AU/ACSC/2006-04

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

CONFLICT OVER NILE WATERS

By

Rachid RHMIRO, Major, Royal Air Force of Morocco

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation

Requirements

Advisor: Mrs. Janet Beilstein

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 2006

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

 OVERVIEW

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Causes and Effects

I- Causes of water scarcity in the region
a- Climatic conditions
b- Population growth and development
c- Pollution and mismanagement
II- Effects of water scarcity in the region

a- Health risk

b- Food shortage

c- regional instability

Chapter 3: Nile conflict

I- Description
II- Past conflicts and their resolution
a- 1929 agreement
b- 1959 agreement
c- Actors and their political interactions after 1959
i. Egypt-Sudan
ii. Egypt-Ethiopia
d- Great Lakes states
e- Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
III- Present and potential conflicts

a- Aspects of cooperation

b- Factors of confrontation

Chapter 4: US involvement

Chapter 5: Conclusion

 Chapter 1

Introduction

Water is a vital resource for all aspects of human existence, environmental

survival, economic development, food security and even a good quality of life. Globally,

freshwater represents only 2.5% of all water available on Earth, and most of it exists in

rivers and lakes shared by one or more nation states.1 In 1998, the UN identified lack of

freshwater as one of the major problems facing humanity. It is increasingly becoming

not only a scarce resource but also one which is divided unequally between sovereign

states. Furthermore, given the increase in water use due to rapid population growth,

agricultural expansion, economic development and urbanization the situation is destined

to worsen in coming decades.

UNESCO estimates that by the year 2050 at least two billion people will suffer

from water scarcity.2 Already today’s water scarcity has reached alarming dimensions in

several regions of the African continent where water is becoming crucial for economic

development and societal well-being and yet is very scarce. The Nile river is a case in

point. In this specific case, disputes have already escalated and led to serious tensions

between upstream and downstream riparians.

The reasons for water crisis in the region are many, including global changes to

the environment, global warming and climate change, as well as regional problems

caused by growing population, urbanization, pollution, overexploitation and the

1
Kirby Alex, “Dawn of a thirsty century”, BBC News, June 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/755497.stm
2
BICC, “Natural resources, environmental degradation and conflict: A perspective from
peace and conflict research”, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),
http://www.bicc.de/tricc/background_paper.pdf

mismanagement of water. As a result, water scarcity in the region poses a serious threat

to both human security and the security of riparian states, especially those most affected.

This paper describes causes and effects of water scarcity in the Nile Basin,

showing how climate conditions, population growth, development, and pollution lead to

health risks, food shortage, and regional instability. However, the main focus of the

paper lies on Nile’s water crisis. It will start with a historical background to the conflict,

with emphasis on 1929 and 1959 agreements, and the political aspects of interaction

between basin countries, in particular Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The paper then

analyzes the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as an instrument of cooperation and defusion of

crisis. On the basis of these elements, the paper will identify some aspects of cooperation

that exist among Nile riparians, as well as some factors of confrontation and risk.

Finally, the paper calls for increased awareness of the international community and

especially US which remains involved in the region, in order to strengthen the Nile basin

regional cooperation.

 Chapter 2

Causes and effects of water scarcity

The first part of this chapter identifies the causes of water scarcity in the Nile

region. Each of the causes illustrates how demand for freshwater is exceeding the

capacity of available water. It also shows how poor management, pollution,

unsustainable use of water, increasing consumption and rapid population growth are

intensifying water shortages along the Nile Basin. The second part of the chapter

stressed the effects generated by water scarcity. It demonstrates that increasing

consumption is straining water resources, and leading to food shortages and conflicts in

the region.

I- Causes of water scarcity in the region

a- Climatic Conditions

In Africa climate has a huge influence, bringing more rain to some regions and

less to others and its overall impact remains uncertain. However, most parts of the

continent suffer from deficit of rainfall. As was stated by an Ethiopian farmer, the main

problem is “that we don't get enough rain. In fact, this is the source of all our problems.

” And even when “the rains do come they don't last long”, he continues.3 Indeed the

negligible amount of rainfall has a great impact on the Nile’s annual flow. In fact, the

average annual flow of the Nile has declined continuously since the late century. For

3
Thomson, Mike, “Nile restrictions anger Ethiopia”, BBC news, February 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4232107.stm

instance, from 1870 to 1899, the average annual flow at Aswan was 110 bcm, then it

declined to 83 bcm from 1899 to 1954, and finally to 81.5 bcm from 1954- 1988.4

b- Population Growth and Development

One of the significant reasons for the water crisis is population growth, and the

desire for better living standards. Since the amount of water available is relatively static,

an increasing population decreases the amount of water available per person. For

instance, Egypt's population has more than doubled since the 1960s.5 This fast growing

population needs more food, and consequently requires more agricultural production. In

fact, Irrigated agriculture is the largest drain on the waters of the Nile, particularly in

Egypt and the Sudan. Moreover, pressure on Nile resources is likely to increase

dramatically since population growth is expected to double in the coming years in all

riparian states.

c- Pollution and Mismanagement

Another reason for water shortage is the inefficient way in which the water is

used. Poor resource management can lead to enormous waste. On the one hand,

agricultural runoff and irrigation contribute to wastage on a large scale, with the water

trickling away or simply evaporating before it can be used. On the other hand, pollution

is making more of the water that is available to us unhealthy for use. Urban waste, and

industrial effluents are the most common sources of contaminating water sources.

4
ICE, “Blue Nile”, Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE) case study, Trade and
Environment Database (TDE), American University, November 1997,
http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/bluenile.htm
5
Thomson, Mike, “Nile restrictions anger Ethiopia”, BBC news, February 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4232107.stm

Contaminated water, left untreated, reduces the amount of fresh water available for use

and also reflects poor management. Therefore, new water management systems and

practices must be found to balance growing agricultural requirements.

II- Effects of water scarcity

a- Health risk

Water scarcity combined with pollution leads to the outbreak of diseases, and

poses great health risks. According to UN, more than five million people die from

waterborne diseases each year. In 2002 in Geneva, Mikhail Gorbachev, as the president

of Green Cross International, affirmed that “three million children will die and millions

more will become blind this year alone as a result of preventable water-borne diseases.”6

UN also estimates that in Africa water scarcity afflicts 300 million people, claims at least

6000 lives a year, and by 2025 about one in two Africans will be confronted with water

stress or water scarcity.7 It means that almost half of the population in the continent will

suffer from the effects of scarce and polluted water.

b- Food shortage

Food security is one of the biggest concerns generated by water scarcity. Indeed,

water shortage prevents the African continent from achieving food self-sufficiency and

food security. Lester Brown, head of environmental research institute Worldwatch,

6
Anthony Turton & Roland Henwood, “Hydropolitics in the developing world: A
Southern African perspective”, African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU),
University of Pretoria, 2002,
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Articles/hydropolitics_book.pdf
7
IRIN, “AFRICA: Diminishing water resources could fuel conflict”, 2004, Integrated
Regional Information Networks (IRIN),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44014

believes that water scarcity is now "the single biggest threat to global food security."8 In

fact, food shortage could compromise even the survival of population. For instance, the

United Nation's World Food Program says that nine million Ethiopians are in need of

food.9

c- Regional instability

As outlined previously, the growing demand caused by population growth,

urbanization, and industrial development exacerbates water insufficiency. However, if a

state does not have enough water to satisfy its needs, then most likely it will expand its

supply of water using shared sources, which generally occur at the expense of

neighboring states. Then, the competition over water between these states can lead to

instability and conflict. Consequently, expanded water use becomes a key element in

regional conflicts.

However, the real difficulty is that there is not a clear international law which

adequately addresses water rights. States tend to claim their sovereignty over water

within their national borders, compete against each other, but generally end up

negotiating agreements rather than resorting to violent confrontations. In case of the Nile

river, two major agreements were established between the riparian countries during the

colonial era, but the increasing pressure on water resources is at work, and risks of water

conflict are becoming higher. This case will be covered in more detail in the next

chapter.

8
Russell Smith, “Africa's potential water wars”, BBC News, November 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/454926.stm
9
Thomson, Mike, “Nile restrictions anger Ethiopia”, BBC news, February 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4232107.stm

 Chapter 3

Nile’s waters Conflict

The recent history of conflict over the Nile began with the 20th century. By the

turn of this century, Britain was the primary colonial power in the Nile River Basin. The

British realized the importance of the river for their colonies, but they did not control the

whole Basin and especially the Ethiopian portions from which over 80% of the Nile’s

waters come. Therefore, in order to assure themselves that the Nile would not be

interfered with, in 1902, they signed an agreement with Ethiopia. The agreement

prohibited any construction on Nile tributaries that would interrupt the flow of the river,

without prior consultation. Afterward, the Nile became a dispute matter between the

Egyptians and the British during colonial era and even after independence.

The chapter describes the two most important agreements signed during this

period, the 1929 Nile Water Agreement and the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization

of the Nile, underlines some of their limitations, and highlights the role of the recent Nile

Basin Initiative (NBI). After providing a concise idea about the past relations between

the most involved nations in the dispute over the Nile’s water, specifically Egypt, Sudan

and Ethiopia, this chapter will finally analyze the current situation and the potential

conflicts over the Nile Basin.

I- Description

The Nile is the world's longest river, stretching 6,700 km in length and covering

an area of 2.9 million km3. The river originates from two distinct geographical zones,

the basins of the White and Blue Niles. The two tributaries have radically different flow

patterns. From its major source at Lake Victoria, the most important of the Great Lakes,

the White Nile flows north through Uganda and crosses the border into Sudan. The Blue

Nile originates in the highlands of Ethiopia and Eretria, as do the other major tributaries

of the Nile, the Atbara and the Sobat. The White and Blue Niles converge in Khartoum,

in Sudan, and from there flow north into Egypt and on to the Mediterranean Sea. The

Nile River has an annual flow in normal years of 84 bcm at Aswan, in southern Egypt.

Of this, 85% to 86% is from the Blue Nile, the Atbara and the Sobat, originating in the

Ethiopian highlands, with only 14% originating from the Great Lakes region.10 It means

that about 85% of the Nile's waters originate in Ethiopia and Eretria, while the majority

of the river's water is used in the Sudan and Egypt. According to the World Bank, the

Nile River Basin is home to an estimated 160 million people, while almost 300 million

live in the 10 countries that share the Nile's waters (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania,

Burundi, Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, and Eritrea).11

Actually, the Nile River is the main source of water for the 10 nations which

make up the Nile basin. As is, the water supplied by the river is hardly enough to satisfy

the huge water demands of the population of these countries. And while the demand for

this resource increases, the supply is likely to remain unchanged. However, upstream

states currently draw little of the Nile waters for use in irrigation which is supported by

abundant rainfall. On the opposite side, the downstream states of Egypt and Sudan, are

heavily dependent on irrigated agriculture for food production, and use 94% of the

available Nile water, leaving just 6% for all other riparian states. Therefore, access to the

10
ICE, “Blue Nile”, Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE) case study, Trade and
Environment Database (TDE), American University, November 1997,
http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/bluenile.htm

Science in Africa, “The Nile: Water Conflicts”, May 2003, Science in Africa Magazine
11

on-line, http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2003/may/nile.htm

Nile's waters has already been defined as a vital national priority by both countries. It is

an issue over which the two nations stated that they are willing to go to war.

Nevertheless, the current tensions between Egypt and Sudan, its neighbor to the south,

are simply an extension of old struggles over who will control the river.

II- Past conflicts and their resolution:

a- 1929 agreement

In 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement was concluded between the British High

Commission in Cairo and the Egyptian government. Great Britain sponsored this

agreement, which regulated the flow of the Nile and allocated its use. The agreement

heavily favored Egypt allocating for the Egyptians the use of 48 bcm per year, only 4

bcm for the Sudan, and left 32 bcm per year unallocated.12

After the World War II, the control of Nile River once again became a vital issue

in regional politics as national liberation movements grew in strength both in Egypt and

Sudan. The British government established a complete hydrological study on the Nile

Basin. The study suggested the construction of the Jongleli canal, which would divert the

flow of the Nile in southern Sudan in order to avoid the enormous losses due to

evaporation which occur there.

In Egypt, the rapid increase in population between 1929 and 1959 had led to an

increase in water needed for irrigated agriculture and industrial water use. Therefore, the

Egyptians started developing a plan to build the Aswan High Dam for storage and

regulation of flood waters. However, the construction of the dam would create a

12
ICE, “Blue Nile”, Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE) case study, Trade and
Environment Database (TDE), American University, November 1997,
http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/bluenile.htm

10

reservoir extending 150 km into the Sudan, submerging the old town of Halfa and

displacing 50,000 people.

In Sudan, in the meantime, in addition to the Jongleli canal, they were developing

new plans to build the Roseries Dam on the Blue Nile in order to increase the irrigated

areas. However, the new plans required a significant increase in allocated use of Nile

waters highly above the amount already stipulated in the 1929 agreement, which leads to

its renegotiation.

b- 1959 agreement

Subsequently, tensions increased between Egypt and the Sudan during the period

1956-1958. After achieving its independence, Sudan raised strong objections to the

Aswan High Dam and demanded a renegotiation of the 1929 agreement. Its first Prime

Minister "immediately reiterated that the 1929 agreement should be revised”.13

Afterward, the Sudanese administration unilaterally declared its non-adherence to the

1929 agreement. As a reaction to the Sudanese provocation, in a show of force, Egypt

moved some units of its army to the border.

In November 1958, after a military takeover, a new regime more open to

negotiation with the Egypt was established in Sudan. The two countries re-negotiated the

1929 agreement and developed the 1959 Agreement. The new agreement allocated to

Egypt 55.5 bcm per year and allocated to Sudan 18.5 bcm per year. The remaining 10

bcm flow per year was allocated to evaporation and other losses. Besides, they agreed

that any new additions to annual flow of the river should be split equally between the two

13
ICE, “Blue Nile”

11

countries. Furthermore, plans to move ahead on the construction of Aswan High Dam

and Roseires reservoir on the Blue Nile were also approved.

c- The Actors and their political interactions after 1959

i- Egypt-Sudan

As soon the agreement with Sudan was signed in 1959, the construction of the

High Dam at Aswan started. During this time, relations between Egypt and Sudan were

favorable. When construction of the dam was finally finished in 1971, behind it the

waters accumulated and formed Lake Nasser, which is 600 kilometers long and almost 50

kilometers wide in some places. This water reservoir became the second largest man-

made lake in the world. Meanwhile, Sudan and Egypt began the joint construction of the

Jonglei Canal, which by diverting the river away from an area where big evaporation

losses occur, would have increased the flow of the Nile. The construction was stopped in

1983 after a series of violent attacks by the Sudanese rebels. One of the reasons was that

the canal would ruin the eco-system of marshes in South Sudan. Then, the continuing

civil war in the south of Sudan has made any additional work impossible.

Egypt and the Sudan's relations continued to be friendly during the early 1980s

until the ouster of Sudanese President Nimeiri. The new regime in Khartoum faced

accelerated population growth and increased food needs and began challenging the 1959

Agreement. Indeed, the Sudan began developing some plans for further irrigation and the

construction of small dams. Then, relations between the two countries deteriorated in

1989 as the Islamic fundamentalist regime unilaterally abolished the previous mutual

agreements and began demanding Egyptian forces to leave its territory.

12

 Tensions between the Sudan and Egypt have been more openly political and less

about water, in part, because of the civil conflict in Sudan. In October 1991, Egyptian

Defense Minister commented that his country would not hesitate to use force to defend its

control of the Nile River. He also predicted that future Middle East wars could result

from water scarcity issues. He said, "I do not actually expect an impending control of the

Nile River by a foreign country, but we consider it a possibility and are planning our

military strategy accordingly.”14 In August 1994, it was reported that Egyptian

government had planned and then canceled an air attack on Sudan’s capital Khartoum,

where a dam was being built. In June 1995, Egyptian President Mubarak barely escaped

an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa perpetrated by Sudanese Islamic militants.

Furthermore, border clashes became frequent between the two neighbors over a disputed

area and conflict seemed possible. Then, Egypt took control of this area and tensions

subsided because of bilateral negotiations.

ii- Egypt-Ethiopia

The 1959 agreement, mentioned above, did not include Ethiopia and allocated the

entire flow to Egypt, Sudan and natural loss. Therefore, Ethiopia claimed its rights to the

waters which are reasonable since they originate from its territory, and began to work

with the United States Bureau of Reclamation to study and assess its water resources for

irrigation and electrical power. In 1970, Egyptian President Sadat had threatened war

with Ethiopia because it was planning for construction of a dam on the Blue Nile.

Ethiopia's official position was always that Ethiopia has all the rights to exploit

her own natural resources. It also reminded that even though Egypt receives 85 percent

14
ICE, “Blue Nile”

13

of its Nile waters from Ethiopia, it has never shown friendship nor sought cooperation.

But, instead, Egypt went ahead and built the Aswan Dam which largely depends on the

Blue Nile without even consulting Ethiopia. On the other side, rapid population growth

and the need for food sufficiency after the 1980’s famines incited Ethiopia to press ahead

with plans to divert Nile waters for irrigation. However, in the early 1990's, Egypt

apparently blocked an African Development Bank financial assistance to an Ethiopian

project which might have decreased the flow of the Nile's water into Egypt. Furthermore,

in 1996, at a conference on Nile cooperation, Egyptian and Ethiopian officials exchanged

non-cooperative policy documents, each of them stressing their rights to use Nile water as

they wish.

It seems that Ethiopia can normally provide an ideal place for the construction of

a series of small dams. The electricity generated by the dams could be used to help the

country build an industrial base in order to develop its economy. Actually, Ethiopia is

considered one of the poorest countries of the world, and according to the United

Nations, about 80 percent of Ethiopians live below the poverty line of a dollar a day.15

d- Great Lakes states:

In addition to Ethiopia, the upstream countries including Kenya, Uganda and

Tanzania, have also expressed their concern over these long-standing treaties which have

served to give Egypt unfair control over the use of the Nile’s waters. Furthermore,

international analysts point out that actually Egypt and Sudan have been very opposed to

renegotiate the agreements and this has, sometimes, strained relations between the

upstream and downstream countries. During the 1990s, attempts have been made to
15
Hobbs Jacklynne, “Do Water Wars Still Loom in Africa? “, Global policy Forum, May
15, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2004/0515waterwar.htm

14

resolve these disagreements and develop a regional partnership between all the countries

surrounding the Nile basin. However, real progress has been slow, and Kenyan, Ugandan

and Tanzanian revived again the debate over the legitimacy of the colonial-era

agreements.

In sum, the 1959 agreement remains relatively the most comprehensive treaty on

the use of the Nile waters. However, the real problem is that the agreement did not put a

real end to the conflict over the rights to the Nile’s waters. Indeed, relations among the

Nile basin countries remain tense, and debate over this agreement sparks again whenever

a new Nile development project is proposed.

e- Nile Basin Initiative NBI

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is a regional partnership initiated by the Nile countries in

1999 to realize a shared vision: "to achieve sustainable socio-economic development

through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water

resources." 16 The 10 countries that share the Nile and its sources, Burundi, Sudan,

Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda (and Eritrea as an

observer), all met to find a way to translate this vision into concrete investments and

actions on the ground that will build confidence and effective cooperation across the

basin. This is mainly being done through the implementation of one of the two major

Programs within the Nile Basin, the Shared Vision Program (SVP).

This program is designed to help realize the shared vision of the Nile basin

countries: “harnessing the resources of the river to create a better life for the 300 million

16
World Bank group, “Nile Basin, Overview”, World Bank Home Site,
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/nilebasin/overview.htm

15

people who depend on it.”17 This is accomplished by creating an enabling environment

for development in the Nile Basin through effective basin wide projects. In fact, the SVP

program consists of seven thematic projects focusing on “water resources, the

environment, power, trade, agriculture, applied training, communication and stakeholder

involvement and benefit sharing.”18 This means developing the river to reduce the

vulnerability of the riparian countries to droughts, to ensure more water, more food, and

more electricity, and better manage floods. However, this should be accomplished in a

way that respects the ecological system of the river itself so it can continue to feed future

generations.

Most of the 10 Nile countries share a similar history of poverty and unstable

economies. So, in addition to contributions from these countries themselves, the Nile

Basin Initiative is also supported by generous support of several multilateral and bilateral

donors. The majority of funds and contributions supporting NBI programs and projects

are administered through the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) which was established in

2003. Donors that contribute through the NBTF include Canada, Denmark, Netherlands,

Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. NBTF is currently managed by the World

Bank on behalf of all these donors.19 This mechanism has proved to be effective in

harmonizing and ensuring a unified and coherent approach to managing funds in order to

implement the NBI’s development projects on the Nile.

17
NBI web site, “NBI - Shared Vision Program Brief”, Nile Basin Initiative, March 23,
2005, http://www.nilebasin.org/svpProgramBriefs.htm
18
Sudan Tribune, “Nile Basin Initiative”, Sudan Tribune article, March 2004,
http://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=2107
19
NBI, “How we are funded”, Nile Basin Initiative Home Site, March 23, 2005
http://www.nilebasin.org/howWeAreFunded.htm

16

 On the other hand, it is vital to the success of future developments on the Nile that

both Egypt and Sudan are involved in the NBI. Indeed, Sudan and Egypt are among the

10 member countries which make up this initiative. So, by being part of the process

means that they are interested in opening up negotiations on the equitable use of the

Nile’s water and reducing conflicts over its use. However, the main challenge for

upstream countries still remains how to find sustainable ways of use of the river in a

manner that would not hinder its flow downstream to Egypt.

III- Present and Potential Conflicts

a- Aspects of Cooperation

At the present time, use of Nile’s water is governed by the 1959 agreement that

gives Egypt and Sudan extensive rights over the river to the detriment of other states

along the Nile and its tributaries. The agreement is obviously a result of outdated

colonial realities, but many attempts to modify it have been resisted by Egypt, which

depends entirely on the river. Thus, tensions in the Nile River Basin are currently limited

by Egypt's political and military power in the region, and also by the Sudanese civil war

and the negligible use of water by the other upstream countries.

In fact, the continuing talks about fairer allocation of the Nile’s waters provide a

source for hope, even if they have been occasionally combined with threats of conflict.

To avoid that option, the riparian nations have established the Nile Basin Initiative

(described in II- e), which is designed to replace this threat of conflict with the spirit of

cooperation. It illustrates that “the tendency” among Nile basin countries “has been to

17

seek means of cooperating rather than fighting over water.”20 As it was stated by Meles

Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, “What we basically need is to deal with the Nile

basin as a single region with shared natural resources. If we take this as a basis for

dealing with the Nile issue, we will be able to devise better ways to achieve the

maximum benefit from its waters.”21

For the same reason, UNESCO has established a global program called PC-CP –

“From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential”. The purpose of the program is to

examine “the potential for shared water resources to become a catalyst for regional peace

and development through dialogue, cooperation and participative management of river

basins.”22 According to UNESCO, this area is still largely uncharted since there is no

international law on the management of water systems. Nor is there any mechanism to

monitor or enforce the numerous bilateral water treaties between states.

However, according to Anthony Turton, a well known water specialist, the high

level of cooperation on the basin permits to shift focus,” from water sharing to benefit

sharing”, which relieves the basin of its political baggage, and enhances the optimal use

of the Nile’s water.23 On the matter, professor Luijendijk, a Dutch water engineer and

20
Barry James,” Averting conflict in the Nile basin”, The New Courier, UNESCO 2005,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=14364&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
21
O.Collins Robert, “The inscrutable at the beginning of the new millennium”, University
of California Santa Barbara, 2001 PDF file,
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/Inscrutable%20Nile1.pdf
22
Barry James,” Averting conflict in the Nile basin”, The New Courier, UNESCO 2005,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=14364&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
23
Hobbs Jacklynne, “Do Water Wars Still Loom in Africa? “, Global policy Forum, May
15, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2004/0515waterwar.htm

18

expert on knowledge systems at UNESCO, also believes that “experts are more capable

of solving water problems than politicians.”24 He thinks that the Nile countries can

achieve a high degree of cooperation by simply exchanging data and working with each

other to resolve problems and build confidence little by little.

Although each of the aspects discussed above represent a possibility of

cooperation, many factors also hold the potential to increase tension and cause conflict in

the basin.

b- Factors of confrontation

Along with aspects of cooperation, however, other factors are working to increase

the risk for conflict over water in the Nile basin including: rapid population growth,

increases in agricultural irrigation, growing development in Ethiopia, and also the

possibility of development in Sudan if civil war ended. Indeed, in recent years, the use of

the Nile's waters for the economic development and agricultural expansion has become a

real obstacle for collaboration among the 10 countries that share Nile basin.

According to the World Bank, the Nile River Basin is home to an estimated 160

million people. In the next 25 years, population in the riparian states is expected to

almost double adding to the increased use of water generated by rapid development in

industry and agriculture. Thus, potential conflict over water would come from the

increased food and agriculture required to cover all the need of that growing population

within the basin. Furthermore, all three of the major players, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia,

openly state that their current share of the water is insufficient and there is a need for

more water. For instance, Egypt is desperately trying to meet its food needs through

24
Barry James

19
significantly expanding the number of acres under irrigation. However, it is believed that

it is already at or above its allocation stipulated by the 1959 Agreement, and some

sources assert that it is currently taking more than its share.

In fact, Egypt is taking advantage of its status as the regional military and political

power to emphasize the colonial era agreement, and in the past years has not hesitated to

threaten the use of force to keep its complete control on the Nile’s waters. “Some of its

armed forces are trained in jungle warfare”, clearly intended for action in countries far to

the south, where the White Nile originates.25

According to Luijendijk, “if Ethiopia decided to build a dam on one of these river

branches, then that would mean war with Egypt immediately. There is no other choice

for Egypt.” Furthermore, he added that “an attempt by any of the nine countries in the

Nile basin to use water in a way that would reduce the flow into Egypt could precipitate

war.”26 Actually, the Nile basin countries “have classified access to the waters of the

Nile river as a vital national interest over which they would be willing to go to war.”

For the moment, there has been enough water to almost satisfy most of the Nile

basin countries, but in the future resources will cease to suffice, and consequently

intensify the problem. As it was stated by Kofi Annan, water “has been a source of

tensions and fierce competition between nations that could become even worse if present

trends continue.”27 Thus, search for constructive solutions becomes more and more

crucial.

25
Barry James

26
Ibid.

27
Ibid.

20

As it appears, possibilities for cooperation and conflicts of interests exist on different

levels with respect to Nile basin issue, and therefore no simple solutions can be found.

However, a solution, may be, could exist through a constructive and multilateral

cooperation that benefits all the Nile’s nations as whole, but at the same time takes into

consideration the specific strategic need of each country, and especially the major

players, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.

21

 Chapter 4

US involvement

One of the big handicaps of water contentions is that there is little clear

international law on the management of water systems, except for few documents that

provide some guidance for water agreements framework. Furthermore, there is no

appropriate mechanism to monitor already signed water agreements. About the Nile’s

waters, the conflict involves a whole region of the world which is made up of 10

countries and about 300 millions inhabitants. For several reasons discussed in the

previous chapter, water conflict risks are particularly serious in the Nile basin. The Nile

riparians are highly water interdependent, and this tendency is expected to dramatically

increase in the coming years. Furthermore, water security has become an essential

component of the national security of each individual country in the region, and as a

matter of fact a part of international security.

The international community and particularly the United States must be

concerned by this conflict, and should take the appropriate measures in order to create a

secure and stable region along the Nile basin and prevent any unexpected escalation. To

achieve this objective, Robert O.Collins, professor of history at University of California,

suggested that US should, first, establish an inter-agency working group to investigate

issues affecting the Nile waters, second, encourage Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda

especially to develop Nile waters as a whole, and finally develop a policy for the Nile

that recognizes the interests of all its riparians.28

28
O.Collins Robert, “Smoothing the Waters: The Nile Conflict”, University of California
Santa Barbara, 1999,
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=igcc

22

 The United States, which has significant commitments in the Nile Basin, can also

use its considerable influence to defuse conflict there. It is true that only the riparians can

ultimately settle the share of the Nile’s water and decide whether cooperation or conflict

prevails. However, Nile conflict could definitely threaten the stability of Egypt, and

could give rise to extremism and radical movements. In that case, if Egypt were

weakened, US influence in the region, particularly in the Middle-East, would be very

limited. One of the most significant impacts would be the inability of US to project

power in the region due to limited access, and blockage of the Suez Canal. Thus, it is in

the interest of the United States to take into consideration the Nile’s water issue and help

develop negotiations in order to find the most suitable solutions for the problem.

23

 Chapter 5

Conclusion

The supply and management of fresh water is likely to be one of the biggest

challenges of the 21st century. The germs of conflict are not only characteristic of Nile

basin, but common to all states sharing a single river basin. However, in the developing

world, as it is the case in the Nile Basin, this issue becomes more sensitive and complex.

For these countries, protection of precious water resources is always associated with

complex political, legal, environmental, and especially economic challenges.

The majority of the nations around the Nile basin are still considered undeveloped

countries. Their economy is highly depending on agriculture, and therefore most of their

development projects are designed at the expense of Nile’s flow. For the moment, Egypt

is may be the only Nile riparian country which economy is moving away from a high

dependence on agriculture. It can therefore be argued that without an adequate supply of

water, no economy can develop in the region. Above all, without a clean supply of

potable water, health and even survival of population, and especially the poorest

fractions, are compromised. Mikhail Gorbachev well described this relationship between

developing countries and water supply when he stated that “in the developing world the

links between water and life are still so clear – resonating in the cry of a sick child, the

daily struggle of a mother, or the despair of a farmer ruined by drought or flood.”29

29
Anthony Turton & Roland Henwood, “Hydropolitics in the developing world: A
Southern African perspective”, African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU),
University of Pretoria, 2002,
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Articles/hydropolitics_book.pdf

24

Besides, domestic political and socio-economic dynamics also have an important impact

on Nile riparians and on the interactions between them. Thus, the importance of

domestic political and economic stability of these countries should not be neglected.

As discussed in chapter 3, since aspects of cooperation and factors of

confrontation exist on different levels, Nile conflict is complex and no simple solutions

can be found. And while the solutions must be locally produced and managed, there is

clearly a need for greater support from the international community, and especially from

developed and rich countries.

25

 Bibliography

ICE, “Blue Nile”, Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE) case study, Trade and
Environment Database (TDE), American University, November 1997,
http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/bluenile.htm

Barry James,” Averting conflict in the Nile basin”, The New Courier, UNESCO 2005,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=14364&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

IRIN, “Ethiopia: Pledge to develop Nile potential with Egypt”, Integrated Regional
Information Networks (IRIN), a UN humanitarian news and information service,
February 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=20492&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&S
electCountry=ETHIOPIA

IRIN, “AFRICA: Diminishing water resources could fuel conflict”, 2004, Integrated
Regional Information Networks (IRIN),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44014

Thomson, Mike, “Nile restrictions anger Ethiopia”, BBC news, February 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4232107.stm

Willa Thayer, “No country is an island”, January 2003, Cairo, AL-AHRAM, The Nile
Basin: National Determinants of Collective Action, John Waterbury, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002,

Hobbs Jacklynne, “Do Water Wars Still Loom in Africa? “, Global policy Forum, May
15, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2004/0515waterwar.htm

IRIN, “Uganda: Harnessing the power of the Nile Part II”, IRIN, Mars 2003, Integrated
Regional Information Networks (IRIN),
http://plusnews.org/wwdreport.asp?ReportID=32970&SelectRegion=WWD

Kassian Stroh, “Water: An Advocate for Reason, Win-Win Solutions for the Nile Basin”,
International Politics and Society, April 2003,
http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/IPG/IPG4_2003/ARTSTROH.HTM

Russell Smith, “Africa's potential water wars”, BBC News, November 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/454926.stm

Kirby Alex, “Dawn of a thirsty century”, BBC News, June 2002,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/755497.stm

26

Kirby Alex, “Water scarcity: A looming crisis?”, BBC News, October 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3747724.stm

O.Collins Robert, “The inscrutable at the beginning of the new millennium”, University
of California Santa Barbara, 2001 PDF file,
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/Inscrutable%20Nile1.pdf

O.Collins Robert, “Smoothing the Waters: The Nile Conflict”, University of California
Santa Barbara, 1999,
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=igcc

Gardner-Outlaw Tom, Engelman Robert, “Sustaining Water, Easing Scarcity: A Second

Update”,1997,
http://www.populationaction.org/resources/publications/water/water97.pdf

Sudan Tribune, “Nile Basin Initiative”, Sudan Tribune article, March 2004,
http://sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=2107

D.Wolfensohn, James “A Vision of Development and Peace on the Nile”, President of

the World Bank Group, Geneva, June 26, 2001,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANE
XTN/0,,contentMDK:20035385~menuPK:375445~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSit
ePK:375422,00.html

NBI web site,”About Nile Basin Initiative”, Nile Basin Initiative Home site, 2006,
http://www.nilebasin.org/

ENA, “Nile Basin Initiative designs 5.6 million US dollars agricultural development
project”, ENA, Addis Ababa, International Affairs News, January 2006,
http://www.ena.gov.et/default.asp?CatId=7&NewsId=194092

Onyango-Obbo, Charles “Will Battle of the Nile Be Fought On the Beaches of Entebbe?”
Nairobi, February 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200602140742.html

Anthony Turton & Roland Henwood, “Hydropolitics in the developing world: A Southern
African perspective”, African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU), University of
Pretoria, 2002,
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Articles/hydropolitics_book.pdf

Niasse, Madiodio,” Climate-Induced Water Conflict Risks in West Africa: Recognizing

and Coping with Increasing Climate Impacts on Shared Watercourses”, IUCN-West
Africa Regional Office, Human Security and Climate Change International Workshop
Oslo, 2005, http://www.cicero.uio.no/humsec/papers/Niasse.pdf

World Bank group, “Nile Basin, Overview”, World Bank Home Site,
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/nilebasin/overview.htm

27

NBI, “NBI - Shared Vision Program Brief”, Nile Basin Initiative Home Site, March 23,
2005, http://www.nilebasin.org/svpProgramBriefs.htm

BICC, “Natural resources, environmental degradation and conflict: A perspective from

peace and conflict research”, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),
http://www.bicc.de/tricc/background_paper.pdf

Science in Africa, “The Nile: Water Conflicts”, May 2003, Science in Africa Magazine
on-line, http://www.scienceinafrica.co.za/2003/may/nile.htm

28