G.R. No. 181531. July 31, 2009.* bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining,
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS,
RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-MANILA
PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, HOLIDAY INN MANILA PAVILION HOTEL
LABOR UNION AND ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL
CORPORATION, respondents.
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Certification Election; In
a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote.—The
inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned
but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification
election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also
have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA
749 (1989), holds: In a certification election, all rank and file employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent are entitled to vote.
Same; Same; Same; Provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the
Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the
provisions of Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections
and jurisprudence thereon.—The provision in the CBA disqualifying
probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-
protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and
jurisprudence thereon. A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract.
Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
Same; Same; Same; The period of reckoning in determining who shall be
included in the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has
been filed from the Order of the Med-Arbiter, the date when the Order of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal,
becomes final and executory.—In light of the immediately-quoted provisions,
and prescinding from the principle that all employees are, from the first day
of their employment, eligible for membership in a labor organization, it is
evident that the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in
the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been filed from
the Order of the Med-Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, whether affirming or denying the appeal,
becomes final and executory.
Same; Same; Same; A certification election is the process of determining
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining; The significance of an
employee’s right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be
overemphasized.—A certification election is the process of determining the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate
refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and
the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. The significance of an
employee’s right to vote in a certification election cannot thus be
overemphasized. For he has considerable interest in the determination of who
shall represent him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his
employment.
Same; Same; Same; Under the so-called “double majority rule” for there
to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have
voted and the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes
cast; Majority is 50% + 1.—As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in the negative. It is well-
settled that under the so-called “double majority rule,” for there to be a
valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must
have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of
the valid votes cast. Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the
probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the
supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid
votes cast would increase—from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor
Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible
voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence,
50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
Same; Same; Same; Two-fold objective of the conduct of a certification
election.—It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the
number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the
required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections.
The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To
be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold
objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to
ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining
representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by
anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between two or more
contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the
members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented
and which union they want to represent them.
Same; Same; Same; Run-off Election; Meaning of a Run-off Election.—A
run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the
two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with
three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in
none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes
cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending unions is at
least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast. With 346 votes cast, 337
of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and
petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice “NO UNION” receiving 1 vote,
then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is in
order.
1
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN) for
petitioner.
Gancayco, Balasbas and Associates Law Offices for
respondent Acesite Philippines Hotel Corporation.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and
Allied Industries Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-
MPHC), herein petitioner, seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals November 8, 2007 Decision[1] and of the Secretary of
Labor and Employments January 25, 2008 Resolution[2] in OS-
A-9-52-05 which affirmed the Med-Arbiters Resolutions dated
January 22, 2007[3] and March 22, 2007.[4]
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among
the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila
Pavilion Hotel (the Hotel) with the following results:
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS LIST = 353
TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
HIMPHLU = 169
NO UNION = 1
SPOILED = 3
SEGREGATED = 22
In view of the significant number of segregated votes,
contending unions, petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and
respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union
(HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma.
Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those votes would
be opened and tallied. Eleven (11) votes were initially
segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees,
albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before
the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because
the employees who cast them were already
occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still
five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were
cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees
cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that the vote of
one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a probationary employee, was
counted.
By Order of August 22, 2006, Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for
the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those
cast by the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the six
supposedly supervisory employees of the Hotel.
Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), arguing that the
votes of the probationary employees should have been opened
considering that probationary employee Gatbontons vote was
tallied. And petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU,
which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified
as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated
ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 +
169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered
would be one vote short of the majority which would then
become 169.
By the assailed Resolution of January 22, 2007, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment (SOLE), through then Acting
Secretary Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed the Med-Arbiters
Order. It held that pursuant to Section 5, Rule IX of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code on exclusion and
inclusion of voters in a certification election, the probationary
employees cannot vote, as at the time the Med-Arbiter issued
on August 9, 2005 the Order granting the petition for the
conduct of the certification election, the six probationary
employees were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote.
The SOLE further held that, with respect to the votes
cast by the 11 dismissed employees, they could be considered
since their dismissal was still pending appeal.
2
 As to the votes cast by the six alleged supervisory
employees, the SOLE held that their votes should be counted
since their promotion took effect months after the issuance of
the above-said August 9, 2005 Order of the Med-Arbiter, hence,
they were still considered as rank-and-file.
Respecting Gatbontons vote, the SOLE ruled that the
same could be the basis to include the votes of the other
probationary employees, as the records show that during the
pre-election conferences, there was no disagreement as to his
inclusion in the voters list, and neither was it timely
challenged when he voted on election day, hence, the Election
Officer could not then segregate his vote.
The SOLE further ruled that even if the 17 votes of the
dismissed and supervisory employees were to be counted and
presumed to be in favor of petitioner, still, the same would not
suffice to overturn the 169 votes garnered by HIMPHLU.
In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of
HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the SOLE by Resolution of March 22, 2007, it appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
By the assailed Decision promulgated on November 8, 2007,
the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the SOLE. It held
that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the ruling in Airtime
Specialist, Inc. v. Ferrer Calleja[5] stating that in a certification
election, all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent, are
entitled to vote, is inapplicable to the case at bar. For, the
appellate court continued, the six probationary employees were
not yet employed by the Hotel at the time the August 9,
2005 Order granting the certification election was issued. It
thus held that Airtime Specialist applies only to situations
wherein the probationary employees were already employed as
of the date of filing of the petition for certification election.
Respecting Gatbontons vote, the appellate court upheld the
SOLEs finding that since it was not properly challenged, its
inclusion could no longer be questioned, nor could it be made
the basis to include the votes of the six probationary
employees.
The appellate court brushed aside petitioners contention that
the opening of the 17 segregated votes would materially affect
the results of the election as there would be the likelihood of a
run-off election in the event none of the contending unions
receive a majority of the valid votes cast. It held that the
majority contemplated in deciding which of the unions in a
certification election is the winner refers to the majority
of valid votes cast, not the simple majority of votes cast, hence,
the SOLE was correct in ruling that even if the 17 votes were
in favor of petitioner, it would still be insufficient to overturn
the results of the certification election.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution of January 25, 2008, the present recourse was filed.
Petitioners contentions may be summarized as follows:
1. Inclusion of Jose Gatbontons vote but excluding
the vote of the six other probationary employees
violated the principle of equal protection and is not in
accord with the ruling in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja;
2. The time of reckoning for purposes of determining
when the probationary employees can be allowed to
vote is not August 9, 2005 the date of issuance by
Med-Arbiter Calabocal of the Order granting the
conduct of certification elections, but March 10, 2006
the date the SOLE Order affirmed the Med-Arbiters
Order.
3. Even if the votes of the six probationary employees
were included, still, HIMPHLU could not be
considered as having obtained a majority of the valid
votes cast as the opening of the 17 ballots would
3
 increase the number of valid votes from 321 to 338,
hence, for HIMPHLU to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent, it should have garnered at least
170, not 169, votes.
Petitioner justifies its not challenging Gatbontons vote
because it was precisely its position that probationary
employees should be allowed to vote. It thus avers that justice
and equity dictate that since Gatbontons vote was counted,
then the votes of the 6 other probationary employees should
likewise be included in the tally.
Petitioner goes on to posit that the word order in Section
5, Rule 9 of Department Order No. 40-03 reading [A]ll
employees who are members of the appropriate bargaining unit
sought to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the
issuance of the order granting the conduct of certification
election shall be allowed to vote refers to an order which has
already become final and executory, in this case the March 10,
2002 Order of the SOLE.
Petitioner thus concludes that if March 10, 2006 is the
reckoning date for the determination of the eligibility of
workers, then all the segregated votes cast by the probationary
employees should be opened and counted, they having already
been working at the Hotel on such date.
Respecting the certification of HIMPHLU as the
exclusive bargaining agent, petitioner argues that the same
was not proper for if the 17 votes would be counted as valid,
then the total number of votes cast would have been 338, not
321, hence, the majority would be 170; as such, the votes
garnered by HIMPHLU is one vote short of the majority for it
to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
The relevant issues for resolution then are first,
whether employees on probationary status at the time of the
certification elections should be allowed to vote, and second,
whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority
for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
On the first issue, the Court rules in the affirmative.
The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not
because it was not questioned but because probationary
employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The
votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also
have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and
file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent are entitled to vote. This principle
is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code
which states that the labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining covers all
aspects of the employment relation and the
resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union
binds all employees in the bargaining
unit. Hence, all rank and file employees,
probationary or permanent, have a substantial
interest in the selection of the bargaining
representative. The Code makes no
distinction as to their employment status as
basis for eligibility in supporting the
petition for certification election. The law
refers to all the employees in the
bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible
to support the petition is to belong to the
bargaining unit. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of
2003, which amended Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, provides:
4

Rule II
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and
workers' associations. - All persons employed
in commercial, industrial and agricultural
enterprises, including employees of government
owned or controlled corporations without original
charters established under the Corporation Code,
as well as employees of religious, charitable,
medical or educational institutions whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to
self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
unions for purposes of collective bargaining:
provided, however, that supervisory employees
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
union of the rank-and-file employees but may
form, join or assist separate labor unions of their
own. Managerial employees shall not be eligible
to form, join or assist any labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining. Alien
employees with valid working permits issued by
the Department may exercise the right to self-
organization and join or assist labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining if they are
nationals of a country which grants the same or
similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by
the Department of Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any
employee, whether employed for a definite
period or not, shall beginning on the first
day of his/her service, be eligible for
membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant,
intermittent and other workers, the self-
employed, rural workers and those without any
definite employers may form labor organizations
for their mutual aid and protection and other
legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
(Emphasis supplied)
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary
employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-
protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on
certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.
A law is read into, and forms part of, a
contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.[6]
Rule XI, Sec. 5 of D.O. 40-03, on which the SOLE and
the appellate court rely to support their position that
probationary employees hired after the issuance of the Order
granting the petition for the conduct of certification election
must be excluded, should not be read in isolation and must be
harmonized with the other provisions of D.O. Rule XI, Sec. 5 of
D.O. 40-03, viz:
Rule XI
xxxx
Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-
exclusion. - All employees who are members
of the appropriate bargaining unit sought
to be represented by the petitioner at the
time of the issuance of the order granting
the conduct of a certification election shall
be eligible to vote. An employee who has been
dismissed from work but has contested the
legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate
jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the
order for the conduct of a certification election
shall be considered a qualified voter, unless
his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final
judgment at the time of the conduct of the
certification election. (Emphasis supplied)
5

xxxx
Section 13. Order/Decision on the petition. -
Within ten (10) days from the date of the last
hearing, the Med-Arbiter shall issue a formal
order granting the petition or a decision denying
the same. In organized establishments, however,
no order or decision shall be issued by the Med-
Arbiter during the freedom period.
The order granting the conduct of a
certification election shall state the
following:
(a) the name of the employer or establishment;
(b) the description of the bargaining unit;
(c) a statement that none of the grounds for
dismissal enumerated in the succeeding
paragraph exists;
(d) the names of contending labor unions which
shall appear as follows: petitioner union/s
in the order in which their petitions were
filed, forced intervenor, and no union; and
(e) a directive upon the employer and the
contending union(s) to submit within
ten (10) days from receipt of the order,
the certified list of employees in the
bargaining unit, or where necessary, the
payrolls covering the members of the
bargaining unit for the last three (3)
months prior to the issuance of the
order. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 21. Decision of the Secretary. - The
Secretary shall have fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the entire records of the petition within
which to decide the appeal. The filing of the
memorandum of appeal from the order or
decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the
holding of any certification election.
The decision of the Secretary shall become
final and executory after ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the parties. No motion for
reconsideration of the decision shall be
entertained. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the immediately-quoted provisions, and
prescinding from the principle that all employees are, from the
first day of their employment, eligible for membership in a
labor organization, it is evident that
the period of reckoning in determining who shall be included in
the list of eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has
been filed from the Order of the Med-
Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labo
r and Employment,
whether affirming or denying theappeal, becomes final
and executory.
The filing of an appeal to the SOLE from the Med-
Arbiters Order stays its execution, in accordance with Sec. 21,
and rationally, the Med-Arbiter cannot direct the employer to
furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters pending the
resolution of the appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the employer may
hire additional employees. To exclude the employees hired
after the issuance of the Med-Arbiters Order but before the
appeal has been resolved would violate the guarantee that
every employee has the right to be part of a labor organization
from the first day of their service.
In the present case, records show that the probationary
employees, including Gatbonton, were included in the list
6
of employees in the bargaining unit submitted by the Hotel
on May 25, 2006 in compliance with the directive of the Med-
Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration have been denied by the SOLE, rendering the
Med-Arbiters August 22, 2005 Order final and executory 10
days after the March 22, 2007 Resolution (denying the motion
for reconsideration of the January 22 Order denying the
appeal), and rightly so. Because, for purposes of self-
organization, those employees are, in light of the discussion
above, deemed eligible to vote.
A certification election is the process of determining the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated
contract between a legitimate labor organization and the
employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms
and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.[7]
The significance of an employees right to vote in a
certification election cannot thus be overemphasized. For he
has considerable interest in the determination of who shall
represent him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his
employment.
Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to
decide the appeal from the Order of the Med-Arbiter,
experience shows that it sometimes takes months to be
resolved. To rule then that only those employees hired as of the
date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiters Order are qualified to
vote would effectively disenfranchise employees hired during
the pendency of the appeal. More importantly, reckoning the
date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiters Order as the cut-off
date would render inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the
probationary employees should be included, under the
particular circumstances of this case and the period of time
which it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six
supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time
the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be
part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect
two months before the election.
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent, the Court rules in the negative. It is well-
settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there
to be a valid certification election, majority of the
bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning
union must have garnered majority of the valid votes
cast.
Prescinding from the Courts ruling that all the
probationary employees votes should be deemed valid votes
while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it
follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase from
321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union
obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible
voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining
unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1
or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151
votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority
vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court
that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially
affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so they
contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner,
still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of
ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as
basis for computing the required majority, and not just to
determine which union won the elections. The opening of the
segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be
sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-
fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the
bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be
7
represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the SO ORDERED.
determination of who between two or more contending unions
won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the
members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be
represented and which union they want to represent them.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election

conducted obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-
off election must be held to determine which between
HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-and-file
employees.

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor

unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a
certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices,
where such a certified or consent election results in none of the
three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid
votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all
contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number
of votes cast.[8] With 346 votes cast, 337 of which are now
deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and
petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice NO UNION
receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between
HIMPHLU and petitioner is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated November 8, 2007 and Resolution dated
January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Resolutions dated January 22, 2007 and March 22, 2007,
respectively, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-
A-9-52-05 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of

Labor Relations is DIRECTED to cause the holding of a run-
off election between petitioner, National Union of Workers in
Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavilion
Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPC), and respondent Holiday
Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU).

8
 G.R. No. 211145. October 14, 2015.*
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN
SHIPYARD, rep. by its President, ALFIE ALIPIO,
petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION
CO., LTD. (HHIC-PHIL.), respondents.
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Right to Self-organization; Workers can also
form and join a workers’ association as well as labor-management
councils (LMC).—More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes
unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join a workers’ association as
well as labor-management councils (LMC). Expressed in the highest law of
the land is the right of all workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution states: Section 3. The State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It
shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. x x x
[Emphasis supplied] And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also
states: Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. In relation thereto, Article
3 of the Labor Code provides: Article 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The
State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations
between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
Same; Same; Same; As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code
provides, the right to self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist
labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted
activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection.—As
Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-
organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for
their mutual aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the State to
foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement as well as to make sure that workers participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare. The
right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two
notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint
which guarantees that the employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as
he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.
Same; Same; Same; In view of the revered right of every worker to self-
organization, the law expressly allows and even encourages the formation of
labor organizations.—In view of the revered right of every worker to self-
organization, the law expressly allows and even encourages the formation of
labor organizations. A labor organization is defined as “any union or
association oremployees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.” A labor organization has two broad rights: (1) to
bargain collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning terms and
conditions of employment. To bargain collectively is a right given to a union
once it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on the
other hand, is a generic description of interaction between employer and
employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours and other terms and
conditions of employment, even if the employees’ group is not registered with
the DOLE.
Same; Same; Same; “Union” and “Workers’ Association,”
Distinguished.—A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector
organized for collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a
workers’ association is an organization of workers formed for the mutual aid
and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than
collective bargaining. Many associations or groups of employees, or even
combinations of only several persons, may qualify as a labor organization yet
fall short of constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a labor
organization, not every labor organization is a labor union. The difference is
one of organization, composition and operation.
Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to say that it is the device and no
other, which secures industrial democracy.—Collective bargaining is just one
of the forms of employee participation. Despite so much interest in and the
promotion of collective bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the device
and no other, which secures industrial democracy. It is equally misleading to
say that collective bargaining is the end-goal of employee representation.
Rather, the real aim is employee participation in whatever form it may
appear, bargaining or no bargaining, union or no union. Any labor
organization which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer.
This explains why a workers’ association or organization does not always
have to be a labor union and why employer-employee collective interactions
are not always collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Same; The right to form or join a labor organization
necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said
right.—The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the
right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that
just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also,
no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. Also inherent
in the right to self-organization is the right to choose whether to form a union
for purposes of collective bargaining or a workers’ association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection. The right to self-organization, however,
9
is subject to certain limitations as provided by law. For instance, the Labor
Code specifically disallows managerial employees from joining, assisting or
forming any labor union. Meanwhile, supervisory employees, while eligible
for membership in labor organizations, are proscribed from joining the
collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees. Even government
employees have the right to self-organization. It is not, however, regarded as
existing or available for purposes of collective bargaining, but simply for the
furtherance and protection of their interests.
Same; Same; Same; Misrepresentation; Misrepresentation, as a ground
for the cancellation of registration of a labor organization, is committed in
connection with the adoption, or ratification of the constitution and bylaws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members who took
part in the ratification of the constitution and bylaws or amendments thereto,
and those in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of
officers, and the list of voters.—Misrepresentation, as a ground for the
cancellation of registration of a labor organization, is committed “in
connection with the adoption, or ratification of the constitution and bylaws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members who
took part in the ratification of the constitution and bylaws or amendments
thereto, and those in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the
election of officers, and the list of voters, x x x.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virginia Lacsa Suarez for petitioner.
Christian Abello for respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism.
Workers may also form or join an association for mutual aid
and protection and for other legitimate purposes.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the July 4, 2013 Decision1 and the January 28, 2014
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
123397, which reversed the November 28, 2011 Resolution3 of
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and reinstated the April
20, 2010 Decision4 of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Director, cancelling the
registration of Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard
(Samahan) as a worker's association under Article 243 (now
Article 249) of the Labor Code.
The Facts
On February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized
representative, Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for
registration5 of its name "Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE. Attached to the application
were the list of names of the association's officers and
members, signatures of the attendees of the February 7, 2010
meeting, copies of their Constitution and By-laws. The
application stated that the association had a total of 120
members.
On February 26, 2010, the DOLE Regional Office No. 3, City of
San Fernando, Pampanga (DOLE-Pampanga), issued the
corresponding certificate of registration6 in favor of Samahan.
On March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and
Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin), with offices at
Greenbeach 1, Renondo Peninsula, Sitio Agustin, Barangay
Cawag, Subic Bay Freeport Zone, filed a petition7 with DOLE-
Pampanga praying for the cancellation of registration of
Samahan's association on the ground that its members did not
fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the
second sentence of Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant,
rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite
employers may form a workers' association. It further posited
that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had
definite employers and the continued existence and
registration of the association would prejudice the company's
goodwill.
On March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a supplemental
petition,8 adding the alternative ground that Samahan
committed a misrepresentation in connection with the list of
members and/or voters who took part in the ratification of their
constitution and by-laws in its application for registration.
Hanjin claimed that Samahan made it appear that its members
were all qualified to become members of the workers'
10
association.
On March 26, 2010, DOLE-Pampanga called for a conference,
wherein Samahan requested for a 10-day period to file a
responsive pleading. No pleading, however, was submitted.
Instead, Samahan filed a motion to dismiss on April 14, 2010.9
The Ruling of the DOLE Regional Director
On April 20, 2010, DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis
ruled in favor of Hanjin. He found that the preamble, as stated
in the Constitution and By-Laws of Samahan, was an
admission on its part that all of its members were employees of
Hanjin, to wit:
KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard
(SAMAHAN) ay naglalayong na isulong ang pagpapabuti ng
kondisyon sa paggawa at katiyakan sa hanapbuhay sa
pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagpapaunlad ng kasanayan ng
para sa mga kasapi nito. Naniniwala na sa pamamagitan ng
aming mga angking lakas, kaalaman at kasanayan ay anting
maitataguyod at makapag-aambag sa kaunlaran ng isang
lipunan. Na mararating at makakamit ang antas ng pagkilala,
pagdakila at pagpapahalaga sa mga tulad naming mga
manggagawa.
x x x10
The same claim was made by Samahan in its motion to
dismiss, but it failed to adduce evidence that the remaining 63
members were also employees of Hanjin. Its admission
bolstered Hanjin's claim that Samahan committed
misrepresentation in its application for registration as it made
an express representation that all of its members were
employees of the former. Having a definite employer, these 57
members should have formed a labor union for collective
bargaining.11 The dispositive portion of the decision of the Dole
Regional Director, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. Consequently, the Certificate of Registration as
Legitimate Workers Association (LWA) issued to the
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN
SHIPYARD (SAMAHAN) with Registration Numbers R0300-
1002-WA-009 dated February 26, 2010 is hereby
CANCELLED, and said association is dropped from the roster
of labor organizations of this Office.
SO DECIDED.12
The Ruling of the Bureau of Labor Relations
Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal13 before the BLR, arguing
that Hanjin had no right to petition for the cancellation of its
registration. Samahan pointed out that the words "Hanjin
Shipyard," as used in its application for registration, referred
to a workplace and not as employer or company. It explained
that when a shipyard was put up in Subic, Zambales, it became
known as Hanjin Shipyard. Further, the remaining 63
members signed the Sama-Samang Pagpapatunay which
stated that they were either working or had worked at Hanjin.
Thus, the alleged misrepresentation committed by Samahan
had no leg to stand on.14
In its Comment to the Appeal,15 Hanjin averred that it was a
party-in-interest. It reiterated that Samahan committed
misrepresentation in its application for registration before
DOLE Pampanga. While Samahan insisted that the remaining
63 members were either working, or had at least worked in
Hanjin, only 10 attested to such fact, thus, leaving its 53
members without any workplace to claim.
On September 6, 2010, the BLR granted Samahan's appeal and
reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. It stated that the
law clearly afforded the right to self-organization to all workers
including those without definite employers.16 As an expression
of the right to self-organization, industrial, commercial and
self-employed workers could form a workers' association if they
so desired but subject to the limitation that it was only for
mutual aid and protection.17 Nowhere could it be found that to
form a workers' association was prohibited or that the exercise
of a workers' right to self-organization was limited to collective
11
bargaining.18
The BLR was of the opinion that there was no
misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The phrase, "KAMI,
ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" if translated,
would be: "We, the workers at Hanjin Shipyard." The use of the
preposition "at" instead of "of " would indicate that "Hanjin
Shipyard" was intended to describe a place.19 Should Hanjin
feel that the use of its name had affected the goodwill of the
company, the remedy was not to seek the cancellation of the
association's registration. At most, the use by Samahan of the
name "Hanjin Shipyard" would only warrant a change in the
name of the association.20 Thus, the dispositive portion of the
BLR decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Order of
DOLE Region III Director Ernesto C. Bihis dated 20 April 2010
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard shall remain in the roster of legitimate workers'
association.21
On October 14, 2010, Hanjin filed its motion for
reconsideration.22
In its Resolution,23 dated November 28, 2011, the BLR affirmed
its September 6, 2010 Decision, but directed Samahan to
remove the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name. The BLR
explained that the Labor Code had no provision on the use of
trade or business name in the naming of a worker's association,
such matters being governed by the Corporation Code.
According to the BLR, the most equitable relief that would
strike a balance between the contending interests of Samahan
and Hanjin was to direct Samahan to drop the name "Hanjin
Shipyard" without delisting it from the roster of legitimate
labor organizations. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our Decision dated 6
September 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with a DIRECTIVE for
SAMAHAN to remove "HANJIN SHIPYARD" from its name.
SO RESOLVED.24
Unsatisfied, Samahan filed a petition for certiorari25 under
Rule 65 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123397.
In its March 21, 2012 Resolution,26 the CA dismissed the
petition because of Samahan's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed November 28, 2011 Resolution.
On April 17, 2012, Samahan filed its motion for
reconsideration27 and on July 18, 2012, Hanjin filed its
comment28 to oppose the same. On October 22, 2012, the CA
issued a resolution granting Samahan's motion for
reconsideration and reinstating the petition. Hanjin was
directed to file a comment five (5) days from receipt of notice.29
On December 12, 2012, Hanjin filed its comment on the
petition,30 arguing that to require Samahan to change its name
was not tantamount to interfering with the workers' right to
self-organization.31 Thus, it prayed, among others, for the
dismissal of the petition for Samahan's failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration.32
On January 17, 2013, Samahan filed its reply.33
On March 22, 2013, Hanjin filed its memorandum.34
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 4, 2013, the CA rendered its decision, holding that the
registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association
was contrary to the provisions of Article 243 of the Labor
Code.35 It stressed that only 57 out of the 120 members were
actually working in Hanjin while the phrase in the preamble of
Samahan's Constitution and By-laws, "KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" created an impression that
all its members were employees of HHIC. Such unqualified
manifestation which was used in its application for
registration, was a clear proof of misrepresentation which
12
warranted the cancellation of Samahan's registration.
It also stated that the members of Samahan could not register
it as a legitimate worker's association because the place where
Hanjin's industry was located was not a rural area. Neither
was there any evidence to show that the members of the
association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant workers.36
At any rate, the CA was of the view that dropping the words
"Hanjin Shipyard" from the association name would not
prejudice or impair its right to self-organization because it
could adopt other appropriate names. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the BLR's
directive, ordering that the words "Hanjin Shipyard" be
removed from petitioner association's name, is AFFIRMED.
The Decision dated April 20, 2010 of the DOLE Regional
Director in Case No. R0300-1003-CP-001, which ordered the
cancellation of petitioner association's registration is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.37
Hence, this petition, raising the following
ISSUES
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SAMAHAN CANNOT FORM A
WORKERS' ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES IN HANJIN
AND INSTEAD SHOULD HAVE FORMED A UNION,
HENCE THEIR REGISTRATION AS A WORKERS'
ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE CANCELLED.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE REMOVAL/DELETION OF THE WORD
"HANJIN" IN THE NAME OF THE UNION BY REASON
OF THE COMPANY'S PROPERTY RIGHT OVER THE
COMPANY NAME "HANJIN."38
Samahan argues that the right to form a workers' association
is not exclusive to intermittent, ambulant and itinerant
workers. While the Labor Code allows the workers "to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing" for the
purpose of collective bargaining, it does not prohibit them from
forming a labor organization simply for purposes of mutual aid
and protection. All members of Samahan have one common
place of work, Hanjin Shipyard. Thus, there is no reason why
they cannot use "Hanjin Shipyard" in their name.39
Hanjin counters that Samahan failed to adduce sufficient basis
that all its members were employees of Hanjin or its legitimate
contractors, and that the use of the name "Hanjin Shipyard"
would create an impression that all its members were
employess of HHIC.40
Samahan reiterates its stand that workers with a definite
employer can organize any association for purposes of mutual
aid and protection. Inherent in the workers' right to self-
organization is its right to name its own organization.
Samahan referred "Hanjin Shipyard" as their common place of
work. Therefore, they may adopt the same in their association's
name.41
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Right to self-organization includes right to form a union,
workers' association and labor management councils
More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes
unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join a workers'
association as well as labor-management councils (LMC).
Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of all
workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution states:
13
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
xxx
[Emphasis Supplied]
And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states:
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work.
[Emphasis Supplied]
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right
to self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist
labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their
mutual aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the
State to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong
and united labor movement as well as to make sure that
workers participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights, duties and welfare.42
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization
comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom,
that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that the
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.43
In view of the revered right of every worker to self-
organization, the law expressly allows and even encourages the
formation of labor organizations. A labor organization is
defined as "any union or association of employees which exists
in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment."44 A labor organization has two broad rights: (1)
to bargain collectively and (2) to deal with the employer
concerning terms and conditions of employment. To bargain
collectively is a right given to a union once it registers itself
with the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on the other hand,
is a generic description of interaction between employer and
employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours and other
terms and conditions of employment, even if the employees'
group is not registered with the DOLE.45
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector
organized for collective bargaining and for other legitimate
purpose,46 while a workers' association is an organization of
workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its
members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective
bargaining.47
Many associations or groups of employees, or even
combinations of only several persons, may qualify as a labor
organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union. While
every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor
organization is a labor union. The difference is one of
organization, composition and operation.48
Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee
participation. Despite so much interest in and the promotion of
collective bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the device
and no other, which secures industrial democracy. It is equally
misleading to say that collective bargaining is the end-goal of
14
employee representation. Rather, the real aim is employee
participation in whatever form it may appear, bargaining or
no bargaining, union or no union.49 Any labor organization
which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer.
This explains why a workers' association or organization does
not always have to be a labor union and why employer-
employee collective interactions are not always collective
bargaining.50
To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255 (now
261)51 of the Labor Code mandates that workers shall have the
right to participate in policy and decision-making processes of
the establishment where they are employed insofar as said
processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare.
For this purpose, workers and employers may form LMCs.
A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a common
element between unionism and the formation of LMCs is the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. Where neither
party is an employer nor an employee of the other, no duty to
bargain collectively would exist.52 In the same manner,
expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the requirement that such
workers be employed in the establishment before they can
participate in policy and decision making processes.
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee relationship is
not mandatory in the formation of workers' association. What
the law simply requires is that the members of the workers'
association, at the very least, share the same interest. The very
definition of a workers' association speaks of "mutual aid and
protection."
Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers'
association belongs to workers themselves
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of
the CA that Samahan should have formed a union for purposes
of collective bargaining instead of a workers' association
because the choice belonged to it. The right to form or join a
labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or
refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just
as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a
conferred right.53 Also inherent in the right to self-organization
is the right to choose whether to form a union for purposes of
collective bargaining or a workers' association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection.
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certain
limitations as provided by law. For instance, the Labor Code
specifically disallows managerial employees from joining,
assisting or forming any labor union. Meanwhile, supervisory
employees, while eligible for membership in labor
organizations, are proscribed from joining the collective
bargaining unit of the rank and file employees.54 Even
government employees have the right to self-organization. It is
not, however, regarded as existing or available for purposes of
collective bargaining, but simply for the furtherance and
protection of their interests.55
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite
employers, hence, they should have formed a union instead of a
workers' association. The Court disagrees. There is no
provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with
definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjin's position that
Samahan's members cannot form the association because they
are not covered by the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249),
to wit:
Article 243. Coverage and employees' right to self-
organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial
and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable,
medical, or educational institutions, whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent
and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural
workers and those without any definite employers may
15
form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May
1, 1980)
[Emphasis Supplied]
Further, Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2 of
Department Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, which
provides:
RULE II
COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Section 1. Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the
free and responsible exercise of the right to self-organization
through the establishment of a simplified mechanism for the
speedy registration of labor unions and workers associations,
determination of representation status and resolution of
inter/intra-union and other related labor relations disputes.
Only legitimate or registered labor unions shall have the right
to represent their members for collective bargaining and other
purposes. Workers' associations shall have the right to
represent their members for purposes other than collective
bargaining.
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers'
associations. - All persons employed in commercial, industrial
and agricultural enterprises, including employees of
government owned or controlled corporations without original
charters established under the Corporation Code, as well as
employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational
institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the
right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
unions for purposes of collective bargaining: provided, however,
that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees
but may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own.
Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or
assist any labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining.
Alien employees with valid working permits issued by the
Department may exercise the right to self-organization and join
or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if
they are nationals of a country which grants the same or
similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed
for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of
his/her service, be eligible for membership in any labor
organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and
other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those
without any definite employers may form labor organizations
for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate
purposes except collective bargaining.
[Emphases Supplied]
Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing rules
which provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot
form or join a workers' association for mutual aid and
protection. Section 2 thereof even broadens the coverage of
workers who can form or join a workers' association. Thus, the
Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to form
a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers. The option to form or join a
union or a workers' association lies with the workers
themselves, and whether they have definite employers or not.
No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant
cancellation of registration
In this case, Samahan's registration was cancelled not because
its members were prohibited from forming a workers'
association but because they allegedly committed
misrepresentation for using the phrase, "KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa HAN JIN Shipyard."
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of
registration of a labor organization, is committed "in connection
16
with the adoption, or ratification of the constitution and by-
laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the
list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, and those in
connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election
of officers, and the list of voters, xxx."56
In Takata Corporation v. Bureau of Relations,57 the DOLE
Regional Director granted the petition for the cancellation of
certificate of registration of Samahang Lakas Manggagawa sa
Takata (Salamat) after finding that the employees who
attended the organizational meeting fell short of the 20% union
registration requirement. The BLR, however, reversed the
ruling of the DOLE Regional Director, stating that petitioner
Takata Corporation (Takata) failed to prove deliberate and
malicious misrepresentation on the part of respondent
Salamat. Although Takata claimed that in the list of members,
there was an employee whose name appeared twice and
another was merely a project employee, such facts were not
considered misrepresentations in the absence of showing that
the respondent deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing
their union membership. The Court ruled in favor of Salamat.
In S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor
Union,58 the petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration was denied. The Court wrote:
If the union's application is infected by falsification and
like serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the
face of the application and its attachments, a union should
be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
Prescinding from these considerations, the issuance to the
Union of Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003
necessarily implies that its application for registration and the
supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any
vitiating irregularities. Another factor which militates against
the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang Petisyon is
the lack of particularities on how, when and where
respondent union perpetrated the alleged fraud on each
member. Such details are crucial for in the proceedings
for cancellation of union registration on the ground of
fraud or misrepresentation, what needs to be established is
that the specific act or omission of the union deprived the
complaining employees-members of their right to choose.
[Emphases Supplied]
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that
misrepresentation, to be a ground for the cancellation of the
certificate of registration, must be done maliciously and
deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the
application or attachments must be grave or refer to significant
matters. The details as to how the alleged fraud was committed
must also be indubitably shown.
The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent
to commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The use
of such words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN
Shipyard" in the preamble of the constitution and by-laws did
not constitute misrepresentation so as to warrant the
cancellation of Samahan's certificate of registration. Hanjin
failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a malicious and
deliberate misrepresentation. Neither was there any showing
that the alleged misrepresentation was serious in character.
Misrepresentation is a devious charge that cannot simply be
entertained by mere surmises and conjectures.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members
misrepresented themselves as employees or workers of Hanjin,
said misrepresentation does not relate to the adoption or
ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to the election of
its officers.
Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association's
name, however, does not infringe on Samahan's right to self-
organization
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin
Shipyard" must be removed in the name of the association. A
legitimate workers' association refers to an association of
workers organized for mutual aid and protection of its
17
members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective
bargaining registered with the DOLE.59 Having been granted a
certificate of registration, Samahan's association is now
recognized by law as a legitimate workers' association.
According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to self-
organization is its right to name its own organization. It seems
to equate the dropping of words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its
name as a restraint in its exercise of the right to self-
organization. Hanjin, on the other hand, invokes that "Hanjin
Shipyard" is a registered trade name and, thus, it is within
their right to prohibit its use.
As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of
the use of name by a workers' association, the Court refers to
the Corporation Code, which governs the names of juridical
persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission if the proposed name
is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of
any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary
to existing laws. When a change in the corporate name is
approved, the Commission shall issue an amended certificate of
incorporation under the amended name.
the wrong impression that all of its members are employed by
Hanjin.
Further, Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-03, Series of 2003
explicitly states:
The change of name of a labor organization shall not affect its
legal personality. All the rights and obligations of a labor
organization under its old name shall continue to be exercised
by the labor organization under its new name.
Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing the words "Hanjin
Shipyard," no abridgement of Samahan's right to self-
organization was committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
July 4, 2013 Decision and the January 28, 2014 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The September 6, 2010 Resolution of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, as modified by its November 28, 2011
Resolution, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[Emphases Supplied]
The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the
registration of a corporate name which is "identical or
deceptively or confusingly similar" to that of any existing
corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or "patently
confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of
fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with
the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and
duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and
supervision over corporations.60

For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of

Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it could give
18
 G.R. No. 179146. July 23, 2013.*
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, petitioner, vs.
HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
and PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG
ANAKPAWIS–HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-
TELU-PIGLAS), respondents.
Labor Law; Certification Elections; Bystander Rule; It has been
consistently held in a number of cases that a certification election is the sole
concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file the petition
pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such
filing its role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a
bystander.—Note must be taken that even without the express provision of
Section 12 of RA No. 9481, the “Bystander Rule” is already well entrenched in
this jurisdiction. It has been consistently held in a number of cases that a
certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the
employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor
Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification
process ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lacks
the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all
therein. This is so since any uncalled-for concern on the part of the employer
may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company union. Indeed,
the demand of the law and policy for an employer to take a strict, hands-off
stance in certification elections is based on the rationale that the employees’
bargaining representative should be chosen free from any extraneous
influence of the management; that, to be effective, the bargaining
representative must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.
Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; The determination of whether
union membership comprises managerial and/or supervisory employees is a
factual issue that is best left for resolution in the inclusion-exclusion
proceedings, which has not yet happened in this case so still premature to pass
upon.—The determination of whether union membership comprises
managerial and/or supervisory employees is a factual issue that is best left
for resolution in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, which has not yet
happened in this case so still premature to pass upon. We could only
emphasize the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally
accorded not only with respect but even finality by the courts when supported
by substantial evidence. Also, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the CA via Rule 45 is generally limited to reviewing errors of
law or jurisdiction. The findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding.
Except in certain recognized instances, We do not entertain factual issues as
it is not Our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again; the
evaluation of facts is best left to the lower courts and administrative
agencies/quasi-judicial bodies which are better equipped for the task.
Same; Same; Words and Phrase; Article 212(g) of the Labor Code
defines a labor organization as “any union or association of employees which
exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing
with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.”—The
concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from,
but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit: Article 212(g) of the Labor
Code defines a labor organization as “any union or association of employees
which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.”
Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office
or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate
indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.
Same; Same; In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a
union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a
petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.—In case of alleged
inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the
union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code,
as amended. To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
Same; Bargaining Units; Words and Phrases; A bargaining unit has
been defined as a “group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all
the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best
suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.”—A bargaining unit has been defined as a
“group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of
the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited
to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.” In determining the proper collective
bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective
bargaining agency, the Court, in the seminal case of Democratic Labor
Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., mentioned several factors
that should be considered, to wit: (1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as
temporary, seasonal and probationary employees. We stressed, however, that
the test of the grouping is community or mutuality of interest, because “the
basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
19
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.”
Same; Certification Elections; The purpose of a certification election is
precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees’ choice of an appropriate
bargaining unit — to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and,
if in the affirmative case, by which one.—Indeed, the purpose of a certification
election is precisely to ascertainthe majority of the employees’ choice of an
appropriate bargaining unit — to be or not to be represented by a labor
organization and, if in the affirmative case, by which one. At this point, it is
not amiss to stress once more that, as a rule, only questions of law may be
raised in a Rule 45 petition. In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,
the Court discussed the particular parameters of a Rule 45 appeal from the
CA’s Rule 65 decision on a labor case.
Peralta, J:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure are the April 18, 2007
Decision1 and July 31, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76175, which affirmed the December 27,
2002 Decision3 and February 13, 2003 Resolution4 of the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (SOLE)
that set aside the August 10, 2002 Decision5 of the Med-Arbiter
denying private respondent’s petition for certification election.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed
by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng
Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and
Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS), alleging that:
PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
representing HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS; HCCS is a private
educational institution duly registered and operating under
Philippine laws; there are approximately one hundred twenty
(120) teachers and employees comprising the proposed
appropriate bargaining unit; and HCCS is unorganized, there
is no collective bargaining agreement or a duly certified
bargaining agent or a labor organization certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed bargaining unit
within one year prior to the filing of the petition.6 Among the
documents attached to the petition were the certificate of
affiliation with Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis
Kristiyanong Alyansa ng Makabayang Obrero (PIGLAS-
KAMAO) issued by the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR),
charter certificate issued by PIGLASKAMAO, and certificate of
registration of HCCS-TELU as a legitimate labor organization
issued by the DOLE.7
In its Comment8 and Position Paper,9 petitioner HCCS
consistently noted that it is a parochial school with a total of
156 employees as of June 28, 2002, broken down as follows:
ninety-eight (98) teaching personnel, twenty-five (25) non-
teaching academic employees, and thirty-three (33) non-
teaching non-academic workers. It averred that of the
employees who signed to support the petition, fourteen (14)
already resigned and six (6) signed twice. Petitioner raised that
members of private respondent do not belong to the same class;
it is not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-
and-file employees – as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a
department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators –
but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel
– as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching personnel. It insisted
that, for not being in accord with Article 24510 of the Labor
Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization
lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election,
as held in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union;11 and an
inappropriate bargaining unit for want of community or
mutuality of interest, as ruled in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.),
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment12 and De La Salle
University Medical Center and College of Medicine v.
Laguesma.13
Private respondent, however, countered that petitioner failed
to substantiate its claim that some of the employees included in
the petition for certification election holds managerial and
supervisory positions.14 Assuming it to be true, it argued that
Section 11 (II),15 Rule XI of DOLE Department Order (D.O.)
No. 9, Series of 1997, provided for specific instances in which a
20
petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be dismissed by
the Med-Arbiter and that "mixture of employees" is not one of
those enumerated. Private respondent pointed out that
questions pertaining to qualifications of employees may be
threshed out in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings prior to the
conduct of the certification election, pursuant to Section
2,16 Rule XII of D.O. No. 9. Lastly, similar to the ruling in In
Re: Globe Machine and Stamping Company,17 it contended that
the will of petitioner’s employees should be respected as they
had manifested their desire to be represented by only one
bargaining unit. To back up the formation of a single employer
unit, private respondent asserted that even if the teachers may
receive additional pay for an advisory class and for holding
additional loads, petitioner’s academic and non-academic
personnel have similar working conditions. It cited Laguna
College v. Court of Industrial Relations,18 as well as the case of
a union in West Negros College in Bacolod City, which
allegedly represented both academic and non-academic
employees.
On August 10, 2002, Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan
denied the petition for certification election on the ground that
the unit which private respondent sought to represent is
inappropriate. She resolved:
A certification election proceeding directly involves two (2)
issues namely: (a) the proper composition and constituency of
the bargaining unit; and (b) the validity of majority
representation claims. It is therefore incumbent upon the Med-
Arbiter to rule on the appropriateness of the bargaining unit
once its composition and constituency is questioned.
Section 1 (q), Rule I, Book V of the Omnibus Rules defines a
"bargaining unit" as a group of employees sharing mutual
interests within a given employer unit comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees in the employer unit or
any specific occupational or geographical grouping within such
employer unit. This definition has provided the "community or
mutuality of interest" test as the standard in determining the
constituency of a collective bargaining unit. This is so because
the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. The application of this test may either result
in the formation of an employer unit or in the fragmentation of
an employer unit.
In the case at bar, the employees of petitioner, may, as already
suggested, quite easily be categorized into (2) general classes:
one, the teaching staff; and two, the non-teaching-staff. Not
much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or
mutuality of interest is wanting between the teaching and the
non-teaching staff. It would seem obvious that the teaching
staff would find very little in common with the non-teaching
staff as regards responsibilities and function, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, skills
and intellectual pursuits, etc. These are plain and patent
realities which cannot be ignored. These dictate the separation
of these two categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining. (University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja,
211 SCRA 451)19
Private respondent appealed before the SOLE, who, on
December 27, 2002, ruled against the dismissal of the petition
and directed the conduct of two separate certification elections
for the teaching and the non-teaching personnel, thus:
We agree with the Med-Arbiter that there are differences in the
nature of work, hours and conditions of work and salary
determination between the teaching and non-teaching
personnel of petitioner. These differences were pointed out by
petitioner in its position paper. We do not, however, agree with
the Med-Arbiter that these differences are substantial enough
to warrant the dismissal of the petition. First, as pointed out by
private respondent, "inappropriateness of the bargaining unit
sought to be represented is not a ground for the dismissal of
the petition." In fact, in the cited case of University of the
Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra, the Supreme Court did not
21
order the dismissal of the petition but ordered the conduct of a
certification election, limiting the same among the non-
academic personnel of the University of the Philippines.
It will be recalled that in the U.P. case, there were two
contending unions, the Organization of Non-Academic
Personnel of U.P. (ONAPUP) and All U.P. Workers Union
composed of both academic and nonacademic personnel of U.P.
ONAPUP sought the conduct of certification election among the
rank-and-file non-academic personnel only while the all U.P.
Workers Union sought the conduct of certification election
among all of U.P.’s rank-and-file employees covering academic
and nonacademic personnel. While the Supreme Court ordered
a separate bargaining unit for the U.P. academic personnel, the
Court, however, did not order them to organize a separate labor
organization among themselves. The All U.P. Workers Union
was not directed to divest itself of its academic personnel
members and in fact, we take administrative notice that the All
U.P. Workers Union continue to exist with a combined
membership of U.P. academic and non-academic personnel
although separate bargaining agreements is sought for the two
bargaining units. Corollary, private respondent can continue to
exist as a legitimate labor organization with the combined
teaching and non-teaching personnel in its membership and
representing both classes of employees in separate bargaining
negotiations and agreements.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 10
August 2002 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, a new order is hereby issued directing the conduct of
two certification elections, one among the non-teaching
personnel of Holy Child Catholic School, and the other, among
the teaching personnel of the same school, subject to the usual
pre-election conferences and inclusion-exclusion proceedings,
with the following choices:
A. Certification Election Among Petitioner’s Teaching
Personnel:
1. Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and
Employees Labor Union; and
2. No Union.
B. Certification Election Among Petitioner’s Non-
Teaching Personnel:
1. Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and
Employees Labor Union; and
2. No Union.
Petitioner is hereby directed to submit to the Regional Office of
origin within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision, a
certified separate list of its teaching and non-teaching
personnel or when necessary a separate copy of their payroll
for the last three (3) months prior to the issuance of this
Decision.20
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration21 which, per
Resolution dated February 13, 2003, was denied. Consequently,
petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction.22 The CA resolved to defer action on the prayer for
TRO pending the filing of private respondent’s
Comment.23 Later, private respondent and petitioner filed their
Comment24 and Reply,25 respectively.
On July 23, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for immediate
issuance of a TRO, alleging that Hon. Helen F. Dacanay of the
Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE was set to
implement the SOLE Decision when it received a summons and
was directed to submit a certified list of teaching and non-
teaching personnel for the last three months prior to the
issuance of the assailed Decision.26 Acting thereon, on August
5, 2003, the CA issued the TRO and ordered private respondent
to show cause why the writ of preliminary injunction should
not be granted.27 Subsequently, a Manifestation and
22
Motion28 was filed by private respondent, stating that it
repleads by reference the arguments raised in its Comment
and that it prays for the immediate lifting of the TRO and the
denial of the preliminary injunction. The CA, however, denied
the manifestation and motion on November 21, 200329 and,
upon motion of petitioner,30 granted the preliminary injunction
on April 21, 2005.31 Thereafter, both parties filed their
respective Memorandum.32
On April 18, 2007, the CA eventually dismissed the petition. As
to the purported commingling of managerial, supervisory, and
rank-and-file employees in private respondent’s membership, it
held that the Toyota ruling is inapplicable because the vice-
principals, department head, and coordinators are neither
supervisory nor managerial employees. It reasoned:
x x x While it may be true that they wield power over other
subordinate employees of the petitioner, it must be stressed,
however, that their functions are not confined with policy-
determining such as hiring, firing, and disciplining of
employees, salaries, teaching/working hours, other monetary
and non-monetary benefits, and other terms and conditions of
employment. Further, while they may formulate policies or
guidelines, nonetheless, such is merely recommendatory in
nature, and still subject to review and evaluation by the higher
executives, i.e., the principals or executive officers of the
petitioner. It cannot also be denied that in institutions like the
petitioner, company policies have already been pre-formulated
by the higher executives and all that the mentioned employees
have to do is carry out these company policies and standards.
Such being the case, it is crystal clear that there is no improper
commingling of members in the private respondent union as to
preclude its petition for certification of (sic) election.33
Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching
personnel, the CA agreed with petitioner that the nature of the
former’s work does not coincide with that of the latter.
Nevertheless, it ruled that the SOLE did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for
certification election, since it directed the conduct of two
separate certification elections based on Our ruling in
University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja.34
A motion for reconsideration35 was filed by petitioner, but the
CA denied the same;36 hence, this petition assigning the alleged
errors as follows:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN THE CASE OF TOYOTA
MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. TOYOTA
MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION (268
SCRA 573) DOES NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR
DESPITE THE [COMMINGLING] OF BOTH SUPERVISORY
OR MANAGERIAL AND RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES IN
THE RESPONDENT UNION;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
CONFLICTING RULING ALLOWING THE CONDUCT OF
CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY UPHOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT UNION REPRESENTED A BARGAINING
UNIT DESPITE ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT THERE IS NO
MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF
RESPONDENT UNION APPLYING THE TEST LAID DOWN
IN THE CASE OF UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
FERRER-CALLEJA (211 SCRA 451).37
We deny.
Petitioner claims that the CA contradicted the very definition
of managerial and supervisory employees under existing law
and jurisprudence when it did not classify the vice-principals,
department head, and coordinators as managerial or
supervisory employees merely because the policies and
guidelines they formulate are still subject to the review and
23
evaluation of the principal or executive officers of petitioner. It
points out that the duties of the vice-principals, department
head, and coordinators include the evaluation and assessment
of the effectiveness and capability of the teachers under them;
that such evaluation and assessment is independently made
without the participation of the higher Administration of
petitioner; that the fact that their recommendation undergoes
the approval of the higher Administration does not take away
the independent nature of their judgment; and that it would be
difficult for the vice-principals, department head, and
coordinators to objectively assess and evaluate the
performances of teachers under them if they would be allowed
to be members of the same labor union.
On the other hand, aside from reiterating its previous
submissions, private respondent cites Sections 9 and 1238 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481 to buttress its contention that
petitioner has no standing to oppose the petition for
certification election. On the basis of the statutory provisions,
it reasons that an employer is not a party-in-interest in a
certification election; thus, petitioner does not have the
requisite right to protect even by way of restraining order or
injunction.
First off, We cannot agree with private respondent’s invocation
of R.A. No. 9481. Said law took effect only on June 14, 2007;
hence, its applicability is limited to labor representation cases
filed on or after said date.39 Instead, the law and rules in force
at the time private respondent filed its petition for certification
election on May 31, 2002 are R.A. No. 6715, which amended
Book V of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (the Labor Code),
as amended, and the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.
No. 6715, as amended by D.O. No. 9, which was dated May 1,
1997 but took effect on June 21, 1997.40
However, note must be taken that even without the express
provision of Section 12 of RA No. 9481, the "Bystander Rule" is
already well entrenched in this jurisdiction. It has been
consistently held in a number of cases that a certification
election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the
employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259
of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such filing its
role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a
bystander.41 The employer clearly lacks the personality to
dispute the election and has no right to interfere at all
therein.42 This is so since any uncalled-for concern on the part
of the employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting
for a company union.43 Indeed, the demand of the law and
policy for an employer to take a strict, hands-off stance in
certification elections is based on the rationale that the
employees’ bargaining representative should be chosen free
from any extraneous influence of the management; that, to be
effective, the bargaining representative must owe its loyalty to
the employees alone and to no other.44
Now, going back to petitioner’s contention, the issue of whether
a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground
that the labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees is actually not a novel
one. In the 2008 case of Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg.,
Philippines, Inc.,45 wherein the employer-company moved to
dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground
inter alia that the union membership is a mixture of rank-and-
file and supervisory employees, this Court had conscientiously
discussed the applicability of Toyota and Dunlop in the context
of R.A. No. 6715 and D.O. No. 9, viz.:
It was in R.A. No. 875, under Section 3, that such questioned
mingling was first prohibited, to wit:
Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization. - Employees shall
have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of employees under their
24
supervision but may form separate organizations of their own.
(Emphasis supplied)
Nothing in R.A. No. 875, however, tells of how the questioned
mingling can affect the legitimacy of the labor organization.
Under Section 15, the only instance when a labor organization
loses its legitimacy is when it violates its duty to bargain
collectively; but there is no word on whether such mingling
would also result in loss of legitimacy. Thus, when the issue of
whether the membership of two supervisory employees impairs
the legitimacy of a rank-and-file labor organization came before
the Court En Banc in Lopez v. Chronicle Publication
Employees Association, the majority pronounced:
It may be observed that nothing is said of the effect of such
ineligibility upon the union itself or on the status of the other
qualified members thereof should such prohibition be
disregarded. Considering that the law is specific where it
intends to divest a legitimate labor union of any of the rights
and privileges granted to it by law, the absence of any provision
on the effect of the disqualification of one of its organizers upon
the legality of the union, may be construed to confine the effect
of such ineligibility only upon the membership of the
supervisor. In other words, the invalidity of membership of one
of the organizers does not make the union illegal, where the
requirements of the law for the organization thereof are,
nevertheless, satisfied and met. (Emphasis supplied)
Then the Labor Code was enacted in 1974 without reproducing
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 875. The provision in the Labor Code closest
to Sec. 3 is Article 290, which is deafeningly silent on the
prohibition against supervisory employees mingling with rank-
and-file employees in one labor organization. Even the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code
(Omnibus Rules) merely provides in Section 11, Rule II, thus:
Sec. 11. Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to
cease operation. - All existing supervisory unions and unions of
security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to
operate as such and their registration certificates shall be
deemed automatically cancelled. However, existing collective
agreements with such unions, the life of which extends beyond
the date of effectivity of the Code shall be respected until their
expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein
are concerned.
Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the
definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to join
or assist the rank and file organization. The determination of
who are managerial employees and who are not shall be the
subject of negotiation between representatives of supervisory
union and the employer. If no agreement s reached between the
parties, either or both of them may bring the issue to the
nearest Regional Office for determination. (Emphasis supplied)
The obvious repeal of the last clause of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 875
prompted the Court to declare in Bulletin v. Sanchez that
supervisory employees who do not fall under the category of
managerial employees may join or assist in the formation of a
labor organization for rank-and-file employees, but they may
not form their own labor organization.
While amending certain provisions of Book V of the Labor
Code, E.O. No. 111 and its implementing rules continued to
recognize the right of supervisory employees, who do not fall
under the category of managerial employees, to join a rank-
and-file labor organization.
Effective 1989, R.A. No. 6715 restored the prohibition against
the questioned mingling in one labor organization, viz.:
Sec. 18. Article 245 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
25
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, just like R.A. No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted
specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition
would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715
(1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency
by introducing the following amendment to Rule II
(Registration of Unions):
Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory employees and
security guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist
or form separate labor organizations of their own; Provided,
that those supervisory employees who are included in an
existing rank-and-file bargaining unit, upon the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that unit x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
and Rule V (Representation Cases and Internal-Union
Conflicts) of the Omnibus Rules, viz.;
Sec. 1. Where to file. - A petition for certification election may
be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the
principal office of the employer. The petition shall be in writing
and under oath.
Sec. 2. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization or the
employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the
petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization,
shall contain, among others:
xxxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the
employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; and
provided further, that the appropriate bargaining unit of the
rank-and-file employees shall not include supervisory
employees and/or security guards. (Emphasis supplied)
By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an
otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor organization
from exercising its right to file a petition for certification
election.
Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to
the fore in Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, held:
Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed
of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor
organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a
legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization
which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition for
certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It
becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an
order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the
composition of any labor organization whenever the status of
the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245
of the Labor Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list
contains the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory
employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to
purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the
status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it
cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for
certification election. (Emphasis supplied)
26
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition
for certification election was one for supervisory employees, but
in which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the
Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right
to file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit
composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file
employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification
election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November
26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989
Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules
was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of
1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the
requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus
Rules - that the petition for certification election indicate that
the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been
mingled with supervisory employees - was removed. Instead,
what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain
description of the bargaining unit, thus:
Rule XI
Certification Elections
xxxx
Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in
writing and under oath and shall contain, among others, the
following: x x x (c) The description of the bargaining unit."
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion
to uphold the validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules,
although the specific provision involved therein was only Sec.
1, Rule VI, to wit:
Sec. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the
Bureau two (2) copies of the following: a) a charter certificate
issued by the federation or national union indicating the
creation or establishment of the local/chapter; (b) the names of
the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal
office of the local/chapter; and (c) the local/ chapter's
constitution and by-laws; provided that where the
local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of
the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated
accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President.
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a
local or chapter submit a list of its members.
Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v.
Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO in which the
core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a
labor organization and its right to file a petition for
certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu,
the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and
reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a
prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-
file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does
not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that
after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise
all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization.
Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for
that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its
registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239
of the Labor Code.
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v.
Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging
27
Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-
FFW, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a
list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny
recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question
pertaining to its individual members.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of
Labor Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of
union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-
and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed
membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in
Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated
in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997
Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in
Tagaytay Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had
already set the tone for it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold
sway in the present altered state of the law and the rules.46
When a similar issue confronted this Court close to three years
later, the above ruling was substantially quoted in Samahang
Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCC-Super) v.
Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation.47 In unequivocal
terms, We reiterated that the alleged inclusionof supervisory
employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of
its status as a legitimate labor organization.48
Indeed, Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold true under the law
and rules governing the instant case. The petitions for
certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed
on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively;
hence, the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) was applied. In contrast,
D.O. No. 9 is applicable in the petition for certification election
of private respondent as it was filed on May 31, 2002.
Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-
Super, it must be stressed that petitioner cannot collaterally
attack the legitimacy of private respondent by praying for the
dismissal of the petition for certification election:
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an
employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely
investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the
employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot
interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion
to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that
some employees participating in a petition for certification
election are actually managerial employees will lend an
employer legal personality to block the certification election.
The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or
informed thereof.
The amendments to the Labor Code and its implementing rules
have buttressed that policy even more.49
Further, the determination of whether union membership
comprises managerial and/or supervisory employees is a
factual issue that is best left for resolution in the inclusion-
exclusion proceedings, which has not yet happened in this case
so still premature to pass upon. We could only emphasize the
rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction,
are generally accorded not only with respect but even finality
by the courts when supported by substantial evidence.50 Also,
the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
CA via Rule 45 is generally limited to reviewing errors of law
28
or jurisdiction. The findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding. Except in certain recognized instances,51 We do not
entertain factual issues as it is not Our function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again; the evaluation of facts is best left
to the lower courts and administrative agencies/quasi-judicial
bodies which are better equipped for the task.52
Turning now to the second and last issue, petitioner argues
that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-
teaching personnel in private respondent due to the absence of
mutuality of interest among its members, the petition for
certification election should have been dismissed on the ground
that private respondent is not qualified to file such petition for
its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization, the
basic qualification of which is the representation of an
appropriate bargaining unit.
We disagree.
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization
are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining
unit:
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as
"any union or association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing
with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment." Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in
favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating
that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire
legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations
upon issuance of the certificate of registration.53
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a
union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is
to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s
certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.54 To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of
registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a
"group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity
to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."55 In determining the proper collective
bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the
collective bargaining agency, the Court, in the seminal case of
Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company,
Inc.,56 mentioned several factors that should be considered, to
wit: (1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and
probationary employees. We stressed, however, that the test of
the grouping is community or mutuality of interest, because
"the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights."57
As the SOLE correctly observed, petitioner failed to
comprehend the full import of Our ruling in U.P. It suffices to
quote with approval the apt disposition of the SOLE when she
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration:
Petitioner likewise claimed that we erred in interpreting the
decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra.
According to petitioner, the Supreme Court stated that the
non-academic rank-andfile employees of the University of the
29
Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion
of the academic employees of the institution. Hence, petitioner
argues, it sought the creation of separate bargaining units,
namely: (1) petitioner’s teaching personnel to the exclusion of
non-teaching personnel; and (2) petitioner’s non-teaching
personnel to the exclusion of teaching personnel.
Petitioner appears to have confused the concepts of
membership in a bargaining unit and membership in a union.
In emphasizing the phrase "to the exclusion of academic
employees" stated in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, petitioner believed
that the petitioning union could not admit academic employees
of the university to its membership. But such was not the
intention of the Supreme Court.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be
represented by a petitioning union. Such employees need not be
members of a union seeking the conduct of a certification
election. A union certified as an exclusive bargaining agent
represents not only its members but also other employees who
are not union members. As pointed out in our assailed
Decision, there were two contending unions in the U.P. case,
namely, the Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of U.P.
(ONAPUP) and the All U.P. Worker’s Union composed of both
U.P. academic and non-academic personnel. ONAPUP sought
the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file
non-academic personnel only, while the All U.P. Workers
Union intended to cover all U.P. rank-and-file employees,
involving both academic and non-academic personnel.
The Supreme Court ordered the "non-academic rank-and-file
employees of U.P. to constitute a bargaining unit to the
exclusion of the academic employees of the institution", but did
not order them to organize a separate labor organization. In
the U.P. case, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition
and affirmed the order for the conduct of a certification election
among the non-academic personnel of U.P., without prejudice
to the right of the academic personnel to constitute a separate
bargaining unit for themselves and for the All U.P. Workers
Union to institute a petition for certification election.
In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel
of petitioner school must form separate bargaining
units.1âwphi1 Thus, the order for the conduct of two separate
certification elections, one involving teaching personnel and the
other involving non-teaching personnel. It should be stressed
that in the subject petition, private respondent union sought
the conduct of a certification election among all the rank-and-
file personnel of petitioner school. Since the decision of the
Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us from commingling
teaching and non-teaching personnel in one bargaining unit,
they have to be separated into two separate bargaining units
with two separate certification elections to determine whether
the employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be
represented by private respondent. In the U.P. case, only one
certification election among the non-academic personnel was
ordered, because ONAPUP sought to represent that bargaining
unit only. No petition for certification election among the
academic personnel was instituted by All U.P. Workers Union
in the said case; thus, no certification election pertaining to its
intended bargaining unit was ordered by the Court.58
Indeed, the purpose of a certification election is precisely to
ascertain the majority of the employees’ choice of an
appropriate bargaining unit – to be or not to be represented by
a labor organization and, if in the affirmative case, by which
one.59
At this point, it is not amiss to stress once more that, as a rule,
only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In
Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,60 the Court
discussed the particular parameters of a Rule 45 appeal from
the CA’s Rule 65 decision on a labor case, as follows:
x x x In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the
assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for
jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65.
30
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of
law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal
correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the
merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be
keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a
review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of
a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to
ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?61

Our review is, therefore, limited to the determination of

whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the SOLE, not on
the basis of whether the latter's decision on the merits of the
case was strictly correct. Whether the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion is not what is ruled upon but whether it
correctly determined the existence or want of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the SOLE.

WHEREFORE, the pet1t1on is DENIED. The April 18, 2007

Decision and July 31, 2007, Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76175, which affirmed the December 27,
2002 Decision of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment that set aside the

August 10, 2002 Decision of the Med-Arbiter denying private

respondent's petition for certification election are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

31
 G.R. No. 171153. September 12, 2007. * local—the first involves the affiliation of an independent union
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION–
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (SMCEU–PTGWO), petitioner, vs. SAN
MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES
UNION– PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO (SMPPEU–PDMP), respondent. 1
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Federations; Locals or
Chapters;Words and Phrases; A legitimate labor organization is
defined as “any labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any
branch or local thereof”; Legitimate labor organizations have
exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by
non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as
the exclusive representative of all the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining.—A legitimate labor organizationis defined as “any
labor organization duly registered wi th the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local
thereof.” The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict
compliance with the requirements on registration because a
legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under
the Labor Code, and are involved in activities directly affecting
matters of public interest. Registration requirements are
intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-
by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or
use the labor organization for ille gitimate ends. Legitimate
labor organizations have excl usive rights under the law which
cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is
the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. The acquisition of rights by
any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a
petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on
whether or not the labor organization has attained the status
of a legitimate labor organization.
Same; Same; Same; The applicable Implementing Rules
enunciates a twofold procedure for the creation of a chapter or a
with a federation or national union or industry union while the
second involves the direct creation of a local or a chapter
through the process of charter-ing.—The procedure for
registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is
provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect
on 21 June 1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated
17 February 2003. The Implementing Rules as amended by
D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar
since respondent’s petition for certification election was filed
with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August
1999. The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold
procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first
involves the affiliation of an independent union with a
federation or national union or industry union. The second,
finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct
creation of a local or a chapter through the process of
chartering.
Same; Same; Same; The intent of the law in imposing less
requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered
federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a
local union with a federation or national union in order to
increase the local union’s bargaining powers respecting terms
and conditions of labor.—Article 234 of the Labor Code
provides that an independent labor organization acquires
legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR: It is
emphasized that the foregoing pert ains to the registration of
an independent labor organization, associat ion or group of
unions or workers. However, the creation of a branch, local or
chapter is treated differently. This Court, in the landmark case
of Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, 205 SCRA 802 (1992),
declared that when an unregistered union becomes a branch,
local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for
registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an
applicant for registration of an independent union is mandated
to submit, among other things, the number of employees and
names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as
32
provided under Article 234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of
Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the same is no
longer required of a branch, local or chapter. The intent of the
law in imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or
local of a registered federation or national union is to
encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or
national union in order to increase the local union’s bargaining
powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.
Same; Same; Same; Trade Union Center; Words and
Phrases;The legal personality of a legitimate labor organization,
such as Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(PDMP), cannot be subject to a collateral attack; A trade union
center is any group of registered national unions or federations
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for
assisting such members in collective bargaining; or, for
participating in the formulation of social and employment
policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) in
accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing
Rules.—As has been held in a long line of cases, the legal
personality of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP,
cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on
this matter. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended,
defines a legitimate labor organization as “any labor
organization duly registered with the DOLE, and includes any
branch or local thereof.” On the other hand, a trade union
center is any group of registered national unions or federations
organized for the mutual aid an d protection of its members; for
assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for
participating in the formulation of social and employment
policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with
the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the
Implementing Rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a certificate of registration
is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to
collateral attack—it may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V,
Book V of the Implementing Rules.—The Implementing Rules
stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered
and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration.
Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its
legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may
be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation
in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules. The aforementioned provision is
enunciated in the following: Sec. 5. Effect of registration.—The
labor organization or wo rkers’ association shall be deemed
registered and vested with legal personality on the date of
issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality
cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in
accordance with these Rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no legal justification to
support the conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to
directly create a local or chapter through chartering.—This
Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on
this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local
or chapter. After an exhaustive study of the governing labor
law provisions, both statutory and regulatory, we find no legal
justification to support the conclusion that a trade union center
is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through
chartering. Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the first
and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the law.
The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply
the law does not include the power to correct by reading into
the law what is not written therein.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term
trade union center was never mentioned under Presidential
Decree No. 442, even as it was amended by Republic Act No.
6715—the trade union center was first adopted in the
Implementing Rules, under Department Order No. 9.—
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code,
was enacted in 1972. Being a legislation on social justice, the
provisions of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have
been subject to several amendments, and they continue to
evolve, considering that labor plays a major role as a socio-
economic force. The Labor Code was first amended by Republic
Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act No. 9481.
33
Incidentally, the term trade union center was never mentioned
under Presidential Decree No. 442, even as it was amended by
Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade union centerwas first
adopted in the Implementing Rules, under Department Order
No. 9.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; R.A. No. 9481, further
amending the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations, lapsed
into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June
2007.—Republic Act No. 9481 or “An Act Strengthening the
Workers’ Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending
for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines” lapsed
into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007.
This law further amends the Labor Code provisions on Labor
Relations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Under
the statutory interpretation maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another;
If the law’s intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily
and conveniently included “trade union centers” in identifying
the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local;
Since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing
rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create
a chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or
national union, then a trade union center is without authority
to charter directly.—This Court deems it proper to apply the
Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this
maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are
specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all
others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies
one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects
of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters. Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the
law could have so easily and conveniently included “trade
union centers” in identifying the labor organizations allowed to
charter a chapter or local. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does
not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of
the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule is restrictive in
the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating
body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if
it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is
implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally.
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable
implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations
to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given
to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is
without authority to charter directly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been observed that the
formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the
circumvention of union registration requirements—absent the
institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a
small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or
union on unsuspecting coworkers and pare the need for
wholehearted voluntariness, which is basic to free unionism.—
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure
from the policy of the law to foster the free and voluntary
organization of a strong and united labor movement, and thus
assure the rights of workers to self-organization. The mandate
of the Labor Code in ensuring strict compliance with the
procedural requirements for registration is not without reason.
It has been observed that the formation of a local or chapter
becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union
registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards,
it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees
to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting
co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness,
which is basic to free unionism. As a legitimate labor
organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code
and involved in activities directly affecting public interest, it is
necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties
affected. However, as this Court has enunciated in Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor
and Employment, it is not this Court’s function to augment the
34
requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as
previously discussed, is to exact strict compliance with what
the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arnel Z. Dolendo for petitioner.
Raymundo G. Hipolito III for private respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioner SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PHILIPPINE
TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(SMCEU-PTGWO) prays that this Court reverse and set aside
the (a) Decision[2] dated 9 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66200, affirming the Decision[3] dated 19
February 2001 of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) which upheld
the Certificate of Registration of respondent SAN MIGUEL
PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES
UNIONPAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO (SMPPEUPDMP); and (b) the Resolution[4] dated 16
January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the same case,
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Decision.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the
bargaining unit comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank
and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel Corporate Staff
Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and
the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and
plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography
Plant in Laguna. It had been the certified bargaining agent for
20 years from 1987 to 1997.
Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter
Certificate No. 112 to respondent on 15 June 1999.[5] In
compliance with registration requirements, respondent
submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose
of acquiring legal personality.[6] Upon submission of its charter
certificate and other documents, respondent was issued
Certificate of Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the
BLR on 6 July 1999.[7]Thereafter, respondent filed with the
Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in the National
Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions for
certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and
SMBP.[8] All three petitions were dismissed, on the ground that
the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.[9]
On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a
petition seeking the cancellation of respondents registration
and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor
organizations. In its petition, petitioner accused respondent of
committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with
registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of
registration. It raised allegations that respondent violated
Articles 239(a), (b) and (c)[10] and 234(c)[11] of the Labor
Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a
legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence,
it cannot directly create a local or chapter. The petition was
docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD.[12]
On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B.
Lim issued an Order dismissing the allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation, and irregularity in the submission of
documents by respondent. Regional Director Lim further ruled
that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or
chapter. However, he found that respondent did not comply
with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the
cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from
the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.[13] Respondent
35
appealed to the BLR. In a Decision dated 19 February 2001, it
declared:
As a chartered local union, appellant is not
required to submit the number of employees and
names of all its members comprising at least 20%
of the employees in the bargaining unit where it
seeks to operate. Thus, the revocation of its
registration based on non-compliance with the
20% membership requirement does not have any
basis in the rules.
Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade
union center, it is a holder of Registration
Certificate No. FED-11558-LC issued by the BLR
on 14 February 1991, which bestowed upon it the
status of a legitimate labor organization with all
the rights and privileges to act as representative
of its members for purposes of collective
bargaining agreement. On this basis, PDMP can
charter or create a local, in accordance with the
provisions of Department Order No. 9.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the
Regional Director dated July 14, 2000, canceling
the registration of appellant San Miguel
Packaging Products Employees Union-
Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(SMPPEU-PDMP) is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant shall hereby remain in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations.[14]
While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional
Director dismissing the allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly
create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional Directors
ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement for
respondent to attain legal personality as a labor
organization. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the BLR. In a Resolution rendered on 19
June 2001 in BLR-A-C-64-05-9-00 (NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD),
the BLR denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed
its Decision dated 19 February 2001.[15]
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66200. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005,
dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the BLR,
ruling as follows:
In Department Order No. 9, a registered
federation or national union may directly create
a local by submitting to the BLR copies of the
charter certificate, the locals constitution and by-
laws, the principal office address of the local, and
the names of its officers and their addresses.
Upon complying with the documentary
requirements, the local shall be issued a
certificate and included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. The [herein
respondent] is an affiliate of a registered
federation PDMP, having been issued a charter
certificate. Under the rules we have reviewed,
there is no need for SMPPEU to show a
membership of 20% of the employees of the
bargaining unit in order to be recognized as a
legitimate labor union.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision
and resolution of the BLR are AFFIRMED, and
the petition is DISMISSED.[16]
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006,
the Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision.
36
 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the e. Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-
Revised Rules of Court where petitioner raises the sole issue of: laws of the applicant union, minutes of its
adoption or ratification and the list of the
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE members who participated in it.[17]
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT Petitioner also insists that the 20% requirement for
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THE NUMBER OF registration of respondent must be based not on the number of
EMPLOYEES AND NAMES OF ALL ITS employees of a single division, but in all three divisions of the
MEMBERS COMPRISING AT LEAST 20% company in all the offices and plants of SMC since they are all
OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE part of one bargaining unit. Petitioner refers to Section 1,
BARGAINING UNIT WHERE IT SEEKS TO Article 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
OPERATE. (CBA),[18] quoted hereunder:

The present petition questions the legal personality of ARTICLE 1

respondent as a legitimate labor organization. SCOPE

Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a
list of members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the
bargaining unit before it may acquire legitimacy, citing Article
234(c) of the Labor Code which stipulates that any applicant
labor organization, association or group of unions or workers
shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration
based on the following requirements:
a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
b. The names of its officers, their addresses,
the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
c. The names of all its members comprising
at least twenty percent (20%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit where it
seeks to operate;
d. If the applicant union has been in existence
for one or more years, copies of its annual
financial reports; and
Section 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit.
The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this
Agreement consists of all regular rank and file
employees paid on the basis of fixed salary per
month and employed by the COMPANY in its
Corporate Staff Units (CSU), San Miguel
Brewing Products (SMBP) and San Miguel
Packaging Products (SMPP) and in different
operations existing in the City of Manila and
suburbs, including Metal Closure and
Lithography Plant located at Canlubang, Laguna
subject to the provisions of Article XV of this
Agreement provided however, that if during the
term of this Agreement, a plant within the
territory covered by this Agreement is
transferred outside but within a radius of fifty
(50) kilometers from the Rizal Monument, Rizal
Park, Metro Manila, the employees in the
transferred plant shall remain in the bargaining
unit covered by this Agreement. (Emphasis
supplied.)
37
 Petitioner thus maintains that respondent, in any case,
failed to meet this 20% membership requirement since it based
its membership on the number of employees of a single division
only, namely, the SMPP.
There is merit in petitioners contentions.
A legitimate labor organization[19] is defined as any
labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local
thereof.[20] The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure strict
compliance with the requirements on registration because a
legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under
the Labor Code,[21] and are involved in activities directly
affecting matters of public interest. Registration requirements
are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-
by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or
use the labor organization for illegitimate ends.[22] Legitimate
labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which
cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is
the right to be certified as the exclusive representative[23] of all
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining.[24] The acquisition of rights by
any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a
petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on
whether or not the labor organization has attained the status
of a legitimate labor organization.[25]
A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered
with the BLR as a local or chapter of PDMP and was issued
Charter Certificate No. 112 on 15 June 1999. Hence,
respondent was directly chartered by PDMP.
The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a
labor organization is provided in Book V of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No.
9 which took effect on 21 June 1997, and again by Department
Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The Implementing
Rules as amended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution of
the petition at bar since respondents petition for certification
election was filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner
on 17 August 1999.[26]
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-
fold procedure for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first
involves the affiliation of an independent union with a
federation or national union or industry union. The second,
finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct
creation of a local or a chapter through the process of
chartering.[27]
A duly registered federation or national union may
directly create a local or chapter by submitting to the DOLE
Regional Office or to the BLR two copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the
federation or national union indicating the
creation or establishment of the
local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers,
their addresses, and the principal office of
the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapters constitution and by-
laws; Provided, That where the
local/chapters constitution and by-laws is
the same as that of the federation or
national union, this fact shall be indicated
accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall
be certified under oath by the Secretary or the
Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by
its President.[28]
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or
chapter may be directly created by a federation or national
38
union. A duly constituted local or chapter created in accordance (d) If the applicant union has been in existence
with the foregoing shall acquire legal personality from the date for one or more years, copies of its annual
of filing of the complete documents with the BLR.[29] The financial reports; and
issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the
DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal (e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws
personality upon a local or a chapter under Department Order of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or
No. 9. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the ratification, and the list of the members who
complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, participated in it. (Italics supplied.)
Rule VI.[30]
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration
of an independent labor organization, association or group of
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as
unions or workers.
amended by Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of
the Labor Code when it provided for less stringent
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is
requirements for the creation of a chapter or local. This Court
treated differently. This Court, in the landmark case
disagrees.
of Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment,[31] declared that when
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent
an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some
labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its
of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no
registration with the BLR:
longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for
registration of an independent union is mandated to submit,
Any applicant labor organization, association or
among other things, the number of employees and names of all
group of unions or workers shall acquire legal
its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the
personality and shall be entitled to the rights
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
Article 234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
of the Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a
registration based on the following requirements:
branch, local or chapter.[32] The intent of the law in imposing
less requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a
local union with a federation or national union in order to
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the
increase the local unions bargaining powers respecting terms
principal address of the labor organization, the
and conditions of labor.[33]
minutes of the organizational meetings and the
list of the workers who participated in
Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano[34] where
such meetings;
the validity of Department Order No. 9 was directly put in
issue, this Court was unequivocal in finding that there is no
(c) The names of all its members comprising at
inconsistency between the Labor Code and Department Order
least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in
No. 9.
the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
As to petitioners claims that respondent obtained its
Certificate of Registration through fraud and
39
misrepresentation, this Court finds that the imputations are
not impressed with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare
that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation
remains wanting. This Court had, indeed, on several occasions,
pronounced that registration based on false and fraudulent
statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor
organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to
a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization,
acquires no rights.[35]
This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the
legitimacy of a labor organization based on fraud and
misrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a
serious allegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations
thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances
and evidence. The records of the case are devoid of such
evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and
this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings
of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies,
such as the BLR, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality.[36]
Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and
legitimately created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter
as it is not a legitimate labor organization, it being a trade
union center.
Petitioners argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the
legitimacy of PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line of
reasoning attempts to predicate that a trade union center is not
a legitimate labor organization. In the process, the legitimacy
of PDMP is being impugned, albeit indirectly. Secondly, the
same contention premises that a trade union center cannot
directly create a local or chapter through the process of
chartering.
Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of
cases, the legal personality of a legitimate labor organization,
such as PDMP, cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law
is very clear on this matter. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code,
as amended, defines a legitimate labor organization[37] as any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, and
includes any branch or local thereof.[38] On the other hand, a
trade union center is any group of registered national unions or
federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its
members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining;
or for participating in the formulation of social and
employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly
registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section
2 of the Implementing Rules.[39]
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor
organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of
registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a
union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral
attack.[40] It may be questioned only in an independent petition
for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V
of the Implementing Rules. The aforementioned provision is
enunciated in the following:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor
organization or workers association shall be
deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Such legal personality
cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack,
but may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation in accordance with these
Rules.
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued
Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14
February 1991. Until the certificate of registration of PDMP is
cancelled, its legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization subsists. Once a union acquires legitimate status
as a labor organization, it continues to be recognized as such
until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an
40
independent action for cancellation.[41] It bears to emphasize
that what is being directly challenged is the personality of
respondent as a legitimate labor organization and not that of
PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this Court is without
jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly impugning the
legitimacy of PDMP.
Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and
privileges appurtenant to a legitimate labor
organization,[42] and continues to be recognized as such until its
certificate of registration is successfully impugned and
thereafter cancelled or revoked in an independent action for
cancellation.
We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly
create a local or a chapter, it being a trade union center.
This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court
and BLR on this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly
create a local or chapter.
center was first adopted in the Implementing Rules, under
Department Order No. 9.
Culling from its definition as provided by Department
Order No. 9, a trade union center is any group of registered
national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and
protection of its members; for assisting such members in
collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of
social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and
is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III,
Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.[46] The same rule provides
that the application for registration of an industry or trade
union center shall be supported by the following:
(a) The list of its member
organizations and their respective
presidents and, in the case of an
industry union, the industry where
the union seeks to operate;

After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law (b) The resolution of
provisions, both statutory and regulatory,[43] we find no legal membership of each member
justification to support the conclusion that a trade union center organization, approved by the Board
is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through of Directors of such union;
chartering. Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the first
and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the (c) The name and principal
law. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and address of the applicant, the names of
apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading its officers and their addresses, the
into the law what is not written therein.[44] minutes of its organizational
meeting/s, and the list of member
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor organizations and their
Code, was enacted in 1972. Being a legislation on social representatives who attended such
justice,[45] the provisions of the Labor Code and the meeting/s; and
Implementing Rules have been subject to several amendments,
and they continue to evolve, considering that labor plays a (d) A copy of its constitution and
major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor Code was first by-laws and minutes of its ratification
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic by a majority of the presidents of the
Act No. 9481. Incidentally, the term trade union center was member organizations, provided that
never mentioned under Presidential Decree No. 442, even as it where the ratification was done
was amended by Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade union simultaneously with the
41
 organizational meeting, it shall be Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by
sufficient that the fact of ratification its President.[50]
be included in the minutes of the
organizational meeting.[47]
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor
Evidently, while a national union or federation is a organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a
labor organization with at least ten locals or chapters or local or chapter through chartering a duly
affiliates, each of which must be a duly certified or recognized registered federation or a national union. Department Order
collective bargaining agent;[48] a trade union center, on the No. 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the
other hand, is composed of a group of registered national private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired
unions or federations.[49] legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly
registered federation or national union and reported to the
The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of
Order No. 9, provide that a duly registered federation or these Rules.[51]
national union may directly create a local or chapter. The
provision reads: Republic Act No. 9481 or An Act Strengthening the
Workers Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended,
local/chapter. A duly registered federation or Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of
national union may directly create a the Philippines lapsed[52] into law on 25 May 2007 and became
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional effective on 14 June 2007.[53] This law further amends the
Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations.
following:
Pertinent amendments read as follows:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation
or national union indicating the creation or SECTION 1. Article 234 of Presidential Decree
establishment of the local/chapter; No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, is hereby further
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers, their amended to read as follows:
addresses, and the principal office of the
local/chapter; and ART. 234. Requirements of
Registration. A federation,
(c) The local/chapters constitution and by-laws; national union or industry or trade
provided that where the local/chapters union center or an independent
constitution and by-laws is the same as that of union shall acquire legal
the federation or national union, this fact shall personality and shall be entitled to
be indicated accordingly. the rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall organizations upon issuance of the
be certified under oath by the Secretary or the
42
 certificate of registration based on
the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00)
registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their
addresses, the principal address of
the labor organization, the minutes
of the organizational meetings and
the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an
independent union, the names of
all its members comprising at least
twenty percent (20%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been
in existence for one or more years,
copies of its annual financial
reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution
and by-laws of the applicant union,
minutes of its adoption or
ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it.
SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted
into the Labor Code as Article 234-A to read as
follows:
ART. 234-A. Chartering and
Creation of a Local Chapter. A
duly registered federation or
national union may directly create
a local chapter by issuing a charter
certificate indicating the
establishment of the local chapter.
The chapter shall acquire legal
personality only for purposes of
filing a petition for certification
election from the date it was issued
a charter certificate.
The chapter shall be entitled to all
other rights and privileges of a
legitimate labor organization only
upon the submission of the
following documents in addition to
its charter certificate:
(a) The names of the chapter's
officers, their addresses, and the
principal office of the chapter; and
(b) The chapter's constitution and
by-laws: Provided, That where the
chapter's constitution and by-laws
are the same as that of the
federation or the national union,
this fact shall be indicated
accordingly.
The additional supporting
requirements shall be certified
under oath by the secretary or
treasurer of the chapter and
attested by its president.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but
interestingly, the provision indicating the procedure for
chartering or creating a local or chapter, namely Article 234-A,
still makes no mention of a trade union center.
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent
amendment of the implementing rules,[54] there was no mention
43
of a trade union center as being among the labor organizations
allowed to charter.
This Court deems it proper to apply the
Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this
maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are
specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all
others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies
one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects
of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are
excluded.[55] Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.[56] Such is the case here. If its intent
were otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently
included trade union centers in identifying the labor
organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. Anything
that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom,
and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected
in the very language of the statute cannot be placed
therein.[57] The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds
from the premise that the legislating body would not have
made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention
not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.[58] Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is
[59]
implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally.
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable
implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations
to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given
to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is
without authority to charter directly.
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a
departure from the policy of the law to foster the free and
voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement,[60] and thus assure the rights of workers to self-
organization.[61] The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring
strict compliance with the procedural requirements for
registration is not without reason. It has been observed that
the formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the
circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent the
institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a
small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation
or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for
wholehearted voluntariness, which is basic to free
unionism.[62] As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to
specific rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities
directly affecting public interest, it is necessary that the law
afford utmost protection to the parties affected.[63] However, as
this Court has enunciated in Progressive Development
Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor and
Employment, it is not this Court's function to augment the
requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as
previously discussed, is to exact strict compliance with what
the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.[64]
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate
labor organization, it has no power to directly create a local or
chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the
more lenient requirements for chartering, but must have
complied with the more stringent rules for creation and
registration of an independent union, including the 20%
membership requirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 09 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR SP No. 66200 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Certificate of Registration of San Miguel Packaging Products
Employees UnionPambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang
Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-
PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labor
organizations.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
44
 Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for certification
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA G.R. No. 177024 election[2] that petitioner company opposed. The company
(OWNED AND OPERATED BY alleged that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be an
GRAND PLAZA HOTEL independent union, when it was, in truth, a local chapter of the
CORPORATION) National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant and Allied
Petitioner, Present: Industries (NUWHRAIN). The company claimed that the HHE
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, union intentionally omitted disclosure of its affiliation with
- versus - Carpio,* NUWHRAIN because the companys supervisors union was
Chico- already affiliated with it.[3] Thus, the company also filed a
Nazario,** petition for the cancellation of the HHE unions registration
Brion, and certificate.[4]
Abad, JJ.
PINAG-ISANG GALING AT LAKAS Meanwhile, the Med-Arbiter granted the HHE unions petition
NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA for certification election.[5] Petitioner company appealed the
HERITAGE MANILA Promulgated: decision to the Secretary of Labor but the latter denied the
(PIGLAS-HERITAGE), appeal.[6] The Secretary also denied petitioners motion for
Respondent. October 30, 2009 reconsideration, prompting the company to file a petition
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- for certiorari[7] with the Court of Appeals.
-- x
On October 12, 2001 the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
DECISION injunction against the holding of the HHE unions certification
election, effective until the petition for cancellation of that
ABAD, J.: unions registration shall have been resolved with
finality.[8] The decision of the Court of Appeals became final
when the HHE union withdrew the petition for review that it
This case is about a companys objections to the filed with this Court.[9]
registration of its rank and file union for non-compliance with
the requirements of its registration. On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees of
petitioner company held a meeting and formed another union,
The Facts and the Case the respondent Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga
Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila (the PIGLAS union). This
union applied for registration with the DOLE-NCR[10] and got
Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner its registration certificate on February 9, 2004. Two months
Heritage Hotel Manila (petitioner company) formed the later, the members of the first union, the HHE union, adopted
Heritage Hotel Employees Union (the HHE union). The a resolution for its dissolution. The HHE union then filed a
Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital petition for cancellation of its union registration.[11]
Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of
registration to this union.
[1] On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a
petition for certification election[12] that petitioner company
also opposed, alleging that the new unions officers and
45
members were also those who comprised the old
union. According to the company, the employees involved
formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of Appeals
injunction against the holding of the certification election
sought by the former union. Despite the companys opposition,
however, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification
election.[13]
On December 6, 2004 petitioner company filed a petition
to cancel the union registration of respondent PIGLAS
union.[14] The company claimed that the documents submitted
with the unions application for registration bore the following
false information:
(a) The List of Members showed that the
PIGLAS union had 100 union members;[15]
(b) The Organizational Minutes said that
90 employees attended the meeting on
December 10, 2003;[16]
(c) The Attendance Sheet of the meeting
of December 10, 2003 bore the signature
of 127 members who ratified the unions
Constitution and By-Laws;[17] and
(d) The Signature Sheet bore 128
signatures of those who attended that
meeting.[18]
Petitioner company alleged that the misrepresentation was
evidenced by the discrepancy in the number of union members
appearing in the application and the list as well as in the
number of signatories to the attendance and signature
sheets. The minutes reported that only 90 employees attended
the meeting. The company further alleged that 33 members of
respondent PIGLAS union were members of the defunct HHE
union. This, according to the company, violated the policy
against dual unionism and showed that the new union was
merely an alter ego of the old.
On February 22, 2005 the DOLE-NCR denied the companys
petition to cancel respondent PIGLAS unions registration for
the reason that the discrepancies in the number of members
stated in the applications supporting documents were not
material and did not constitute misrepresentation. As for the
charge of dual unionism, the same is not a ground for canceling
registration. It merely exposed a union member to a possible
charge of disloyalty, an internal matter. Here, the members of
the former union simply exercised their right to self-
organization and to the freedom of association when they
subsequently joined the PIGLAS union.[19]
On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relation (BLR) affirmed the
ruling of the DOLE-NCR. It reasoned that respondent PIGLAS
unions organization meeting lasted for 12 hours. It was
possible for the number of attendees to have increased from 90
to 128 as the meeting progressed. Besides, with a total of 250
employees in the bargaining unit, the union needed only 50
members to comply with the 20 percent membership
requirement. Thus, the union could not be accused of
misrepresentation since it did not pad its membership to secure
registration.
As for the issue of dual unionism, it has become moot and
academic, said the BLR, because of the dissolution of the old
union and the cancellation of its certificate of registration.[20]
Petitioner company filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals,[21] assailing the order of the BLR. But the latter
court dismissed the petition, not being accompanied by
material documents and portions of the record.[22] The company
filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching parts of the record
that were deemed indispensable but the court denied it for lack
of merit.[23] Hence, the company filed this petition for review
under Rule 45.
Issues Presented
The petition presents the following issues:
46

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari before it for
failure of petitioner company to attach certain
material portions of the record;
2. Whether or not the union made fatal
misrepresentation in its application for union
registration; and
3. Whether or not dual unionism is a ground for
canceling a unions registration.
The Rulings of the Court
First. While the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
companys petition initially for failure to attach material
portions of the record, the court should have bended back a
little when petitioner company subsequently attached those
missing materials to its motion for reconsideration. As a
general rule, petitions for certiorari that lack copies of essential
pleadings and portions of the record may be dismissed but this
rule has not been regarded as absolute. The omission may be
cured.[24]
The Court of Appeals has three courses of action when the
annexes to the petition are insufficient. It may dismiss the
petition,[25] require the submission of the relevant documents,
or order the filing of an amended petition with the required
pleadings or documents. A petition lacking in essential
pleadings or portions of the record may still be given due
course, or reinstated if earlier dismissed, upon subsequent
submission of the necessary documents or to serve the higher
interest of justice.[26]
Second. Since a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals for
a determination of the substantive issues will only result in
more delays and since these issues have been amply argued by
the opposing sides in the various pleadings and documents they
submitted to this Court, the case may now be resolved on the
merits.
Did respondent PIGLAS union commit fraud and
misrepresentation in its application for union registration? We
agree with the DOLE-NCR and the BLR that it did not.Except
for the evident discrepancies as to the number of union
members involved as these appeared on the documents that
supported the unions application for registration, petitioner
company has no other evidence of the alleged
misrepresentation. But those discrepancies alone cannot be
taken as an indication that respondent misrepresented the
information contained in these documents.
The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and
misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious
charge and deserves close scrutiny. It is serious because once
such charge is proved, the labor union acquires none of the
rights accorded to registered organizations. Consequently,
charges of this nature should be clearly established by evidence
and the surrounding circumstances.[27]
Here, the discrepancies in the number of union members or
employees stated in the various supporting documents that
respondent PIGLAS union submitted to labor authorities can
be explained. While it appears in the minutes of the December
10, 2003 organizational meeting that only 90 employees
responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be
assumed that such number could not grow to 128 as reflected
on the signature sheet for attendance. The meeting lasted 12
hours from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. There is no evidence that
the meeting hall was locked up to exclude late attendees.
There is also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about
the fact that only 127 members ratified the unions constitution
and by-laws when 128 signed the attendance sheet. It cannot
47
be assumed that all those who attended approved of the
constitution and by-laws. Any member had the right to hold
out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply
ignore the process.
At any rate, the Labor Code[28] and its implementing rules[29] do
not require that the number of members appearing on the
documents in question should completely dovetail. For as long
as the documents and signatures are shown to be genuine and
regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically
ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration
requirements.
registration. The right of any person to join an organization
also includes the right to leave that organization and join
another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to exist
and its certificate of registration had already been cancelled.
Thus, petitioners arguments on this point may also be now
regarded as moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition
and AFFIRMS the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations
in BLR-A-26-3-05 dated May 26, 2006.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner company claims that respondent PIGLAS union was

required to submit the names of all its members comprising at
least 20 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit. Yet
the list it submitted named only 100 members notwithstanding
that the signature and attendance sheets reflected a
membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission, said the
company, amounted to material misrepresentation that
warranted the cancellation of the unions registration.
But, as the labor authorities held, this discrepancy is
immaterial. A comparison of the documents shows that, except
for six members, the names found in the subject list are also in
the attendance and signature sheets. Notably, the bargaining
unit that respondent PIGLAS union sought to represent
consisted of 250 employees. Only 20 percent of this number or
50 employees were required to unionize. Here, the union more
than complied with such requirement.

Labor laws are liberally construed in favor of labor especially if

doing so would affirm its constitutionally guaranteed right to
self-organization.[30] Here, the PIGLAS unions supporting
documents reveal the unmistakable yearning of petitioner
companys rank and file employees to organize. This yearning
should not be frustrated by inconsequential technicalities.

Third. The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS unions

members were also members of the old rank and file union, the
HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new unions
48
 G.R. No. 178989. March 18, 2010.*
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB,
petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE
EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU), respondents.
Certiorari; The party who seeks to avail of certiorari must strictly
observe the rules laid down by law.—Certiorari is an extraordinary,
prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right. Accordingly, the
party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by
law. Petitions for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require a
“sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.”
Pleadings and Practice; Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; A
certification of non-forum shopping signed by counsel without the proper
authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
petition.—In the instant case, the sworn verification and certification of non-
forum shopping in the petition for certiorari of Eagle Ridge filed before the
CA carried the signature of its counsel without the requisite authority. Eagle
Ridge tried to address its faux pas by submitting its board secretary’s
Certificate dated May 15, 2007, attesting to the issuance on May 10, 2007 of
Board Resolution No. ERGCCI 07/III-01 that authorized its counsel of record,
Atty. Luna C. Piezas, to represent it before the appellate court. The CA,
however, rejected Eagle Ridge’s virtual plea for the relaxation of the rules on
the signing of the verification and certification against forum shopping,
observing that the board resolution adverted to was approved after Atty.
Piezas has signed and filed for Eagle Ridge the petition for certiorari. The
appellate court’s assailed action is in no way tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, as Eagle Ridge would have this Court believed. Indeed, a
certification of non-forum shopping signed by counsel without the proper
authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
petition.
Same; Same; The rule that the submission of the board secretary’s
certificate through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s)
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari may be considered a substantial
compliance with the Rules of Court presupposes that the authorizing board
resolution, the approval of which is certified to by the secretary’s certification,
was passed within the reglementary period for filing the petition.—The
submission of the board secretary’s certificate through a motion for
reconsideration of the CA’s decision dismissing the petition for certiorari may
be considered a substantial compliance with the Rules of Court. Yet, this rule
presupposes that the authorizing board resolution, the approval of which is
certified to by the secretary’s certification, was passed within the
reglementary period for filing the petition. This particular situation does not,
however, obtain under the premises. The records yield the following material
dates and incidents: Eagle Ridge received the May 7, 2007 resolution of the
BLR Director on March 9, 2007, thus giving it 60 days or up to May 8, 2007 to
file a petition for certiorari, as it in fact filed its petition on April 18, 2007
before the CA. The authorization for its counsel, however, was only issued in
a meeting of its board on May 10, 2007 or a couple of days beyond the 60-day
reglementary period referred to in filing a certiorari action. Thus, there was
no substantial compliance with the Rules.
Same; Same; Attorneys; In filing a pleading, the counsel affixes his
signature on it, but it is the client who must sign the verification and the
certification against forum shopping, save when a board resolution authorizes
the former to sign so; The authority to represent a client before a court or
quasi-judicial agency does not require an authorizing board resolution, as the
counsel-client relationship is presumed by the counsel’s representation by the
filing of a pleading on behalf of the client.—To us, Eagle Ridge has not
satisfactorily explained its failure to comply. It may be true, as Eagle Ridge
urges, that its counsel’s authority to represent the corporation was never
questioned before the DOLE regional office and agency. But EREU’s misstep
could hardly lend Eagle Ridge comfort. And obviously, Eagle Ridge and its
counsel erred in equating the latter’s representation as legal counsel with the
authority to sign the verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping in
the former’s behalf. We note that the authority to represent a client before a
court or quasi-judicial agency does not require an authorizing board
resolution, as the counsel-client relationship is presumed by the counsel’s
representation by the filing of a pleading on behalf of the client. In filing a
pleading, the counsel affixes his signature on it, but it is the client who must
sign the verification and the certification against forum shopping, save when
a board resolution authorizes the former to sign so. It is entirely a different
matter for the counsel to sign the verification and the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The attestation or certification in either verification or certification
of non-forum shopping requires the act of the principal party. As earlier
indicated, Sec. 3 of Rule 46 exacts this requirement; so does the first
paragraph of Sec. 5 of Rule 7.
Labor Law; Right to Self-Organization; Labor Unions; The right of
employees to self-organization and membership in a union must not be
trammeled by undue difficulties.—The right of employees to self-organization
and membership in a union must not be trammeled by undue difficulties. In
this case, when the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been
admitted as union members, it is enough to establish the fact of admission of
the four that they had duly signified such desire by accomplishing the
membership form. The fact, as pointed out by Eagle Ridge, that the Union,
owing to its scant membership, had not yet fully organized its different
committees evidently shows the direct and valid acceptance of the four
employee applicants rather than deter their admission—as erroneously
asserted by Eagle Ridge.
Same; Same; Same; Certification Elections; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence
Rule; Affidavits; It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay
evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement, which may thus
be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.—It is settled that
affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant’s statement, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. The above rule affirms the general
49
requirement in adversarial proceedings for the examination of the affiant by
the party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is
required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the
hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing
party, i.e., the Union. For their non-presentation and consonant to the above-
quoted rule, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence
against the Union in the instant case. Moreover, the affidavit and joint-
affidavits presented by the Union before the DOLE Regional Director were
duly re-affirmed in the hearing of March 20, 2006 by the affiants. Thus, a
reversible error was committed by the DOLE Regional Director and the BLR
OIC Director in giving credence to the inadmissible affidavits of retraction
presented by Eagle Ridge while not giving credence to the duly re-affirmed
affidavits presented by the Union.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A certification election is the most
appropriate procedure for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the
competing organizations should represent the employees for the purpose of
collective bargaining; Where the company seeks the cancellation of a union’s
registration during the pendency of a petition for certification election, the
same grounds invoked to cancel should not be used to bar the certification
election.—In Eastland Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Noriel, 111 SCRA 674
(1982) the Court emphasized, and reiterated its earlier rulings, that “even if
there were less than 30% [the required percentage of minimum membership
then] of the employees asking for a certification election, that of itself would
not be a bar to respondent Director ordering such an election provided, of
course, there is no grave abuse of discretion.” Citing Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 69 SCRA 132 (1976) the
Court emphasized that a certification election is the most appropriate
procedure for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the competing
organizations should represent the employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining. Indeed, where the company seeks the cancellation of a union’s
registration during the pendency of a petition for certification election, the
same grounds invoked to cancel should not be used to bar the certification
election. A certification election is the most expeditious and fairest mode of
ascertaining the will of a collective bargaining unit as to its choice of its
exclusive representative. It is the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force.
It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression
in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their
choice, is controlling.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The employees’ withdrawal from a labor
union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is
presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is
considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same.—The Court ends
this disposition by reproducing the following apt excepts from its holding
in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union
(SSVLU), 559 SCRA 435 (2008), on the effect of the withdrawal from union
membership right before or after the filing of a petition for certification
election: We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA,
these mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March
20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of
registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership
executed after the Union’s filing of a petition for certification election on
March 21, 2000. We have in precedent cases said that the employees’
withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition
for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal
after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and
does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union
membership done after a petition for certification election has been
filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume
that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the
union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the
BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the
affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Laguesma, Magsalin, Consulta & Gastardo Law
Offices for petitioner.
Domingo T. Añonuevo for respondent Eagle Ridge
Employees Union (EREU).
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Eagle Ridge
Golf & Country Club (Eagle Ridge) assails and seeks to nullify
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 27,
2007[1] and June 6, 2007,[2] issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 98624,
denying a similar recourse petitioner earlier interposed to set
aside the December 21, 2006 Decision[3] of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), as reiterated in a Resolution[4] of March 7,
2007.
Petitioner Eagle Ridge is a corporation engaged in the
business of maintaining golf courses. It had, at the end of CY
2005, around 112 rank-and-file employees. The instant case is
an off-shot of the desire of a number of these employees to
organize themselves as a legitimate labor union and their
employers opposition to their aspiration.
The Facts
On December 6, 2005, at least 20% of Eagle Ridges
rank-and-file employeesthe percentage threshold required
under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for union
50
registrationhad a meeting where they organized themselves
into an independent labor union, named Eagle Ridge
Employees Union (EREU or Union),[5] elected a set of
officers,[6] and ratified[7] their constitution and by-laws.[8]
On December 19, 2005, EREU formally applied for
registration[9] and filed BLR Reg. Form No. I-LO, s.
1998[10] before the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Regional Office IV (RO IV). In time, DOLE RO IV
granted the application and issued EREU Registration
Certificate (Reg. Cert.) No. RO400-200512-UR-003.
The EREU then filed a petition for certification election
in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club, docketed as Case
No. RO400-0601-RU-002. Eagle Ridge opposed this
petition, followed by its filing of a petition for the
[11]
cancellation[12] of Reg. Cert. No. RO400-200512-UR-
003. Docketed as RO400-0602-AU-003, Eagle Ridges petition
ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU
in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws,
the numerical composition of the Union, and the election of its
officers.
Going into specifics, Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU
declared in its application for registration having 30 members,
when the minutes of its December 6, 2005 organizational
meeting showed it only had 26 members. The
misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between
the certification issued by the Union secretary and president
that 25 members actually ratified the constitution and by-laws
on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed
their signatures on the documents, making one signature a
forgery.
Finally, Eagle Ridge contended that five employees who
attended the organizational meeting had manifested the desire
to withdraw from the union. The five executed individual
affidavits or Sinumpaang Salaysay[13] on February 15, 2006,
attesting that they arrived late at said meeting which they
claimed to be drinking spree; that they did not know that the
documents they signed on that occasion pertained to the
organization of a union; and that they now wanted to be
excluded from the Union. The withdrawal of the five, Eagle
Ridge maintained, effectively reduced the union membership to
20 or 21, either of which is below the mandatory minimum 20%
membership requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor
Code. Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file employees of Eagle
Ridge, the required number would be 22 or 23 employees.
As a counterpoint, EREU, in its Comment,[14] argued in
gist:
1) the petition for cancellation was
procedurally deficient as it does not contain a
certification against forum shopping and that the
same was verified by one not duly authorized by
Eagle Ridges board;
2) the alleged discrepancies are not real
for before filing of its application on December
19, 2005, four additional employees joined the
union on December 8, 2005, thus raising the
union membership to 30 members as of
December 19, 2005;
3) the understatement by one member
who ratified the constitution and by-laws was a
typographical error, which does not make it
either grave or malicious warranting the
cancellation of the unions registration;
4) the retraction of 5 union members
should not be given any credence for the reasons
that: (a) the sworn statements of the five
retracting union members sans other affirmative
evidence presented hardly qualify as clear and
credible evidence considering the joint affidavits
of the other members attesting to the orderly
conduct of the organizational meeting; (b) the
retracting members did not deny signing the
51
 union documents; (c)
following, Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-
Calleja[15] and Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment,[16] it can be
presumed that duress, coercion or valuable
consideration was brought to bear on the
retracting members; and (d)
citing La SuerteCigar and Cigarette Factory v.
Director of Bureau of Labor
Relations,[17] Belyca Corporation and Oriental
Tin Can Labor Union, where the Court ruled
that once the required percentage requirement
has been reached, the employees withdrawal
from union membership taking place after the
filing of the petition for certification election will
not affect the petition, it asserted the
applicability of said ruling as the petition for
certification election was filed on January 10,
2006 or long before February 15, 2006 when the
affidavits of retraction were executed by the five
union members, thus contending that the
retractions do not affect nor be deemed
compelling enough to cancel its certificate of
registration.
The Union presented the duly accomplished union
membership forms[18] dated December 8, 2005 of four additional
members. And to rebut the allegations in the affidavits of
retraction of the five union members, it presented the Sama-
Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay[19] dated March 20, 2006 of
eight union members; another Sama-Samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay,[20] also bearing date March 20, 2006, of four other
union members; and the Sworn Statement[21] dated March 16,
2006 of the Unions legal counsel, Atty. Domingo T.
Aonuevo. These affidavits attested to the orderly and proper
proceedings of the organizational meeting on December 6,
2005.
In its Reply,[22] Eagle Ridge reiterated the grounds it
raised in its petition for cancellation and asserted further that
the four additional members were fraudulently admitted into
the Union. As Eagle Ridge claimed, the applications of the four
neither complied with the requirements under Section 2, Art.
IV of the unions constitution and by-laws nor were they shown
to have been duly received, issued receipts for admission fees,
processed with recommendation for approval, and approved by
the union president.
Moreover, Eagle Ridge presented another Sinumpaang
Salaysay[23] of retraction dated March 15, 2006 of another
union member. The membership of EREU had thus been
further reduced to only 19 or 20. This same member was listed
in the first Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay[24] presented
by the Union but did not sign it.
The Ruling of the DOLE Regional Director
After due proceedings, the DOLE Regional Director,
Region IV-A, focusing on the question of misrepresentation,
issued on April 28, 2006 an Order[25] finding for Eagle Ridge, its
petition to cancel Reg. Cert. No. RO400-200512-UR-003 being
granted and EREU being delisted from the roster of legitimate
labor organizations.
Aggrieved, the Union appealed to the BLR, the recourse
docketed as BLR A-C-30-5-31-06 (Case No. RO400-0602-AU-
003).
The Ruling of the BLR
Initially, the BLR, then headed by an Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), affirmed[26] the appealed order of the DOLE Regional
Director.
Undeterred by successive set backs, EREU interposed a
motion for reconsideration, contending that:
1) Contrary to the ruling of the BLR OIC
Director, a certificate of non-forum shopping is
52
 mandatory requirement, under Department
Order No. (DO) 40-03 and the Rules of Court,
non-compliance with which is a ground to
dismiss a petition for cancellation of a certificate
of registration;
2) It was erroneous for both the Regional
Director and the BLR OIC Director to give
credence to the retraction statements of union
members which were not presented for
reaffirmation during any of the hearings of the
case, contrary to the requirement for the
admission of such evidence under Sec. 11, Rule
XI of DO 40-03.
In a Decision dated December 21, 2006, the BLR, now
headed by Director Rebecca C. Chato, set aside the July 28,
2006 order of the BLR OIC Director, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and our
Resolution dated 28 July 2006 is hereby
VACATED. Accordingly, the Eagle Ridge
Employees Union (EREU) shall remain in the
roster of legitimate organizations.
In finding for the Union, the BLR Director eschewed
procedural technicalities. Nonetheless, she found as without
basis allegations of misrepresentation or fraud as ground for
cancellation of EREUs registration.
In turn aggrieved, Eagle Ridge sought but was denied
reconsideration per the BLRs Resolution dated March 7, 2007.
Eagle Ridge thereupon went to the CA on a petition
for certiorari.
The Ruling of the CA
On April 27, 2007, the appellate court, in a terse two-
page Resolution,[27] dismissed Eagle Ridges petition for being
deficient, as:
1. the questioned [BLR] Decision dated
December 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated
March 7, 2007 Resolution [appended to the
petition] are mere machine copies; and
2. the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping was subscribed to by Luna C.
Piezas on her representation as the legal
counsel of the petitioner, but sans [the
requisite] Secretarys Certificate or Board
Resolution authorizing her to execute and
sign the same.
The CA later denied, in its second assailed resolution,
Eagle Ridges motion for reconsideration, albeit the latter had
submitted a certificate to show that its legal counsel has been
authorized, per a board resolution, to represent the
corporation.
The Issues
Eagle Ridge is now before us via this petition
for certiorari on the submissions that:
I.
[THE CA] COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE
COMPANYS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND DENYING ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION CONSIDERING THAT
THE COMPANYS PREVIOUS COUNSEL WAS
AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE
COMPANY IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE [CA];
53
 xxxx
II.
The petitioner shall also submit together
IN ORDER NOT TO FURTHER PREJUDICE with the petition a sworn certification that he
THE COMPANY, IT IS RESPECTFULLY has not theretofore commenced any action
SUBMITTED THAT THIS HONORABLE involving the same issues in the Supreme
COURT COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE Court, the Court of Appeals x x x, or any other
MERITS OF THIS CASE AND RESOLVE THAT tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, proceeding, he must state the status of the same
THERE WAS FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION x x x.
AND/OR FALSE STATEMENT WHICH
WARRANT THE CANCELLATION OF xxxx
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF
EREU.[28] The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis
The Courts Ruling supplied.)

We dismiss the petition.

Procedural Issue: Lack of Authority
Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and
is never issued as a matter of right.[29] Accordingly, the party
who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the
rules laid down by law.[30]
Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court require a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.[31] Sec. 3,
paragraphs 4 and 6 of Rule 46 pertinently provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition;
effect of non-compliance with requirements.
xxxx
Evidently, the Rules requires the petitioner, not his
counsel, to sign under oath the requisite certification against
non-forum shopping. Such certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
to the court that there are no other pending cases involving
basically the same parties, issues, and cause of action.[32]
In the instant case, the sworn verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in the petition for certiorari
of Eagle Ridge filed before the CA carried the signature of its
counsel without the requisite authority.
Eagle Ridge tried to address its faux pas by submitting
its board secretarys Certificate[33] dated May 15, 2007,
attesting to the issuance on May 10, 2007 of Board Resolution
No. ERGCCI 07/III-01 that authorized its counsel of record,
Atty. Luna C. Piezas, to represent it before the appellate court.

xxxx The CA, however, rejected Eagle Ridges virtual plea for
the relaxation of the rules on the signing of the verification and
54
certification against forum shopping, observing that the board
resolution adverted to was approved after Atty. Piezas has
signed and filed for Eagle Ridge the petition for certiorari.
The appellate courts assailed action is in no way tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, as Eagle Ridge would have this
Court believed. Indeed, a certification of non-forum shopping
signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective
and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.[34]
The submission of the board secretarys certificate
through a motion for reconsideration of the CAs decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari may be considered a
substantial compliance with the Rules of Court.[35] Yet, this
rule presupposes that the authorizing board resolution, the
approval of which is certified to by the secretarys certification,
was passed within the reglementary period for filing the
petition. This particular situation does not, however, obtain
under the premises. The records yield the following material
dates and incidents: Eagle Ridge received the May 7, 2007
resolution of the BLR Director on March 9, 2007, thus giving it
60 days or up to May 8, 2007 to file a petition for certiorari, as
it in fact filed its petition on April 18, 2007 before the CA. The
authorization for its counsel, however, was only issued in a
meeting of its board on May 10, 2007 or a couple of days beyond
the 60-day reglementary period referred to in filing a certiorari
action. Thus, there was no substantial compliance with the
Rules.
As with most rules of procedure, however, exceptions
are invariably recognized and the relaxation of procedural
rules on review has been effected to obviate jeopardizing
substantial justice.[36] This liberality stresses the importance of
review in our judicial grievance structure to accord every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.[37] But concomitant to a liberal interpretation of
the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to
abide by the rules.[38]
To us, Eagle Ridge has not satisfactorily explained its
failure to comply. It may be true, as Eagle Ridge urges, that its
counsels authority to represent the corporation was never
questioned before the DOLE regional office and agency. But
EREUs misstep could hardly lend Eagle Ridge comfort. And
obviously, Eagle Ridge and its counsel erred in equating the
latters representation as legal counsel with the authority to
sign the verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping
in the formers behalf. We note that the authority to represent a
client before a court or quasi-judicial agency does not require
an authorizing board resolution, as the counsel-client
relationship is presumed by the counsels representation by the
filing of a pleading on behalf of the client. In filing a pleading,
the counsel affixes his signature on it, but it is the client who
must sign the verification and the certification against forum
shopping, save when a board resolution authorizes the former
to sign so.
It is entirely a different matter for the counsel to sign
the verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping. The
attestation or certification in either verification or certification
of non-forum shopping requires the act of the principal
party. As earlier indicated, Sec. 3 of Rule 46 exacts this
requirement; so does the first paragraph of Sec. 5 of Rule 7
pertinently reading:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum
shopping. The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action
55
 or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed. (Emphasis
added.)
It is, thus, clear that the counsel is not the proper
person to sign the certification against forum shopping. If, for
any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the
one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.[39]
In addition, Eagle Ridge maintains that the submitted
board resolution, albeit passed after the filing of the petition
was filed, should be treated as a ratificatory medium of the
counsels act of signing the sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.
We are not inclined to grant the desired liberality owing
to Eagle Ridges failure to sufficiently explain its failure to
follow the clear rules.
If for the foregoing considerations alone, the Court could
very well dismiss the instant petition. Nevertheless, the Court
will explore the merits of the instant case to obviate the
inequity that might result from the outright denial of the
petition.
Substantive Issue: No Fraud in the Application
Eagle Ridge cites the grounds provided under
Art. 239(a) and (c) of the Labor Code for its petition for
cancellation of the EREUs registration. On the other hand,
the Union asserts bona fide compliance with the registration
requirements under Art. 234 of the Code, explaining the
seeming discrepancies between the number of employees who
participated in the organizational meeting and the total
number of union members at the time it filed its registration,
as well as the typographical error in its certification which
understated by one the number of union members who ratified
the unions constitution and by-laws.
Before their amendment by Republic Act No. 9481[40] on
June 15, 2007, the then governing Art. 234 (on the
requirements of registration of a labor union) and Art. 239 (on
the grounds for cancellation of union registration) of the Labor
Code respectively provided as follows:
ART. 234. REQUIREMENTS OF
REGISTRATION. Any applicant labor
organization, association or group of unions or
workers shall acquire legal personality and shall
be entitled to the rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor organizations upon
issuance of the certificate of registration based
on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their
addresses, the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of
workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members
comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of
all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
xxxx
(e) Four copies (4) of the constitution and
by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its
adoption or ratification and the list of the
members who participated in it.[41]
xxxx
56
 ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR
CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION.
The following shall constitute grounds for
cancellation of union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false
statements or fraud in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the constitution
and by-laws or amendments thereto,
the minutes of ratification, and the list of
members who took part in the ratification;
xxxx
(c) Misrepresentation, false
statements or fraud in connection with the
election of officers, minutes of the election
of officers, the list of voters, or failure to
submit these documents together with the list of
the newly elected/appointed officers and their
postal addresses within thirty (30) days from
election.[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
A scrutiny of the records fails to show any
misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by
EREU to merit cancellation of its registration.
First. The Union submitted the required documents
attesting to the facts of the organizational meeting on
December 6, 2005, the election of its officers, and the adoption
of the Unions constitution and by-laws. It submitted before the
DOLE Regional Office with its Application for Registration and
the duly filled out BLR Reg. Form No. I-LO, s. 1998, the
following documents, to wit:
(a) the minutes of its organizational
meeting[43] held on December 6, 2005 showing
26 founding members who elected its union
officers by secret ballot;
(b) the list of rank-and-file employees[44] of Eagle
Ridge who attended the organizational
meeting and the election of officers with their
individual signatures;
(c) the list of rank-and-file employees[45] who
ratified the unions constitution and by-laws
showing the very same list as those who
attended the organizational meeting and the
election of officers with their individual
signatures except the addition of four
employees without their signatures, i.e.,
Cherry Labajo,
Grace Pollo, Annalyn Poniente and
Rowel Dolendo;
(d) the unions constitution and by-laws[46] as
approved on December 6, 2005;
(e) the list of officers[47] and their addresses;
(f) the list of union members[48] showing a total of
30 members; and
(g) the Sworn Statement[49] of the unions elected
president and secretary. All the foregoing
documents except the sworn statement of the
president and the secretary were
accompanied by Certifications by the union
[50]
secretary duly attested to by the union
president.
Second. The members of the EREU totaled 30
employees when it applied on December 19, 2005 for
registration. The Union thereby complied with the mandatory
minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c). Of
note is the undisputed number of 112 rank-and-file employees
in Eagle Ridge, as shown in the Sworn Statement of the Union
57
president and secretary and confirmed by Eagle Ridge in its
petition for cancellation.
Third. The Union has sufficiently explained the
discrepancy between the number of those who attended the
organizational meeting showing 26 employees and the list of
union members showing 30. The difference is due to the
additional four members admitted two days after the
organizational meeting as attested to by their duly
accomplished Union Membership forms. Consequently, the
total number of union members, as of December 8, 2005, was
30, which was truthfully indicated in its application for
registration on December 19, 2005.
As aptly found by the BLR Director, the Union already
had 30 members when it applied for registration, for the
admission of new members is neither prohibited by law nor was
it concealed in its application for registration. Eagle Ridges
contention is flawed when it equated the requirements under
Art. 234(b) and (c) of the Labor Code. Par. (b) clearly required
the submission of the minutes of the organizational meetings
and the list of workers who participated in the meetings, while
par. (c) merely required the list of names of all the union
members comprising at least 20% of the bargaining unit. The
fact that EREU had 30 members when it applied for
registration on December 19, 2005 while only 26 actually
participated in the organizational meeting is borne by the
records.
Fourth. In its futile attempt to clutch at straws, Eagle
Ridge assails the inclusion of the additional four members
allegedly for not complying with what it termed as the sine qua
non requirements for union member applications under
the Unions constitution and by-laws, specifically Sec. 2 of Art.
IV. We are not persuaded. Any seeming infirmity in the
application and admission of union membership, most
especially in cases of independent labor unions, must be viewed
in favor of valid membership.
The right of employees to self-organization and
membership in a union must not be trammeled by undue
difficulties. In this case, when the Union said that the four
employee-applicants had been admitted as union members, it is
enough to establish the fact of admission of the four that they
had duly signified such desire by accomplishing the
membership form. The fact, as pointed out by Eagle Ridge, that
the Union, owing to its scant membership, had not yet fully
organized its different committees evidently shows the direct
and valid acceptance of the four employee applicants rather
than deter their admissionas erroneously asserted by Eagle
Ridge.
Fifth. The difference between the number of 26
members, who ratified the Unions constitution and by-laws,
and the 25 members shown in the certification of the Union
secretary as having ratified it, is, as shown by the factual
antecedents, a typographical error. It was an insignificant
mistake committed without malice or prevarication. The list of
those who attended the organizational meeting shows 26
members, as evidenced by the signatures beside their
handwritten names. Thus, the certifications understatement by
one member, while not factual, was clearly an error, but
neither a misleading one nor a misrepresentation of what had
actually happened.
Sixth. In the more meaty issue of the affidavits of
retraction executed by six union members, we hold that the
probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the
supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as
to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational
meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director
and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to
the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same
treatment to the supporting affidavits.
The six affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not
presented in a hearing before the Hearing Officer (DOLE
Regional Director), as required under the Rules Implementing
Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relations. Said Rules
58
is embodied in Department Order No. (DO) 40-03 which was
issued on February 17, 2003 and took effect on March 15, 2003
to replace DO 9 of 1997. Sec. 11, Rule XI of DO 40-03
specifically requires:
Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial
evidence. Any affidavit submitted by a party
to prove his/her claims or defenses shall be re-
affirmed by the presentation of the
affiant before the Med-Arbiter or Hearing
Officer, as the case may be. Any affidavit
submitted without the re-affirmation of the
affiant during a scheduled hearing shall not
be admitted in evidence, except when the
party against whom the affidavit is being offered
admits all allegations therein and waives the
examination of the affiant.
It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of
hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the
affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.[51] The above rule
affirms the general requirement in adversarial proceedings for
the examination of the affiant by the party against whom the
affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is required for
affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the
hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the
opposing party, i.e., the Union.
For their non-presentation and consonant to the above-
quoted rule, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as
evidence against the Union in the instant case. Moreover, the
affidavit and joint-affidavits presented by the Union before the
DOLE Regional Director were duly re-affirmed in the hearing
of March 20, 2006 by the affiants. Thus, a reversible error was
committed by the DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC
Director in giving credence to the inadmissible affidavits of
retraction presented by Eagle Ridge while not giving credence
to the duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union.
Evidently, the allegations in the six affidavits of
retraction have no probative value and at the very least cannot
outweigh the rebutting attestations of the duly re-affirmed
affidavits presented by the Union.
Seventh. The fact that six union members, indeed,
expressed the desire to withdraw their membership through
their affidavits of retraction will not cause the cancellation of
registration on the ground of violation of Art. 234(c) of the
Labor Code requiring the mandatory minimum 20%
membership of rank-and-file employees in the employees
union.
The six retracting union members clearly severed and
withdrew their union membership. The query is whether such
separation from the Union can detrimentally affect the
registration of the Union.
We answer in the negative.
Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in
Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22
employees (112 x 205 = 22.4). When the EREU filed its
application for registration on December 19, 2005, there were
clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of
registration was granted, there is no dispute that
the Union complied with the mandatory 20% membership
requirement.
Besides, it cannot be argued that the six affidavits of
retraction retroact to the time of the application of registration
or even way back to the organizational meeting. Prior to their
withdrawal, the six employees in question were bona fide union
members. More so, they never disputed affixing their
signatures beside their handwritten names during the
organizational meetings. While they alleged that they did not
know what they were signing, it bears stressing that their
59
affidavits of retraction were not re-affirmed during the
hearings of the instant case rendering them of little, if any,
evidentiary value.
With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still
compliance with the mandatory membership requirement
under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members
constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 22
employees.
Eagle Ridge further argues that the list of union
members includes a supervisory employee. This is a factual
issue which had not been raised at the first instance before the
DOLE Regional Director and cannot be appreciated in this
proceeding. To be sure, Eagle Ridge knows well who among its
personnel belongs or does not belong to the supervisory group.
Obviously, its attempt to raise the issue referred to is no more
than an afterthought and ought to be rejected.
Eighth. Finally, it may not be amiss to note, given the
factual antecedents of the instant case, that Eagle Ridge has
apparently resorted to filing the instant case for cancellation of
the Unions certificate of registration to bar the holding of a
certification election. This can be gleaned from the fact that the
grounds it raised in its opposition to the petition for
certification election are basically the same grounds it resorted
to in the instant case for cancellation of EREUs certificate of
registration.This amounts to a clear circumvention of the law
and cannot be countenanced.
For clarity, we reiterate the following undisputed
antecedent facts:
(1) On December 6, 2005, the Union was organized, with
26 employees of Eagle Ridge attending;
(2) On December 19, 2005, the Union filed its formal
application for registration indicating a total of 30 union
members with the inclusion of four additional members on
December 8, 2005 (Reg. Cert. No. RO400-200512-UR-003 was
eventually issued by the DOLE RO IV-A);
(3) On January 10, 2006, the Union filed before the
DOLE RO IV-A its petition for certification election in Eagle
Ridge;
(4) On February 13, 2006, Eagle Ridge filed its Position
Paper opposing the petition for certification election on
essentially the same grounds it raised in the instant case; and
(5) On February 24, 2006, Eagle Ridge filed the instant
case for cancellation of the Unions certificate of registration on
essentially the same grounds it raised in its opposition to
the Unions petition for certification election.
Evidently, as the Union persuasively argues, the
withdrawal of six member-employees from the Union will affect
neither the Unions registration nor its petition for certification
election, as their affidavits of retraction were executed after
the Unions petition for certification election had been filed. The
initial five affidavits of retraction were executed on February
15, 2006; the sixth, on March 15, 2006. Indisputably, all six
were executed way after the filing of the petition for
certification election on January 10, 2006.
In Eastland Manufacturing Company, Inc. v.
Noriel,[52] the Court emphasized, and reiterated its earlier
rulings,[53] that even if there were less than 30% [the required
percentage of minimum membership then] of the employees
asking for a certification election, that of itself would not be a
bar to respondent Director ordering such an election provided,
of course, there is no grave abuse of
discretion.[54] Citing Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,[55] the Court emphasized
that a certification election is the most appropriate procedure
for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the competing
organizations should represent the employees for the purpose
of collective bargaining.[56]
60
 Indeed, where the company seeks the cancellation of a union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to
unions registration during the pendency of a petition for agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its
certification election, the same grounds invoked to cancel discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that
should not be used to bar the certification election. A the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members
certification election is the most expeditious and fairest mode had no evidentiary weight.[59] (Emphasis
of ascertaining the will of a collective bargaining unit as to its supplied.)
choice of its exclusive representative.[57] It is the fairest and
most effective way of determining which labor organization can
truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest instant petition for lack of merit.
election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their
choice, is controlling.[58] Costs against petitioner.

The Court ends this disposition by reproducing the SO ORDERED.

following apt excepts from its holding in S.S. Ventures
International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union (SSVLU) on
the effect of the withdrawal from union membership right
before or after the filing of a petition for certification election:

We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by

both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated
written statements submitted by Ventures on
March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its
petition for cancellation of registration, partake
of the nature of withdrawal of union membership
executed after the Unions filing of a petition for
certification election on March 21, 2000. We
have in precedent cases said that the
employees withdrawal from a labor union
made before the filing of the petition for
certification election is presumed
voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing
of such petition is considered to be
involuntary and does not affect the
same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union
membership done after a petition for
certification election has been filed does
not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical
to assume that such withdrawal cannot
work to nullify the registration of the
61
 G.R. No. 169717. March 16, 2011.*
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER
CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
(SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO—
Union President, petitioner, vs. CHARTER CHEMICAL
AND COATING CORPORATION, respondent.
Labor Law; Labor Unions; A union’s charter certificate need not be
executed under oath.—As readily seen, the Sama-samang Pahayag ng
Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang
Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not
among the documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or
Bureau of Labor Relations in order to register a labor organization. As to the
charter certificate, the above-quoted rule indicates that it should be executed
under oath. Petitioner union concedes and the records confirm that its
charter certificate was not executed under oath. However, in San Miguel
Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing
Products Plants-San Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-
FFW (MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW), 467 SCRA 107 (2005), which was
decided under the auspices of D.O. No. 9, Series of 1997, we ruled—In San
Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon. Laguesma, 331 Phil. 356
(1996), the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate
to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. Id. While this
ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous Implementing
Rules provisions which were supplanted by the 1997 amendments, we
believe that the same doctrine obtains in this case. Considering that the
charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the
local/chapter, it does not make sense to have the local/chapter’s
officers x x x certify or attest to a document which they had no hand
in the preparation of. (Emphasis supplied) In accordance with this ruling,
petitioner union’s charter certificate need not be executed under oath.
Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization
upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the names of its officers,
their addresses, and its principal office, and (3) its constitution and by-laws—
the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper
union officials as borne out by the records.
Same; Same; The inclusion of the supervisory employees in a rank-and-
file union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization—
the doctrine in Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Labor Union, 268 SCRA 573 (1997), no longer holds sway under
the altered state of the law and rules applicable.—Preliminarily, we note that
petitioner union questions the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter, as upheld
by the appellate court, that 12 of its members, consisting of batchman, mill
operator and leadman, are supervisory employees. However, petitioner union
failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the proceedings below after
respondent company submitted in evidence the job descriptions of the
aforesaid employees. The job descriptions indicate that the aforesaid
employees exercise recommendatory managerial actions which are not merely
routinary but require the use of independent judgment, hence, falling within
the definition of supervisory employees under Article 212(m) of the Labor
Code. For this reason, we are constrained to agree with the Med-Arbiter, as
upheld by the appellate court, that petitioner union consisted of both rank-
and-file and supervisory employees. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the
aforesaid supervisory employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its
status as a legitimate labor organization. The appellate court’s reliance
on Toyota is misplaced in view of this Court’s subsequent ruling in Republic
v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc, 559 SCRA 386 (2008),
(hereinafter Kawashima). In Kawashima, we explained at length how and
why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds sway under the altered state of the
law and rules applicable to this case.
Same; Same; Certification Elections; A labor union’s personality cannot
be collaterally attacked in a certification election proceedings.—Petitioner
union correctly argues that its legal personality cannot be collaterally
attacked in the certification election proceedings. As we explained in
Kawashima: Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer
is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding
is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to
determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the
exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan
interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by
filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation
that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are
actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to
block the certification election. The employer’s only right in the proceeding is
to be notified or informed thereof.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Josefina D. David for petitioner.
King, Capuchino, Tan and Associates for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded
to a labor organization provided that it complies with the
requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of
supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to
represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does
not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. We
apply these principles to this case.
62
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set
aside the Court of Appeal’s March 15, 2005 Decision1 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 58203, which annulled and set aside the January
13, 2000 Decision2 of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) in OS-A-6-53-99 (NCR-OD-M-9902-019)
and the September 16, 2005 Resolution3 denying petitioner
union’s motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On February 19, 1999, Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter
Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition
for certification election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation
(respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of
the DOLE, National Capital Region.
On April 14, 1999, respondent company filed an Answer with
Motion to Dismiss4 on the ground that petitioner union is not a
legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply
with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the
inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.5
Med-Arbiter’s Ruling
On April 30, 1999, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued a
Decision6 dismissing the petition for certification election. The
Med-Arbiter ruled that petitioner union is not a legitimate
labor organization because the Charter Certificate, "Sama-
samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization," and "Listahan
ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-
ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed
under oath and certified by the union secretary and attested to
by the union president as required by Section 235 of the Labor
Code7 in relation to Section 1, Rule VI of Department Order
(D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997. The union registration was, thus,
fatally defective.
The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of
petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and
leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article
245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees are
prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to
represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company.
As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization,
petitioner union has no right to file a petition for certification
election for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Department of Labor and Employment’s Ruling
On July 16, 1999, the DOLE initially issued a Decision8 in
favor of respondent company dismissing petitioner union’s
appeal on the ground that the latter’s petition for certification
election was filed out of time. Although the DOLE ruled,
contrary to the findings of the Med-Arbiter, that the charter
certificate need not be verified and that there was no
independent evidence presented to establish respondent
company’s claim that some members of petitioner union were
holding supervisory positions, the DOLE sustained the
dismissal of the petition for certification after it took judicial
notice that another union, i.e., Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa
sa Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation, previously filed
a petition for certification election on January 16, 1998. The
Decision granting the said petition became final and executory
on September 16, 1998 and was remanded for immediate
implementation. Under Section 7, Rule XI of D.O. No. 9, series
of 1997, a motion for intervention involving a certification
election in an unorganized establishment should be filed prior
to the finality of the decision calling for a certification election.
Considering that petitioner union filed its petition only on
February 14, 1999, the same was filed out of time.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the DOLE reversed its
earlier ruling. In its January 13, 2000 Decision, the DOLE
found that a review of the records indicates that no
certification election was previously conducted in respondent
63
company. On the contrary, the prior certification election filed
by Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical and
Coating Corporation was, likewise, denied by the Med-Arbiter
and, on appeal, was dismissed by the DOLE for being filed out
of time. Hence, there was no obstacle to the grant of petitioner
union’s petition for certification election, viz:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED and the decision of this Office dated 16
July 1999 is MODIFIED to allow the certification election
among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation with the following choices:
1. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical-
Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reform (SMCC-SUPER); and
2. No Union.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Office
of origin for the immediate conduct of a certification election,
subject to the usual pre-election conference.
SO DECIDED.9
Court of Appeal’s Ruling
On March 15, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision,
viz:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution dated January 13, 2000 and
February 17, 2000 are hereby [ANNULLED] and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.10
In nullifying the decision of the DOLE, the appellate court gave
credence to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that petitioner
union failed to comply with the documentation requirements
under the Labor Code. It, likewise, upheld the Med-Arbiter’s
finding that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file
and supervisory employees. Moreover, the CA held that the
issues as to the legitimacy of petitioner union may be attacked
collaterally in a petition for certification election and the
infirmity in the membership of petitioner union cannot be
remedied through the exclusion-inclusion proceedings in a pre-
election conference pursuant to the ruling in Toyota Motor
Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor
Union.11 Thus, considering that petitioner union is not a
legitimate labor organization, it has no legal right to file a
petition for certification election.
Issues
I
Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the respondent [company’s] petition for certiorari (CA
G.R. No. SP No. 58203) in spite of the fact that the issues
subject of the respondent company[’s] petition was already
settled with finality and barred from being re-litigated.
II
Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding
that the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employee[s] of petitioner [union’s] membership is [a] ground for
the cancellation of petitioner [union’s] legal personality and
dismissal of [the] petition for certification election.
III
Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding
that the alleged failure to certify under oath the local charter
certificate issued by its mother federation and list of the union
64
membership attending the organizational meeting [is a ground]
for the cancellation of petitioner [union’s] legal personality as a
labor organization and for the dismissal of the petition for
certification election.12
Petitioner Union’s Arguments
Petitioner union claims that the litigation of the issue as to its
legal personality to file the subject petition for certification
election is barred by the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE.
In this decision, the DOLE ruled that petitioner union complied
with all the documentation requirements and that there was no
independent evidence presented to prove an illegal mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in petitioner union.
After the promulgation of this Decision, respondent company
did not move for reconsideration, thus, this issue must be
deemed settled.
Petitioner union further argues that the lack of verification of
its charter certificate and the alleged illegal composition of its
membership are not grounds for the dismissal of a petition for
certification election under Section 11, Rule XI of D.O. No. 9,
series of 1997, as amended, nor are they grounds for the
cancellation of a union’s registration under Section 3, Rule VIII
of said issuance. It contends that what is required to be
certified under oath by the local union’s secretary or treasurer
and attested to by the local union’s president are limited to the
union’s constitution and by-laws, statement of the set of
officers, and the books of accounts.
Finally, the legal personality of petitioner union cannot be
collaterally attacked but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation pursuant to Section 5,
Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code and
the doctrine enunciated in Tagaytay Highlands International
Golf Club Incoprorated v. Tagaytay Highlands Empoyees
Union-PTGWO.13
Respondent Company’s Arguments
Respondent company asserts that it cannot be precluded from
challenging the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE. The said
decision did not attain finality because the DOLE subsequently
reversed its earlier ruling and, from this decision, respondent
company timely filed its motion for reconsideration.
On the issue of lack of verification of the charter certificate,
respondent company notes that Article 235 of the Labor Code
and Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as
amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, expressly requires that
the charter certificate be certified under oath.
It also contends that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor
organization because its composition is a mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in violation of Article
245 of the Labor Code. Respondent company maintains that
the ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines vs. Toyota Motor
Philippines Labor Union14 continues to be good case law. Thus,
the illegal composition of petitioner union nullifies its legal
personality to file the subject petition for certification election
and its legal personality may be collaterally attacked in the
proceedings for a petition for certification election as was done
here.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The issue as to the legal personality of petitioner union is not
barred by the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE.
A review of the records indicates that the issue as to petitioner
union’s legal personality has been timely and consistently
raised by respondent company before the Med-Arbiter, DOLE,
CA and now this Court. In its July 16, 1999 Decision, the
DOLE found that petitioner union complied with the
documentation requirements of the Labor Code and that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that there was an illegal
mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its
65
membership. Nonetheless, the petition for certification election
was dismissed on the ground that another union had
previously filed a petition for certification election seeking to
represent the same bargaining unit in respondent company.
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner union on
January 13, 2000, the DOLE reversed its previous ruling. It
upheld the right of petitioner union to file the subject petition
for certification election because its previous decision was
based on a mistaken appreciation of facts.15 From this adverse
decision, respondent company timely moved for reconsideration
by reiterating its previous arguments before the Med-Arbiter
that petitioner union has no legal personality to file the subject
petition for certification election.
The July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE, therefore, never
attained finality because the parties timely moved for
reconsideration. The issue then as to the legal personality of
petitioner union to file the certification election was properly
raised before the DOLE, the appellate court and now this
Court.
The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the
local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by its
president.
Preliminarily, we must note that Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 948116 which took effect on June 14, 2007.17 This
law introduced substantial amendments to the Labor Code.
However, since the operative facts in this case occurred in
1999, we shall decide the issues under the pertinent legal
provisions then in force (i.e., R.A. No. 6715,18 amending Book V
of the Labor Code, and the rules and
regulations19 implementing R.A. No. 6715, as amended by D.O.
No. 9,20
series of 1997) pursuant to our ruling in Republic v.
Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.21
In the main, the CA ruled that petitioner union failed to
comply with the requisite documents for registration under
Article 235 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules. It
agreed with the Med-Arbiter that the Charter Certificate,
Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization, and
Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga
Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas were not
executed under oath. Thus, petitioner union cannot be accorded
the status of a legitimate labor organization.
We disagree.
The then prevailing Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997,
provides:
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local chapter — A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the
Bureau two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or
national union indicating the creation or establishment
of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter’s officers, their
addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter;
and
(c) The local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws provided
that where the local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws
[are] the same as [those] of the federation or national
union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President.
66
As readily seen, the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at
Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa
Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika
sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to
be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor
Relations in order to register a labor organization. As to the
charter certificate, the above-quoted rule indicates that it
should be executed under oath. Petitioner union concedes and
the records confirm that its charter certificate was not executed
under oath. However, in San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue
Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products
Plants-San Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File
Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW),22 which was
decided under the auspices of D.O. No. 9, Series of 1997, we
ruled –
In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon.
Laguesma, 331 Phil. 356 (1996), the Court ruled that it
was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified
and attested by the local/chapter officers. Id. While this
ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous
Implementing Rules provisions which were supplanted
by the 1997 amendments, we believe that the same
doctrine obtains in this case. Considering that the charter
certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not
the local/chapter, it does not make sense to have the
local/chapter’s officers x x x certify or attest to a
document which they had no hand in the preparation
of.23 (Emphasis supplied)
In accordance with this ruling, petitioner union’s charter
certificate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it
validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization
upon submission of (1) its charter certificate,24 (2) the names of
its officers, their addresses, and its principal office,25 and (3) its
constitution and by-laws26— the last two requirements having
been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne
out by the records.
The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in
petitioner union does not nullify its legal personality as a
legitimate labor organization.
The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees. However,
petitioner union sought to represent the bargaining unit
consisting of rank-and-file employees. Under Article 24527 of
the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for
membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner union cannot be
considered a legitimate labor organization pursuant to Toyota
Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
Labor Union28 (hereinafter Toyota).
Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the
factual findings of the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate
court, that 12 of its members, consisting of batchman, mill
operator and leadman, are supervisory employees. However,
petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the
proceedings below after respondent company submitted in
evidence the job descriptions29 of the aforesaid employees. The
job descriptions indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise
recommendatory managerial actions which are not merely
routinary but require the use of independent judgment, hence,
falling within the definition of supervisory employees under
Article 212(m)30 of the Labor Code. For this reason, we are
constrained to agree with the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the
appellate court, that petitioner union consisted of both rank-
and-file and supervisory employees.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory
employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as
a legitimate labor organization. The appellate court’s reliance
on Toyota is misplaced in view of this Court’s subsequent
ruling in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines,
Inc.31 (hereinafter Kawashima). In Kawashima, we explained
at length how and why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds
67
sway under the altered state of the law and rules applicable to
this case, viz:
R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any
violation of the prohibition [on the co-mingling of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees] would bring
about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715
(1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency
by introducing the following amendment to Rule II
(Registration of Unions):
"Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory employees
and security guards shall not be eligible for membership
in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees
but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations
of their own; Provided, that those supervisory employees who
are included in an existing rank-and-file bargaining unit, upon
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that
unit x x x. (Emphasis supplied) and Rule V (Representation
Cases and Internal-Union Conflicts) of the Omnibus Rules, viz:
"Sec. 1. Where to file. - A petition for certification election may
be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the
principal office of the employer. The petition shall be in writing
and under oath.
Sec. 2. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization or the
employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the
petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization,
shall contain, among others:
xxxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the
employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require;
and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining
unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not include
supervisory employees and/or security guards. (Emphasis
supplied)
By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an
otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor organization
from exercising its right to file a petition for certification
election.
Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to
the fore in Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, held:
"Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization
composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no
labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be
a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an
organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file
and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the
rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the
right to file a petition for certification election for the
purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a
certification election, to inquire into the composition of
any labor organization whenever the status of the labor
organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of
the Labor Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list
contains the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory
employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to
purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the
status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it
cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for
certification election." (Emphasis supplied)
68
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition
for certification election was one for supervisory employees, but
in which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the
Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right
to file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit
composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file
employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification
election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November
26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989
Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules
was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of
1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the
requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus
Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that
the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been
mingled with supervisory employees – was removed. Instead,
what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain
description of the bargaining unit, thus:
Rule XI
Certification Elections
xxxx
Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in
writing and under oath and shall contain, among others, the
following: x x x (c) The description of the bargaining unit.
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion
to uphold the validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules,
although the specific provision involved therein was only Sec.
1, Rule VI, to wit:
"Section. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the
Bureau two (2) copies of the following: a) a charter certificate
issued by the federation or national union indicating the
creation or establishment of the local/chapter; (b) the names of
the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal
office of the local/chapter; and (c) the local/ chapter's
constitution and by-laws; provided that where the
local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of
the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated
accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President."
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a
local or chapter submit a list of its members.
Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v.
Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO in which the
core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a
labor organization and its right to file a petition for
certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu,
the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlopand
reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a
prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-
file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does
not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that
after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise
all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization.
Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for
that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its
registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239
of the Labor Code.
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v.
Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging
69
Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-
FFW, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a
list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny
recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question
pertaining to its individual members.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of
Labor Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of
union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-
and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed
membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling
in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated
in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997
Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court
in Tagaytay Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had
already set the tone for it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold
sway in the present altered state of the law and the
rules.32 [Underline supplied]
The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same
as those in Kawashima because the present petition for
certification election was filed in 1999 when D.O. No. 9, series
of 1997, was still in effect. Hence, Kawashimaapplies with
equal force here. As a result, petitioner union was not divested
of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of
its members were supervisory employees; it had the right to file
the subject petition for certification election.
The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally
attacked by respondent company in the certification election
proceedings.
Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal personality
cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election
proceedings. As we explained in Kawashima:
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an
employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely
investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the
employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot
interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion
to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that
some employees participating in a petition for certification
election are actually managerial employees will lend an
employer legal personality to block the certification election.
The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or
informed thereof.
The amendments to the Labor Code and its implementing rules
have buttressed that policy even more.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 15,
2005 Decision and September 16, 2005 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58203 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The January 13, 2000 Decision of the Department of
Labor and Employment in OS-A-6-53-99 (NCR-OD-M-9902-
019) is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
70
 G.R. No. 163532. March 12, 2010.*
YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner, vs.YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Appeals; A petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law—questions of
fact are not reviewable.—A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court should include only questions of law—questions of fact are
not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the
law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if
the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the
evidence, the question is one of fact.
Same; Same; Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not disturb
the Court of Appeals’ factual findings; The Supreme Court will only exercise
its power of review in known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of
evidence or a total void of evidence.—Factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are binding on the Court. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not
disturb the Court of Appeals’ factual findings. In Encarnacion v. Court of
Appeals, 223 SCRA 279 (1993), the Court held that, “unless there is a clearly
grave or whimsical abuse on its part, findings of fact of the appellate court
will not be disturbed. The Supreme Court will only exercise its power of
review in known exceptions such as gross misappreciation of evidence or a
total void of evidence.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Platon, Martinez, Flores, San Pedro & Leaño for
petitioner.
Pro Labor Legal Assistance Center for respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 16 January 2004
Decision[2] and 12 May 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65460. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the 12 March[4] and 3 May[5] 2001 Resolutions of the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) in BLR-A-C-7-2-05-01,
reversing the 18 December 2000 Decision[6] of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. 3, San
Fernando, Pampanga (Regional Office), in Case No. RO300-
0001-CP-002.
Yokohama Employees Union (YEU) is the labor organization of
the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc.
(YTPI). YEU was registered as a legitimate labor labor union
on 10 September 1999.
YEU filed before the Regional Office a petition for certification
election. YTPI filed before the Regional Office a
petition[7] dated 24 January 2000 for the revocation of YEUs
registration. YTPI alleged that YEU violated Article 239(a)[8] of
the Labor Code: (1) YEU fraudulently included the signature of
a certain Ronald O. Pineda (Pineda) in the organizational
documents; (2) Pineda was not aware of any election of union
officers; (3) YEU fraudulently obtained the employees
signatures by making them believe that they were signing a
petition for a 125% increase in the minimum wage, not a
petition for registration; (4) the employees did not belong to a
single bargaining unit; and (5) YEU fraudulently stated in its
organizational meeting minutes that its second vice president
was Bernard David, not Bernardo David.
In its 18 December 2000 Decision, the Regional Office granted
the 24 January 2000 petition. The Regional Office held that
YEU committed misrepresentation: (1) YEU failed to remove
Pinedas signature from the organizational documents despite
instructions to do so; and (2) YEU declared that it conducted an
election of union officers when, in truth, it did not.
YEU appealed the 18 December 2000 Decision to the BLR. In
its 12 March 2001 Resolution, the BLR reversed the 18
December 2000 Decision. The BLR found that (1) Pineda did
not approach any officer of YEU to have his signature removed
from the organizational documents; (2) Pinedas affidavit that
no election of officers took place was unreliable and
inconsistent with his earlier written statement; (3) the affidavit
of a certain Rachelle Gonzales (Gonzales) that no election of
officers took place was unreliable and inconsistent with her
earlier resignation letter; (4) the affidavit of a certain Arthur
Calma (Calma) did not state that no election of officers took
71
place; (5) at least 82 other members of YEU did not question
the legality of YEUs organization; and (6) 50 YEU members
executed a Sama-Samang Pahayag[9] stating that:
3. Noong ika-25 ng Hulyo 1999, kami ay
dumalo sa isang pulong para sa pag-
oorganisa ng aming Unyon at pagraratipika
ng Saligang Batas at Alituntunin nito. x x x
xxxx
5. Walang katotohanan ang alegasyon
ng Yokohama na walang naganap na
pagpupulong kaugnay ng pag-oorganisa o
pagtatayo namin ng Unyon. Nakakatuwa
ring isipin ang alegasyon ng kompanya na
hindi namin lubos na naiintindihan ang
aming kapasyahang magtayo at sumapi sa
aming Unyon.
6. Malinaw na ginagawa ng kompanya ang
lahat ng paraan upang hadlangan ang aming
karapatan sa pag-oorganisa at kilalanin
bilang kinatawan ng lahat ng mga regular na
manggagawa para sa sama-samang
pakikipagtawaran.
7. Sa kabila ng lahat ng ito, kami ay lubos pa
ring naninindigan sa aming Unyon at
patuloy na ipaglalaban ang aming karapatan
sa pag-oorganisa at sa sama-samang
pakikipagtawaran;[10]
The BLR also held that (1) YTPI was estopped from
questioning the fact that the Sama-Samang Pahayag was an
unsworn document since it filed the 24 January 2000 petition
for the revocation of YEUs registration based on unsworn
documents; (2) the fact that there was no express mention of an
election of union officers in the Sama-Samang Pahayag did not
necessarily mean that no election occurred; (3) there was an
organizational meeting and an organizational meeting may
include an election of union officers; (4) any infirmity in the
election of union officers may be remedied under the last
paragraph[11] of Article 241 of the Labor Code and under Rule
XIV of DOLE Department Order No. 9; and (5) cancellation of
union registration must be done with great caution.
YTPI filed before the BLR a motion[12] for reconsideration. In
its 3 May 2001 Resolution, the BLR denied the motion for lack
of merit.
YTPI filed before the Court of Appeals a petition[13] for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In its 16
January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition and held that the BLR did not commit grave abuse of
discretion: (1) Pinedas affidavit that no election of officers took
place was unreliable and inconsistent with his earlier written
statement; (2) Gonzales affidavit that no election of officers
took place was unreliable and inconsistent with her earlier
resignation letter; (3) Calmas affidavit was unreliable because
he admitted that he stayed at the organizational meeting for
only 20 minutes; (4) the affidavit of a certain Bernardino David
(David) that no election of officers took place was unreliable
and inconsistent with his earlier sinumpaang salaysay; (5)
Davids affidavit was only filed before the BLR when YTPI filed
its motion for reconsideration of the BLRs 12 March 2001
Resolution; (6) Pineda did not approach any officer of YEU to
have his signature removed from the organizational
documents; (7) the Sama-Samang Pahayag was entitled to
credit even if it was an unsworn document; (8) the allegation
that the signatures of a certain Denry Villanueva (Villanueva)
and a certain Apolinar Bognot (Bognot) in the Sama-Samang
Pahayag were forged was only raised for the first time before
the BLR when YTPI filed its motion for reconsideration of the
BLRs 12 March 2001 Resolution; (9) Villanueva and Bognot
were not signatories to YEUs organizational documents; (10)
cancellation of union registration must be done with great
caution; (11) YTPI, in filing the petition for revocation of YEUs
72
registration, had the burden of proving that YEU committed
fraud and misrepresentation; and (12) YTPI failed to prove that
YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation.
YTPI filed before the Court of Appeals a motion[14] for
reconsideration. In its 12 May 2004 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition. YTPI raises as issues that (1) the
Court of Appeals erred in finding that YEU did not commit
fraud or misrepresentation, and (2) the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that YTPI had the burden of proving that YEU
committed fraud and misrepresentation.
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Court of Appeals found that YEU did not commit fraud or
misrepresentation:
Anent whether an election of officers was
conducted or not, the petitioner relied largely on
the affidavit of Pineda to substantiate its claim
that no election of officers was held by the
union. However, respondent BLR Director
accorded greater credence to Pinedas
handwritten statement, wherein he made
references to at least 2 meetings he had attended
during which he had signed the organizational
documents, than to Pinedas later affidavit,
whereby he denied any knowledge of the holding
of an election. A perusal of the affirmative
handwritten statement easily explains why the
public respondent preferred it to the
negating affidavit, to wit:
Noong unang araw na pumirma
ako galing ako sa
graveyard. Pagkatapos yung
pangalawang meeting graveyard
din ako, pinapirma ako doon sa
siyam (9) na pirasong papel noong
umagang pag-uwi namin. x x x
July 25, 99 - Unang Pirmahan
July 26, 99 - Pinirmahan ko ang
siyam na piraso
July 27, 99 - Pinatatanggal ko ang
aking pangalan sa listahan
The petitioner also relied on the affidavit of Ma.
Rachelle Gonzales attesting that there was no
election of officers, but respondent BLR Director
dismissed the affidavit as nothing but the
petitioners belated attempt to establish its claim
about the election being held considering that
Gonzales did not even intimate such matter in
her handwritten resignation letter to YEU.
Another affidavit, that of Arthur Calma, stated
that no election was held, but, again, respondent
BLR Director gave Calmas affidavit scant
consideration because the affiant admittedly
remained in the YEU office for only 20
minutes. In contrast, the public respondent
accorded more weight to the sama-samang
pahayag executed by 50 YEU members who
averred about the holding of an organizational
meeting. The public respondent justifiably
favored the latter, deeming the meeting to
include the holding of an election of officers, for,
after all, Art. 234, (b), Labor Code, does not itself
distinguish between the two.
Respondent BLR Director is further assailed for
not taking into consideration
the affidavit asserting that no election of officers
was ever conducted, which Bernardino David,
YEUs second vice president, executed. The
omission is not serious enough, however, because
the affidavit was submitted only when the
73
petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
questioned decision, and because
the affidavit was even inconsistent with Davids
earlier sinumpaang salaysay, whereby he
attested to his attendance at the organizational
meeting and to his election thereat as vice
president.
As to the inclusion of Pinedas signature in the
organizational documents, the BLR Director
correctly ruled that evidence to prove the
participation of YEU in the failure to delete
Pinedas signature from the organizational
documents was wanting. It is not deniable that
Pineda never approached any officer of YEU; and
that Pineda approached a certain Tontonwhom
he knew to be a union organizer but who was not
an officer of the union nor an employee of the
company.
If the petitioner was [sic] sincere and intent on
this imputed error, its effort to show so does not
[sic] appear in the record. What appears is its
abject failure to establish Tontons actual
identity. The petitioner seemed content in
making the insinuation in the petition
for certiorari that Tonton was widely recognized
as the organizer behind the creation of
YEU. That was not enough.
In sum, the BLR Director was neither capricious
nor whimsical in his exercise of judgment, and,
therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. For certiorari to lie, more than mere
abuse of discretion is required to be established
by the petitioner. Herein, no degree of abuse of
discretion was attendant.[15]
YTPI claims that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
YEU did not commit fraud or misrepresentation. YTPI stated
that:
There was evidence that respondent committed
fraud and misrepresentation in its failure to omit
the name of Ronald Pineda prior to the filing of
the respondents organizational documents with
the Department of Labor and Employment. On
the other hand, the Regional Director held
that there was no election of officers that
had taken place during respondents alleged
organizational meeting as there was no
proof of such election.[16] (Emphasis in the
original)
The Court is not convinced. A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only
questions of law questions of fact are not reviewable. A
question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law
is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact exists when
the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of
being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
the evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence,
the question is one of fact.[17]
Whether YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation in
failing to remove Pinedas signature from the list of employees
who supported YEUs application for registration and whether
YEU conducted an election of its officers are questions of
fact. They are not reviewable.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the
Court. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not
disturb the Court of Appeals factual findings.[18]In Encarnacion
v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court held that, unless there is a
clearly grave or whimsical abuse on its part, findings of fact of
the appellate court will not be disturbed. The Supreme Court
74
will only exercise its power of review in known exceptions such
as gross misappreciation of evidence or a total void of
evidence. YTPI failed to show that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion.
The Court of Appeals held that YTPI had the burden of proving
that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation:
The cancellation of union registration at the
employers instance, while permitted, must be
approached with caution and strict scrutiny in
order that the right to belong to a legitimate
labor organization and to enjoy the privileges
appurtenant to such membership will not be
denied to the employees. As the applicant for
cancellation, the petitioner naturally had the
burden to present proof sufficient to warrant the
cancellation. The petitioner was thus expected to
satisfactorily establish that YEU committed
misrepresentations, false statements or fraud in
connection with the election of its officers, or
with the minutes of the election of officers, or in
the list of votes, as expressly required in Art.
239, (c), Labor Code. But, as the respondent BLR
Director has found and determined, and We fully
agree with him, the petitioner simply failed to
discharge its burden.[20]
YTPI claims that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
YTPI had the burden of proving that YEU committed fraud and
misrepresentation. YTPI stated that:
5.5 In the Decision dated 16
January 2004, the Honorable Court of Appeals
upheld the BLR Directors ruling that the
petitioner had the burden of proving that subject
election of officers never took place.
5.6 However, the petitioner does
not have the burden of proof vis--vis whether or
not the said elections took place. The
respondent has the burden of proof in
showing that an election of officers took
place.[21] (Emphasis in the original)
The Court is not convinced. YTPI, being the one which filed the
petition for the revocation of YEUs registration, had the
burden of proving that YEU committed fraud and
misrepresentation. YTPI had the burden of proving the
truthfulness of its accusations that YEU fraudulently failed to
remove Pinedas signature from the organizational documents
and that YEU fraudulently misrepresented that it conducted
an election of officers.
In Heritage Hotel Manila v. Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng
mga Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila,[22] the employer filed a
petition to revoke the registration of its rank-and-file
employees union, accusing it of committing fraud and
misrepresentation. The Court held that the petition was
rightfully denied because the employer failed to prove that the
labor union committed fraud and misrepresentation. The Court
held that:
Did respondent PIGLAS union commit fraud
and misrepresentation in its application
for union registration? We agree with the DOLE-
NCR and the BLR that it did not. Except for the
evident discrepancies as to the number of union
members involved as these appeared on the
documents that supported the unions application
for registration, petitioner company has no
other evidence of the
alleged misrepresentation. But those
discrepancies alone cannot be taken as an
indication that respondent misrepresented the
information contained in these documents.
The charge that a labor organization
committed fraud and misrepresentation in
75
 securing its registration is a serious charge
and deserves close scrutiny. It is serious
because once such charge is proved,
the labor union acquires none of the rights
accorded to registered
organizations. Consequently, charges of this
nature should be clearly established by
evidence and the surrounding
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
[23]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 16

January 2004 Decision and 12 May 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65460.

SO ORDERED.

76
 G.R. No. 196276. June 4, 2014.*
TAKATA (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS and
SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA NG TAKATA
(SALAMAT), respondents.
Labor Law; Bureau of Labor Relations; Certiorari; The decision of the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on cases brought before it on appeal from the
Regional Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 and the Rules of Court.—The case of Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc.
v. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union, 323 SCRA 392 (2000), cited by
petitioner is not at all applicable in this case as the issue therein is the
authority of the Labor Secretary to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decision of
the Regional Director in cases involving cancellations of certificate of
registration of labor unions. We found no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the Secretary of Labor in not acting on therein petitioner’s appeal. The
decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations on cases brought before it on appeal
from the Regional Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of the
aggrieved
party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorariunder
Rule 65 and the Rules of Court. In this case, after the Labor Secretary motu
propio referred respondent’s appeal filed with it to the BLR which rendered
its decision reversing the Regional Director, petitioner went directly to the
CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; Labor Unions; After the issuance of the certificate of registration,
the labor organization’s registration could be assailed directly through
cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and
239 of the Labor Code.—After the issuance of the certificate of registration,
the labor organization’s registration could be assailed directly through
cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and
239 of the Labor Code. And the cancellation of union certificate of
registration and the grounds thereof are as follows: ART. 238. Cancellation of
Registration.—The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor
organization, whether national or local, may be cancelled by the Bureau,
after due hearing, only on the grounds specified in Article 239 hereof.
ART.239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.—The following
may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in
the ratification; (b)Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection
with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of
voters; (c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
Same; Same; The 20% minimum requirement pertains to the employees’
membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in the
organizational meeting.—It does not appear in Article 234(b) of the Labor
Code that the attendees in the organizational meeting must comprise 20% of
the employees in the bargaining unit. In fact, even the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code does not so provide. It is only under
Article 234(c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at least
twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it
seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the
employees’ membership in the union and not to the list of workers who
participated in the organizational meeting. Indeed, Article 234(b) and (c)
provide for separate requirements, which must be submitted for the union’s
registration, and which respondent did submit.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alonso & Associates for petitioner.
Banzuela, Velandrez & Associates for private
respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner TAKATA Philippines Corporation assailing the
Decision1 dated December 22, 2010 and the Resolution2 dated
March 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
112406.
On July 7, 2009, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office a Petition3for
Cancellation of the Certificate of Union Registration of
Respondent Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng Takata
(SALAMA1) on the ground that the latter is guilty of
misrepresentation, false statement and fraud with respect to
the number of those who participated in the organizational
meeting, the adoption and ratification of its Constitution and
By-Laws, and in the election of its officers. It contended that in
the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting of respondent, only 68
attendees signed the attendance sheet, and which number
comprised only 17% of the total number of the 396 regular
rank- and-file employees which respondent sought to represent,
77
and hence, respondent failed to comply with the 20% minimum
membership requirement. Petitioner insisted that the
document "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon" bore no
signatures of the alleged 119 union members; and that
employees were not given sufficient information on the
documents they signed; that the document "Sama-Samang
Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not submitted at the time of the
filing of respondent's application for union registration; that
the 119 union members were actually only 117; and, that the
total number of petitioner's employees as of May 1, 2009 was
470, and not 396 as respondent claimed.4
Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union
members were more than the 20% requirement for union
registration. The document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng
Pagsapi sa Unyon" which it presented in its petition for
certification election5 supported their claim of 119 members.
Respondent also contended that petitioner was estopped from
assailing its legal personality as it agreed to a certification
election and actively participated in the pre-election conference
of the certification election proceedings.6 Respondent argued
that the union members were informed of the contents of the
documents they signed and that the 68 attendees to the
organizational meeting constituted more than 50% of the total
union membership, hence, a quo rumexisted for the conduct of
the said meeting.7
On August 27, 2009, DOLE Regional Director, Atty. Ricardo S.
Martinez, Sr., issued a Decision8 granting the petition for
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing considerations, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the respondent Union
Certificate of Registration No. RO400A-2009-05-01-UR-LAG,
dated May 19, 2009 is hereby REVOCKED (sic) and /or
CANCELLED pursuant to paragraph (a) & (b), Section 3, Rule
XIV of Department Order No. 40-03 and the Samahang Lakas
ng Manggagawa ng TAKATA (SALAMAT) is hereby delisted
from the roll of legitimate labor organization of this office.9
In revoking respondent's certificate of registration, the
Regional Director found that the 68 employees who attended
the organizational meeting was obviously less than 20% of the
total number of 396 regular rank-and-file employees which
respondent sought to represent, hence, short of the union
registration requirement; that the attendance sheet which
contained the signatures and names of the union members
totalling to 68 contradicted the list of names stated in the
document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasaping
Unyon." The document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi"
was not attached to the application for registration as it was
only submitted in the petition for certification election filed by
respondent at a later date. The Regional Director also found
that the proceedings in the cancellation of registration and
certification elections are two different and entirely separate
and independent proceedings which were not dependent on
each other.
Dissatisfied, respondent, through Bukluran ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (BMP) Paralegal Officer, Domingo P. Mole, filed a
Notice and Memorandum of Appeal10 with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR). However, on September 28,2009, respondent,
through its counsels, Attys.
Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. and Jehn Louie W. Velandrez, filed
an Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance11 to
the Office of the DOLE Secretary, which the latter eventually
referred to the BLR. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Appeals12 praying for their dismissal on the ground of forum
shopping as respondent filed two separate appeals in two
separate venues; and for failing to avail of the correct remedy
within the period; and that the certificate of registration was
tainted with fraud, misrepresentation and falsification.
In its Answer,13 respondent claimed that there was no forum
shopping as BMP's Paralegal Officer was no longer authorized
78
to file an appeal on behalf of respondent as the latter's link
with BMP was already terminated and only the Union
President was authorized to file the appeal; and that it
complied with Department Order No. 40-03.
On December 9, 2009, after considering respondent's Appeal
Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance and
petitioner's Answer, the BLR rendered its Decision14 reversing
the Order of the Regional Director, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
of Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr., dated 27 August
2009, is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng TAKATA
(SALAMAT) shall remain in the roster of labor organizations.15
In reversing, the BLR found that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent deliberately and maliciously misrepresented the
number of rank-and-file employees. It pointed out petitioner's
basis for the alleged noncompliance with the minimum
membership requirement for registration was the attendance of
68 members to the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting
supposedly comprising only 17% of the total 396 regular rank-
and-file employees. However, the BLR found that the list of
employees who participated in the organizational meeting was
a separate and distinct requirement from the list of the names
of members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the
bargaining unit; and that there was no requirement for
signatures opposite the names of the union members; and there
was no evidence showing that the employees assailed their
inclusion in the list of union members.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
by the BLR in a Resolution16 dated January 8, 2010.
Undaunted, petitioner went to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
After the submission of the parties' respective pleadings, the
case was submitted for decision.
On December 22, 2010, the CA rendered its assailed decision
which denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the BLR.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated March 29, 2011.
Hence this petition for review filed by petitioner raising the
following issues, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT BLR AND NOT
FINDING ANY VIOLATION BY SAMAHANG LAKAS
MANGGAGAWA SA TAKATA (SALAMAT) OF THE RULE
ON FORUM SHOPPING IN THE FILING OF TWO
VERIFIED APPEALS FOR AND ITS BEHALF. BOTH OF
THE APPEALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT BLR, ON GROUND
OF FORUM SHOPPING.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA
SA TAKATA (SALAMAT) WAS COMPLIANT WITH THE
LAW. CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING
IN THE REGISTRATION OF SALAMAT, IT IS CLEAR THAT
THE SAME IS TAINTED WITH FRAUD,
MISREPRESENTATION AND FALSIFICATION. SALAMAT
DID NOT POSSESS THE REQUIREDNUMBER OF
MEMBERS AT THE TIME OF FILING OF ITS
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION, HENCE, IT SHOULD
BE HELD GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION, AND FALSE
STATEMENTS AND FRAUD IN CONNECTION
THEREWITH. 17
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that respondent had
filed two separate appeals with two different representations at
79
two different venues, in violation of the rule on multiplicity of
suits and forum shopping, and instead of dismissing both
appeals, the appeal erroneously filed before the Labor
Secretary was the one held validly filed, entertained and even
granted; that it is not within the discretion of BLR to choose
which between the two appeals should be entertained, as it is
the fact of the filing of the two appeals that is being prohibited
and not who among the representatives therein possessed the
authority.
We are not persuaded.
We find no error committed by the CA in finding that
respondent committed no forum shopping. As the CA correctly
concluded, to wit:
It is undisputed that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole
was no longer authorized to file an appeal on behalf of union
SALAMAT and that BMP was duly informed that its services
was already terminated. SALAMAT even submitted before the
BLR its "Resolusyon Blg. 01-2009" terminating the services of
BMP and revoking the representation of Mr. Domingo Mole in
any of the pending cases being handled by him on behalf of the
union. So, considering that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P.
Mole was no longer authorized to file an appeal when it filed
the Notice and Memorandum of Appeal to DOLE Regional
Office No. IV-A, the same can no longer be treated as an appeal
filed by union SALAMAT. Hence, there is no forum shopping to
speak of in this case as only the Appeal Memorandum with
Formal Entry of Appearance filed by Atty. Napoleon C.
Banzuela, Jr. and Atty. Jehn Louie W. Velandrez is sanctioned
by SALAMAT.18
Since Mole's appeal filed with the BLR was not specifically
authorized by respondent, such appeal is considered to have
not been filed at all. It has been held that "if a complaint is
filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to
do so, the complaint is not deemed filed.
An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect."19
Respondent through its authorized representative filed its
Appeal Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance before
the Labor Secretary, and not with the BLR. As the appeal
emanated from the petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration filed with the Regional Office, the decision
canceling the registration is appealable to the BLR, and not
with the Labor Secretary. However, since the Labor Secretary
motu propio referred the appeal with the BLR, the latter can
now act on it. Considering that Mole's appeal with the BLR
was not deemed filed, respondent’s appeal, through Banzuela
and Associates, which the Labor Secretary referred to the BLR
was the only existing appeal with the BLR for resolution. There
is, therefore, no merit to petitioner's claim that BLR chose the
appeal of Banzuela and Associates over Mole's appeal.
The case of Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories Employees Union20 cited by petitioner is not at all
applicable in this case as the issue therein is the authority of
the Labor Secretary to review the decision of the Bureau of
Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over decision of the Regional Director in cases
involving cancellations of certificate of registration of labor
unions. We found no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the Secretary of Labor in not acting on therein petitioner's
appeal. The decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations on cases
brought before it on appeal from the Regional Director are final
and executory. Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 and the Rules of Court. In this case, after the Labor
Secretary motu propio referred respondent's appeal filed with it
to the BLR which rendered its decision reversing the Regional
Director, petitioner went directly to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
As to the second issue, petitioner seeks the cancellation of
respondent's registration on grounds offraud and
misrepresentation bearing on the minimum requirement of the
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law as to its membership, considering the big disparity in
numbers, between the organizational meeting and the list of
members, and so misleading the BLR that it obtained the
minimum required number of employees for purposes of
organization and registration.
We find no merit in the arguments.
Art. 234 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. - A federation,
national union or industry or trade union center or an
independent union shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate
of registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (₱50.00)registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the
principal address of the labor organization, the minutes
of the organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the
names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining
unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one
or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification,
and the list of the members who participated in it."
And after the issuance of the certificate of registration, the
labor organization's registration could be assailed directly
through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance
with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code. And the
cancellation of union certificate of registration and the grounds
thereof are as follows:
ART. 238. Cancellation of Registration. - The certificate of
registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether
national or local, may be cancelled by the Bureau, after due
hearing, only on the grounds specified in Article 239 hereof.
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration. -
The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union
registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the
minutes of ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in
connection with the election of officers, minutes of the
election of officers, and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
Petitioner's charge that respondent committed
misrepresentation and fraud in securing its certificate of
registration is a serious charge and must be carefully
evaluated. Allegations thereof should be compounded with
supporting circumstances and evidence.21 We find no evidence
on record to support petitioner's accusation.
Petitioner's allegation of misrepresentation and fraud is based
on its claim that during the organizational meeting on May 1,
2009, only 68 employees attended, while respondent claimed
that it has 119 members as shown in the document
denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon;" hence,
respondent misrepresented on the 20% requirement of the law
as to its membership.
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We do not agree.
It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the
attendees in the organizational meeting must comprise 20% of
the employees in the bargaining unit. In fact, even the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code does
not so provide. It is only under Article 234 (c) that requires the
names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks
to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to
the employees’ membership in the union and not to the list of
workers who participated in the organizational meeting.
Indeed, Article 234 (b) and (c) provide for separate
requirements, which must be submitted for the union's
registration, and which respondent did submit. Here, the total
number of employees in the bargaining unit was 396, and 20%
of which was about 79. Respondent submitted a document
entitled "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon" showing the
names of 119 employees as union members, thus respondent
sufficiently complied even beyond the 20% minimum
membership requirement. Respondent also submitted the
attendance sheet of the organizational meeting which
contained the names and signatures of the 68 union members
who attended the meeting. Considering that there are 119
union members which are more than 20% of all the employees
of the bargaining unit, and since the law does not provide for
the required number of members to attend the organizational
meeting, the 68 attendees which comprised at least the
majority of the 119 union members would already constitute a
quorum for the meeting to proceed and to validly ratify the
Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is, therefore, no
basis for petitioner to contend that grounds exist for the
cancellation of respondent's union registration. For fraud and
misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union
registration under Article 239 of the Labor Code, the nature of
the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.22
Petitioner's claim that the alleged union members signed
documents without adequate information is not persuasive.
The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence.23 In fact, we note that not one
of those listed in the document denominated as "Pangalan ng
Mga Kasaping Unyon" had come forward to deny their
membership with respondent. Notably, it had not been
rebutted that the same union members had signed the
document entitled "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi," thus,
strengtheningtheir desire to be members of the respondent
union.
Petitioner claims that in the list of members, there was an
employee whose name appeared twice and another employee
who was merely a project employee. Such could not be
considered a misrepresentation in the absence of showing that
respondent deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing
their union membership. In fact, even if those two names were
not included in the list of union members, there would still be
117 members which was still more than 20% of the 396 rank-
and-file employees.
As to petitioner's argument that the total number of its
employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, and not396 as
respondent claimed, still the 117 union members comprised
more than the 20% membership requirement for respondent's
registration.
In Mariwasa Siam Ceramics v. Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment,24 we said:
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it
must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the
election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the
list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together
with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their
postal addresses to the BLR.
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The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of
those who participated in the organizational meeting would
not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel respondent’s
certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union’s
registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right
of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation
to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the
Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation
must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a
majority of union members.1âwphi1

In this case, we agree with the BLR and the CA that

respondent could not have possibly committed
misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements. The alleged
failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision
the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no
moment, especially as it was able to comply with the 20%
minimum membership requirement. Even if the total number
of rank-and-file employees of petitioner is 528, while
respondent declared that it should only be 455, it still cannot
be denied that the latter would have more than complied with
the registration requirement.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is

DENIED. The Decision dated December 22, 2010 and the
Resolution dated March 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 112406, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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