[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088.

July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.

DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed
by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from
his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that
the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as
the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private
person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was
dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-
16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his
wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]

1|NDC – CIVREV A-1

 Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent
judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the
latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit,
the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that
she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the
marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary
in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively
dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35
of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."

2|NDC – CIVREV A-1

 The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of
the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.

3|NDC – CIVREV A-1

 Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a
lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them
to know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous
union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying
the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

4|NDC – CIVREV A-1

 [G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
single and Filipino.[8]

5|NDC – CIVREV A-1

 Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15] The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted
their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack
of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

6|NDC – CIVREV A-1

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners
marriage to the respondent

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53
of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent
in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of
the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on
two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven,
and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because
of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated
(the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where
the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant

7|NDC – CIVREV A-1

it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned,
can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:

xxxxxxxxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

xxxxxxxxx

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further
proof of its authenticity and due execution.

8|NDC – CIVREV A-1

 Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial

9|NDC – CIVREV A-1

function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was
void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which
no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite
the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of
the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects
of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her,
its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

10 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the
City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended
Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick
A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void
on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one
in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

11 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 [G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL,
INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis

DECISION

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient"
to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m

12 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant
to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs
to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the

13 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. x x x"Sdaad

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.

14 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent,
only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other
that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact
from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance
of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their fathers marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment
of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.

15 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article
40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage[27] and
such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

16 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,

Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by
a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered
in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of
the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the
Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by
constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated

17 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in
their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge
himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a
long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven

18 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long
period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.

19 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, G.R. No. 179474
Petitioner,
Present:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent. March 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines
and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986,

20 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came
to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later,
Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to
Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage
with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage
contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of
their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent
the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting
marriage with him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.[7]

21 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence

presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case
is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version
of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected
that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a
package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper
for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have
put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that
her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him,
more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed
was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the
fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May
12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming
to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of
[Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not
believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was
because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he
really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead
the name of his sister.

When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further
testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by
the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen
by her brother she answered yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied
his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]

22 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It
cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the
fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have
filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be
without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as
it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that
the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article
86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that
the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive
period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following
manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on

Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof
had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was
obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within
four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991
within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only
on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.[15]

23 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa
was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized
under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing
an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the
effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by
Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was
misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave
credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the
affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage,
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was
a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of
Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties
to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The
prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

24 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage

solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they
had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,

which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as
a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized

without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void
from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate
court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court
of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of

25 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the
appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it
for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of
its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY

OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with
Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose
from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented
by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes

26 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this
Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points
to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage
license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not
affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with;
and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was
legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the
fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties
marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary
evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein
he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May
1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a
false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs
their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

27 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but
not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.[30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of
a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.[32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortis or
at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]

28 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained
the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.[37] One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the
latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that
the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but
to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an
indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to
be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

29 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted
that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose
was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986
after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was
only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum
five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide
on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily
not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court
of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings
are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article
76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be
excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of
marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are

30 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the
presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or
fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate
them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license
is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the
legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must
a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on
equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby
profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds

31 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
no room for application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped
from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose
and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from
the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose
Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

32 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
G.R. No. L-9005 June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,

vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.

Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.

Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.

It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together
as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no
children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came
seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the
service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to
confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter,
upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of
marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both
agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her
Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her
marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting
as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in
January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial
ceremonies.

On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are
grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced
heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They
obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed and dismissed the complaint.

Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-
which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the events which took
place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.

According to the Court of Appeals:

There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized
the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on
January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony
in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side

33 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the celebration or
performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was
not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr.
Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-
ridden; and according to his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so
apprehensive was he about her condition that he decided in administering to her the
sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest objection
of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under
consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not registered.

The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.

There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also
no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared
before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as
husband and wife."

The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:

(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the
priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and

(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.

The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The Court
of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such
marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a
fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of
the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said
marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage
invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34,
Record on Appeal.)

However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage
certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?

Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which
provides:

Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required,
but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take
each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).

34 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.

In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by
the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case
actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by
the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling
has been cited making it an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary
value, which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be
established is quite another.

Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually

provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording
of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not
essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license,
certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording.
(Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)

Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a
license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the
ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the
marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to
secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such
statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where
such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is
the purpose of these statutes to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit
intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties
who live together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage. . .
. (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See
also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)

And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or
several formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of
such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his
obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to
visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any,
which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and
its environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections
20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious
consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by the
emergency.

35 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones
vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest
to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the
issuance of a marriage license. The firstpractically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage
celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also
be voidable for lack of such affidavit.

In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have
lived publicly in a state of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.

The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs
who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of
nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

36 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 [G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998]

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD

(deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and
filiation be proven?

The Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the
Court of Appeals[1] Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994[2] and Resolution promulgated
on February 8, 1995[3] in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court
and dismissed petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint[4] for partition and
damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the
Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.[5] On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so
he was not substituted as a party.[6]
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision[7] in favor of the petitioner,
in which it ruled:[8]
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son
of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased
father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the
plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share from said land before and
the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he stopped
receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that
petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to
each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision
disposed:[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners] complaint and the
counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:[10]

37 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994,
for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the
modification of the decision.

Hence, this petition.[11]

The Facts

The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:[12]
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of
Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described
therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3)
children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio
Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to
partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single
when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had
lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had
been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not
given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named
children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three
(23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the
above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he
be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby
reproduces pertinent portions of the trial courts decision:[13]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in
1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified
that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4
years. Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association
of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she
knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad

38 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and
his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness
was about 30 meters away from plaintiffs parents[] house and she used to go there 2 or 3
times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the
father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified
she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was
Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in
Barrio Tigayon.

When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness
answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels
belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio
Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children,
namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided
among the 3 children of Patricio.

A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in
the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified
by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the
witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes
Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and
Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.

Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She
testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was
holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court
when xxx the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if
Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his
parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name
Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being
July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.

On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she
used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the
area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the
pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was not
present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she
knows all of them.

At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only
sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.

Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She
testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes,

39 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left
them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the
parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor
by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very
well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and
Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season. That she knows that during the
lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed
the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes,
Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any
share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she
was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness
testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was
still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was
growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by
Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get
his fathers share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.

Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants,
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his
father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already
dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.

As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate
of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned
during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.

When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as
his mother was already dead. Plaintiffs mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated
him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19,
he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria
Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and
children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants
when the latter invited him to live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as
Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter, his uncle
and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously
marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According to
him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the
defendants. That a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate
the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked
for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which
parcel 1 is an upland.

Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100
coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are : East-
Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio
Briones; located at Tigayon.

40 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1
bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are : East-Ambrosio
Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.

Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the
deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.

Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a
years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico
Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.

Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.

Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540
square meters is the subject of litigation.

Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with
reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-
half share.

Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the
cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia
Briones.

Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration
No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl.
No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.

On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting
the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that
his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a
municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he
was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who
died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his
mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this
case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the
produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and
they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioners] highest educational attainment is
Grade 3.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a
resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix
by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and brother. That he also

41 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already
dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his
death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time
of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, Nanay Taya,
referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes
Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with
his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad
cohabited with anybody before his death, he answered, That I do not know, neither
does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if
he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with
whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after
the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as
he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who
has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness,
Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father
was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the
subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he does not
know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the
eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness
when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to
him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When asked on
cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in
1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land because the Japanese
forces were roaming around the place.When confronted with Exhibit A which is the
alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify
the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and
the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix
Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he
does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She
stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad
was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila
where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941. According to her,
upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days
before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware
that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did
[not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato,
witness answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in
Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew
the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, Yes, but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had

42 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the
defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his
mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if there had
been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered,
he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house,
witness also said, He did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her
parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes
Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already
dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones.Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died
without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
died without a wife and children. She herself testified that she does not have any family
of her own for she has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes
Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody
will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by
the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that
Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941
and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When
she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was
holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the child that
she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she was
only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be
baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if
there was a party, she answered; Maybe there was. When confronted with Exhibit A-1
which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained
that she was requested to bring the child to the church and that the picture taken
together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child was taken during
the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She likewise
identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother,
Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another
child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are already
blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the
right of the child held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify
because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad,
holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel for
the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio
Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that
she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she
knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner
that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed
Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that a few months after the war
broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose names was Eugenia Rufo
Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in
Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was

43 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 already sick. That according to her, about 1 months after his arrival from Manila,
Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that
Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was
in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died.According to her she was born in 1928,
therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can
remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese
occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes
Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the
Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and
a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that xxx she knew both the [petitioner]
and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200
meters from them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad,
[Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15 days and
died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944,
and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is
only across the street from her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not
true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad
Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan. That she knew
this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano
Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived
from Manila he was in good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad
and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was
solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during the
marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix
Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not
able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated
September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births,
deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during
the Japanese time.

Respondent Courts Ruling

In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:[14]
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence
to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim
legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a

44 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants
that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel
Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad
Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the
protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p.
4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes
acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil.
23). Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property
without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958)
acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the defendants have been in
possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father
died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age
of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus
acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of
the Philippines).

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:[15]

1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence
the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to
prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents
(defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the
Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code
became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally by
the private respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership
of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action
for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

45 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 The Courts Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents
estate.[16] His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the
existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative
father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner
and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral

Attack on Filiation

At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented by
the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.But
in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does
not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in
this case.[17]
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly
married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to
Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of whether a
marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence:
the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children
born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.[19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification[20] from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to
petitioners case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place.[21]
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren,
who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942
in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported
themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain
of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers association, used to visit
Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters
away.[22]On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to
petitioner. She also attended petitioners baptismal party held at the same house.[23] Her
testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage.[24] It further gives
rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[25] Petitioner also presented his

46 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs
father and mother.[26]
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing
in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.[27]
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification[28] that records relative to his birth were
either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the
ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures,
his baptismal certificate and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second
daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying
petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another
picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child (Exhibit B-
2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly
prove petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private
respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B
shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners daughter, she demurred that she did so only
because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized.[29] When shown Exhibit
A, she recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the couples children -- slyly
explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.[30]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the
other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court
ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of
proof in his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the Family Code. Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by
either consanguinity or affinity,[32] her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding
pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioners legitimacy.

47 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over
private respondents self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents thesis is that Inocentes
died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones,
testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because
nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by
the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the
Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and
evasive:[33]
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or
not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad
and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he
had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody
with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed
with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese
occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was
sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and

48 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew
Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever
married to Inocentes.[34]
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in
March 1941.[35] The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942;[36] thus, it stands
to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local residents were
unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who
were roaming around the area.[37]
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection
from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child.[38]
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party.[39] Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written)
ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate
filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies,
a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility.[40] Applying this rule, the
trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioners
favor. It declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the
status of being their nephew xxx before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family
of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his
father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx is shown
by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were taken at a
time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his fathers share. xxxx His
demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants,
thus, they disowned him as their nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the
continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of
the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for
the partition xxx as he was already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes
Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who
is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer
and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this
case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew
of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad,
being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.[41]
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted.[42] Rather than rely on this
axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents marriage. Hence,
there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioners cause.

49 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-
ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession -- in the concept of
owners -- of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of
these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in
question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-
owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership.[43] Thus, no prescription runs in favor
of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in
the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of
the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was
beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership
of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still
in their fathers name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since
1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this
case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held:[44]
x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other
words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership
is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC,
156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that
petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

50 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner,

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

- versus - (Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio, and

Azcuna, JJ.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent. Promulgated:

October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized

as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can

the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

51 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling

on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15,

2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and

its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a

quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.

The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the

Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church

of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a

daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A

few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce

decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently

live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

52 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the

petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE

FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the

instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a

petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law

that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of

judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists

that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to

remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the

Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court

actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the

Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

53 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable

controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)

that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is

ripe for judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between

two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and

remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner

representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a

private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,

has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination

inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of

his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply

to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in

the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

54 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.

209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26

thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the

laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order

No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A

second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented

by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the

marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the

time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife

was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her

capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

55 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic

Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2

of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose

spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce

even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can
re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code

Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married

to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.

Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is

valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under

Philippine law.

56 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the

marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign

citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of

Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.

The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same

year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his

naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we

hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,

at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them

becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse

should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the

solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to

mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed

according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A

statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long

as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where

the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no

57 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within

the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2

of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of

the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still

a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the

naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,

the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.

Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino

spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment

would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering

that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,

58 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,

the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by

respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is

settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not

evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife

was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be

recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and

demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be

proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws

must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce

decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there

would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family

Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino

citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,

also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence

submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that

his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had

59 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could

only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial

Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

60 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

Respondent.
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of
law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan
and (2) gender from female to male.

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

61 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered
as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at
age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed
that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The
Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines Philippine General
Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as
CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified
that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is

entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the
Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was
medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his
body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be
male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a
male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is

hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of
Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

62 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry,

baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX
OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A
MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male,
on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff,
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the local
civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed
to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or
gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does
not make her a male.[7]

63 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish
on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in
the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks
in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose
the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of
the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for

64 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with

this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid

grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought

may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified

65 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local
civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for
the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents
the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of
securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before
it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a
copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a

judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

66 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older,
some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of
both male and female sexes.

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people
with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either
male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering
from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or

67 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those
individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this
Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis

for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical
testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and

categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has
female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or

naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his
life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking
lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

68 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
 In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less
on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent
is an incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law,
the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of
being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and
thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents
change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

69 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices
said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize
the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

70 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to

the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG]
has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries
in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through

71 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of
the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.

72 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was
also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground
of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of

73 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry
in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as

74 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the
legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth

75 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female"
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on
the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131
of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is

76 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may
be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there
are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However,
the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

77 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial
declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated
July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Decision4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting
petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged
Norberto with bigamy.7The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the
legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing
fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already
married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice)
at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to
another woman[.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a
certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered
with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto.12

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On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime
in 1987.13 "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get
married in 1994."14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s
revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice
were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having
an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour.18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the
affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she
continued seeing her paramour.19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid
marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of
bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella
Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of
the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution dated June 3, 2013.24

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Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto
filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents as
evidence a Certification28from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife,
Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the
marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of
the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must
be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage
with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise
proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his
first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the
second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto,
therefore, should be convicted of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his
first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the
bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no
marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the
civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing
to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending,
he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

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[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the
civil registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was
still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him
of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was
solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became
effective on August 3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents
the state’s "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states:

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[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of
this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS.
GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not
exist.42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage
contract between him and his first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and
Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage.44This
"should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any
record of the marriage[.]"45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity
of a marriage.47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the
marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil
registrar’s] records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar]
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’
sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the
contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The
certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no
prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification
having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose
of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the
certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to
establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute
for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That
the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are
concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The
motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

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This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño, the marriage
contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license
number.52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage
license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first
marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number
freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their
solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage
was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and
17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as
spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is
rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first
marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission
of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of
evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil
registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of
proving that no such marriage license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.55 There is
no evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have
been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after
the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence
that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown
whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have
contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar
implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of
official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to
the conclusion that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without
the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the
marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not
exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract
duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The
marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a
conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

83 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to
a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—
that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many
criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion
of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may
be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can
easily be created by an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the
trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as
much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by
the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article
40 of the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime
of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void."61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court
En Banc as petitioner insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he
subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of
bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed.
The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his
first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.64

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With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the
crime charged.1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed
on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending
circumstances are considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision
correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium
period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium
period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges
as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

85 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that
affirmed the same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on
the ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The
CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second
marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to
await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus
and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in
its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC.
The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista
was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a
member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void.
On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its
Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated
22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced
by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground

86 | N D C – C I V R E V A - 1
that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first
marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into
marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied
respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.

In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article
41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January
6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family
Code. 13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married
Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab
initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of
nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said
that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September
2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order
and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since
Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the
time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that
the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage.21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the
questioned CA Resolution22dated 16 September 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner
valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage
be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his
Petition.

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 OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted
both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil
Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using
the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,2681,27 82,28 and
83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph),30 8531and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:
(1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a
voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void
marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being
nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring
are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a
void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage. 37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third
marriage was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first
marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for
being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no
judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the
Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a
previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second
marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the
institution of this requirement:

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Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In
more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and
with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less,
will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage,
but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.40(Emphases supplied)1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties
were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue
to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he
was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of
the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent,
there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As
held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner
and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

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As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The
Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal
and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6She heard the petitioner
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to
the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

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The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing
the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that
in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner
violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the
Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a
violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be
promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the
act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under
Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of
the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

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The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that
the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere
in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear
on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article
625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer

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and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and
this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek
to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the
theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting
its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.

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From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive
of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by
a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished

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by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not
Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present
case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition
of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is
one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44
of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

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