PEOPLE vs. MACARIO A. ULEP
y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO
FACTS: Ulep, was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
of parricide. The facts are undisputed. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the
evening, in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a
result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband,
accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of Police of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who
allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health
Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a
bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and the husband of the
deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be
conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the daughter
of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on
her preference. At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was
made shortly before the burial.
A statement was sworn to before Fiscal, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted
that he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then
drunk and was uttering indecent words. The following day he reiterated that
the cause of death of his wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his elbowing her on her
breast Exhibit "B". Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at
their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She vomitted and then went to bed, The
accused then left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and
found his wife dead on her bed. He reported this death to their barrio captain.
Ulep retracted his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before
that, and while his wife went to have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded
with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast. With
the pain in her chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."
From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy
report, the cause of death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and
primary shock caused by the strong pressure applied on the upper front chest
bone. This happens when one steps, kneels or presses the body of a victim
against a wall. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor
upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal results.
ISSUE: WON appellant should be held liable
HELD: YES
We have previously stated that:
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart
disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused —
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability. 13
Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred
by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended."
Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not
cause any external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen
and peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have been
previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot
accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the
death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted. 14
We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement
between the two medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and
that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the life of the victim, Asuncion
Pablo.
There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame
for these in human acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.
RODOLFO BELBIS, JR.
BRUCALES, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano,
Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. Jose's live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and
calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and
shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy
(petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed
him.
His attending physician, issued a medical certificate, which stated the following
wounds found on Jose's body: (1) stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, right; (2)
stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, left; (3) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, medial
aspect; and (4) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, lateral aspect.
He was finally discharged on December 15 1997. Dr. Reduta issued Jose
prescriptions and instructed the latter to go back to the hospital after the
medicines prescribed are consumed. Jose remained bedridden and should
have returned to the hospital on December 22, 1997, but failed to do so due
to financial constraints. During that time, the wounds of Jose were not yet fully
healed.
Veronica brought Jose back to St. Claire Medical Clinic on January 1, 1998,
because the latter was complaining of urinary retention and pains in his left
and right lumbar regions. He was brought back to the same hospital on
January 7, 1998 and was diagnosed by Dr. Corral as having advanced
Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and with pus formation and scarring.
January 8, 1998, it was found that Jose's kidney had acute inflammation due
to infection. He was returned to St. Claire Medical Clinic and was advised to
go to Manila. However, Jose died at 10:00 p.m. of the same day. Autopsy
Report indicated multiple organ failure as the cause of the victim's death. Thus,
petitioners were charged with the crime of homicide.
The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. CA
affirmed.
HELD: The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.18 Verily, to
invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then
forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.19
Petitioners argue that the unlawful aggression that was started by the victim
continued even if petitioner Rodolfo was already in possession of the bladed
weapon used in the victim's stabbing. Based on testimony, it is apparent that
the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased when petitioner
Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still
some struggle involved between the victim and petitioner Rodolfo, there is no
doubt that the latter, who was in possession of the same weapon, already
became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense.
In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression
still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. 21 Such an
aggression can also be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by the
victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of the stab
wounds, all at the back portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area,
left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock, lateral aspect), that petitioner
Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if the wounds
inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's body. The CA is,
therefore, correct in agreeing with the observation of the RTC.
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be
commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted,
and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression.23 In the present case, four stab wounds that are the product of
direct thrusting of the bladed weapon are not necessary to prevent what the
petitioners claim to be the continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as
the latter was already without any weapon. In connection therewith, having
established that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
when he was stabbed, petitioners cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense.
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield located at about 100
meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where
he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see
what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass.
He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded
that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide)
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano
but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left
leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When
Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and
prevented him from hacking Javier.
Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead
suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available
medicine. After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions
returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination
[1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right. As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days
period]
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle
their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses
of Javier.
Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition.
When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On
November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.
Filomeno Urbano was charged and convicted with the crime of homicide.
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found
no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after
two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The
evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the
time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected
with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the
record.
ISSUE: whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any
liability for Javier's death.
HELD: YES The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and
the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A
short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. BLAH
BLAH Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a
man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected
by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms
of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than
14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound
was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding
Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few
but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting
slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect
was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and
Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise
agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the
express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee - versus - ORLITO
VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On June 21, 2002, an Information[3] was filed against Villacorta
charging him with the crime of murder, as follows:
Witness Mendeja narrated while she was tending her sari-sari store where
both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers. At around two oclock in the
morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly
appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruzs
body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left
in Cruzs body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja
gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store,
she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruzs
body.[5] Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center. While
admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus
infection secondary to stab wound.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing
Cruz. Villacorta recounted that he was on his way home from work at around
two oclock in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta
drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When
Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacortas
shoulder. This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went
home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out
about Cruzs death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002
ISSUE: WON accused is liable
HELD: Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that
in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held
liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The
proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab
wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.[21]
Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends
on the incubation period of the disease. The incubation period for tetanus
infection and the length of time between the hacking incident and the
manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the
Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking
incident.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the
stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection
from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22
days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short
incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two
to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality.Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely
the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been
the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was
stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta
is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal
Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the
instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight
physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries
constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.[25]
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder
because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.
FACTS: accused-appellant Orlando Acuram was convicted guilty of murder.
Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson
Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the market in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they
decided to head for home instead. They went to the national highway, stood
at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and
waited for a ride there. They flagged down an approaching passenger
jeepney which, however, swerved dangerously towards them. At this
juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo,
Manligis man kamo" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A
passenger inside the jeepney shouted back "Noano man diay, isog mo?"
(Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the
air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney.
Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but
instead speeded towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on
the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de
Oro Medical Center.
the following day, the victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the victim
died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of
Rolando's death was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary
to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive loss of
blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal circumstances, the
wound would not necessarily cause death but in this case where the wound
transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He clarified that the
victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the front portion
of the right knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two
wounds.5
During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned
jeepney and had a gun at that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was
impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time since he was sitting at the
front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter's
father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the rifle was locked and wrapped by his
jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver. 9
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and
unreliable. On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the
court found appellant guilty as charged.
ISSUES: I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
ACCUSED APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR ESCAPED AFTER
THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING
WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT IS GUILTY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT
PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND THE
ALLEGED WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. 11
HELD:
I. To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the
shooting incident, we find that his behavior proves otherwise. Appellant
admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting
happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the
unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he
should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the incident
and go his way.
Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our view, is quite untenable.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture. 13 In this case, it was appellant's commanding officer who
surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one's
superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating
authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as
contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant's favor.
II. . For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there
must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack
to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. 14 In this
case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As observed by
the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and
the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous
response to the cursing, as appellant correctly claimed. 15 Treachery
cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of
a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the
will
III. Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was
the perpetrator of the crime. He claims he was not conclusively
identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True,
prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one
who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 17It is settled that conviction
may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the following
requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. 18Circumstantial evidence could be of similar
weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct evidence of
a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led
intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction
that from said fact or facts some other facts may be validly
inferred. 19 No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence
is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is
that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed and that the accused committed the crime. 20
IV. Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death
of the victim on the lack of prompt and proper medical attention given.
He insists that the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the
victim constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts him
from criminal responsibility. This assertion is disingenuous, to say the
least. Appellant never introduced proof to support his allegation that the
attending doctors in this case were negligent in treating the victim. On
the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at
the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim
by applying bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He
added that the victim was immediately given blood transfusion at the
Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the doctor found out that
the victim had a very low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood
pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as the main
blood vessel of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive
loss of blood. The surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately,
the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable
for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical
treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection
 between the wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by
the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The
proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the
appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all
the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in
consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive
proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal
responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to
the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just
consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many
criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely
establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death. 24
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner, -versus-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: accused VIRGILIO TALAMPAS, with intent to kill, while conveniently
armed with a short firearm and without any justifiable cause, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Ernesto Matic y Masinloc with the said firearm, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound at the back of his body which directly caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that
his enemy had been Eduardo Matic (Eduardo), not victim Ernesto Matic
(Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the
incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow;
that he and Eduardo had then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while
they had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he
had thus struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had
accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during their struggling with each other; that
the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then
seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled
the scene when people had started swarming around.
ISSUE: WON accused’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
accidental death
HELD: Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself.[9]
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the
accused and the victim. The established circumstances indicated that such did
not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only against
Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of Talampas
attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In
reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression
against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression
from the victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense
unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking
accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,[10] the legal
provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation where a person is in
fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and
prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to
something not in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing
out of a legal act.[11] Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, it
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.[12] In short,
accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and
poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed
to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice.
One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall
face down to the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing
Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts were by no means lawful,
being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not
Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of
Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas felonious deadly
assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or
mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal
responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa,
es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused).[13] Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[14] criminal liability
is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA
FACTS: On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to
celebrate the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos,
Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-
jeng Malubago, attended the party with his brother and co-appellant Edwin
Flora, alias "Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a high
school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo
Gallarte, a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.
The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On
signal by Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice.
The first shot grazed the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma,
below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the
floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring
to Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a knife at her
neck, threatened to kill her before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the
scene.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos,
Kalayaan, Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died. 6
the trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double murder and
attempted murder. Appellants now raise this sole assigned error:
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR IDENTITIES AND
GUILT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED.
HELD: NO. Appellants challenge the court's finding that they failed to prove
their alibi because they did not establish that it was physically impossible for
them to be present at the crime scene. According to the trial court, by
Hermogenes' own admission, the house of his sister Shirley, where appellants
were allegedly sleeping, was only one (1) kilometer away from Sitio Silab,
where the offenses allegedly took place. The sole issue here, in our view,
concerns only the plausibility of the appellants' alibi and the credibility of the
witnesses who identified them as the perpetrators of the crimes charged.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish
two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was
committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at
the time of its commission. 13 The defense of alibi and the usual corroboration
thereof are disfavored in law since both could be very easily contrived. 14 In the
present case, appellants' alibi is patently self-serving. Although Edwin's
testimony was corroborated by his common-law wife, it is ineffectual against
the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses and surviving victims who
contradicted his alibi. Moreover, an alibi becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and
his immediate relative or relatives. 15 Appellants' defense of alibi should have
been corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. 16Said
uncorroborated alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification made by
eyewitnesses. 17
In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not categorically
and clearly identified by the witnesses of the prosecution. They claim that the
testimonies of the said witnesses were not entitled to credence. They assail
the credibility of two eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie Roma and Flor Espinas,
because of the alleged inconsistencies in their testimonies.
Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the present case,
when Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit
Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emerita's death
and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis
of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended. 27
We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery.
In order for treachery to exist, two conditions must concur namely: (1) the
employment of means, methods or manner of execution which would ensure
the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the
offended party; and (2) such means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously chosen by the offender. 28 When Hermogenes
Flora suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo, both were helpless to defend
themselves. Their deaths were murders, not simply homicides since the acts
were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that
appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double
murder for the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and guilty of
attempted murder of Flor
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO VIOLIN, REMEGIO YAZAR, CESAR ALLEGO (at large) and
EUTIQUIO CHERRIGUENE, accused-appellants
FACTS: Dioscoro Jr. and Darmo were constrained to spend the night in Bgy.
San Jose at the house of Allego who left them to attend the public dance.
Shortly after Dioscoro Jr. stood up to urinate but was told by Allego to relieve
himself outside the house because he would be using the comfort room
himself. Dioscoro Jr. went out leaving Darmo alone in the kitchen. All of a
sudden Darmo heard several gunshots. Alarmed, he ran towards the door but
was met on the way by Dioscoro Jr. who was bleeding, staggering and about
to fall. Dioscoro Jr. told him to hide or he might also be shot by the three —
Violin, Cherriguene and Yazar. Darmo then crawled and hid himself under a
table measuring about three (3) feet wide, seven (7) feet long and two (2) feet
and four-and-a-half (4-1/2) inches tall. From this position he saw Violin
standing at the kitchen door, firing at Dioscoro Jr. and shouting Tapos ka, ayos
na an singkwenta mil pesos (P50,000.00) nga bayad ni Cata (You are already
through, the fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) paid by Cata is already
finished.) 9 A stray bullet fired from the firearm of Violin grazed the right side
of Darmo's head. At that instant, Yazar also fired at Dioscoro Jr.
saying Kapitan, waray na kamo kuntra hit election, waray na kuntra iton mga
Figueroa. 10 Cherriguene who positioned himself outside the kitchen window
also fired at Dioscoro Jr. The three (3) assailants then looked for Darmo but
could not find him. Failing thus, they left towards the direction of the coconut
trees behind the house.
Dr. Honorata L. Gabon autopsied the cadaver of Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and
ascertained the cause of death as cardiorespiratory failure secondary to
severe hemorrhage resulting from his multiple gunshot wounds. 11
The defense tells a different story, invoking alibi for all the accused-appellants.
Accused Remegio Yazar, overseer of the coconut plantation and the cattle
ranch of Catalino Figueroa, claims that he could not have participated in the
killing of Dioscoro. The accused Antonio Violin testified that on 31 December
1985 he bearded a motorboat together with Allego and the Astorga brothers
en route to Bgy. San Jose.
ISSUE: WON liable
HELD: While accused-appellants feign bafflement that Darmo would crawl
under the table instead of seeking cover outside the house, there is nothing
strange or unnatural about this behavior. Darmo's act appears to be
spontaneous and instinctive in that after the gunshots he ran towards the door
where he was met by his brother who was already bleeding and about to fall,
and who told him to hide otherwise he might also be shot. For him to go out of
the house would have been illogical and suicidal since the attackers of his
brother were still outside. The only recourse available at that very moment was
to seek cover inside the house, and he found one under a table
The defense speaks of the impossibility of Darmo crawling and hiding under a
table measuring only about three (3) feet wide, seven (7) feet long, and two
feet and four inches high (2'4") considering that he stands five feet and five
inches (5'5") tall. A small table such as that described by Darmo could not have
provided ample protection for him, for squatting underneath it would entail
great difficulty. While the proposition may sound plausible we are not
persuaded that it was impossible. Truly, Darmo did not have the luxury of time
and choice. He could not at leisure studiously reflect upon the situation and
scout around for a good and comfortable hiding place. His very life was at
stake. Safety was his immediate and only concern, not convenience.
Moreover, it does not follow that "since Darmo's head and shoulders would
have touched the top of the table, his vision would be severely inhibited by the
breadth and width of the table." 15 To conclude that because of his position "
he could have only seen the lower parts of the attackers' bodies, and
consequently, could not have seen the faces and identified the attackers 16 is
specious and delusive because it erroneously assumes the validity of a false
premise.
-- ARTICLE VI --
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails
and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999
resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner
Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging
petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991
in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a
piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by
lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was
unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel,
pleaded "Not Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among
them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her
classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and
Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision
of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building",
…) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room
307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the
University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around
10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on
a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of
chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not
move. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She
wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet
with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got
free. With this …the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab
hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused
Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok
sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however,
know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of
her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material
while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He … was
wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard
Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then
proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was
stained with blue … (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window
with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her
bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through
the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one
without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993,
p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate
…, was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings
for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she
rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at
the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a
white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter
(sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and
Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand name
“Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to
Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when
CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the
room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when
CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] …. S/G
Ferolin made the following entry in the security guard’s logbook …:
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a
Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic)
for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as he said
so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was
corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of December
12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the door woke him up, …. He
was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at
the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the knock at the
door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt
(Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. …. It was at around 3 o’clock in the
morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of
knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ….
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was
shown by Bernard the open window through which the intruder supposedly
passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was
finally able to talk to CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter that something had
happened and that they were not being allowed to get out of the building.
Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray
bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another
classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They
likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the
two (2) were questioned ….
An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that
in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his
roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the
Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging
to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the
authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to
search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray
"Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they
did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he
saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid,
p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the
classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among
others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black
Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear,
and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit
"D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO’s because CHITO had
lent the very same one to him …. The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity symbol,
CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used
at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13,
1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadan’s testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4
feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it
then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went
back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o’clock that afternoon along with some CIS
agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where Renato
had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o’clock in Camp
Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written
request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13,
1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory
examination on the specimen collated and submitted…. Her Chemistry Report
No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the following:
Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.
Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic
poison on the above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the
following results:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket
added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself.
He denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous
advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense
sought to establish the following, as culled from the same decision of the
appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With Robert
Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi
Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to him being also a medical student at
the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the
prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their
Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7
o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the
entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas
gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No.
3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool …. Soon
after, … the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included,
were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and
long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered each … dry clothes
to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol
and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt
with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and
shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and
Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to
the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left
his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and
toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day
….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking at his
watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and
saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO
entry …. xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already
about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the
opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door
until Rommel Montes, … approached him and even commented: "Okey ang
suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open
the door of Unit 306 … but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to
just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …, at
last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph
immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO
, …changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same short
pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p.
20).
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up …. He was
already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the
room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was so and, without
elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had happened and to just go
to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom
MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape
her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the
Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros,
CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU,
then asked him for the key to Room 306….
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told
to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp
Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside
his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to
ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later
instructed them to undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital
….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by a
certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip ….
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short
pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345),
inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o’clock in the morning of December
13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and
Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS
agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the
contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who,
however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied
putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of
December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity house. He likewise
disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he
returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of
December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at
about 6 o’clock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to
Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not
aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He
only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded
to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was
in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s fraternity
brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with
CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Duran’s place at Greenhills,
riding on the same car going to and coming from the party and dropping the
petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were one in
saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short
pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel
Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO
between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open
the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of
short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her father’s
house.8 Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a
forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court
showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds
without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting
petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the
Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged
in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum,
with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay
the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way
of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney’s fees of
P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated
January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings
of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in
its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed
the attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent
and convincing evidence to prove the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of
circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the
requisites for conviction based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the
petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
 5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact
that the award was improper and unjustified absent any evidence
to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption
of innocence and that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he
should be acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against
him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether
or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of
applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s acquittal,
but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the
intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed
in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to
that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There
are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission
of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very
act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. 13 In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed
in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct
evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons
who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if –
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence that led
to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had
access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had
a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU
stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard
Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and
fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning
of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had
made out the feel of her intruder’s apparel to be something made of cotton
material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where
witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most
incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some
kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-
shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala,
identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU
during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress
both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn
exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face
the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the
weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an
intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner’s actuation thus
described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any
other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou
after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General,
echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he
would not have lain on top of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who
has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the
aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru
Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the
offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit
an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or
carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to
the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a
chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of
rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into
a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too
strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt
to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed
and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch
her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not
have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even
anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had
been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to
come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim
is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already
mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before
even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first, or as
in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice
disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere
speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the
crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce
the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have
commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim
but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance,
the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her,
mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her
sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute
attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to
force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio
arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme
our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted
rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent,
under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed
against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of
Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou
testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily,
while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light
coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a
crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 24 it
cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for
which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner
contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly
observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice,
restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust
vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the
reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly
annoy or irritate an innocent person.25 The paramount question is whether the
offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to
the mind of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after the incident
in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a
sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from ₱5.00 to
₱200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the
charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light
coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay
a fine of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery
and sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision
correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision
mayor for being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was
patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo,
caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the
wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time
the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested
him and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the
provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge and the Solicitor-General, as
constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense;
that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt
to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the
opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an
offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and
its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of
the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that
said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into
a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of
entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the
offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in
the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be
inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused
on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the
wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his
evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of
its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store,
was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other
offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.1avvphil.ñet
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not
consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the
action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the
same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion
medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their
very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the
circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that
they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of
double interpretation , that is, in favor as well as against the culprit,
and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not
and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor
frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted
for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to
produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the
facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from
them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury.
This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that
in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that
the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit
an offense, they would be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts
leading to the commission of the offense, are not punished except when they
are aimed directly to its execution, and therefore they must have an immediate
and necessary relation to the offense."
Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of
March 21, 1892 — that in order to declare that such and such overt
acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their
objective be known and established, or that said acts be of such
nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal
objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve
as ground for the designation of the offense: . . . .
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to
dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal
Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling
of another against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and
sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the
evidence and the following allegation contained in the information: "... the
accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a
board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and
that the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the presence of
the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise
produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ... ."
Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is
presumed. (U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs.
Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18
Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must be taken
into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former
convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for
robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall should
not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as
this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted
trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated
offense of trespass to dwelling, if committed with force, is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted
trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Because of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be imposed
in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the accused
is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby
held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force,
with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to
three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties
thereof and to pay the costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011
of the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000.
The CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok"
(appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant
of frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias
Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to
kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE
alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting gunshot
wounds on the different parts of her breast which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an
Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to
kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde
with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect, middle third
right forearm 1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused;
that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio
Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag
pled not guilty in both cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution
presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No.
2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr.
Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara District Hospital where the
victims were admitted. The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant,
Demapanag, and the latter’s brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23
December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn
Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter,
Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their
house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from
Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and
Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The
two other accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is
already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was
pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment
of his gunshot wound.
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that
her death was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac
Tamponade due to gunshot wound."5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the
incident. He found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one
centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma
formation" in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23
December 2000. He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio,
armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot
appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from
Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did
not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill,
which is approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was
corroborated by Frederick, Demapanag’s brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and frustrated murder.
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of
Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused
to reclusion perpetua together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay
the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder
and hereby sentences the said accused to a prison term ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the necessary penalty
provided by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein
imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the
crimes charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy
Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely
erred in convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu,
however, upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of
moral and exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a
distinction between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial
court should have awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds
of damages. For death indemnity, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant
to the current judicial policy on the matter, without need of any evidence or
proof of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving family should
be assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral damages."9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint
Decision dated March 10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive
portion of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused
to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to
pay the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder
and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with
the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire
period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when
the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the
crime(s) charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy
Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that
appellant is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold
appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify
the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the
award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly
rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v.
Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden
of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
elements of his defense. However, appellant’s version of the incident was
uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.12
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his
testimony and his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him
and Gregorio before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also,
as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is
belied by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s
alleged unlawful aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as
appellant claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the following morning,
he did not also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely
accidental.13
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the
shotgun accidentally fired is also implausible.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both
the CA-Cebu and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were
credible and presented in a clear and convincing manner. This Court has
consistently put much weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court.14 In People v.
Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth,
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis,
gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’
credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these
aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the
witnesses were not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension
of relevant facts, the same must be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous
attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend
himself or resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was
deliberately chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and to render the
victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the
accused.18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by
appellant. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is
undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the
offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder,
and not frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of
felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted
felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences
 the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of
the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator;
on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-
fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the
offender’s own spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would
have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. 21 If the evidence
fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the
victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be
convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio
Conde was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined
Gregorio after the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court
what was the situation of the patient when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not
in distress.
xxxx
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma
formation at the anterior aspect right shoulder.22
Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should
be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51
of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder
shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder
under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.1âwphi1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium
period to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of
damages imposed by the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No.
2001-1555, this Court hereby awards ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages in the foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay
₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY
of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,
and pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143468-71. January 24, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FREEDIE
LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 54, finding accused-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the
death penalty for each count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant[2] was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape
under four separate Informations. The accusatory portion of each of the four
Informations reads:
That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing
and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing
and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing
and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
XXX
That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of
one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing
and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing
himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y
AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-
171390, 99-171391, 99-171392 and 99-171393, respectively.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by
counsel de parte and entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges.[4] A
joint trial then ensued.
II. Evidence of the Prosecution[5]
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro,
Bohol, had three (3) children, namely: Analia, who was born on December 18,
1985;[6] Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years
old. However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left
Bohol and settled in Manila with her young children. She worked as a waitress
to make both ends meet.
 In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as
husband and wife at No. 1252 Jose Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo,
Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from her job as a waitress. She secured a loan,
bought a truck and used it for her business.
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds
thereof to put up a video shop in her house. She sold Avon products from
house to house to augment her income. Whenever she was out of their house,
Rossel and Analia took turns in tending the video shop and attending to
customers.
Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant
entered. He laid on top of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear.He then
inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis
in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his
penis. She also felt pain in her sex organ. Satiated, accused-appellant
dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to
her. Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident lasted less
than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what
happened to her.[7]
Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room
of Analia, placed himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then
inserted his finger into her sex organ (fininger niya ako). Satiated, accused-
appellant left the room. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-
appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a week.
On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their
house studying her assignments. Accused-appellant was also in the
sala. Rossel tended the video shop while his mother was away. Analia went
into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room
because her brother might enter any time. She wanted to sleep but found it
difficult to do so. Accused-appellant went to his room next to the room of
Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a pair of
short pants and was naked from waist up. Analia did not mind accused-
appellant entering her room because she knew that her brother, Rossel was
around. However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed himself
on top of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled
to extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and touched her
sex organ. Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it
and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant
ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily, Rossel passed by
the room of Analia after drinking water from the refrigerator, and peeped
through the door. He saw accused-appellant on top of Analia. Accused-
appellant saw Rossel and dismounted. Accused-appellant berated Rossel and
ordered him to go to his room and sleep.Rossel did. Accused-appellant then
left the room. Analia likewise left the room, went out of the house and stayed
outside for one hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00 p.m. However, Analia did not
divulge to her mother what accused-appellant had just done to her.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the
house. Accused-appellant was in the sala of the house watching
television.Analia tended the video shop. However, accused-appellant told
Analia to go to the sala. She refused, as nobody would tend the video
shop.This infuriated accused-appellant who threatened to slap and kick her.
Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and
stayed in the video shop. When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued
between accused-appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit
Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. Ayoko na, ayoko na. Shortly thereafter,
Rose and Analia left the house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother
in going to Don Bosco Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to retrieve some tapes
which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter what
she meant by her statement, ayoko na, ayoko na, she told her mother that
accused-appellant had been touching the sensitive parts of her body and that
he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. The two
proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accused-appellant placed
under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western Police
District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in
the presence of SPO2 Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police investigator
that accused-appellant had touched her breasts and arms in August, 1998,
September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, at 3:00
p.m. Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil,
a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medico-legal officer interviewed Analia,
told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00 p.m. and November 5, 1998
at 3:00 p.m.[8]
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on Living Case No. MO-98-1265
which contained her findings during her examination on Analia, thus:
xxx
Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory
subject. Breasts, developed, hemispherical, firm. ----, brown, 3.0 cms. in
diameter. Nipples brown, protruding, 0.7 cms. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated.
Fourchette, tense. Vetibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick,
intact. Hymenal orifice measures, 1.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight.
Rugosities, prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the
subject at the time of examination.
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury.[9]
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that mabuti na lang iyong
panghihipo lang ang sinabi ko. When Rose inquired from her daughter what
she meant by her statement, Analia revealed to her mother that accused-
appellant had sexually abused her. On December 15, 1998, Analia executed
a Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla and charged accused-appellant with
rape.[10]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a
month of courtship, he and Rose agreed in 1994 to live together as husband
and wife. He was then a utility worker with the Navotas Branch of the Philippine
Banking Corporation. Rose, on the other hand, was a waitress at the Golden
Bird beer house at Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he
loved the children of Rose as if they were his own children. He took care of
them, as in fact he cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home
from school. At times, he ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except
Analia who was already big. Analia was hard-headed because she disobeyed
him whenever he ordered her to do some errands. Because of Analias
misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose oftentimes quarreled. Rose even
demanded that accused-appellant leave their house. Another irritant in his and
Roses lives were the frequent visits of the relatives of her husband.
Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his
employment and received a separation pay of P9,000.00 which he used to put
up the VHS Rental and Karaoke from which he earned a monthly income
of P25,000.00. While living together, accused-appellant and Rose acquired
two colored television sets, two VHS Hi-fi recorders, one VHS player, one
washing machine, one scooter motor, two VHS rewinders, one sala set, one
compact disc player and many other properties.
Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and
Rossel to testify against him and used them to fabricate charges against him
because Rose wanted to manage their business and take control of all the
properties they acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose was so
exasperated because he had no job.
IV. The Verdict
On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-
appellant finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape,
defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against
him in these four (4) cases, convicts him thereof, and sentences him to DEATH
PENALTY in each and every case as provided for in the seventh paragraph,
no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[11]
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred
in his brief that:
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A
FINDING OF FACT IN ITS DECISION AND SUCH FAILURE IS
A REVERSIBLE ERROR.[12]
XXX
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the
decision of the trial court is null and void as it failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1,
Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the
court a quo made no findings of facts in its decision. The trial court merely
summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and those of
accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal
portion of said decision.The trial court even failed to state in said decision the
factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on
him. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that there should be no
mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision. Trial courts may well-nigh
synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that courts are harassed
by crowded dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court did not
elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties imposed,
nevertheless the decision is valid. In any event, the Solicitor General contends
that despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no need to remand the case
to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional requirement as the Court
may resolve the case on its merits to avoid delay in the final disposition of the
case and afford accused-appellant his right to a speedy trial.
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII,
paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and
implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are
any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense,
whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the
wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has
been reserved or waived.[14]
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person
reading the decision on how it was reached by the court after consideration of
the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed
on the issues, and of the applicable laws.The parties must be assured from a
reading of the decision of the trial court that they were accorded their rights to
be heard by an impartial and responsible judge.[15] More substantial reasons
for the requirement are:
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the
decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors
for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if well-presented and
reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept
the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless
appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and
the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme
Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful
references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies.[16]
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had
been proved and its conclusions culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on
the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution. [17] Trial courts
should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both
parties and come out with its decretal conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under
the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized
the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accused-appellant
on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary
evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of
the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and
sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the
prosecution based on their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its
resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases
for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court
rendered judgment against accused-appellant with the curt declaration in the
decretal portion of its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the
prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of
the prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision why it believed and gave
probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution. Reading the decision of
the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence
of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even bother specifying the factual
and legal bases for its imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accused-
appellant for each count of rape.The trial court merely cited seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the
trial court is a good example of what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution
and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.
The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of
the infirmity of the decision of the trial court, for compliance with the
constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of
the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering
that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been
elevated to the Court.[18] The parties filed their respective briefs articulating
their respective stances on the factual and legal issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles:
(1) to accuse a man of rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult though the
accused may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[19] By the very
nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainants testimony because of the fact that usually
only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused
raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element of the crime, and the
prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence, the prosecution has
failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil
of doubt and hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for
convenience, as follows:
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the crime
of rape committed on or about October 22, 1998 and on or about September
15, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the
requisite quantum of evidence that he raped the private complainant precisely
on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical findings
of Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen of the private complainant was intact
and its orifice so small as to preclude complete penetration by an average size
adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury. The physical evidence belies private complainants claim of having been
deflowered by accused-appellant on four different occasions. The Office of the
Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the prosecution through the private
complainant proved the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged on
both counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The
private complainant testified that since 1996, when she was only eleven years
old, until 1998, for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place himself
on top of her and despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and
sex organ and inserted his finger and penis into her vagina. In the process, he
ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone
what he did to her.[20] Although private complainant did not testify that she was
raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, nevertheless accused-
appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the testimony of
private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are
alleged to have been committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or
about October 22, 1998. The words on or about envisage a period, months or
even two or four years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The
prosecution may prove that the crime charged was committed on or about
September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan,[21] this Court affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant of five (5) counts of rape, four of which were committed in December
1992 (two counts) and one each in March and April, 1993 and in November,
1995 and one count of acts of lasciviousness committed in December 1992,
on a criminal complaint for multiple rape, viz:
That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his
own twelve (12) year old daughter, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have
repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M. Gianan, against her will and consent,
to her damage and prejudice.[22]
On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction
for rape in December 1992 was so remote from the date (November 1995)
alleged in the Information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as
being as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as
provided under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, this Court held:
Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in
December 1992 is so remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the
information, so that the latter could no longer be considered as being as near
to the actual date at which the offense was committed as provided under Rule
110, 11.
This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a
conviction for ten counts of rape based on an information which alleged that
the accused committed multiple rape from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994,
a time difference of almost four years which is longer than that involved in the
case at bar. In any case, as earlier stated, accused-appellants failure to raise
a timely objection based on this ground constitutes a waiver of his right to
object.[23]
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-
appellant defiled her two times a week from 1996 until 1998, accused-
appellant raised nary a whimper of protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously
cross-examined the private complainant on her testimony on direct
examination. The presentation by the prosecution, without objection on the
part of accused-appellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a week
from 1996 until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22,
1998) to prove the charges lodged against him constituted a waiver by
accused-appellant of his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the
amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the evidence adduced
by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to
1998 does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by
accused-appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible
that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether
or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial
bearing on accused-appellants commission of the crime.[24] Even the slightest
penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into
the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be
entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.[25] In People vs.
Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron,[26] we held that there could be a finding
of rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the
complainant still retained an intact hymen without injury. In these cases, the
private complainant testified that the penis of accused-appellant gained entry
into her vagina:
Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what
happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q What did he do while he was on top of you?
A He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong
ano nya)
Q Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I
quote Pinatong nya yong ano nya and where did he place
it?
A His organ, sir.
Q Where did he place his organ?
A In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)
Q At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance
that was coming out, sir.[27] (Underlining supplied)
We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of
simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that
accused-appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of private
complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years
old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of
the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the
common-law husband of the victims mother, is a special qualifying
circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty.[28] However, said
circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given
retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the
accused.[29] Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying
circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accused-
appellant being the common-law husband of her mother, accused-appellant is
guilty only of simple rape. Under the given law, the penalty for simple rape
is reclusion perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-
appellant is liable to private complainant for civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count
of rape, or a total of P200,000.00.
Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the crime
committed on or about August 1998 and November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No.
99-171390 is defective because the date of the offense on or about August
1998 alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission. (11a)[30]
Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
that he raped private complainant in August 1998. Hence, he argues, he
should be acquitted of said charge. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its
part, argued that the date on or about August 1998 is sufficiently definite. After
all, the date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element
of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-
appellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned from
her testimony during the trial.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the
precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element
of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed
does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the
gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant
under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did not even bother
to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed, accused-
appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge without any plaint on the sufficiency of the
Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that
accused-appellant questioned for the first time the sufficiency of the
Information filed against him.It is now too late in the day for him to do
so. Moreover, in People vs. Salalima,[31] this Court held that:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is
obvious.The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element
of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge
under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any
time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information
is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed before and until October 15, 1994, sometime in the year 1991 and
the days thereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior
and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime in the year
1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates
when the sexual assaults took place, we believe that the allegations therein
that the acts were committed sometime during the month of March 1996 or
thereabout, sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout, sometime Court:
during the month of May 1996 or thereabout substantially apprised appellant
of the crimes he was charged with since all the elements of rape were stated May answer.
in the informations. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived
of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases filed against Fiscal Carisma:
him.Accordingly, appellants assertion that he was deprived of the opportunity
to prepare for his defense has no leg to stand on. I will re-propound the question, your honor.

The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the court
that accused-appellant raped her two times a week in 1998. As in Criminal with what part of his body, did he touch your sex organ?
Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is guilty only of
simple rape.
Witness:
As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391,
With his hands, sir.
accused-appellant avers that he is not criminally liable of rape. We agree with
accused-appellant. The collective testimony of private complainant and her
Q What about after November 1998 - - -was this the last incident,
younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, accused-appellant
this unusual thing that you experienced from the hands of
who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up, entered the
bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands, removed the accused was this that last time, the one you narrated
her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused- in November 1998?
appellant saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He berated
Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to A Yes, sir.[32]
sleep. Accused-appellant then left the room of the private complainant. The
testimony of private complainant on direct examination reads: On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:

Fiscal Carisma: Atty. Balaba:

Q In between 1996 and August 1997? Q Who was that somebody who entered the room?

A Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week. A My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.

Q In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience Q He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that
that happened to you again? correct?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.

Q What was this unusual experience of yours? Q And he had his pants on, is that correct?

A He laid himself on top of me, sir. A He was wearing a short pants, sir.

Q You said he whom are you referring to? Q Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?

A Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir. A He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.

Q The same person you pointed to earlier? Q When you realized that somebody was entering the room were
you not afraid?
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir, I was not afraid.
Q You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998,
what did he do while he was on top of you? Q What happened when you realized that somebody entered the
room, and the one who entered was your stepfather,
A Hes smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms Freedie Lizada?
and my legs, sir.
A I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my
Q What else if any madam witness? brother was around but suddenly I felt that somebody was
holding me.
A He was also touching my sex organ, sir.
Q He was holding you, where were you when he held you?
Q What else, if any?
A I was in the bed, sir, lying down.
Atty. Estorco:
Q You were lying down?
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the
prosecution - - - A Yes, sir.

Court: Q What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched
you?
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering that she
is crying and still young. A My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.

Witness: Q Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and
at the same time your legs, is that what you are trying to
None else, sir. tell us?

Fiscal Carisma: A He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.

With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ? Q He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell
us?
Atty. Estorco:
Fiscal Carisma:
Your Honor, that is - - -
Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then the A I was not able to extricate myself, sir.
legs.
Q You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm,
Court: and the other hand was holding your leg, is that what you
are trying to tell us?
Already answered.
A No, sir, its not like that.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help
Q Your honor, I am just trying to - - and you were trying to extricate yourself, what happened?

Court: A He suddenly went out of the room, sir.

Proceed. Q Now, he went - - -

Atty. Balaba: Court:

Q He held your arms with his two hands? You did not shout during that time?

A Only with one hand, sir. A No, your honor.[33]

Q Which hand were you touched? Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant
corroborated in part his sisters testimony. He testified on direct examination,
A I do not know which hand, sir. thus:

Q Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada? Fiscal Carisma: (continuing)

A I could not recall, sir. Q Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at
about 3:00 oclock?
Q Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?
A I was outside our house, sir.
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where
Q What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your was your house at that date, time and place? At that date
arms? and time?

A He was sitting on our bed, sir. A 1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.

Q Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on? Court:

A I do not know, sir. I cannot recall. Q The same address?

Atty. Balaba: A Yes, sir.

Can we take a recess your honor? Fiscal Carisma:

Court: Q On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister
Anna Lea Orillosa was?
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Where was she?
We will confront the witness with so many things your honor.
A She was sleeping, sir.
Court:
Q Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside
your house, did you stay the whole afternoon outside your
Yes, thats why I am asking you how long will it take you to finish
house?
your cross?
A No, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Where did you go next?
About another hour, sir.
A Inside, sir.
Court:
Q For what purpose did you get inside your house?
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
A Because I was thirsty, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q So you went to the fridge to get some water?
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie
Lizada?
A Yes, sir.
A I cannot recall, sir.
Q And what happened as you went inside your house to get some
water?
Q When this happened, did you not shout for help?
A I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he
A I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he
touched her and then he laid on top of her, sir.
would go out, sir. I was struggling to free myself from him,
sir.
Q Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?
Q And you were not able to extricate yourself from him?
A Yes, sir. Q So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her
panty, is that what you are trying to tell us?
Q Will you point to him?
A Yes, sir.
A He is the one, sir.
Q And where was the - - - and the accused saw you when he was
Court Interpreter: removing the panty of your sister?

Witness pointing to a male person who when asked answers to A Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator
the name Freedie Lizada. because he might be thirsty.

Fiscal Carisma: Q So---you said the accused was touching your sister. What part
of her body was touched by the accused?
Q This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to your
elder sister, did you see this before or after you went to the A Here, sir.
fridge to get some water?
Court Interpreter:
A I already got water then, sir.
Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.
Q What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your
stepfather to your elder sister? Atty. Balaba:

A I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir. Q You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?

Q Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie A Yes, sir.
Lizada?
Q What hand was he touching your sister?
A Yes, sir.
A This hand, sir.
Q So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?
Court Interpreter:
A He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and
after that he went to the other room and slept, sir.[34] Witness raising his right hand.

Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus: Atty. Balaba:

Q So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house? Q And which part of your sisters body was the accused touching
with his right hand? Your sisters body was the accused
A Yes, sir. touching with his right hand?

Q And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator? A Her right leg, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his
left hand?
Q And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie Lizada
touching your sister? A Removing her panty, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Removing her?

Q Where was this refrigerator located? A Panty, sir.

A In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir. Q Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left hand
of the accused?
Q So the door of your sisters room was open?
Court:
A Yes, sir.
Which?
Q And --- okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the
position of your sister when you said the accused removed Atty. Balaba:
her panty?
Which hand, which hand?
A She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q Were you noticed by your sister at that time?
The question is vague, your honor.
A No, sir.
Atty. Balaba:
Q And your sister did not call for help at that time?
Because he said that removing the hand ---
A No, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
Q And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the
refrigerator where you were taking a glass of water? He said removing the panty.

A Yes, sir. Atty. Balaba:

Q Did you not say something to the accused? Is that panty? Im sorry.

A No, sir, I was just looking. Q So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh
of your sister ---
 Fiscal Carisma:
The right thigh.
Atty. Balaba:
Q Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand
removing the panty, is that what you are telling to tell us?
A Yes, sir.
Q And your sister all the time was trying to ---was struggling to
get free, is that not correct?
A Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)
Q She was struggling --- was the accused able to remove the
panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water
in your hand?
A Yes, sir.[35]
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of
the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the
vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally
liable for consummated rape.[36]
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant
is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as
amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code. In light of the evidence on record, we believe that accused-appellant is
guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision
correccional.[37]
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential
elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.[38]
Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that
form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried
on a wanton manner.[39]
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.[40]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements,
namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.[41]
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning
or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.[42] The raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt
act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely
of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily
so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that
must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any
fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason
that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty
what the intent of the accused is.[43] It is necessary that the overt act should
have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.[44] The
act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the
intended crime.[45] In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.[46]
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be
distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or
measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end.[47] One
perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a
felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony
under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. [48] The
Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for
overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective
be known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they
themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily
intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the
offense.[49]
There is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the
material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin)
cannot exactly be ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature
of the acts executed (accion medio).[50] Hence, it is necessary that the acts of
the accused must be such that, by their nature, by the facts to which they are
related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the
offense. This Court emphasized in People vs. Lamahang[51] that:
The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the
offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention
must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to
avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to cause a
particular injury.[52]
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
his spontaneous desistance, he is not guilty of an attempted felony.[53] The law
does not punish him for his attempt to commit a felony.[54] The rationale of the
law, as explained by Viada:
La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que
castigarlo. Si el autor de la tentativa, despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar
el delito por actos exteriores, se detiene, por un sentimiento libre y
espontaneo, en el borde del abismo, salvo esta. Es un llamamiento al
remordimiento, a la conciencia, una gracia un perdon que concede la Ley al
arrepentimiento voluntario.[55]
As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily
abandoned. There is no conceivable overt act to which the abandoned
purpose could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the
offender, so long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan, should be
encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case of such retreat before it
is possible for any evil consequences to ensue. Neither society, nor any private
person, has been injured by his act. There is no damage, therefore, to redress.
To punish him after retreat and abandonment would be to destroy the motive
for retreat and abandonment.[56]
 It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of
a malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended crime but it
does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his
desistance.[57]
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that
accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private
complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution
were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-
appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his
spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape.Although accused-
appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his
desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of
the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is
guilty only of attempted rape.[58] In a case of similar factual backdrop as this
case, we held:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted
rape.He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes,
undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed
to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the
timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys
private organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is
attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua.[59] Accused-appellant should be meted an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which should be taken from prision
correccional which has a range of from six months and one day to six years
and the maximum of which shall be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten years, without
any modifying circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable to private
complainant for moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, is SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is also hereby ordered to pay private
complainant Analia Orillosa the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found
guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from six years of prision correccional in its maximum
period, as minimum to ten years of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay private complainant
Analia Orillosa the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; and,
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-
appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
simple rape, defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to private complainant
Analia Orillosa the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each count, or a total
amount of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013
FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker
and trisicad driver, was charged with frustrated homicide in an
Information7 which reads:
That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or
less, at Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with intent to kill, attack, assault, harm and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y
PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck, thereby inflicting
the injury described below, to wit:
• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and
• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
some cause or causes independent of the will of the accused, that
is the timely and able intervention of the medical attendance
rendered to the said victim.
Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8
After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only
arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002.9
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.
The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno;10 (b) Amelita
Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with
whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr.
Ardiente), a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City,
who rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by
the petitioner.
The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around
11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his house. A certain Roger
Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring
trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting
with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to
convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and
along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to
apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.
Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived
bringing with him two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed
Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner
wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked
him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held in
his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right
hand was used to hack the latter’s neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and
was immediately taken to the hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase
Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of more than ₱10,000.00 for
hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills.17 He further claimed that after
the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus
deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.18
Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral
aspect neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised wound left hand dorsal aspect 4
cm".19 Benigno was initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and
was discharged on September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection,
since the scythe used in the hacking was not sterile, complications and
infections could have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by
Benigno, but fortunately did not.21
The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner; 22 (b) Fernando
Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the petitioner; and (c) Urbano
Cabag24 (Urbano).
The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from
September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he and his family resided in Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the
hacking incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando
testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner gathering woods to
make a hut.25 Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the
petitioner drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.26
The RTC Ruling
On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The
fallo of the Judgment27 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by
the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond
reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and
penalized by Article 249 in relation to Article 50 and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant
Benigno Abella the sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical
expenses incurred; to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.28
The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No
disinterested witnesses were presented to corroborate the petitioner’s claim
that he was nowhere at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6,
1998. Fernando and Urbano’s testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies.
The RTC accorded more credence to the averments of the prosecution
witnesses, who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner,
positively, categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator
of the crime. Besides, medical records show that Benigno sustained a wound
in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the trial.
The RTC awarded ₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical
expenses he incurred despite the prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as
evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay ₱100,000.00 as
consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for
the award.
The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the
claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on
Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental
especially since he had no motive whatsoever which could have impelled him
to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent to
kill.
The CA Ruling
On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision30 affirming
the petitioner’s conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number
of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and
(e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him
on the victim.
Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner
attacked Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was
directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting
Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to
defend himself.
Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate,
testified that Benigno suffered from a hack wound on the left neck, and an
incised wound on the left hand palm. He said that the wounds might have been
caused by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have
resulted to death without proper medical attendance. Benigno was
hospitalized for about a month because of the injuries. The location of the
wound (on the neck) shows the nature and seriousness of the wound suffered
by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it not been for the timely
intervention of medical science.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum."32 The CA explained that:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime
of consummated homicide is reclusion temporal , or twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty
for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus,
frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor , or six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor . To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor
should be reduced by one degree, which is prision correccional , with a range
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision
correccional.33(Citation omitted)
The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and
consequential damages as there were no competent proofs to justify the
awards. The CA instead ruled that Benigno is entitled to ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages,34 the latter being awarded
when some pecuniary loss has been incurred, but the amount cannot be
proven with certainty.35
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of
whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which are
not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which if not
corrected, will cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner.37
In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate
relevant facts, which if considered, would justify either his acquittal or the
downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner
points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after
Alejandro and Dionisio leaving Benigno behind. Had there been an intent to
kill on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that
time, he had two scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the
hacking blow was sudden and unexpected, providing Benigno with no
opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw the petitioner arriving with
weapons on hand. Benigno could not have been unaware of the danger facing
him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt him. Benigno thus
approached the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit
with the latter’s scythe.
The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People38 where this Court found
the downgrading of a conviction from attempted murder to physical injuries as
proper considering that homicidal intent was absent when the accused shot
the victim once and did not hit a vital part of the latter’s body.39
Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from
Benigno’s hacking wound in the neck and incised wound in the hand. Such
being the case, death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not "so
extensive because it did not involve a big blood vessel on its vital structure"
while the incised wound in the hand, which only required cleansing and
suturing, merely left a slight scarring.40 Besides, Benigno was only confined
for seventeen (17) days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in
the nature of less serious ones.
In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal
of the instant petition. The OSG stresses that the petitioner raises factual
issues, which call for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of
a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioner’s
argument that the development of infections or complications on the wounds
is a necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The
petitioner’s intent to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the
weapon used, the extent of injuries inflicted and the circumstances of the
aggression. Benigno could have died had there been no timely medical
assistance rendered to him.
If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able
to chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick, fist blow, push, or the use of a less
lethal weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been
sufficient. However, the petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile
scythe, leaving behind a big, open and gaping wound.
This Court’s Ruling
The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a
petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas42 is instructive
anent what is the subject of review in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, viz:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a
lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances
that we admit and review questions of fact.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.43(Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of
the courts a quo that the petitioner had a homicidal intent when he hacked
Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could
have caused his death had there been no prompt medical intervention. These
questions are patently factual in nature requiring no less than a re-calibration
of the contending parties’ evidence.
It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and
Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among which is, "when the judgment of the
CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain
relevant facts that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x
x."44 However, the factual backdrop and circumstances surrounding the instant
petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.
Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual
issues, still, the instant petition is susceptible to denial.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing
was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that
of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all
the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could
cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance. 45
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to
take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly
to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to
kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used
and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.46
The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to
attack, much less kill Benigno. The petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in
Pentecostes, Jr.47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where the
accused shot the victim only once when there was an opportunity to do
otherwise. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill
Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death,
and not leave right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.
The analogy is flawed.
In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part
of the body. The attending physician certified that the injury would require
medical attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged
from the hospital the following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the
neck and a 4-cm long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile
scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have
complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were
extensive and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is a
possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the
instrument used was not a sterile instrument contaminated with other
things."48 No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could
have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17
days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.
From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the
use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s
homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require
imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of
a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While
no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s
neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained
were potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the
hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of
medical attention.
This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent
to kill is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained
from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already
delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die
from the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided
to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.1âwphi1
All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming
the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.
The Court modifies the award of damages.
As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the
payment of the consequential damages awarded by the trial court in the
absence of proof thereof. Where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined because of the absence of supporting receipts but entitlement is
shown by the facts of the case, temperate damages may be awarded.49 In the
instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized and
underwent medical treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is
prudent to award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of
actual damages.50
Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount
of ₱25,000.00.51 There is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary
human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on
Benigno would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral
shock, and similar injury.52
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution,
dated October 26, 2010 and August 11 2011, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY
the offended party moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 and temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for
damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) p r
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.53
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO
QUIANOLA y ESCUADRO and EDUARDO ESCUADRO y
FLORO, accused-appellants.
The information, dated 06 April 1994, charging the two accused with the
crime of rape reads:
Catalina Carciller, her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male
companion named Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance Sitio Bangag,
Cebu. Catalina, was just then fifteen (15) years and four (4) months old. About
an hour later, they left the party and were soon on their way home. While
resting on a waiting shed, accused Agapito Quianola, a.k.a. Petoy, and
accused Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, who were both armed with guns,
suddenly turned up. Quianola, beaming his flashlight at the trio while Escuadro
stood by, focused his attention on Catalina. Quianola announced that he and
Escuadro were members of the New Peoples Army ("NPA"). Quianola
instructed Escuadro to take care of the male companions of Catalina while he
(Quianola) held the latter at gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He
ordered the duo to lie face down on the ground and then urinated at
them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his pants, Diaz and Ginto were
able to escape and ran away. Meanwhile, Quianola, with his gun pointed at
Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a
gunfire but Quianola assured her that it was only an exploding
firecracker. When Escuadro again showed up, Catalina asked about her two
friends. Quianola replied that he had ordered them to go home. Catalina
begged that she herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked
the path towards the road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quianola
forced Catalina to sit on the ground. She resisted but Quianola, pointing his
gun at her, warned her that if she would not accede to what he wanted, he
would kill her. Catalina started to cry. Quianola told Escuadro to remove her
denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold but to no
avail. Escuadro ultimately succeeded in undressing her. Quianola unzipped
his pants and laid on top of her while Escuadro held her legs. Quianola started
to pump, to push and pull[5] even as Catalina still tried desperately to free
herself from him. She felt his organ "on the lips of (her) genitalia.[6] When
Quianola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by placing himself on
top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro on the lips of
(her) vulva[7]while he made a push and pull movement. Quianola, who stood
by, kept on smoking a cigarette.
Dr. Tomas P. Refe, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI") of Region 7, Central Visayas, who conducted the physical
examination of Catalina on 07 March 1994, showed that there was no evidence
of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the Subject.[9] The genital
examination yielded the following findings on the victim:
The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter,
was so small as to preclude complete penetration of an average-size adult
penis in erection without producing laceration.[11]
 Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their
defense, interposed alibi, ill motive on the part of an "uncle" of the complainant,
and insufficient identification.
Accused Agapito Quianola, a member of the Philippine National Police
stationed at Naga, Cebu, testified that it was his day-off on 05 March 1994.At
about 8:30 a.m., he and his wife, Leticia, who had just arrived in Naga from
Cebu City, proceeded to the house of his parents in Panla-an, Dumanjug, to
attend to the construction of their unfinished house. Quianola helped Vidal
Laojan and Nicasio Arnaiz in cementing the kitchen floor of their house. The
work was finished at around 11:00 oclock in the evening. After Vidal and
Nicasio had gone home, Quianola went to bed with his wife around midnight
until the following morning of 06 March 1994. He denied having been in the
company of his co-accused, Escuadro a.k.a. Botiquil, at any time during the
whole day and night of 05 March 1994. According to him, Guillermo
Zozobrado, Catalinas brother-in-law, concocted the rape charge to get even
with him because of an incident in August 1993 at a fiesta dance in upper
Tangil, Panla-an, when George Camaso, the husband of his sister Jinga, got
into trouble with Samuel Escuadro.
Quianola tried to pacify George Camaso who was then drunk but
Camaso suddenly hit him. He parried the blow and slapped Camaso on the
face.Zozobrado joined the fray and tried to hit Quianola but because
Zozobrado was drunk, he stumbled when Quianola had pushed him.[12] He
admitted that he had no misunderstanding of any kind with the complainant
and her parents themselves.
Leticia Quianola, the wife of accused Agapito Quianola, testified to
attest to her husband's good moral character and to corroborate his
testimony.Leticia said that after the workers had left their house at around
midnight, she and appellant talked for a while and then made love. Vidal
Laojan, the carpenter, was presented to state that Quianola was at home
helping the carpenters until past 11:00 oclock on the night of the
incident. Nicasio Arnaiz, a farmer and stone cutter, added that work in the
Quianola house had started late in the morning of 05 March 1994 since they
still waited for Quianola and his wife Pritsy to arrive. Work in the house, he
said, had stopped at about past 11:00 oclock that night.
Accused Eduardo Escuadro, a.k.a. Botiquil, declared that at about
seven oclock in the evening of 05 March 1994, he and Pablito Cuizon, Jr., went
fishing in Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu, until about ten oclock that evening. After
partaking of supper at around 11:30 p.m., they had a drinking spree and went
to bed at 12:00 midnight, waking up at 6:30 a.m. the following day. He denied
having been in the company of Quianola and insisted that the rape charge had
been the result of a mere mistaken identity. Pablito Cuizon, Jr., corroborated
Escuadros story about their being together up until they parted company after
a drinking spree.
The defense also presented the two police officers, PO2 William Beltran
and SPO2 Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., who took part in the investigation of the
crime, and Margarito Villaluna, a suspect at the early stages of the police
investigation who was in the frequent company of the accused. According to
PO2 Beltran, barangay tanods Gilly and George Zozobrado reported the rape
incident to him at midnight of 05 March 1994. He entered the report in the
temporary blotter because the suspect was unknown then.[13] Accompanied by
the two tanods, he went to the residence of the victim and when he asked
Catalina if she was able to recognize the malefactors, she kept silent and
continued crying. SPO2 Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., asserted that, in the early
morning of 06 March 1994, Gilly and George Zozobrado went to the police
station and named Pitoy Quianola, Margarito Villaluna and Batiquil or
Escuadro as being the suspects in the rape incident. While on their way to the
latter's respective residences, the team met Catalina Carciller and party who
were themselves about to repair to the police headquarters. Mascarinas asked
Catalina about the identities of the rapists. She named "Pitoy Quianola but said
she did not know the names of the other persons although she could recognize
them by face. Botiquil was later brought to the police station. Pitoy Quianola
by that time had already gone to Naga. Margarito Villaluna declared that he
had been in Panla-an, Negros Oriental, from 05 March 1994 until 09 March
1994, harvesting corn. His sister, Mercy Villaluna, testified that, in the morning
of 06 March 1994, policemen in the company of barangay tanods, including
Gilly Zozobrado and his son Marcelo, came to their house looking for her
brother Margarito. Shortly after the group had left, another policeman, in the
company of one Erwin Quirante also came looking for her brother. The arrival
of the policemen prompted her to verify from the Coast Guard whether her
brother had indeed left for Negros Oriental. She was told that her brother was
in the boat that departed for Negros in early dawn of 02 March 1994. Still
unsatisfied with the result of her queries, Mercy went to Guinholngan where
she met Margarito.
Following the trial and submission of the case for decision, the court a
quo,[14] on 01 March 1996, found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of "frustrated rape" and sentenced them accordingly; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds guilty beyond
reasonable doubt the two accused Agapito `Petoy Quianola and Eduardo
Escuadro, alias `Batiquil, as principals by direct participation and
indispensable cooperation of the frustrated rape of the complaining witness
Catalina 'Cathy' Carciller, and considering the attendance in the commission
of the crime of the six (6) aggravating circumstances aforementioned, not
offset by any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences these two accused
individually to Reclusion Perpetua of Forty (40) Years, plus all the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the offended party civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 each.
"The Court also hereby recommends that under no circumstance should the
two accused be granted parole or conditional or absolute pardon, in view of
the extreme moral turpitude and perversity which they exhibited in the
commission of the crime not until they shall have served at least thirty (30)
years of the full range of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua meted out
against them in this case. They should be interdicted for that length of time
from the usual and normal liasons (sic) and dealings with their fellowmen and
their community so as to protect the latter from their pernicious and insidious
examples. This is the most generous and charitable recommendation that the
Court can make for these two malefactors, short of imposing upon them the
supreme penalty of death, which the Court in other times and conditions might
have been compelled, as a matter of inexorable duty, to mete out against them,
in obedience to the implacable and peremptory demands and dictates of
retributive justice.
"Costs shall also be taxed against the two accused.
"SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled that the accused were liable for the crime of
frustrated rape with an eye to extending to the two accused the benefit of the
principle that in case of doubt criminal justice naturally leans in favor of the
milder form of penalty[16] but that, because of the existence of at least six (6)
aggravating circumstances,[17] not offset by any mitigating
circumstance,[18] the accused should each be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It explained:
Now, the crime of rape had it been consummated and had it been committed
with the attendance of the above-mentioned aggravating circumstances, with
absolutely no offsetting mitigating circumstances, ought to be punished with
the mandatory penalty of death under the pertinent provisions of Section 11
and 23 of Republic Act No. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and further amplified the aggravating circumstances enumerated
in Article 14 of the same code. But because the crime committed here is
'merely' frustrated rape for the reasons heretofore discussed, attended by the
aforementioned six aggravating circumstances, not offset by even one
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the two
principals, the two accused herein, both co-conspirators, by direct participation
and indispensable cooperation, of the frustrated rape, should be one degree
lower than the indivisible afflictive penalty of death, which is also the indivisible
afflictive penalty of reclusion perpetua which, under Section 21 of the
amendatory statute, shall range from twenty years and one day to forty
years.[19]
In their appeal to this court, the two convicted accused interposed the
following assignment of errors:
"I. THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH IF THOROUGHLY
CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED.
"II. THE COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF
COMPLAINING WITNESS CARCILLER EVEN IF THE SAME WERE
CLOUDED WITH GRAVE INCONSISTENCIES.
"III. THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF
ACCUSED AND BY DISMISSING IT AS WEAK ALIBIS.
"IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EVEN IF THE SAME WERE NOT
CONTROVERTED.
"V. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICEMEN WHICH WERE UNCONTROVERTED
AND WITH PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTIES.
"VI. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
FRUSTRATED RAPE AND OF SENTENCING THEM TO 40 YEARS OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA."[20]
 In reviewing rape cases, this Court must again say that it has been
continually guided by the principles (a) that an accusation of rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
which usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. [21] Expectedly,
courts would scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant with the
thought always in mind that the conviction of the accused would have to
depend heavily on the credibility of the offended woman. It is not much
different in this instance for, at bottom, appellants assail the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of the complainant, in seeking a
reversal of the judgment of conviction.
The doctrine, then again, is that the findings of the trial court on
credibility are entitled to highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could have consequential effects. The stringency with which appellate
tribunals have observed this rule is predicated on the undisputed vantage of
the trial court in the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence.[22]
In assailing Catalinas credibility, as against the assessment made by
the trial court which has described the victim's testimony to be impressed with
candor, spontaneity and naturalness, appellants theorize that the sexual
intercourse, if indeed true, could have only been committed against Catalina
in a sitting position, contrary to her declaration of having been made to lie on
the ground, because her T-shirt, marked Exhibit E, is not tainted with mud at
all especially the back if she were made to lie down.[23] The Court finds this so-
called incongruity committed by the complainant to be a feeble attempt to
discredit her testimony. The Court is convinced of the sexual assault made
against her.
"Q When Agapito Quianola lay on top of you and made a push and pull
movement, do you mean to say that he inserted his penis into your
vagina?
"A I felt something hard on the lips of my genitals.
"Q What is this something hard that you felt that touched the lips of your
vagina or vulva?
"A His organ or penis.
"Q When Agapito Quianola unzipped his pants, did you see his penis?
"A Yes.
"Q You also said that Eduardo Escuadro took his turn and laid on top of
you and made a push and pull on you, specifically what did Eduardo
Escuadro do?
"A The same as Agapito did, he was doing the push and pull movement.
"Q What did you feel when Eduardo Escuadro was already on top of you
and made a push and pull on you?
"A I held my breath.
"Q Did you see the penis of Eduardo Escuadro?
"A No.
"Q Now, did you feel that the penis of Escuadro was inserted into your
vagina?
"A I felt it on the lips of my vulva.[24]
The fact that she must have been lying down when violated has even more
been made clear by the defense on cross-examination. Thus:
Q Did you say any testimony in the direct that you were made to lie on the
ground at the time when you were raped by these two accused?
"A They pointed a gun at me and ordered me to lie down.
"Q Lie on the ground?
"A Yes.[25]
The Court has consistently ruled that discrepancies between the
statement of an affiant in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand do
not necessarily downgrade testimonial evidence.Ex parte affidavits are usually
incomplete and frequently prepared by an administering officer and cast in the
latters language and understanding of what the affiant has said. Quite
frequently, the affiant would simply sign the affidavit after it has been read to
him or to her.[26]
Not much differently could be said of Catalinas identification of
appellants as being her ravishers. On the witness stand, Catalina explained
that while she gave appellant Escuadros nickname Botiquil to the investigating
police officer, the latter did not mention that name in the affidavit because,
according to the officer, the affidavit was merely a shortcut.[27] In her testimony,
she was categorical that she had known appellants even before the rape
incident.She knew that appellant Quianola was a policeman and a
"popular maldito (nasty) in the locality.[28] Catalina knew that appellant
Escuadro, a resident of Punla-an not far from her own abode, was commonly
known as Batiquil (Botiquil). She could not have been mistaken in the
identification of the culprits since appellants themselves held a flashlight which
they used that added to the illumination shed by a fluorescent lamp and two
bulbs on the side of a house only some meters away.
As regards the allegation of appellants that the testimony of Catalina
contradicted in certain respects that of prosecution witness Rufo Ginto, suffice
it to say that the testimony of Rufo Ginto (who was noted by the trial court not
to be an intelligent witness[29]) was merely corroborative in nature and neither
dealt with the actual commission of the crime nor delved on material points.
Catalinas candid and straightforward narration of the two sexual
assaults perpetrated on her on the night of the incident unmistakably deserves
credence. It is unbelievable that a young barrio lass would concoct a tale of
defloration, publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted, allow
the examination of her private parts, and undergo all the trouble and
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she
not in fact been raped and truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, as
well as to obtain justice, for the wicked acts committed against her.[30] There is
no plausible reason why Catalina should testify against appellants, imputing
upon them so grave a crime as rape if it did not happen. This Court has
consistently held that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason
or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the
accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves faith
and credit.[31] So, also, the Court has repeatedly said that the lone testimony
of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.[32]
The positive identification of appellants as being the perpetrators of the
crime effectively effaces their alibi.[33] The rule is that affirmative testimony is
far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes from the mouth of
a credible witness.[34] Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only when an
accused has been shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that
it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or
its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. [35]
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge,
unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.[36] The
crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the mans penis merely
enters the labia or lips of the female organ[37] or, as once so said in a case, by
the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act.[38] In People vs. Escober,[39] in convicting a
father of having raped twice his 11-year-old daughter, the Court has said:
While the evidence may not show full penetration on both occasions of rape,
the slightest penetration is enough to consummate the offense. In fact, there
was vulva penetration in both cases. The fact that the hymen was intact upon
examination does not belie rape for a broken hymen is not an essential
element of rape; nor does the fact that the victim has remained a virgin negate
the crime. What is fundamental is that the entrance, or at least the introduction,
of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. As in the case at
bar, it can be said that there was penetration, although incomplete, and it was
sufficient to prove carnal knowledge of a child under twelve years of age. A
medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for
rape. The accused may be convicted on the sole basis of complainants
testimony, if credible, and the findings of the medico-legal officer do not
disprove the commission of rape.
"There are no half measures or even quarter measures nor is their gravity
graduated by the inches of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full
penetration. The rape is deemed consummated in either case. In a manner of
speaking, bombardment of the drawbridge is invasion enough even if the
troops do not succeed in entering the castle.[40] (Italics supplied.)
In another case, People vs. Gabayron,[41] where the accused has been found
guilty of raping his daughter, then less than twelve years old, the Court has
observed:
Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that based on the medico-legal
findings, there is no showing that his daughters hymen was penetrated, nor
was there any evidence of injuries inflicted. However, jurisprudence is well-
settled to the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of the hymen is
not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustained a laceration
especially if the complainant is a young girl. The medical examination merely
stated that the smallness of the vaginal orifice only precludes COMPLETE
penetration. This does not mean that rape has not been committed. The fact
that there was no deep penetration of the victims vagina and that her hymen
was intact does not negate rape, since this crime is committed even with the
slightest penetration of a womans sex organ. Presence of a laceration in the
vagina is not an essential prerequisite to prove that a victim has been
raped.Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no
significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In fact,
many cases of pregnancy have been reported in women with unruptured
hymen. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ merely, without rupture of
the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction. What
must be proven in the crime of rape is merely the introduction of the male organ
into the labia of the pudendum and not the full penetration of the complainants
private part. As we held in Baculi: 'there could still be a finding of rape even if
despite the repeated intercourse over a period of four years the complainant
still retained an intact hymen without signs of injury.' In the case at bench,
Summers testimony has established without a doubt that accused-appellants
organ managed to come into contact with her vagina, enough to cause her
pain.[42] (Italics supplied.)
In its recent holding in People vs. Echegaray,[43] the Court has declared that a
mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's
penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victims vagina
is not required to sustain a conviction.
The trial court, in convicting appellants only of frustrated rape, ruled that
there was no "conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
offended party,[44] in that: (a) Catalina had admitted that she did not spread her
legs and (b) the medico-legal officers findings showed she did not sustain any
extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect
average-size penis would not have completely penetrated it without causing
laceration. It would seem that the trial court failed to consider Catalinas
testimony in its entirety; she testified:
Q And when he mounted on top of you Escuadro was holding on to your
two feet and all the time that he (Quianola) was making a push and
pull on you, Escuadro was holding on to your two feet?
"A. Yes.
"COURT:
"Q Your two feet?
"A Yes.
"ATTY. CREER:
"Q Now, in other words, since your two feet were held and Eduardo
Escuadro was waving (sic [moving]) slightly to your left, as you
demonstrated, your two feet became closer to each other, it could
not be spread?
"A I was still struggling at that time to free myself and I do not know
whether my legs were spread out or not.
"Q Did you spread your legs?
"A No.
"Q Since you did not spread your legs and Quianola was on top of you,
did you not bother to pull your legs, kick the one holding it and
pushed Quianola or do any harm to him?
"A No, because I was already frightened considering that there were two
of them and they were armed.[45]
This testimony would indicate that Catalina, considering her struggle to free
herself, understandably failed to notice whether her legs were spread apart or
close together during her ordeal. What she did distinctly recall, however, was
that Escuadro had kept holding both her legs when Quianola took her. Thus -
Q At that time when he unzipped and your hands were free, did you not
attempt to hold his penis forcibly so that he will refrain from raping
you?
"A I was not able to think of that because of my fear, and besides that
Eduardo Escuadro was holding on to both my legs.
"Q Now, if Eduardo Escuadro was holding on both your two legs how was
Quianola able to place himself on top of you?
"A It was because Eduardo Escuadro had already released my hands and
Quianola was the one holding on to it already, afterwards Eduardo
Escuadro transferred to hold both my legs.[46]
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so
stands, there is no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita,[47] the
Court has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People
vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 666; People vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974,
58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of
rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ
by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction.Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People vs. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53
Phil. 694; United States vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of
execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
"Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People
vs. Eriia, 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated
rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the offended party. However, it appears that this is a 'stray' decision inasmuch
as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are
aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated
March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty
of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed
by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular
provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriia case, supra, might
have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in
the amendments introduced by said laws.[48]
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, has retained the provision penalizing
with reclusion perpetua to death an accused who commits homicide by reason
or on the occasion of an attempted or frustrated rape. Until Congress sees it
fit to define the term frustrated rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see
its continued usage in the statute book as being merely a persistent lapse in
language.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account
of a clear conspiracy between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts
to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. Each of them, therefore, is
responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the
rape committed by the other as well.[49]
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, when rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two persons, the crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Even
while the information has failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of the rape, appellants can, nonetheless, be held accountable
under that provision since the information has likewise averred that the above-
named accused, referring to the two appellants, have conspiratorially
committed the crime.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,[50] includes among its
enumeration of generic aggravating circumstances the fact that the crime is
committedwith the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity. The fact alone, then, that a malefactor has sported a firearm does
not, by itself, militate to aggravate the crime. As regards appellant Quianola,
the aggravating circumstance of his being a member of the Philippine National
Police would have exposed him to the penalty of death[51] under the
amendatory provisions of Article 335 by Republic Act No. 7659, had this
circumstance been properly alleged in the information. The description by the
trial court of appellants as being powerfully, built, brawny and mean-looking as
against the short, slender, easily cowed 15-year-old victim would not here
warrant a finding that abuse of superior strength has aggravated the
commission of the crime. The law should be deemed to have already
considered this circumstance in qualifying the crime to its "heinous" character,
rendering, in that context, abuse of superior strength as an inherent element
thereof. Neither may nighttime be considered an aggravating circumstance in
the absence of proof of its having been deliberately sought out by appellants
to facilitate the commission of the offense.[52] Craft, fraud or disguise[53] is a
species of aggravating circumstance that denotes intellectual trickery or
cunning resorted to by an accused to aid in the execution of his criminal design
or to lure the victim into a trap and to conceal the identity of the accused. The
fact that one of the appellants has pretended to be a member of the New
Peoples Army does not necessarily imply the use of craft, fraud or disguise, in
the commission of the crime. Finally, the Court does not subscribe to the view
of the trial court that accused-appellants have employed means which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the crime, particularly in stripp(ing) the victim
of her denim pants and panties and then sending her home in this humiliating
and distressing condition.[54] There is nothing on record that even remotely
suggests that accused-appellants so deliberately sought to leave Catalina with
bottoms bare that she might be left alone in shame with only her T-shirt and
brassieres on.

The absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of a

crime punishable by two (2) indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to
death, would justify, even without any mitigating circumstance, the imposition
of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, appellants Agapito Quianola y Escuadro and Eduardo

Escuadro y Floro are each found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of consummated rape and, accordingly, sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in each case. Said appellants are ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, Catalina Carciller the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
indemnity ex delictu for the two counts of consummated rape
plus P60,000.00 moral damages. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.