Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No.
47800, December 2, 1940 consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
Meaning of Social Justice
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a
taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the
respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in
its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of
the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530
pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary
the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public
Works approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by
the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to
the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
the promulgation of the said law and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
 fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
FACTS
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions. They will be subject to one common discussion and
resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
 The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano,
Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They
question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229,
and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full owners of
the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with
1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit
the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members).
It was granted by the court.
 Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was
granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of
his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the
then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer
were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay
lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and
cancellation of these certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without
hearing.
 Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which
rendered his motion moot.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing
the measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a
valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits
required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement
that a bill should only have one subject, to be expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific
department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of
eminent domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle
of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation
RULING
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been
sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 &
229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when
the Congress was formally convened and took over legislative
power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not
its principal purpose and therefore is not required to conform to
the requirements.
4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of
the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied
in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of
the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is
payment of just compensation unlike in the exercise of police
power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if
there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method.
As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid
down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is
the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional
goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not
only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made
to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of
payment, other modes of payment shall be permitted as
compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the
just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money, they find further that the proportion of cash payment to the
other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined
on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are
likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP
 bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of Subtopic: (LANDMARK CASE - RH BILL CASE)
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
FACTS:
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is
as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Bill.
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That
ISSUES:
is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not
what we shall decree today.)
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 112844, June
2, 1995 (Read also the concurrence of J. Brion)
2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom

Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections

TOPIC: Role of the Preamble

 c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by 2. NO.
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
3.
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition a.) NO.

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) b.) YES.

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom c.) NO.

6. Due process clause 4. YES.

7. Equal protection clause 5. NO.

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude 6. NO.

7. NO.

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration 8. NO.
(FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the
B. NO.
Essential Drugs List is valid

C. NO.

* RATIO:
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
HELD:
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
A. they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on
this matter.
1. NO.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the
traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries
cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources
also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer
to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child
upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life
of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure to prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes
that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion
or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb”
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under
all
the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting
this
diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be
maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA
4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH
must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials
have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress
cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient
and effective”.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives
or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a
religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not
the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to
dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5
of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the
State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite
their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These
provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article
VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is
the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion.
While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to
it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors
(under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause.
There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and 4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even
their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
he/she is employed in the government. autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families
perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits
or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
do not pertain to life-threatening cases.
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of

intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature marriage and the family.

has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of

a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the

nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a development of moral character shall receive the support of the

reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in

even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in

seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall

information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the

of family life without the intervention of the State. right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-
surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures)
about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental
guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the
RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department
of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the
term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior
to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions
of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the
parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials,
and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it
could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health
service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children
and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number,
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples
who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple
may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second,
Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods
(under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over
a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law
does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the
ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the

regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication
by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare.
PT&T Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired
Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a
fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for
C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.
She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F.
Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991
and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman
was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of
the job application form under civil status that she was single although
she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring
her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a
reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992.
Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to
terminate the services of an employee.
RULING:
No. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.
Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of,
and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on
account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with
the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy
that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of
her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in
bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she
wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words,
she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices.
Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which
are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
 However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of
dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the
NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of
Grace from work.
Grace attained regular status as an employee
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status
at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on
Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150
days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2,
1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary
period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it
was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.
There was illegal dismissal
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as
she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against
marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family
as the foundation of the nation.
Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771,
April 21, 2015)
FACTS:
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the
DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a
company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine
branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged
Philippine agent of JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and
JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46)
for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources
in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the
Tañon Strait. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an
ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted
until February 8, 2008. It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that
petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original
petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek
that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among
others, violation of the 1987 Constitution. Protesting the adverse
ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait
and they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent
JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the
affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were
not held prior to the ECC's issuance. Public respondents, through the
Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46
does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the
petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and
regulations. They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions
have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been
mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008.
ISSUE:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS
VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTES
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING
CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED
SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL
PROTECTION GRANTED TO PETITIONERS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
RULES:
I. Adhering to the below mentioned guidelines, this Court finds
that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the
requirements of the 1987 Constitution. While the requirements
in executing service contracts seem like mere formalities, they,
in reality, take on a much bigger role. They are requirements
placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental
law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with
respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which
are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a
general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of
terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to
the President for signature, it will have been vetted several
times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to
law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President
shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any.
II. It is the duty of the court to rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-
vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the
Government when executing service contracts involving not
only the Tañon Strait, but also other similar areas. True to the
constitutional policy, Section 16 Article 2, that the "State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature," Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the
perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas. Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected
area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their
unique physical and biological significance, managed to
enhance biological diversity and protected against human
exploitation. Surveying for energy resources under Section 14
is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement
in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional
requisites before any exploration for energy resources may be
done in protected areas.
SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering
information on the possible energy resources in the Tañon
Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations
relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in
commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a
NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil
exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said
protected seascape.
 Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-
VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586. judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the
DISCUSSION:
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the '"moot and academic
principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot
and academic under the following exceptions:
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA, G.R. No. 110120, March
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; 16, 1994
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;
3. The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 (read also the
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
concurrence of J. Feliciano explaining the nuances of the ponencia
Environmental Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any
of J. Davide)
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,

including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a MMDA, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R.
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case
within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the
order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

Facts:
Ratio :
Lao Ichong, petitoner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other
alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act
is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4)
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila
contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the
interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected
but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of
inheritance is only of statutory origin.
Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of
the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and
for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term
in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens
and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and
other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to
present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of
the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for
a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Issue: Whether or not Retail Trade Nationalization Law is enacted in
interest of national economic survival and security.
Ruling:
Yes, Retail Trade Nationalization Law is enacted in interest of national
economic survival and security.
The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security
itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which
and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme
welfare of its citizens. The Court is fully satisfied upon a consideration of
all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of
racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has
unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage.
Thus, Retail Trade Nationalization Law is enacted in interest of national
economic survival and security.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investments.

Here, there is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears
to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all
kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic
Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not
2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited
for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762
and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily now allows them to do so under four categories:
become full and complete. But the dangers arising from alien Catego Less than Exclusively for
participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance ry A US$2,500,000. Filipino citizens and
alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly 00 corporations wholly
endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and owned by Filipino
citizens.
action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act
Catego US$2,500,000. For the first two
in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of
ry B 00 up but lessyears of R.A. 8762s
prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made than effectivity, foreign
available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they US$7,500,000. ownership is
would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the 00 allowed up to 60%.
national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy After the two-year
and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, period, 100%
producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. foreign equity shall
be allowed.
Catego US$7,500,000.May be wholly
 ry C 00 or more owned by of certain loans.
foreigners. Foreign
investments for (5) There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote
establishing a store monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade.
in Categories B and
C shall not be less Respondent argue that: Petitioners have no legal standing to file the
than the equivalent petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A.
in Philippine Pesos 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
of US$830,000.00.
Catego US$250,000.0 May be wholly The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
ry D 0 per store ofowned by
foreign foreigners. Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
enterprises R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not
specializing in self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
high-end or
luxury The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of
products foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens
certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It
of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds: does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to
(1) The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Filipino citizens.
Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under
the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, ISSUE:
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino 1. WON petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies. constitutionality of R.A. 8762.
2. WON R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
(2) The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the
retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of HELD:
business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must
economy. have a standing to do so. Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right
of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More
(3) Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in
retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage
about more unemployment. of that law.

(4) The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail
the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on
them, either as taxpayers or as legislators.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The PUNO, J.:
objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to
pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can
enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The
NEDA has not opposed such policy.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But
as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened
any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the
implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the
retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and
strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict
safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus -
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on
imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other
hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later
than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable . . .”

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the
categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical
entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the
Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject
Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain which should be expressed in its title.
retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of
mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-
door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar
retailing activities. They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,”
“decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso
exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete 4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution
since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and
guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil unfair competition?
industry.

III. THE RULING

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which
proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry in
February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180
when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the [The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180
implementation of full deregulation. unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the 1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade
requirement of the Constitution.
and unfair competition

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one

title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue
all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general
II. THE ISSUES subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane
Constitution? to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective
2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on
delegation of power? imported petroleum.

3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition

on undue delegation of power.
 Two tests have been developed to determine whether the
delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of
the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of
these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests
are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided
in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the
end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of
March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of
the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,”
“declining” and “stable” should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as
they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of
these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to
practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction,
and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run
riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity
of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.
A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it
only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of
Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining,
and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as
a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that
some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to
deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We
therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor
of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor
cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department
considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world
market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar.
By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive
is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede
to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to
transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of
delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a
mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the
cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF
fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world
market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the
text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the
Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be
the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been
accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light
of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392
constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of
trade and unfair competition.
[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated
and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell
and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All
other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet,
this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and
cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the
entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but
compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce
prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by
burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging
to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream
oil industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of
Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell
and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No.
8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors
again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a
prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of
inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further
occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and
enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.
Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is
defined as “. . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price
unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers
to the detriment of competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision
works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The
ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is
interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of
new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory
pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the
provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer
Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining
of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
future. The monopoly profits will never materialize,
however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon
as the successful predator attempts to raise its price.
Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market
contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory
requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to
enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by
R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to
engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’
charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not
without reason.
[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High
Tribunal held that the offending provisions of the law so permeated its
essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff
differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal
props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry without these provisions.]
Garcia v. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, December 17, 1999 – timing of
full deregulation not justiciable
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other
lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our
National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO
opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products, and thus provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement. A “free market” as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
“free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our
constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if
such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues/Held:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition does raise a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.”
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
the rules of evidence.
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept
of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly
limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties
Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.”
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization’ would imply rejection
of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
(Read also the dissent of J. Puno)
FACTS:
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation
50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
RULING:
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
protected, is self-executing.
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
letter, but which GSIS refused to accept.
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of
such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the
past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that
of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions
has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put
it in operation.
Cruz v. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013
Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those
who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e.,
he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of
the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision
which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
"equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible
into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult
to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was
not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be
subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply
to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is
minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention
to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number
of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually
impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which
are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is
both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before
this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception
of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an
international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of
Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1)
natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to
read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election;
and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and
was disqualified.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Phils., G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 <--- FOCUS ON Full
Disclosure of Public Transactions (Sec. 28)
1.) The International Concept of Association; “A state within a
state”
2.) Right to self-determination (but it does not extend to unilateral
right of secession except under the most extreme of cases, under
carefully defined circumstances); distinction between internal and
external self-determination; countervailing principle: right to
territorial integrity; UN DRIP does not authorize MOA-AD
Facts:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign on August
5, 2008 a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of the Ancestral Domain
(AD) Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. But this was assailed by various petitioners and
consolidated by the court as per below.
 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol
on its petition to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD
disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare
null and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from
signing the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec.
Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying
to declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect
and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a
judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other
agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the
MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading
Iqbal.
Memorandum of Agreement-Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
 Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli
Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as
ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e
compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order).
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people
have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which
they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation
in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as
"the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government
having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."
It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE)
to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace
the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in
a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be
subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B”
which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another
separate agreement.
The BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms
from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the
baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south
west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the
BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal
waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to
enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to
include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to
remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have
participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the
negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental
protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the
bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain.
The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And
they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship
between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further
discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly
contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build,
develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the comprehensive compact
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe
for adjudication.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information
on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)
3. Whether or not by signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines would be binding itself;
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g)
& Chapter VII (DELINEATION,RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS).
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by
the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David
v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act
. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 Art III) The right to information guarantees the right of the people
to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided
by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD are a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right
to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 (DEFINING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
FOR GOVERNMENT’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE EFFORTS) itself is
replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is
the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in
the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever
any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution,
it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on
the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution
and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But
even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon
the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath
of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential
power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision.
As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits
to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-
discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is
submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and
be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-
AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by
Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.
The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall
be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro
homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form
part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or In re Dick, G.R. No. L-13862, April 15, 1918
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of In Re Sotto, January 21, 1949 (Read also the concurrence of J.
inhabitants from their total environment. Perfecto)

CONCLUSION:
The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process,
as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and In re Integration of the Philippine Bar
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and Santiago v. Vazquez, G.R. Nos. 99289, January 27, 1993
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,
1999

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

MMDA, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R.

Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011 (Read also the respective
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950 dissents of JJ. Carpio and Sereno)
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. Republic, G.R. No.
177857-58, September 17, 2009
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928) (Read the oft-quoted dissent of J. Holmes regarding
blending of powers)
Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-7910, January 18, 1955
De La Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
Lagman v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
SPCMB Law Offices v. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016
Endencia v. David, G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953
Topic: Propriety of Construction
Subtopic: Power to Construe as a Judicial Function
Case: Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected
income taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes
from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of
their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent,
through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of
judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of
income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not
a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
otherwise. conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to
give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore,
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.
otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate the Judiciary.
a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their
task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In
the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the
well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 – the six characteristics of a political
The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and question
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more
true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution,
which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions.
Alejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041, September 11, 1924
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the (NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws.
The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of
said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority
to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946 (NOTE: ruling no
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the
 the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one
had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947 (NOTE: enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule
ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution) → IMP’T: such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict
Read also the scathing dissent of J. Perfecto, especially on the with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the
two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
political question doctrine
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the
journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
FACTS:
“shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
enactment thereof.”
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by
except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the
president and filed by the secretary of state.
required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by
as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . .
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
(2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives
Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress,
allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
enactment thereof.”
ISSUE:
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
HELD:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
Arnault v. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955 – SC cannot
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two review the findings of the Houses of Congress in the exercise of
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in their legislative prerogatives

Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960 – political
question: whether a legislator’s action constitutes “disorderly
behavior” or “disorderly conduct”
De Castro v. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. L-71688, September 3,
1985 – political issue: whether the action of the Committee on
Justice of the Batasan in dismissing, for insufficiency in form and
substance, the impeachment complaint against President Marcos
was valid
Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December
20, 1985 – political issue: whether the “snap” presidential
elections of 1986 should be enjoined
Facts:
This case (along with other similar cases and petitions, 140 SCRA 453)
was filed against holding of a snap election for the office of President and
Vice President through enforcement of B.P. Blg. 883 due to lack of actual
vacancy in the Office of the President in reference to a provision in Article
VII, Section 9 of the 1973 Constitution.
The incumbent president’s conditional resignation demanded for himself
to stay in office until a new president is proclaimed and qualified.
Issue:
Whether or not B.P. Blg. 883 is unconstitutional;
Whether or not the Court should stop the holding of the snap elections for
the office of President and Vice President.
Rule:
The Court failed to secure 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg 883
Unconstitutional. Seven Justices DISMISSED the petitions in this case
(along with the other similar cases) and DENIED prayer for issuance of
an injunction restraining respondents from holding an election on
February 7, 1986.
With what appears to be a popular clamor to hold a snap election, amidst
supervening events, the People of the Philippines from which all
sovereignty emanates must be given a chance to decide, either to re-elect
the incumbent or choose a new leader. Having the issue turned political,
the Supreme Court should not stand in the way.
Romulo v. Yñiguez, G.R. No. 71908, February 4, 1986 – political
issue: whether the Supreme Court should order the Committee on
Justice to recall from the Batasan archives the impeachment
resolution and complaint against President Marcos and the
Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained therein
FACTS
Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the
Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of
President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment.
Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG).
The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance
to warrant its further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and
dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then
submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for
the recall from the archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint
attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The
present petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent
provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power to the Batasan to
determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power
to approve of deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also
pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment
complaint attached thereto be declared null and void. It is the petitioner’s
contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional
because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without
complying with the amendatory process provided in the Constitution.
Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide
whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a
collegiate body and not by a small body of the Batasan. They also content
that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition
precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to
trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members
of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles
of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.
ISSUEs
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the
Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?
2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for
impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to
conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint?
3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional?
HELD
No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for
the recall from the Archives of RN 644 and the complaint for
impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing
said complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that
no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes
of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the
Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically
impossible the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the
members. It would serve no purpose to proceed any further when it is
obvious that the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained.
Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A
dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and complaint
for impeachment – as in the dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case –
makes irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The
dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the
impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the
exercise of the powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the
power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to
conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the
CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the complaint and resolution would
produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to proceed with the
impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed
provisions are constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to
adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to
govern impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in
impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an impeachment
complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when
sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has
not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the
Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973
Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular
provisions of the Rules (aside from the fact that the question involved is
a political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained
had already been consummated. They are fait accompli.
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 – Political:
Whether a law is void because the House failed to comply with its
own internal rules (read also the concurring and dissenting
opinion of J. Puno)
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved
it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is
that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure
to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But
this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated,
as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 – legislative policy
underlying the enactment of a statute not reviewable by the Court;
Court rejected argument that, because R.A. 9262 is intended to
prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse—which could very
well be committed by either the husband or the wife—gender alone
is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under the law
Metrobank v. Tobias, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012 – principle
of non-interference
Spouses Balangauan v. CA, G. R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008 –
exception to the principle of non-interference: when Secretary of
Justice commits grave abuse of discretion
Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 (decision);
FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and
ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Tañada could deliver
his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate
President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate
and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who
continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco,
as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings
against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected
because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority
required of the 24-member Senate.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it
involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the
judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view
that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the
other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter
alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly,
because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in
view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all
the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious
to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the
office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators,
the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority.
Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821,March 14, 1949 (resolution) →
(Read also concurrence of J. Perfecto to the March 14, 1949
resolution, especially his critique of the judicial “hands-off” policy)
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R.
L-2821, Jose Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice
to writing later an extended opinion, has resolved, by a majority of
seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in
the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by
Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice Briones in their
separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session
where respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate
President.
The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of
the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
a quorum would result in the respondent's election as Senate President,
and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has
been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes
against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes.
For this reason, he believes that the group has done enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in
conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public
interest.
The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J.
Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on
the question of jurisdiction but concurs on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on
that on that of quorum.
Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and
reserves his vote on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.
Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957” in the
Senate
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2,
as amended by Resolution No. 4, calling for a Constitutional Convention
to propose amendments to the Philippine Constitution. Said Resolution
was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, for the election of delegates
of the said Convention. Hence, the 1971 Constitutional Convention began
to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in
session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November
30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No.
73, which is an order for setting and appropriating of funds for a
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution as
drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission
on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to
enjoin said respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree No. 73, on the grounds that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and the appropriation of public
funds for the purpose are lodged exclusively by the Constitution in
Congress and there is no proper submission to the people of said
Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform
the people of the contents thereof.
On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution.
The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned case.
In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-
35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as
soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." The next
day, January 13, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents to comment and file an answer to the said "urgent motion"
not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being
heard, the Secretary of Justice called on and said that, “upon instructions
of the President, he is delivering a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which
had just been signed by the President earlier that morning.”
Proclamation No. 1102, declares that Citizen Assemblies referendum was
conducted, and that the result shows that more than 95% of the members
of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and
majority also answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that
the vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered as a vote in a
plebiscite. The then President of the Philippines, Marcos, hereby certify
and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the
votes cast by the members of the Citizens Assemblies throughout the
Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive
Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance,
to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found
in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935.
Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the
ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies";
that the same "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that
the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free
election, hence null and void."
Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
involves a justiciable or political question.
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified
to said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been
approved by a majority of the people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly
held throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.
Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the
petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are
entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition.
Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to
grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
First Issue
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6)
members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo
qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been
approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the
affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's
will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and
legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been
complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3)
members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the
ambit of judicial inquiry."
Second Issue
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of
the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one
way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the
1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still
maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning
and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies,
specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and
canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of
the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that
factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for
considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of
the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am
constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal
sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the
belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,
hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts
most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the
Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial
compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
Third Issue
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the
aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached
by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973
Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold
that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no
expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of
their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under
Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in
some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of
the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the
people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the
shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what
is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a
concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are
joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of
martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of
judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."
Fourth Issue
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on
the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution,
in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these
cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and
to give due course to the petitions.
Fifth Issue
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in
their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is
not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare
that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the
four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby
dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It
is so ordered.
Sanidad v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos proposes amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has
not been convened.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling
for a national referendum for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present
powers.
Twenty days he issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring
the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.
On the same date he issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued
opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite.
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son,
commenced an action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is
no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Solicitor General filed the comment maintains that petitioners have
no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period,
only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent
power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the President to conduct a Referendum-
Plebiscite which was alleged as unconstitutional is political in nature and
is beyond the judicial cognizance of the Court.
HELD:
The Court ruled that issue raised is a judicial question. Under the terms
of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of
transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite.
The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed
as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.
The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of
treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending,
like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within
its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality
of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the
legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable
or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the
act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending
process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question.
If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not
Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989
Facts:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of
the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and
was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number
to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised
its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing
the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed
LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.
The petitioner challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
Issue:
Wether or not petitioner'sremival from the Commission on Appointments
and replacement by respondent was valid.
Ruling:
The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each
House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF
THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority
of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly
complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not
only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against
members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to
which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party,
the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is
materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant
the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held
by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely
affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the
Constitution.
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other
lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our
National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO
opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products, and thus provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement. A “free market” as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
“free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our
constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if
such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues/Held:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition does raise a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.”
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated
Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the
exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating
the rules of evidence.
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept
of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly
limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties
Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.”
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization’ would imply rejection
of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in
exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November
10, 2003
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and
was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October
23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
accordance with the guidelines set in this Decree and its implementing
rules and regulations. (Underscoring supplied).
Section 3 of the same law empowers the Commission on Audit (COA) to
make a quarterly audit of the JDF:

The second impeachment complaint charges the Chief Justice with
alleged unlawful underpayment of the cost of living allowances of
members and personnel of the judiciary and the unlawful disbursement of
the JDF for certain infrastructure projects and acquisition of motor
vehicles.
Issues:
Whether or not congress can assail the wisdom and legality of the
allocation and utilization of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
Held:
No.
Section 1 of PD 1949 imposes the following percentage limits on the use
of the JDF:
SECTION 3. The amounts accruing to the Fund shall be deposited by the
Chief Justice or his duly authorized representative in an authorized
government depository bank or private bank owned or controlled by the
Government, and the income or interest earned shall likewise form part of
the Fund. The Commission on Audit through the Auditor of the Supreme
Court or his duly authorized representative shall quarterly audit the
receipts, revenues, uses, disbursements and expenditures of the Fund,
and shall submit the appropriate report in writing to the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, copy
furnished the Presiding Appellate Justice of the Intermediate Appellate
Court and all Executive Judges. (Underscoring supplied).
It is clear from PD 1949 that it is the COA, not Congress, that has the
power to audit the disbursements of the JDF and determine if the same
comply with the 80-20 ratio set by the law.

That at least eighty percent (80%) of the Fund shall be used for cost of
living allowances, and not more than twenty percent (20%) of the said
Fund shall be used for office equipment and facilities of the Courts
located where the legal fees are collected; Provided, further, That said
allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary shall be
distributed in proportion of their basic salaries; and, Provided, finally,
That bigger allowances may be granted to those receiving a basic salary
of less than P1,000.00 a month.

Section 2 thereof grants to the Chief Justice the sole and exclusive power
to authorize disbursements and expenditures of the JDF:

SECTION 2. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall administer and
allocate the Fund and shall have the sole exclusive power and duty to
approve and authorize disbursements and expenditures of the Fund in