscipline'scurrentepistemological and

methodological trends,Eric an
Voegelinoccupies important positionin
contemporary politicalthought.In thisarticlethe a
author, former
studentand long-time colleagueof ProfessorVoegelin,analyzesthe
processwhichhas broughthimto thepresentstateof hispolitical
philosophyand presentsa conciseand lucidsummaryof thecentral
featuresof his work.He ends withsome questionsconcerningVoegelin's
theoretical
achievementand suggestslinesofinquirythatmustbe
pursuedifhisphilosophyis to providea basisfora futurepolitical
science.
WilliamC. Havard is dean of theCollege ofArtsand Sciencesand
University DistinguishedProfessorat VirginiaPolytechnic Instituteand
State Universityas wellas Editorof The Journalof Politics.He has a
longand closerelationship withPolitysinceitis largelytohisuntiring
effortsthatPolityowes itsexistence.His numerouspublicationsinclude
articleson Voegelin'spoliticalthoughtand reviewsofa numberof
Voegelin'sbooks.The presentessaywas givenas a paperat the1976
AnnualMeetingof theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationin
Chicago.
I.
Fromtimeto timeone runsacrossor hearsabouta rank-ordered list-
ing of outstandingAmericanpoliticalscientists,
usuallyconsisting of
abouttennames.Rumorevenhas it thaton one occasiontwoof the
eminences whohad beensingledoutfora distinctionof thistypewere
engagedin a disputeoversomematterhavingto do withthestateof
and one ofthemclosedouttheargument
thediscipline, (without regard
to thesubstanceof theissue) by pointing
out thathis positionshould
34 Noteson Voegelin'sContributions
toPoliticalTheory
carrytheday becausehe stooda place or twoahead of theotherin

therankings. So faras I knowEricVoegelin'snamehas neverappeared
on sucha list.Indeed,withsomeregularity he has beentacitly excluded
fromseriousconsideration in thedebateoverthenatureof thedisci-
plineand therelative standingsof thecontributions of variousscholars
to itbytheimplication or theoutright assertionthathe is nota political
at all.
scientist
The foregoing paragraph is notintended to be totally facetious.For a
numberof reasonsanyadequateassessment of Voegelinas a political
theorist,especially in presentcontext, willalso haveto be-at leastin-
ferentially-an assessment orcritique thestateofpolitical
of science.
In thefirst
place,Voegelin'sprofessional has
self-identity alwaysbeen
as a politicalscientist,'howeverpuzzlingthismayseemto colleagues
who,thoughnotquitesurewhatpoliticalscienceis, or whatitsprac-
titionersshouldbe doing,are sufficiently uncomfortable withVoegelin's
languageand conceptualconcernsto wantto label himas something
else.Buthisteaching appointments in American and Germanuniversi-
ties forsomethirty yearshave been in politicalscience,and he has
boldlyaffirmed the dependenceof any scienceon the existenceof a
colleagialworkingrelationship, for "Scienceis not the singlehanded
achievement of thisor thatindividual scholar;it is a cooperative effort.
Effectiveworkis possibleonlywithin a traditionofintellectual culture." 2
Despite these apparent identifyingcharacteristics as a member of the

politicalscienceprofession, Voegelinis rightly suspectin thatrole,not
onlyby those who are somewhat uncertain about thepossibility of a
scienceof politics, butevenmoreso by thosewho are positivethata
scienceofpoliticsbasedon themethods ofthenaturalsciencesnotonly
is possible,but has been,or is aboutto be achieved.For one thing,
Voegelinpersists in theuse of a terminology thatdoes notconveythe
immediate meaningthatorthodox politicalsciensists ascribeto it. He
talksforinstance, aboutthe"science"ofmanand society anditsorigins
1. In a set of unpublished"AutobiographicalNotes," taped by Ellis Sandoz,

Voegelinexplainshis selectionof a career in politicalsciencein preferenceto
otherpossiblechoicesas "partlyeconomic,partly..,.principle"(p. 3). Professor
Sandoz has graciouslypermitted me to use thenotesas "reinforcing" in
references
thispaper.Relyingon othersources,I have discussedsome of theearlyinfluences
on ProfessorVoegelinas a politicalscientist,as well as his "position"vis-4-vis
neo-Kantianpositivism, in my essay,"The ChangingPatternof Voegelin'sCon-
ceptionof Historyand Consciousness,"SouthernReview 7, no. 1 N.S. (Winter
1971):52.
2. The New Scienceof Politics(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952),
p. 23.
WilliamC. Havard 35
in theepistimipolitikiof theclassicalphilosophers, whereastheyun-

derstand "science"in thereductionist sensewhichVoegelinidentifies as
a "scientistic creed... characterizedbythreedogmas:(1) theassump-
tionthatthemathematized scienceof naturalphenomena is a model
scienceto whichall othersciencesoughtto conform; (2) thatall realms
ofbeingareaccessibletothemethods ofthesciencesofphenomena; and
(3) thatall reality whichis notaccessibleto sciencesof phenomena is
eitherirrelevant or,in themoreradicalformof thedogma,illusionary.
The creedimpliestwogreatdenials:it deniesthedignity of scienceto
the questforsubstancein nature,in man and society,as well as in
transcendental reality;and in themoreradicalform, itdeniesthereality
of substance." " Strangerstill,Voegelin talks about theempirical basis
of theory evenwhenhis references are to meanings in history,experi-
encesoftranscendence, symbolism, and suchabstract "values"as order.
Every"scientist," on theotherhand,knowsthatscientists are supposed
to do theirworkwithoutresortto value-judgments, thatvalues are
subjective andareproperly advancedas "preferences" whichareoutside
theboundsof cognitive validation,and thatscienceis basedon "facts"
apprehended by observation of external(objective)phenomena.4
It is a disturbingexperience forthosewhoselanguagesymbols derive
fromthe"climate ofopinion"(whichVoegelinfrequently citesas Alfred
NorthWhitehead's term)within contemporary cultureto be confronted
witha languagewhichsuggests thattheyare operating froma closed
"position" with to of and
respect problems epistemology methodology,
ratherthanfroman opennessto theexploration of reality basedon an
of
abidingtradition inquiry at
reaching least to classical antiquity.It is
not surprising, therefore,thatmostpoliticalscientists (and American
ones,particularly) shouldreactdefensively in thefaceof thisthreatto
thesubstantiality oftheirself-contained world.It is fareasier
intellectual
and morein keepingwiththenatureof theproblemas Voegelinhas
addressedit to makedogmatic assertionsaboutthemeaningof science
andtorelegate Voegelintothestatusofa "metaphysician" orworsethan
to tryto cometo gripswiththedirection of hisinquiry and itsresults.
Duringthe roughly twenty years(ca. 1950-1970) whenthe struggle
3. "The Originsof Scientism," Social Research15, no. 4 (Dec. 1948):462.

4. Voegelinoftenmakesthe distinction betweena genericunderstanding of sci-
ence as epistimi,whichis open to any questionpertinent to humanexperience,
and the appropriation of the term"science"by thosewho wishto limitthe ques-
tionswhichmay be legitimately asked to those whichcan be respondedto by
the methodsof the sciencesof naturalphenomena.Perhapsthe earliestextended
discussionin the strictcontextof the social sciencesis in the introduction
to The
New Scienceof Politics,especiallypp. 3-13.
toPoliticalTheory
within thediscipline wasbetweenan aggressive behavioralist movement,

solidlyunitedunderthe positivist creed,and an amalgamof groups
(mostlyratherpassiveand generally aphilosophical) commonly desig-
natedby behavioralists as "traditionalists,"Voegelintendedto be as-
signedto thelattercategory bythebehavioralists, although thereis not
muchevidenceofhishavingmorethana proformaacceptance bymost
of thediffuse elements of traditionalism. In theirstandard workon the
profession, Somitand Tanenhaushave summedthe matterup most
appositely:"On the otherside of the ideologicalfence,therewas
Eric Voegelin'simpressive but less widelyread The New Scienceof
Politics."
5
Voegelin'sunderstanding of theory also tendsto differentiate himas
a politicalscientist
fromthosewhomight be considered morerepresen-
tativeof thestateof thediscipline in itscurrent self-conception(s). In
readingVoegelin'sbooksand essaysit does notseemto me to be pos-
sibletoabstract a firmlyfixedconceptofwhattheory is outofthetotality
of the inquiryin whichhe is engaged.For one thing,he is waryof
everything thatsmacksofa definitional fixture ofanyoftheexperiences
he examines. He usestheterms"theory," "theoretical," and "retheoreti-
zation"as familiar language symbols which connote neither a logically
coherent, butinadequately tested,explanation to be used as a frame-
workfordirecting experimental inquiry, nora synthesized explanation
of theresultsof empirical analysis,nor a unionof thesetwocognitive
functionstoforma paradigm accordingto whichscienceproceeds.Even
if theoryhas a guidingrolewithrespectto scienceand is also, in a
specialsense,thesumofthestateofaffirmed knowledge at a giventime,
it is muchmorethanthis.Although the term is not altogether satisfac-
tory,one mightsaythattheory, forVoegelin,is morea processthana
logicalconstruct abstractedfromthewholeexperiential activity which
producedit. A scientist is involvedwiththeoretical activity fromhis
confrontation withthefirst stimulus to inquiry, through theframing of
5. The Developmentof Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism
(Boston: Allynand Bacon,Inc., 1967), p. 188. AlthoughneitherVoegelinnor the
behavioralistswouldbe likelyto acceptthedesignation of theirworkas "ideolog-
ical," a good manyof the more vigorousproponentsof behavioralismhave ex-
hibitedsomeof thebehavioralcharacteristics of personsengagedin an ideological
cause. Voegelinhas had followers,to be sure,but he has continuedhis work (in-
cludingsome cogentdiscussionsof the natureof ideology) withoutpropagating
doctrineby meansof a claque organizedas a "movement." Neitherhis mode of
behaviornor his animadversions on ideologyhas preventedothersfromascribing
to him a wide rangeof ideologicalpositions,and most of theseascriptionsbla-
tantlycontradictone another.
WilliamC. Havard 37
thequestions whichhe seeksto answer, intothemethods appropriateto

theinquiry, andon to theframing ofthesymbols bywhichhe interprets
and communicates theexperiences whichbothdirectthisprocessand
are theobjectsofitsinvestigation.
Thisimplied unionofsubjectandobject,through whichthetheoretical
processmoves,however,pushesus beyondthe limitsof the present
argument andintothemoresubstantive problem whichVoegelindeline-
atesas man'sawareness ofbeinga participant in thestructural realityof
whichhe is a part.For themoment it is sufficient thatthe
to stipulate
structureof realityis suchthatman'sparticipation in it by wayof the
theoreticalactivityis never complete.Although constantobjectof
the
thesearchmaybe identified, knowledge is notaccessiblein finalform
tomanas subject-participant becauserealization ofthisaspiration would
transgress the limits of man which result from his beingpart the
of
natural world as wellas consubstantial withthedivinegroundof that
world.The condition ofman,then,is an essential sourceofhistheoreti-
cal activity,
as wellas a limiton theresults tobe achievedbytheory. Not
onlymaythe theoretical activitybe misdirected, but becauseit takes
place withinthefluxof history, itsachievements maybe misplacedor
lost over timeand have to be recovered by way of recollection and
retheoretization, whichinvolvesrecreating the experiencesthrough
whichthe theoretical attainments were realizedratherthan a mere
recovery of the symbols by means of whichtheywereexpressed. Real-
izationofthelimit-end ofthequestis as mucha factof thetheoretical
activityas anyof theotherlogicallyanalyzable, butpractically insep-
arable,components of the whole of this
activity.
Although theterm"theory" has notbeenclearlyor consistently de-
lineatedin the literature of Americanpoliticalscience,6a cursory
examination oftherecenttendency tomodify thenoun(oftenwithother
noun-adjectives) providessomeinsights intotheprevailing inclinations
towardsa scientific orthodoxy, an orthodoxy quiteat oddswithVoege-
lin'stheoreticalcontribution. The separation of"empirical" theoryfrom
"normative" theory,for instance,further illustrates the pointmade
earlierabouttheextentto whichthedominant trendhas been toward
the acceptanceof thenaturalsciencesas thedefinitive modelforthe
scienceofmanandsocietyand,beyondthis,theextent to whichmethod
6. For a reasonablysuccinctdiscussionof the confusingrange of meaning

ascribedto "politicaltheory,"cf., Neil A. McDonald and JamesN. Rosenau,
"PoliticalTheoryas AcademicField and IntellectualActivity,"
Journalof Politics
30, no. 2 (May 1968):311-344.
to PoliticalTheory
has come to displacetheoretical relevanceas the determinant of the

choiceof objectsto be studiedin thepursuit of a scienceof politics.I
do notwantto dwelltoolongon thissubject, butitshouldbe notedthat
the contextin which"empiricaltheory"usuallyappearsincludesthe
assumption (moreoftenimplicit thanexplicit)thatpoliticshas an objec-
ordered
tively structure analogoustotheorderofnature, whichhasbeen
successfullypenetrated bythemathematized natural sciences.
The further modification of"theory" intothestratified conceptions of
"explanatory" (the lower order) and "causal (the
theory" higher order)
impliesa progressive development, theculmination ofwhichis a predic-
tivescienceof politics.Althoughdisappointment has been expressed
fromtimeto timeabouttheslownesswithwhichthemassiveenterprise
thatAmericanpoliticalsciencehas becomein recentyearsis moving
towardthisperceived goal,littleevidencecan be adducedto showthat
theproponents haveseriously addressed thequestion ofwhata definitive
on
knowledgeof politicspredicated such foundations would imply.
Would a technology of manipulative controlover man and society
emergefromsuch a completedtheoretical pursuit?And would the
results
ofthatpotential dominance overthescientifically revealedstruc-
tureofmanand societyproducea utopiaor a nightmare? Thusfar,the
failureof a scienceof politicsmodeledon thenaturalsciencesto pro-
duce evenan explanatory theory, let alone a causal one, has led (at
leastwithin thediscipline)to littlemorethanthesuggestion that,in the
of
period waiting for the Godot of the
grandtheory, profession should
concentrate on "middle-range" theory. Apparently such a pursuit would
insurea continuation of thepositivist mode, and perpetuate a concern
withproblems whichdo notdisturb eitherthepolitical"system" within
whichthetheoretical activity takes place or the kind of theorywhich
makes no effort to cope with as
politics part of the full rangeofhuman
experience.
FromtheappearanceofTheNewScienceofPoliticsonwardsVoege-
linhasbeenengagedin a theoretical effort at itshighest level.Thateffort
has involvedtwotightly interrelated activities: First,he has offered a
devastating criticism ofpoliticalscienceas ithas virtually destroyed our
graspof politicalreality through thepositivist reduction. In thecourse
of thiscriticism he has also demonstrated how positivism openedthe
wayforimmanentist ideologiesto replacea scienceofmanand society
based on ontology. Second,he has producedan increasingly complex
and authoritative articulation of whatis involvedin therestoration of
thetheoretical content ofa scienceofpoliticsthatexplores therealityof
politicsfromthe perspective of the generality of humanexperience.
WilliamC. Havard 39
GregorSebba has characterized in theoretical

Voegelin'sparticipation
in
activity theseterms:7
The question:Whatis politicalscience?is beinganswered anew
out of a radicalreconsideration of thequestion:Whatis political
reality,and what cognitiveavenueslead to its criticalunder-
standing?
Two factorshave so farstoodin theway of recognizing this
extremely rapiddevelopment of new theory, quiteapartfromits
newness.The firstfactoris that,in contrast to behavioralsocial
science,it is nottheresultof manytheoretical and technological
researchadvancesinitiated by a numberof social scientists and
continued by a hostof workers backedby enormous institutional
support;it is theworkof one independent thinker, Eric Voegelin,
whopublished hisfirstbookfourdecadesago,launchedhismajor
enterprise a dozenyearsago and is stillforging ahead at a pace
whichleaveshisbestreadersbehind....
The secondfactoris of coursetheenormous demandwhichthe
newdevelopment makesuponthenewcomer to suchstudies.To
gainan adequateunderstanding-not evena criticalone-he must
be ableto followsomeofthemostabstract philosophical reasoning
foundtoday,he musthavea thorough knowledge ofthehistory of
thought, philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, religion and the-
ology,ofpolitical theory, andofpolitical historyfromtheSumerians
to thepresent;he mustknowthepresentstateof scholarship in
fieldslike anthropology, biblicalcriticism,
comparative literature,
psychology-the listis by no meanscomplete. All thisis veryfar
fromthe concernsof thepracticing politicalscientist today.
Thissummation providesmorethana briefassessment of theextent
oftheseparation between Voegelin'snewscienceofpoliticsandthenew
scienceof behavioralist politicswhichis stillin theascendency in the
profession;it also suggests someof thedifficulties of attempting evena
simpleexegesisof Voegelin'swork,let alone trying to drawon his
achievement to providea sustaining core of theoryaroundwhichan
culturedevotedto epistimipolitikemightbe developed.
intellectual
Some of theseproblemsof interpretation and potentialextrapolation
can be understood onlyin the lightof the interplay betweencertain
biographical events and the chronologicaldevelopment of topicalcon-
7. "The PresentState of Political Theory,"Polity 1, no. 2 (Winter 1968):

263-264.
to PoliticalTheory
cernsin Voegelin'swork.Obviously an analysisof thistypecannotbe

attemptedhere,but at leasta cursory ofsomeofthefeatures
exposition
and writing
of hisscholarship may furnisha usefulbackgroundagainst
whichthesubstance ofthistheoretical maybe madea little
contribution
clearer.
II.
The unityofVoegelin'sworkis notto be foundin an emphasison his-
toricalchronology, a particularobjectofstudy(whether itbe an histori-
cal unitofsocialor politicalorganization or themeaning of an abstract
concept in its concrete manifestations),or a focuson anyone method
appropriate to an understanding of man's experience politics.The
with
constancy of the search is, course, mostobviousfeatureof his
of the
bios theoretikos, and one mightsay thattheevocativepull exertedby
the literalphilosophiais the undoubtedmotivation behindthe total
dedication to scholarship he has demonstrated both in his teachingand
hisvoluminous andcomplexresearch Butthisis a personal
productivity.
qualitythatdoes notnecessarily culminate in theoreticalcoherenceon
a scale worthy of beingdesignated a science.One can pointto other
scholarswhoworkedtirelessly to producereamsofbooksand articles,
someofwhichhavebecomeminorclassicson specialsubjects, butwhose
cumulative resultsdo notseemto be informed by anyprinciples that
wouldenablethemto lay claimto beinga theoretical achievement on
thislevel.8
Throughout Voegelin'swork,one can detectthepersistence of the
questionsdesigned to establishtheoretical the
relevance, abiding nature
of thegeneraltopicsone has to elucidatein thecourseof theinquiry,
and the way in whichmethodsemergefromand are appliedto the
8. WalterLippmannaffordsan examplewhichis almosttoo easy and not, as

some academicpoliticalscientists wouldhave it,becausehe was justa "journalist"
(althoughthepressureof keepingabreastof, and writingabout,publicaffairson
a day to day basis may have playeda part in limitinghis potentialas a political
theorist).Even whenLippmann'sbooks attractedthe attention of seriousstudents
of internationalpolitics,publicopinion,and politicalphilosophyby reasonof his
obviousanalyticalcraftsmanship, he neverreachedthepointof breakingthrough
to the unifyingrealitybehindhis insightsintoparticularproblems.Not only did
he move throughseveralvarietiesof ideology(most of themwithinthe general
framework of liberalism)withoutgoingmuch beyondthe treatment of each set
of problemsas sequentialcorrectives of each other,but even when his critical
facultieswere at theirbest and he perceivedthat fundamental gaps existedin
"thepublicphilosophy," than
he saw rathermoreof the resultsof thedeficiencies
whatkindof theoretical inquirywouldbe neededto understand and correctthem.
WilliamC. Havard 41
problemsthusidentified. Becausetheseconstants do not alwaysstand

in thesamerelation to one anotherwithin thevariouspartsofthework,
and becausetheconstants themselves are alwaysbeingsharpened and
extendedin relationto theirparticular applications to the historical
materials on whichhe worksat a giventime,Voegelinappearsto some
who have not read himcarefully to rangeover an impossibly large
sourcematerial whichhe interprets almostcapriciously on thebasisof
abstractconceptions whichhavelittleconcrete meaning. On thecontrary,
the workis cumulative in a dual sense: each new subjectaddressed
expandsthe scope of the empirical inquiry(usuallyin termsbothof
historicalextension and thevarietyof symbolic formsexamined)and
simultaneously displays a refinement of the largertheoretical context
withinwhichtheparticular problemis set.Criticalanalysisis thusguided
by thestateof theorypreviously developed,evenwhilethe expanded
rangeof criticism is extending,sharpening, and reinforcing thegeneral
theory a
on which scienceof politicsis predicated. As DanteGermino
has noted:"To Voegelinpoliticalscienceand politicaltheoryare in-
separately boundtogether." 9
The pointcan be illustrated bya briefoverview oftheorderin which
theworkhasunfolded. In thiscontextitis worth noting thattheinternal
patterns of Voegelin'stheoreticaldevelopment closelyparallelsomeof
thepreconditions and subsequent developments in hisgeneralinterpre-
tationofthewayinwhicha scienceoforderhas emerged undervarious
historicalcircumstances.
In The New Science of Politics,wherehe first
explainsat somelengththenatureof his generalquest,he pointsout
thattheexpansion ofpoliticalsciencetoitsfullgrandeur "as thescience
of humanexistence in societyand history,
as wellas theprinciples of
orderingeneral, hasbeentypical forthegreatepochsofa revolutionary
and criticalnature."10At thatpointhe identifies threegreatepochal
in
crises Westernhistory, each marked by the production of a major
theoretical
development: the foundation of politicalscienceby Plato
and Aristotlein theHelleniccrisis,St. Augustine'sCivitasDei in the
crisisofRomeand Christianty, and Hegel'sphilosophy oflaw and his-
toryin "thefirst
majorearthquake oftheWestern crisis."11In between,
minorepochsoccurredand secondary tookplace,forex-
restorations
ample,Bodininthesixteenth century.
This conception of thestimulus to a theoretical
scienceof orderin
9. BeyondIdeology:The Revival of PoliticalTheory(New York: Harper and

Row, 1967), p. 163.
10. The New Scienceof Politics,p. 2.
11.Ibid.
toPoliticalTheory
manand society, or therestoration of theprinciples of sucha science,

outof a crisisin theexistentialorderofmanand societyis a constant,
butitsapplication, so to speak,changesin thecontext of theunfolding
analysisof a largerand largerfieldof empiricalhistorical materials.
Amongotherexamples thatmight be cited,twoseemtometo standout.
In hislatertreatment ofHegel,12Voegelinhad movedso farawayfrom
theepochaltheme(whichimplieshistorical regularity in theresponsive
relationof scienceto crisis)and had developedhisowncriticaltheory
to suchan extent(through further studiesof pre-Socratic philosophy,
Gnosticism, and theseventeenth century neo-Platonists, amongothers)
thathe was able to discernin Hegel'sresponseto thecrisisofWestern
modernity as manifested in theFrenchRevolution a perversion of the
of
orderingsymbols philosophy in the form of an egophanicrevolt
againstreality,which was less a restoration of a science of orderthan
a symptom of how deep theWestern crisisof orderhad become.On
theotherhand,theconception is givennew contentand vigorwhen
Voegelinappliesitonceagainin hisremarkably compactanalysisofthe
classicalexperience of reason,wherehe is not dealingwiththe 'idea'
or a nominalist of reasonbutwiththeprocessin realityin
'definition'
whichconcrete humanbeings,the'loversof wisdom,'thephilosophers
as theystyledthemselves, wereengagedin an act of resistance against
thepersonaland socialdisorder oftheirage."13 Once againwe see the
conceptin application in a fullerdimension thanever,following thein-
tervening work on the Polis,Plato and Aristotle, and the elaboration of
a philosophy ofconsciousness inAnamnesis. Herewe havetheoriginat-
ing influence of personaland societaldisordercloselyrelatedto the
penetration through thesymbols to theexperience ofreasonas thesub-
stanceandsourceofunderstanding ofreality, andtheboldinterpretation
of thephilosophers as beingin revoltagainstthedisorder of theirage
as thestartingpointfortheirdiscovery ofreason.
Voegelin'sawarenessof thedisorders of theage as theymanifested
themselves in theideologies of thetwentieth century, and thewarsand
revolutions intowhichmassmovements based on these ideologiesde-
bouched,was also thepointof departure forhis searchfora science
thatmightexplainnot onlyhow suchdisordercame about,but also
whatsourcesone mightdrawon fora restoration of order.As a stu-
dentin Viennain the early1920's he was apparently fairlywell ad-
justedto the"climateofopinion"ofthetimeandplace.For a timethe
12."On Hegel-A Study in Sorcery,"StudiumGenerale 24 (1971):335-368.

13."Reason: The Classic Experience,"The SouthernReview 10, no. 2 (Spring
1974):237.
WilliamC. Havard 43
neo-Kantian positivistcircleinfluenced him,especially sincehe was an

assistantto Professor Hans Kelsen.But otherexperiences, too com-
plexto go intohere,pushedhimin newdirections whichled eventually
to thestudyoforderandhistory. The processwas in closekeepingwith
hissuggestion thatsciencestartsfroman assessment oftheconcrete po-
liticaleventsin the immediate range of one's experience. The value
neutrality of thepurescienceof law (and of Max Weber)was no de-
fenseagainsttheinsurgency of ideologies, so Voegelinincreasingly be-
cameinterested in politicalideasas manifestations of ideology.
The booksand monographs ofthe1930's-on theraceidea,theau-
thoritarian and
state, politicalreligions-were partoftheeffort to come
to gripswiththeseproblems. His subsequent assessment oftheseworks
followsthepattern ofhisretrospection at anygiventimeon almostany
of hisearlierwork:theywereall rightas specialstudies,butwerenot
sufficientlywell-informed bysometheoretical principle or principlesre-
vealedthrough laterworkto be morethantentative. The studyof the
authoritarian state,forexample, whichwashisfirst attempt to penetrate
theroleof contemporary ideologies, rightand left,was written before
had
Voegelin fully analyzed the distortion of language characteristicof
ideologies. The term "authoritarian" itself is too closely relatedto ideo-
logicalwaysofcharacterizing regimes to serveas an adequatetheoretical
for
category examining theeffortof a stateto assertitsauthority against
ideological movements bent on imposing themselves by usingconstitu-
tionalarrangements whichtheythendestroy.Similarly, the studyof
politicalreligions reliedon a literature which treated ideologiesas a
of a
secularvariety re&igions,usage which tended to distorttheexperi-
encesbymixing themup withproblems dogmaof and doctrine,and by
lumping together a number ofphenomena whichshould have been dif-
ferentiated morefully forcomparative purposes.14
The interplay oftherisinginterest in thehistory ofpoliticalideas,the
broadening ofcontacts withtheintellectual worldbeyondVienna(espe-
ciallythetimespentin theUnitedStates,England,and Franceundera
Laura SpelmanRockefeller grantin the 1920's), and the courseof
political events in Austria in the early1930's led Voegelinintothe
of
study Christianity and classicalantiquity. Shortly afterhis moveto
Americain 1938 he startedto workon a history of Westernpolitical
ideas;at first theprojectwas conceivedas a textbook, butthescopeof
14."Autobiographical Notes,"pp. 41, 50-55. A slightlymore extendeddiscus-
sion of therelationof The Authoritarian State (1936) to boththe 1921 Austrian
Constitution(Kelsen was the principaldraftsman)and the Dollfusscorporative
of 1934 is to be foundin "The ChangingPatternof Voegelin'sConcep-
constitution
tionof Historyand Consciousness," pp. 56-57.
to PoliticalTheory
the materialssoon outranthatobjective.The history was written in

largepartby the late 1940's, and it coveredthetypicalperiodfromthe
Hellenicoriginsuntilwellintothenineteenth century. The theoretical
focuswhichemerged in thisworkwas theconcentration on Christianity
and classicalphilosophy as the experiential substanceout of which
Western civilizationemerged, and whichconstituted thesourcesof or-
derforWestern manand society.The criticalstandards againstwhich
theideasofmajorfigures in Western thought wereexamined was Voe-
gelin'sexegesisof Plato and Aristotle and themajorsourcesthrough
whichtheChristian experience was interpreted. If one appliesone of
Voegelin'scategories from another the
context, understanding ofChris-
tianityand classicalphilosophy which he was to differentiate more fully
in thelaterworkswas alreadytherein compactform(and was actually
in theprocessof differentiation in thevariousrevisions of thehistory).
By the late 1940's Voegelinwas uncertain about the futurecourseof
thehistory. As usual,he feltcompelledto pushhis inquiriesfarbe-
yondtheboundaries setby theprojectas originally conceived,and as
alteredfromtextbook to multivolume interpretation of thepatterns in
thehistory ofWestern Civilization as revealedbywayofpoliticalideas.
The studiesof bothChristianity and theclassicsrequiredfurther con-
sideration of thedeeperhistorical background of theirorigins, so the
Hebraicstudiesand theexploration ofthehistorical sourceson thean-
cientNearEasternempireswerebegun.In thecourseof theworkon
Schelling,Voegelinalso beganto questiontheconception ofa history of
ideasas a meansofelucidating politicalreality. If I read him correctly,
Voegelinbeganat thispointto see the necessity forgetting beyond
"ideas"to thesymbols through whichsocietiesexpressed theirmeanings
forexistence in history, andthento penetrate thesymbolizations in or-
der to understand theexperiences of realitythatthe symbolsexpress.
The problems oftherelations ofideasto symbols and ofsymbols to ex-
perienceis an extremely difficultone whichcannotbe discussedin any
detailhere,so forthemoment it is sufficient
to leaveit thatthepercep-
tionof thisproblem, together withtheexpansionof thehistorical per-
spectiveto othercivilizations, led to theabandonment of thehistory of
ideasas a method
political ofgrasping political
reality.15
15.Althoughmaterialsdevelopedfromthe historyhave been workedinto The

New Science of Politics; Wissenschaft,Politik und Gnosis (Miinchen: Kisel-
Verlag, 1959); Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik (Miinchen:
R. Piperand Co. Verlag,1966); and Orderand History(Baton Rouge: Louisiana
StateUniversity
Press,Vol. I, 1956; Vols. II and III, 1957; Vol. Iv, 1974), Voegelin
refusedseparatepublicationof the historyof Westernideas, in whole or in part,
until the appearance of From Enlightenmentto Revolution, edited by John H.
WilliamC. Havard 45
The invitation
to givetheWalgreenLecturesin Chicagoin 1951 of-
feredthe opportunityto formulate
some of the theoretical
principles
thathad emergedfromthehistoricalstudieswhichhad resultedin his
placingthehistory
ofideasin abeyance.The lectures
werepublished as
The New Science of Politics,and the book is in many respectsan at-
tenuated versionofthetheory thathas beenunfolded in thesubsequent
twenty-fiveyears. I do not wishto summarize the book at thispoint,but
rather to place it in thecontextof thetheoretical development. By this
timeVoegelinhad gonefarbeyondtheorigins of thesearchin thedis-
ordersof hisowntimeand was expressing in cryptic formthewaysin
whichWestern had
society symbolized itsexistence in history, howthose
symbols had differentiatedovertime,and how the symbols which most
closelyapproximated had
reality been deformed to the of
point produc-
ingthepresent crisisoforder.Once againitis possibleto see themajor
conceptions in earlystagesof elucidation relativeto thelaterexplora-
tions.Included(amonga hostoflesserthemes)aretheforms of repre-
sentational symbols embodiedin thecosmological myths of theearliest
civilizations,the representational symbolization of transcendence
through Greekphilosophy, revelationin Israel,and the soteriological
truthofChristianity. All ofthesesubjectswereto be exploredin detail
and undermorecompletely workedouttheoretical principles in Order
and History.
Perhapsof mostimportance in thisparticular
volumewas theexam-
inationof Gnosticism
as the particularsourceof explanation
forthe
conversionof theChristian
symbols of transcendent into
reality imma-
Hallowell (Durham,NorthCarolina: Duke University Press,1975), whichselec-

tivelycoverstheperiodfromVoltairethroughMarx.I thinkthatProfessorVoege-
lin underestimatesthe importanceof the history,not only as a major factorin
leadinghim into more penetrating methodsof theoreticalinquiry,but also as a
sourcefor understanding his theoriesof man and societyand his philosophyof
history.The theoriesare embeddedin the historicalcriticism:even if "ideas" are
twiceremovedfromexperiencesof reality,the languagethroughwhichtheyare
expressedis a symbolicformwhichVoegelin analyzeswithgreatskill to dem-
onstratethe distortionof realityor, in some instances,the effectivenessof the
symbolization of realityembodiedin the expressionsof ideas. In the "Autobio-
graphicalNotes" he indicatesthe variationsin pointsof time at whichvarious
influencesmade theirinitial,if stillunformed,impactson his thinking; manyof
the fullydevelopedtheoriesare thusdiscerniblein theirincipient(and sometimes
more than incipient)stages in the history,which itselfhas undergonemany
revisions.ElsewhereI have argued that the best approachto Voegelin by the
neophyte is throughFrom Enlightenmentto Revolution. See my essay, "Voegelin's
Diagnosisof theWesternCrisis,"The DenverQuarterly10,no. 3 (Autumn1975):
133-134.
toPoliticalTheory
nentist whicharedistortions
interpretations andsourcesofdis-
ofreality
order. In The New Science of Politics,Voegelin discusses the way in
whichGnosticism developedduringthecourseof the struggles which
attended thedeclineoftheancientworldand theemergence ofthenew
multi-ethnicecumenic empires,withChristianity emerging as dominant in
theWest.In viewof Christianity's symbolization of therealmsof ex-
istenceas beingdividedbetween theeternal, transcendent realmofGod
and thefinite, mundanerealmof man,withsalvationformanpossible
onlybeyondtheworld,thegnosticvisionof theworldas a place of
totalchaoswhichwasitselfto be transformed intoa worldofperfected,
durableorderby divineor humanintervention was, of course,in its
manifestation withinChristianity, heretical.As Voegelinindicates,
Gnosticism persists invariousforms through theentire courseoftheWest-
ernChristian era, but was generally contained until theerosionof the
meaning behind the Christian symbols permitted gnosticsymbols of re-
alityto takeovertherepresentational function amongthe nation-states
oftheWestern world.The resultis a steadyacceleration in theintensity
of therevoltagainstGod and manin theattempt to realizeone or an-
otherofthegnostic dreamworldsthathavebecomethenewversions of
reality.The pathhas been fromprogressivism through utopianism to
totalitarianism.
A problem ofinterpretation arisesherethatagainillustrates thediffi-
of
culty entering intoa serious discussion of Voegelin's theory withthe
general run of politicalscientists.Even some of his closest readershave
had difficultyperceiving in the application of the concept "Gnosticism"
to the analysisof thepoliticaldisorders of modernity anything more
thana usefulanalogicaltool(and an exceptionally looseoneat that)for
characterizing and categorizing historicalevents.16 It is difficultenough
to comprehend that the Christian (and classical philosophical)sym-
bolizationsof reality havebeensufficiently evocativeoftheexperiences
ofreality to be ableto touchtheconsciousness of so largea segment of
mankind as to formthebasisofreality order
fora civilizational persist-
ing through twomillenia.But the notionthatthatentirehistory was
acteduponby a persisting doctrinal conversion of thosesymbols(in-
cludingespecially thetrinitarian symbols of sacredhistory and eschato-
16.In his essay"Orderand History:The Breakingof theProgram,"The Denver

Quarterly10, no. 3 (Autumn1975): 122, JohnCorringtonsays that Professor
Altizeronce observedto him that "ProfessorVoegelin findseverything to be
Gnostic."Corrington thoughtat the timethatthe remarkwas defensive(in light
of Voegelin'scommentson "death of God" philosophyand theology),but he
admitsthathe sees some substancein it afterhavingread The EcumenicAge.
The problems,in otherwords,tendto enlargeas Voegelinmovesfromhistorical
studiestowardstheelucidationof "pure"theory.
WilliamC. Havard 47
logicalexpectation,bothof whichwereimmanentized) and thatthese

deformationsof realityevokedmassmovements thatconstantly threat-
ened,and eventually brokethrough, thewholestructure of societywas
not easy to assimilate,even for thosenot alreadylivingwithinthe
representational of one of the"second"realities.
interpretation For the
a sortof intellectual
latter,Voegelinis apparently anachronism whois
to
trying apply the outmoded internecinearguments of the Christian
MiddleAges to a modemsecular("scientific")worldin whichthey
haveno place.17
In a manner thatshouldnowbe familiar to all whohavefollowed his
intellectual
odyssey, Voegelinchose the occasion of his inaugurallec-
tureat Munich(1958) to elaboratethemeaningof Gnosticism in its
recentcontextand to illustrate an
by analysis of some major German
thinkers (Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche,and Heidegger)how theirgnostic
speculationsdifferfroma philosophy of politics.18In theintroductory
material explainsthatGnosticism
Voegelincarefully was notan arcane
17.In a reviewarticle,"The Scienceof Politics:New and Old," WorldPolitics

7 (1955):479-489, RobertDahl complainsthat"Voegelinreifiesendlessly"and
says thathe will followsuit (p. 486). The statement was made as a criticismof
Voegelin'sreference to thefactthatpre-Christian societiessymbolizedthemselves
as representativesof transcendenttruth(an antecedentof thelateranalysisof the
cosmologicalmythas a "compact"symbolof the undifferentiated conceptionof
the quadripartitestructureof man and society,God and the universe).The point
is thatVoegelinwas not reifying anything; everysocietyexistsas part of reality
by reasonof its symbolicinterpretation of what it is, and everybodywho deems
himselfa memberof thatsocietyparticipates to a greateror lesserdegreein the
experiencesbehindthe representative symbolsof the society'struthof existence.
Dahl offersso manyotherarguments in thereviewthatare characteristic of the
differencebetweenVoegelin'sconceptionsof scienceand theoryand thoseof the
orthodoxpoliticalscientiststhatthe entirediscussioncould be used as foilforan
analysisof the ways in whichcontemporary politicalsciencefails or refusesto
come to gripswithVoegelin'stheory.One is temptedto digressintoan analysisof
thispiece,but one or two self-evident examplesshouldsuffice:Dahl notesat one
point that one of threeparts of The New Science of Politics is "a historical
examinationof theriseof whatVoegelincalls Gnosticism"(italicssupplied).And
he concludesthereview,withoutpayingeven passingregardto Voegelin'sdiscus-
sion of the post-Cartesianreductionof the meaningof science,by demonstrating
how he participatesin thatreductionwhenhe says thatVoegelin"has not only
un-defined science;he has un-sciencedit" (p. 489). I do not mean to cap this
notewithan ad hominemargument whenI say thatthereviewis a good illustra-
tion of the appropriateness of Dahl's place (usually at the top) on lists of the
typereferred to at thebeginning of thisessay.
18.The lecturewas published,withan introduction on thenatureof gnosisand
an added sectionon 'Der Gottesmord"underthe titleWissenschaft, Politikund
Gnosis. A previouslypublishedessay on "Ersatz-Religion" was includedin the
Americanedition:Science,Politicsand Gnosticism(Chicago: HenryRegneryCo.,
1968).
48 Noteson Voegelin's to PoliticalTheory
Contributions
Christian heresywhichhe had chosenforanalytical convenience. He

pointsout that"The idea thatone of themaincurrents of European,
especially of German,thought is essentially gnosticsoundsstrangeto-
day,butthisis nota recentdiscovery. Untilabouta hundred yearsago
the factsof the matterwerewell known." 19 He goes on to cite the
earlierliterature, as wellas therevivalof interest in thesubjectin the
1930's as partof thegeneral(if notwidelyrecognized)revivalof the
historical sciencesoverthepastseveraldecades,whichhavecontributed
so muchto hisownwork.He also further identifies theproblemof the
recovery of science when he notes that,in America, thegnosticnature
ofersatzreligions was recognized by William James earlyin thetwenti-
ethcentury, and thatJamesalso knewthatHegel'sspeculation was the
culmination of moderngnosticism, buthis criticalopposition had little
effectbecausetodayintellectual movements ofthegnostic typedominate
thepublic scene in bothAmericaandEurope. "The attempts to cometo
gripswiththeproblems ofpersonalandsocialorderwhenitis disrupted
bygnosticisms.. . has notbeenverysuccessful becausethephilosophi-
cal knowledge thatwouldbe required forthepurposehas itselfbeende-
stroyed by theprevailing intellectual climate.The struggle againstthe
consequences of gnosticism is beingconducted in theverylanguageof
gnosticism." 20
The treatment ofGnosticism is richin meaning, notonlyin itself, but
foritselucidation ofthemannerin whichVoegelin'sachievements as a
theorist are realized.Severalitemsdeservemention, if onlyin passing.
First, it is obvious that the participants in the intellectualculturein
whichhe worksare historians, philosophers, theologians, anthropolo-
gists,and others,and not"socialscientists." His mastery of thelitera-
ture,primary and secondary, is extraordinary, notonlyforitsbreadth,
butforhis controlof it. Second, his own objectionsto "positions" as
starting pointsforspeculations in
thatculminate closed"systems" which
resolvebyexclusion all problems thatdo notfitintotheinternally self-
sustaining "model"of reality are amplyborneout by his example:he
notonlyrespondsto questionsraisedaboutthelacunain hispresenta-
tions(including thoserecognized through his self-criticism), buthe is
constantly makingthenewdepartures necessitated by theopennessof
science.21 Third,thequestionofVoegelin'slanguage, muchcomplained
19.Science,Politicsand Gnosticism,p. 3.
20. Ibid., "Foreword,"p. vi.
21. See thepenultimate paragraphin ibid.,p. vii in whichhe refersto thestudy
of moderngnosticismas "inevitablywork in progress,"in the presentstate of
science,and thengoes on to pointout his own extensionof the studyinto the
subjectof alienation.
WilliamC. Havard 49
aboutbythosewhowishto depicthimas an obscurantist, and a source

ofdifficultyat timesevenforthosewhohavescrupulously attemptedto
comprehend him,22 is clarifiedbothby implication and by dire,:trefer-
ence.Here and in subsequent workit is madeplainthathe is notin-
venting a technical languageof his own,butis seekingto recoverthe
precisemeanings ofthelanguageappropriate to philosophical discourse.
The purposeis dual: to circumvent misinterpretationbynotielyingon
a languagethathas beencorrupted by thedeculturation of our times,
and to assure(through textualand contextual accuracy)thatmoreof
thenuances,let alonethebroaderexpressions, of thephilosophers are
not lost in the interpretations. Again, the criticaland reconstructive
effortsgo forward together.Increasingly, Voegelinhas indulgedthose
who have followedhimopen-mindedly, and implicitly answeredthose
whohaveregarded hislanguageas whollycontrived,23 by carryingthe
Greek(or occasionally in
otherlanguage)terms parentheses alongside
theEnglishequivalent.
The NewScienceofPoliticswas a prefiguration ofthestudyof "The
orderof history [which]emergesfromthehistory of order."24 Order
andHistory, ina manner similartothehistory ofideas,hasgonethrough
a metamorphosis whichis stillin process.It was originally plannedas a
sixvolumeworkranging overthecivilizations oftheancientNearEast
through theHelleniccivilization, intothemulticivilization empiressince
Alexander, theChristian empire in theWest, the Protestant centuries,
theemergence of themodernnationalstates,and thedevelopment of
Gnosisas thesymbolic formof order.The first threevolumes-Israel
and Revelation, The Worldof thePolis,and Platoand Aristotle-ap-
peared in 1956 and 1957. Pursuing theobjectof identifying fromhis-
toricalsources the ways in which thevarious societiessymbolized the
meanings oftheirexistence, whichincluded thequarternarian community
ofbeing(God andman,worldand society),Voegelinfoundtheearliest
societiesexpressing theirmeaningsthrough the cosmological mythin
22. Much of thecommentary on Voegelinwhichaims at broadeningthegeneral
basis of understanding of what he is about tendsto trackhis terminology(and
sometimeseven his syntaxand idiomaticusage) so closelythatits interpretative
value is depreciated.This tendencyis understandable, however,in lightof his
frequently repeatedstrictures on the debased uses to which"languagesymbols"
may be put, and the steadilyenlargingvocabularywhich his philologicalskill
bringsintohiswritings as he enlargesthescopeof hisinquiry.
23. See Dahl, "The Science of Politics,"p. 484 for a preciseexampleof this
mode of criticism.
24. This is thefirstsentencein theprefacewithwhichVoegelinopenstheinitial
volume of Order and History: Israel and Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
Press,1956), p. ix.
State University
50 Noteson Voegelin's
Contributions
to PoliticalTheory
whichtheelements of thecommunity of beingwerenotdifferentiated.

The major"leapsin being"through whichconsciousness of theexperi-
of
ence existence foundsymbolic expressionwererevelation in Israel,
philosophyin Hellas,and thesoteriological The
truthof Christianity.25
first
threevolumesofOrderandHistory analyze,withtheusualmastery
of historical
materialcombinedwiththeoretical rigor,the varietiesof
mythic symbols,the crisesthatevokedthenoeticexperiences of the
andtherevelatory
philosophers, experiencesofMosesandtheprophets,
andthewaysinwhichtheexperiences ofparticipationinthestructureof
being affected
theorder of thecivilizations
underconsideration.It was
anticipatedthatthe courseof Westerncivilization wouldbe pursued
downtothepresent inthefinalthreevolumes.
Eighteenyearselapsedbetween thepublicationofVolumesIII and Iv
of Orderand History.In theintroduction
to The EcumenicAge Voegelin
explainsthata "break"occurredin theprogram he had originally laid
out fortheprojectedsix volumework.As theworkproceeded"the
structuresthatemerged fromthehistorical ordersand theirsymboliza-
tion provedmorecomplicated than... [he] had anticipated." 26 The
principleofthestudy(thattheorderofhistory emergesfromthehistory
of order?)was notwrong, buttheexpansiveness oftheprojectcarried
it beyondtheoriginally established boundaries.The merequantity of
empiricalmaterialsresulting fromthecontinuing rapidadvancement of
sciences"wouldhavenecessitated
the"historical thatthethreeadditional
volumesbe expandedto atleastsix,andthefivetypesoforderandsym-
bolizationset forthat the beginning (the ancientNear East and the
cosmologicalmyth, Israel and the formofexistence
revelatory inhistory,
Hellasandthedevelopment ofphilosophy,themulticivilizational
empires
and theemergence of Christianity,and themodemnationalstateand
Gnosticism)were"regrettably limited."That situationwas awkward
enough;
Whatultimately broketheproject,however, was theimpossibility
ofaligning
theempirical in
types any timesequenceat all thatwould
permitthestructures actuallyfound to emergefroma history con-
25. This sentenceis a synthesizedstatementbased on prefatory commentsin

Israel and Revelationand sectionsof The New Science of Politics,especiallypp.
76-77. AlthoughI thinkit is adequateforthe stageof the worknow beingcon-
sidered(ca. 1950-1960), laterpublishedwork,includingVolumeIV of Orderand
History-The EcumenicAge (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UniversityPress,
1974)--raises some questionsabout therelationbetweenthe noeticexperienceof
philosophyand thepneumaticexperiences thatare not completely
of Christianity
resolved.
26. The EcumenicAge, p. 2.
WilliamC. Havard 51
ceivedas a "course."The programas originally conceived,it is

true,was notall wrong.Therewereindeedtheepochaldifferen-
tiating the"leapsinbeing,"whichengendered
events, theconscious-
ness of a Beforeand Afterand, in theirrespectivesocieties,
motivated thesymbolism ofa historical
"course"thatwasmeaning-
fullystructuredbythe eventof the ofa new
leap. The experiences
insightintothetruthofexistence,
accompanied bytheconsciousness
of an eventas constituting
an epochin history,werereal enough.
... Still, the conceptionwas untenablebecause it had not taken
properaccountof theimportant linesof meaningin history that
didnotrunalonglinesoftime.27
Without complicating theissuesunnecessarily at thispoint,we might
refertersely to someoftheconsequences of thisbroadened perspective
on thehistoric order.For one thingVoegelindiscovers that,evenin the
cosmological civilizations,
historyis notconceived as simply cyclical,but
theverygenesisofthehistorical imagination involvesthe symbolization
of the existenceof the concretesocietyas originating in the infinity
whichprecededtime,andas continuing intofuture
indefinitely timeand
evenbeyondtime.Second,theappearancenotonly in theWest,butin
theFar East,ofecumenical civilizationsinvolvestheconsciousness, even
withintheconfines of nonuniversal concrete(tribaland ethnic?)soci-
eties,of theuniversality of mankind(we haveno historical experience
of a worldempire,onlytheconception and, apparently,complexand
repetitiveaspirations forsuchan order).Finally(butnotdefinitively),
the complications of the relationsbetweenthe symbolizations of the
experiences of order and the ways in which those symbols are drawn
upon for representationalpurposes in the societiesthemselves seem to
be muchgreater thanin theearlierwork.To takeonlyone example, the
movements to establishmulti-ethnic (ecumenic)geographic empiresby
27. Ibid. The commentsabout the epochal natureof the leap in beingare in-
triguing in the lightof some of the laterinterpretations.The Greekphilosophers,
for instance,not only developedphilosophyas a symbolicformto expressa
of experiencebeyondtheformof themyth,buttheywereconscious
differentiation
thatthis symbolization constituted a new epoch in history(the awarenessof a
break in linear time which would thenceforth establisha "Before and After"
conceptualization of history).In lightof some latersuggestionsabout the "equiv-
alence" of various symbolicformswithoutrespectto temporalsequences,one
wonderswhetherthe engendering experiencesare the same in the equivalencies,
and the effectiveness of the symbolizationsis the criticalelementin constituting
and sustainingthe concreteexistencesof societies.If so, the "leap in being" is
not so mucha differentiation of experienceas an advance in the communicative
expressionof the experience.
Contributions
conquest maybe described as risingoutofalmostpurepowerconsidera-

tions(libidodominandi)on thepartoftheconquering imperators, with
the ecumenical of
religions(and theirsymbolizations spiritual order)
beingconveniently at handtobe used,notas thesubstantial foundations
of order,butas palliatives forthedisorders of thesociety.The contin-
genciesin experience thatfollowfromthenatureand condition of man
makeeventhemostfullydifferentiated experiences of thenoeticand
pneumatic forms lessthancomplete(anyotherconstruction oftheprob-
lem wouldbe gnostic);the necessarily inadequatetranslation of the
experiences intocommunicative symbols involves stillfurther loss of
immediacy in the of
experience reality (vide St. Paul and the reception
ofthesymbolofeschatology in theformofexpectation ofthereturn of
Christwithinthe era of theliving);and the historical circumstances
attending thereception ofthesymbolizations makeforthepossibility of
concurrent perversion of the symbols, not to speak of the process of de-
formation overtime.
One otherconsideration thataffected theshiftin thestructure and
contextof Orderand History(althoughnot fully as discussed in the
"Introduction" to VolumeIv as thehistorical factors)was Voegelin's
intenseconcentration on thephilosophy ofconsciousness in theinterim
between thefirstthreevolumesand thelatestone.Thatshiftin interest
was manifested mostclearlyin thepublication of Anamnesis in 1966.
Although someof thediscretestudiesthatmakeup thisvolumeorig-
inatedin earlierperiodsofVoegelin'scareer,and he notesthathe was
interestedin thesubjectas farback as thenineteen-twenties, thecore
pieces (some previously published) were written or substantially modi-
fiedinthedecadepriortotheappearance ofthebook.28
Perhapsthe changein focusthatthisnew direction in Voegelin's
research brought to Order and History is most succinctly summarized in
thefollowing statement: "History is not a stream of human beings and
theiractionsin time,buttheprocessof man'sparticipation in a fluxof
divinepresencethathas eschatological direction. The enigmatic symbol-
ismofa 'history ofmankind,' thus,expresses man's understanding that
theseinsights,thoughthey arise from concrete events in the conscious-
ness of concretehumanbeingsare valid forall men."29The change
28. Althoughno Englishlanguageeditionof Anamnesisis available,two essays

whichconcentrate on the book are amongthe bettercommentaries on Voegelin
(the closingsectionof Germino'spiece excepted). These are Dante Germino,
"Eric Voegelin'sAnamnesis,"The SouthernReview7, no. 1, N.S. (Winter1971):
68-88; and Ellis Sandoz, "The Foundationsof Voegelin'sPoliticalTheory,"The
Political Reviewer 1 (Fall 1971):30-73.
29. The Ecumenic Age, p. 6.
WilliamC. Havard 53
seemsto implythatwhilethesearchforthehistory of ordercontinues

as partof man'sineluctable searchforthe meaningof existence, the
orderof history willnot emergefromthewelterof eventsof history.
Theremaybe concreteordersin history, butthereis no overallorder
beyondthediscernment oftheordersand disorders in thesoulsofmen
whichrecurrently manifest themselves in symbolsthrough whichthe
panoplyofpoliticalordersare moreorless fullyrepresented in theflux
ofhistory.
The contents of VolumeIv, as wellas thesuggested contents of the
projected fifth and final volume of Order and History, reflect this
changedemphasis. Like A namnesis thesevolumes are a series of discrete
examinations ofa tremendous rangeofproblems thatarelooselyunified
by theiroriginsin the experience of consciousness inman.The organiza-
tionalprinciplehaschangedfromonedirected as muchbytheperception
ofa "course"ofhistory as bytheconstancy oftheobjectofthequestfor
ontologicalmeaning,to one directedby the evocativeurgeto probe
deeperand deeperintotheexperiencing psychebehindthesymbols by
whichmanhas expressed his experiences of participation in thedivine
groundof being.Someof thepiecesin Volumeiv and thoseprojected
forVolumev are explorations of someof thebroadestconceptions of
experience(for example,historiogenesis, immortality, equivalences of
experience and symbolizations, theclassicalexperience of reason,etc.)
whileothersare explorations of theexperiences and waysin whichthe
experiences weresymbolized byrepresentative individuals (forexample,
St. Paul,Hegel,Schelling, Henry James, etc.). Although extracted from
history,and in some instances the of
taking experience history itselfas
a theme,thesestudiesare morenearlyapproachesto a puretheory of
being than they are to a study of order and history as such.
III.
Voegelin'scontributionto politicalsciencecannotbe understood, in my

view,without someinsight intotheprocessoutofwhichhistheoretical
attainments haveemerged, hencetheforegoing sketchysummary. Butit
is also obligatory, underthepresent
especially circumstances, thatsome
effort be madeto formulate thecontent of his theorya littlemoreco-
herently. One wayofengaging inso riskya ventureinso briefa compass
is by takinghis own criteriaof a theoryof politicsand assessingthe
extentto whichhe has metthem.In thisframework, threedispersed
statements seemto me to constitute the sum of whathe includesas
expectationsfrom"theory,"while keepingin mind my previouslyex-
pressed reservationsabout discoveringin him any "fixed"meaningof
54 Noteson Voegelin's toPoliticalTheory
Contributions
theterm.Oneoftherequisites forpolitical theory thatonefindsexplicitly

statedat numerous places in his works, impliedin others,
and is a fully
articulated philosophical anthropology, or conceptof the natureof
man.30A secondcriterion is established in theopeningsentence of The
New Scienceof Politics:"The existence of man in politicalsocietyis
historical
existence; anda theory ofpolitics, ifitpenetratestoprinciples,
mustat thesame timebe a theoryof history." 31 Finally,Voegelin's
foreword toAnamnesis beginsas follows:"Theproblems ofhumanorder
in societyand history originate in theorderof consciousness. The phi-
losophyof theconsciousness is therefore thecore of a philosophy of
politics."
32 A philosophical anthropology,theory history, a
a of and
of
philosophy consciousness, then,are essentialto a theory of politics.
An adumbration of Voegelin'sphilosophical anthropology is difficult
fortworeasons.The first is a problemof surfacesimplicity: I haveno
reasonto doubtthepossibility of extracting froma variorum treatment
ofVoegelin'scomments on thesubjecta fairly clearsetofpropositional
statements thatsummarize hisconceptofthenatureofman.Sucha sum-
marystartswiththe mostelementaldistinctions and movesto more
differentiatedconceptions of an ontology. RobertPennWarrenstated
whatcould be the openingproposition withdevastating succinctness
whenhe said thatman is a machinewithconsciousness. Although
consciousofthefiniteness ofhisexistence within theworld,manis also
consciousofparticipation inthestructure ofbeingofwhichhe is a part.
Humanexistence is besetbythetension oflivinginan "in-between" state
(thePlatonicmetaxy)inwhichtheconfinements oflifein theworldare
all toopresent(mortality, disorder, alienation, meaninglessness), butin
whichthereis also thepull towardtranscendental reality(the divine
ground) as thesource of the intimations of immortality, order,andcon-
with
substantiality being. The order of the individual soul is dependent
on theorientation towards thegroundofbeing,andtheorderofsociety
dependson itsanalogyto thestructure oforderin thesoulofthewell-
orderedman.The possibilities forman'sorientation towardstheground
ofbeingas a sourceoforderin hisownsoul (and thusofhisawareness
ofthepossibilityoforderin societyand history)is not,however, some-
30. Some of Voegelin'smostcogentpresentations are to be foundin his lesser

notedcriticalworks.For thatreason the followingexampleof his oftenstated
attachmentto theprincipleof a philosophicalanthropology
is takenfroma review
of Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism in The Review of Politics 15,
no. 1 (Jan. 1953):p. 68. "It is difficult
to categorizepoliticalphenomenaproperly
withouta welldevelopedphilosophical anthropology."
31. The New Science of Politics, p. 1.
32. Anamnesis, p. 7.
WilliamC. Havard 55
thingthatcan be made simplya matterof doctrinal prescription,or

dogmatized. It takesplace within theindividual consciousness, and the
processis one whichhas to be experienced by theindividual. Nonethe-
less,theprocessof attunement to thedivineorderhas beensymbolized
inwidelydifferentiated ways:inclassicalphilosophy through theconcept
of nous (thatis, reasonas thedifferentiating attributeof mankind and
theone through whichmansharesas a participant in being;theterms
"noetic"and"noesis"derivefrom"nous"),inSt.Augustine through the
dichotomy of the amor Dei and the amor sui, and in Bergsonthrough
thecontrast betweentheopeningof thesoul to transcendence and the
closureofthesoulagainstultimate reality.
Here thepropositional statement mustend,becausewe are already
the
beyond point of the surface simplicity of a description, and intothe
for the
necessity penetrating symbols in the effort
to reconstitute the
experiences themselves. in
The seconddifficultysummarizing Voegelin's
philosophical anthropology arisesout of thistransition froma descrip-
tionthatis moreor less familiar to us fromdoctrinal sourcesin meta-
physicsand religionto Voegelin'sphilosophical reconstruction of the
experiences ofconsciousness, especially as theyweresymbolized through
the originsof philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. In twolong essays,
"Was ist PolitischeRealitit?" 3 and "Reason: The Classic Experi-
ence,"34Voegelinextendsthecontent ofphilosophical anthropology to
thepointofmaking itvirtuallyonewithhisphilosophy ofconsciousness.
Although the essaysare long,theyare so compactthattheyvirtually
defysummary exegesis.Theymustbe readin theirentirety to realizethe
fullimport ofVoegelin'stheoretical reconstruction.The problemis fur-
thercompounded by thefactthat,although theyselectfromtheentire
corpusof classical philosophy, they arenot simply recapitulations ofkey
conceptsin Platoand Aristotle, butare philosophical reconstructions of
theexperience ofconsciousness initsnoeticmanifestations.
If thesekeyessayscannotbe summarized here,the rangeof their
contentsmaybe indicated without distortion: theycovertheoriginsof
philosophical inquiry in theeffort to separatephilosophy (love of wis-
dom) fromphilodoxy (love ofopinion),explorethewaysin whichthe
dialecticalargument proceeds,reconstruct the processby whichthe
noeticpotentialis exploredto its depthsand heights(withparticular
emphasis on thesearchforthedivinegroundandtheultimate luminosity
whichthenoeticconsciousness bringsto its ownonenesswithbeing),
and moveon intothe experience of orderin man'spsycheand the
33. In SouthernReview,10:283-354.
34.Anamnesis,pp. 237-264.
Contributions
articulationof thatorderthrough symbolswhichare representative of

thenoeticpotential sharedbymankind.
Someoftheimplications oftheseexplorations fora scienceofpolitics
willbe considered later.For nowit mustbe sufficient to mention one
or two.First,noteveryhumanbeingwilllivethenoeticlife,or be the
fullyorderedor maturemancharacterized by theAristotelian concept
ofthespoudaios,butthenoeticorderis opento all men,at leastto the
extentof thecapacityto be drawnto it whenperceived in others,and
thephilosopher, inparticular, willrepresentinhispersontheattainment
oftheorderofreality opento all men.The possibilities fortheorderof
societyarise out of these ordering in
potentials man. A further exten-
sionofthenoeticpotential at thepragmatic levelis to be foundin the
capacityof everymanfortheexerciseof commonsensein relationto
mostaspectsofbothprivateand publiclife.35 The ordering potential of
also
the noeticconsciousness provides the means of critically under-
standing thenatureofdisorder tothepointofpsychopathology. The way
inwhichthefoundations forcriticism ofthedisorder insociety aredevel-
opedthrough thegraspoftheclosureagainst thenoeticmeaning ofreason
inmanis alsoanalyzed intheessayonreason.Sinceexistence intension is
notabolishedby its discovery, noesishas educational,diagnostic, and
therapeuticfunctions.
Becauseofwhatseemsto me to be a changein focusfroma philoso-
phyofhistory as suchin theearlierworksto a philosophy ofconscious-
nessin relationto criticalhistorical eventsin thelaterones,notmuch
needbe saidhereaboutthetheory ofhistoryas partofVoegelin'sover-
all commitment. At a minimum itmaybe notedthathistory is thefieldin
whichthedramaofhumanity, the
involving quest for order in manand
society,takes place.The science ofman and society, is
then, necessarily
involvedwiththehistorical sciences.The materialsof empirical history
are thesourcesfromwhichsocietiesmaybe seento emergeoutof the
symbolizations of orderwhichconstitute theirself-interpretations, as
wellas thesourcesthrough whichthedisorders of man and society are
perceived.Furthermore, the leaps in beingthrough whichman has
hisconsciousness
differentiated ofrealityareeventsin history whichare
epochalin thesensethattheychangetheorderofhistory are
and recog-
nizedas beingepochalbythosewhosymbolize them.
A theoryofhistory is necessary alsobecausetheconception ofhistory
is partofman'sinterpretation ofhisorderof being;in theveryappre-
35. The part playedby the apprehensionof the philosophyof commonsense

of the ScottishSchool (especiallyThomas Reid) in Voegelin'stheoryis an inter-
estingproblemwhichcannotbe pursuedhere.
WilliamC. Havard 57
hensionofhistory manmakesit a partoftheself-interpretation ofman

in
andsociety theirexistential or
Buthistory, at leastthesymbols
reality.
whichincludehistory as partoftherepresentative
order,canalsobecome
partofthedisordering escapeintounreality. Gnosticism,forinstance,
is
characterized in partbyitsprojection of an apocalypticendof history.
All attempts to makehistory a closed conceptionare stigmatized
as
derailments fromreality Politikiepistime,
into"second"realities. then,
is a scienceofman,society, andhistory.
IV.
At theoutsetI indicated thatan assessment ofVoegelin'scontributions
as a politicaltheoristwouldnecessarily involvean assessment of the
science
political That
profession. judgment was made largelyon the basis
ofhisvirtually effort
single-handed (at least amongcontemporary politi-
cal scientists)
to developa scienceofpoliticsgrounded in theory which
is bothepistemologically
andmethodologically at oddswiththepositivist
orientation now dominantin the discipline.36 The question,then,is
whether or notVoegelinhas produceda sufficiently comprehensive and
cohesivetheoreticalfoundation on whichthosewhoaspireto be partof
an "intellectualculture"could buildcooperatively to extendand per-
petuatea scienceofpolitics.If so, whathas he providedin thistheory
thatmakesita moreeffective wayofunderstanding than
politicalreality
thealternative,andhowdoesone workfromit as a "paradigm"? These
questions can be addressedbyan appraisaloffouraspectsofVoegelin's
work:thegenerality ofhistheory, thatis, thecoherence of hisconcep-
tionofpoliticsas a constantin humanexistence, and therelation ofthe
to
politicalexperience experience as a whole; the effectiveness of his
criticismof otherconceptsof politicalreality as themeansof opening
thewayto understanding politicsthrough thereconstruction of politiki
the
epistimi; suitability of his formulation of theoreticalprinciples as a
36. This is not meantto implythatall practicing politicalscientists

are positiv-
ists.It is ratherto say thatmostof thosewho have self-consciously engagedin,
or lookedforwardto thepossibility of,theformulation of a comprehensive theory
of politicshave had positivist Othershave workedon politicalprob-
orientations.
lems in eclecticwayswithoutdisplayingmuchinterestin theoreticalissues.Ger-
mino has identified the principalfigureswho have made recentcontributions to
the revivalof politicaltheoryon a nonpositivist basis-particularlyOakeshott,
Arendt,Jouvenel,and Strauss,in additionto Voegelin--buthe seems to me to
have placed Voegelinin a uniquepositionin his book, not onlyin termsof space
devotedto him in comparisonwiththe others,but also in the greateremphasis
placed on the criticalworkof Oakeshott,et al., as contrastedwiththe focuson
Voegelin'stheoretical BeyondIdeology,especiallychap. 7 and 8.
constructiveness.
Contributions
guideto whatwe seekin a scienceofpolitics;and theissuesin Voege-

lin's theoretical conclusionsthat requirefurther clarification if the
theoreticalfoundations themselves are to be extended. Onceagain,only
thebriefest excursions intothesevastareasofinquiry arepossiblewithin
thelimitsofthisessay.
On theissueof thegenerality of his theory, thecentralpointto be
emphasized once againis thatVoegelinhas not attempted to explain
politicsas a special,or limitedform(in MichaelOakeshott's terms,a
"mode")ofexperience. A theory ofmanandsociety whichis notsolidly
relatedto an ontological theory cannotexplainanything morethanthe
of
ephemera politics, because politics arisesout of man's specialplace
in thechainofbeing,and thatplaceinvolvesman'sparticipation in the
structure of whichhe is a part.The sourceof thestructure of society,
like man'sown structure, is not a givenwhichone can comprehend
solely from an external perspective. The ontological understanding of
mancan takeplaceonlyfromwithin; itsappropriate methodof inquiry
involvesan examination of the experience of consciousness, and the
resultsare expressed through philosophical symbols. Since politicsis a
partofman'stemporal existence,manhimself is thecreativesourceof
hispoliticalexperience. To use Oakeshott's terminology again,politics
is a self-moved mannerof activity. But thenatureof thatself-moved
activitydependson whatmanis,notjustas a participant ofpolitics, but
whathe is as a participant in thetotality of existence. The orderof
societythatmanseeksto structure through politicsdependson theex-
perience of order he is capable realizing partoftheorderofbeing.
of as
Andthatorder,ofcourse,whilenotinfinitely opento man'scomprehen-
sionbecauseitssourceis thegroundof beingof whichmanis onlya
part(although a consubstantial partthrough participation in thenoetic
is
consciousness), sufficiently open to man to enable him to structure
theorderofhisbeingthrough reason(nous) as he explorestheorderof
consciousness through thetensiontowardtheground.The orderof so-
ciety,thendepends thesymbolization
on of theorderof beingas an
analogueof the man whose soul is in order. Althoughawarenessof
in
participation the order of being takes place onlyin individuals, and
in variouslevelsin different personsat that, reason is the universal
substance whichdifferentiates manin thestructure ofreality. The capa-
cityto symbolize theexperience in
of participation the order of reality
through philosophy affords a measurewhichmakesa universal science
ofpoliticspossible.At thesametimethelimitsofman'sexistence in the
worldas expressed bythePlatonicmetaxy meansthatthestatesoforder
in man and societyare in historicalflux,and the theoreticalactivity
whichseeksto comprehendthatorderis nevercomplete.
WilliamC. Havard 59
That we are not accustomed at presentto thinking in termsof an

ontological foundation ofpoliticsis partoftheproblem thatgivesriseto
Voegelin'scriticalachievement. Most of thedebateovera scienceof
politicstakesplace at thelevelof "politicalideas"and notat thelevel
of themeaningof politicsin the structure of noeticreality.Even the
relativelyundistorted symbols ofpoliticalreality whicharethemeansof
expressing theexistence ofa particular society inhistory tendto become
doctrinalized and dogmatized in a waythatdoes notevoketheexperi-
enceswhichconstitute theorderofreality whichthesocietyrepresents.
And wherethosesymbolshave been deformed in the serviceof an
ideology, the loss of realityis so complete as to constitute a crisisof
order.
Voegelin'scriticism started,as indicated, fromthecrisisofourtimes,
withits activistmovements having been generated through ideologies
(whichin his mostextendedcharacterization Voegelinrefersto as
revolutions againstman and God). It thenmovedback through the
history of ideas to theformsof symbolization, and fromthereto the
effortto reconstitutetheexperiences whichproduced thesymbolizations.
The vastbodyof criticism whichwas producedin thecourseof these
explorations is a mostvaluablesourceforapproaching thetheoretical
principles;butevenforthosewhodo nothavethephilosophical urge
to penetrate to theoreticalprinciples, it constitutesa of
body regulative
ideaswhichmayprevent morepragmatically oriented politicalscientists
frommakingsomeofthegrosser theoreticalerrorscommonto thepro-
fession.The clarityand comprehensiveness of thecriticism are impres-
sivein theirownright; furthermore, some of thebest of it can be found
in reviewsandjournalarticles whichhavenotbeenreprinted as partof
thelargerstudies.
One of thebestexamples(especiallybecauseit does not have the
coruscating effectof someof theattackson theGnosticdepredations)
is theessayon "TheOxfordPoliticalPhilosophers." 37 It willbe remem-
beredbyhisreadersthatVoegelinindicated in theclosingparagraph of
TheNewScienceofPoliticsthattheAmerican andEnglishdemocracies,
through theirinstitutions,mostsolidlyrepresented thetruth ofthesoul,
andwereatthesametimethestrongest powers, thusproviding somehope
for"repressing Gnosticcorruption and restoring theforcesof civiliza-
zation."38 But in the essayunderconsideration he was concernedto
pointouthowtheprevailing tradition ofpoliticalphilosophy in Oxford
fellshortofmeeting thetestsoftheoretical relevance. By takingBritish
37. The PhilosophicalQuarterly

3, no. 11 (April1953):97-114.
38. The New Scienceof Politics,p. 189.
60 Noteson Voegelin's
Contributions
to PoliticalTheory
institutions as themodelfora validgeneraltheory ofpoliticsthevarious

philosophers (withthesingleexception ofG. R. G. Mure) narrowed the
objectoftheory froma civilizational wholeto a particular nationalstate,
tendedto treatthevariouspoliticalmovements within thecontemporary
nationalstateas movements on thelevelofsecularpowerpolitics(which
theyarenot),andfailedto penetrate toprinciples becausetheyengaged
in debatesabouttherights ofmanandwhatinstitutions are bestinstead
of elucidating thelargerproblems of a philosophical anthropology. In
the
appraising specifics of the "theory" of several leadingfigures, Voege-
lin showshow each tendedin his own way to turnthe secularized
institutions ofBritain intoa civiltheology (without analyzing thesymbols
they lauded for establishing politicalorder in Britishhistory), and then
turnedtheprinciples on whichthisspecialset of politicalinstitutions
werebasedintotheprinciples of politicsas a whole.Here,as in all of
Voegelin'scriticism, the concretepresentation of the materialsunder
scrutiny is informed by the"aim,howeverdimlyseen,of developing a
[moreembracing] theory. ...." 39
The criticism of the Oxfordphilosophers, thoughpointed,is mild
becauseit represents theexamination of a stagein politicalsciencein
whichsomeofthesymbolic manifestations ofthepublicorderin Britain
are protected against erosion or deformation by elevatingtheminto
doctrine or dogma,whichin somewaysis to be commended. But it is
stilla digressive defenseas wellas an inadequate one;whatis neededin
thefaceof therevolutionary ideologicalthreats to theordering institu-
tionson whichtheOxfordphilosophers concentrate is a penetration to
theirsourcesin reality.
In moreextendedcriticism Voegelinanalyzesthewayin whichthe
secularcreedsadvancetheirdestructive work,movingfromthemilder
formsof progressivism and liberalism to utopiasbased on evermore
demonically closedsystems of thought, and on intothe revolutionary
movements ofnihilism, nationalsocialism, andcommunism, all ofwhich
have as theireventualpurposethetransformation of man and society
in thenameof an immanentist reality,ratherthanthepreservation of
an environment in whichmanwillhave theopportunity to live a life
attuned to theorderofreality.
The standards of criticism whichVoegelinexhibits in his ownwork
are sufficiently suppleto be used at almostanylevelof analysisfrom
simpleinstitutional description to themorecomplexabstractions em-
bodiedin ideas and symbols.The applicationto politicalscienceas
practiced byboththepositivists andtheOxfordphilosophers has already
p. 99.
39. "The OxfordPoliticalPhilosophers,"
WilliamC. Havard 61
beennoted,withspecialemphasison therespective waysin whichthey

limittheobjectsof inquiryand dogmatize certainsymbolsand ideas.
One can extrapolate bynotinghowVoegelin'scriticalanalysismightbe
extended to themovement within American politicalsciencewhichhas
latelychallenged behavioralism's claimto be the"new"politicalscience.
I refer,ofcourse,to theactivist movement whichis generally identified
withtheCaucusfora New PoliticalScience.In manyoftheircriticisms
of thediscipline(especiallyas it has beentending towardsbehavioral-
ism), the leadingspokesmen for the Caucus share a good manyper-
spectives with Voegelin: the argument, instance,againsta slavish
for
imitation ofthenaturalscienceson thegrounds thatthehumanexperi-
encesmostpertinent to politicsareexcludedbysucha commitment, and
theviewthatthevalueneutrality of behavioralism coversa rolethatis
strongly supportive ofthestatusquo. Voegelinmightalso findthecon-
sciousness ofthecrisisofliberalism amongsomemembers oftheCaucus
a potential stimulus to inquiry intotheloss of meaningin someof the
symbolsof theexisting politicalorder.But he wouldalso discernin a
number of thetendencies amongthosewhoclaimto be theproponents
ofthenewestinsurgency in politicalsciencelittlemorethana profusion
ofleftistideologyand a plea foractivism as a surrogate fortherestora-
tionof theory. In manywaysthelatestwave of thefuture withinthe
discipline is even more symptomatic of the crisisin both politicsand
politicalscience than the rather innocuous addiction of to
behavioralists
scientism.
The bodyof theoretical principles whichVoegelinhas been articu-
the
latingover pastquarter or
century moreincludes someofthesubjects
whichhavealreadybeentoucheduponbriefly. Includedamongtheseare
a philosophical anthropology thatdifferentiates manas a participant in
thestructure of existence in history and thesearchfortheexperiences
oforderin manoutofwhichthosesymbols wereproducedas themain
objectivesof inquiry, and the application of methodsdirectedby the
contentof the philosophical anthropology and the objectsof inquiry
(thesebeingmainlyan empirical examination of orderin history and
a philosophical probe into the order of consciousness).
At thispoint,however, it seemsusefulto stressonceagainthelimits
imposed on the effortsto restorea scienceof politicsthatis grounded
in such theoretical principles. These limits,too, shouldbe included
the
among principles themselves. The first is thelimitofknowledge that
is opento manby reasonof his "in-between" place in thestructureof
being. The consciousness of having to livewith the tensionsof existence
ratherthanbeing able completelyto overcomethemby an act of ego-
phanic revoltis the main defenseagainst the ideological and activist
Contributions
inclinationstowardsthedestruction oftheexistential order.The second

is the limiton the extentand durationof orderin concretesociety.
Societiesare non-noetic, eventhoughtheirrespective ordersdependon
thenoeticsymbolization of theirexistence. The noeticlifecan be lived
onlybyindividual humanbeings,and thismeansthata noeticresponse
to disorder is theonlypossibility forevokinga restoration of epistimi
politikeout of a crisisof social order.Since the orderof society
is not a self-correcting "system," but is the resultof the infusion of
orderthrough a symbolization the
involving noetically orderedman writ
large,theprinciples ofa scienceoforderin manand societywillnotbe
fixedforall time,butmustbe constantly in processof restoration
and
extension. Finally,and in a senseclosely to
related the of
constancy the
theoreticalactivity,the noetic lifeitself imposes limitson thepragmatic
politicalactivism of the theorist. It is the philosopher'sobligationto
engagein the theoretical activity, and to seek to bringthe resultsof
thatactivity to bearon theorderof societyby expressing themin open
debateon principles. Butthephilosopher's symbols of ordercannotbe
imposedby actionswhicheffectively reducethemto doctrines to be
exploited in thestruggles forexistential power.Persuasion, notthewill
to poweris theonlyeffective way of thephilosopher as seekerafter
truth.(Socratesis stillthesymbolic modelfortheobligations attaching
tothepersonengagedinthebiostheoretikos).
V.
In his ownbodyof generaltheoryand thecriticism whichled intoit,
has
Voegelin also set a limitless
virtually set of problems on whichto
Not of is
work. least these theproblem analyzing of his own theoretical
achievement. In largepartthispaperhas concentrated on theprocess
whichhastakenhimto thecurrent stateofhistheoretical generalizations
aboutpolitics.Since the perpetualopennessof the inquiryhas been
stressed itis timeto providea sampleofthetypeofquestions
so heavily,
growing outof histheoretical principlesthatstillneedto be addressed
by Voegelinor someoneelse working withinthe "paradigm"he has
established. Leavingaside the omnipresent questionsof internal con-
sistency, threeproblemsseemto me to requirefurther explorationor
further explanation fromVoegelinorfromsomepersonwhomayhavea
clearerreadingof himthanI have.Theseare: (1) thepossibility that
theintrospective method ofapprehending noesisinthefullest sensemay
resultin something thatis verynearsolipsism, (2) theopaquenessof
therelations betweenthedifferentiation of theexperience of orderand
theeffective symbolization of thatexperience as therepresentation of
WilliamC. Havard 63
themeaningof theconcretesociety'sexistence in history, and (3) the

problemof therelation betweenphilosophy and Christianity as sources
forthesymbols of orderby whichWestern civilization has represented
itstruth ofexistence in history.
As Voegelinmoveshistheoretical inquestfromsymbols to experience
as expressed through a philosophy ofconsciousness it seemsto me that
the inquiryfromwithinbecomesso nearlytotallysubjectivethatit
virtuallydefiesexpression, letaloneexpression in clearenoughsymbols
to permit thenoeticorderof thephilosopher to exertsufficient pullon
thenoeticpotential in nonphilosophers to be effective in bringing order
to society.Thispointis notraisedbecauseI findVoegelin'sexegesisof
theexperience ofreasonintheclassicalphilosophers inadequate. Indeed
it is a tourde force,althoughthe penetration to the divineground
through noeticconsciousness is described intermswhicharereminiscent
oftheineffableness ofmysticism. All ofus areawareoftheinadequacies
oflanguageandothersymbols forexpressing ourdeepestexperiences in
an evocativeway,evenifwe havenothad thetemerity to inform our
instructors in creative writing (as one student is reported to havedone)
thatwe had liveda poemso intensely thatwe couldnotwriteit.What
reallybothersme is thatin his latestworkVoegelinseemsto findso
manypossibilities fordistortions of the symbolsthroughwhichthe
experiences of order in the noetic consciousness are expressed thatthe
prospects for societal order on anything other than the most precarious
basisare verydimindeed.
The secondproblem,whichshouldbe capable of clarification by
empirical studyof theemergence or restoration of socialorderin con-
cretesocieties, is closelyrelatedto thefirst one. Thatis, iftheorderof
societyis non-noetic, butdependent on the noeticorderof manforits
realization, whatis therelation betweenthenoeticexperience of order
and thesymbolizations whichexpresstheorderof the society?If the
self-interpretations whichconstitute societyare notnoetic,yetpolitike
episteme is properly basedon a noeticinterpretation ofmanandsociety,
politicalscienceshouldstillbe able to tellus howthenon-noetic inter-
pretations represent an orderthatis at leasta doctrinalized or dogma-
tized versionof noeticorder.In particular, are religioussymbols
invariably involved in the symbolic self-interpretations of anysocietyas
thenon-noetic expression of thesociety's relation to thedivineground?
Posingthequestionin thiswayleadsimmediately to thethirdsample
issue.In the earlierworksVoegelinregularly stressedthatthe main
constitutive symbolsin theorderof Westerncivilization wereChristi-
anity and classical philosophy. Even in parts of The Ecumenic Age he
seemsto treatthe differentiation of consciousness through noetic
the
Contributions
andpneumatic experiences as beingon essentially thesamelevel.40 But

someofhisclosestreadershavebeenpuzzledby thewayin whichthe
concentration on thephilosophy ofconsciousness has beenaccompanied
by an apparentshiftof emphasisto philosophical symbolization as the
uniqueformforexpressing the orderof reality.41 The criticism also
containssome ratherdisturbing comments thatsuggestthatdoctrinal
and dogmaticconcernshave dominated the pneumatic symbolizations
fromtheirbeginnings, and evenSt. ThomasAquinaswas givena few
sharpraps as a non-noetic propositionalmetaphysician. Has noesis
its
through experience of the divine the
groundsuperseded pneumatic
experience of Christianityentirely? In thisinstance, at least,one might
wishthatVoegelinhad pursuedhis originally expressedintention of
examining "The Christian Centuries" as part of his study of order and
history.The studyof "The PaulineVisionof theResurrected" in The
EcumenicAge is hardlya theoretical counterpart of the philosophical
analysisof consciousness in Anamnesisand the essay on reasonin
classicalphilosophy.Mostof theshifts in thefocusofVoegelin'stheo-
reticalinterestsovertimecan be explainedin thetotalcontextof his
work;as yetthisone does notseemto me to be accountedfor.
Despitetheseand otherquestionswhichremainaboutvariousparts
ofVoegelin'smultifaceted exploration of politicalreality,it seemsclear
thathe hasopenedquestions thathavebeenneglected or evenprecluded
fromexamination in recentpoliticalscience,and thatthequestionsare
forthedevelopment
critical ofan adequatetheoretical basisforpolitical
science.Whether thisfoundation willbe builtuponby enoughpolitical
scientiststo makean impacton theorientation of thediscipline is, to
the
say least,problematic.
40. The EcumenicAge,especiallychap. 7, p. 327.
41. See, for example,GerhartNiemeyer,"Eric Voegelin'sPhilosophyand the
Drama of Mankind,"Modern Age 20 (1976):28-39. The problemhas been
addressedas a matterof intellectualcontrolin BruceDouglass,"The Gospel and
Journalof
PoliticalOrder: Eric Voegelinon the PoliticalRole of Christianity,"
Politics38, no. 1 (Feb. 1976): 25-45.

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Notes on Voegelin's Contributions to Political Theory

Author(s): William C. Havard

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Despitehisrejectionof thediscipline'scurrentepistemological and

carrytheday becausehe stooda place or twoahead of theotherin

Despite these apparent identifyingcharacteristics as a member of the

1. In a set of unpublished"AutobiographicalNotes," taped by Ellis Sandoz,

in theepistimipolitikiof theclassicalphilosophers, whereastheyun-

3. "The Originsof Scientism," Social Research15, no. 4 (Dec. 1948):462.

within thediscipline wasbetweenan aggressive behavioralist movement,

thequestions whichhe seeksto answer, intothemethods appropriateto

6. For a reasonablysuccinctdiscussionof the confusingrange of meaning

has come to displacetheoretical relevanceas the determinant of the

GregorSebba has characterized in theoretical

7. "The PresentState of Political Theory,"Polity 1, no. 2 (Winter 1968):

cernsin Voegelin'swork.Obviously an analysisof thistypecannotbe

8. WalterLippmannaffordsan examplewhichis almosttoo easy and not, as

problemsthusidentified. Becausetheseconstants do not alwaysstand

9. BeyondIdeology:The Revival of PoliticalTheory(New York: Harper and

manand society, or therestoration of theprinciples of sucha science,

12."On Hegel-A Study in Sorcery,"StudiumGenerale 24 (1971):335-368.

neo-Kantian positivistcircleinfluenced him,especially sincehe was an

the materialssoon outranthatobjective.The history was written in

15.Althoughmaterialsdevelopedfromthe historyhave been workedinto The

Hallowell (Durham,NorthCarolina: Duke University Press,1975), whichselec-

16.In his essay"Orderand History:The Breakingof theProgram,"The Denver

logicalexpectation,bothof whichwereimmanentized) and thatthese

17.In a reviewarticle,"The Scienceof Politics:New and Old," WorldPolitics

Christian heresywhichhe had chosenforanalytical convenience. He

aboutbythosewhowishto depicthimas an obscurantist, and a source

whichtheelements of thecommunity of beingwerenotdifferentiated.

25. This sentenceis a synthesizedstatementbased on prefatory commentsin

ceivedas a "course."The programas originally conceived,it is

conquest maybe described as risingoutofalmostpurepowerconsidera-

28. Althoughno Englishlanguageeditionof Anamnesisis available,two essays

seemsto implythatwhilethesearchforthehistory of ordercontinues

Voegelin'scontributionto politicalsciencecannotbe understood, in my

theterm.Oneoftherequisites forpolitical theory thatonefindsexplicitly

30. Some of Voegelin'smostcogentpresentations are to be foundin his lesser

thingthatcan be made simplya matterof doctrinal prescription,or

articulationof thatorderthrough symbolswhichare representative of

35. The part playedby the apprehensionof the philosophyof commonsense

hensionofhistory manmakesit a partoftheself-interpretation ofman

36. This is not meantto implythatall practicing politicalscientists

guideto whatwe seekin a scienceofpolitics;and theissuesin Voege-

That we are not accustomed at presentto thinking in termsof an

37. The PhilosophicalQuarterly

institutions as themodelfora validgeneraltheory ofpoliticsthevarious

beennoted,withspecialemphasison therespective waysin whichthey

inclinationstowardsthedestruction oftheexistential order.The second

themeaningof theconcretesociety'sexistence in history, and (3) the

andpneumatic experiences as beingon essentially thesamelevel.40 But

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