DECISION

EN BANC
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 193459
Petitioner,
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for
Present:
- versus - certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House
CORONA, C.J., of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
CARPIO,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CARPIO MORALES,
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA VELASCO, JR.,* Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. NACHURA,
Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or
LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., BRION, on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG PERALTA,
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); BERSAMIN, spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment
MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, DEL CASTILLO, complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; ABAD,
DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY- VILLARAMA, JR., Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]
GENERAL OF KILUSANG PEREZ,
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); MENDOZA, and A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn
ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SERENO, JJ.
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES
impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. [3] who, by
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R.
GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT the Order of Business.[4]
OF GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John
TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
Respondents. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner with a
resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares,
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Promulgated:
Respondent-Intervenor. Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana
February 15, 2011
de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still
of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to
Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, [8] also directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of
the Committee on Rules,[9] instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary
General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the
Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of
Business,[10] which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for
the following day, August 11, 2010.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.[11]
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred
to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th
Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September
1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the
motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for
her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her
motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of
substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the
truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach
could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice
directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. [13]
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010,
petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En
Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require
respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by
Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the
second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel)
filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010
which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on
October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of
October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day
period.
The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first
resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment

complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and
that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. [17]
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of
Representatives.[18] The argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the
reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of
the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme
Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power
of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review
of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call
upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the
principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full
well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when
they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to
leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.
xxxx
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that
it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in
seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election, of a congressman as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara
v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective
of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances.Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
 whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite
of independence and interdependence that insures that no of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct,
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the original; adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. [25] In the present petition,
underscoring supplied) there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
the expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
Government.[21]
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding
jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural
should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public
in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her
claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in
year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.
this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the
repository of the sovereign will.[22]
Due process of law
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the
Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel
exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not
Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his
yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and
father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To
respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition[23] on September 13,
petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father
2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and
influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and
substance of the two complaints.
 in fairness and in accordance with law under that
vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
substance of the complaints against her.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your
merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not Honor, but he decides.
suffice.[26]
JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches: We presume that he is acting in good faith,
Your Honor, but then (interrupted)
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial
body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the JUSTICE MORALES:
commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident So, that he was found liable for violation of
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner that mean that your client will be deprived of due
Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the process of law?
rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a
majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC JUSTICE CUEVAS:
order, resolution or decision. No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that
expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman,
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the which goes with the element of due process is the lack
National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not of impartiality that may be expected of him.
speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-
man body x x x. [28] JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a
one-man committee?
In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, JUSTICE CUEVAS:
vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of That is correct, Your Honor.

form and substance of the complaints.[29] JUSTICE MORALES:

So, why do you say then that there is a lack
of impartiality?
Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
Because if anything before anything goes
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
(sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in
Well, the Committee is headed by a
this case there were objections relative to the existence
gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the
of the implementing rules not heard, there was
charges that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to
objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect
that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another
that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.
case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality,
 prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and
JUSTICE MORALES: underscoring supplied)
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is
there any law or rule you can cite which makes it
mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of
given that he had previously been found liable for
violation of a law[?] sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the

JUSTICE CUEVAS: Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.
jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby
with that background as the material or pertinent
antecedent that there could be no violation of the right JUSTICE MORALES:
of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of Is it not that the Committee
notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an should first determine that there is
impartial adjudicator.[30] (emphasis and underscoring sufficiency in form and substance before
supplied) she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public That is correct, Your Honor.

respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear JUSTICE MORALES:
indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to During which she can raise any
defenses she can assail the regularity of the
arrive thereat. proceedings and related irregularities?

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an
indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or
quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an
injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt
dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly
administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances
peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public
officers official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent
with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners
to present contradictory evidence other than a mere
tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners
failed to discharge. The swift completion of the
Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as
shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably
regular performance of not just one but five state
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity
and in full accord with that statement,
Your Honor, because it is only after a
determination that the complaint is sufficient
in form and substance that a complaint may
be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may
be asked, how is not your action premature,
Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of
the other violations involved and that is
(interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15 th Congress reflects the
impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34] which
denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the
opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept
petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the
impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set
by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35]
The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers
of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to
public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion,
the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an
impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional
purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide
for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance,
the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, [36] and that the
substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. [37]
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
made necessary.This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as
Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. [38] In
the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to
effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement
in the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the
offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of
certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
complaints, which involve matters of defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the
lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3,
2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th
Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules,
admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers
of general circulation.[40]
Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process
since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after
public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise
tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.
Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the
publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
[43]
Officers and Investigations which held that the Constitution categorically requires
publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent
explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to
effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.
Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as
To publish; to announce officially; to make public
as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a
statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to
cause an agency law or regulation to become known or
obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied)
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory
difference in their usage.
[45]
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times.
of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances
emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate
and publish, the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these
rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication.[46]
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision
directing Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates in the
presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its
canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, [47] it did
not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the
canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication
likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in
quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules
occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it
was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. [49]
A number
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to
publication, the former should be understood to have been used in its general
sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.
 procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive,
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v.
promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987
beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed
through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is known the issuances.
but one avenue for Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically
teaches that From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then

x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the
opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it
could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in
legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other single formal
term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it
being published.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of
legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the
Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section
3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment
process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have
decided to put in an additional section because, for instance,
under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified
complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate
facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In
other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of
court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like
indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or
crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section
4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL
PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
THEREOF. I think all these other proceduralrequirements
could be taken care of by the Rules of
Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions
are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend
the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains
in designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
 directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can
be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body,
which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not
nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which
faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start
of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-
day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect,
the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment
complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules
on impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment
proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it
proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to
meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective
implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application
to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. [54] In the present
case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for
the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the
offender.[55]
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were
not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the
rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective.[56] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper
procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions[57] of the
Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for
reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation
of the due process clause.
The one-year bar rule
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads:
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening
on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22,
2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public
respondent.
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-
intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment
complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but
venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the
conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially
maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its
impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means
to file the complaint and take initial action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second
verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had
already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici
No curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking
initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third[61] of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.[62] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th
Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 16 [63] and
17[64] of Rule V thereof ─ clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they
g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant
records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs
statements[66]that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner
Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the
initiation and that the Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of
that initiation phase.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this, [67] for certain
exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as
shown in the following exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for
initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a
vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House
is required to initiate proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only
one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is required; for
conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership
of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have
here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect,
disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to
revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary
Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look
towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment
proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that
problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather
than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the
Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the
Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to
overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we
would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the
Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half
or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and
that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is
prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo
Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to
impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file the
case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to
the Articles of Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because
when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of
Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner
Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the
committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the
one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about
this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with
me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I
have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration
of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of
the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings
and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word resolution the
phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in
impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole
section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the
committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the
House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,
really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of
Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct
filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners
Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be
accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets
the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material
dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-
year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of
referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not
be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that had already been
done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the
committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to
determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following
petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by
a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the
impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution
mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the
word complaint[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes
against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged
and plural sense.[75]
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment
complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle,
unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the
complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the
candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and
illusory.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever
files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress
which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government
resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best
intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the
expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in
line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even
hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings
turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird
even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely
intended to effectively weed out worms in high offices which could otherwise be
ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual
complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an
almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be
brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the
House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment
complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the
Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment
proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third
impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment
complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even
members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no
other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their
endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment
proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings
prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas
disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in
the House[77] precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact,
petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole
and absolute control of the House of Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal
import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must
deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame
and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone,
not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.
The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House
Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or
freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper
committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there
is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of
Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own
chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard
against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently
unconstitutional complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall
be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-
minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer
a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits
thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral.[80] With respect to complaints for
impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate
show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has
already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet
expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited
second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral
stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact,
grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment
proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint
for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter.
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on
the allegedly belated referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the
Baraquel group.For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was
yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that
the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to
run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the
Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
within the said 10-day session period.[81]
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment
complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited
political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire

citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges
the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the
mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the
initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar,
should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public
respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the
complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the
House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84]
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was
inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the
12th Congress.The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the
Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled
in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief
Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to
accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a
court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way,
then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should
be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated
in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one
way between one set of litigants and the opposite
way between another. "If a group of cases
involves the same point, the parties expect the
same decision. It would be a gross injustice to
decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a
case was decided against me yesterday when I
was a defendant, I shall look for the same
judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment
and wrong in my breast; it would be an
infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the
rule rather than the exception if litigants are to
have faith in the even-handed administration of
justice in the courts.[85]
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a
further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding
is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series
of steps that follow.[86]
Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral
allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own
respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee
shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the
complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the
overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the
House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes
group),[88] or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary
regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of
these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed
one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps
operating in unison under one proceeding.
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one
impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo
Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice
Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue
or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of]
legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that
reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is
not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of the
highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative
body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment
proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple
impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the
element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should
defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded
from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run
only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its
main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means
filing andreferral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by
the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a
maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment
complaint to the date of referral.
As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent-
intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable
officer abound.The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single
proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a
finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before bothering a
respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in
the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard
operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil
after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and
substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the
primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.
To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious
effects of bad publicity are enough oppression.
Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other
resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non
sequitur.What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from
arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the
charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In
considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise
an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave
issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media
tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they
deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of
protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if
Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There
is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional
safeguard of one-year bar rule.
Applicability of the Rules
impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent
on Criminal Procedure
public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an
discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier
impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of
chastised.
impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal
Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the
in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the
an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers
Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules
as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to
political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution
impeachment proceedings before the House.
stage the complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an
impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the
Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional
Philippines.
adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate,
petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal
Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups
First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of
point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls
the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of
under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from
the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or information must
office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. Both
charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on
various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in
pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her
Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which
in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political
prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into
nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules;
the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial
determination of which must be made by the House[93] which has yet to pass upon
the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.
indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an
article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of SO ORDERED.
Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not
allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In

rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one
impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to

consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that [c]onsolidation depends on the
Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come
later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for
purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact,
initially describes the consolidation as merely contemplated. [96]

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet
order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this
matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. [97]

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment
complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal
anomaly fails.Petitioners theory obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint
equation which the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of

September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT
 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Amended
THIRD DIVISION
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated 28 August
2008. The Amended Decision reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, G.R. No. 184315 2008 Decision[2] of the same court, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1114 dated 8
Petitioner,
November 2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages.
Present:
- versus -
CORONA, J.,
The facts of the case, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
Chairperson,
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CHICO-NAZARIO,
CORPORATION, ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges
VELASCO, JR.,
CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA that in the last quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation
NACHURA, and
GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and (Chronicle Publishing for brevity) published in the Manila
THELMA SAN JUAN, PERALTA, JJ. Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the
subject articles (November 10 and 12, 1993 issues), he was
Respondents.
imputed to be a Marcos crony or a Marcos-Romualdez crony,
which term according to him is commonly used and understood in
Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient of
Promulgated: special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez
due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and
which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and
dishonorable business activities.
November 25, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The plaintiff claims that the said articles further branded
DECISION him as a mere front or dummy for the Marcos and Romualdez
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: clans in Benguet Corporation, which company sought to take-over
the management of Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation
When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous (Oriental for brevity). He contends that such an imputation is
articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly untrue since his holdings in Benguet Corporation were legally
privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from acquired by him.
attaching in a defamatory imputation.
 Also, he was likewise accused of unsound and immoral
business practices by insinuating that he wanted to take control of
Oriental in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden
Benguet Corporation. He claims that the accusation is untrue
since he was merely interested in being represented in the board
thereof so as to protect his and his companies interest therein as
shareholders.
The subject articles insinuated that he personally and
intentionally caused the failure of Benguet Corporation and that if
even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the
same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he
assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it was already
experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world
prices of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into.
Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an
unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife
Corporation, of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike, when
the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his
group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor
problems as in Grepalife.
Furthermore, the subject articles accused him of inducing
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC for brevity) to
violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI
loans. He denies the imputations believing that there is nothing
irregular in the RCBC-Piedras transaction for the acquisition of
shares of Oriental.
Also, the plaintiff claims that the subject articles
insinuated that he induced others to disobey lawful orders of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) when the
truth is that the officials of RCBC and Alcorn never defied any SEC
order, and that if ever they did, he never induced them to do so.
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the subject articles
imputed to him the derogatory tag of corporate raider, implying
that he was seeking to profit for something he did not work
for. He denies the imputation since he acquired his stake in
Oriental for adequate and valuable consideration at the time
when no one was willing to bailout the government from its
difficult and losing position thereto.
In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming
that the subject articles were not defamatory since they were
composed and published in good faith and only after having
ascertained their contents. In any event, they claim that these
articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and
balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest
which cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against
them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the
bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of
the press.
Furthermore, they contend that since plaintiff is a public
figure, and assuming that the articles were indeed defamatory,
they cannot be held liable for damages since they were not
impelled by actual malice in the composition thereof. They did not
compose and/or publish said articles with the knowledge that
they contained falsehoods, or with reckless disregard on whether
or not they contained falsehood.
 As to defendant Coyiuto, he claims that he had no
participation in the publication of the subject articles nor
consented or approved their publication.
PLAINTIFFS EVIDENCE
During the trial, the plaintiff himself, ALFONSO T.
YUCHENGCO, testified that prior to his appointment as
Ambassador to Japan, he was the chairman of various business
organizations notably: Benguet Corporation (Benguet), Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC), Bank of America Savings Bank, House of
Investments, Inc., Dole Philippines and Philippine Fuji Xerox
Corporation. He was also the President of the Philippine
Ambassadors; chairman or vice president of Bantayog ng Bayan;
and chairman of AY Foundation, Inc. He was appointed Philippine
Ambassador to Peoples Republic of China after the EDSA
Revolution.
As regards the article referring to the November 10,
1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. A), he stated that he had
never been a Marcos crony nor had been a business partner of
the Romualdezes or had personal dealings with them; that during
the shareholders meeting, the two (2) sons of Benjamin Kokoy
Romualdez were elected as directors of Benguet Corporation
pursuant to a Court order; that he had no personal dealings with
them; that he had no intention of taking over Oriental and that
Benguet Corporation did not lose the amount as stated in the
article; that Benguet Corporation experienced liquidity problems,
and that before he joined the corporation, it had already
diversified into many other financial ventures; that he denied
having any business partnership with the Romualdezes at that
time.
Regarding the November 12, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. B), he denied having any partnership with the
Marcos family; that he denied responsibility for the losses
incurred by Benguet Corporation, as the losses were due to the
drop of the commodity market, and for having diversified into
other non-profitable ventures; that he had no intention
whatsoever of taking over Oriental; that although the Yuchengco
family owns a substantial block of shares of RCBC, Sanwa Bank
actually owns twenty-five percent (25%) thereof; that RCBC did
not finance his fund but it extended a loan to Piedras Petroleum, a
subsidiary of the Presidential Commission of Good Government
(PCGG for brevity); admitted that Traders Royal Bank also granted
a loan to PCGG but such was an independent transaction of RCBC.
About the November 15, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. C), he denied any knowledge of what transpired at
the Trust Department of RCBC because as Chairman he was not
involved in many of the banks transactions.
Referring to November 16, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. D), he considered the attacks against him to be
malicious considering that he does not see any connection
between the labor strike at Grepalife with the case of Alcorn and
RCBC; that the article would like to show that he was the reason
for the huge losses incurred by Benguet Corporation.
As regards the November 22, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. E), he denied giving any interest free loan, the fact
that they gave a loan to PCGG does not mean that they gave a
loan to Benedicto since the latter had already turned over the
shares of Piedras to PCGG at that time.

Regarding the November 23, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. F), he denied extending an interest free loan
considering that he is not the only owner of RCBC; that these
series of attacks against him and RCBC were intended to cause a
bank run; that the article imputes that he was responsible for
giving an interest free loan.
About the December 5, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. G), he said the article was intended to humiliate
and embarrass him since he really had no intention of taking over
Oriental; that the reason for the attack against his person was
because he and defendant Coyiuto, Jr. were both rivals in the
insurance business and that the latter has always been envious of
his position for having owned Malayan Insurance Company.
On cross-examination, plaintiff Yuchengco testified that
he does not consider himself a public figure; and that he felt
maligned by the references to him as a Marcos crony. [TSN, 07
February 1997; 10 February 1997; 12 February 1997]
ROSAURO ZARAGOZA testified that he is the Executive
Vice-President of RCBC; that the statement in Exhibits D, E and F
with regard to the interest free loan allegedly granted to Piedras
Petroleum Company, Inc. (Piedras) are false because the Piedras
deal was a trust transaction which involved an advance in
exchange for shares of stock; that plaintiff Yuchengco did not
have a personal interest in the Piedras deal; that Piedras or
Oriental Petroleum Mineral Corporation (Oriental Petroleum)
shares were not transferred to plaintiff Yuchengcos name by
virtue of the transaction; and that the defendants did not
approach him or RCBC to check the veracity of the subject
articles. The affidavit of Mr. Zaragoza (Exhibit H) was adopted as
part of his testimony.
On cross-examination, Mr. Zaragoza testified that he
volunteered to testify in the instant case because he was the most
knowledgeable about the Piedras deal; that plaintiff Yuchengco
was aggrieved upon reading the subject articles; that under the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between RCBC and Piedras,
should the latter fail to comply with its obligations under the
MOA, it will pay interest at the prevailing market interest rate
from the date of advance until full payment; and that there was a
complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against RCBC
by Mr. Felipe Remollo questioning the Piedras deal. [TSN 28
February 1997; 26 June 1997; 27 June 1997; 04 July 1997]
JOSE REVILLA testified that he and Amb. Yuchengco were
long time friends, where he (Revilla) worked for him (Yuchengco)
for thirty-two (32) years in his (Yuchengco) credit card company
Industrial Finance Corporation Credit Cards; that knowing Amb.
Yuchengco for a considerable period of time, he does not believe
the truth of the contents of the subject articles; that plaintiff
Yuchengco appeared distressed when he joked about the subject
articles; that other people approached him to ask whether the
subject articles are true [TSN 25 August 1997].
xxxx
DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE
On the other hand, defendants Zaragoza, Gatdula,
Cabrera and Valino substantially testified on the following
matters:
 GERRY ZARAGOZA testified that he was the Managing
Editor of Manila Chronicle in charge of the national and political
news; that defendant San Juan was the other Managing Editor in
charge of the lifestyle section; that a story conference is
conducted everyday where the articles, including the pages where
they will appear, are discussed; that the editor-in-chief (defendant
Cruz), executive editor (defendant Tolentino) and deputy editor
(defendant Cabrera) were the ones responsible for the decisions
of the story conference relative to the printing of the newspaper;
that he was not involved in the writing and editing of the subject
articles; that Exhibits A to D are classified as business news; that
columns, specifically Exhibits E and F are not discussed during
story conferences; and that Exhibit G, which appeared in the
Money Section did not pass thru him.
On cross-examination, defendant Zaragoza testified that
except for the columns, Exhibits A to D and Exhibit G are
considered hard news; that he handled the hard news, while
defendant San Juan handled the soft news; and that defendant
Valino was the business editor in charge of the business section
(TSN 22 July 1998; 23 September 1998]
DONNABELLE GATDULA claimed that she was a
correspondent for Manila Chronicle assigned to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) beat; that she had no participation in
the writing or publication of Exhibits A to C and G to E; that she
attended the hearing conducted by the SEC and interviewed the
two lawyers of RCBC and SEC Chairman Rosario Lopez regarding
the Oriental Petroleum case; that her name appears as a tag line
in Exhibit D, because she only wrote part of the story; and that
she did not write the entire article (Exhibit D) as some of the
statements therein were added by the editor/s; and that she did
not discuss Exhibit D with any of the editors.
On cross-examination, defendant Gatdula testified that
she does not have a copy of the original article which she wrote;
that she read Exhibit D after it was published; that she did not
compare her original story with Exhibit D nor question the
authority of the editor to edit her story; and that she agreed to
put her name on Exhibit D. (TSN 23 September 1998; 05 October
1998).
NOEL CABRERA contended that after having gone
through the subject articles, he believes that the news stories and
commentaries were fair and that those who wrote the same
followed the proper standards; that as regard the contents of
Exhibits E and F, the opinion of Mr. Raul Valino, as written in the
said articles, were valid and based on documentary facts; as to
Exhibit D, pertaining to the article of Ms. Donnabelle Gatdula, she
based her article on documents pertaining to the Oriental
transaction, other documents, as well as interviews; that at the
time the subject articles were written, Amb. Yuchengco was a
public figure, being a very prominent businessman with vast
interest in banks and other businesses; that during the year 1993,
the word crony was more or less accepted to mean as a big
businessman or close associate of the late President Marcos, and
its use in the column was meant only to supply the perspective as
to the figure or subject involved in the news story, and there is
thus no malice or derogatory intent when the same was used.
On cross-examination, defendant Cabrera testified that
defendant Coyiuto is one of the owners of Manila Chronicle; and
that he only saw the records of Exhibits 8 to 10 and 16 to 20 after
the publication of Exhibits A to G (TSN 21 April 1999; 28 April 1999
05 May 1999; 10 May 1999).
RAUL VALINO stated that he was the Acting Business
Manager and later Managing Editor and Business Editor-in-Chief
 of Manila Chronicle; that after having consulted several
dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he did not come
across a definition describing the word to mean someone who is a a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos
recipient of any undeserving or special favor from anyone, that it (P10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
merely refers to someone who is a friend or a special friend; there
was no mention whatsoever in the subject article that Amb.
Yuchengco was being accused of fronting for the late President b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos
Marcos (referring to par. 2.3.2 of the complaint); that nowhere in (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
the said paragraph was Amb. Yuchengco accused of having acted
as a front to facilitate the acquisition of a prohibited interest in a
private corporation by a public official while occupying a public
2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants
office; that nowhere in the article was Amb. Yuchengco accused
Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff
of being directly or indirectly involved in unsound business
Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
practices (referring to par. 2.4 of the complaint); that whatever
imputation of ill-will in par. 2.4.1 of the complaint was only in
plaintiffs mind; and as regards par. 2.6 of the complaint, that he
was merely reporting on what transpired at the picket line and a. the amount of Fifty Million Pesos
what the striking employees answered to him; and that he did not (P50,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
state in his columns (Exhibits E and F) that plaintiff Yuchengco
violated banking laws. [TSN 23 February 2000][3]
b. the amount of Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;

On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of herein

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants
petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, disposing of the case as follows:
to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal
costs.[4]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants
Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and
severally:
The respondents, namely the Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation,
Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza,
Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, and Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 and was
raffled to the Fifth Division.
 RECONSIDERATION WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF THE
CA DECISION DATED MARCH 18, 2008.
On 18 March 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
affirming the RTC Decision:
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeals of OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
defendants-appellants and AFFIRMING the decision
[5]
dated November 8, 2002 of the trial court IN TOTO.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE.[6]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 28 August 2008, the

Court of Appeals reversed itself in an Amended Decision:

Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of
this Court dated March 18, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the court a quo dated November 8,
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. A libel is a public and
2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Complaint for
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
Damages against the defendants-appellants is DISMISSED. No
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
pronouncement as to costs.
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where petitioner puts forth
the following Assignments of Error: Based on this definition, this Court has held that four elements constitute
the crime of libel, namely (a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt; (b) malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication; and (d)
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED identifiability of the person defamed.[7]
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE CASE OF
ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
CITED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR MOTION FOR
 Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be thus left with the determination of the existence of the three remaining elements
instituted, like in the case at bar, as a purely civil action, the cause of action for of libel, namely: (1) the defamatory imputation; (2) the identity of the person
which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides: defamed; and (3) the existence of malice.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical

injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured Defamatory Imputation
party.Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for
damages. As held by this Court in GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos[8]:
An award of damages under the premises presupposes
the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or
libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and
malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following
elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring
a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It
is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill or
confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the
plaintiff. It is the publication of anything that is injurious to the good name or
reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. [10] In determining
whether certain utterances are defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would
naturally be understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense. [11]
In order to fully appreciate whether the subject articles are, in fact,
defamatory, an analysis thereof is in order. The following are what have been
referred to as the subject articles:

Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the
Manila Chronicle Issue Title Exhibit
publication of the alleged imputation. Libel is published not only when it is widely
Date (Author)
circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of
another person other than its author and the offended party.[9] The circulation of an 10 November 1993 Yuchengko joins forces with A, A-1 to A-5
allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient publication. We are
(no by-line) Kokoy
12 November 1993 RCBC probed for violating
CB rules
(no by-line)
15 November 1993 RCBC called to SEC;
subtitled Yuchengco Bank
(no by-line) defies government order
16 November 1993 Alcorn, RCBC execs own
guilt
(Donna Gatdula)
22 November 1993 Bank runs and RCBC free
loans
(Raul Valino)
Alfonso Yuchengco, a Marcos crony who wants to
takeover the ownership and management of the highly profitable
B, B-1 to B-2 Oriental Petroleum Minerals Corp. (OMPC), has tied up with
Marcos brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez through two
of his sons, records at the securities and Exchange Commission
C, C-1 to C-3 (SEC) showed yesterday.
Kokoys two sons, Benjamin Philip Gomez Romualdez, 32,
D, D-1 to D-4
and Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, 29, are now members of the
board of the debt-ridden and heavily losing Benguet Corp., a
company taken over by Marcos during his dictatorship, but which
E, E-1 to E-2 was sequestered at the start of President Aquinos term.

23 November 1993 RCBC case bugs Bangko F, F-1 to F-3 xxxx

Sentral
(Raul Valino)

5 December 1993 The Battle for Oriental G, G-1 to G-4 Observers said they believed the elections of the
Romualdez sons officially confirmed suspicions that the Marcos
(Rodney P. Diola) and Romualdez clans really owned Benguet.

Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, employed by

the company for 10 years before he was named finance secretary
by then President Aquino, committed suicide after being accused
of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony.
In two of the subject articles, respondents allegedly accused and labeled
Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the
former President to gain unwarranted benefits:

Yuchengco Bank under CB probe[13]

Yuchengco joins forces with Kokoy[12]

xxxx
 The official said the case was recently brought to Bangko The interest-free loan controversy also involves Traders
Sentrals attention by an RCBC creditor who felt he was being Royal Bank (TRB), a sequestered bank, owned by Roberto
cheated by the bank through interest-free loans granted to Benedicto, a Marcos crony.
related interests.

xxxx
Under the interest-free loan scheme, Yuchengco was
able to own OMPC shares of Piedras since they were the same
shares RCBC financed and which were turned over to the bank as
The deal could be from one crony to another since
payment for the loan.
Yuchengco is very much associated with the Marcoses and the
Romualdezes, a source opined.

The Central Bank official said that Bangko Sentral is now

determining whether RCBC violated the rule on loans to directors,
Yuchengco owns Benguet Corp., which is heavily losing
officers, stockholders and related interests (DOSRI).
since he joined the Company as Chairman in 1989.

Yuchengco is both a director (chairman) officer,

xxxx
stockholder, and a related interest of RCBC.

Since Benguet is encountering all kinds of financial

xxxx
problems, losses and overdue debts, observers say they fear that
Oriental may also suffer the same fate when and should
Yuchengco and his partners assume management of OMPC.
Violating the DOSRI rule is a criminal offense. The Bangko
Sentral official stressed. I believe that that is tantamount, not only
to cheating the depositor, but also robbing the bank of its clients
Already, it was noted the Oriental shares sold on the
money.
stock market are weakening, and stock observers say this could be
attributed to the planned entry into the company of Yuchengco,
Leonardo Siguion-Reyna and their minority partners.
If Bangko Sentral does not act decisively on this matter,
the official asked what will prevent the other banks from resorting
to this kind of transactions to enrich their owners and enable
them to acquire shares of stock from other companies?
 In another of the subject articles, respondents allegedly insinuated that
Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful orders of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC):
Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt[14]
xxxx
Some observers said the APMC order to RCBC could be a
ploy to prevent Robert Coyiuto, Jr., chairman and president of
OPMC, from retaining his majority control of Oriental, and a
scheme to put on the board members of the Yuchengco company.

Two officials of Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals

Corporation (AMPC) and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) admitted before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) yesterday that they ignored the SEC order commanding
them to process all Alcorn shares in the name of R. Coyiuto
Securities Inc. and its investor clients such as Oriental Petroleum
and Minerals Corporation (OMPC).
xxxx
In fact, when Yuchengco created his own OPMC board of
directors, he appointed Ricalde as corporate secretary, OPMC
officials pointed out.
In our opinion, observers following the OPMC
developments stated, this is a clear and simple case of criminal
conspiracy whose perpetrators must be meted the harshest
punishment to prevent corporate thieves from making a mockery
of the law and from illegally taking over corporations which they
do not own in the first place.

RCBC is owned by Alfonso Yuchengco, chairman of the

debt-ridden and heavily-losing Benguet Corp. He also owns Great
Pacific Life Insurance Co., whose employees are on strike because
of the companys refusal to grant them better salaries and
Yuchengco further presented the following articles which allegedly accused
benefits.
him of inducing Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on Directors, Officers, stockholders, and
Related Interest (DOSRI) loans:
xxxx

Bank runs and RCBC free loans[15]

SEC insiders said that while Monreal and Ricalde should
be punished for disobeying a lawful order from the SEC, people
who masterminded the APMC order should also be penalized
once proven guilty. The Bank runs that devastated the economy in the recent
past were, first and foremost, instigated by rumors that bank
owners were, themselves, using the publics money to promote xxxx
their own businesses and interests in violation of Central Bank
rules and regulations.
The P101 million interest-free loan to Piedras is of
national interest for not just one reason alone.
xxxx

First, the money involved came from the depositors, and

Now here comes Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation not from the pockets of Yuchengco.
(RCBC) being charged with engaging in unsound banking by
lending an interest-free loan of P101 million to one company,
Piedras Petroleum Corporation, which Marcos crony Roberto
Second, banking rules dictate that a bank must be
Benedicto had surrendered to the Presidential Commission on
prudent in lending out its clients money, so that its financial
Good Government (PCGG).
viability must never be put in question.

xxxx
Third, the money lent to a borrower must never end up
in the pocket of the owner of the bank.

What would happen if all the other banks resort to this

kind of lending activity, giving away loans without interest? The
Fourth, such a practice could lead to a bank run, which
entire banking system would certainly be compromised.
the economy cannot afford at this time, even if the run is confined
to just one bank.

The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal

with their depositors money. They should also consider what fatal
effects such a practice could inflict on the very system where
RCBC operates. The country, at this time, cannot afford another
Yuchengco further claims that the following article, in labeling him as a
series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.
corporate raider, implies that he is seeking to profit from something he did not
work for:

RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral[16] The Battle for Oriental[17]

 Ledesma says Coyiuto will not wilt from Yuchengcos
fabled financial power. Robert has a lot of friends that will help
him fend off a raider like Yuchengco, says Ledesma.
xxxx
Ledesma of OPMC says that even if Coyiuto loses in the
bid, hell still remain a very significant player in OPMC given his
substantial personal holdings and proxies in the
company.Coyiutos investment in OPMC is now valued at more
than a billion pesos compared to the Yuchengco block which, the
Coyiuto group points out, has only minimal investments.
Thats our moral ascendancy over their group. Coyiuto
virtually made Oriental what it is today unlike Yuchengco who is
just getting into the act now because Oriental has become an
attractive cash cow says Ledesma.
War of Families
The fight for control of Oriental Petroleum gains
particular poignancy given the long history of feuding between
the families of Yuchengco and Coyiuto. Their families were bitter
rivals in the insurance business way back in the seventies. The
Yuchengcos own the Malayan Group of Insurance Companies
while the Coyiutos used to control Pioneer Insurance. That rivalry
seems to have come full circle with their battle in Oriental
Petroleum.
Pomento says the best arrangement would have been a
modus vivendi between the two groups to stop their quarrel and
work instead for the interest of the company. But given the bad
blood that exists between the two families, that might be a
difficult proposition, he says.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that the above
articles contain defamatory imputations. Even the Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, wherein the appellate court reversed itself and held that respondents
were not liable for damages, did not modify its earlier ruling affirming the
defamatory character of the imputations in the above articles. The Court of Appeals
merely reversed itself on account of the allegedly privileged nature of the articles,
which goes into the element of malice.Malice, as an element of libel, and the
defenses affecting the existence of the same shall be discussed later.
In arguing that the subject articles are not really derogatory, respondent
Cabrera explains that the word crony was more or less accepted to describe a big
businessman or close associate of the late President Marcos, and its use in the
column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject
involved in the news story. Respondent Valino further claimed that after consulting
several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he did not come across a
definition describing the word to mean someone who is a recipient of any
undeserving or special favor from anyone.
We are not swayed by the explanations of respondents Cabrera and
Valino. In determining the defamatory character of words used, the explanation of
the respondent should not prevail over what the utterances (or writing) convey to
an ordinary listener (or reader).[18] Furthermore, as held by this Court in United
States v. Sotto[19]:
 [F]or the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication
alleged to be libelous that construction must be adopted which
will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in
the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be
libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to
the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any
subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on
being called to account. The whole question being the effect the
publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not
having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the
article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting,
if any there be, from the word used in the publication. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In finding that the phrase Marcos crony is derogatory, the trial court took
judicial notice of the fact that the said phrase, as understood in Philippine context,
refers to an individual who was the recipient of special and/or undeserved favors
from the late President Marcos due to a special closeness to the latter. This finding,
which was upheld by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision and was not
tackled in the Amended Decision, is even supported by one of the subject
articles. In particular, the 10 November 1993article marked as Exhibit A mentioned
that Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, committed suicide after being
accused of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony.[20] This statement highlights the
disgrace respondents wanted to associate with the term crony, which was used to
describe Yuchengco in the very same article.
Even a cursory reading of the subject articles would show the intention of
the writers to injure the reputation, credit and virtue of Yuchengco and expose him
to public hatred, discredit, contempt and ridicule. The indirect manner in which the
articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., the money involved came from
depositors, and not from Yuchengco) does not lessen the culpability of the writers
and publishers thereof, but instead makes the defamatory imputations even more
effective. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to
destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical
language is a favored vehicle for slander.[21]
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the
following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took
advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain unwarranted
benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful
orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer
due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he
induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans;
and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a corporate raider seeking to profit from
something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and
ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.
Identification
Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person,
and that person must be the plaintiff. Statements are not libelous unless they refer
to an ascertained or ascertainable person.[22] However, the obnoxious writing need
not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is shown that the
offended party is the person meant or alluded to.[23]
In the case at bar, all but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the
name of petitioner Yuchengco. The lone article, which does not mention Yuchengco
at all, Bank runs & RCBC free loans,[24] nevertheless chided the owners of RCBC:
 The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal
with their depositors money. They should also consider what fatal
effects such a practice could inflict on the very system where
RCBC operates. The country, at this time, cannot afford another
series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.[25]
Identifying Yuchengco in said article by name was, however, not necessary,
since the other subject articles, published a few days before and after this one, had
already referred to Yuchengco as the owner of RCBC, sometimes explicitly (Benguet
started to bleed in 1989, the year Yuchengco, who owns Rizal Commercial Banking
Corp. [RCBC], took over as chairman of the company [26]), and sometimes implicitly
(the money involved came from depositors, and not from Yuchengco). While the
defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an
individual, this is subject to exception when it can be shown that he is the target of
the defamatory matter.[27] This Court therefore finds that Yuchengco was clearly
identified as the libeled party in the subject defamatory imputations.
Malice
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[28] It is present when it is shown that the author
of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[29]
Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. There are two
types of malice malice in law and malice in fact.[30] Malice in law is a presumption of
law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the presumption
are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive malice, legal
malice, or implied malice.[31] On the other hand, malice in fact is a positive desire
and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated
by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice,
true malice, or particular malice.[32]
In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code, which also enumerates exceptions thereto:
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.
 There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those
imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be
making such imputation. actionable unless made with malice or bad faith.[34]

The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly

privileged communications. The enumeration under said article is, however, not an
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on
the publication of the subject articles was attended by actual malice:
matters of public interest are likewise privileged.[33] They are known as qualifiedly
privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule
requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held
In the instant case, there is preponderance of evidence
actionable. In other words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any
showing that there exists malice in fact in the writing and
of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged communications enumerated above (1)
publication of the subject libelous articles.
a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
As correctly found by the trial court, [petitioner] was
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
able to show that [respondents] were animated by a desire to
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation as shown by the
exercise of their functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest
timing and frequency of the publication of the defamatory
may still be considered actionable if actual malice is proven. This is in contrast articles. Further, as previously stated, [respondents] failed to
with absolutely privileged communications, wherein the imputations are not show that they had any good intention and justifiable motive for
actionable, even if attended by actual malice: composing and publishing the vicious and malicious accusations
against [petitioner].

A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not

actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. This class
includes statements made by members of Congress in the
discharge of their functions as such, official communications
made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and
allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in
their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial
proceedings, as well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to
questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings,
provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the
questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand,
Moreover, [respondents] published or caused the
publication of the subject defamatory articles with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. As previously stated,
there is no proof that the contents of the subject articles are true
or that the respondents exercised a reasonable degree of care
before publishing the same. [Respondents] failed to present
evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the
subject articles, especially in light of the categorical denial by
[petitioner] of the accusations made against him.
 [Respondents] did not exercise reasonable degree of care
or good faith efforts to arrive at the truth before publishing the
subject defamatory articles. [Respondents] did not present any
competent evidence to establish the truth of their allegations
against [petitioner]. There was no showing that [respondents]
made any attempt to talk to [petitioner] to verify the statements
contained in the defamatory articles, especially considering the
gravity of the accusations made against [petitioner]. At the very
least, [respondents] should have exercised efforts to talk to
[petitioner] to clarify the issues and get his side. [Respondents]
failure to verify the truth of the information from [petitioner]
himself is in itself an evidence of their lack of bona fide efforts to
verify the accuracy of her information.
The incessant publication of the defamatory articles
attacking the honor and reputation of [petitioner] is also proof of
[respondents] malicious scheme to malign and defame the name,
honor and reputation of [petitioner]. As earlier pointed out, in a
span of one (1) month, [respondents] wrote and published
and/or caused the publication of seven (7) libelous articles
against [petitioner] attacking his honor and reputation as a
distinguished businessman, philanthropist, his political
inclination, and as an employer in his insurance company. In
fact, the presence of malice is made more evident by
[respondents] baseless and uncalled for attack on the person of
[petitioner] as an employer. As aptly noted by the trial court in
the assailed Decision:
Also in one of the articles, herein
plaintiff was portrayed as an unfair and uncaring
employer due to the strike staged by the
employees of Grepalife suggesting that it was
the [petitioner] who was the cause, and of
insinuating that if [petitioners] group takes over
control of Oriental, it would experience the
same labor problem as in Grepalife. The Court
finds that [respondents] failed to render an
unbiased and fair report as to the real cause of
the strike except to lay the blame to
[petitioner], without stating, much less
describing, his participation thereon, knowing
fully well that Grepalife is an entity distinct from
the plaintiff. In other words, the labor policies
implemented by Grepalife as regards its
employees are obviously not that of Yuchengco.
Such baseless and malicious accusation of
[respondents] on [petitioner] only proves the intention of the
[respondents] in publishing the defamatory articles was not to
present an unbiased report on current issues but to launch a
personal attack on the very person of [petitioner].
As earlier explained, as correctly found by the trial
court, even the timing of the publication of these subject articles
is highly suspicious inasmuch as the subject libelous articles
came out in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper owned and
under the control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around November to
December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the January
stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation. From this, it is
logical to conclude that the publication of the subject defamatory
articles defaming the good name and reputation of [petitioner] is
but a part of [a] grand scheme to create a negative image of
[petitioner] so as to negatively affect [petitioners] credibility to
the public, more particularly, to the then stockholders of Oriental
Corporation. Worth noting also is the fact that the subject articles
did not only portray [petitioner] in a bad light. Curiously, in these
articles, [respondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner], was
portrayed as the underdog, the David and [petitioner] as the
Goliath in their battle for control over Oriental Corporation. This
does not escape the Courts attention.

These circumstances clearly indicate the presence of
actual malice on the part of [respondents] in the publication of
the subject libelous articles.[35] (Emphases supplied.)
When the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration, it did
not touch upon its earlier finding of actual malice on the part of respondents in
publishing the subject articles. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely held that the
subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell
within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged communications.
This was a glaring error on the part of the Court of Appeals. As discussed
above, whereas there is an absolute bar to an action in the case of absolutely
privileged communication, the same is not true with respect to qualifiedly
privileged communication, wherein the law merely raises a prima facie presumption
in favor of the occasion. In the former, the freedom from liability is absolute,
regardless of the existence of actual malice, as contrasted with the freedom in the
latter, where it is conditioned on the want or absence of actual
malice. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are actionable when
[36]
made with actual malice.
When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous
articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly
privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from
attaching to a defamatory imputation.
Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the
respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the
attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a desire to inflict
unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of the
publication of the defamatory articles. The portrayal of then Chronicle Publishing
Chairman Coyiuto as an underdog and his rival Yuchengco as the greedy Goliath in
their battle for control over Oriental Corporation, taken with the timing of the
publication of these subject articles a couple of months prior to the January
stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation, clearly indicate that the articles
constituted an orchestrated attack to undermine the reputation of
Yuchengco.Furthermore, respondents were shown to have acted with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity of the articles they published, when they were
unable to rebut the categorical denial by Yuchengco of the accusations made
against him, and his allegation that he was not approached by respondents for his
side of the stories before the publication thereof.Respondents failure to present
evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles is fatal to
their cause. In In re: Emil P. Jurado,[37] this Court ruled that categorical denials of
the truth of allegations in a publication place the burden upon the party
publishing it, either of proving the truth of the imputations or of showing that the
same was an honest mistake or error committed despite good efforts to arrive at
the truth. There is actual malice when there is either (1) knowledge of the
publications falsity; or (2) reckless disregard of whether the contents of the
publication were false or not.[38] Failure to even get the side of Yuchengco in the
published articles clearly constituted reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of said
articles.
Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was
not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the
Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair
commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the
third type of qualifiedly privileged communications.
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. Theonen,[39] this Court
adopted the pronouncement in the United States Decision in Gertz v. Robert
Welsch, Inc.[40]that, in order to be considered as fair commentaries on matters of
public interest, the individual to whom the defamatory articles were imputed
should either be a public officer or a public figure:
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that the
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are likewise privileged. We stated that the
doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved,
and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may
be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition.
Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As
we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public
official or public figure. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., [418
U. S. 323 (1974)] that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing
defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a
public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the
falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.(Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, in trying to prove that the subject articles delved on matters
concerning public interest, the Court of Appeals insisted that Yuchengco was a
public official or public figure, who must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts.[41] The Court of Appeals then noted that Yuchengco
was, at the time of the Amended Decision, appointed as a Presidential Adviser on
Foreign Affairs with Cabinet rank, and proceeded to enumerate [42] the public
positions held by Yuchengco through the years.
However, an examination of the subject articles reveals that the
allegations therein pertain to Yuchengcos private business endeavors and do not
refer to his duties, functions and responsibilities as a Philippine Ambassador
to China and Japan, or to any of the other public positions he occupied. A topic or
story should not be considered a matter of public interest by the mere fact that the
person involved is a public officer, unless the said topic or story relates to his
functions as such. Assuming a public office is not tantamount to completely
abdicating ones right to privacy. Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether
or not a topic is a matter of public interest, Yuchengco cannot be considered a
public officer.
Neither is Yuchengco a public figure. The above case Philippine
Journalists continues to cite the US case Gertz in describing who is a public figure:
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment. Third, this would
impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide
which publications address issues of general interest and which
do not. Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every
instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily
exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with
respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office
or assumed an influential role in ordering society. (Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no
part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and
 consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for
redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public b. The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from
officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Five Hundred
recovery.[43] (Emphasis supplied.) Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);

2. The damages for which Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing
shall be jointly and severally liable under the second cause of action shall be
The records in the case at bar do not disclose any instance wherein
reduced as follows:
Yuchengco had voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. He cannot,
therefore, be considered a public figure. Since Yuchengco, the person defamed in
the subject articles, is neither as public officer nor a public figure, said articles a. The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Fifty
cannot be considered as qualifiedly privileged communications even if they deal Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to Twenty-Five Million Pesos
with matters of public concern. (P25,000,000.00); and

In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant b. The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from
Petition and reinstate the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) Ten Million Pesos
Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of (P10,000,000.00).
damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos by the trial court to be
rather excessive given the circumstances. This Court, thus, further resolves to
reduce the award of damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated 28 August 2008, which
1. The damages for which Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto
reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March 2008 Decision of the same
Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
Valino and Rodney Diola shall be jointly and severally liable under the first cause of
the Regional Trial Court ofMakati City in Civil Case No. 94-1114 dated 8 November
action shall be reduced as follows:
2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages, is hereby REINSTATED, but
shall be MODIFIED to read as follows:

a. The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Ten

Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Two Million Pesos WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
(P2,000,000.00); and hereby rendered as follows:
 1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Costs against respondents.
Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and
severally: SO ORDERED.

a. the amount of Two Million Pesos

(P2,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants

Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff
Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Twenty-Five Million Pesos

(P25,000,000.00) as moral damages;
and

b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos

(P10,000,000.00) as exemplary
damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants

to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal
costs.
 At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court transpired and led to the filing of the motions is in order.

Manila The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several

allegedly defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation. Consequently, petitioner filed a

complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, G.R. No. 184315
Petitioner, City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1114, under three separate causes
Present:
of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal H. Cruz,
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula,
PERALTA,
MENDOZA, and Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial staff and writers of The
THE MANILA CHRONICLE REYES, JJ.
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, Promulgated: Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right
NOEL CABRERA, GERRY November 28, 2011
ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorneys fees and
RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL
VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN and costs against all the respondents.
ROBERT COYIUTO, JR.,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] in favor of

petitioner.
RESOLUTION

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the Court of Appeals

PERALTA, J.:
(CA). On March 18, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision[4] affirming in toto the

decision of the RTC.

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated January 15, 2010,

filed by the respondents, and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[2] of

Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] praying that the CA
respondent Robert Coyiuto, Jr., dated March 17, 2010, from the Decision rendered in
reconsider its earlier decision and reverse the decision of the trial court. On August
favor of petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, dated November 25, 2009.
28, 2008, the CA rendered an Amended Decision[6] reversing the earlier Decision.
 Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court which On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[9] resolving to recall the

puts forth the following assignment of errors: Resolution dated March 3, 2010; grant Coyiuto, Jr.s motion for leave to file

supplemental motion for reconsideration; note the supplemental motion for

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN reconsideration; and require petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration
RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET
AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., CITED BY and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, WARRANTED THE
REVERSAL OF THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH On June 22, 2010, petitioner filed his Comment on the Motion for
18, 2008.
Reconsideration[10] dated January 15, 2010 and Comment on respondent Coyiuto,
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN Jr.s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[11] dated 17 March 2010.
RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE
COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents moved for a reconsideration
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
of the earlier decision on the following grounds:
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
OR PUBLIC FIGURE.[7] 1. MALICE-IN-FACT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN.
2. PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC FIGURE.
3. THE SUBJECT OF THE PUBLICATIONS CONSTITUTES
On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting FAIR COMMENTS, ON PUBLIC ISSUES, ON MATTERS
OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND NATIONAL CONCERN.
the petition. 4. RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT IN A RECKLESS
MANNER OR IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE
TRUTH OF THE MATTERS COVERED BY THE
SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
Respondents later filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 15, 5. THE PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF QUALIFIED
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTS THE
2010, which the Court denied in the Resolution[8] dated March 3, 2010. SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
6. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO
HOLD DONNA GATDULA, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY,
Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File LIABLE FOR THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS,
TOGETHER WITH THE EDITORS AND STAFF OF THE
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Attached Supplemental Motion, both NEWSPAPER.
7. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO HOLD THELMA SAN
dated March 17, 2010. JUAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUBJECT
PUBLICATIONS.
8. THE QUICK NOTES COLUMN OF MR. RAUL VALINO
ARE BASED ON FACTS; THUS, NOT LIBELOUS.
 9. ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. IS NOT IMPLEADED WITH DOCUMENTS SHOW THE CONTRARY, AS WILL BE
THE EDITORS AND STAFF MEMBERS OF DISCUSSED HEREUNDER. SO HOW COULD RESPONDENT
THE MANILA CHRONICLE, BUT IS SUED IN HIS COYIUTO, JR. BE IMPLEADED TO HAVE ABUSED HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY FOR AN ABUSE OF RIGHT AND RIGHT AS A NON-CHAIRMAN, NON-STOCKHOLDER,
NO EVIDENCE LINKS HIM TO THE SUBJECT NON-OFFICER OF RESPONDENT MANILA CHRONICLE
PUBLICATIONS. PUBLISHING CORPORATION? IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT
10. THE AWARDED DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS ON THE PARTY
EQUITABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED.[12] ASSERTING A FACT OR ESTABLISHING A CLAIM (RULE
131, REVISED RULES OF COURT).[13]

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Coyiuto, Jr. raises the

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the motion for reconsideration
following arguments:
generally restates and reiterates the arguments, which were previously advanced by

I. respondents and does not present any substantial reasons, which were not formerly
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE COURT
OBVIOUSLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT IN invoked and passed upon by the Court.
PETITIONERS AMENDED COMPLAINT (DATED OCTOBER
17, 1994), RESPONDENT ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. WAS NOT
SUED FOR DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY DUE TO LIBELOUS
However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent
PUBLICATIONS (FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION). HE WAS
SUED, HOWEVER, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY FOR that Coyiuto, Jr. raises a new matter which has not been raised in the proceedings
ABUSE OF RIGHT (SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION)
ALLEGEDLY, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, below. This notwithstanding, basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr. should be given
OFFICER, PRINCIPAL OWNER, OF THE MANILA
CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION UNDER all the opportunity to ventilate his arguments in the present action, but more
ARTICLES 19 AND 20 OF THE CIVIL CODE. AS SUCH, THE
IMPOSITION OF MORAL (P25 MILLION PESOS) AND importantly, in order to write finis to the present controversy. It should be noted that
EXEMPLARY (P10 MILLION PESOS) DAMAGES AGAINST
RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. HAS NO BASIS IN LAW AND the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration was later recalled by this
CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES
Court in the Resolution dated March 3, 2010, and therein, petitioner was given the
2219 AND 2229, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 2233,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CIVIL CODE AS WILL BE opportunity to refute Coyiuto, Jr.s arguments by filing his comment on the motion
ELUCIDATED HEREUNDER.
for reconsideration and the supplemental motion for reconsideration, which
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, APART FROM THE SELF- petitioner complied with.
SERVING/UNILATERAL ALLEGATION IN PARAGRAPH
3.11 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT (ANNEX C OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW), NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE WAS
ADDUCED ON TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLEGATION From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, it was
THAT RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. WAS CHAIRMAN, substantially established that he was the Chairman of Manila Chronicle Publishing
PRINCIPAL OWNER AND OFFICER OF RESPONDENT
MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION. SEC
Corporation when the subject articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr. even admitted this
fact in his Reply and Comment on Request for Admission, [14] to wit:
4. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. ADMITS that he was the
Chairman of the Board but not President of the Manila Chronicle
during the period Novemeber (sic) to December 1993.
5. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. DENIES paragraph
11. He has already conveyed such denial to plaintiff in the course
of the pre-trial. It was The Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of
general circulation, of which he is, admittedly Chairman of the
Board, that published the items marked as plaintiffs Exhibits A, B,
C, D, E, F, and G.
xxxx
12. This case, based on plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, is limited to the publications in The Manila Chronicle
marked plaintiffs Exhibits A to G, consecutively, published by
defendant Manila Chronicle. Thus, only the question of whether
Mr. Robert Coyiuto, Jr. was Chairman and President of defendant
Manila Chronicle, during these publications and whether he caused
these publications, among all of plaintiffs queries, are relevant and
material to this case. And defendant Robert Coyiuto, Jr. has
answered that: Yes, he was Chairman of the Board. No, he was
never President of The Manila Chronicle. No, he did not cause the
publications in The Manila Chronicle: it was the Manila Chronicle
that published the news items adverted to.[15]
Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual
findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. While this
Court has recognized several exceptions[16] to this rule, none of these exceptions
exists in the present case.Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to depart from the
findings of fact of the trial court and the CA.
More importantly and contrary again to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, the cause
of action of petitioner based on abuse of rights, or Article 19, in relation to Article 20
of the Civil Code, warrants the award of damages.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise
of ones rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice;
give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.[17]
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[18] it
was elucidated that while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government
of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper. The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil
Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and
for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to
remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects
of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and
which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
 dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is
that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
Art. 19. Every person must, in the violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law,
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his depends on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was found that
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred
to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which led to the publication of the libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. to petitioner. Such damages may be awarded when the transgression is the cause of
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform petitioners anguish.[21] Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.s argument, although
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and still such violations directly resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the recovery of moral
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.[19]
damages under (7) of Article 2219.[22]

Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law,

However, despite the foregoing, the damages awarded to petitioner appear
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
to be too excessive and warrants a second hard look by the Court.
same. It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not

especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in
reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the
[20]
must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its
wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. [23]
violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil

Code would be proper.

Even petitioner, in his Comment[24] dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral

damages are not awarded in order to punish the respondents or to make the petitioner
any richer than he already is, but to enable the latter to find some cure for the moral actions.[29] On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the first and second

anguish and distress he has undergone by reason of the defamatory and damaging cause of action in the amount of P500,000.00 and P10,000,000.00, respectively, is

articles which the respondents wrote and published.[25] Further, petitioner cites as reduced to P200,000.00 and P1,000,000.00, respectively.

sufficient basis for the award of damages the plain reason that he had to go through

the ordeal of defending himself everytime someone approached him to ask whether On the matter of attorneys fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same

or not the statements in the defamatory article are true. Code provides, among others, that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be

recovered in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems

In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be

Thoenen,[26] citing Guevarra v. Almario,[27] We noted that the damages in a libel case recovered. In any event, however, such award must be reasonable, just and

must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the equitable.[30] Thus, the award of attorneys fees and costs is reduced

court, although appellate courts were more likely to reduce damages for libel than to from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.

increase them. So it must be in this case.

One final note, the case against respondent was one for damages based on

Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendants the publication of libelous articles against petitioner; hence, only civil in nature. The

grief and suffering. Moral damages should be reasonably approximate to the extent rule is that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his

of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. [28] The Court, therefore, finds cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, respondents liability was

the award of moral damages in the first and second cause of action in the amount proven only on the basis of preponderance of evidence, which is quite different from

of P2,000,000.00 and P25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too excessive and holds a criminal case for libel where proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established.

that an award of P1,000,000.00 and P10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages

are more reasonable. Corollarilly, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the person who

caused the publication of a defamatory article shall be responsible for the

As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages same. Hence, Coyiuto, Jr. should have been held jointly and solidarily liable with the

may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, other respondents in the first cause of action under this article and not on the basis of

exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but violation of the principle of abuse of rights founded on Articles 19 and 20 of the

to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious Civil Code. Because of the exclusion of Coyiuto, Jr. in the first cause of action for
 a. the amount of One Million Pesos
libel, he cannot be held solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first cause (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Two Hundred
of action. Nonetheless, since damage to petitioner was in fact established warranting Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same could only be awarded based

on petitioners second cause of action impleading Coyiuto, Jr. for violation of the 2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants
Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff
principle of abuse of right. Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

It did not escape the attention of the Court that in filing two different causes a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
of action based on the same published articles, petitioner intended the liability of b. the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
Coyiuto, Jr. to be different from the other respondents. It can be inferred that if
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants
Coyiuto, Jr. was impleaded in the first cause of action for recovery of the civil
to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of
liability in libel, petitioner could not have prayed for higher damages, considering Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as attorneys fee and
legal costs.
that the other respondents, who are jointly and severally liable with one another, are

not in the same financial standing as Coyiuto, Jr. Petitioner, in effect, had spared the Costs against respondents.

other respondents from paying such steep amount of damages, while at the same
SO ORDERED.
time prayed that Coyiuto, Jr. pay millions of pesos by way of moral and exemplary

damages in the second cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion

for Reconsideration are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of this Court,

dated November 25, 2009, is MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants

Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel
Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino and Rodney Diola, to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and
severally:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of
Court are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The
assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-
26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing
Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA
Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in
Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then
decided to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00. 4 Respondent allegedly
paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and
Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess
employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she
got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the
receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the
Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to
Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and
repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even
searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another
argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the
Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to
receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while
respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter
again refused to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human
Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and the
latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling
respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she
was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13 With the above experience,
respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights,
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral
shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for
Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc.
(California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon
(Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and
exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.16
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance
of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier
(Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who
did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between
the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt,
Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ,"
which the former believed to mean that the item has already been
paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for
respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop
to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made.
Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they
meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus
went to the agreed venue where they talked to respondent.19 They pointed
out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall
whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were gentle and
polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in
answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the other
defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the
complaint and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the
trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in
good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no
motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the
court held that when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely
exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was made. The
RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation
took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself
who put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to
the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against
the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to
embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no
evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant
the award of damages.23
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984
(for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle
Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.24
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good
faith when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about
the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of
evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official
receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment. 25 Contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu
Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for
assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to
ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to
pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the
incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged
respondent’s employer who was not privy to the transaction. This is
especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a
narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent
in trying to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners
are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and
attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its
employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the
demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon and
Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability. 28
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the
same was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT
HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR
INJURY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.30
The petition is without merit.
Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of
abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human
relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her
when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased
from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt
issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners
had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if
they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such
right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in
the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable
under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is
noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or
omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy
or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the
principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are
as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between
the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt
to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and
discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans
was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to
make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from
respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did
not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good
faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would
be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the
acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. 35 Malice
or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether
she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the
Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned
sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC
and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting
views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that
respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together
with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot
insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation.
Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper
forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went
overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were
demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a
demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident
but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of
payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left
(sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely
being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment,
thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to
hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank
expression and told me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much
money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill."
Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such
denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how
much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then
answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very
certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited
her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently
refused saying that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but
that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly
left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the
issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased.
There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade
payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a rush in
leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess
employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the
supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the
eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence
and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. 39 In this case,
petitioners obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles
20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages

and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease
the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the
latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the
circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to
protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise
just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated
November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave
THIRD DIVISION
and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the
death of his unborn child.
CONTINENTAL STEEL G.R. No. 182836
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

Petitioner, The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson, Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
CHICO-NAZARIO, Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
VELASCO, JR.,
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NACHURA, and for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION- PERALTA, JJ. between Continental and the Union, which reads:
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
Respondents. Promulgated:

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to

grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of
October 13, 2009
death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the
[2] 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,

xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe
Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents,
brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos
wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she
th [5]
was in the 38 week of pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave
but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of
the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims
for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance
machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties
still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for
voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling
the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers, [12] Replies,[13]and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X,
Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK
Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of
Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs. personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered
a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to
be supported.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an

employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had
already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union
[15]
and Mayer Steel. Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb
and only died during labor.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition
of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have qualified the
parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union
to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees
unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
existing CBA with the Union. irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities
of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of
bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of
an unborn child constituted company practice.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides
that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave with pay and death benefits.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of
the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
existed in Hortillanos case.Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 [16] of
the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was
dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
 This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of
bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is death; (2)
such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such
dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for
death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is death; (b)
such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent
must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.[18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported
by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore,
the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or
delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully
married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby
rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay
Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred
Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement
leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount
of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide
with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos
claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because
no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of
a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed
out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified
by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only
be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
 Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed
Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
interpreted death to mean as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the

legal sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails to
impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the With costs against [herein petitioner Continental
purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death Steel].[21]
benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive
upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the
be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.
loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead
fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term death of
a legitimate dependent as condition for granting bereavement Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is
leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be
Steels] theory, there can be no experience of death to speak of. applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired
The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply a juridical personality.
cannot be equated with anything less than loss of human life,
especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement
leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and
We are not persuaded.
the latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support,
rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of
fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
point.[20] Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e.,
parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations
of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance
under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper
legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental
Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental
argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and
dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction
of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management
nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and
other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of
the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is
lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations
prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The
rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die.Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is
a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of
its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
 The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in
[27]
relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, we have expounded on who is
a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid
and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and
there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)
[28]
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel, we identified an illegitimate child to be
as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code.
Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside
a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them
legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted
by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and
his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents
grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this
case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and
other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of
doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be
interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions
should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the
Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of
judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides,
the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor
Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract
between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to
accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are,
likewise, sworn to uphold.
 In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and

capital are to be weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter should
be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation

v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of

labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to
the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27

February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband
of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio
Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo
and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court
of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority
vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the
first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than
two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter
Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and
P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and
his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for
his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we
granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in
the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article
2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the
said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus
pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there
is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is
generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child
(Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial
note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either dismissed. Without costs.
help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the
the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
(Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of
moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates
that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the
Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have
taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously

feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought
at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that
the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather
than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea
in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he
had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil
action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be
the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of

appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that,
under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may
be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited
the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before
she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for
actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as
his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live
in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that
the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award
of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian
citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig,
Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second
year medicine proper;
 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay
Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July,
1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the
manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent.
The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the
sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and
two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses
and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise
to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of
that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance
with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs
and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim
was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary
of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested
by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at
the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they first
met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and
she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on
August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her
hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted
to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and
their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers
and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed
to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with
plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon.
When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City,
they continued to live together in defendant's apartment.
However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning
that made her sleep the whole day and night until the
following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he
told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff
left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay
captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother,
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to
talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was
already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth,
as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant
is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou,
 he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does
not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted
that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by
the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to
trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not
have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In
fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and
"E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that
plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted
that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach
party together with the manager and employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.),
and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56,
tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he
was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was
(sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And
this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's
insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino,
the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of
this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff
resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man
of good moral character and must think so low and have so
little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly
admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife
in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just
like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he
felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful
country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception
on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public
policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner
who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its
decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the
Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise
to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that
on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now
his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in
the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on
him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the
private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to
the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil
down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule
in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings
as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses
and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the
result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93
Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.)
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista
v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622
[1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez,
33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of
breach of promise suits in the United States and in England
has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to
abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere
of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm:
"A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage
be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has
been committed, and though the girl and family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents
cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened
the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be
held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article
338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in
a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
— who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became
intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him
by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all
cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must
be induced to depart from the path of virtue
by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated
to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the
woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the demoralization
of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47
Am. Jur. 662)
 xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out
that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for
had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and
wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would
have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend
to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause
of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court
of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the
intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court
of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733,
Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz
Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962).
(In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and
the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of
moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around,
there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer,
33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still
subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without
any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by
willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the
woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But
so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under
the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him,
both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even
goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury
or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own
doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will
become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex
"C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of
financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And
this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that
may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let
faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values
and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust of morality and dignity.
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
SO ORDERED.
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and

traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault;
in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could
be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by
the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the
burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault,

there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides
is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one
party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).