Jader V Camaisa

8/15/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 374
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JaderManalo vs. Camaisa
*
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
THELMA A. JADERMANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA

FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA,
respondents.
Actions; Summary Judgment; A summary judgment is one

granted by the court upon motion by a party for an expeditious
settlement of a case, there appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact involved, and that therefore, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.—Petitioner
alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary
judgment in favor of respondent spouses there being a genuine
issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the
contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was
perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by
the court upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of
a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact involved, and that therefore, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A perusal of the pleadings
submit
______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
499
VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 499
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001653cb2a39ed4b68851003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
ted by both parties show that there is no genuine controversy as

to the facts involved therein.
Husband and Wife; Conjugal Property; The disposition of a
conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
cases must be with the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void.—The law requires that the disposition of a
conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerers. (Italics ours.)
Same; Same; Even granting that the wife actively participated
in negotiating for the sale of the properties, her written consent to
the sale is required by law for its validity; Being merely aware of a
transaction is not consent.—Respondent Norma Camaisa
admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even
granting that respondent Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not
consent.
Same; Same; The court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does
not give consent is incapacitated.—Petitioner argues that since
respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the
contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted. The argument is bereft
500
of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the

written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being
withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such
authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances.
However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art.
124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to
allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give
her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the
wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Thelma A. JaderManalo for and in her own behalf.
Jose R. Ebro, Jr., for private respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband

may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife’s written consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when
petitioner Thelma A. JaderManalo allegedly came across
an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses
Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in
the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN
TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten
door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was
interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated
for the purchase through a real estate broker,
1
Mr. Proceso
Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses. Petitioner made
a visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate
broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property
tax payment receipts, location plans, and
______________
1 Paragraph IV of Complaint; Rollo, p. 61.
501
VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 501

2
vicinity maps relating to the properties. Thereafter,
petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be
respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the
properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the
knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma
3
Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker. After
some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the
purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay
4
property
and P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property to be paid on
installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00 and
P200,000.00, respectively, on April5
15, 1992. The balance
thereof was to be paid as follows:
Taytay Property Makati Property

6th month P 200,000.00 P 300,000.00
12th month 700,000.00 1,600,000.00
18th month 500,000.00
This agreement
6
was handwritten by petitioner and signed
by Ediberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal
nature of the properties, Edilberto 7assured her of his wife’s
conformity and consent to the sale. The formal typewritten
Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner.
The following day, petitioner, the real estate broker and
Edilberto met in the latter’s office 8for the formal signing of
the typewritten Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed
the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks,
namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April 15, 1992 for
P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April
15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate
broker and an
______________
2 Paragraph V of Complaint; id.

3 Paragraph VI of Complaint; id.
4 Paragraph VII of Complaint, id., at p. 62.
5 Id.
6 The handwritten agreement was attached as Annex “E” to the
Complaint; Rollo, pp. 8083.
7 Supra, Note 4.
8 Paragraph IX of Complaint; Rollo, p. 63.
502

9
employee in Edilberto’s office. The contracts were given to
Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife’s signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from
respondent Norma requesting 10
a meeting to clarify some
provisions of the contracts. To accommodate her queries,
petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto
and Norma11
and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in
Makati. During the meeting, handwritten notations were
made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to
incorporate the notations12
and to meet again for the formal
signing of the contracts.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and
the real estate broker at Edilberto’s office for the formal
affixing of Norma’s signature, she was surprised when
respondent spouses informed her that they were backing
out of the agreement because they needed 13
“spot cash” for
the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded
respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already
been duly perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to
sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint
for specific performance and damages against respondent
spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
136 on April 29, 1992, to compel respondent Norma
Camaisa to sign the contracts
14
to sell.
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondents which
was denied
15
by the trial court in its Resolution of July 21,
1992.
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, alleging that it was an agreement between
herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that
the sale of the subject properties was still subject to the
approval and conformity of his
______________
9 Photocopies of these checks were attached as Annex “H” to the

Complaint; Rollo, pp. 9092.
10 Paragraph XI of Complaint; Rollo, pp. 6364.
11 Paragraph XII of Complaint; id.
12 Paragraph XIII of Complaint; id.
13 Paragraph XIX; id., pp. 6465.
14 Rollo, pp. 107110.
15 Id., at p. 143.
503
VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 503

16
wife Norma Camaisa. Thereafter, when Norma refused to
give her consent to the sale, her refusal 17
was duly
communicated by Edilberto to petitioner. The checks
issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto
18
and
she accepted the same without any objection. Respondent
further claimed that the acceptance of the checks returned
to petitioner signified her assent
19
to the cancellation of the
sale of the subject properties. Respondent Norma denied
that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of
the subject properties and
20
that she gave her consent and
conformity to the same.
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma 21
F. Camaisa
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the
basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties
considering that the wife’s written consent was not
obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal
properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract
was null and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary
judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that
under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot
intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the
consent of the wife since said wife who refused to give
consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby

rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of

the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT
Nos. (464860) S8724 and (464861) S8725 of the Registry
of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971
of the Registry of Rizal.
______________
16 Paragraph XI of Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, id., p. 95.
17 Paragraph XIII, id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim;
id. at 9394.
21 Rollo, p. 186.
504

2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant

spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorney’s Fees.
22
Costs against plaintiff.
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

On November 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of
P50,000.00 as damages and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties
subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as
such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect
to the sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa
refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected.
In fact, the downpayment was returned by respondent
spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of
Appeals also stressed that authority of the court to allow
sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the
consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases
where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property.
Hence, the present recourse assigning the following
errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY

ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE
TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF
REAL PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER
HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE

LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT
MRS. CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS OF PAYMENT IN
THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY THE
PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND
WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX “G” IN THE COMPLAINT
EXCEPT, FOR MINOR PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY
LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF
______________
22 Annex “Q,” p. 3; Rollo, pp. 224225.
505
VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 505

TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN

CASE OF NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER READILY
AGREED AND ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;
ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT
OF SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE
MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403,
1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
23
AND GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.
The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it
entered a summary judgment in favor of respondent
spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner
maintains that the issue of whether the contracts to sell
between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected
is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one
granted by the court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there
are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and
that therefore the
24
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. A perusal of the pleadings submitted by
both parties show that there is no genuine controversy as
to the facts involved therein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the
sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and
respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent

Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price
and the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid by
petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Norma refused
to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for
resolution in the trial court was whether or not the
contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses
were already per
______________
23 Rollo, p. 23.
24 271 SCRA 36 (1997).
506

fected such that the latter could no longer back out of the
agreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise,
the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerers. (Italics ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were

conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must concur.

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her
written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused
to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However,
25
being merely aware of a transaction is
not consent.
______________
25 Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, 100 SCRA 619 (1980).
507
VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 507

Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma

unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to
sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family
Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct
insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the
other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the
matter may be brought to court which will give such
authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances.
However, it should be stressed that court authorization
under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where
26
the spouse
who does not give consent is incapacitated.
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that
respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to
the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife’s
incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary
judgment was proper considering that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be
resolved by the trial court was whether the contract to sell
involving conjugal properties was valid without the written
consent of the wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2000
in CAG.R. CV No. 43421 is AFFIRMED.
______________
26 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Arturo Tolentino, Vol. I, p. 461 citing the case of Nicolas vs.
Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 635 (1987) which held that:
“. . . the very conspicuous absence of the wife’s conforme to such
disposition of the ganancial property, there being no showing that Lourdes
Manuel, whom respondent Madlangsakay married in 1927, is legally
incapacitated—renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it is in
contravention of the mandatory requirement in Article 166 of the Civil
Code. This doctrine is too wellsettled in our jurisprudence to require
further elucidation.”
See also p. 392 of Tolentino’s Commentaries relating to an identical
provision, Art. 96 of the Civil Code, on community property. Tolentino
writes:
“As a result of this joint ownership, neither spouse may alienate or
encumber any common property without the written consent of the other,
or, if the other spouse is incapacitated, the authorization of the court.”
508

Casano vs. Magat
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Pardo and

YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—A motion for summary judgment is premised on

the assumption that a scrutiny of the facts will disclose
that the issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no
genuine issue as to any pertinent fact—it is a method
sanctioned by the Rules of Court for prompt disposition of a
civil action where there exists no serious controversy.
(Raboca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000])
It is axiomatic under the law on procedure that a
summary judgment is a final disposition in a legal suit
which can be rectified by means of an appeal therefrom.
(Aqualyn Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 307
[1992])
——o0o——
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8/15/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 374

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THELMA A. JADER­MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA

Actions; Summary Judgment; A summary judgment is one

VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 499

Jader­Manalo vs. Camaisa

ted by both parties show that there is no genuine controversy as

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jader­Manalo vs. Camaisa

of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband

VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 501

Taytay Property Makati Property

2 Paragraph V of Complaint; id.

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

9 Photocopies of these checks were attached as Annex “H” to the

VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 503

WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby

1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant

Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY

HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE

22 Annex “Q,” p. 3; Rollo, pp. 224­225.

VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 505

TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN

respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

The properties subject of the contracts in this case were

consent of both husband and wife must concur.

25 Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, 100 SCRA 619 (1980).

VOL. 374, JANUARY 23, 2002 507

Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Pardo and

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—A motion for summary judgment is premised on

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22 Annex “Q,” p. 3; Rollo, pp. 224225.