Regional Security and Defense Diplomacy

Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper to
Conference on Resilience in the Age of Global Insecurity
Philippines Center of Excellence in Defense, Development and Security
National Defense College of the Philippines
Manila, August 16-17, 2018
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Regional Security and Defense Diplomacy

Carlyle A. Thayer

Introduction
This presentation is divided into four parts. Part one discusses the evolution of and
definitions of defense diplomacy. Part 2 provides an overview of defense diplomacy in
Southeast Asia, its institutions and tools. Part 3 presents a case study of Vietnam’s
omnidirectional defense diplomacy through the negotiation of strategic partnerships
agreements. Part 3 discusses the likely future tasks to be assigned to regional defense
establishments requiring defense diplomacy arising from the recently adopted ASEAN-
China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text.

Part 1. Defining Defense Diplomacy

Scholars are generally in agreement that the term defense diplomacy came into vogue
in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. In the new security environment Western
governments adopted the Partnership for Peace program to utilize NATO armed forces
to engage their former Warsaw Pact adversaries as a strategy aimed at encouraging the
adoption of democratic norms of civil-military relations so as to integrate Eastern
European states into the European Union and NATO itself.1
The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) is credited with offering the first
official definition of defense diplomacy as a conceptual tool. Defense diplomacy was
defined as the use of armed forces “to meet the varied activities undertaken by the
MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of
democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to
conflict prevention and resolution.” 2
One of the first comprehensive analysis of the shift in roles from historical concepts like
“military cooperation” and “security assistance” to defense diplomacy focused on the
practical activities that were adopted to promote cooperation and peaceful coexistence
in post-Cold War Europe.3 This study identified ten defense diplomacy activities:


Emeritus Professor and Visiting Fellow, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The
University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
1
Gregory Winger, “The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy,” Junior Fellow
Conferences (Institute fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen/Institute for Human Sciences),
6(2014) http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxxiii/the-
velvet-gauntlet/.
2
United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, Policy Paper No. 1 (London 2000), 2.
3
Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Roles for Military
Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 3

1. Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defense officials
2. Appointment of defense attaches to foreign countries
3. Bilateral defense cooperation agreements
4. Training of foreign military and civilian defense personnel
5. Provision of expertise and advice on democratic control of armed forces, defense
management and military technical areas
6. Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits
7. Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries’ defense ministries and
armed forces (exchanges)
8. Deployment of training teams
9. Provision of military equipment and other material aid
10. Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes
There is no agreed definition of defense diplomacy but there is considerable overlap
that it entails cooperation and peaceful interaction between armed forces of different
states. For example, here are three definitions in the literature presented in
chronological order.
Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills, basing their research of South Africa, define defense
diplomacy as “the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their
trained experience and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad.” 4
Cottey and Forster define defense diplomacy as “the peacetime use of armed forces and
related infrastructure (primarily defense ministries) as a tool of foreign and security
policy.”5
While K.A. Muthana writes that defense diplomacy refers to regional strategic
engagement in creating a sustainable, cooperative relationship to build trust and to
facilitate conflict prevention.6
In sum, defense diplomacy emerged in the post-Cold War era as a non-violent tool of
statecraft characterized by the use of a state’s defense organization “to advance the
strategic aims of a government through cooperation with other countries.”7 Defence
diplomacy became a catch-all term to describe diverse activities such as officer
exchanges, ship visits, training missions, and joint military activities.
From an academic perspective, however, a basket of diverse activities tells us little
about how states go about utilizing defense diplomacy as an element of national power
to achieve their objectives.

4
Martin Edmonds and Greg Mills, Beyond the Horizon: Defence Diplomacy and South Africa’s
Naval Opportunities (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs and the
Centre for Defence and International Studies, 1998). 106.
5
Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy, 5-6.
6
Muthanna, K. A. “Military Diplomacy,” Journal of Defence Studies, 5(1), January 2011, 1.
7
Winger, “The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy.”
 4

Gregory Winger, who critically reviewed the literature on defense diplomacy, developed
a theory of defense diplomacy based on how states pursue their interests in world
affairs. His initial premise is that in an anarchical world system states are responsible for
protecting and promoting their interests. But how do they achieve their objectives?
Winger, following Joseph Nye,8 argues that states employ three types of power – hard
power, economic power and soft power – and use different mechanisms to apply power
in relations with another state. Winger nests defense diplomacy under soft power and
its use of the mechanism of co-option, the ability to convince a country and its leaders
to do what another country wants. Winger defines defense diplomacy as
the peaceful use of the defense institutions of one country to co-opt the government
institutions of another country in order to achieve a preferred outcome.9
This definition is particularly apt for the security environment in Southeast where
defense establishments are attempting to build a political-security community amidst
heightened strategic uncertainty resulting from China’s rise and the relative decline in
power by the United States.
Before turning to a discussion of defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to
observe that the major external powers – the United States,10 Japan,11 China,12 India13
8
Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books,
1991), Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It
Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), and Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in
World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
9
Winger, “The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy.”
10
United States, The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
December 2017; United States Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge;
and James E. Willard, Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool of Foreign Policy at the Theater
Strategic Level, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Academic Year 2005-06.
11
Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016.
12
State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing
2015), on neighborhood diplomacy; Penghong Cai,“ASEAN Defense Diplomacy and China’s
Military Diplomacy,” Asia Policy, No. 22, July 2016, 89-95; Ian Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense
Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8(3), 2012, 287-310; and Dato’ Noor Aziz Yunan,
“China’s Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea,” Paper presented to MIMA Conference on the
South China Sea: Recent Developments and Implications for Peaceful Dispute Resolution,
sponsored by The Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Royal Chulan Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
December 12-13, 2011.
13
In April 2018, the Indian government set up a new think tank named the Defense Planning
Committee to formulate national military and security strategies and oversee foreign
acquisitions and sales
 5

and Australia14 – all have highly developed regional/theater engagement programs

designed to co-opt Southeast Asian states derived from their national security and
defense strategies.

Part 2. Overview of Southeast Asia’s Defense Diplomacy

In the post-Cold War era Southeast Asian states pursued defense diplomacy to
engender cooperation to meet the challenges of non-traditional security threats that no
single state could meet on its own. This led to “new regionalism” that took the form of
“defense regionalism” or multilateral defense diplomacy.15 Increasingly, however, major
power rivalry in the South China Sea pushed regional defense establishments into new
forms of defense diplomacy to build confidence and trust to prevent, manage and
resolve conflicts in the maritime domain.
There is a rich and diverse literature on defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia pioneered
by regional scholars with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the
Nanayang Technological University playing a leading role. See Seng Tan notes that the
first bilateral naval exercise, CORPATPHILINDO, took place in 1972 between Indonesia
and the Philippines. Tan wrote that this exercise “marked the practice of defence
diplomacy in the region.” 16

Evolution of Defense Diplomacy

Leaving this historical footnote aside, defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia gradually
evolved after the end of the Cold War. In 1991, the first ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet was
held in Malaysia and it continues to this day. Three years later the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) was established involving both foreign affairs and defense officials. In 2000,
the first annual ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting was held. The following
year, the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force informal Meeting and ASEAN Navies
Interaction (later renamed ASEAN Navy Chiefs) met for the first time. In 2003, the
ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting also held it first meeting. The following year the
ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference held their inaugural meeting. In 2010 and 2011, the first
ASEAN Sergeant Majors Annual Meeting and first ASEAN Armies Sergeants Major
Annual Meeting were held, respectively.

14
Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper; and Defence
Diplomacy: Is the game worth the candle? The Centre of Gravity Series No. 17, Strategic &
Defence Studies Centre, ANU College of Arts & the Pacific, Canberra: The Australian National
University, November 2014.
15
See Seng Tan, “’Talking Their Walk’? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in Southeast Asia,”
Asian Security 8(3), 2012, 232-250.
16
See Seng Tan, “’Talking Their Walk’? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in Southeast Asia,”
Asian Security 8(3), 2012, 235.
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ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting

Southeast Asian defense diplomacy really came into its own with the establishment of
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in Kuala Lumpur in May 2006.
According to a spokesperson for the ASEAN Secretariat, “defence diplomacy will
consolidate the prevailing peace and stability relations in Southeast Asia by promoting
greater convergence between national security and regional security.”17
The creation of the ADMM resulted in a hierarchical structure that provided a clear
chain of command. The three service chiefs (Army, Navy and Air) and the chiefs of
military intelligence formed the bottom layer of this structure. They reported to the
Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting that in turn reported to the ADMM. ADMM
Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM) assisted the Defence Ministers.
A major milestone was reached in July 2012 when the Republic of Singapore Navy and
the Indonesian Navy co-hosted the inaugural ASEAN Maritime Security Information-
Sharing Exercise (AMSISX) at the Changi Command and Control Centre. AMSISX was
attended by navy chiefs from Brunei, Indonesia Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The
exercise included not only the participants in Singapore but also their respective
countries’ operations centers that were linked through the ASEAN Information-Sharing
Portal (AIP).
A second milestone was reached with the inaugural ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise
(AMNEX) hosted by Thailand from November 13-22, 2017. AMNEX included ships from
nine ASEAN navies - Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore Thailand and Vietnam. During this period an International Fleet Review
(pictured on the cover of this paper), was held in Pattaya Bay to celebrate ASEAN’s 50th
Anniversary. The Fleet Review included forty ships from nineteen participating
countries.

ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus

In 2010 a new body was created with the ADMM’s expansion to include eight dialogue
partners - Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the
United States – known as the ADMM-Plus. According to Singh and Tan, the concept of
defense diplomacy emerged among members of ASEAN at this time as an important
tool of state foreign and security policy. The ADMM-Plus initially met triennially and in
2013 this was changed to biennially.
Since its formation the ADMM-Plus has conducted twelve exercises in each of the seven
areas of agreed cooperation: counterterrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, humanitarian mine action, maritime security, military medicine and
peacekeeping. As See Seng Tan notes,
some field exercises have been huge and complex affairs. For example, a combined maritime
security and counterterrorism exercise that took place in Brunei and Singapore in May 2016

17
M. C. Abad writing in The Jakarta Post, May 8, 2006.
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involved a total of 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, 25 aircraft and 40 special forces teams.
All ADMM+ member countries participated in shore-based activities in Brunei, exercises that
simulated a terrorist attack at sea between Brunei and Singapore and land-based exercises in
north-western Singapore...
ADMM+ stand out as an exception to the rule in a region where form has triumphed over
substance in regional security cooperation. ADMM+ reflects what ASEAN and its dialogue
partners can achieve so long as the will is there. But as much as the achievements of ADMM+
suggest that ASEAN and its partners could finally be getting security right, their ability to
translate these successes into lasting consequences for the region remains to be seen. The
prospect of participant fatigue and diminishing returns from commitments to defence
cooperation are all too real, particularly if tensions over the South China Seas continue to
escalate. 18

Part 3. Case Study: Vietnam’s Omnidirectional Defense Diplomacy

This section presents a case study of Vietnam’s approach to defense diplomacy through
bilateral agreements on strategic partnerships. Vietnam is not allied with any major
power and pursues a defense policy of “three no’s” -
Vietnam consistently advocates neither joining any military alliances nor giving any other
countries permission to have military bases or use its soil to carry out military activities
against other countries.19
Among Southeast Asian states Vietnam arguably has one of the most developed
strategic frameworks for the conduct of defense diplomacy. Since June 1991, Vietnam
hs pursued a foreign policy of “diversifying and multilateralizing” (đa dạng hóa, đa
phương hóa) its external relations.
In March 2001, Vietnam signed its first strategic partnership agreement with the Russian
Federation. This agreement set out broad-ranging cooperation in eight major areas:
political-diplomatic, military equipment and technology, oil and gas cooperation, energy
cooperation for hydro and nuclear power, trade and investment, science and technology,
education and training, and culture and tourism. The centrepiece of the strategic
partnership is defence cooperation including arms sales (including guided missile
frigates and six advanced Kilo-class submarines), the transfer of military-related
technology and co-production of anti-ship missiles.
The Vietnam-Russia strategic partnership became the model for Vietnam’s relations
with the major powers and other important countries. In 2006 the Tenth National
Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party adopted a Political Report that stated,
Vietnam will “carry out the foreign policy of openness, multi-laterilasation and
diversification of international relations. To proactively integrate into the international
economy and, at the same time, expand international co-operation in other domains.”

18
See Seng Tan, “In defence of ADMM+,” East Asia Forum, April 30, 2018.
19
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam National Defence (Hanoi
December, 2019), 21-22.
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In sum, the Tenth Congress kick started Vietnam’s drive to transform bilateral relations
into strategic and comprehensive partnerships.
As bilateral relations developed breadth and depth several strategic partnerships were
upgraded. For example, in October 2009, Vietnam and South Korea raised their 2001
comprehensive partnership to a strategic cooperative partnership. In July 2012, Vietnam
and Russia raised their strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership.
Other strategic partnerships were upgraded and described as extensive, enhanced,
comprehensive or comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships.
In October 2006, Japan and Vietnam signed an agreement on strategic partnership and
in March 2014, they re-designated their bilateral relations as an extensive strategic
partnership. In July 2007, India and Vietnam became strategic partners. In September
2016, Vietnam and India raised bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic
partnership. In June 2008, Vietnam and China officially became strategic partners. A
year later this was upgraded to a strategic cooperative partnership and in 2013 the
relationship was elevated to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, the
highest designation among all of Vietnam’s strategic partners. In September 2009,
Vietnam and Australia signed an agreement on comprehensive partnership and in 2018
raised bilateral relations to a strategic partnership.

Between 2009 and 2013 Vietnam also concluded strategic partnership agreements with
five European countries: Spain (December 2009), United Kingdom (September 2010),
Germany (October 2011), Italy (January 2013), and France (September 2013).
Of particular note is that from 2013 to 2016, Vietnam gave priority to reaching strategic
partnership agreements with its Southeast Asian neighbors. In 2013, Thailand (June),
Indonesia (June) and Singapore (September) became strategic partners with Vietnam,
followed by Malaysia (August 2015) and the Philippines (September 2016). Vietnam and
Brunei have pledged to raise their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership in future.
Currently Vietnam has a total of sixteen strategic partners and ten comprehensive
partners (including the United States under an agreement reached in July 2013).
The purpose of strategic partnerships is to promote comprehensive cooperation across
a number of areas and to give each strategic partner, especially major powers, equity in
Vietnam’s stability and development in order to ensure Vietnam’s non-alignment and
strategic autonomy. All strategic partnership agreements have a section relating to
defense cooperation and defense diplomacy that vary in scope from country to country.
The paragraphs below summarize the defense component in joint statements on
strategic partnerships between Vietnam and its five ASEAN neighbors.

Thailand
On defence and security cooperation: to strengthen, expand and improve the efficiency of
defence and security cooperation; to increase cooperation on dealing with traditional and
non-traditional security challenges; to promote consular cooperation; and to reaffirm their
commitment not to allowing any individual or organisation to use their own national territory
to conduct activities against the other.
 9

Indonesia
6. On defense and security cooperation, the two leaders supported further effective
implementation of the MOU on Promotion of Cooperation of Defence Officials and Related
Activities (2010), the Agreement on Cooperation of Criminal Combating and Prevention
(2005) and the Terms of Reference on Navy to Navy Talks (2012), particularly in promoting
capacity building and exchange personnel. The two leaders also encouraged the
enhancement of cooperation in national defense industry and non-traditional security fields.

Singapore
On Enhancing Security and Defence Cooperation
9. Continue to build on the Defence Cooperation Agreement (2009) and further strengthen
bilateral defence ties, mutual understanding and trust by increasing cooperation in areas
such as military and training exchanges in both countries, multilateral cooperation within
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, as well as through further
exchange of views on security issues of common interest.

Malaysia
7. Both sides agreed to intensify defense and security cooperation, including the proposal to
establish a Joint Committee on bilateral defence relations, which is in line with the
Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Defence Cooperation signed in August 2008, as
well as the establishment of 'hotline' between the two navies. Both sides also agreed to
expedite the signing of the MOU on Prevention and Combat of Transnational Crimes.

Philippines
17. Sustain regular meetings of Viet Nam – Philippines Defense Cooperation Working Group
at the Assistant Secretary/Director General – level on an annual basis, and the Viet Nam –
Philippines Defense Strategic Dialogue at the Vice Minister-level.
18. Implement the existing joint mechanisms and agreements, including the MOA on Defense
Cooperation, to intensify cooperation between their armed services. To this end, joint
confidence- and capacity-building activities will be conducted leading to the eventual holding
of actual joint activities between the two navies, the timing and modalities of which shall be
subject to future discussion. Promote cooperation and experience sharing on UN
peacekeeping operations. Enhance cooperation in multilateral military and defense fora,
including ADMM, ADMM-Plus , ARF, ACDFIM, among others.

Part 4. Future Tasks: South China Sea Code of Conduct

On June 29, 2018 the 15th ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation
of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (SOM-DOC) met
in Changsha, China and adopted the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of
Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT). This was approved in early August by the foreign
ministers of China and the ten ASEAN member states at the 10+1 Post-Ministerial
Conference held in Singapore.
The SDNT is described as a “living document” to which all parties may add or delete
proposals. The SDNT identifies submissions by various countries in green color in the
text using the following legend: Brunei (BD), Cambodia (CA), China (CH), Indonesia (ID),
 10

Laos (LA), Malaysia (MA), Myanmar (MM), Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), Thailand
(TH) and Vietnam (VN).
The SDNT is scheduled to go through three hearings with adoption at a “mutually
agreed timeline.” A review of this document indicates that if and when approved the
armed forces of the parties concerned will be called upon to step up defense diplomacy
in order to promote further confidence and trust and more importantly work
cooperatively to prevent, manage and resolve maritime disputes.
The passages below summarize references to activities that will become the
responsibility of defense establishments and the armed forces of the eleven contracting
parties when the Code of Conduct is finally adopted.
Section 2a, General Provisions, contains three objectives:
i. To establish a rules-based framework containing a set of norms to guide the conduct of
parties and promote maritime cooperation in the South China Sea;
ii. To promote mutual trust, cooperation and confidence, prevent incidents, manage
incidents should they occur, and create a favourable environment for the peaceful
settlement of the disputes;
iii. To ensure maritime security and safety and freedom of navigation and overflight.
Point 10 states:
Parties reaffirm their commitment to ensure maritime security and safety in the South China
Sea, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as the relevant international
conventions and treaties relating to maritime security and safety. [MY]
Point 11 reads in part:
Consistent with this Code, all Parties shall [PH]:
a. Conduct their activities in the South China Sea in a manner consistent with
international law, and that promotes mutual trust, cooperation and confidence; [BN, CA,
CH, ID, PH, VN, SG]
b. Avoid or prevent incidents in the South China Sea that may disrupt peace and stability
in the region; [BN, CA, CH, ID, PH, VN, SG]
c. Manage such incidents in a peaceful manner and consistent with international law,
should they occur; [BN, CA, CH, ID, PH, VN, SG]
d. Ensure the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight and freedom of
commerce in the South China Sea [ID, SG, MY Option 1: in accordance with international
law, including the 1982 UNCLOS] [PH Option 2: through an effective implementation of
their obligations under applicable international instruments]; [BN, CA, CH, ID, PH, VN,
TH, MY, SG]
e. Maintain a favourable environment for the peaceful, comprehensive, and durable
resolution of disputes in the South China Sea, in accordance with international law,
including the 1982 UNCLOS. [BN,CA, CH, ID, PH, VN, SG]
 11

Part 2, Section c, contains six clauses under the heading Basic undertaking. These are:
i. Duty to cooperate
ii. Promotion of practical maritime cooperation
iii. Self-restraint/Promotion of trust and confidence
iv. Prevention of incidents
v. Management of incidents
vi. Other undertakings, in accordance with international law, to fulfil the objectives and
principles of the COC (incorrectly numbered v in the SDNT)
Section 2.c(ii), on promotion of practical maritime cooperation, is the most contentious
section of the SDNT. Four separate options are advanced by the Philippines, Indonesia
and Singapore, China, and Cambodia outline practical activities such as cooperative
projects and activities in accord with the Guidelines for the Implementation of the
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
Section 2.c(iii), Self-restraint/Promotion of trust and confidence, contains two options ,
one by Indonesia and one by China, on suggested activities to build trust and confidence
among the parties. These options directly touch on tasks to be undertaken through
defense diplomacy. Indonesia recommends, inter alia, “holding dialogues and exchanges
of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials,” voluntary
notification “of any impending joint-combined military exercises,” and the voluntary
exchange of “relevant information.”
Option 2, proposed by China, includes the following activities involving defence and
military officials:
a. Undertaking that military activities in the region shall be conducive to enhancing mutual
trust among the countries concerned and to maintaining peace and stability of the region;
[CH]
b. Enhancing exchanges and cooperation among the defence and military forces, promoting
maritime cooperation, dialogue and exchanges at all levels, setting up and improving
platforms for regular communication and dialogue, and carrying out activities such as mutual
port calls of military vessels and joint patrol on a regular basis; [CH]
c. Undertaking joint military exercises among China and ASEAN Member States on a regular
basis; [CH]
d. The Parties shall establish a notification mechanism on military activities, and to notify
each other of major military activities if deemed necessary. The Parties shall not hold joint
military exercises with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are
notified beforehand and express no objection; [CH]
e. Military vessels and military aircraft enjoy sovereign immunity and are therefore immune
from the jurisdiction of any State other than their flag state. Military vessels and military
aircraft are entitled to self-defence under international law, but should have due regard for
the other side’s military vessels and military aircraft while exercising the right of self-defence;
[CH]
 12

Part 2.c (Iv), Prevention of incidents, covers confidence building measures with particular
emphasis on adherence to international law. Five countries proposed that parties to the
final Code of Conduct comply with the following international Instruments:
 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG),
 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR),
 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) and
 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation. [CA, CH, ID, TH, SG]
The same five countries (CA, CH, ID, TH, SG) also encouraged “the application of the
recommendations on operational procedures for the promotion of safety of overflight
and navigation under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Part 2.c(v), Management of incidents, contained detailed proposals that would require
defense diplomacy to initiate and carry out. In order to manage incidents at sea
Singapore proposed compliance with 1972 COLREG and 1974 SOLAS. Thailand added
“the application of international standards for the safety of navigation at sea such as
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPC Code), Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), etc., in accordance with the specific scope of each document.
Seven highly specific proposals were included that will involve defense diplomacy to
initiate and carry out. The original numbers have been retained in the list below:
3. In order to improve operational safety of naval ships and naval aircrafts in air and at sea,
and ensure mutual trust among all Parties, Parties agree to use the safety and
communication procedures for the safety of all Parties’ naval ships and naval aircrafts, as set
out in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) CUES when they encounter each other
in the South China Sea; [CA, CH, SG]
4. The Parties agree to carry out joint exercises for the implementation of CUES; [CH]
5. The Parties are encouraged to develop bilateral and multilateral codes for maritime and air
encounters of military ships and aircraft, consistent with the purposes and principles of the
COC; [CH]
6. The Parties undertake to manage incidents in a calm and constructive manner; [MY]
7. The Parties further agree to utilise the MFA-to-MFA Hotline established to promote
immediate and effective exchange of information and views and coordination among the
MFAs of the ASEAN Member States and China with regard to maritime emergencies that
require immediate policy level intervention, in relation to the full and effective
implementation of the Code, to promote confidence. [BN, CA, CH, ID, SG]
8. In managing and resolving incidents, the concerned Parties abide by the following rules
and procedures: [ID]
a. The relevant Parties shall submit a written chronology of events that include signals
used during an incident and whether or not both sides acknowledged signals; provide
 13

appropriate position, course, speed and bearing, and range data;

b. The relevant Parties shall, when available, submit narrated video, motion pictures,
and/or sequence of photographs; [ID]
c. The chiefs of naval operation or naval attaches/military attaches of the parties involved
shall discuss the incident immediately after it occurs; [ID]
d. The Parties agreed to establish a hotline of communication between the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs to facilitate the speedy resolution of the incidents; [ID]
e. The Parties commit themselves to resolve incidents expeditiously and peacefully
through diplomatic channels by resorting, inter alia, to formal ASEAN-China mechanisms;
[ID]
f. The Parties agreed, as appropriate, to resort to the High Council of the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC), at the consent of the Parties concerned, to settle any dispute
relating to incidents that may arise in the South China Sea; [ID]
g. The Parties agreed that any unresolved incident may be referred to an appropriate
international dispute settlement mechanism, at the consent of the concerned Parties. [ID]
9. Establish in a gradual manner bilateral and multilateral military hotlines among the
defence authorities at all levels; [CH]
Vietnam proposed replacing all the proposals under Point 2.c, Basic Undertaking,
discussed above, with a list of twenty actions that contracting parties “shall” undertake
and seven actions that contracting states “shall not “undertake. Most of Vietnam’s
proposals overlap with suggestions made by other state. Of interest to defense and
military officials are four “shall not” do activities (original numbers retained):
2. The Contracting States shall not:
d. Militarize occupied features in the South China Sea;
e. Blockade vessels carrying provisions or personnel for rotation;
f. Declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea;
g. Conduct simulated attacks that aim guns, missile launches, inter alia, at targets
of other countries.

Conclusion
Although all ten ASEAN member states have an interest in peace and stability in the
South China Sea and preventing existing tensions from escalating into armed hostility,
they have differing national interests in how this peaceful end state can be achieved.
The four claimant states – Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam – also have
differing national interests based on coastal geography, the number and location of
features that they occupy, the location of off shore oil exploration activities, and their
degree of propinquity to China’s seven artificial islands. Other littoral states, such as
Singapore and Indonesia, are interested parties with separate and distinct national
interests.
 14

ASEAN member states have been able to work collectively to address non-traditional
security challenges and threats, and carry out other cooperative activities such as search
and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Reaching a common position on
how to implement the final Code of Conduct in the South China Sea is another matter.
The two states most concerned, the Philippines and Vietnam, will have to conduct
intense defense diplomacy with fellow ASEAN members and China to co-opt them to
shape an outcome that is favorable to their interests.

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