The State, Society and

International Interventions in
Timor-Leste (1999-2006):
Creating Conditions for Violence?

Dr Rebecca E. Engel, University of York

Rebecca.engel@york.ac.uk

Presentation to UNTL
26 July 2018
 Overview

 Introduction

 Political settlement formation in historical context

 State of Affairs (1999-2006)

 Implications for the domestic political settlement

 Lessons for future interventions

 Why this research?

 Investigate impact of international interventions on the

domestic political settlement and conflict dynamics

 Move away from singular, domestically driven

explanations of the (2006) crisis

 Interrogate the premise that development strategies and

programmes are increasingly ‘locally-led and conceived’

 Link to new trends in IFI investment and the work of the

G7+ in conflict-affected states
 The Argument

 Development interventions emphasise liberalised markets,

democratisation and institution-strengthening

 Local social, historical, political and economic

realities/expectations disregarded

 Conflict prevention and peace-building are reduced to

technocratic, apolitical, time-bound and
compartmentalised exercises

 The international community is always a party to political

settlement negotiations and must assume responsibility
Political Settlement Definition

 “A political settlement is a combination of power and

institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable
in terms of economic and political viability” (emphasis in
original) (Khan 2010:4).

 “The achievement of a political settlement in developing

countries typically requires informal modifications of
formal institutions to bring the distribution of incomes into
alignment with the distribution of power across
organizations” (Khan 2013:12-13).

 Cannot forget the social contract

Domestic Political, Economic and
Social Context

 1975 Political party platforms

 1975-1978 bases de apoio
 1980s Indonesian investments (especially in
agriculture, roads, markets)
 1998 Magna Carta
 Transition politics (diversification of power)
 Restoration of independence
 State of Affairs
(1999-2006)

 International Financial Institutions and UN division of

labour
 State institutions and the civil service
 Agriculture
 Monetary policy
 Private sector and Civil society
 IFI and UN Division of Labour

 UN → Security, elections, administrative structure,

exit
 Report to NY HQ
 No infrastructure/finances to run a state

 IFIs → All productive, reconstruction and service

sectors
 MDTF management
 TLDPM
 JAM
 State institutions
and the Civil Service

 Reduction in civil servants

 Lean, efficient state
 No social safety net

World Bank assumptions regarding what the East

Timorese government could or could not afford were
premised on what donors were prepared to finance

(WB official)
 The Blank Slate

“East Timor needs to start anew. The past can

not serve as a good guide to the future…Any
plan for the future must start from zero…There
is no apparent need for pacification between
different…segments of the population…In a
way it would be more useful to treat the
problem as a post-natural-disaster situation…”
(JAM 1999:2)
 Agriculture

POLICY FRAMEWORK
 End of subsidies
 End of guaranteed market
 End of civil servants with salaries
 Import of cheap rice

IMPACT
 Increase in subsistence farming
 Decrease in production
 Prioritisation of production for immediate consumption
 Difficulties meeting social obligations
 Respondent perspectives

 80 percent of respondents professionally associated

with agriculture, forestry and fishing discussed the
positive aspects of Indonesian-era agriculture
practices.

 Ten of eleven respondents from rural NGOs and CBOs

and 64 percent of veterans and members of the
resistance shared the view that the Indonesian
agriculture policy was beneficial to the population.
 Monetary Policy

 Adoption of the US Dollar

 “In Indonesian times the rupiah was small, but we

could buy things. We had change and it could buy you
something, but not a dollar” (Rural respondent)
 Private Sector

 Private sector should drive development

 State should create a regulatory environment

 Local private sector resistance:

“Strangely, they were the ones who would say ‘why should
this be competitive? Contracts should be awarded on an
individual basis’. …”
(World Bank official)
 Finding a Role
for the Private Sector

“At the beginning, it was absolutely non-

existent. [We faced a] complicated dilemma—
work was reserved for the private sector
because the state can’t afford to do it, but it
can’t outsource either because there was no
private sector.”
(World Bank official)
 Civil Society

 Three assumptions about the East Timorese state:

 Weak
 Ineffective
 Poor (pre-oil and gas)

 No differentiation between NGO as service provider,

economic agent, watchdog

Convergence between the perceived and

actual weaknesses of the state
State/Civil Society Competition

“That is what winning elections are about: to deliver

services to the people; to manage the economy well
so we can create jobs; reduce poverty; give people
better standards of living. This is the objective of
being in government” (MP)

“NGOs write proposals and they use our names to

get money and then come to do work.” (CBO)
“Literally, we would have someone show up
with a briefcase full of cash, giving out $10,000
to anyone who could plausibly play themselves
out as an NGO. And the Timorese are smart and
suddenly you have lots of people creating
letterhead and stuff like that. Then, suddenly
they had new motorcycles”
(US Government official)
 Selected Findings

 Majority believed Government was distant

 The government was distant…but had good intentions

 Majority thought international community had bad or

negligible impact

 Urban and rural respondents cited injustice, inequality,

discrimination and social jealousy related to unequal
access to services as drivers of the crisis.
The first government did “not provide
necessities to farmers [because] they had no
money…we understood.”
(Village leader and veteran of the resistance, Baucau)

The donors “played with money and killed the

government.”
(District-based agriculture director)
 Many unable to think about
‘development as usual’

“[We are] very emotional about independence.

Many people died and not just at the hands of
Indonesians, but many Timorese killed other
Timorese... [It is] hard to think about
development…We talk about development but
we can’t yet implement it until we find the right
path”
(Civil society member of the resistance and agriculture expert
recalled a conversation with rural farmers)
Development Defined Differently
(National/International)

 No consensus on what it is or who is responsible.

 Majority of domestic respondents noted the

centrality of the government, its ministries and
national leaders as its primary drivers.

 Importance of legitimacy, unity, balance,

participation…
 Crisis
(Internal and External Causes)

“People were asking ‘what did we fight for? Why did we

fight for independence if this is how things are?’”

“We thought that what worked from Indonesia we

would keep, of course, free from colonialism. After
independence, we thought we would not be hungry,
that each family would have a home. But, in the end,
this expectation was not realised.”
(Young urban elites)
 Post-crisis Political Shifts

 Extension services
 Povu Kuda Governu Sosa
 Social Safety Net
 Valorisation of Heroes of the Resistance
 New procurement systems
 State directed contracts
Political Settlement Negotiations
(Ongoing)

 Establish mechanisms for intra-East Timorese and

international-Timorese dialogue about the nation
being built.

 Challenges facing the country are not merely lack of

funds.

 Maintain emphasis on building a social contract.

 Looking forward…

 Technical support never a-political

 IFIs are increasing support to FCS

 IFI-led interventions in other FCS do no adequately

adapt to domestic socio-economic, political and
historical conditions.

 Opportunity for G7+ to broaden the scope of

discussions on peace and state-building.
 Questions for the Audience

 How is the state managing its evolving political

settlement?

 Are national leaders basing their economic

development strategies on particular model(s)?

 What are the key policy differences between parties?

 What are the barriers to bridging the gap between

theory and practice among all the ‘lessons learned’?