Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IRENEUSZ PSZCZÓŁKA*
Abstract
Introduction of the common currency in Europe was one of the most spec−
tacular events in the world monetary history. It took almost half of the twentieth
century to reach this goal and see the euro circling in European economy. There
are still some European Union countries left that are potential members of the
European Monetary Union. Therefore it is very important for them to estimate
properly all costs and benefits of this decision, thought only some of them have
right not to join the EMU.
There are two main benefits to be considered. One is the elimination of trans−
action cost and the other is the elimination of exchange rate risk. There are also
two most important costs: one is a cost of institutions and individuals adjustment
to a new currency and the other is a lack of national monetary policy as an adjust−
ment tool when a member state experiences an economic asymmetric shock.
Introduction
On 1st January 1999 we witnessed the introduction of a new European com−
mon currency. At that time 11 countries, members of the European Union (UE),
decided to replace their own legal tender with a brand new one, euro. Since that
the euro has been the official currency of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ger−
many, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. These elev−
en countries, before joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) had to fulfil the
following convergence criteria:
1) price stability – country must have a rate of inflation no more than 1,5 pp above
the average of the three countries in the EU with the lowest inflation,
2) long−term interest rate – country must have a nominal interest rate on long−term
(usually 10−years) government bonds no more than 2 pp above the average of
the three countries in the EU with the lowest inflation rate,
3) government budget deficits – no more than 3 % of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP),
4) total government debt – no more than 60% of GDP,
* Adjunct Professor, Higher Finance & Banking School in Radom, K. Pulaski Technical University
of Radom, Poland.
1
There will be a monetary union in Europe or there will be no Europe, [in:] E. Apel, European Mon−
etary Integration 1958−2002. Routledge, New York 1998, Preface.
216 The Dilemmas of Regional Economic Integration
The year 1969 was a turning point in the whole process of monetary integra−
tion. In December 1969, on the initiative of the French Head of State Georges
Pompidou, The Hague Summit was held. Six Government Leaders strong−willed to
give European integration a fresh impulse. It was decided that the final objective
of the European Community is to create the EMU which should be completed in
1980. All details concerning entire process of monetary integration in Europe was
published in The Werner Report in 1970. Unfortunately the Community didn’t suc−
ceed in achieving this ultimate goal9.
Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods10 system collapsed so the Community author−
ities decided to widen fluctuating margins of members’ currencies against the dol−
lar by introducing the European currency ‘snake in the tunnel’ in 1972. This was
named so, because the margin for fluctuation between European Community (EC)
currencies was narrower than against the dollar11. The snake was not a success and
after a few years shrank so much that was not capable of operating any more12.
The next important step on the road to the full monetary integration in Eu−
rope was the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The core
of this system are the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the European Cur−
rency Unit (ECU) used as a unit of account in the intervention and credit mecha−
nism and as a mutual means of settlement. For every members’ currency, a central
rate against the ECU was calculated and these rates were used to find out a grid of
bilateral central rates. The fluctuation bands were set at 2.25% on either side of the
central rate for most currencies but there was also another option for weaker cur−
rencies with margin of 6%13. Due to the EMS hassles, especially 1992−1993 ERM
crises, Finance ministers of European Community decided to widen the currency
bands for all currencies except the Deutsche Mark (DM) and Dutch Guilder (DG)
to 15%. The DM and DG margin remained at 2.25% on either side of the central
rate14.
The Delors Report, the most important document regarding European union
on the monetary front since establishing the EMS, was published in 198915. There
are several similarities between this Report and The Werner Report, mainly in struc−
ture and ideas, therefore one can call it “a new Werner Report”. According to The
Delores Report, the crucial issue was to centralise monetary authority by establish−
ing a whole new institution – the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). That
Report is treated as a prologue to the first Stage of launching the new European
currency16.
9
W.F.V. Vanthoor, European monetary union …, op. cit., p. 75−77.
10
See more about the Bretton Woods system S.K. Cooper, D.R. Fraser, G.C. Uselton, Money, the fi−
nancial system, and economic policy. Addison−Wesley Publishing Company, 1985.
11
See more H. Carter, I. Partington, Applied economics in banking and finance, Oxford University
Press, 1984, p. 339.
12
N. Barkin, A. Cox, EMU explained …, op. cit., p. 5.
13
W. F. V. Vanthoor, European monetary union …, op. cit., p. 87−94
14
About the ERM crises see more A. Buckley, The essence of international money, Prentice Hall,
London 1996, p. 140−147
15
The Delors Report was one of the effects of the Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986 and
finally approved in 1987. See more about the SEA S. F. Overturf, Money …, op. cit., p. 59−71.
16
Ibidem, p. 73−103.
218 The Dilemmas of Regional Economic Integration
etary policy and all new government bonds in participating countries stared to be
issued in euros. The second phase was planned to last for 6 months but finally it
ceased four months earlier. In January 2002 euro notes and coins appeared for the
first time and national currencies were withdrawn24. During this phase Greece, af−
ter fulfilling convergence criteria, joined the EMU.
24
See more S. F. Overturf, Money and …, op. cit., p. 105−115, Ch. N. Chabot, Understanding the
euro …, op. cit., p. 6−9
25
P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 59.
26
For more opportunities for financial markets after the introduction of euro see M. Artis, E. Hennessy,
A. Weber, The euro. A challenge and opportunity for financial markets. Routledge, London 2000,
p. 3−10 and R. Smith, I. Walter, High finance in the euro zone. Pearson Education, London 2000.
220 The Dilemmas of Regional Economic Integration
When France is hit by a negative shock, companies there make losses and that
drives down stock prices of these companies. We assume that both mentioned
markets are fully integrated so stocks of French companies are held by German
investors. At the same time there is an economic boom in Germany and stocks of
German companies go up what gives profits also to French investors holding Ger−
man shares. In this case the risk of a negative shock in one country is shared by all
EMU members. A very similar mechanism also works through the fully integrated
bond market27.
The most important argument justifying the introduction of common curren−
cy is that exchange rate uncertainty is inherently damaging to the volume of real
flows of trade and investment. It means that entrepreneurs facing investment or
trade opportunity are likely to be more enthusiastic when the decision does not
involve the risk of currency fluctuations28.
The elimination of exchange rate risk affects positively international business
environment. The more unpredictable are exchange rates, the more risky are for−
eign investments (both, portfolio and direct) and it is the least expected that com−
panies are willing to purse growth in foreign markets29. This risk is bothersome to
all who make economic decision today and expect payoff in a future time. The euro
completely eliminates exchange rate risk between all the EMU members30.
27
P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary …, op. cit., p. 219−220.
28
L. S. Copeland, Exchange rates and international finance, Pearson Education, London 2000, p. 264−266.
29
See more P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary …, op. cit., p. 61−64.
30
Ch. N. Chabot, Understanding the euro…, op. cit., p. 39−42.
31
See more P. De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary …, op. cit., p. 5−22.
32
L. S. Copeland, Exchange rates …, op. cit., p. 269−270.
33
Ch. N. Chabot, Understanding the euro …, op. cit., p. 50.
I. Pszczółka, Advantages and Disadvantages of Introducing the Euro 221
into the euro it can handle asymmetric shock using monetary34 and fiscal policies,
but when it decides to enter a monetary union it does not have right to conduct
national monetary policy any more and has to search for different tools to deal with
this kind of shocks. The remaining tools are fiscal adjustment, labour mobility,
capital mobility and, as it was mentioned above, fully integrated common financial
market in the EMU, just to mention a few35.
Conclusions
The introduction of the euro was one of the most important events in the
world’s monetary history. It started with eleven countries, then also Greece joined
in, and there is still a long queue of the EU members willing to be a member of the
EMU. This big number of countries doing their best to fulfil convergence criteria
confirms, that there are more advantages than disadvantages of changing their na−
tional legal tenders into the common European currency. Apart from all mentioned
negative effects, lower transaction costs, elimination of exchange rate risk along
with price transparency and single legal tender, have increased the effective size of
products markets across the EMU. Therefore, it should facilitate achieving econo−
mies of scale.
On the other hand at the time of birth of the euro many politicians claimed
that the common currency would lead Europe to a golden age of higher economic
growth. That has not happened so far and the same politicians state that it is due to
introducing the euro. In fact, they use common European currency as an excuse of
their internal economics ineffectiveness.
Some economists also say that introducing euro is not just about cost−benefit
analysis. The main driving force of entire European integration process was the pure
political goal36. Even the EU member countries differ in estimating the advantages
and disadvantages of new European currency. The three countries of a „old core of
the EU”, Denmark, Sweden and the Great Britain decided to stay out of the EMU
but almost all new members of the EU are very excited about joining the monetary
union. Some of them have already decided to enter the European Rate Mechanism
II (ERM II).
References
1. Apel E., European Monetary Integration 1958−2002. Routledge, New York 1998.
2. Artis M., Hennessy E., Weber A., The euro. A challenge and opportunity for finan−
cial markets, Routledge. London 2000.
3. Barkin N., Cox A., EMU explained. The impact of the euro. Kogan Page, London
1998.
34
For example by interest rate adjustment or exchange rate intervention. National central bank of a non−
member state can response to economic slow dawn by lowering this country’s interest rates. As far
as a member state is concern, the ECB is responsible for interest rates in the EMU and has to take
care of all economics.
35
Ch. N. Chabot, Understanding the euro …, op. cit., p. 51−53.
36
Ibidem, p. 59.
222 The Dilemmas of Regional Economic Integration
4. Buckley A., The essence of international money. Prentice Hall, London 1996.
5. Carter H., Partington I., Applied economics in banking and finance, Oxford Uni−
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8. Copeland L.S., Exchange rates and international finance. Pearson Education, Lon−
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