PAGSUYOIN, Joanna Marie Y.

LTD | 2D, 4:30-6:30

August 10, 2018

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 179987 . April 29, 2009]

FACTS: On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration of Lot 9864-A, located in
Silang Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than 30 years.

At the hearing, Aristedes Velazco, Malabanan’s witness, testified that the property originally belonged to a 22-hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–
the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. By 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification issued by CENRO-DENR, which stated that
the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per a Land Classification Map and
approved as such on March 15, 1982.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan and approved his application for registration. The Republic interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

In 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the
property was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could
not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.

ISSUE # 1: Whether or not it is necessary for the land sought to be registered to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 for Section 14(1) of PD 1529 to apply?

HELD: NO. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

Since Section 48(b) ) of the Public Land Act merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
ISSUE #2: For purposes of Section 14(2) of PD 1529, may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

HELD: NO. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens
into ownership.

ISSUE # 3: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD: NO, petitioners are NOT ENTITLED to the registration of the subject land in their names. It is clear that
the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
 ALEXANDER KRIVENKO vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA

[G.R. No. L-630 . November 15, 1947]

FACTS: In December of 1941, Alexander Krivenko, a foreign national, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena
Estate, Inc. The registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to pursue said registration but
was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.
Krivenko then brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta. The CFI rendered
judgment sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. While the motion
was pending in the Supreme Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to
accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien, under our Constitution, may acquire residential land.

HELD: NO. The Court held that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the
Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino
nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity.
The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary
part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that section 5 is included in Article XIII, which reads “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.”

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens'
hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, section 5
is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together
for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-
transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same
technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5.
 VALENTIN SUSI vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

[G.R. No. L-24066 . December 9, 1925]

FACTS: On December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the subject land, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza for P12. In 1899, Garcia and Mendoza sold the subject land to Valentin Susi for P12, reserving the right to
repurchase it. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Garcia and Mendoza, and then by Susi has
been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution.

On September 13, 1913, Angela Razon commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land. Upon trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint. Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of
the land in question, Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned
of said application, Susi filed an opposition thereto, asserting his possession of the land for 25 year. After investigation,
the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Susi and sold the land to Razon. By virtue of said grant, the register of
deeds of Pampanga issued the proper certificate of title to Razon. Consequently, Razon required Susi to vacate the land in
question.

Valentin Susi then filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, asking that judgment be rendered: (1)
declaring her as the sole and absolute owner of the subject land; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in
favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Angela Razon acquired a right to the subject land by virtue of the sale made in her favor
by the Director of Lands

HELD: NO. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is the presumption juris et de jure established in Section 45(b) of Act No.
2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for
he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.

When Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts; an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of Section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon
did not thereby acquire any right.