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The RTC ruled for MACAM and ordered value of shipment. CA Under the Civil Code provisions governing Agency, an agent
reversed RTC’s decision. can only be held liable in cases where his acts are attended by
fraud, negligence, deceit or if there is a conflict of interest
between him and the principal. Under the same law an agent
Issue: Are the respondents liable to the petitioner for is likewise liable if he appoints a substitute when he was not
releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank given the power to appoint one or otherwise appoints one that
guarantee? is notoriously incompetent or insolvent. These facts were not
proven in the record.
Held: It is a standard maritime practice when immediate SERVANDO v PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION
delivery is of the essence, for shipper to request or instruct
the carrier to deliver the goods to the buyer upon arrival at Facts:
the port of destination without requiring presentation of bill of 1. Clara UyBico and AmparoServando loaded on board a
lading as that usually takes time. Thus, taking vessel of Philippine Steam Navigation Co. for carriage from
intoaccount that subject shipment consisted of perishable Manila to Negros Occidental 1,528 cavans of rice and 44
goods and SOLIDBANK pre-paid the full amount of value cartons of colored paper, toys and general merchandise.
thereof, it is not hard to believe the claim of respondent 2. The contract of carriage of cargo was evidenced by a Bill
WALLEM that petitioner indeed requested the release of the of Lading (B/L). There was a stipulation limiting the
goods to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and responsibility of the carrier for loss or damage that may be
bank guarantee. caused to the shipment
a. “carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to
To implement the said telex instruction, the delivery of the shipments billed ‘owner’s risk’ unless such loss or damage is
shipment must be to GPC, the notify party or real due to the negligence of the carrier. Nor shall the carrier be
importer/buyer of the goods and not the PAKISTANI BANK responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure,
since the latter can very well present the original Bills of dangers or accidents of the sea, war, public enemies, fire”.
Lading in its possession. Likewise, if it were the PAKISTANI 3. Upon arrival of the vessel at its destination, the cargoes
BANK to whom the cargoes were to be strictly delivered, it will were discharged in good condition and placed inside the
no longer be proper to require a bank guarantee as a warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.
substitute for the Bill of Lading. To construe otherwise will 4. UyBico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice.
render meaningless the telex instruction. After all, the cargoes 5. Unfortunately, the warehouse was razed by fire of
consist of perishable fresh fruits and immediate delivery unknown origin later that same day destroying the remaining
thereof the buyer/importer is essentially a factor to reckon cargoes.
with. 6. UyBico and Servando filed a claim for the value of the
goods against the carrier.
We emphasize that the extraordinary responsibility of the 7. The lower court ruled in their favor. It held that the
common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of delivery of the shipment to the warehouse is not the delivery
the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right contemplated by Art. 1736 of the CC. And since the burning of
to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of the warehouse occurred prior to the actual or constructive
lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. delivery of the goods, the loss is chargeable against the
However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as vessel.
buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in
his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint
Issue:Whether or not the carrier is liable for the loss of the
before the trial court. This premise draws us to conclude that
goods.
the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which,
conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the
Held:No.
right to receive them was proper.
1. Article 1736 of the CC imposes upon common carriers the
Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd
duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the
(132 SCRA 529)
goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the
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same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier W/N petitioner was negligent and should be held liable for the
to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive payment of damages.
them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738.” The HELD:
court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question
to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery YES. Plainly, the heavy seas and rains referred to in
contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the the master's report were notcaso fortuito, but normal
warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of occurrences that an ocean-going vessel, particularly in the
the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the month of September which, in our area, is a month of rains
appellant. and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. They
are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. These are conditions
2. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide for, in
lading issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed the ordinary course of a voyage. That rain water (not sea
to limit the responsibility of the carrier. The stipulation is valid water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a
not being contrary to law, morals or public policy. clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the
3. The petitioners however, contend that the stipulation closing of the ship's hatches so that rainwater would not find
does not bind them since it was printed at the back of the B/L its way into the cargo holds of the ship.
and that they did not sign the same. However, as the Court
held in OngYiu vs. CA, while it may be true that a passenger Moreover, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code,
had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by common carriers are bound to observe "extra-ordinary
the provisions thereof. Such provisions have been held to be a vigilance over goods . . . .according to all circumstances of
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon each case," and Article 1735 of the same Code states, to wit:
the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or
assent to the regulation. Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in
4. Also, where fortuitous event is the immediate and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are
proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
liability for non-performance.In the case at bar, the burning of presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter as required in article 1733.
could not have foreseen the event.
5. There is nothing in the record to show that the carrier Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso
incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the
appears that it had not only notified UyBico and Servando of part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present
the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence
same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, UyBico required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order to escape
had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had
the warehouse. admittedly carried in this case. No such evidence exists of
6. Nor can the carrier or its employees be charged with record. Thus, the carrier cannot escape liability.
negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs
warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by UyBico and The presumption, therefore, that the cargo was in
Servando was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and apparent good condition when it was delivered by the vessel
consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was to the arrastre operator by the clean tally sheets has been
maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute overturned and traversed. The evidence is clear to the
negligence to the carrier, the latter having no control effect that the damage to the cargo was suffered while aboard
whatsoever over the same. petitioner's vessel
CA –set aside RTC’s decision and ordered petitioner to pay HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
1. YES
ISSUE: In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts
that petitioner was a common carrier, she alleged in this
petition that the contract between her and Cipriano was lease
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of the truck. She also stated that: she was not catering to the brought to NASSCO compound. Later, the Acting Mayor issued
general public. Thus, in her answer to the amended complaint, a receipt stating that the Municipality had taken custody of
she said that she does business under the same style of A.M. the scrap iron. Respondent instituted an action for damages
Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to those who against petitioner. Respondent Court found in favor for
have cargo to move, not to the general public but to a few Tumambing.
customers only in view of the fact that it is only a small Issue:
business. Whether or not petitioner Ganzon, a common carrier, can be
We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that exempt from liability by invoking order of competent authority.
petitioner is a common carrier. Ruling: NO.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a) The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps
person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the was due to any of the following causes enumerated in Article
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or 1734 of the Civil Code.
both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their Before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from
services to the public.” The test to determine a common responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by
carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to
the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was
or extent of the business transacted.” 12 In this case, issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to
petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting
trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither
move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the
required to prove the same. 13 Municipality of Mariveles. The fact remains that the order
But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea
because they offer their services only to a select group of was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to
people. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order of the
Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14 is instructive. In acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for appellee
referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry out. The
“The above article makes no distinction between one whose petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods dump into the sea the scrap iron.
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article 1732 also Transportation Case Digest: Phil Am Gen Insurance Co,
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or Et Al. V. PKS Shipping Co (2003)
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an FACTS:
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC)
1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the contracted the services of PKS Shipping Company
“general public,” i.e., the general community or population, (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a 75,000 bags of cement worth P3,375,000.
narrow segment of the general population. We think that DUMC insured the goods for its full value with
Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such Philippine American General Insurance Company
distinctions.” (Philamgen).
2. NO The goods were loaded aboard the dumb
Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that barge Limar I belonging to PKS Shipping.
the loss of the goods was not due to force majeure. December 22, 1988 9 pm: While Limar I was being
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary towed by PKS’ tugboat MT Iron Eagle, the barge sank
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. a couple of miles off the coast of Dumagasa Point, in
Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to Zamboanga del Sur, bringing down with it the entire
have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or cargo of 75,000 bags of cement.
deteriorated. There are very few instances when the DUMC filed a formal claim with Philamgen for the full
presumption of negligence does not attach and these amount of the insurance. Philamgen promptly made
instances are enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases payment; it then sought reimbursement from PKS
where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must Shipping of the sum paid to DUMC but the shipping
prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to company refused to pay so Philamgen to file suit
overcome the presumption. against PKS Shipping
In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force RTC: dismissed the complaint - fortuitous event
majeure which exculpated her from liability for the loss of the CA:Affirmed - not a common carrier but a casual
cargo. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that occupation
hijacking, not being included in the provisions of Article 1734, ISSUE: W/N PKS Shipping is NOT liable since it was NOT a
must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and common carrier
thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from
hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers
HELD: NO. Petition is DENIED
acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This
is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which
provides:
“Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations,
considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy; firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
xx transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by air for compensation, offering their services to the public
thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible Complementary is Section 13, paragraph (b), of the
threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or diminished;” xx Public Service Act
public service" to be –
GANZON V. CA (G.R. NO. L-48757) "x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate,
manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or
Facts: compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
Private respondent Tumambing contracted the services of permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general
petitioner Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Bataan business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street
to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT “Batman.” railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger,
Petitioner sent his lighter with its Captain Filomeno to dock at or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its
Mariveles, where respondent Tumambing delivered the scrap classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express
irons for loading which also begun on the same day. Mayor service, steamboat, or steamship, or steamship line, pontines,
Advincula arrived at the port and demanded P 5,000 ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
shakedown from respondent. The two ended up in a heated passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop,
argument where respondent had to be taken to a hospital to wharf or dock, ice plant, ice refrigeration plant, canal,
be treated of a gunshot wound. After sometime, the loading of irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water
the scrap iron was resumed. But now, the Acting Mayor supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or
together with 3 policemen ordered Captain Filomeno to dump wireless communication systems, wire or wireless
the scrap iron where the lighter was docked and the rest to be broadcasting stations and other similar public services
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