Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
International Studies Association and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Studies Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International
StudiesQuarterly
(2000) 44, 213-237.
NottinghamTrentUniversity
AND
COLIN WIGHT
Authors'note:This articlehas benefitedfromthe advice and commentsof manypeople, none of whom might
wishto agree withall or anyof the arguments.As such, ultimateresponsibility,
as always,restswiththe authors.The
articlehas been greatlyimprovedby the critical,yetencouraging,commentsfromthe editorsof International Studies
Quarterlyand the anonymous reviewers.Numerous individuals have also commented on the work. A few in
particularrequire mention (apologies for any omissions): Stephen Chan, Thomas Forsberg,Ronen Palan, Magnus
Ryner,Ian Clarke, Michael Williams,Steve Smith,and Tim Dunne. We should also thank the participantsof the
BISA panel "Afterthe State and Beyond Constructivism"on 15 December 1998, at the Universityof Sussex,
Brighton,UK, for a stimulatingdiscussionon the themes of the paper.
( 2000 International
StudiesAssociation.
PublishedbyBlackwellPublishers,
350 Main Street,Malden,MA 02148,USA,and 108 CowleyRoad, OxfordOX4 IJF,UK.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
214 AfterPostpositivism?
make the human condition better.We thinkthat, at least in many cases, both
suspicionscarrysome weight.
The typicalsolution in this kind of situationis to tryto find a compromise
position,whichwould enable a constructivesynthesisof the main points of both
positions.Indeed, it seems that in IR "constructivism," in various guises, is rap-
idlyemergingas a kind of a new middle ground (Adler, 1997). We findWaever's
(1992:186; 1996:165-169; 1997:18-23) schemes, summarized(and slightlymodi-
fied) in Figure 1, particularlyhelpfulin understandingthe currentsituationand
mainstreamself-understanding in IR. The trianglein the middle is a variationof
the (already anachronistic)"inter-paradigmdebate."
In the 1980s the main movementsseemed to be towardsa synthesisof neo-
liberalismand neo-realism(the neo-neo debate spot in Figure 1) and the fading
awayof Marxismas the thirdposition. The main challenge that emerged in the
1980s, however,was that of the epistemological radicals (postpositivistsof all
sorts).If the new radicalswere radical enough (like Ashleyand Walker,1990a; b),
theyexceeded, according to Waver, the "boundaryof negativity"(dotted line on
the epistemologicalaxis); and if the neo-neo scholarswere too positivist(like the
work of mathematicalmodel builders or the Correlates of War project), they
exceeded the "boundaryof boredom" (the other dotted line on the epistemo-
logical axis). The happyface thathas seeminglyavoided all these pitfallsand has
found,by the late 1990s,a positionin the middle of everything, is constructivism
(cf. Adler, 1997).
As a story,illustratedby a nice picture,thismayaugur well forconstructivism,
and other middle ground positions,particularlyifwe take for grantedthe wide-
spread de facto aversion against followingstrictlypositivist,scientificmethods
("the boundaryof boredom") and againstbeing too "radical"eitherpoliticallyor
epistemologically("the boundaryof negativity")(S0rensen, 1998). The problem
is that, as it stands, this veryloose categoryof the "middle ground" does not
reallyresolve any of the underlyingproblems. The dilemma is that where the
"middle ground" is deemed to be is a functionof where one draws the bound-
aries. In thisrespect,the attractiveness of the middle ground forIR scholarsis a
directcorollaryof a particularunderstandingof the boundaries-an understand-
ing we intend to challenge.
With the boundaries as currentlyconceptualized the middle ground does
indeed appear attractive. Althoughprimafacie an appealing position,Max Weber
providesa damning indictmentof thiskind of "middle-groundism." Weber held
thatwe should "strugglerelentlesslyagainst the self-deceptionwhich assertsthat
through the synthesisof several party points of view ... practical norms of
Positivism
w X / ,S 1 Politic#realism
..........~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~................................
. Construc-
tiv-ism
S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
, ...........SE
g
\
,,
i,.,
..................
...........................
Ne,o-neo
debate
/m
.........................................
........
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 215
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
216 AfterPostpositivism?
2We thinkit is importanthere not to lapse into a facile rejectionof positivismwhere the functionof the term
is simplyto label a body of workone disagreeswith.Althoughwe fun-damentally disagree withpositivismwe view
it as an important,although flawed,body of thoughtwithinphilosophy.
3 The issue of a common anti-realismhas also been noted by Alexander Wendt. See Wendt, 1999.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 217
but draw differentconclusions than those of George. Because having noted the
implicitanti-realismof positivismit is paradoxical that George adopts such a
position himself.
According to George (who might be considered by some to be beyond the
boundaryof negativity)the objects and subjectsof reality"are sociolinguistically
constructed"(George, 1994:156). Compare just how close thisposition comes to
that of Kenneth Waltz, considered by many postpositivistwritersto be beyond
the boundary of boredom. For Waltz, "whatwe think of as realityis itselfan
elaborate conception constructedand reconstructedthrough the ages. Reality
emerges fromour selection and organisationof materialsthat are available in
infinitequantity"(Waltz,1979:5).
From an ontologicallyorientatedperspectiveboth the positivistsand the post-
positivistsshare a common metaphysicalstructure.For positiviststhe real is
defined in termsof the experienced (esse estpercipi) and for manypostpositivists
in termsof language/discourse(esse est dictumesse). What can be considered real
alwaysbears the mark,or insignia,of some human attribute;in effect,an anthro-
pocentric philosophy(Bhaskar,1989:147). We argue that this anthropocentrism
is problematic,tying,as it does, existence to its being experienced or being
spoken. Yet "to be" means more than "to be experienced" or "to be spoken." A
world prior to the emergence of humanityis a condition of possibilityfor that
emergence. Even the term construction,employed by both George and Waltz,
implies a set of materials,whethersocial or natural,out of which this so-called
realityis constructedand which have to exist prior to the construction.
But does thislatent anti-realismmake any difference?Afterall, even though
many (though not all) postpositivistsclaim that "nothing exists outside of dis-
course" (Campbell, 1998:24-25), theycontinue to referto it (Wight,1999). And
positivists,despite dismissingtalk of an independentlyexistingrealityas meta-
physical,stillconstructtheoriesthat treatnonobservable theoreticalentities"as
if" theyexisted.We think,however,that an explicitcommitmentto ontological
realism has real consequences.
On the boundaryof negativity, in termsof epistemology,the denial of objects
existingindependentlyof the discourses that constructthem as objects seems
unable to differentiatebetween competing truthclaims (Norris, 1996). If dis-
courses constructthe objects to which the discourses refer,then the discourse
itselfcan neverbe wrongabout the existenceof its objects,in any meaningfulor
methodologicallyinterestingway.Nor can an alternativediscourse possiblycri-
tique another discourse, since the objects of a given discourse exist if the dis-
course says theyexist. External criticismof the existentialclaims of discourses
seems impossible. Ontologically,if discourses do constructtheir own objects,
thenwhatconstructedthe discoursesthemselves?There is, of course, a long and
venerable philosophical traditionof overtidealism that attemptsto answerjust
this question. For example, for Berkeleyit was God, for Hegel, Geist. We are
unconvinced by these arguments,but if IR scholars want to adopt idealist posi-
tions then let us at least have the argumentsin the open where theymightbe
assessed. Methodologically,and despite the rhetoricof the "new,"we see little
change in the manner of research practicesbeyond the boundaryof negativity.
Argumentsare stilladvanced and assessed, evidence offered,and independently
existingobjects,whethercreated in the discourse or not, are stillreferredto.
Those beyond the boundary of boredom fare littlebetter.Epistemologyand
ontologybecome tied together(whatBhaskar calls the epistemicfallacy);whatis
knownis whatcan be experienced and/orobserved and what "is" is what can be
known. Nonobservable theoreticalentitiesare treated instrumentally. They are
"merefictions,"usefulperhaps but in no sense can theybe considered real. Note
also that thisempiricistmetaphysicscan never achieve the flightfromsubjectiv-
ityand hence the objectivityit so desires. The tyingof existence to experience
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
218 AfterPostpositivism?
tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis,that pre-
tends to discoverthe ultimateoriginal qualities of human nature,ought at first
to be rejected as presumptuousand chimerical.... When we see that we have
arrivedat the utmostextent of human reason, we sit down contented. (Hume,
1967:88-89)
The depth realism we advocate, on the other hand, challenges both of these
positions.We argue thatpart of the rationale forscience is the attemptto know
whetheror not thingsare reallyas described, and what it is that makes them
appear as such. Science on thisaccount nevercomes to an end. No claim is ever
immune from challenge. Discourses can be, and often are wrong about their
objects, and the assumptionof "as if" theyexist is at best a short-termsolution.
The world is real and science is dependent upon the making of existential
hypotheses.This is not, however,to advocate a blind allegiance to science, foras
Bhaskar puts it, science is not
In thismanner,scientificoutputs,understoodsimplyas knowledgethatattempts
to explain, still require social evaluation.4The above argumentsprovide com-
4 Examples of this process are the public debates over geneticallymodifiedfood an-dhuman clon-ing.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKIPATOMAKI
ANDCOLINWIGHT 219
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
220 AfterPostpositivism?
8
Again, this argumentwas also advanced by Hobbes (1909:19-21).
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKIAND COLIN WIGHT 221
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
222 AfterPostpositivism?
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 223
CriticalRealism
Everytheoryof knowledgemust also logicallypresuppose a theoryof what the
worldis like (ontology)forknowledge(epistemology)to be possible.Or as Bhaskar,
invertinga Hegelian aphorism, puts it, "all philosophies, cognitivediscourses
and practicalactivitiespresuppose a realism-in the sense of some ontologyor
general account,of the world-of one kind or another" (Bhaskar, 1989:2). The
question is not of whetherto be a realist,but of what kind of realistto be. We
have attemptedto show how the boundaries of both negativityand boredom
share a common "problem-field,"which is structuredby various formsof anti-
realism/scepticism. We have also argued that those beyond the boundary of
boredom tend to be empiricalrealistsand those beyond the boundaryof nega-
tivitytend towardslinguisticrealism.We wantto now situatea different "problem-
field": one that takes the possibilityof a deeper realism to be a condition of
possibilityfor both empirical and linguisticrealism. The form of realism we
advocate can be called criticalrealism (for essential readings,see Archer et al.,
1998).
There are twodistinctwaysin whichcriticalrealismdiffersfromempiricaland
linguisticrealism.First,according to criticalrealism the world is composed not
onlyof events,statesof affairs,experiences,impressions,and discourses,but also
ofunderlyingstructures, powers,and tendenciesthatexist,whetheror not detected
or known throughexperience and/or discourse. For criticalrealiststhis under-
lyingrealityprovidesthe conditionsof possibilityforactual eventsand perceived
and/or experienced phenomena. According to critical realists,empirical and
linguisticrealistscollapse what are, in effect,differentlevels of realityinto one
(Bhaskar, 1975:56). For both the underlyingrealitythat makes experience pos-
sible and the course of events that is not experienced/spokenare reduced to
what can be experienced or become an object of discourse.
Second, forcriticalrealismthe differentlevels maybe out of phase witheach
other.What we mean is that although the underlyinglevel may possess certain
powersand tendencies,these are not alwaysmanifestin experience, or even for
thatmatterrealized. A nuclear arsenal has the power to bringabout vastdestruc-
tion and thispower existsirrespectiveof being actualized. Moreover,thispower
is itselfbased on more than thatwhich we directlyexperience. The conception
we are proposingis thatof a worldcomposed, in part,of complex things(includ-
ing systemsand complexlystructuredsituations)that, by virtue of their struc-
tures, possess certain powers, potentials,and capacities to act in certain ways
even ifthose capacitiesare not alwaysrealized. The worldon thisviewconsistsof
more than the actual course of eventsand experiences and/or discoursesabout
them.
Science, in this view, is not a deductive process that attemptsto seek out
constant event conjunctions,but one that aims at identifyingand illuminating
the structures,powers, and tendencies that structurethe course of events. A
significantpartof whatconstitutesscience is the attemptto identifythe relatively
enduringstructures,powers,and tendencies,and to understandtheircharacter-
isticwaysof acting.Explanation entailsprovidingan account of those structures,
powers and tendencies that have contributedto, or facilitated,some already
identifiedphenomenon of interest.It is importantto note that the mode of
inference implied by critical realism is neither deduction nor induction, but
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
224 AfterPostpositivism?
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 225
PuttingCriticalRealism to Workin IR
TheIncommensurability
Thesis
Criticalrealismshares withpostpositivistapproaches a commitmentto method-
ological and epistemologicalpluralism.Yet the incommensurabilitythesisthreat-
ens any nascent multi-paradigmaticapproach.12 If incommensurabilityentails
that meaningfulcommunication across paradigms is, in principle, impossible,
then any formof multi-paradigmatic inquirywould seem to be futile.In effect,
although incommensurability seems to provide the rationale to keep the con-
" Althoughit should be noted thatWendt has recentlyadded a question markto thisassertion(Wendt, 1999).
However, according to critical realism the social world can no more be ideas all the way down than it can be
materialityall the waydown.
12
For a more detailed refutationof the incommensurability thesisand its attendantproblemssee Wight,1996.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
226 AfterPostpositivism?
13
It seems to us that the argumentthat there is no "neutral"metalanguagewithwhich to compare competing
theoriesis basicallysound. However,thisdoes not mean thatcommunication/translation across theories/paradigms
is impossible.If one is translatingfromone language into another one does not firsthave to learn a neutral third
language in order to communicate.Interestingly, Kuhn was keen to distance himselffromsome of the more radical
interpretationsof the incommensurability thesis that have emerged (see Kuhn, 1970b, 1982, 1990).
14 For how this kind of analysisis done in the contextof explaining the Economic and MonetaryUnion, see
Patomaki, 1997.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 227
Causality
Outside the strictlypositivistcamp there has been verylittletalk about causality
in IR. In general thisis because those thatreject the applicabilityof causal talk
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
228 AfterPostpositivism?
in the social still presume the Humean account of it. When based on this
positivist-Humean account of cause, scientificexplanationsare essentiallydeduc-
tivein form.Accordingto thisview the explanandum (the eventto be explained)
is the logical conclusion of a general law and the occurrence of a set of initial
conditions,whichtogetherconstitutethe explanans (thatwhichdoes the explain-
ing). This model of explanation is generallyknownas the D-N, or "coveringlaw"
model. To get a clearer pictureof what thismodel entails,suppose thateventsA
and B are related by the general law, "if event A occurs then event B must
occur."15 The followingschema exemplifiesthe D-N model:
The D-N model implies that the role of an empirical science is to uncover
general laws (coveringlaws) that can then be used as the premisesof deductive
arguments.This model implies the symmetry of explanation and prediction:if
one has knowledgeto explain B, one could have also predictedit. It also implies
the parityof explanation,prediction,and falsification, in thata failed prediction
falsifies(Bhaskar,1994:20). But what are the keyproblems withthis model?
Firstand foremost,based as it is solelyat the level of co-joined events,it does
not really constitutean explanation at all. To say that "this acid turns litmus
paper red, or thismetal conductselectricitybecause all do is hardlyexplanatory"
(Bhaskar,1994:20). Moreover,the model cannot sustain the distinctionbetween
a necessaryand an accidental sequence of events.There maywell be a correla-
tion between democracies and peace, but is there a connection? The Humean
model also cannot account for the fundamentalcommon-sense experience of
tryingto do somethingwe are unable to do, and failing (Gerwin, 1987). The
world resistsall attemptsto reduce it to our ideas.
The question thatcriticalrealistspose for thismodel is: Is the noted constant
conjunction,i.e., the principle of empirical invariance,either necessary,or suf-
ficientfor explanation?The answeris no. For constantconjunctions (empirical
regularities)in general only obtain under experimentallycontrolledconditions.
That is, under closure. Given that the social world is open not closed, then it is
hardly surprisingthat no laws have yet been discovered. Both the ontology
(perception or sense-realismand the implicitassumptionthatsocial systemsare
closed) and the related theoryof causalityare false and misleading.
Among the recent and most systematicattemptsto tackle the problem of
causalityin IR is that of Suganami's On theCauses of War(1996). With a simple
analysisof causes as necessaryand/or sufficientconditions,Suganami (1996:48-
53) is able to demonstratethe implausibilityof the Waltzian notion of inter-
national anarchyas an explanation of war. He also shows how the claim that
liberal states have not fought against each other is also withoutan adequate
account of the historical mechanisms that would explain this alleged statistical
invariance. In general, as admitted even by the main advocates of the thesis,
dyadic liberalism is neither a necessary nor a sufficientcondition for peace
(Suganami,1996:70-74 and also Chapter3, particularly 101-112). This is explained
by Suganami:
15 Note thatthisis a simplificationto the extreme.The "coveringlaw" model does not, in general, presuppose
that there is a unique A, which is a sufficientcondition for B. Moreover,even withinpositivistapproaches, causal
relationscan be conditional,multistage,and allow foralternativecausation of the same phenomena, thus allowing
for more appropriateconstructionof "models of some fragmentsof 'historicalreality"'(see Nowak, 1960).
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMXKI AND COLIN WIGHT 229
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
230 AfterPostpositivism?
Agency/Structure
The fundamentalissue in the agent-structure problem (ASP) is enshrinedby the
pithyyetcompellingtruismarticulatedby Marx. Men (sic) do indeed make their
own historybut not in circumstancesof theirown choosing. Withinthe commu-
nity of internationalrelations scholars the ASP has tended to be subsumed
under the guise of the level-of-analysis problem. Explicit recognition of the
agent-structure problem came withAlexander Wendt's influential1987 article,
althoughAshley(1984) had alreadydiscussed it. Followingthis,interventionsby
David Dessler (1989), Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990, 1992, 1994), and
Walter Carlsnaes (1992), to name but a few,have served to highlightthe impor-
tance of this debate to IR scholars and have separated this problem from the
"level-of-analysis"problem.
At heart the agent-structure problem is an ontological problem concerning
the constitutiveelements of the social world and theirinterrelationships. From
this ontological problem epistemological and methodological problems arise.
The approach we advocate rejects both individualism(however the individuals
are defined-generally states)and holism.We argue thateverysocial act, event,
or phenomenon is onlypossible insofaras the conditionsforaction exist as well
as the agents which act; conditionswhich,we argue, are real and not reducible
to the discourses and/or experiences of the agents. Ontologically,the social
world can onlybe understood as a processual flow thatis intrinsically open and
subject to multipleand at timescontradictorycausal processes. In thisview,the
issue is not how to integrateagents and structuresinto one account, but how
theycould ever be separated. Even when such a separation becomes necessary
on analyticalgrounds,as in the abstractingof agencyfromstructurein order to
studystructure,it is vital to rememberthat this is only an analyticalseparation
and not an ontological one.
Agents cannot be separated fromstructuresfor at least three reasons. First,
agents cannot easily be separated from the social situationsin which theyare
routinelyembedded. This should not be taken to implya denial of an individu-
al's sense of identity,personality,and perception of the social world as these
things are experienced and/or influenced by her, or his, social experience.
Individual selves, however,are rhythmically developing,stratifiedbeings, and a
criticalrealist account would necessarilyreject extreme psychologicalexplana-
tions thatview the individualas a separate unit possessinga fixed inner core or
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 231
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
232 AfterPostpositivism?
mightbe confused about the role, nature,and origin of their reasons for,and
rationalisationof, actions. By doing thingsagents bring about changes of states
of affairseven when those actions amount to the mere reproductionof already
existingsocial relationsand positioned practices (there are statesof affairsthat
would be otherwisewithoutagents' actions).
Equally,everysocial act, event,or phenomenon is onlypossible insofaras the
conditionsfor activityexist. Agents,their intentions,and the reasons for these
intentions,however,are not enough to account for social causality.Although
reasonsare causes for actions, social structuresare real conditions(in differentsenses,
but also alwaysnecessaryconditions) for both these reasons and their causal
efficaciousness.The real question is thus: how should we decompose the inter-
nally and externallyrelated elements of social settingsand contexts?And our
general,even if (always)tentativeansweris: there are (i) historicallyconstructed,
yetalso idiosyncraticcorporeal (bodily)actors,who are both internallyand exter-
nally related to each other; (ii) intentionalaction, the meanings of which are
socio-historicallystructured;(iii) regulativeand constitutiverules implicated in
everyaction and constitutionof actors; (iv) resources as competencies and facil-
ities, bringingabout also productiveand destructivecapabilities; and (v) rela-
tional and positioned practices, which might be organised in a manner of
accomplishingcollectiveidentitiesand actors,and whichare often-also in other
cases-(inter) dependent.
Moreover, social systemsare open systems,that is, susceptible to external
influences and internal,qualitativechange and emergence. Spaces and times
intersectand overlap and overlapping,elongated, truncated,spatio-temporalities
may and do coalesce. Differenttendential causes can bring about similar epi-
sodes and trends and the same (kinds of) tendential causes can bring about
different(kinds of) events,episodes, and trends,depending on the totalityof
relevant(open-systemic)causal complexes and processes.
LevelsofAnalysis
BeforeWendt's (1987) article,individualismand holism were discussed in IR in
termsof "levels of analysis."Even afterthat article, there seems to have been
confusionabout the relationshipbetweenASP and the levels-of-analysis problem
(cf. Hollis and Smith,1991, 1992; Wendt, 1991, 1992). It is our contentionthat
the disciplineof IR should fundamentallyrethinkitsunderstandingof the levels-
of-analysisproblem. As presentlyformulatedit confuses and misleads much
more than illuminates(Walker,1993:131-140; Patomaiki,1996; Wight,2000).
In general, the metaphorof level is widelyused in realisttheoriesof science,
and forgood reasons (Bunge, 1963:36-48). There are different ontological layers
in the world,and the social world is itselfa causally efficaciousemergentlevel.
Given the empiricalrealismand linguisticrealismadhered to by those of either
boundary,then the best that can be said of levels is that we treat them "as if"
theyexisted (beyond the boundary of boredom), or deny the notion of depth
altogether(beyond the boundary of negativity).Contraryto these positionswe
suggest that it is a question of building substantialtheories and models that
attemptto resolveexactlywhere the layersare to be located and theirinterrela-
tionships.Moreover,we would also wish to talk about levels and depth within
social worlds.We suggestat least two directionsof depth, that is, of movements
towardsdeeper levels.
First is the ontological stratificationof agency and discourses, which are
closely interrelated,but not reducible to each other. Language and discourse,
for example, are closely connected to, but not reducible to the unconscious
level. And in both of these levels there can be interrelatedmechanisms that
could co-explain reasoning for,and rationalisationof, actions. Here the image
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 233
track.But the price of the Kantian dichotomybetween phenomena and noumena has been the disappearance of
causes and, ultimately,social structures.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
234 AfterPostpositivism?
Conclusion
We have argued for an approach that makes its commitmentto realism explicit
as opposed to secretingan implicitrealism.Through such a recoveryof realism
the "problem-field"of IR may be transcended. The positivism/postpositivism
dichotomythatreplaced the interparadigmdebate seems so naturalnow. It is as
if we have alwaysthoughtin this way and alwayswill.Yet this debate itselfis a
constructof those engaged in it and is a product of the "problem-field"of IR.
Mapped onto the "problem-field"of IR thisdivide mirrorsKant's dualisticworld
view.The positivistsconcern themselveswithKant's phenomenal realm and the
postpositivistswith the noumenal. Critical realism suggestsa differenttheory/
problem solution field. One, no doubt, that will contain the seeds of its own
destruction,forwe make no claims to finitudeor ahistoricalknowledge.
The "problem-field"of IR constitutesthe present-dayconditionsof possibility
forthinkingabout, hence actingin, the realm of internationalrelations.And as
such it blocks the developmentof a more ethicallyand politicallyaware body of
scholarshiporiented towardsemancipation. For, as MargaretArcher has put it,
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMXKI AND COLIN WIGHT 235
References
ADLER, E. (1997) Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivismin World Politics. EuropeanJournalof
InternationalRelations3:319-363.
ARCHER, M., ET AL. (1998) CriticalRealism:EssentialReadings.London: Routledge.
ASHLEY, R. (1984) The Povertyof Neorealism. International Organization 38:225-286.
ASHLEY, R., AND R. B. J. WALKER (1990a) Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in
InternationalStudies. InternationalStudiesQuarterly 34:259-268.
ASHLEY, R., AND R. B. J. WALKER (1990b) Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisisand the
Question of Sovereigntyin InternationalStudies. International StudiesQuarterly 34:367-416.
BHASKAR, R. (1975) A RealistTheory ofScience.Brighton:HarvesterPress.
BHASKAR, R. (1979) ThePossibilityofNaturalism. A PhilosophicalCritiqueofContemporary Human Sciences.
Brighton:HarvesterPress.
BHASKAR, R. (1986) ScientificRealism& Human Emancipation. London: Verso.
BHASKAR, R. (1989) Reclaiming Reality:A CriticalIntroductionto Contemporary London: Verso.
Phlilosophy.
BHASKAR, R. (1993) Dialectic.ThePulse ofFreedom. London: Verso.
BHASKAR, R. (1994) Plato Etc. TheProblems ofPhlilosophy and TheirResolution. London: Verso.
BUNGE, M. (1963) TheMyth Problems
ofSimplicity: ofScientific
Philosophy.
EnglewoodCliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.
BUNGE, M. (1996) FindingPhlilosophy in Social Science.London: Yale UniversityPress.
CAMPBELL, D. (1998) NationalDeconstruction: Violence,Identity,andJusticein Bosnia.London: University
of Minnesota Press.
CAMPBELL, D. (1999) Contra Wight:The Errorsof a PrematureWriting.ReviewofInternational Studies
25:317-321.
CARLSNAES, W. (1992) The Agent-Structure Problem in Foreign PolicyAnalysis.International Studies
Quarterly36:245-270.
CARNAP, R. (1972) "Empiricism,Semanticsand Ontology."In TheProblem Realism,edited
ofScientific
by A. MacKinnon, pp. 102-122. New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts.
COPJEC, J. (1994) SupposingtheSubject.London: Verso.
CULLER, J. (1983) On Deconstruction.Theoryand Criticism After Ithaca: Cornell University
Structuralism.
Press.
DESSLER, D. (1989) What'sat Stakein theAgent-Structure Debate? InternationalOrganization43:441-473.
DEWS, P. (1987) LogicsofDisintegration. Thoughtand ClaimsofCriticalTheory.
Post-Structuralist London:
Verso.
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
236 AfterPostpositivism?
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HEIKKI PATOMAKI AND COLIN WIGHT 237
This content downloaded from 134.58.253.57 on Mon, 04 Jan 2016 08:55:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions