Emirbayer and Mische 1998, What Is Agency

What Is Agency?
Author(s): Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische

Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Jan., 1998), pp. 962-1023
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782934
Accessed: 07/08/2010 13:28
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Journal of Sociology.
http://www.jstor.org
WhatIs Agency?'
MustafaEmirbayerand Ann Mische
New Schoolfor Social Research
This articleaims (1) to analyticallydisaggregateagencyintoitssev-

eral componentelements(thoughtheseare interrelated empirically),
(2) to demonstratethewaysin whichtheseagenticdimensionsinter-
penetratewithformsof structure, and (3) to pointout the implica-
tionsofsuch a conceptionofagencyforempiricalresearch.The au-
thorsconceptualizeagency as a temporallyembedded process of
socialengagement, informed bythepast (in its"iterational"
or habit-
ual aspect) but also orientedtoward the future(as a "projective"
capacityto imaginealternativepossibilities)and towardthepresent
(as a "practical-evaluative"
capacityto contextualizepast habitsand
futureprojectswithinthe contingencies of the moment).
The conceptofagencyhas becomea sourceofincreasingstrainand confu-
sion in social thought.Variantsof action theory,normativetheory,and
analysishave defended,attacked,buried,and resus-
political-institutional
citatedthe conceptin oftencontradictory and overlappingways. At the
centerof the debate, the termagencyitselfhas maintainedan elusive,
albeitresonant,vagueness;ithas all too seldominspiredsystematic analy-
sis, despitethe long listof termswithwhichit has been associated:self-
hood, motivation,will, purposiveness,intentionality, choice, initiative,
freedom,and creativity. Moreover,in thestruggleto demonstrate thein-
terpenetration of agencyand structure,
manytheoristshave failedto dis-
1 Thisis a fully
coauthoredarticle.Earlierdraftswerepresentedat thePaul F. Lazars-
feldCenterfortheSocialSciencesat ColumbiaUniversity, theWorkshopon Politics,
Power,and Protestat New YorkUniversity, theColloquiumon Cultureand Politics
at theNew SchoolforSocialResearch,themeeting oftheAmericanSociologicalAsso-
ciationat Los Angeles,and variousseminarsat theNew SchoolforSocial Research
and Princeton We wouldliketothanktheparticipants
University. in thoseforums for
theirmanyusefulcomments. We wouldalso liketothankJeffrey Alexander, Bernard
Barber,RichardBernstein,Donald Black, Mary Blair-Loy,David Gibson,Chad
Goldberg,JeffGoodwin,Michael Hanagan, Hans Joas,MicheleLamont,Edward
Lehman,CalvinMorrill,MichaelMuhlhaus,ShepleyOrr,MargaritaPalacios,Mimi
Sheller,CharlesTilly,Diane Vaughan,Loic Wacquant,and HarrisonWhitefortheir
manyilluminating insights,
criticisms,andsuggestions.Directcorrespondence toMus-
tafaEmirbayer, Department ofSociology,New SchoolforSocial Research,65 Fifth
Avenue,New York,New York 10003.
? 1998by The University
of Chicago.All rightsreserved.
0002-9602/98/10304-0004$02.50
962 AJS Volume 103 Number4 (January1998): 962-1023

Agency
tinguishagencyas an analyticalcategoryin its own right-with distinc-

tivetheoreticaldimensionsand temporally variablesocial manifestations.
The resulthas been a flatand impoverishedconceptionthat,whenit es-
capes theabstractvoluntarismof rationalchoicetheory,tendsto remain
so tightlybound to structurethatone loses sightof thedifferent ways in
whichagencyactuallyshapes social action.
We argue thateach of the mostsignificant recentattemptsto theorize
agencyhas neglectedcrucialaspectsoftheproblem.In distinguishing (and
showingthe interplay)betweendifferent dimensionsof agency,we seek
to go beyondthesevariousone-sidedpointsof view. "Theoristsof prac-
tice" such as PierreBourdieu and AnthonyGiddens,forexample,have
given selectiveattentionto the role of habitusand routinizedpractices;
theirperspective(perhapsthe dominantone in contemporary American
sociology)sees human agency as habitual, repetitive,and taken for
granted-a view sharedby ethnomethodologists, new institutionalists in
organizationaltheory, and manyothers.Alternative approacheshave sim-
ilarlyreliedupon one-sidedconceptionsofagency;forexample,traditions
as different fromone anotheras rationalchoicetheoryand phenomenol-
ogyhave stressedgoal seekingand purposivity, whiletheoriesofpublicity
and communication, as well as certainfeminist theories,have overempha-
sized deliberationand judgment.While routine,purpose,and judgment
all constituteimportantdimensionsof agency,none by itselfcapturesits
fullcomplexity. Moreover,when one or anotheris conflatedwithagency
itself,we lose a sense of the dynamicinterplayamong thesedimensions
and of how this interplayvaries withindifferent structuralcontextsof
action.
Our immediateaimsin thisarticle,then,are threefold: (1) to analytically
disaggregateagency into its several componentelements(even though
theseare clearlyinterrelated (2) to demonstrate
empirically), thedifferent
waysin whichthedimensionsofagencyinterpenetrate withdiverseforms
of structure, and (3) to pointout theimplicationsof such a differentiated
conceptionof agencyforempiricalresearch.
Theoretically,our centralcontribution is to begin to reconceptualize
human agencyas a temporallyembeddedprocessof social engagement,
informedby thepast (in itshabitualaspect),but also orientedtowardthe
future(as a capacityto imaginealternativepossibilities)and towardthe
present(as a capacityto contextualizepast habits and futureprojects
withinthecontingencies ofthemoment).The agenticdimensionof social
actioncan onlybe capturedin itsfullcomplexity, we argue,ifit is analyti-
callysituatedwithintheflowof time.More radically,we also arguethat
the structuralcontextsof action are themselvestemporalas well as
relationalfields-multiple,overlappingways of orderingtime toward
963
AmericanJournalof Sociology
which social actors can assume different simultaneousagenticorienta-

tions.Since social actorsare embeddedwithinmanysuch temporalities
at once,theycan be said to be orientedtowardthe past,the future,and
thepresentat anygivenmoment,althoughtheymaybe primarily oriented
toward one or anotherof these withinany one emergentsituation.As
actorsmove withinand among thesedifferent unfoldingcontexts,they
switch between (or "recompose")theirtemporalorientations-as con-
structedwithinand by meansofthosecontexts-and thusare capable of
changingtheirrelationshipto structure.We claim that,in examining
changesin agenticorientation, we can gain crucialanalyticalleveragefor
chartingvaryingdegreesofmaneuverability, inventiveness,and reflective
choiceshownby social actorsin relationto theconstraining and enabling
contextsof action.
Most broadly,our guidingconcernsin thisarticleare moraland practi-
cal in nature.We contendthatreconceptualizing agencyas an internally
complextemporaldynamicmakes possible a new perspectiveupon the
age-oldproblemof freewill and determinism. How are social actors,we
ask, capable (at least in principle)of criticallyevaluating and recon-
structing theconditionsoftheirown lives?If structuralcontextsare ana-
lyticallyseparable from(and stand over against) capacities forhuman
agency,how is it possibleforactorseverto mediateor to transform their
own relationshipsto thesecontexts?Withoutdisaggregating the concept
of agencyintoits mostimportantanalyticaldimensions,we cannotever
hope to findsatisfactory answersto thesequestions.The keyto grasping
the dynamicpossibilitiesof human agencyis to view it as composedof
variableand changingorientations withintheflowoftime.Onlythenwill
itbe clearhow thestructural environments ofactionare bothdynamically
sustainedby and also alteredthroughhumanagency-by actorscapable
of formulating projectsforthe futureand realizingthem,even ifonlyin
small part,and withunforeseenoutcomes,in the present.
THEORIZING AGENCY
Many of the tensionsin present-dayconceptionsof human agencycan
be tracedback to the Enlightenment debate over whetherinstrumental
rationalityor moraland norm-basedactionis thetruestexpressionofhu-
man freedom.Teleologicaland instrumentalist conceptionsof actionfu-
eled the philosophicalindividualismof the earlyEnlightenment, which,
whilestillgroundedin thereligiousmoralityofthetimes,allowed forthe
subsequentinventionoftheindividualas a "freeagent"able tomakeratio-
nal choices for (him)selfand society(Lukes 1973). With JohnLocke's
(1978) rejectionof the bindingpower of tradition,his locationof beliefs
in individualexperience,and hisgroundingofsocietyin thesocialcontract
964
Agency
betweenindividuals,a new conceptionof agencyemergedthataffirmed

the capacityof human beingsto shape the circumstancesin whichthey
live. This faithsubsequentlysustaineda long line of social thinkers,in-
cludingAdam Smith,Jeremy Bentham,and JohnStuartMill,and embed-
ded agencyin an individualistand calculativeconceptionof actionthat
stillunderliesmanyWesternaccountsof freedomand progress.
In responseto this associationof freedomwith rationalself-interest,
otherEnlightenment thinkers,
mostnotablyJean-JacquesRousseau, an-
ticipatedthe laterRomanticsby exploringinsteadsuch alternativecon-
ceptionsof freedomas the ascendancyof conscienceand moralwill,of a
self-legislatingmorality.Theirperspectiveunderscoredtheimportanceof
the transcendentalimaginationas well as that of instrumental reason.
These two pointsof view both foundtheirway into Immanuel Kant's
(1965, 1956,1951)criticalphilosophy, whichsaw freedomas normatively
groundedindividualwill,governedby the categoricalimperativerather
thanby materialnecessity(or interest).Kant bifurcatedall ofrealityinto
two opposingorders:the conditionaland the normative,necessityand
freedom-the latterconceivedof as the pure unconditionedactivityof
autonomousmoralbeings.His renderingof the ancientquestionof free
will versusnecessitybecame in classical sociologicaltheorythe pointof
departurefora concernwithnonrationalnorm-oriented action-in con-
tradistinction to the rationalinstrumental action emphasizedby econo-
misticanalystsof society(Habermas 1984-89; Munch 1981, 1994). In
Hans Joas's (1993, p. 247) words,"As a safeguardagainstthe utilitarian
dangersofthetheoryofrationalaction,thefoundingtheorists ofsociology
[had] recourseto Kant and his notionof free,moralaction."In thisline,
theearlyactiontheoryofTalcottParsonscan be read as a Kant-inspired
attemptto synthesizethe rational-utilitarian and nonrational-normative
dimensionsofaction.In The StructureofSocial Action,forexample,Par-
sons (1968,p. 732) arguedthat"conditionsmay be conceivedat one pole,
ends and normativerulesat another,means and effort as theconnecting
link betweenthem."Agency,forParsons,was capturedin the notionof
effort, as theforcethatachieves,in Kantianterminology, theinterpenetra-
tion means-endsrationalityand categoricalobligation.
of
Parsons's earlyattentionto the temporaldimensionof action (subse-
quentlydiscardedin his laterstructural-functionalist work)also remained
caughtwithin Kantian dualisms.He noted that all social action,whether
instrumental or normative,is teleologicalin structure: "An act is always
a processin time .... The conceptend always impliesa futurereference,
to a statewhichis . . . not yetin existence,and whichwould not come
intoexistenceifsomethingwere notdone about it by the actor"(Parsons
1968,p. 45). In noneofhis writings, on theotherhand,did Parsonselabo-
rate a fullytemporaltheoryof agency(or, indeed,of structure):agency
965
remained"outside"oftime(as in Kant's own conceptionofthe"uncondi-

tioned"),while structureremaineda spatial categoryratherthan (also) a
temporalconstruction. Moreover,in none of his writingsdid Parsonsde-
vote much systematicattentionto disaggregating the crucialconceptof
effortitself-to openingup the"black box" of human agency.
Agencyin Social Theory

In explicitdialoguewithParsonian(and Kantian)theoriesofagency,both
JamesColeman and Jeffrey Alexanderhave recentlypresentedattempts
to join instrumental and normativeapproaches,althoughwithstrikingly
different results.Respondingto thedisappearanceof agencyin laterver-
sionsofstructural-functionalism, rationalchoiceadvocateshave followed
GeorgeHomans's (1964) call to "bringmen back in" and to returnto an
actiontheoryfirmly groundedin thepurposive,instrumental, and calcu-
latingorientationsof individuals.In his major syntheticwork,Founda-
tions of Social Theory,Coleman (1990) triesto overcomethe Kantian
division between interestsand norms by arguingthat rationalchoice
assumptionscan providetheunderpinnings fora normativetheorybased
uponpower-weighted socialinfluence. Colemancountersthedecontextua-
lizedindividualismofmanyrationalactorperspectivesbylinkingpurpos-
ive activityat themicrolevel to systemicinterdependencies at themacro
level,therebyshowingthatactionis always a complexsocial and interac-
tive phenomenon.However,he failsto addressthe problemat theheart
of rationalchoice explanations:the (clearlyacknowledged)decision to
bracketthe questionof how temporallyembeddedactorsactuallyreach
decisionsthatcan retrospectively be interpreted as rational.By assuming
that"actionsare 'caused' by their(anticipated)consequences"Coleman
(1986,p. 1312)attributes theimpulseto actionto a means-endsrationality
abstractedfromthe human experienceof time.While thisbracketingof
subjectivetemporality does in factlead to thepredictionofan impressive
rangeof social phenomenaresultingfromindividualchoices,it does not
allow us to understandthe interpretive processeswherebychoices are
imagined,evaluated,and contingently reconstructed by actorsin ongoing
dialogue with unfoldingsituations.The post hoc causal attributionim-
plicitin rationalchoiceconceptionsof agencyleaves Parsons's black box
untouched.2
2 We acknowledge that many rational choice theoristshave made great stridesin ac-
counting for the contingenciesand uncertaintiesinvolved in choice making (March
and Simon 1958; March and Olsen 1976; March 1978), as well as in attemptingto
explore the role of values, norms,and other cultural elements (Elster 1989; Hechter
1992, 1994; see also the essays in Cook and Levi [1990]). However, we maintain that
even these more sophisticated versions of rational actor models are still grounded in
presuppositionsthat preventthem fromadequately theorizingthe interpretiveinter-
966
Agency
A morepromisinginitiativein the analyticexplorationof agencycan

be seen in the recentwork of Jeffrey Alexander(1988, esp. pp. 301-33;
1992).Althougha neo-Parsonianhimselfin manyrespects,and thusin-
fluencedin the deep structureof his thoughtby Kantian categories(he
continuesto take as his frameof referencethe dichotomybetweenthe
conditionaland thenormative), Alexanderadvances considerablybeyond
bothKant and Parsonsin thematizing the ways in whichhumanagency
engageswithits structuralcontexts.He is thefirstmajor theoristto sys-
tematically disaggregatetheconceptofagencyitself,probingintoitsinner
structureand delineatingcategoriesof agenticprocesses.In Actionand
Its Environments, Alexander(1988) proposesthatactionbe conceivedof
in termsof two basic dimensions,whichhe calls interpretation (further
subdividedintotypification and invention)and strategization.He intends
by these analyticalcategoriesto synthesize,as did Parsons beforehim,
thenormativeand utilitarianperspectivesby presenting themas comple-
mentarybutanalytically distinguishabledimensionsofhumanaction.But
Alexander'smultidimensional theoryalso goes much furtherthan Par-
sonian theoryin providinginsightinto preciselythatelementbracketed
by Coleman,thatis, the interpretive processesof contexuallyembedded
actors.In whatfollows,we builduponAlexander'shighlyusefulcategori-
zation,whichopens up theoreticalspace foranalyzingtheinventiveand
criticalaspectsofagency.We contend,however,thatbecause his analysis
remainssubsumedundera broadercategoryof normativity, he has little
to say about invention'sconstitutive featuresand, specifically,
its prag-
maticand experimental dimensions.Even moreimportant, Alexanderne-
glects to situate his analysis of agency withina specificallytemporal
framework. We argue,by contrast,thatagenticprocessescan onlybe un-
derstoodiftheyare linkedintrinsically to thechangingtemporalorienta-
tionsof situatedactors.
To place agencywithinsuch a temporalframework, and to moveeffec-
tivelybeyondthe divisionbetweeninstrumental and normativeaction,
we mustturnto thephilosophicalschoolthatmostconsistently challenges
suchdualisms,notablyAmericanpragmatism(withitsclosetiesto Conti-
nentalphenomenology). In responseto the utilitarianmodel of rational
action, pragmatistthinkerssuch as John Dewey and George Herbert
Mead, as well as social phenomenologists such as AlfredSchutz,insist
that action not be perceivedas the pursuitof preestablishedends, ab-
stractedfromconcretesituations,but ratherthatends and meansdevelop
coterminously withincontextsthatare themselveseverchangingand thus
always subject to reevaluationand reconstruction on the part of the re-
subjectiveconstruction
of choicesfromthetemporalvantagepointsof contextually
embeddedactors.
967
flectiveintelligence.Moreover,pragmatistsrejectthe Kantian response

to utilitarianism by condemningthe false distinctionbetweenmaterial
interests and transcendentalvalues,sinceall humanobjectsand purposes
outofsocial meaningsand values. These basic
are necessarilyconstructed
premisesallow the pragmatistthinkersto sidestepmany of the conun-
drumsthatdominatesociologicalthoughtand to lay the foundationsfor
a theoryof actionthatanalyzesthe"conditionsofpossibility" (Joas 1993,
p. 250) forthe evaluative,experimental, and constructive dimensionsof
perceptionand action,withinthe contextsof social experience.
While we draw upon a varietyof pragmatistand phenomenological
thinkersin the sectionsto come,it is the workof GeorgeHerbertMead
that offersus the mostcompellingtools forovercomingthe inadequate
conceptionsof agency in both rational choice and norm-oriented ap-
proaches.AlthoughMead is best known forhis contributions to social
psychologyand symbolicinteractionism, we focushereupon his seminal
(but littlediscussed)theorizationof temporalityin The Philosophyofthe
Present(1932).3 Two insightsin thisworkare criticalforour efforts: the
conceptof timeas constituted throughemergent events,whichrequirea
continualrefocusingof past and future,and the conceptof human con-
sciousnessas constitutedthroughsociality,thecapacityto be bothtempo-
rallyand relationallyin a varietyof systemsat once. Buildingupon the
work of Henri Bergson(1989), Mead rejectsthe Newtonianconception
oftimeas a successionofisolatedinstants,characterizing timeinsteadas
a multilevelflowofnestedevents,radicallygroundedin (butnotbounded
by) presentexperience."Realityexistsin a present"(Mead 1932, p. 1),
althoughthe immediacyof presentsituationsis extendedby our ability
to imaginativelyconstructa sense of past and future.But Mead also
movesbeyondtheindividualistand subjectivistpresuppositions ofBerg-
son's theory,which conceptualizestime as an introspectiveduree, a
merelypsychologicalratherthanintrinsically social phenomenon.By con-
trast,Mead insiststhatthe humanexperienceof temporality is based in
thesocial characterof emergence,thatis, in the passage fromthe old to
thenew,and in theinterrelated changesoccurringthroughout thevarious
situationalcontextswithinwhichhumanbeingsare embedded.As actors
respond to changingenvironments, they must continuallyreconstruct
3 We are not concerned here with Mead's engagementin this work with functionalist
evolutionarytheorynor with his debate with metaphysical theoristsof temporality.
AlthoughMead develops his theoriesthrougha comparison with more general physi-
cal and biological (i.e., nonhuman) processes and has been criticizedforveeringaway
fromaction theorytoward metaphysics(Joas 1985), he also provides the philosophical
core of a temporal and relational understandingof the intersubjectivedevelopment
of agentic capacities, which is of critical importance for a theoryof action. For a
related discussion, see also Mead's (1938) work, The Philosophy of the Act.
968
Agency
theirview ofthepast in an attemptto understandthecausal conditioning

of the emergentpresent,while using this understanding to controland
shape theirresponsesin thearisingfuture.This processformsthecoreof
what Mead (1932, p. 76) calls "thedeliberativeattitude,"the capacityto
"get hold of the conditionsof futureconductas these are foundin the
organizedresponseswe have formed,and so constructour pastsin antici-
pationof thatfuture."
Mead pointsthisinsightin thedirectionof actiontheoryby describing
how whathe calls sociality-thatis, thesituatednessofactorsin multiple
temporallyevolvingrelationalcontexts-contributes to thedevelopment
of reflectiveconsciousness.Mead outlinesthreelevels of consciousness,
distinguished in termsoftheincreasingcapacityofactorsto activelycon-
stitutetheirenvironments throughselectivecontrolover theirown re-
sponses:(1) thelevel of"contactexperience," characterizedby immediacy
of responseto sense and feeling,(2) thatof"distanceexperience,"charac-
terizedby the capacityto use ideationand imageryin remembranceand
anticipation, (3) theculminationofsocialityin communicative
and finally,
interaction, in whichsocialmeaningsand values developoutofthecapac-
ityto take on theperspectivesof (concreteand generalized)others.What
drivesthedevelopmentof consciousnessfromone level to thenextis the
"awakeningof delayed and conflicting responses"(Mead 1932,p. 71) to
problematicsituationsin one's variousenvironments, increasingthefield
of choice while extendingthe temporalperspectiveof action. At every
step,actorsare conceivedof not as atomizedindividuals,but ratheras
activerespondents withinnestedand overlappingsystems(whichwe pre-
ferto call temporal-relational contexts);theconstruction oftemporalper-
is an
spectives fundamentally intersubjective process, constitutedby the
ability to hold simultaneously to one's own and to another's viewpoint.
Actorsdeveloptheirdeliberativecapacitiesas theyconfront emergentsit-
uationsthatimpactupon each otherand pose increasingly complexprob-
lems,whichmustbe takenup as challengesby the responsive(and com-
municative)intelligence.
UnlikeMead, we are notprimarily interestedin theevolutionofreflec-
tive consciousnessbut ratherin the insightthatMead's analysisaffords
intotheinternalstructuring of agenticcapacitiesand theirdifferent con-
stitutiverelationshipsto action. We agree withHans Joas in his recent
book,The CreativityofAction(1996; see also Joas,n.d.),thatpragmatist
thinkers providethefirststepstowarddevelopingan adequate conception
of the constitutivecreativityof action,conceivedof as "the permanent
reorganizationand reconstitution of habits and institutions" (Joas, n.d.,
p. 24). Such a conception, Joasargues,fundamentally challengestheteleo-
logical means-endsmodel present in both rational choice and neo-
Parsonianapproaches,replacingit withan accountofthesituationaland
969
corporealembeddednessof action.4Joas's major contribution is to wrest

the theoryof action fromboth its rationalistand,norm-centered pre-
suppositions, thata conceptionofthesituationally
insisting embeddedcre-
ativityof actionis essentialnot onlyforstudiesof microinteraction,but
also formacrosociological forunderstanding
analysis(and particularly the
possibilitiesofwhatDewey calls creativedemocracy).Yet he bracketsthe
major question that we examine here, that of "large differencesin
the various acts and actorsin regardsto creativity"(Joas 1996,p. 197).
We maintainthatthisis not merelyan empiricalbut also an analytical
question:by differentiating betweenthe differentdimensionsof agency,
we can help to account forvariabilityand change in actors' capacities
forimaginativeand criticalintervention in the diversecontextswithin
whichtheyact.
The Chordal Triad of Agency

What,then,is humanagency?We defineit as thetemporally constructed
engagement byactorsofdifferentstructuralenvironments-thetemporal-
relationalcontextsofaction-which, throughtheinterplayofhabit,imag-
ination,and judgment,bothreproducesand transforms thosestructures
in interactiveresponseto theproblemsposed bychanginghistoricalsitua-
tions.5This definition
encompasseswhatwe shall analyticallydistinguish
below as the differentconstitutiveelementsof human agency:iteration,
projectivity,and practicalevaluation.In broad terms,thesecorrespond
4ForJoas(1996,p. 160),actionis notsimplycontingent uponthesituation, butmore

"thesituationis constitutive
essentially, ofaction"(originalemphasis),providing
not
merely "means"and "conditions" forpreestablished
endsbutalso thestructuredhabit-
ual patternsofresponsethatbecomethebasisforthereflective and creativeengage-
mentof actorswiththeirchangingenvironments.
'While ourprincipalfocusin thisarticleremainsthedifferent analyticaldimensions
ofagencyratherthanaction'sstructural contexts,
we followearlierwork(Emirbayer
and Goodwin1996)-along withSorokin(1947),Parsonsand Shils(1951),and,espe-
cially,Alexander(1988b)-in our disaggregation of thelatter.As we conceiveof it,
the cultural contextencompasses those symbolicpatterns,structures,and formations
(e.g.,culturaldiscourses,
narratives,
and idioms)thatconstrainand enableactionby
structuringactors'normative commitments and theirunderstandingsoftheirworld
and theirpossibilitieswithinit. The social-structuralcontextencompasses those net-
workpatterns ofsocialties(seeEmirbayerand Goodwin1994)thatcomprise interper-
sonal, interorganizational,
or transnational
settingsof action. Finally,the social-
psychological contextencompasses those psychical structuresthat constrain and en-
ableactionbychanneling actors'flowsandinvestmentsofemotional energy,
including
long-lastingdurablestructuresof attachmentand emotionalsolidarity.
These inter-
penetrating(butanalytically
autonomous) crosscutthekeyinstitutional
categories sec-
torsof modernsocial life:theadministrative-bureaucratic
state,thecapitalistecon-
omy,and civilsociety(Emirbayerand Sheller1996).
970
Agency
to the differenttemporalorientationsof agency,allowingus to examine

formsof actionthatare moreoriented(respectively) towardthe past,the
future,and thepresent.Such a categorization givesanalyticalexpression
to Mead's conceptionofthepositioningofhumanactorswithintemporal
passage, involvingthe continualreconstruction of theirorientationsto-
ward past and futurein responseto emergentevents.In addition,itincor-
poratesMead's insightthatit is the capacityforimaginativedistancing,
as well as forcommunicativeevaluation,in relationto habitualpatterns
of social engagementthatdrivesthedevelopmentof thereflective intelli-
gence,thatis, the capacityof actorsto criticallyshape theirown respon-
sivenessto problematicsituations.
The iterationalelement.-The firstofthesedimensions,whichwe term

theiterationalelement,has receivedperhapsthemostsystematic attention
in philosophyand sociologicaltheory,mostrecentlyfromthattradition
of thoughtthat Ortner(1984) describesas theoriesofpractice(see also
Turner1994).It refersto theselectivereactivationby actorsofpast pat-
ternsofthought and action,as routinelyincorporated inpracticalactivity,
therebygivingstabilityand orderto social universesand helpingto sus-
tain identities,interactions,
and institutionsovertime.
The projectiveelement.-The seconddimensionof agency,theprojec-
tive element,has been largelyneglectedin recentsociologicaltheory,al-
thoughit does receiveattentionin the writingsof AlfredSchutzand his
followers, ofrationalchoicetheorists.
and,indirectly, Outsideofsociology,
concernwithprojectivity can be foundin phenomenological and existen-
tial philosophy,psychoanalysis, narrativepsychology,and dramaturgic
anthropology.Projectivityencompassesthe imaginativegenerationby
actorsofpossiblefuturetrajectoriesofaction,in whichreceivedstructures
ofthoughtand actionmaybe creativelyreconfigured in relationto actors'
hopes,fears,and desiresfor thefuture.
The practical-evaluativeelement.-Finally, the practical-evaluative
element of agency has been left strikinglyundertheorizedby socio-
logical thinkers,althoughintimationsof it can be foundin a long tradi-
tion of moral philosophyextendingfromAristotelianethicsto morere-
centtheoriesof criticaldeliberation,as well as certainfeministanalyses.
It entailsthe capacityof actors to make practical and normativejudg-
mentsamongalternativepossibletrajectoriesofaction,in responseto the
emerging demands,dilemmas,and ambiguitiesofpresently evolvingsitua-
tions.
We shouldstressfromthe outsetthattheseare analyticaldistinctions;

all threeoftheseconstitutive
dimensionsofhumanagencyare to be found,
in varyingdegrees,withinany concreteempiricalinstanceof action.In
971
thissense,it is possibleto speak ofa chordaltriadofagencywithinwhich

all threedimensionsresonateas separate but not always harmonious
tones.6On the otherhand, we also claim that,in any givencase, one or
anotherof thesethreeaspects mightwell predominate.It is possibleto
speak of actionthatis more(or less) engagedwiththepast,more(or less)
directedtowardthefuture,and more(orless) responsiveto thepresent.In
each ofthethreemajorsectionsbelow,we isolatethesevariousanalytical
dimensionsand examinethe internalstructureof each. Althoughit will
neverbe possibleto carryout our analyticaldissectionswithsurgicalpre-
cision,we aim to show what agenticprocesseswould entailwere one or
anotherofthesetonesin thechordaltriadto be soundedmostforcefully.7
Moreover,we also argue thateach of the threeanalyticaldimensions
can be said to possessitsown internalchordalstructure. The threedimen-
sionsofagencythatwe describedo notcorrespondin anysimple,exclusive
way to past, present,and futureas successivestages of action.Rather,
empiricalsocial actionis constructedthroughongoingtemporalpassage
and thusthroughwhat Mead calls emergentevents,ratherthanthrough
a sequentiality ofdiscreteacts or stagesofone act. Each ofourdimensions
of agencyhas itselfa simultaneousinternalorientationtowardpast, fu-
ture,and present,forall formsofagencyare temporally embeddedin the
flowof time.We do claim, however,that foreach analyticalaspect of
agencyone temporalorientationis the dominanttone,shapingthe way
in whichactorsrelateto theothertwodimensionsoftime.Disaggregating
thedimensionsofagency(and exploringwhichorientations are dominant
withina givensituation)allows us to suggestthateach primaryorienta-
tionin the chordaltriadencompassesas subtonesthe othertwo as well,
whilealso showinghow this"chordalcomposition"can changeas actors
respondto the diverseand shifting environments aroundthem.8
Several further pointsof clarification are in orderhere.First,we must
reaffirmthatagencyas we have sketcheditabove is a historically variable
6 This usage is analogousto Patterson's(1991) discussionof the chordaltriad of

freedom.
'We bracketfornowtheaddedcomplication thatactorsarealwaysembeddedwithin
manydifferent temporal-relational at onceand thusmayexhibita projective
contexts
orientationwithinone context,e.g.,even as theyexhibitan iterationalorientation
withinanother.We returnto thisissuein thefinalsectionofthearticle.
8 Lest we fallintothe analytical
nightmare of "subsubtones"within"subtones," we
wish to stressthatthe notionof an internalchordalstructure is a heuristicdevice
thatallowsus to analyzevariationand changein thecomposition ofagenticorienta-
tions;clearly,actorsdo notdissectexperiencein sucha mannerwhilethemselves in
theflowoftemporalpassage.We shouldalso notethatwhatwe call chordalstructures
are not necessarilyharmonious;the subtonesmay be dissonantwithone another,
creatinginternaltensionsthatmayspurtherecomposition oftemporalorientations.
972
Agency
phenomenon, embeddedin changingtheoretical and practicalconceptions

of timeand action.Ours is not a universalistic perspectivethatassumes
that all times,places, and personsare equally iterational,projective,or
practical-evaluative.Rather,itis preciselythehistorical,cultural,and per-
sonal variabilityofagenticorientations thatmakethisframework so com-
pelling.The ways in whichpeople understandtheirown relationshipto
the past,future,and presentmakea difference to theiractions;changing
conceptionsof agenticpossibilityin relationto structuralcontextspro-
foundlyinfluencehow actors in different periods and places see their
worldsas more or less responsiveto human imagination,purpose,and
effort.
Second,we followMead in arguingthatchangesin temporalorientation
mayalso involvevaryingdegreesofinventiveness in rela-
and reflectivity
tionto actionand itstemporal-relational contexts,althoughnotnecessar-
ily,as we shall show later,in simple or straightforward ways. (Such a
conceptionsignalsourdeliberatecommitment to a humanistic, normative,
and criticalperspectiveupon social life.)Whilewe claimthateven habit-
ual actionis agentic,since it involvesattentionand effort, such activity
is largelyunreflectiveand takenforgranted;as actorsencounterproblem-
atic situationsrequiringthe exerciseof imaginationand judgment,they
gain a reflective distancefromreceivedpatternsthatmay (in some con-
texts)may allow forgreaterimagination,choice,and consciouspurpose.
A disaggregatedconceptionof agencythusallows us to locate morepre-
ciselytheinterplaybetweenthe reproductiveand transformative dimen-
sions of social action (Hays 1994) and to explain how reflectivity can
change in either the
direction,through increasing routinizationor prob-
lematizationof experience.
Third,we wish to stressthatour conceptionof agencyis intrinsically
social and relational(Emirbayer1997)sinceit centersaroundtheengage-
ment(and disengagement) by actorsof the different contextualenviron-
ments that constitutetheir own structured yet flexible social universes.
For thisreason,and also becauseofourdeep resonancewithbothclassical
and contemporary pragmatism,one mightcharacterizeour approach as
relationalpragmatics.Viewed internally, agencyentailsdifferent ways of
experiencingthe world,althougheven here,just as consciousnessis al-
ways consciousnessof something(James 1976; Husserl 1960), so too is
agencyalways agencytowardsomething, by meansofwhichactorsenter
intorelationship withsurrounding persons,places,meanings,and events.
Viewed externally, agencyentailsactual interactions withits contexts,in
somethinglike an ongoingconversation;in this sense,it is "filledwith
dialogicovertones,"as a sortof "linkin the chain of speech communica-
tion"(Bakhtin1986,pp. 92, 91). FollowingMead and Joas,we highlight
theimportanceofintersubjectivity, socialinteraction, and communication
973
as criticalcomponentsof agenticprocesses:agencyis always a dialogical

processby and throughwhichactorsimmersedin temporalpassage en-
gage withotherswithincollectivelyorganizedcontextsof action.
Finally,we groundthis capacityforhuman agencyin the structures
and processesofthehumanself,conceivedofas an internalconversation
possessinganalytic autonomyvis-a-vis transpersonalinteractions.We
conceptualizethe selfnot as a metaphysicalsubstanceor entity,such as
the"soul" or "will"(see White 1995),but ratheras a dialogicalstructure,
itselfthoroughly relational.Our perspective,in otherwords,is relational
all the way down.9We cannotbeginto explorehere the ontologyof the
selfor the fullimplicationsforagencyof such categoriesas "desire"(al-
thoughsee Lacan 1977).Nor can we presentherea systematic analysisof
thecomponentsor structures ofthisself,or elaboratea new philosophical
psychology,althoughwe can suggest,followingNorbertWiley (1994,
p. 210) in The SemioticSelf,that"theinterpretive process[takingplace
withinit] is, withinlimits,open and free,"and thatthis"in turnallows
humansto createas well as to pursue goals."'0We maintainthatwhile
transpersonalcontextsdo both constrainand enable the dialogicalpro-
cess,suchcontextscannotthemselvesserveas thepointoforiginofagentic
whichmustresideone level down (so to speak),at the level
possibilities,
of self-dynamics.
In thefollowingdiscussion,then,we take up in turnthreeconstituent
elementsofhumanagency:theiterational, projective,and practical-evalu-
ative tonesof the chordaltriad.Withineach of the sectionsto come,we
firstreview brieflythe relevanthistoryof concepts,then analyze from
withinthedimensionof agencyat hand,thenfinallyexploretheimplica-
tionsof each aspect forconcreteempiricalresearch.In the finalmajor
sectionofthearticle,we stepback to discussthedifferent ways in which
these threedimensionsof human agency interpenetrate with different
structuring contextsof action.
I Sucha position
doespresentus witha certaindifficulty:
namely,
thatcorporate
actors
suchas firms, states,or otherorganizational
entitiescannoteasilybe accommodated
withinthetermsof such a framework unlesstheyare themselves giventheoretical
statusequivalentto thatof naturalpersonsor selves(forexamplesof thismodeof
reasoning, see Coleman[1990],Luhmann[1990],and White[1992]).Whilenotaverse
tosucha movein principle, we do notpursueall ofitsmanyimplications in thepages
to come,or grapplesystematically withthe specialchallengesin translation thatit
wouldnecessarily entail.
10 It is worthnotingthatWiley'sperspective is itselfself-consciously
groundedin the
pragmatist tradition(see also Wiley1994,pp. 10, 29, 47); fora similarperspective,
see Taylor(1991),Colapietro(1990),and Gergen(1994).Moreworkneedsto be done,
ofcourse,in theorizing thesystematicblockagesto such"openand free"intrapsychic
communication or dialogue.
974
Agency
THE ITERATIONAL DIMENSION OF AGENCY
If we thinkof agencyas a chordaltriadcomposedof threeanalytically

distinctelements(orientedvariouslytowardthepast,future,and present),
thenwhatwe call theiterationaldimensionappearsas thatchordalvaria-
tionin whichthepast is themostresonanttone.Although,as Mead (1932,
p. 17) remindsus, all experiencetakes place in the present,thispresent
is permeatedbytheconditioning qualityofthepast:"Its presenceis exhib-
ited in memory,and in the historicalapparatus that extendsmemory."
Past experiencesconditionpresentactions"whentheyhave takenon the
organizedstructureof tendencies"(Mead 1932,p. 18). In thissection,we
examinehow thepast,throughhabitand repetition, becomesa stabilizing
influencethatshapes theflowofeffort and allows us to sustainidentities,
meanings,and interactionsover time.The primarylocus of agencyfor
the iterationaldimension,we argue,lies in the schematizationof social
experience.It is manifestedin actors' abilitiesto recall,to select,and to
appropriately applythemoreor less tacitand taken-for-granted schemas
ofactionthattheyhave developedthroughpast interactions. Schemasare
corporealand affectiveas well as cognitivepatterns;theyconsistin the
interpenetration ofmentalcategories,embodiedpractices,and socialorga-
nization.Moreover,theyconstitute temporalas wellas relationalpatterns,
recursively implemented in social life(Giddens1984).The agenticdimen-
sion lies in how actorsselectivelyrecognize,locate,and implementsuch
schemasin theirongoingand situatedtransactions.While thismay take
place at a low level of consciousreflection, it stillrequiresattentionand
engagementon the part of actorsin orderto narrowthe possibilitiesfor
actionwithinparticulartemporal-relational contexts.
The conceptof iterationis crucialforour conceptionof agencysince
we maintainthatboththeprojectiveand practical-evaluative dimensions
are deeplygroundedin habitual,unreflected, and mostlyunproblematic
patternsof actionby means of whichwe orientour efforts in thegreater
partofourdailylives.We have settledupontheunfamiliartermiteration
to describesuch activitypreciselybecause the dimensionof agencyto
whichitrefersis themostdifficult to conceiveofin properlyagenticterms.
The subset of words with which it is colloquiallyassociated-routines,
dispositions,preconceptions,competences,schemas, patterns,typifica-
tions,and traditions-seemmoreto implystructurethan what we com-
monlythinkofas agency.This problemis also reflected in mostattempts
to theorizethe habitualdimensionof actionsincetheyfocusupon recur-
ringpatternsof actionthemselvesand thusupon structures, ratherthan
upontheprecisewaysin whichsocialactorsrelationally engagewiththose
preexisting patternsor schemas.
975
Iteration:The Historyof a Concept

In muchof social and psychologicaltheory,habithas unfortunately been
seen as littlemorethana matterof stimulusand response,an orientation
thatshiftsattentionaway fromhumanagencyand towardthestructural
contextsthatshape action.Indeed,as CharlesCamic (1986,p. 1046)points
out,a prevailingtendencyin muchof social sciencesince the early20th
centuryhas been to regardhabit as "behaviorthat consistsin a fixed,
mechanicalreactionto particularstimuliand [that]is, as such,devoid of
meaningfromtheactor'spointofview."The outcomehas effectively been
to removehabit fromthe domain of social action.11 In what follows,by
contrast,our key concernis to locate the agenticdimensionin even the
mostroutinized,prestructured formsofsocial action.Even relativelyun-
reflective actionhas itsown momentofeffort; thetypification
and routin-
izationof experienceare active processesentailingselectivereactivation
of receivedstructureswithinexpectedsituations,dynamictransactions
betweenactorand situation.We followa currentof thought(also docu-
mentedby Camic) that never did succumb to the aforementioned ten-
dency to conceive of habit as a "fixed,mechanicalreactionto stimuli"
(Camic 1986,p. 1046). Accordingto thisperspective,habit entailsmuch
morethanbiophysiological (or institutional)
processes;it includesas well
theelementof agency-no less thando the morereflective and delibera-
tive modes of action.
Classical and medievalphilosophy.-Some of the earliestsystematic
thinkingon theiterationalaspectof humanagencycan be foundin Aris-
totle(1985,p. 44), who uses thetermhexisto referto any settleddisposi-
tion or state leading to action.Aristotledistinguishesthe hexis-some-
timesalso translatedas habit-from mechanicalbehavioras such,sinceit
also reflectsa person'sdesiresand decisions.In theNicomacheanEthics,
Aristotle(1985) further depictshabitsas the basis for"virtues"or "excel-
lences"ofcharacter,whichentaila settleddispositiontowardappropriate
action in accordancewithwisdom.Habits could not formthe basis for
virtueif theywere merelyautomaticactivity.St. Thomas Aquinas, too,
definesiterationalactivity(in his terminology,
thehabitus)as a manifesta-
" See,e.g.,Camic'sdiscussions
ofW. I. Thomas,FlorianZnaniecki,RobertPark,and
TalcottParsons,amongothers,in Camic (1986,pp. 1072-75).Camic adds thatthe
historical
reasonsforthistendency
aretwofold:ontheonehand,theemergence during
thelate 19thcentury ofDarwinianevolutionarytheoryand ofexperimental physiol-
ogyand,on theotherhand,theriseduringthatsameperiodofa "militantly scientistic"
new fieldof psychology.Betweenthem,thesedevelopments led to an identification
ofhabitualactionwiththemostelementary behavioralprocessesofthehumanorgan-
ism,akinto thoseofthelowerspecies(Camic 1986,pp. 1048-49).
976
Agency
tionof humanagency.12In "The Treatiseon Habits,"Aquinas (1948,pp.

822, 824) followsAristotlein associatingthe habituswithmoralvirtue:
"Virtueis a habituswhichis alwaysforgood.... [It]is a habitusbywhich
a personacts well."
Nineteenth-and 20th-century social thought.-Dewey (1922) contrib-
utes to thisperspectiveon habit in Human Natureand Conduct,where
he describeshabitsas "activemeans,meansthatprojectthemselves, ener-
geticand dominatingwaysofacting.... Habit meansspecialsensitiveness
or accessibilityto certainclasses of stimuli,standingpredilectionsand
aversions,ratherthan bare recurrenceof specificacts. It means will"
(Dewey 1922,pp. 26,40-41). Habit emergesas something inherently plas-
tic and educable, ratherthan a matterof mere stimulusand response.
This critiqueof behavioralreductionismallows Dewey to elaboratethe
social and psychologicalfoundationsfora democraticpolitics,thegoal of
whichshouldbe to replacetheunreflective habitswith"intelligent" ones
"whichexperiencehas shownto makeus sensitive,generous,imaginative,
[and] impartial"(Dewey 1922,p. 194).
During the mid 20th century,phenomenologistssuch as Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and AlfredSchutzfurther developsuchviews,reconceptu-
alizinghabitas a formof"prereflective intentionality"(Kestenbaum1977).
For Merleau-Ponty, is locatedpriorto languagein thesedi-
intentionality
mentationof meaningin the body;thebodyis conceivedof as an "inten-
tionalarc"directedtowardtheworld,thevehiclebymeansofwhichcom-
munication with the world is carried out (Merleau-Ponty 1964,
pp. 67; see also Wacquant 1992a). Schutz,on the otherhand,emphasizes
the social (ratherthan the embodied)dimensionof the prereflexive life
world,findingin Weberianideal-typesa modelfortheschemasand typi-
ficationsthatguidesocial actorsduringtheirroutinizeddailylives.These
typifications provide forthe continuityof social knowledgeover time;
while such knowledgeis takenforgranted,it neverthelesshas a "highly
socializedstructure" (Schutz 1962,p. 75). This focusupon the routinized
prereflective characterofthesocial worldalso providesthebasis forHar-
old Garfinkel'sethnomethodology (1984), as well as forthe social con-
structivism of PeterBergerand Thomas Luckmann(1966).
Theoriesofpractice.-In thepresentday,so-calledtheorists ofpractice
(Ortner1984) such as Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990; Bourdieu and Wac-
12
"For Aquinas,. . . a habitusputsone's activitymoreunderone's controlthanit
mightotherwise be. In thissense,to have a habitusis to be disposedto someactivity
or other-notbecauseone tendsto thatactivityon everypossibleoccasion,butbe-
cause one findsit natural,readilycopedwith,an obviousactivityto engagein, and
so on" (Davies 1992,pp. 225-26; emphasisin theoriginal).
977
quant 1992) and Giddens (1979, 1984) build upon the insightsof both
pragmatismand phenomenology, as well as upon earliertraditionsof
thought.Bourdieuuses theAristotelian/Thomistic idea ofhabitusto illu-
minatetheformativeinfluences ofthepast upon thecognitive,corporeal,
and intentionalstructures ofempiricalaction.Throughtheincorporation
of past experiencesin the body,he maintainsthat social actorsdevelop
a setofpreconsciousexpectationsabout thefuturethatare typicallyinar-
ticulate,naturalized,and takenforgrantedbut nevertheless strategically
mobilizedin accordancewith the contingenciesof particularempirical
situations.Bourdieurecognizesthecompatibility ofsuchnotionswiththe
insightsofbothDewey and thephenomenologists: "The theoryofpractical
sensepresentsmanysimilarities withtheories,suchas Dewey's,thatgrant
a centralroleto thenotionof habit,understoodas an activeand creative
relationto the world"(Bourdieuand Wacquant 1992,p. 122).
In similarfashion,Giddensconceptualizestheagenticdimensionofrou-
tinebehaviorin termsof what he calls thestratification modelofaction
(Giddens1979,p. 56). By distinguishing betweenthreelevelsofconscious-
ness-the unconscious,practicalconsciousness,and discursiveconscious-
ness-he in effectconstructsa continuumbetweenthe unreflective and
reflectivedimensionsof action.But despitethisnod towarddiscursivity,
Giddensgivesroutinizedpracticalconsciousnessa privilegedplace in the
explanationofsocial reproduction, themasterkeyof
callingroutinization
his theoryof structuration. Such consciousnessemergesout of a back-
groundof"tacitlyemployedmutualknowledge"(Giddens1979,p. 58), by
means of which social interactionsare reflexively monitored.In under-
scoringtheagenticmomentin thereproduction he also de-
of structures,
velops the importantidea of recursivity:structures(which Giddens
definesas "rulesand resources")are reallyonly"virtual"structures (para-
digmaticpatterns)thatmustbe recursivelyactivatedwithinsocial prac-
tices.The agenticdimensionof routinizedaction lies preciselyin the re-
cursiveimplementation of structuresby humanactors."3
The InternalStructureof Iteration

We can see thataccordingto manymajor theorists, habitualand routin-
ized activitiesare not devoid of agency.Here we elaborateupon these
theorists'insightsbyexaminingin moredetailhow agencyworksto repro-
13 Giddens(1991)is particularly
interestedin theconceptofroutinization becauseof
hisontological he emphasizestheneedfor"basictrust"and"ontologi-
presuppositions:
thatdriveshumansto routinizetheirpracticesand to give orderand
cal security"
to theirrelationships,
stability especiallyin the faceof the growingcomplexityand
diversityofmodernsociety(fora similarperspective, see White[1992]).
978
Agency
duce past patternsofaction.For thesake of greaterspecificity,we subdi-

vide the iterationalmomentinto a numberof interrelatedcomponents
(keepingin mindthattheseblend intoone anotherin practice);each in-
volves theengagementof a specifickindof schematizingprocess.Recall-
ing the imageryof the internalchordalstructure, we show how thispri-
maryorientation towardthepast involvesdifferent processesofselective
recallfrompast experience,whichwe distinguishhereas selectiveatten-
tion,recognitionoftypes,and categoricallocation.In addition,we show
how theseelementsshade over into projectiveand practical-evaluative
dimensionsof agency.The futureand thepresentnow emergeas second-
arytonesin thechordalcomposition:thefuturethroughexpectation,the
memory-sustained anticipationthatpastpatternsofexperiencewillrepeat
themselvesin successiveinteractions, allowing relationshipsto be sus-
tainedand reproducedovertime,and thepresentthroughmaneuver,the
improvisationalorientationtoward habitual practices,largelytacit and
unreflective, whichtakes place in ongoingdialoguewithsituationalcon-
tingencies.
Selective attention.-At any given point in the flowof transactions,
social actorsare able to focusattentionupon onlya small area of reality.
As Schutz (1964, p. 283) tellsus, "There is a small kernelof knowledge
thatis clear,distinct,and consistentin itself.This kernelis surrounded
by zones of various gradationsof vagueness,obscurity,and ambiguity."
The qualityof attentiondirectedat any elementor "zone" of knowledge
is conditionedby what Schutz calls "systemsof relevances,"developed
over the course of biographicalhistoriesand past collectiveexperience,
whichalertactorsto elementsofemerging situationsthatrequireattention
and response.The same idea is expressedin the psychologicalnotionof
gestalt,whichshowshow the activityof directingattentionis also linked
to unconsciousprocesses.Many elementsof practicalday-to-dayactivity
may requireonlymarginalclarityof consciousness;yeteven the semiob-
scurezone of habitualtaken-for-granted activityrequiresa selectivefo-
cusingofattentionin orderto singleouttheelementsofresponserequired
to sustaina particularformof interaction.
Recognitionoftypes.-Having directedattention, actorsmustidentify
typicalpatternsof experienceand predicttheirrecurrencein the future;
to do this,theyroutinely constructsimplifying modelsby meansofwhich
theycharacterizerecurrent aspectsof persons,relationships,contexts,or
events.As Schutz(1967) puts it,thisprocessof "typification" takes place
througha "synthesis ofrecognition" by whichactorsrecognizethe"same-
ness,""likeness,"or"analogy"ofan emergingexperiencewiththoseofthe
past, eitherwithinthe actor's directmemoryor withina social memory
as objectifiedin various media of communication(see also Alexander
1988, pp. 301-33). While emergentsituationsnever completelymatch
979
these simplifying idealizations,actorstend to retrospectively assimilate

new experiencesto the old by means of an "enveloping"procedureby
whichdifferences or faulty"fits"are smoothedover throughuse of what
Garfinkel(1984) calls theet ceteraclause. Throughthisactiveprocessof
recognition and assimilation, actorscontribute to a senseofcontinuityand
orderwithintemporallyevolvingexperiences.
Categoricallocation.-Social actors not only identifysimilaritiesbe-
tweenpast and presenttypesof experiences;theyalso locate thesetypifi-
cationsin relationto otherpersons,contexts,or eventswithinmatrices
composedof sociallyrecognizedcategoriesof identityand value. These
matricesmaybe builtupon setsofbinaryoppositions(Levi-Strauss1966;
Douglas 1985; Bourdieu 1977; Alexander1988b),whichdelineatephysi-
cal, social, and normativecategories;as Bourdieu argues,such homolo-
gous systemsofoppositionsconstitute transposableschemasby means of
which fieldsof social relationshipscan be objectivelymapped. On the
otherhand,theseclassificatory schemasmayalso be nonbinaryand com-
posed of morecomplexmultivalentnetworksofrelationships, containing
nuancedlinesofinclusionand exclusion,acceptability and nonacceptabil-
ity,withincrosscutting contextsofaction.Althoughforthemostpartthese
matricesare unreflective and takenforgranted,actorsmuststillexercise
effort in orderto locatecorrectly wheregivenexperiencesfitwithinthem
and thuskeep social relationshipsworkingalong establishedlines.
Maneuver amongrepertoires.-As we have seen, the employmentof
routinesis notmechanicallyor situationally determined; rather,itrequires
a processofselectionfrompracticalrepertoires ofhabitualactivity.While
repertoires are limitedby individualand collectivehistoriesand may be
more or less extensiveand flexible,theydo requirea certaindegreeof
maneuverability in orderto assuretheappropriateness oftheresponseto
thesituationat hand. (Here theiterationaldimensionmostcloselyresem-
bles what we shall laterdescribeas practicalevaluation.)In unproblem-
atic situations,this maneuveringis semiconsciousor taken forgranted,
the resultof an incorporation of schemasof action intoone's embodied
practicalactivity.On the otherhand, the applicationof such repertoires
remainsintentionalinsofaras it allows one to get thingsdone through
habitualinteractionsor negotiations(allowingBourdieuto speak of the
paradox of "intentionless As Bourdieu notes,theremay be
intentions").
much ingenuityand resourcefulness to the selectionof responsesfrom
practicalrepertoires, even whenthiscontributes to thereproduction of a
givenstructureof social relationships.
Expectationmaintenance.-One of the resultsof the variousformsof
schematization describedabove is thattheyprovideactorswithmoreor
less reliableknowledgeof social relationships, whichallows themto pre-
980
Agency
dict what will happen in the future.These patternsof expectationsgive

stabilityand continuityto action,the sense that "I can do it again," as
well as "trust"thatotherswill also act in predictableways (Schutz 1967;
Garfinkel1963, 1984). (Here we encounterthe subtonein the chordal
structure ofiterationthatmostapproximatestheprojectivedimensionof
agency.)The maintenanceofexpectationsregardinghow oneselfand oth-
erswillact is notan automaticprocess:one's expectationsaboutthefuture
can breakdown(requiringwhatGarfinkelcalls repair)due to disruptions,
misunderstandings, and changes in systemsof relevance.The mainte-
nance workthatgoes intosustainingexpectationshas practicalas well as
ontologicalimportance, allowingnotonlyfora senseofconsistent identity
amidstchange(Pizzorno1986;Melucci 1994),butalso forsocial coordina-
tionwithincontingentand interdependent environments.
Iterationin EmpiricalResearch
The iterationalorientationof agencyhas alreadyproveda richsourceof
researchquestionsin a varietyof social sciencedisciplines.Here we ex-
plorehow such researchopens up a numberofintriguing linesofinquiry
intothereciprocalrelationship-theongoingdialogueor conversation-
between the agency in its iterationalmodalityand a wide range of
temporal-relational contextsof action.
Culturalcompetences.-Researchbuildingupon Bourdieu's notionof
habitusproveshighlyusefulin showinghow different formativeexperi-
ences,such as thoseinfluencedby gender,race, ethnicity, or class back-
grounds,deeplyshape theweb ofcognitive,affective, and bodilyschemas
throughwhichactorscometo knowhow to act in particularsocial worlds.
Ann Swidler(1986) evokesBourdieuin speakingofthe"culturaltoolbox"
of practicalcompetencesthatpredisposeactorsto feela fitwithinsome
actionsand notothers.AlthoughLoic Wacquant (1992b)criticizestheim-
plicitinstrumentalism of Swidler's account,his work on boxingin Chi-
cago ghettoneighborhoodssoundssimilarthemesby exploringhow em-
bodied competencesand classificatory schemas firstlearned withinthe
streetenvironment underlieboxers'subsequentengagementofthe"pugi-
listicfield."Likewise,MicheleLamont's (1992) researchintomoney,mor-
als, and mannersin France and the UnitedStatesexamineshow classifi-
catoryschemas developed withinparticularclass, race, and national
settingsinfluencetheboundaryworkofsocial actorsin articulating tastes
and aspirations,as well as in distinguishing
themselvesfromothersocial
groups.In suchways,thesewritersclaim,theagenticreactivationofsche-
mas inculcatedthroughpast experiencetendsto correspondto (and thus
to reproduce)societalpatterns:"Social structuresand cognitivestructures
981
are recursivelyand structurally linked,and the correspondence thatob-

tainsbetweenthemprovidesone ofthemostsolidpropsofsocial domina-
tion"(Wacquant 1992a, p. 14).
Reproductionthroughcreativity.-Whiletheabove authorstendto fo-
cus uponthe"closenessoffit"betweenthehabitusand subsequentagentic
activity,othersoperatingin a similartraditionemphasizethe conflictual
and contradictory relationshipsbetweenhumanagencyand social repro-
duction.For example,Paul Willis(1977),in his studyof theculturalcre-
ativityofrebelliousworking-class lads,arguesthattheirinteractivelygen-
eratedcriticismand rejectionof middle-classtrajectorieswas shaped by
theirworking-class experienceand leads,ironically, to thereproductionof
theirsubordinateclass position.From a social-psychological perspective,
William Corsaro demonstrateshow childrenreproduceadult culture
throughthecreativeand interactiveelaborationofpeerroutines:"Social-
izationis not somethingthathappensto children;it is a processin which
children,in interactionwithothers,producetheirown peer cultureand
eventuallycome to reproduce,to extend,and to join the adult world"
(Corsaro 1992,p. 175).Likewise,Garfinkel(1984) showsin a famouscase
studyhow "Agnes,"an "intersexed person,"deploystremendous effort
and
ingenuityin orderto negotiatethe taken-for-granted dimensionof social
interactions and therebytopass as a womanaccordingto dominantsocial
norms.While these accountsrepresentheighteneddegreesof conscious
purpose (Garfinkel),creative embellishment(Corsaro), and/or critical
penetration(Willis), and thus brush up against the second and third
dimensionsof agency,the iterationaldimensionremainsprimary,since
choices continueto reflecta deeper stratumof culturallyand social-
psychologically rootedpredispositions, therebycontributing to therepro-
ductionof social structures.
Life coursedevelopment.-Recentresearchon lifecoursedevelopment
also inquiresintothe formativeinfluenceof past experienceson agentic
processes(Berteaux1981; Elder 1985, 1994; O'Rand and Krecker1990).
In the traditionof Thomas and Znaniecki(1918),such researchexplores
the connectionbetweensocial structuresand social-psychological devel-
opment,as manifested in thelifetrajectoriesresultingfromparticularin-
tersectionsof biographyand history.The implicationforagencyis that
neithersocial structures norpsychologicaltraitsin themselvesdetermine
habitsofaction;rather,actorsdeveloprelatively stablepatternsofinterac-
tionin activeresponseto historicalsituations.For example,GlennElder's
(1974) studyof cohorteffectsduringthe GreatDepressiondemonstrates
how familyinteractions amid periodsofeconomichardshipworkto shape
emotionaland culturalresourcesand thusto precondition subsequentlife
careers.Otherresearchers(Kohli 1986;Meyer1986)focusupon theinsti-
tutionalizednatureof lifecoursetrajectories, whichsocializeindividuals
982
Agency
in relationto prestructured stages and pathways;however,theyargue

thatthisdoes not eliminatethe role of agencyin the construction of life
directions:"The individuallifecoursehas to be conceptualizednot as a
behavioraloutcomeofmacrosocialorganizations (orofitsinteractionwith
psychologicalproperties oftheindividual)butas theresultofthesubject's
constructive activityin dealing withthe available lifecourseprograms"
(Kohli 1986,p. 272).
Typification withinorganizations.-Finally,the importanceof habit
and routinein shapinginteractions is stressedin organizationalanalysis,
particularlyby the so-callednew institutionalists (Powell and DiMaggio
1991;Meyerand Rowan 1991;Zucker1977,1983;March and Olsen 1976,
1984).Reactingagainstoverlyinstrumental and purposiveviews oforga-
nizationallife,manyoftheseresearchers draw heavilyupon ethnometho-
dological,phenomenological, and cognitiveapproaches,emphasizingthe
routinized, taken-for-granted (or"scripted")qualityofknowledgeand ac-
tion that makes organizationsrelativelystable and resistantto change.
Institutional decisionsdo notdevelopthroughrationalcost-benefit analy-
sis,butratherare embeddedin establishedroutinesand become"rational-
ized"(and therebylegitimated) onlythroughretrospective accountingpro-
cesses.This approachallowssuchresearchers to arguethatthepersistence
and/orresistanceto changeofpracticeswithinorganizationsmaybe due
less to social sanctionsor to formalstructure thanto thedegreeofinstitu-
tionalizationofinformalpatternsofsharedbeliefsand socializedexpecta-
tions(Zucker 1977; Meyer,Scott,and Deal 1981). The strongformative
influenceofthepast can also be seenin theperseveranceoforganizational
procedureseven in thefaceofinefficiency, due to theimprintoffounding
practicesthatcommitorganizationsto routines(Nystromand Starbuck
1984; Powell 1986).
THE PROJECTIVEDIMENSION OF AGENCY

One keylimitationof manycontemporary theoriesof agencyis thatthey
tendto restrictthe discussionof human agencyto its iterationaldimen-
sion.Whilesuchtheorists as Bourdieuand Giddensdo, in fact,recuperate
the creative,improvisational, dimensionsof the imple-
and foresightful
mentationof practicalschemasof action-what we call here maneuver
and expectation-theyfocusupon a low level of reflectivity and do not
showus how suchschemascan be challenged,reconsidered, and reformu-
lated.14By contrast,we maintainthathumanactorsdo not merelyrepeat
14 This is notto say,on theotherhand,thattheseauthors see changeas impossible;

Giddens'sidea of"discursive and Bourdieu'scallsfora "reflexive
consciousness" soci-
ology"suggestthateach believesa certainincreasein freedomand flexibility
ofaction
is possible,as one becomesmoreconsciousofone's situation.However,theirframe-
983
past routines;theyare also the inventorsof new possibilitiesforthought

and action(see also Joas 1993).To understandthiscreativereconstructive
dimensionof agency,we must shiftour analyticattentionaway from
actors'orientation towardthepast and focusupon how agenticprocesses
giveshape and directiontofuturepossibilities. We arguethatan imagina-
tiveengagementof thefutureis also a crucialcomponentof theeffort of
humanactors.As theyrespondto the challengesand uncertainties of so-
cial life,actorsare capable of distancingthemselves(at least in partial
exploratory ways)fromtheschemas,habits,and traditionsthatconstrain
social identitiesand institutions. This capacityforwhat Mead calls "dis-
tance experience"enables themto reconstruct and innovateupon those
traditions in accordancewithevolvingdesiresand purposes.The subsetof
wordsused to describethisabilityhas rangedfromthestrongly purposive
terminology of goals, plans, and objectivesto the more ephemerallan-
guage of dreams,wishes,desires,anxieties,hopes,fears,and aspirations.
In thisarticle,we termit theprojectivedimensionof human agency.
In our view, projectivity is neitherradicallyvoluntaristnor narrowly
instrumentalist; theformation ofprojectsis alwaysan interactive, cultur-
allyembeddedprocessbywhichsocial actorsnegotiatetheirpathstoward
the future,receivingtheirdrivingimpetusfromthe conflictsand chal-
lengesof social life.The locus of agencyherelies in the hypothesization
ofexperience,as actorsattemptto reconfigure receivedschemasbygener-
atingalternativepossibleresponsesto theproblematicsituationstheycon-
frontin theirlives. Immersedin a temporalflow,theymove "beyond
themselves"intothefutureand constructchangingimagesofwherethey
thinktheyare going,wheretheywant to go, and how theycan getthere
fromwheretheyare at present.Such images can be conceivedof with
varyingdegreesof clarityand detail and extendwith greateror lesser
reach into the future;theyentail proposedinterventions at diverseand
intersecting levels of social life.Projectivityis thus located in a critical
mediatingjuncturebetweenthe iterationaland practical-evaluative as-
pectsofagency.It involvesa firststeptowardreflectivity, as theresponse
of a desirousimaginationto problemsthat cannot satisfactorily be re-
solvedby thetaken-for-granted habitsofthoughtand actionthatcharac-
terizethe backgroundstructureof the social world."5
worksdo nothelpus to analyzethispossibility,
nordo theygiveus thetoolsto recog-
nizeit in thecourseofdoingempiricalresearch.
15Here we need to takegreatcare to avoid misinterpreting
whatwe call thefuture-
orientedaspectofimagination.The desirousimaginationis certainly
directedtoward
thepastas wellas thefuture;thereconstructivedimensionofmemory has beenwell
documentedby researchin thisarea (Hobsbawnand Ranger1983;Schwartz1991;
Halbwachs1992;Olickand Levy 1997;Olick1997).Mead himself (1932,p. 12)makes
thispointby insistingthat"thepast (or the meaningful
structure of thepast) is as
hypotheticalas thefuture."
He also stresses,
however,thatthereasonactorsengage
984
Agency
The Historyof a Concept

Projectivity:
We wishto stressfromtheoutsetthatprojectivity does notalwaysgener-
ate morallysuperioror desirable engagementswith problematicsitua-
tions.Its potentialinventiveness can yieldresponsesas benignand mun-
dane as theprojectsto growa garden,to starta business,or to patch up
a familyrelationship,or as sweepingand destructiveas the projectto
establisha 1,000-yearReich. We also wish to stressthatnot all timepe-
riods,cultures,theoreticaltraditions, or even individualsare equallypro-
jective. As Niklas Luhmann (1990) pointsout, "ancient"conceptionsof
time(accordingto whichan "enduringpresent"confronts a temporalflow
in whichthe futureis largelypredetermined by the past),can be clearly
distinguishedfrom"modern"conceptions,in which experienceis con-
ceivedofas movingtowardan indeterminate future, whichis purposefully
constructedthroughmeans-endsrationality. Moreover,manynon-West-
ern cultureshave alternativeconstructions of the relationshipbetween
past,present,and future,whichconstrainand enable particularformsof
social creativity and reproduction. Our premiseis simplythatthespecific
culturallyembeddedwaysin whichpeopleimagine,talkabout,negotiate,
and make commitments to theirfuturesinfluencetheirdegreeoffreedom
and maneuverability in relationto existingstructures(i.e., it mattersto
whatdegreetheyunderstandtimeas something fixedand determinate, or
conversely, as somethingopen and negotiable).These pointswill become
cleareras we examinethehistoricaldevelopmentofthenotionofprojecti-
vityin philosophicalthought.
Classical and Enlightenment conceptions.-From theHebraic and an-
cientGreektraditions, we gain importantearlyconceptionsoftheprojec-
tivecapacityofhumanbeings.In Exodus and Revolution(1985),Michael
Walzer offersa compellinginterpretation of early biblical narratives,
showinghow visionsby the Jewishpeople of the futureand theirown
relationshipto it-ideas of the covenant,redemption,and promised
land-came laterto influenceChristiannarrativesofredemption, as well
as thediscourseofrevolutionary politicsin themodernworld.Withinthe
in suchimaginative reconstruction ofpastexperience is thattheyconfront emergent

situationsinvolvingnew futurehorizons;thatis, the reconstruction of the past is
carriedoutwith(moreorlessexplicit)reference to future desires,concerns, and possi-
bilities.We can maketheeven stronger claimthatas actionwithina givencontext
becomesmoreself-reflective, thefuturedimensiongainsin salience;thisis implied,
as Joas(1985,p. 192)pointsout,byMead's insistence activity,
thatall self-reflective
regardlessof the richnesswithwhichit engagesthe past,is "essentially referredto
the future.. . . It directsitselfto the organism'spresentattitudesthathave been
formedby the past, becomesaware of theirimplicitreference to the future,and
therebybecomescapable ofexperimentally testingalternative in
futurepossibilities
thepresentand thendeliberately to constructtheplan ofits own action."
985
morestaticdestiny-bound framework oftheancientGreeks,however,the

futuredid not have the centralityit has today as an object of human
imaginationand action (Kearney 1988). Plato was deeply suspiciousof
the imaginationas a source of illusion,irrationality,
and immorality, in
oppositionto the pure,ideal, and eternalworld of rationalform.From
Aristotle'srealistepistemology,on the otherhand, came the beginnings
ofa morebenignview oftheimaginationas a psychologicallinkbetween
sensationand reason,which,while not exactly"productive"in the way
Kant and thelaterRomanticswould see it,did providethebasis forratio-
nal deliberationaboutthefuturebyallowingsocialactorsto transcendthe
boundsofsensibleexperience.Aristotlealso gave us thekeyconceptionof
the telosof actionas a basis formeans-endsrationality, a view thatpro-
videsphilosophicgroundingforprevailingWesterninstrumentalist narra-
tivesabout the future.
Tensionsbetweenthesetwocontributions oftheAristotelian legacycan
later be foundin earlymoderndivisionsbetweenan affirmation of the
moralconscienceand thetranscendental imagination(whichis idealized
as the"privilegedexpressionof humanfreedom"[Kearney1988,p. 175]),
and the abstractlyrational-and imaginativelyimpoverished-instru-
mentalityof the utilitariantradition.These conflictingconcernseventu-
allygainedsystematic expressionin thedualistphilosophyofKant (which
accorded primacy,however,finallyto the "practical"or transcendental
moment),as well as in the Utilitarianand Romanticcurrentsof the late
18thand 19thcenturies.They also gainedexpressionin theHegelianand
Marxisttraditions, withtheirfocusupon thetelosofhistoryand therela-
tionbetweenobjectiveinterests and subjectiveliberation(see Marx 1978).
As we have seen,in present-daysociology,thesecurrentsmoststrongly
manifestthemselves, on theone hand,in rationalchoiceperspectives, with
theirstressupon purposive-rational actionand, on theotherhand,in nor-
mativeapproachesthatstressculturalideals and moralaction,thepursuit
and realizationof ultimatevalues.
Phenomenologicaland existentialistperspectives.-Beginningin the
late 19thcentury,we encounteryet anotherline of reasoning-that of
phenomenology and existentialism-thatcontributes to thedevelopment
the of
of theoriesregarding projectivedimension agency.Buildingupon
Edmund Husserl's (1960) theoryof thetemporalstructureof experience,
as well as thepassionatedialecticsof S0renKierkegaard,philosophersin
this traditiondepict actorsas "thrown"into historicallyevolvingsitua-
tions;out of the anguish,uncertainty, and longingthat arise fromthe
conditionof"becoming,"actorsnecessarily"project"themselvesintotheir
own possibilitiesof being.Reflectionabout thefutureis characterizedby
emotionalengagement, "forwhenexistenceis interpenetrated withreflec-
tion it generatespassion" (Kiekegaard 1944, p. 313). Martin Heidegger
986
Agency
(1962) termsthis dimensioncare (Sorge),the preconsciousaffectiveen-

gagementoftheworldthatconstitutes the"forestructure" ofaction;actors
investeffort in the formulation of projectsbecause in some way or other
theycare about (notjust "have an interestin") what will happen to them
in the future.16 As Jean-PaulSartre(1956) later stresses,this emotional
engagementof the futurealways impliesa thrustto surpass our basic
conditionofincompleteness: "The fundamentalprojectof thefor-itself is
to achieve a coincidencewithwhat it lacks" (Bernstein1971,p. 139).
The bridgefromtheexistentialand phenomenological traditionsto the
sociologicalpreoccupationwithsharedmeaningis made by Schutz(1962,
1967),who stresses"theproject"as a fundamentalunitof action.Schutz
(1967, p. 61) bringsHusserl's basicallyepistemologicalobservationsinto
the realmof actiontheory,pointingout that"themeaningofany action
is its corresponding projectedact." Projectsrepresentthecompletedact-
to-beas imaginedin the futureperfecttense;"The unityof the action is
a functionofthespan or breadthoftheproject"(Schutz 1967,p. 62; em-
phasis in the original).Here Schutz takes up the questionbracketedby
rationalchoice theory:he is interestednot in behavioraloutcomes,but
ratherin how forward-looking (but notalways utility-maximizing)actors
actuallyconstructchoices out of fluidand shiftingfieldsof possibilities.
For Schutz,purposefulactionis rarelyguided by the abstractobjective
analysisof means and ends,or by the clear choice betweenalternatives,
thatrationalchoicetheorists in commonwithParsons
propose(ironically,
[Schutz1978;Joas 1996]).Not onlyis actionlimitedand shaped by typifi-
cationsfrompast experiences,but,moreimportant, bothmeansand ends
are always temporallyevolving,multiplyinflected, and markedby high
degreesofindeterminacy. Plans and purposesundergoa continualprocess
ofprojective"phantasying," in which"raysofattention" are focusedupon
a pluralityof possiblefuturestatesuntilchoicesdetachthemselves,"like
overripefruit,"fromthe subjectivehorizonsof futureactions (Schutz
1967,pp. 67-68).17
Pragmatistperspectives.-Whiletheexistentialist and phenomenologi-
cal traditionshighlight thecentralityofprojectsforhumanlife,theyprove
16 Cornelius
Castoriadis(1987,p. 87) drawsheavilyuponHeidegger-as wellas Aris-
totleand Marx-in his own theoryof"theimaginative of society":"To
constitution
do something, to do a book,to make a child,a revolution, or just doingas such,
is projectingoneselfintoa futuresituationwhichis openedup on all sides to the
unknown."
17In
contrastto mostrationalchoicetheorists, Schutz(1967,p. 69) maintainsthat
choicesare highlyunstableand onlygainrelativeclarityaftertheact has beencom-
pleted,throughex postfactoreflection: "The erroris to supposethatthe conscious
state,whichonlyexistsafterthedeed is done,lies back at some 'pointof duration'
beforetheactual choice."
987
less helpfulin showingwhat projectsare good for-that is, how our pro-
jectivecapacityis essentialto problemsolvingwithina community. Here,
once again,we can turnto the pragmatists, who in additionto theircon-
cern with routine,are deeply attunedto the imaginativeflexibility of
actors' deliberationsabout the future.Dewey (1981, p. 61), forexample,
characterizestheexperimental withthefutureas an essential
relationship
dimensionofhumanaction:"Experiencein itsvitalformis experimental,
an effortto changethegiven;itis characterized byprojection,byreaching
forwardintotheunknown;connectionwiththefutureis itssalienttrait."
Human intelligenceis based upon the capacityto "read futureresultsin
presenton-goings"(Dewey 1981,p. 69); thisprojectivecapacitypermits
thekindof responsivechoiceand inventivemanipulationofthephysical
and socialworldsthatis so essentialtodemocraticparticipation. Likewise,
Mead (1934) stressesthe essentiallyintersubjective dimensionof projec-
tivity,arguingthatour basic self-concept is developedfromthecapacity
to projectourselvesintotheexperiencesofothers.The imaginativecapac-
ityof the "I" to move betweenmultiplesituationallyvariable "me's" is
what constitutesfreedomand maneuverability in relationto established
roles,as well as makingpossiblesocial coordination, joint problemsolv-
ing,and collectiveprojectsofsocial reform. In thepragmatistview,proj-
ects are not constitutedmerelyby "thrownness" intoan uncertainworld
that condemnsus to freedom,but also by the practicalexerciseof that
freedomalong withothersin pursuitof a commongood.
The InternalStructureof Projectivity

As theforegoing discussionsuggests,theconceptofprojectivity has a rich
legacy in philosophyand in sociologicaltheory.Our own conception
builds criticallyupon the insightsof the above-mentionedtheoristsbut
seeks to give a more concreteelaborationof how projectivityactually
worksin social processes.As in the previoussection,we outlineseveral
importantprocessesinvolvedin the projectionof futureaction,keeping
in mind again thattheseoverlap withand feedinto one another,inter-
actingin an open-ended,recursive,and synergistic fashion.We differenti-
ate betweenthreedominanttoneswithinthe internalchordalstructure
ofprojectivity:narrativeconstruction,symbolicrecomposition, and hypo-
theticalresolution.In addition,we again point to secondarytonesthat
orientactorstoward the othertwo dimensionsof time:relationshipsto
the past througha retrospective-prospective processof identification,in
whichpossibletrajectoriesare locatedagainsta backdropof priortypifi-
cationsfromexperience,and relationships to the presentthroughexperi-
mentation,in whichalternativecoursesof actionare tentatively enacted
in responseto currently emergingsituations.
988
Agency
Anticipatoryidentification.-Alternativesare seldom clearly and

neatlypresented,but neitheris the futurean open book. Understanding
the limitedand yetflexiblestructureof futurepossibilitiesinvolvesthe
workof identifying patternsof possibledevelopmentsin an oftenvague
and indeterminate futurehorizon.As Schutz(1967) tellsus, thisanticipa-
torywork is done by means of a retrospective engagementwith one's
prior"stockofknowledge"as storedin typifications, repertoires,and social
narratives.This retrospective-prospective processshowstheessentialrole
of memoryin the mappingof futuretrajectoriesof action.(In thisway,
itdrawsthepastintotheinternalstructure ofprojectivity.)
We draw upon
pastexperiencesin orderto clarifymotives,goals,and intentions, to locate
possiblefutureconstraints, and to identifymorallyand practicallyappro-
priatecoursesofaction.Such anticipatory identifications
are neveraccom-
plishedonce and forall, but ratherare subjectto continualreevaluation
in lightoftheshifting and multidimensional characterofhumanmotiva-
tionsand social relationships.
Narrativeconstruction. -Such identification of typicaltrajectoriesis
closelytiedto theconstruction ofnarrativesthatlocatefuturepossibilities
in relationto moreor less coherentcausal and temporalsequences.While
narrativesare notidenticalwithprojects(sincenarrativesrepresent a par-
ticularculturalstructurethatmay existindependently of intentionality),
theydo provideculturalresourcesby whichactorscan develop a sense
ofmovementforwardin time(i.e.,the proverbialbeginning,middle,and
end). JeromeBruner(1986) notes that the plots of such storiescontain
at least threebasic elements:plight,character,and consciousness;these
elementshelp actorsto visualize proposedresolutionsto lived conflicts
(see also Taylor 1989).All social groupspossessrepertoires of storiesthat
serveas temporalframingresourcesand thathelp to definemembership
in a community(Carr 1986; Somers 1992); the degreeof specificity and
complexitywithwhichfuturesare imaginedis closelyrelatedto the sa-
lienceofexistingnarrativesand the"careers"(White1992)thattheypres-
ent as bothmorallyand practicallyacceptable.While narrativesprovide
"maps ofaction"(Ricoeur1991) and thushelpto institutionalize stagesin
thelifecourse(Meyer1986),theyalso, because oftheirflexibleand meta-
phoricstructure, can be used to experimentally positnew resolutionsto
emergingproblems.
Symbolicrecomposition.-Theprojectiveimaginationworksin a way
analogous to the capacityof metaphorto createsemanticinnovation;it
takes elementsof meaningapart in orderto bringthemback together
again in new unexpectedcombinations.Paul Ricoeur(1991, pp. 173-74)
describesthe imaginationas the "freeplay of possibilitiesin a state of
non-involvement with respectto the world of perceptionor of action."
Actorsplayfullyinsertthemselvesinto a varietyof possible trajectories
989
and spin out alternativemeans-endssequences,therebyexpandingtheir

flexibleresponseto a givenfieldof action.In thisplay ofscenarios,(rela-
tively)freedofpracticalconstraints, symboliccodes,schemas,and narra-
tivescan be creativelyreconfigured due to theirmultivocal,homologous,
and transposablecharacter(Alexander1988, pp. 301-33). This process
has an intersubjective transactionaldimension;forexample,in gamethe-
ory,actorsmakedecisionson thebasis ofimaginativescenariosregarding
the simultaneousimaginativeprojectionsby otheractors(Axelrod1984).
In a potentiallyless agonisticfashion,jointprojectionsofactionscenarios
providecommunicativebases forthe formulationof new strategiesfor
collectiveaction (Melucci 1989),as well as forthe developmentof new
social policies, normativeideals, or ways of organizinginstitutions
(McLoughlin1978; Castoriadis1987).
Hypotheticalresolution.-Aftersurveyingpossiblescenariosofaction,
actorsface the task of proposinghypotheticalresolutionsthat will ade-
quatelyrespondto the moral,practical,and emotionalconcernsarising
fromlived conflicts. The factthatall of our conflictsare overdetermined
and thatour senseofrelevancechangesoverthecourseofa lifetime, usu-
allymeansthatsuchresolutions willbe synthetic in nature;theywilloften
attemptto resolveseveralconflicts simultaneously and to incorporatedif-
ferentfieldsofintendedaction.A careerproject,forexample,mayjointly
addressa person'sdesireformoney,status,accomplishment, and creative
expression,as well as the hope to make a difference in the widerworld.
Likewise,by participating in social movements,one may attemptto re-
solve social problemswhile simultaneouslygainingthe opportunity for
peer recognition, solidarity,rebelliousness,and organizationalachieve-
ment.Whileall oftheseresolutions are notnecessarilypresentat theoutset
as clearly articulatedgoals of action (and may be understood,if at
all, onlythroughex post factoreflection), mostactors,whenpressed,will
give more or less differentiated and multivalentdescriptionsof what
they"want" or "intend"in theirplans to pursue a particularcourse of
action.
Experimentalenactment.-Thisfinaldimensionofprojectivity restson
the borderlinebetweenimaginationand action (and hence betweenthe
futureand thepresent);once scenarioshave been examinedand solutions
proposed,thesehypothetical resolutions maybe putto thetestin tentative
or exploratorysocial interactions.Psychologistssuch as Erik Erikson
(1968) speak of thisas "roleexperimentation," particularly salientduring
adolescence,by means of which individualstryout possible identities
withoutcommitting themselvesto the fullresponsibilities involved.Ex-
perimental enactmentsoftenhave ritualovertones,whichhave beenstud-
ied in versionsof symbolicinteractionism (Goffman1959) as well as dra-
990
Agency
maturgicanthropology. VictorTurner(1974),forexample,describesthe
"social dramas"thatare enactedduring"liminalperiods"in whichsocie-
tiesritualistically
reversesocial roles.AlthoughTurnerstresseshow such
dramas reinforce the social order,we would argue thattheseliminalex-
perimentalperiodsmay also have a transformative and renovationalef-
fectupon the largerculture,as new possibilitiesforhuman interactions
are imagined,tested,and (perhaps)definedon a collectivescale.
Projectivityin EmpiricalResearch
In consideringhow past patternsof interactionare imaginatively recom-
posed to generatenew futurepossibilities, we open up a richlysuggestive
fieldforsociologicalresearch.This is in contrastwithmuchof empirical
sociology,where,despiteits extensivephilosophicallegacy,the notionof
projectshas largelybeen ignored,due in part to its perceivedsubjective
nature and the apparent incompatibility of "imaginative"phenomena
with behavioral observation,survey techniques,and macrostructural
analysis.We arguethatprojectivity needsto be rescuedfromthesubjec-
tivistghettoand put to use in empiricalresearchas an essentialelement
in understanding processesof social reproductionand change.Many of
theelementsoutlinedabove have, in fact,been addressedby a wide body
of literaturein various social sciencedisciplines,albeit in an undertheo-
rizedand residualway. Here we discussseveraloftheseapproaches(and
theirlimitations),in orderto pointtowardfutureresearchon theinterplay
betweenthe projectivedimensionof agencyand the different temporal-
relationalcontextsof action.
Time perspectives.-While most life course approaches in sociology
have tendedto focusupon theinfluenceofpast experienceson subsequent
life paths, a well-developedsubfieldin social psychologyhas explored
questionsmoredirectlylinkedto projectivity. Since the 1940s,research
has been carriedout on "timeperspective"and itsinfluenceon such mat-
tersas academicsuccessand civilianmorale(Lewin 1948);morerecently,
researchers in thisarea have investigatedchangesin timeperspectivedur-
ingdifferent developmentalperiods,such as childhood,adolescence,mid-
dle adulthood,and old age. Of particularrelevanceto projectivityare
studiesoftheconstruction offutureexpectations, examiningsuch factors
as variabilityin the densityand extensionof imaginedfutureevents,
linkedto cognitivedevelopmentand/orparticularsocial contextssuch as
familyor class background(Cottle and Klineberg1974; Devolder and
Lens 1982;Wessmanand Gorman1977;Greene1986,1990).Whilemuch
ofthisresearchis limitedby overlybehavioraland correlationalassump-
tions,recenttheorists ofnarrativity have added an interpretive dimension
991
to lifecoursestudies(Gergenand Gergen1983,1984,1988;Bruner1986;
Sarbin 1986),exploringhow personalconceptionsabout past and future
are transformed at key momentsof transitionand/orcrisis(Riegel 1975,
1977; Cohler 1982).
Propheticmovements. -A second line of work that directlyengages
projectivity is the extensiveliteratureon prophetic,utopian,and revolu-
tionarymovements.Whilesuchliterature can be criticizedforitsoverem-
phasis on cultural(as opposedto social-structural or social-psychological)
factors,we argue (along withDesroche [1979] and Ricoeur[1991]) that
theprojectiveimaginationas expressedin collectiveideals and aspirations
plays a constitutive, not just an epiphenomenal,role in a wide variety
of historicalphenomena,rangingfrommillenarianmovements,religious
cults,alternativecommunities, and revolutionary organizations, to more
generalizedformsof culturalrevival.For example,NormanCohn (1977,
pp. 16-17) arguesthatmillenarianprojectionsappearingin Europe dur-
ing the llth-16th centuriesresultedin very different kinds of move-
mentsthan the more limitedlocalized peasant or artisanrevoltsof the
period:"The usual desireof the poor to improvethe materialconditions
of theirlives became transfusedwithphantasiesof a world reborninto
innocence througha final, apocalyptic massacre." Likewise, William
McLoughlin(1978,p. 2) claimsthatmajor"greatawakenings"duringpe-
riodsofuncertainty and changein Americanhistoryled to catharticreviv-
als that"eventuatedin basic restructurings of our institutions and redefi-
nitions of our social goals." Finally, both Marxist and non-Marxist
historiansof revolutions(e.g.,Thompson1966, 1993; Walzer 1965, 1980)
explore the projectivedimensionsof revolutionarymovements,which
Walzerdefinesas "consciousattemptsto establisha new moraland mate-
rial worldand to impose,or evoke,radicallynew patternsof day-to-day
conduct."Revolutionitself,he concludes,"is a project"(Walzer 1980,
pp. 202-3).
Framingprocesses.-The projectiveimaginationis also a factorin less
apocalypticformsofsocial movementsand efforts at institutional
reform.
Most work in this well-researched area fails to adequatelytheorizethe
projectivedimension,due in part to the paradigmaticsplit duringthe
1970s and 1980s between"strategy"and "identity"(Cohen 1985). This
split,whichgoes back to theKantian divisionbetweeninterestsand ide-
als, has had the effectof severingtwo intrinsically linkeddimensionsof
projectivity:strategiesare strippedofmeaningand reflexivity, whileiden-
titiesare temporally flattenedout and shornoftheirorienting power(Mis-
che 1994).18Recentattemptsto bringthetwoparadigmstogether (see Mor-
developedthiscritiquein an empiricalstudyof
18 Mische(1997,pp. 7-8) has further
projectivityand social movements,arguingthatthe conceptof projectivity allows
992
Agency
ris and Mueller 1992) have resulted in concepts approximating

projectivity,such as thatofframingin collectiveaction(Snow et al. 1986;
Snow and Benford1988; Gamson 1992; Tarrow 1992; foran alternative
formulation, see Steinberg[1996]).Despite its structuralist
overtones,the
notionof frames(or moreaccurately,framingprocesses)"impliesagency
and contentionat the level of realityconstruction" (Snow and Benford
1992,p. 136). Framingis both diagnosticand prognostic:it suggests"a
generalline of actionforamelioratingtheproblemand theassignmentof
responsibility for carryingout that action" (Snow and Benford 1992,
p. 137).In proposingnew social ends as well as different meansforarriv-
ing at them,actorsdraw upon-and sometimesextend,rearrange,and
transform-themasterframesextantin the broaderpoliticalculture.
Institutionalinnovation.-A fourthresearcharea in whichprojectivity
is important (butas yetunderdeveloped)is thatofinstitutional innovation
and change. As we have seen, the new institutionalists reactedagainst
rational-choiceviews of organizationaldecision making by, in effect,
eclipsingtheprojectivedimension,arguingthatinstitutional purposesare
embeddedin routinesthatcometo lightonlyin posthoc accountingprac-
tices.But recently,someorganizationalresearchers (DiMaggio 1988,1991;
Galaskiewicz1991; Fligstein1991;Brintand Karabel 1991)have triedto
recuperatethepurposefuland conflict-driven aspectoforganizationsand
to pay moreattentionto processesofinstitution buildingand reform.Paul
DiMaggio (1991),forexample,invokesthelanguageofprojectivity (albeit
withouttheorizing it)in his studyofthestrugglesofmuseumprofessionals
over the model of art museumto be imposedon a developingorganiza-
tionalfield.DiMaggio (1991,p. 277) showshow opportunities for"profes-
sional projects""reinforced theawarenessthattheywerepartof a collec-
tiveenterprise, and thusthelikelihoodthattheywouldlookto one another
as modelsand as sourcesofinnovation."These projectswereconstructed
by drawingcontentiously upon the"Westernculturalaccount"ofjustice
and progress(Meyer,Boli, and Thomas 1987),showingthe importance
of narrativereconstruction in the developmentof collectiveprojectsof
action.
us to supersedethesplitbetweenrationalchoiceand norm-based (or identity-based)

perspectives on collectiveaction:"Projectsare simultaneously moral,practical,and
politicalinscope,weavingtogether idealsand interests,
protestand proposals,utopian
alternativesand pragmaticassessments ofopportunity structures."
Similarly,projec-
tivitychallengesthedividebetweenrationalchoiceand culturaldeterminism: "Proj-
ectsare themeansby whichactorsimaginatively formulate purposiveactions,but
theseare alwayscomposedfromtheculturalnarratives and repertoiresat hand....
In contrastto theabstractvoluntarism ofrational-choice theory,
moreover, thecon-
struction ofprojectsis situationally
contingent,subjectto learningprocessesand revi-
sion,and alwayssurrounded by a highdegreeof uncertainty."
993
THE PRACTICAL-EVALUATIVEDIMENSION OF AGENCY

The finalvariationwe examinein thechordaltriadofagencyis thatwhich
respondsto thedemandsand contingencies ofthepresent.Even relatively
unreflectiveroutinedispositionsmust be adjusted to the exigenciesof
changingsituations;and newlyimaginedprojectsmustbe broughtdown
to earth within real-worldcircumstances.Moreover,judgments and
choicesmustoftenbe made in theface of considerableambiguity, uncer-
tainty,and conflict;meansand endssometimescontradicteach other,and
unintendedconsequencesrequirechanges in strategyand direction."A
ruledoesn't[just] applyitself;it has to be applied,and thismay involve
difficult,finelytunedjudgments.... There is, as it were,a crucial'phro-
neticgap' betweenthe formulaand its enactment"(Taylor 1993,p. 57).
The problematizationof experiencein responseto emergentsituations
thus calls forincreasinglyreflectiveand interpretive work on the part
of social actors.This exerciseof situationallybased judgmenthas been
variously termed practical wisdom, prudence, art, tact, discretion,
application,improvisation, and intelligence;here we designateit as the
practical-evaluativedimensionof agency.
The primarylocus of agencyin its practical-evaluative dimensionlies
in thecontextualization of social experience.Again,we echo thepragma-
tistsin stressingthecommunicative transactionaldimensionofsuch pro-
cesses; throughdeliberationwith others(or sometimes,self-reflexively,
withthemselves)about the pragmaticand normativeexigenciesof lived
situations,actorsgain in the capacityto make considereddecisionsthat
may challengereceivedpatternsof action. This communicativeprocess
is whatdistinguishes the"strong"situationalmomentofdeliberativedeci-
sion makingfromthe "weak" situatednessof what we call, in the itera-
tionaldimension,tacitmaneuver.By increasingtheircapacityforpracti-
cal evaluation,actors strengthentheir abilityto exerciseagency in a
mediatingfashion,enablingthem(at leastpotentially) to pursuetheirproj-
ects in ways that may challengeand transform the situationalcontexts
of actionthemselves(although,giventhecontingency and uncertaintyof
interactions,the consequencesof theiractionscannotbe controlledand
will often"feedback" in ways thatnecessitatenew agenticinterventions).
PracticalEvaluation: The Historyof a Concept

Despite its long history,the conceptof practicalevaluationhas received
less sustainedand systematictreatment duringmoderntimesthanit did
in the ancientor medieval periods.In contemporary action theoryand
moralphilosophy, it has been overshadowed an
by emphasisupon clear
and explicitrulesof conduct,conceptsthatpermitrelativelylittlescope
fortheexerciseof situationally based judgment.In social theory,modern
994
Agency
concernswithexplicitdecisionproceduresand a widespread"flightfrom
ambiguity"(Levine 1985) and judgmenthave become evidentin a host
of analyticalperspectives-notonlyrationalchoice theory,but also less
explicityet equally instrumentalist conceptionsof social action,dating
back at least to Max Weber's discussionsofZweck-and Wertrationalitat
(Weber 1978).Even Durkheim(1961,pp. 31, 26) sees morality, by defini-
tion,as a "systemof commandments," of special rules [that
"an infinity
are] fixedand specific.""To the extent,"he writes,"thatthe rule leaves
us free[and] does notprescribein detailwhat we oughtto do, the action
beingleftto ourownjudgment,to thatextentthereis no moralvaluation"
(Durkheim1961,pp. 23-24).
Aristotelianperspectiveson practicalwisdom.-We mustreturnonce
again to Aristotle'swritingson ethicsforone of the earliest(and most
fullydeveloped)theoriesofprudenceor practicalwisdom.In markedcon-
trastto later rule-basedtheories,Aristotleholds that "threefeaturesof
'the matterof the practical' . . . show why practicalchoices cannotbe
adequatelyand completely capturedin a systemofuniversalrules"(Nuss-
baum 1986,pp. 303-4): themutability oftheparticular,itsindeterminacy
(complexityand contextualvariety),and its inherentnonrepeatability.19
Also, the values, rules,and principlesthatare constitutive of a good hu-
man lifeare themselvesplural and incommensurable; hence,a concern
forsituatedjudgmentssupplantsany simplebeliefin the unproblematic
applicationofuniversalnormsor imperatives(Nussbaum 1986,pp. 303-
4, 294-95). In Aristotle'sview, practicalwisdom can refervariouslyto
meansor to ends;itcan be eitherstrategicand calculative-in whichcase,
he says,we can speak of personsas beingclever,crafty,or cunning-or
it can be concernedwithbroaderquestionsofthegood lifeitself(Aristotle
1985,p. 153).Aristotlesees practicalwisdomas intrinsically communica-
tive in nature;thatis, it entailsa deep involvementand participationin
an ongoingcommunity of discourse.Far frombeingpurelyindividualor
monological,itremainsopento dialogueand persuasionand is profoundly
implicatedin commonvalues, interests, and purposes.
Theoriesofjudgmentand critical deliberation. -A significant break
withthislegacycomesaboutwithKantianethics,whichregardsprudence
not as a virtue,as did so many earliermoral theories,but ratheras a
vehicleforcold and selfishcalculation,expediency,and pragmatism. And
yet,especiallyin his laterwork,even Kant indirectlyprovidesa theory
ofpracticalevaluation.20 Moreover,he adds thatpracticaljudgments(spe-
19
"Perhapsthemostobviousand astonishing absencefromAristotle's
thoughtforany
modernreaderis thatthereis relativelylittlementionofrulesanywhere intheEthics"
(MacIntyre1981,p. 141).
viewsofprudence,see Kant (1956),pp. 16,37-38; (1964),
20 For Kant's earlycritical
p. 83. For his laterworkon practicaljudgment,see Kant (1971),pp. 389-90. In the
995
cifically,
judgmentsoftaste)fallwithinthepotentiality ofall personssince
they"depend . .. on our presupposing the existence of a commonsense
[sensuscommunis]"(Kant 1951,p. 83). Kant linkssuch "commonsense"
to what he calls thecapacityforan "enlargedmentality," in whichjudg-
mentis carriedout by abstractingfromone's own limitedexperiencein
orderto put oneselfin thepositionofeveryoneelse and thusto deliberate
over thecollectivegood. Such an idea recallsAristotle'snotionof a com-
munityof discourse,as well as the more distinctively modernthemeof
autonomy,sincejudgmentno longerdependsupon the subjectivityand
capriceof concreteindividuals.
More recentexamplesof theoriesthat fullyembracethe criticaland
dialogic aspects of practicalevaluationcan be foundin the writingsof
JohnDewey, Hannah Arendt,and JurgenHabermas. Dewey subsumes
Kant's insightson reflective judgmentintohisown pragmatist-and emi-
nentlyrelational-theoryof judgment.In "The Logic of Judgmentsof
Practice"(1985),he pointsout thatall suchjudgmentsbeginwitha prob-
lematicexperience,a forkin theroad,whichtheyattemptexperimentally
to resolve.Judgmentsgain intersubjectivevalidityfromassumingthe
standpointof a sensuscommunis,"a wholeofcommoninterestsand pur-
poses"(Dewey 1978,p. 286). Arendt(1984,p. 36) also expandsupon Kant
by maintainingthat reflective judgmentis not limitedto aestheticsbut
represents "themostpoliticalofman's mentalabilities."She buildsupon
Kant's notionof the enlargedmentality, whichshe terms"representative
thinking," describingit as the abilityto see thingsfromthe perspective
ofothers,"an anticipatedcommunication withotherswithwhomI know
I mustfinallycome to some agreement"(Arendt1977a,pp. 220; see also
Arendt1977b;Benhabib 1992b).And finally,Habermas (1990, 1993) en-
gages Kant's doctrineof judgmentwhile insistingthat he is correcting
Kant's ethicalrigorism;to a Kantian "discourseof justification" he adds
a moreAristotelian"discourseof application."In developinghis theory
ofcommunicative action,Habermasretainsa Kantianemphasisupon de-
liberationand intersubjective validity,even as he objectsto theemptiness
of Kantian ethicsitself.21
CritiqueofJudgment, Kant (1951,p. 18) distinguishes

between"determinate" and
"reflective"
judgments; theformermerelysubsumetheparticular undera ruleor uni-
versalalreadygivenforit,whilethelatterare"compelled toascendfromtheparticular
in natureto the universal."For Kant, logicaland moraljudgmentsbelongto the
former category, whilejudgments oftastebelongto thelatterand necessarily
involve
practicalevaluation.
21 A moreambiguous example(fromwithintheKantiantradition) ofimplicit
reasoning
inrespecttopracticalevaluationis Max Weber's(1946)classicdiscussionof"responsi-
ble action"(see also Rothand Schluchter[1979],chap. 2), whichrequiresan "open-
eyed"apprehensionof concretesituationsand of the possible(unintended) conse-
quencesofactionwithinthem.Weber'sanalysisis an ambiguousone because,unlike
996
Agency
Feministtheories.-Meanwhile,manyfeminist thinkerscritically
draw
upon both Aristotelianand Kantian outlookson practicalevaluationin
analyzingthe particularcapacities,experiences,and historiesof women,
while also generalizingfromthese experiencesto develop broader(less
"essentializing")theoriesofmoraland practicalreasoning.One important
contribution is Carol Gilligan's(1982, p. 22) In a DifferentVoice,which
stressesgenderdifferences in theuse of situatedreasoningand a "contex-
tual mode ofjudgment"and therebyseeksto overcomethelimitationsof
Kant's abstractuniversalisticconceptionsof moraljudgmentand action
(e.g.,Kohlberg1981).Froma verydifferent perspective,Donna Haraway
(1988),too,criticizesestablishedunderstandings of"objectivity,"
and calls
insteadfor"situatedknowledges"groundedin theparticularities ofpartial
"limited"locations.Finally,Seyla Benhabibstressesprocessesofdialogue
and publicdeliberationin herown communicative conceptionofpractical
judgment:thereis "no incompatibility," she writes,"betweentheexercise
of moral intuitionguided by an egalitarianand universalistmodel of
moralconversation[Kant]and theexerciseofcontextualjudgment[Aris-
totle]"(Benhabib 1992a, p. 54; see also Benhabib 1987, 1992c).
The InternalStructureof PracticalEvaluation

As the foregoingdiscussiondemonstrates, practicalevaluationas a con-
cept is associatedwithmanydifferent formsof activity:withcognitive,
moral,and aestheticjudgmentas well as withgeneralmodesofpractical
consciousnessand action;withexpansiveideals of universality, together
withmorerestrictive notionsof genderedidentitiesand social positions;
withclevernessand calculation,and yetalso withenlargedthinkingand
public deliberation.Here we examinethe internalstructureof practical
evaluation,showinghow certainof its dimensionsare implicatedin all
of the manifestations mentionedabove. We suggestthatthreedominant
toneswithinitsinternalchordalstructure can be distinguished
as problem-
atization,decision,and execution,all of whichrequirethecontextualiza-
tionofprojectsor ofhabitualpracticeswithintheconcretecircumstances
ofthemoment.We also describetwosecondarytones:theactor'srelation-
ship to the past is based upon the characterizationof a given situation
againstthebackgroundofpastpatternsofexperience;and therelationship
to the futureis characterizedby deliberationover possible trajectories
thoseofDewey,Arendt,and Habermas,itpointstowarda decisionistic ethics("Here

I stand;I can do no other")and greatlydownplaysKant's originalvisionof an "en-
larged"or"representative"(Arendt)thinking.
Weberfailsto theorizetheintersubjec-
tiveprocesseswherebyultimateendsmaythemselves be chosenby reflective actors
in a wise and prudentialfashion.
997
of action,in whichactorsconsideralternativehypothetical scenariosby

criticallyevaluatingtheconsequencesofimplementing thesewithinreal-
worldsituations.
Problematization. -The firstanalyticalcomponentofpracticalevalua-
tion consistsin the recognitionthat the concreteparticularsituationat
hand is somehowambiguous,unsettled, or unresolved.In thecase ofproj-
ects,thisrecognition entailstheapprehensionofpresentrealityas in some
degreeresistantto theirimmediateand effortless realization,posingchal-
lengesin applicationor contextualization. In thecase ofiterationalor ha-
bitual activity,thereis also the problemthat no new situationis ever
preciselythesame as ones thatcame before;all routineactivityfacesnew
contingencies to whichcertainadjustmentshave to be made. Hence the
criticalchallengeof"analogicaltransposition" raisedexplicitly byWilliam
Sewell (1992) and addressedas well by Bourdieu and Giddens. Dewey
referstothisproblemas theobjective"incompleteness" ofsituations:"This
incompleteness is not psychical.Somethingis 'there,'but what is there
does notconstitute theentireobjectivesituation.... The logicalimplica-
tion is that of a subject-matter as yet unterminated, unfinished, or not
whollygiven"(Dewey 1985,p. 15). Somethingmustbe done-some prac-
tical judgmentarrivedat-that will renderthe givensituationunprob-
lematic,settled,and resolved.
Characterization.-The problematiccircumstancesat hand must in
turnbe relatedto principles,schemas,or typifications frompast experi-
ence by whichtheyare characterizedin some fashion.(This component
mostdeeplyimplicatesthe past in the momentof practicalevaluation.)
Does thesituationin questioncall forthe activationof a particularitera-
tionalor habitualactivity?Does it call forthe performance of a specific
duty,or presentitselfas a contextin which the pursuitof a particular
projectofactionis appropriateor even possible?Speakingin specificref-
erenceto moral situations,Benhabib (1992b) termsthis the problemof
"epistemicidentification" (whileAristotlecalls it "perception"or "under-
standing,"and Kant discussesitundertherubricof"reflective judgment").
It requires"respondingto nuanceand fineshading,adapting[one's]judg-
mentto thematterat hand in a way thatprinciples[orschemasofaction]
setup in advance have a hardtimedoing"(Nussbaum 1986,p. 301).Judg-
mentsof thisnatureare emotional(or "passional")as well as cognitive:
"Perceptionis a complexresponseof the entirepersonality"(Nussbaum
1986,p. 309),in whichemotionscan be seen(withAristotle)as themselves
"intelligent,"educable,and inseparablefromintellectuallife.
Deliberation.-Plausible choicesmustbe weighedin thelightofpracti-
cal perceptionsand understandings againstthebackdropofbroaderfields
of possibilitiesand aspirations.(Here the elementof projectivity enters
into processesof practicalevaluation.)Deliberationinvolvesmorethan
998
Agency
an unreflective adjustmentof habitualpatternsof actionto the concrete

demands of the present;it also entails(at least potentially)a conscious
searchingconsiderationof how best to respondto situationalcontingen-
cies in lightof broadergoals and projects.Such considerationcan take
place individualistically or discursively,monologicallyor withinpublic
spaces,recallingtheKantianideal ofan "enlargedmentality." Whileoften
employingstrategicreasoningor means-endsrationality, it can also re-
quire attentionto "what conducesto the end" (Aristotle1985,p. 63; em-
phasis added); it thereforeentailsfurther ofhabitsand proj-
specification
ects as well as determination of the specificmeans foractualizingthem.
Deliberationapplies to conflictamong alternativepossibleends, no less
thanit does to the contextualization of singularends,involvinga search
forthepropercourseof actionto followunderambiguouscircumstances
(Taylor 1985). Finally,deliberationalso entails emotionalengagement
withtheparticularities ofsituations;it stands"on theborderlinebetween
the intellectualand the passional, partakingof both natures:it can be
describedas eitherdesiderativedeliberationor deliberativedesire"(Nuss-
baum 1986,pp. 307-8).
Decision.-Deliberation aims towarddecision(or choice),the resolu-
tionto act hereand now in a particularway. In certaincases,such resolu-
tion entails a highlydiscreteor circumscribedchoice: an actor "finally
arrivesat a decision."In othercases, it blendsindiscriminately into the
flowof practicalactivity,and is onlyclearlyperceivedafterthe fact.In
all of thesecases, it pointsin the directionof action withinthe circum-
stancesofthepresentand yieldsa resolutionto translateengagement with
such circumstances (howeverpassionalor implicit)intoconcrete,empiri-
cal intervention. It shouldbe notedthatnotall choicesreflectunambigu-
ous strategies;forthis reason,Dewey (1940) speaks of flexible"ends-in-
view"ratherthanofclear and fixedobjectives.Certaindecisionsare pro-
visional,tenuous,and opportunistic, as we shall see below;theymayalso
engage(in a synthetic or polysemousmanner)withmorethan one prob-
lematicsituationsimultaneously. Nor do all decisionslend themselvesto
easy formulation and explication.Choicescan be a matteroftacitadjust-
mentor adaptationto changingcontingencies-including feedbacksfrom
experience-as well as the productof articulableexplicitreasoning.
Execution.-If deliberationentailsconsideration orplanning,and deci-
sion marksa movementtowardconcreteaction,thenexecutivecapacity
is thatcapacity"todo thethingsthattendtowardsthemarkthatwe have
set beforeourselves"(Aristotle1985,p. 169).It is a capacityto act rightly
and effectively withinparticularconcretelifecircumstances. Ideally,one
notonlygraspswhat one oughtto do but also how bestto set about it in
the case at hand. To respond"at the righttimes,with referenceto the
rightobjects,towardtherightpeople,withtherightaim,and in theright
999
way, is what is appropriateand best,and this[is what] is characteristic

ofexcellence"(Aristotle1985,p. 44). Sometimesevenjudiciousexecution,
however,entailstragicloss,as whenthefulfillment ofa dutyor realization
ofa particularvisionofthegood requiresthesacrificeof an equallycom-
pellingdutyor good (Hook 1974). Execution,in such cases, marksnot a
happyresolutionbutratherthefulfillment ofa lesserevil.Moreover,even
relativelyunproblematic instancesofexecutionoftencreatenew problems
foractionfurther down the road; feedbackeffectsmay be initiatedover
whichactorsthemselveshave littlecontroland whichtheymaynoteven
intend.In any case, withexecutionor action,the arc of practicalevalua-
tion is complete:not only deliberationand judgment,but executionas
well is requiredforthe contextualization
of our habits,ends,duties,and
projects.
PracticalEvaluation in EmpiricalResearch
Finally,we outlineresearchfindingsthatpertainto empiricalmanifesta-
tionsof practicalevaluation,in orderto conveya clearersense of what
is entailedby this analyticalaspect of agencyand to show how it can
be investigatedsociologically.These findingsunderscorepossiblewaysin
whichpracticalevaluationmightbe elicitedin particularcontextsand in
whichit affectsin turnthe abilityof actorsto engage with,respondto,
and potentiallytransform theirstructuralenvironments.
Temporalimprovisation.-Oneresearcharea thatprovidesinsightinto
the temporalcontextualization of both ritualand purposiveaction in-
cludesstudiesofsequencingprocessesin social interactions. For example,
Bourdieu's investigations of the manipulationof the temporalstructure
of giftexchangereveal that the same gift-giving act can have different
meaningsat different times,alteringtheeffectiveness oftheintendedact.
Temporal strategiesthat enable actorsto controlintervalsbetweenex-
pectedritualtransactions-forexample,by "holdingback or puttingoff,
maintainingsuspense or expectation,"or otherwisemanipulatingthe
"tempos"of action-allow themto gain significant materialand/orsym-
bolic advantages vis-a-vistheirpartnersin exchange (Bourdieu 1977,
p. 71). Additionalexamples of temporalimprovisationinclude "turn-
taking"patternsin everydayconversationalinteractions.Conversation
analystsin the traditionof Schutz and Garfinkel(e.g., Sacks, Schegloff,
and Jefferson 1974) investigatethe subtletiesof timingand delay in the
social organizationoftalk,showingat a microlevelhow agenticmanipu-
lationsoftimeallow actorsto engagein repairwork,to avoid or (alterna-
tively)initiateconflict,and in myriadotherways to advance theirown
interests.
Resistance,subversion, -Another openingforpractical
and contention.
1000
Agency
judgnientcan be seen in the "proceduresand ruses"(De Certeau 1984)

by which actors can resistand subvertthe logics and practicesof the
establishedorder.Such tacticsare "alwayson thewatchforopportunities
thatmustbe seized 'on the wing'" (De Certeau 1984,pp. xix-xx). They
utilizean "art of placing blows,"of "gettingaround the rules of a con-
strainingspace" (De Certeau 1984, p. 18). James Scott (1985, 1990) ex-
plorestheuse ofsuch "tacticsof resistance"amongoppressedgroupsand
individuals;in hisstudiesofMalay villagers,as wellas in broadercontexts
ofslavery,serfdom, caste subordination, colonialism,racism,and patriar-
chal domination,he uncoversstrikingly similarpatternsof disguiseddis-
sent fromwhat he terms(echoingGoffman[1959]) "official"or "public
transcripts." In examiningmoreovertinstancesof resistanceand collec-
tive action,Charles Tilly (1986, 1994) also underscoresthe shrewdness,
tact, and situationalawareness of individualsand groups,even in the
implementation ofwhathe calls "repertoiresofcontention"; they"perform
in dramasin whichtheyalreadyknowtheirapproximateparts,[but]dur-
ing whichtheynevertheless improviseconstantly" (Tilly 1994,p. 15).
Local or prudentialaction.-Yet anotherwindow of opportunity for
practicalevaluationarisesin thosestructural situationsin whichno clear
expectationsforactionapply in thefirstplace, settingsin which,as Eric
Leifer(1988,p. 865) putsit,"rolesare not 'givens' thatconstraininterac-
tion,but somethingthatactorsmustacquire throughinteraction." These
settings(or"pockets")ofroleambiguitynecessitatewhatLeifercalls "local
action," in which actors in face-to-facecompetitionavoid claiming
"global"rolesuntiltheirpartnerssignalthatsuchroleswill be recognized.
A powerfulillustration is providedbyJohnPadgettand Christopher An-
sell's (1993) studyoftheriseoftheMedici in earlymodernFlorence.Pad-
gettand Ansell(1993,p. 1264,n.9) complicateLeifer'smodelof local ac-
tionbyspeakingof"an entirelinkedecologyofgames,each gamelayered
on top of another,"ratherthanof one single,unitarygame. But bothac-
countsconcuron the importanceof "flexibleopportunism-maintaining
discretionary optionsacross unforeseeablefuturesin the face of hostile
attemptsby othersto narrowthose options"(Padgettand Ansell 1993,
p. 1263).
Political decisionmaking.-A highlycontextualizedanalysisof politi-
cal leadershipand decisionmakingcan be seen in workof such authors
as AlfredStepan(1978) and GuillermoO'Donnell and PhilippeSchmitter
(1986) on thebreakdownof(and transitions to) democracy.These writers
describeopen-endedand contingent sequencesofaction,underscoring the
uncertainties and multiplepossibilitiesconfronting actorsat each stageof
complexreversibleprocesses;whethertheybe "hardliners,""softliners,"
oppositionalpublics,or militarymen,politicalleadersrequire"good . ..
judgmentto testthelimitsofa situation"(O'Donnell and Schmitter1986,
1001
p. 27). More counterfactually,BarringtonMoore (1978) analyzesleader-,

shipchoicesin his discussionof"thesuppressionofhistoricalalternatives"
in GermanyafterWorld War I, choices that mighthave led to a more
stable regimeand therebyavoided the horrorsof Nazism. (That is, was
a different
policypossible?Whywas itnotattempted?How aboutalterna-
tive tactics,strategy,and timing?)Leon Trotsky's(1980) assessmentof
thepivotalrolethatLeninplayedin themakingoftheRussianRevolution
is anotherclassic analysis of situationallycontingentdecision making;
morerecently, TimothyGartonAsh (1990) has analyzedthe decisiveyet
almostseat-of-the-pants way in whichleaders of the Velvet Revolution
orchestrated and channeledeventsin Czechoslovakiaduringthe crucial
monthsof mid 1989.
Deliberationin publics.-One of the most importantapplicationsof
judgment,and by extensionof the capacityforhuman agencyitself,is
deliberationover theproperappropriateends of action-over what con-
duces to theseends. Empiricalstudiesof civil society(Cohen and Arato
1992) and of "publicsin history"(Emirbayerand Sheller 1996; see also
Emirbayer1992a,1992b)closelyexaminesuchagenticprocessesof"repre-
sentativethinking"and collectivedeliberation.For example,JaneMans-
bridge's(1983) ethnography of a New England townmeetingand of an
urbancrisiscenterconcludesthatcitizenboards are mosteffective when
thejudgmentand experienceofmemberscontributes to commonproblem
solving.SeymourMartinLipset,MartinTrow,and JamesColemanexam-
ine theinternaldynamicsofdeliberationwithinparticipatory workplaces
in theirclassicsociologicalstudy,UnionDemocracy(1962).More recently,
analystssuch as Alain Touraine and his associates (1983), Lawrence
Goodwyn(1991),and Roman Laba (1991) have investigatedtheprocesses
of collectivedeliberationthatprevailedat thegrassrootslevel duringthe
Solidaritymovementin Poland. They demonstratehow Polish citizens
arrivedat judgmentsregardingthe verynatureof theirmovement,its
ultimateends,and even the ideals to whichtheyaspiredthroughdemo-
craticdiscourse,dialogue,and debate withinpublic spaces.
CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In thisfinalsectionwe turnto the questionof how the threedimensions
of agency-iteration,projectivity, and practicalevaluation-enter into
differentand changingrelationships withthetemporal-relational contexts
ofaction.The challengehereis to analyzethevariablenatureoftheinter-
play betweenstructureand agency,ratherthan to understandthese as
eitherstandingin insurmountable opposition,or, as in currentlyinfluen-
tialtheorizations,
being"mutuallyconstitutive" in a directand stableway.
1002
Agency
We contendthatas actorsalteror shiftbetweentheiragenticorientations,

theinternalcompositionoftheirchordaltriad,
dialogicallyreconstructing
theymay increaseor decrease theircapacityforinvention,choice,and
transformative impactin relationto thesituationalcontextswithinwhich
theyact. Such a conceptionopens up compellingquestionsforfuturere-
searchacross manydifferent empiricalsubfields.
Structure,
Action,and Agency
A varietyofrecentattemptsto rethinktherelationship betweenstructure
and agencyhave arguedthatthe Kantian dichotomybetweenideal and
materialrealms-togetherwithparalleldistinctions betweenfreewilland
necessity, voluntarismand determinism-mustbe replacedbyan outlook
thatregardstheseelementsas reciprocally constitutingmomentsofa uni-
fiedsocial process.Seminal workin thisarea includesBourdieu's (1977,
1990) attack on the divisionbetweensubjectivismand objectivism,as
well as Giddens's(1979,1984)theoryofstructuration, whichcharacterizes
structure and agencyas mutuallyconstitutive (and henceinseparable)ele-
ments.This notionhas been a salutaryand fruitful one forsociological
theory,making possible empiricalresearchthat underscoresboth the
causal significanceof structureas the constrainingand enablingcondi-
tionsof action,and of praxis as "an active constituting process,accom-
plishedby,and consistingin,thedoingsofactivesubjects"(Giddens1976,
p. 121). But it has also broughtin its trainseveraltheoreticaldisadvan-
tages.Foremostamongtheseis a tendencytowardwhatMargaretArcher
(1982, 1988) termsthe "fallacyof centralconflation": the tendencyto see
structureas so closelyintertwined witheveryaspectofpracticethat"the
constituentcomponents[of structureand agency]cannot be examined
separately.... In the absence of any degreeof autonomyit becomesim-
possible to examinetheirinterplay"(Archer1988, pp. 77, 80; emphasis
in the original).22
speaking,Archermeansby "centralconflation"
22 Strictly an elisionof thetwo key
elementsof "CulturalSystem"and "Sociocultural Interaction."
We generalizefrom
hercriticismsto makea broaderpointabouttherelationship betweenagencyand its
pluralityofstructural If,as Archer(1988,pp. 89-90) putsit,"thepowersof
contexts.
Mephistopheles [structure]
ultimately dependon Faustus[agency]continuing to in-
vokethem,"theconstraining and enablingpowersofspecificactualstructures cannot
be determined.Andcorrespondingly, ifactors"areassumedtoenjoya constant degree
oftransformative thenthecircumstances
freedom," underwhichoneencounters "more
voluntarism" or "moredeterminism" also cannotbe specified(on thispoint,see also
Alexander[1994]).
1003
What becomeseclipsedin the notionof the inseparability of structure

and agencyis thedegreeofchangeability or mutability ofdifferent actual
structures, as well as the variable (and changing)ways in which social
actorsrelateto them.In mostcentral-conflationist views,theconstitutive
relationshipbetweenagencyand structureis held analyticallyconstant.
We argue,by contrast,thatwhilethetemporal-relational contextsof ac-
tioninfluenceand shape agencyand are (re)shapedby it in turn,thefor-
mer is neverso deeplyintertwinedwith everyaspect of the latterthat
thesedifferent analyticalelementscannotbe examinedindependently of
one another.The agenticorientations of actors(along withtheircapacity
forinventiveor deliberativeresponse)mayvaryin dialoguewiththedif-
ferentsituationalcontextsto which(and bymeansofwhich)theyrespond.
Whilehumanagencyrepresents thepossibilityforimaginativedistancing
from(and communicative evaluationof) receivedstructures, agenticpro-
cesses themselvesassume diverseempiricalformsin responseto thespe-
cificcontextswithinwhichactionunfolds.We mighttherefore speak of
the doubleconstitutionofagencyand structure: temporal-relational con-
textssupportparticularagenticorientations, whichin turnconstitute dif-
ferentstructuring relationships of actorstowardtheirenvironments. It is
theconstitution ofsuch orientations withinparticularstructuralcontexts
that gives formto effortand allows actorsto assume greateror lesser
degreesof transformative leveragein relationto the structuring contexts
of action.
Here it is importantto be perfectly clear about our analyticaldistinc-
tions:the foregoingformulations are based upon a threefolddifferentia-
tion betweenagency,action,and structure.While what we have called
"agenticorientations" varyin theirconcretemanifestations, agencyitself
remainsa dimensionthatis presentin (butconceptuallydistinctfrom)all
empiricalinstancesof humanaction;hencethereare no concreteagents,
but only actors who engage agenticallywith theirstructuring environ-
ments.We concurwithAlexander(1992,pp. 1-2) thatthe"identification
ofactorand agency"rendersone "guiltyof[thefallacyof] misplacedcon-
creteness.Ratherthanreplacingor reinterpreting thefamiliardichotomy
betweenactorsand structures, [this]identification. . . actuallyreproduces
it in anotherform.... Actorsper se are muchmorethan,and [simulta-
neously]much less than,'agents' [alone]."All social actionis a concrete
synthesis,shaped and conditioned,on the one hand, by the temporal-
relationalcontextsof action and, on the other,by the dynamicelement
of agencyitself.The latterguaranteesthat empiricalsocial action will
neverbe completely determinedor structured.On the otherhand, there
is no hypothetical momentin whichagencyactuallygets"free"of struc-
ture;it is not,in otherwords,some pure Kantian transcendental will.
1004
Agency
EmpiricalPropositions
Given these theoreticalformulations, the empiricalchallengebecomes

thatof locating,comparing,and predictingthe relationshipbetweendif-
ferentkinds of agenticprocessesand particularstructuring contextsof
action. Here we take a step beyondimportantrecentinitiativesin this
direction,such as thatof Sewell (1992),whichfocusesprimarilyupon the
structuralsideofsuchvariation.WhilebuildingupontheworkofGiddens
and Bourdieu,Sewell (1992,p. 16) criticizestheoverlyreproductive con-
ceptionsoftheseauthors,arguingthat"a theoryofchangecannotbe built
intoa theoryof structure untilwe adopt a farmoremultiple,contingent,
and fracturedconceptionof society-and of structure."Agency,in his
view,consistsprimarily in thecapacityofresource-equipped actorsto act
creativelythroughthetransposition ofexistingschemasintonew contexts.
He notesthat"agencydiffersenormouslyin both kind and extent,"but
attributesthisdifference primarilyto the"natureof theparticularstruc-
turesthatinformthosesocial worlds"(Sewell 1992,pp. 20-21). Whilethis
frameworkallows Sewell to advance several highlysuggestiveproposi-
tionsregardingdifferent rates of change among such structuresas lan-
guage,states,and capitalisteconomies,he failsto offeranytheorization of
differences in agenticcapacitythatare notinseparablyboundtostructural
qualities. Moreover,he does not examine the internalcompositionof
agencyitself,and, in particular,the temporalorientations of agencythat
we have discussedin thisarticle.
Wheremightwe lookforevidenceofsuchvariationin agenticcapacity?
How mightwe locate what we have called the double constitutionof
agencyand structure (i.e.,how temporal-relationalcontextsconstitutethe
patternsofresponsethatshape agenticorientations, whichgo on to consti-
tute different mediatingrelationshipsof actorstoward those contexts)?
Buildingupon Mead's suggestionthatit is thesocialityofexperiencethat
drivesthedevelopmentof agenticcapacities,we offerthreelinesofques-
tioningthroughwhichtheseanalyticalformulations mightpointto new
initiativesin empiricalresearch.
1. How do different temporal-relational contextssupport(or conduce
to) particularagenticorientations?This initialquestionmightbe consid-
ered the firstconstitutivedimensionof the studyof agency,in which
agenticorientationsare held steadyin orderto examinethe formative
influencesupon themof different kindsof situationalcontexts.The task
here is to locate which sorts of social-structural, cultural,and social-
psychologicalcontextsare moreconduciveto developingthedifferent mo-
dalities of agencythat we have outlinedin this article.What kinds of
settingsand situations,forexample,tendto keep actorsengagedin main-
1005
tainingthehabitualschematicresponsesand relationsthathave become

embodiedand institutionalized in past experiences?What kindsof con-
textsprovokeor facilitatethemtowardgainingimaginativedistancefrom
thoseresponsesand therebyreformulating past patternsthroughthepro-
jection of alternativefuturetrajectories?And finally,what sortsof con-
textsconstrainor enable theircapacityforcommunicativedeliberation,
by means of whichtheyjudge whichparticularactionsare mostsuitable
forresolvingthepracticaldilemmasofemergent situations?The goal here
is to locate particularpackages of commonlyoccurringstructure-agency
relationships, acrossa wide rangeofhistorical, institutional,and interper-
sonal contexts.23
We can startin thisdirectionbybuildingupon Swidler's(1986) distinc-
tionbetween"settled"and "unsettled"times.Duringstablehistoricalpe-
riods,she suggests,mostpeopleunproblematically employestablishedcul-
turalcompetences;however,duringperiodsof upheaval, otherformsof
agenticactivitymay come into play. While certainsets of actorsmight
resistchangeand hold tightlyto past routines(such as local or national
traditions)in an attemptto ward offuncertainty, othersmay be more
likelyto engagein projectiveactivity(as expressedin ideologiesand uto-
pias) as theyseekto imaginealternativefuturesfora problematicpresent.
As a countereffect, the strongfutureorientations provokedby historical
changemightinhibitactors'responsiveness to situationalcomplexity and
practicalexigencies(as expressedby ideologicalrigidity or lack ofnegoti-
ating capacity).In response,later momentsin a historicalchange cycle
mightbringmorepracticallyevaluativenegotiators and institutionbuild-
ersto thefore.We contendthatinsightintosuch processescan be gained
by lookingat the agenticorientationssupportedby periodsof stability
and/orchange.This recallswhat Mead termsthe temporaldimensionof
sociality:actorsengaged in emergenteventsfindthemselvespositioned
betweenthe old and the new and are thusforcedto develop new ways
of integrating past and futureperspectives.We can formulatethisas an
exploratory proposition,a probabilisticaxis along whichto directempiri-
cal research:Actorswhoface changingsituationsthatdemand(orfacili-
tate) thereconstruction oftemporalperspectives can expandtheircapacity
for imaginativeand/ordeliberativeresponse.
We can also tacklethisquestionin anotherway by focusingupon the
relational(ratherthan the temporal)dimensionof sociality(i.e., the em-
23 We bracket forthepurposesofthisarticlethequestionofhowdifferences in agentic

orientation can be empirically
measured,althoughthiscertainlyposesa challengefor
futureresearch.We also resistcallingagenticorientations"variables"in any linear
orcausalsense(Abbott1988),inordertostresstherecursivity andmultiple determina-
tionof all social processes.
1006
Agency
beddednessofactorsin multiplecultural,social-structural, and social-psy-

chologicalcontexts).A compellingstartingplace is Rose Laub Coser's
(1975,p. 239) elaborationofMerton'stheoryof thedevelopmentof indi-
vidual autonomyfromthe complexityof role sets: "The multiplicity of
expectationsfaced by the modernindividual,incompatibleor contradic-
toryas theymaybe, or ratherpreciselybecause theyare,makesroleartic-
ulation possible in a more self-consciousmannerthan if therewere no
such multiplicity." The implicationhere,supportedby Coser's research
amongnursingpersonnel,is thatactorswho are locatedin morecomplex
relationalsettingsmustcorrespondingly learn to take a widervarietyof
factorsinto account,to reflectupon alternativepaths of action,and to
communicate, to negotiate,and to compromisewithpeople ofdiversepo-
sitionsand perspectives-all qualities,she argues,thatsupportmoreau-
tonomouspersonaland occupationalidentities(and, by extension,more
imaginativeand reflective engagementswiththe contextsof action).An-
otherintriguing researcharea relatesvariationin agenticcapacityto insti-
tutionalcomplexity;forexample,in his previouslymentionedwork on
museumreform,DiMaggio (1991) argues that the creationof a profes-
sional environment at the interorganizationallevel leads to morecritical
discourse,formalequality,and purposefulsearchforalternatives, in con-
trastto theroutine,hierarchy, and scripted forms of rationality
thatpre-
dominateinsideorganizations. Whilesomeresearchers have begunto look
at how choicemakingand careersare embeddedin complexnetworkin-
teractions(Abbottand Hrycak1990;Abbott1997a; Pescosolido1992),lit-
tle attentionhas yet been given to how differently structurednetworks
and careerssupportvariable agenticorientations.We can build upon
thesefindingsby formulating anotherexploratory propositionto serveas
a secondaxis forempiricalinvestigation: Actorswhoare positionedat the
intersectionof multipletemporal-relational contextscan developgreater
capacitiesfor creativeand criticalintervention.
These formulations maybe extendedto thestudyofactorsin brokerage
positions,longconsideredan exemplaryinstanceofagenticactivity.Such
social, political,and economicentrepreneurs seize opportunities forpur-
posiveintervention by maneuveringback and forthbetweendifferent so-
cial networksas well as culturalor social-psychological settings.While
thecriticalroleof brokershas been well documentedby anthropologists,
politicalscientists,economists,and social networkanalysts(Wolf 1956;
Geertz1960;Boissevain1974;Marsden1982;Fernandezand Gould 1994),
less attentionhas been paid to the kindsof temporalconstructions (and
agenticorientations) thatthesebrokeragepositionsmaysupport(Mische
1997; Gibson and Mische 1995). Our analysisraisesa seriesof questions
in thisvein: are actorsin such bridgingpositionsmoreproneto projecti-
vityand practicalevaluationthanthosein moreboundedtight-knit con-
1007
texts,given the greateravailabilityof resourcesfor hypotheticalre-

arrangementand comparative evaluation of possible trajectoriesof
action? Does the capacityto draw, when needed,upon different forms
of routinizedrelationships, or conversely,purposivelyto manipulate,to
extend,or to transposetheseacrosschangingcontexts,underlietheirabil-
ityto gain greatercontroland directivityoverthevariouscontextswithin
whichtheyact?
2. How do changesin agenticorientations allowactorsto exercisediffer-
entformsofmediationovertheircontextsofaction?This secondquestion
requiresthatwe reverseourinitialqueryin orderto examinehow changes
in agenticorientations give actorsvaryingcapacitiesto influencethe di-
verse contextswithinwhich theyact. While the foregoingpropositions
seem to providea relativelystraightforward and optimisticset ofscenar-
ios-actors positionedin moretemporallyand relationallycomplexset-
tingsmayhave morenecessityand/oropportunity to developthecapacity
forinventiveand deliberativeintervention-herewe runintogreaterana-
lyticaldifficulties.
As anystudentofsocialprocessesknows,agenticcapac-
itiesare onlyone side ofthequestion;just because actorsdesireor attempt
to intervenedoes notmean thattheirinterventions will have thedesired
effects.Both Giddensand Sewell (amongothers)have takencare to high-
lighttheunintendedconsequencesof action,and a similarpointhas been
made byMarshallSahlins(1981, 1985,1991)in a strikingseriesofstudies
on the interplaybetweenthe reproductiveand transformative effectsof
action.While a studyof such consequencesis by definition exceedingly
complexand beyondthe scope of thisessay,we can alertresearchersto
some of the paradoxical or counterintuitive situationsthat a studyof
agency'sinterplaywithstructuremightreveal.
For example,an analysisofthemultiplexnatureofagenticorientations
can helpto unpackthefollowingparadoxicalobservation:Actorswhofeel
creativeand deliberativewhile in theflow ofunproblematic trajectories
can oftenbe highlyreproductive ofreceivedcontexts.To understandthis
phenomenon,we must recall that actors are always simultaneously lo-
cated in a varietyof temporal-relationalcontextsat once; thisis reminis-
centofGoffman's(1974)stressuponthemultipleembeddingsofsituations
in differentframesor vantagepointson action.We can extendGoffman's
imageryby suggestingthat it is possibleto be (primarily)iterationalin
one frame,projectivein another,and practical-evaluative in yeta third.
Moreover,a switchin framescan reveal apparentcontradictions in the
reproductive ortransformative consequencesofaction.Take, forexample,
the case of actors who successfullyfollowestablishedoccupationalca-
reers,in whichtheyexperiencea considerabledegreeofcreativeand prac-
ticalrealization.Fromtheperspectiveoftheirown professional lives,they
are exercisinga high degree of personal agency;most likely,theyare
1008
Agency
highlyfutureorientedin formulatinggoals and objectives,and well

equipped withflexiblecommunicativeskills,givingthemthecapacityto
creativelysolve emergentproblemswithinthe contextof the workplace.
On the otherhand, these same actions can be reframedto show their
privilegedpositioningin relationto othersimilarlyestablishedcareertra-
jectorieswithina particularsocial-structural matrixat a givenhistorical
conjuncture.It maybe shown,in fact,thatsuch actorsare extremely un-
questioning(and iterational)in relationto theselargertemporaland rela-
tional patternsof action. By "swimmingwith the current"(Blair-Loy
1997), theyunhesitatingly reproducelargerschemas,helpingto lock in
place social, political,and economiccontexts,which,however"unjust"
theymay appear in an expanded perspective,afterall serve the actors
well withintheirown personaland professionallives.
An analysisofshiftsin agenticorientations can also shedlightuponthe
converseobservation:Actorswhofeelblockedin encountering problematic
situationscan actuallybe pioneersin exploringand reconstructing con-
textsofaction.Here again we build fromthepremisethatactorsmay be
capable ofswitchingbetweenagenticorientations and therebyexercising
different mediatinginfluencesupon theircontextsof action.In thiscase,
we can take as an examplethosewho feelthattheirattemptsto follow
establishedtrajectoriesare blocked by the social, political,or economic
relationsoftheday (e.g.,thecase of womenenteringmale-dominated ca-
reers[Blair-Loy1997],or of membersof any excludedgroupseekingen-
tranceinto a previouslybarred arena). It may be that the reason such
bordercrossersexperiencedifficulties is that theyhave alreadyprojec-
tivelyexpandedand recomposedtheirproposedfieldsof action(e.g.,the
experienceof thoseinvolvedin heady discussionsof social reform, such
as thecivilrights,feminist,or gayand lesbianrightsmovements), butthat
whentryingto implementthosereforms in practice,on eithera personal/
professionalor institutional/legalscale, theyencounterhard barriersof
interpersonal and institutionalconventions.Such actorsmaynotyethave
developedthepractical-evaluative skillsneededto deal withtheambigu-
ities and dilemmasof new and unexpectedsituations;theymay in this
case fallback intoheavilyscripted(or iterational)patternsofinteraction,
in whichconventionalroles(e.g.,mother,seductress,maidenaunt in the
case of womenin businesscareers[Kanter1977])are transposedintothe
new contexts(see also Tilly 1998). On the otherhand, as such pioneers
make inroadsinto previouslysegmentedfields,theymay also findnew
and creativeways of fusing,extending,and transforming thesereceived
schemas,as theyexperiment withpracticalstrategies to confronttheemer-
gentchallengesof historically changingcircumstances.
3. How do actorsreconstruct theiragenticorientations and therebyalter
theirown structuring relationshipsto the contextsofaction? Finally,we
1009
focusupon the researchquestionsopenedup by theself-reflexive dimen-

sion of agenticorientations, thatis, the capacityof actorsto reflectively
reconstructtheirown temporalorientationstoward action. In Mead's
(1932, p. 72) terms,thisis due to the abilityof consciousbeingsto direct
attentionand intervention towardtheirown patternsof response:"Life
becomesconsciousat thosepointsat whichtheorganism'sown responses
enterintotheobjectivefieldto whichit reacts."Importantworkin social
psychology has focusedupon thedevelopmentofsuch criticalself-aware-
ness,oftenbuildinguponMeadian conceptionsofcommunicative interac-
tion(Cottrell1969;Denzin 1988;Callero 1991;Schwalbe 1991).Of partic-
ular relevance here is previously mentioned work on life course
development,withits focusupon trajectoriesand turningpoints(Elder
1985; George1993),especiallyworkexaminingthesubjectiveand/ornar-
rativereconstruction of the selfthroughself-interpretive activityduring
criticallifetransitions (Cohler1982).The temporaldimensionofsuchself-
construction was stressedthreedecades ago byErik Erikson,who showed
how conceptionsof timedevelop and changeat keytransitionalperiods
in thelifecycle;forexample,a criticaltaskofadolescenceis theconstruc-
tionof a sense of a futureconnectedwitha past, as manifestedin a per-
sonal identitythat"includesa subjectivesense of continuousexistence"
(Erikson1968,p. 61). Likewise,researcherson adulthoodand aginghave
notedself-reflective shiftsin temporalperspectivesas individualsbecome
less preoccupiedwiththe futureand moreengagedin ruminationsupon
thepast: "Whilereminiscence is used by mucholderpersonsprimarily as
a means of settlingaccountspriorto death . . . middle-agedpersonsare
morelikelyto use reminiscence in an effort
to solve problemsin thepres-
ent"(Cohler 1982,p. 225).
Withso muchattentionto temporalperspectiveswithinthesubfieldof
social psychology, it is remarkablethat so littleof it has made its way
into mainstreamtheoreticaland empiricaltraditionsin sociology.More
workis necessaryin orderto linkthestudyoftemporalconstructions with
the varietiesof agenticactivitythat we have triedto delineatein this
article.We can formulatethisas a finalexploratory proposition:By sub-
jecting theirown agenticorientationsto imaginativerecomposition and
criticaljudgment,actorscan loosenthemselves frompastpatternsofinter-
action and reframetheirrelationshipsto existingconstraints.A classic
exampleis Freudianpsychoanalysis, in whichinterpretive recollectionof
past experienceshas a liberatingeffectupon action;Ricoeur(1970) points
out thatthis processis projectiveas well, suggestingresearchinto how
temporalorientationsare intermingled(and undergochanges) in the
courseof therapeuticprocesses.Anotherexampleis the notionof"cogni-
tive liberation"in the social movementliterature(McAdam 1982), in
which actors "discover"the possibilityof collectiveaction in orderto
1010
Agency
changean undesiredstateofaffairs.In what waysdo such liberatingmo-

mentsrequireor provokea recomposition of the temporalconstruction
oftheself?Underwhat conditionsdo such reconstructions of agenticori-
entationgive actorsgreateror lessertransformative leveragein relation
to theirenvironments? Here we have indicatedonlya fewgeneralcompo-
nentsof thisprocess,the fullscope and dynamicsof whichpose ample
challengesforfutureresearch.
We close with the suggestionthat these propositionsare not merely
relevantformicro-or individual-levelanalysisbut also have important
implicationsfor macrolevelresearch.Abbott(1997b),for example,has
suggestedthatthe conceptof "turningpoints"has extensionsoutsideof
lifecourseresearch,includingstudiesof politicalrealignments, business
progress(notto mentionsocial movementsand revo-
cycles,and scientific
lutions).24We can pose thefurther queryas to whetherpartof what hap-
pens duringsuch periodsis a reformulation of the temporalorientations
that shape the self-understandings of collectiveas well as individual
actors.Here we echo Aminzade's(1992,p. 470) call fortheories"thatlink
theobjectivetemporalities oflong-term historicalprocessesto thesubjec-
tivetemporalorientations ofsocial actors."Historicalactionsand choices
are deeplyconditionedby how collectiveactorsconceiveof the binding
powerofthepast,themalleabilityofthefuture,or thecapacitiesofactors
to intervenein theirimmediatesituations.Researchershave shown,for
example, how cyclical (more iterational)and/or linear (more future-
oriented)conceptionsof timecan place "different limitson the rangeof
adaptive responsesto new circumstances"(Aminzade 1992, p. 472; see
also Lauer 1973;Goldstone1987,1988);such differences in temporalper-
spectivescan have criticaleffectsuponthecohesionor longevityofdiffer-
entformsofcommunity organizationand/orcollectiveaction(Hall 1978).
Yet, despitea fewsuggestivestudies,we stillhave littleunderstanding of
the dynamicsby which historicalchanges in agenticorientationstake
place. We need furtherstudiesof the communicativeprocessesof chal-
lenge,experimentation, and debatebywhichactorsformulate new tempo-
rallyconstructedunderstandings of theirown abilitiesto engagein indi-
vidual and collectivechange,as well as how thesemicrolevelprocesses
intersectwith longer-term social, political,and economic trajectories.
24 Abbott,
however,is less interestedin the subjectivecomposition of such turning
pointsthanin thestructural characteristics
thatmakethemparticularly susceptible
to transformative
action.Trajectories,he claims,can be conceivedof as narratively
constructed"networksthrough time,"linkedbyoccasionaltransitions thatbringabout
ofthelogicgoverning
a reformulation theconnection betweenpastandfuture possibil-
ities.Turningpointsare the"peculiarly essentialjunctures. . . whereactionmight
makeparticularlyconsequential bridgesbymakingor breakinglinksbetweenmany
networks" (Abbott1997b,p. 99).
1011
Such an approachwould have theadditionalmeritofplacingthediscus-

sion of agencysquarelywithinthecontextofits own essentialhistoricity.
CONCLUSION
We have argued throughoutthis essay that human agencyneeds to be
radicallyreconceptualized.Neitherrationalchoice theory,norm-based
approaches,nor any of the othersociologicalperspectivesextanttoday
providea fullyadequate understanding ofitssignificanceand constituent
features.Nor do such perspectivessatisfactorily answerthe questionas
to how agency interpenetrates with and impacts upon the temporal-
relationalcontextsof action.
We have contendedthatone keyto understanding thevariableorienta-
tionsofagencytowarditsstructural contextsliesin a moreadequate theo-
rizationof the temporalnatureof human experience.Actorsare always
livingsimultaneously in the past, future,and present,and adjustingthe
varioustemporalities of theirempiricalexistenceto one another(and to
theirempiricalcircumstances)in more or less imaginativeor reflective
ways. They continuously engagepatternsand repertoires fromthe past,
projecthypothetical pathwaysforwardin time,and adjust theiractions
to the exigenciesof emergingsituations.Moreover,thereare timesand
places whenactorsare moreorientedtowardthepast,moredirectiveto-
ward the future,or more evaluative of the present;actors may switch
between (and reflexivelytransform)their orientationstoward action,
therebychangingtheirdegreesofflexible,inventive,and criticalresponse
towardstructuring contexts.Such a perspectivelays thebasis fora richer
and moredynamicunderstanding ofthecapacitythatactorshave tomedi-
ate thestructuringcontextswithinwhichactionunfolds.We have referred
to thisperspectiveas relationalpragmatics.
Finally,thispointof view also opens up the possibilityto conceiveof
moraland practicalissues regardinghumanfreedom,creativity, and de-
mocracyin a moresatisfactory and powerfulway. In thisessay,we have
notlaid out a normativetheorythatactuallydistinguishes between"bet-
ter"or "worse"agenticprocesses,"moreor less morallyworthy"projects.
The elaborationof such a theorywould requireeven longerand more
complexargumentsthan thosepresentedhere. Yet, we have delineated
theanalyticalspace withinwhichreflective and morallyresponsibleaction
mightbe said to unfold.Throughout,we have stressedthereconstructive,
(self-)transformative potentialitiesof human agency,when faced with
contradictory or otherwiseproblematicsituations.What are commonly
referredto as normsand values, we can now add, are themselvesby-
productsofactors'engagementwithone anotherin ambiguousand chal-
lengingcircumstances;theyemergewhen individualsexperiencea dis-
1012
Agency
cordancebetweenthe claims of multiplenormativecommitments. Prob-

lematic situationsof a moral and practical nature can thus become
resolved(to theextentthattheycan becomeresolvedat all [Hook 1974])
only when actors reconstructthe temporal-relational contextswithin
whichtheyare embeddedand, in theprocess,transform theirown values
and themselves.As Mead (1964,p. 149) expressesit,"The appearanceof
... differentinterestsin theforumofreflection[leadsto]thereconstruction
of the social world,and the consequentappearance of the new selfthat
answersto the new object."
Whiletheoptimisticprogressivism oftheclassicalpragmatists mayap-
pear relativelysimpleand even naive fromour positionat theclose ofthe
20thcentury, theorientationtowardactionthattheypresentstillresonates
powerfullyas we attemptto respondto a rapidlychangingworld com-
posed of increasingly complexand overlappingmatricesof social, politi-
cal, and economicrelations.If we cannotcontroltheconsequencesofour
interventions, we can at least commitourselvesto a responsive,experi-
mental,and deliberativeattitudeas we confront emergentproblemsand
possibilitiesacross the varietyof contextswithinwhich we act. As the
pragmatistthinkersnever tiredof remindingus, this is a preeminently
dialogicand communicativeprocess,whichunfoldsin perpetualinterac-
tion withthe social universe.Both the pragmatistconceptionof the re-
sponsiveintelligence and theKantianideal oftheenlargedmentality can
be of use to us in thecontinuingchallengeto develop ever morecompre-
hensive,cosmopolitan, and universalistic
perspectives-perspectives nev-
erthelessflexibleenoughto respondto situationalcomplexity and ambigu-
ity.The "mode of associated living"thatJoas (1996), followingDewey,
calls"creativedemocracy"embodiessuchmoralintelligence on a transper-
sonal scale; it involves"conjointcommunicatedexperience"(Dewey 1980,
p. 93) in whichimaginativereformulation and practicalreasoningare un-
dertakenin commonthroughinquiryintomoraland practicalproblems
on the model of an experimentalscience.If our perspectiveon human
agencydoes notin itselfresolvesuchproblems,it can at leasthelp to give
social sciencea more adequate theoreticalgrounding,so thatit can be-
come a creativeand vital participantin thisdemocraticdebate.
REFERENCES
Abbott,Andrew.1988."Transcending GeneralLinearReality."SociologicalTheory
6:169-86.
. 1997a."Of Time and Space: The ContemporaryRelevanceof the Chicago
School." Social Forces 75:1149-82.
Social Research16:
. 1997b."On theConceptofTurningPoint."Comparative
85-105.
Abbott,Andrew,and AlexandraHrycak.1990."MeasuringResemblancein Sequence
1013
Data: An OptimalMatchingAnalysisofMusicians'Careers."American Journalof

Sociology96:144-85.
Alexander, C. 1988a.Actionand Its Environments.
Jeffrey New York:ColumbiaUni-
versityPress.
, ed. 1988b.Durkheimian Sociology:CulturalStudies.New York:Cambridge
University Press.
. 1992. "Some Remarkson 'Agency'in RecentSociologicalTheory."Per-
spectives(TheorySectionNewsletter, AmericanSociologicalAssociation)15:1-4.
. 1995."The RealityofReduction:The Failed Synthesis ofPierreBourdieu."
Pp. 128-217in Fin de Siecle Social Theory:Relativism, Reduction,and theProb-
lemofReason. London:Verso.
Aminzade,Ronald. 1992."HistoricalSociologyand Time."SociologicalMethodand
Research20:456-80.
Aquinas,Thomas.1948.SummaTheologica,3 vols.Translatedbyfathers oftheEn-
glishDominicanProvince.Westminster, Md.: ChristianClassics.
Archer,MargaretS. 1982. "Morphogenesis versus Structuration:On Combining
Structure and Action."BritishJournalofSociology33:455-83.
. 1988.Cultureand Agency:ThePlace ofCulturein Social Theory.Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press.
Arendt,Hannah. 1977a. "The Crisis in Culture:Its Social and PoliticalSignifi-
cance."Pp. 197-226inBetweenPast and Future.Harmondsworth: PenguinBooks.
1977b.TheLifeoftheMind. New York:Harcourt,Brace Jovanovich.
1984."Thinkingand Moral Considerations: A Lecture."Social Research51:
7-37.
Aristotle. 1985.NicomacheanEthics,translated byTerenceIrwin.Indianapolis,Ind.:
Hackett.
Axelrod,Robert.1984.The EvolutionofCooperation. New York: Basic.
Bakhtin,M. M. 1986."The ProblemofSpeechGenres."Pp. 60-102 in SpeechGenres
and OtherLate Essays,editedbyCarylEmersonand MichaelHolquist.Translated
by VernW. McGee. Austin:University of Texas Press.
Benhabib,Seyla. 1987."The GeneralizedOtherand theConcreteOther:The Kohl-
berg-Gilligan Controversy and FeministTheory."Pp. 77-95 in Feminismas Cri-
tique,editedby Seyla Benhabiband DrucillaCornell.Minneapolis:University of
MinnesotaPress.
. 1992a."In the Shadow of Aristotleand Hegel: Communicative Ethicsand
CurrentControversies in PracticalPhilosophy."Pp. 23-67 in Situatingthe Self
New York: Routledge.
. 1992b."Judgment and theMoralFoundationsofPoliticsin HannahArendt's
Thought."Pp. 121-44 in SituatingtheSelf New York:Routledge.
. 1992c.SituatingtheSelf New York: Routledge.
Berger,Peter,and ThomasLuckmann.1966.The Social Construction ofReality:A
Treatisein theSociologyofKnowledge.New York: Doubleday.
Bergson,H. 1989.Timeand Free Will,translatedby F. L. Pogson.London:Allen
Unwin.
Bernstein, RichardJ. 1971.Praxisand Action.Philadelphia:University ofPennsylva-
nia Press.
Berteaux,Daniel,ed. 1981.Biography and History:TheLifeHistoryApproachin the
Human Sciences.BeverlyHills,Calif.:Sage.
Blair-Loy, Mary.1997."CareerPatterns ofExecutiveWomenin Finance:An Optimal
MatchingAnalysis."Manuscript. Washington StateUniversity,Department ofSo-
ciology.
Boissevain,Jeremy.1974.Friendsof Friends:Networks, Manipulators, and Coali-
tions.Oxford:Blackwell.
1014
Agency
Bourdieu,Pierre.1977.Outlineofa TheoryofPractice,translated by RichardNice.

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
. 1984.Distinction:A Social CritiqueoftheJudgment ofTaste,translatedby
RichardNice. Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press.
. 1990. The Logic of Practice,translatedby RichardNice. Stanford,Calif.:
StanfordUniversity Press.
Bourdieu,Pierre,and Loic Wacquant. 1992.An Invitationto ReflexiveSociology.
Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
Brint,Steven,andJeromeKarabel.1991."Institutional Originsand Transformations:
The Case ofAmericanCommunity Colleges."Pp. 337-60in TheNewInstitutional-
ism in Organizational Analysis,editedby WalterPowell and Paul J. DiMaggio.
Bruner,Jerome.1986.ActualMinds,Possible Worlds.Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Callero,PeterL. 1991."Toward a Sociologyof Cognition."Pp. 43-54 in The Self-
SocietyDynamic:Cognition, Emotion,and Action,editedby JudithA. Howard
and PeterL. Callero.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Camic,Charles.1986."TheMatterofHabit."American JournalofSociology91:1039-
87.
Carr,David. 1986.Time,Narrative,and History.Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
Castoriadis,Cornelius.1987. The ImaginaryConstitution ofSociety,translatedby
KathleenBlamey.Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
Cohen,JeanL. 1985."Strategy orIdentity:New TheoreticalParadigmsand Contem-
porarySocial Movements." Social Research52:663-716.
Cohen,JeanL., and AndrewArato.1992.Civil Societyand PoliticalTheory.Cam-
bridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
Cohler,BertramJ. 1982."PersonalNarrativeand LifeCourse."LifeCourseDevelop-
mentand Behavior4:206-41.
Cohn,Norman.1977. The Pursuitof theMillennium:Revolutionary Millenarians
and MysticalAnarchists oftheMiddleAges.New York:OxfordUniversity Press.
Colapietro,VincentM. 1990."The VanishingSubjectofContemporary Discourse:A
PragmaticResponse."JournalofPhilosophy87:644-55.
Coleman,JamesS. 1986."Social Theory,Social Research,and a TheoryofAction."
AmericanJournalofSociology6:1309-35.
. 1990.FoundationsofSocial Theory.Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press.
Cook,KarenScweers,and MargaretLevi,eds. 1990.TheLimitsofRationality.Chi-
cago: University of ChicagoPress.
Corsaro,WilliamA. 1992."Interpretive Reproduction in Children'sPeer Culture."
Social Psychology Quarterly 55:160-77.
Coser,Rose Laub. 1975."The Complexity ofRolesas a SeedbedofIndividualAuton-
omy."Pp. 237-63 in TheIdea ofSocial Structure: Essays in HonorofRobertMer-
ton,editedby Lewis Coser.New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich.
Cottle,T. J.,and Klineberg, S. 1974.ThePresentofThingsFuture.New York:Free
Press.
Cottrell,L. 1969. "Interpersonal Interactionand the Developmentof the Self."
Pp. 543-70inHandbookofSocializationTheoryandResearch,editedbyD. Goslin.
Chicago:Rand McNally.
Davies, Brian. 1992.The ThoughtofThomasAquinas.Oxford:ClarendonPress.
De Certeau,Michel.1984.ThePracticeofEverydayLife,translated by StevenRen-
dall. Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University of CaliforniaPress.
Denzin, Norman K. 1985. "Act, Language and Self in SymbolicInteractionist
Thought."Studiesin SymbolicInteractionism 9:51-80.
1015
Desroche,Henri. 1979.The SociologyofHope, translatedby Carol Martin-Sperry.

London:Routledge& Kegan Paul.
Devolder,M. L., and W. Lens. 1982."AcademicAchievement and FutureTime Per-
spective:A Cognitive-Motivational Concept."Journalof Personalityand Social
Psychology 42:566-71.
Dewey,John.1922.HumanNatureand Conduct.New York:ModernLibrary.
. 1940."CreativeDemocracy:The Task beforeUs." Pp. 220-28in ThePhiloso-
pheroftheCommonMan: Essaysin HonorofJohnDeweyto CelebrateHis Eighti-
ethBirthday,editedby SidneyRatner.New York: Greenwood.
. 1978.Ethics,editedbyJoAnnDoydston.Carbondale:SouthernIllinoisUni-
versityPress.
. 1980.Democracyand Education.Vol. 9 ofTheMiddle WorksofJohnDewey,
1899-1924.EditedbyJoAnnBoydston.Carbondale:SouthernIllinoisUniversity
Press.
. 1981."The Need fora Recoveryof Philosophy." Pp. 58-97 in The Philos-
ophyofJohnDewey,editedbyJohnJ.McDermott. Chicago:University ofChicago
Press.
. 1985."The LogicofJudgments ofPractice."Pp. 14-82inJohnDewey:Essays
onEducationand Politics,1915,editedbyJoAnnBoydston.Carbondale:Southern
IllinoisUniversity Press.
DiMaggio,Paul J. 1988."Interestand Agencyin Institutional Theory."Pp. 3-21 in
InstitutionalPatternsand Organizations:Cultureand Environment, editedby
LynneG. Zucker.Cambridge,Mass.: Ballinger.
. 1991."Constructing an Organizational Field as a ProfessionalProject:U.S.
ArtMuseums,1920-1940."Pp. 267-92 in The New Institutionalism in Organiza-
tionalAnalysis,editedby WalterW. Powelland Paul J.DiMaggio.Chicago:Uni-
versityof ChicagoPress.
Douglas,Mary.1985.Purityand Danger.London:ArkPaperbacks.
Durkheim,Emile.1961.MoralEducation:A Studyin theTheoryand Application of
theSociologyofEducation,translated byEverettK. Wilsonand HermanSchnurer.
New York: Free Press.
Elder,GlennH., Jr.1974.ChildrenoftheGreatDepression:Social Changein Life
Experiences.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
. 1985."Perspectives on theLifeCourse."Pp. 23-49 inLifeCourseDynamics,
editedby GlennH. Elder,Jr.Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press.
. 1994."Time,Human Agency,and Social Change:Perspectives on theLife
Course."Social Psychological Quarterly57:4-15.
Elster,Jon.1989.The CementofSociety:A StudyofSocial Order.Cambridge:Cam-
bridgeUniversity Press.
Emirbayer, Mustafa.1992a. "BeyondStructuralism and Voluntarism: The Politics
and DiscourseofProgressive SchoolReform,1890-1930."Theoryand Society21:
621-64.
. 1992b."The Shapingofa VirtuousCitizenry: EducationalReformin Massa-
chusetts,1830-1860."Studiesin AmericanPoliticalDevelopment 6:391-419.
. 1997."Manifesto fora RelationalSociology." AmericanJournalofSociology
103:281-317.
Emirbayer, Mustafa,and JeffGoodwin.1994."NetworkAnalysis,Culture,and the
ProblemofAgency."AmericanJournalofSociology99:1411-53.
. 1996."Symbols, Positions,and Objects:Towarda New TheoryofRevolution
and CollectiveAction."Historyand Theory35:358-74.
Emirbayer, Mustafa,and MimiSheller.1996."Publicsin History."Paper presented
at themeetingof theSocial ScienceHistoryAssociation, New Orleans.
Erikson,Erik H. 1968.Identity:Youthand Crisis.New York:Norton.
Fernandez,RobertoM., and RogerV. Gould.1994."A DilemmaofStatePower:Bro-
1016
Agency
kerageand Influencein theMentalHealthPolicyDomain."AmericanJournalof

Sociology99:1455-91.
Fligstein, Neil. 1991."The StructuralTransformation ofAmericanIndustry: An Insti-
tutionalAccountoftheCauses ofDiversification in theLargestFirms,1919-1979."
Pp. 311-36 in TheNewInstitutionalism in OrganizationalAnalysis,editedbyWal-
terW. Powelland Paul J.DiMaggio.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
Galaskiewicz,Joseph.1991. "Making CorporateActorsAccountable:Institution-
Buildingin Minneapolis-St.Paul." Pp. 293-310 in The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis,editedby WalterW. Powelland Paul J.DiMaggio.Chi-
cago: University of ChicagoPress.
Gamson,WilliamA. 1992.TalkingPolitics.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Garfinkel, Harold.1963."A Conceptionofand Experiments with'Trust' as a Condi-
tionofConcertedStableActions."Pp. 187-238in Motivationand Social Interac-
tion,editedby 0. J. Harvey.New York:Ronald Press.
. 1984.Studiesin Ethnomethodology. Cambridge:PolityPress.
GartonAsh,Timothy.1990.TheMagic Lantern:TheRevolutionof'89 Witnessed in
Warsaw,Budapest,Berlin,and Prague.New York:RandomHouse.
Geertz,Clifford. 1960."The JavaneseKijaji: The ChangingRole of a CulturalBro-
ker."Comparative Studiesin Societyand History2:228-49.
George,Linda K. 1993."SociologicalPerspectives on LifeTransitions." AnnualRe-
viewofSociology19:353-73.
Gergen,KennethJ. 1994.Realitiesand Relationships: Soundingsin Social Construc-
tion.Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press.
Gergen,KennethJ.,and MaryM. Gergen.1983."Narrativesof theSelf."Pp. 254-
73 in Studiesin Social Identity,editedby TheodoreR. Sarbinand Karl Scheibe.
New York: Praeger.
. 1984."The SocialConstruction ofNarrativeAccounts." Pp. 173-89inHistor-
ical Social Psychology, editedby KennethJ. Gergenand MaryM. Gergen.Hills-
dale,N.J.:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.
. 1988."Narrativeand the Selfas Relationship." Advancesin Experimental
Social Psychology 21:17-56.
Gibson,David, and AnnMische.1995."Internetwork Encounters and theEmergence
ofLeadership."Pre-Print Series,no. 202. LazersfeldCenterfortheSocial Sciences,
ColumbiaUniversity.
Giddens,Anthony.1976.New RulesforSociologicalMethod.New York: Basic.
. 1979.CentralProblemsin Social Theory.Berkeleyand Los Angeles:Univer-
sityof CaliforniaPress.
. 1984.The Constitution ofSociety.Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University of
CaliforniaPress.
. 1991.Modernity and Self-Identity:Selfand Societyin theLate ModernAge.
Stanford, Calif.:StanfordUniversity Press.
Gilligan,Carol. 1982.In a Different Voice:Psychological Theoryand Women'sDevel-
opment.Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press.
Goffman, Erving.1959.ThePresentation ofSelfin EverydayLife.New York:Dou-
bleday.
. 1974.FrameAnalysis:An Essay on the OrganizationofExperience.New
York: Harper& Row.
Goldstone, JackA. 1987."CulturalOrthodoxy, Risk,and Innovation:The Divergence
of East and Westin theEarlyModernWorld."SociologicalTheory5:119-35.
. 1988."East and Westin theSeventeenth Century:PoliticalCrisesin Stuart
England,OttomanTurkey,and MingChina."Comparative Studiesin Societyand
History30:103-42.
Goodwyn,Lawrence.1991.BreakingtheBarrier:The Rise ofSolidarityin Poland.
New York: OxfordUniversity Press.
1017
Greene,A. L. 1986."FutureTimePerspective in Adolescence:The PresentofThings

Future,Revisited." Journalof Youthand Adolescence15:99-113.
. 1990."GreatExpectations: ConstructionsoftheLifeCourseduringAdoles-
cence."Journalof Youthand Adolescence19:289-306.
Habermas,Jiirgen. 1984-89.TheTheoryofCommunicative Action,2 vols.Translated
by ThomasMcCarthy.Boston:Beacon Press.
. 1990.Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,translatedby Chris-
tianLenhardtand ShierryWeberNicholsen.Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
. 1993.Justificationand Application,translatedby Ciaran P. Cronin.Cam-
bridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
Halbwachs,Maurice.1992.On CollectiveMemory,editedand translatedby Lewis
Coser.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress
Hall, JohnR. 1978.The WaysOut: UtopianCommunalGroupsin an AgeofBabylon.
Boston:Routledge& Kegan Paul.
Haraway,Donna. 1988."SituatedKnowledges:The ScienceQuestionin Feminism
and thePrivilegeof PartialPerspective." FeministStudies 14:575-99.
Hays,Sharon.1994."Structure andAgencyandtheStickyProblemofCulture."Socio-
logicalTheory12:57-72.
Hechter,Michael.1992."ShouldValuesBe Written Out oftheSociologist'sLexicon?"
SociologicalTheory10:214-30.
. 1994."The Role ofValuesin RationalChoiceTheory."Rationality and Soci-
ety6:318-33.
Heidegger,Martin.1962.Beingand Time,translatedby JohnMacquarrieand Ed-
wardRobinson.New York: Harper& Row.
Hobsbawn,ErikJ.,and TerenceRandger,eds. 1983.TheInventionofTradition.New
York: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Homans,GeorgeCaspar. 1964."Bringing Men Back In." AmericanSociologicalRe-
view 29:809-18.
Hook,Sydney.1974."Pragmatism and theTragicSenseofLife."Pp. 3-25 inPragma-
tismand theTragicSense ofLife.New York: Basic.
Husserl,Edmund.1960.CartesianMeditations:An Introduction to Phenomenology,
translatedby DorionCairns.The Hague: MartinusNijhoff.
James,William.1976.Essays in Radical Empiricism.Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Joas,Hans. 1985. G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-Examinationof His Thought.
Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
1993.Pragmatism and Social Theory.Chicago:University ofChicagoPress.
1996.The CreativityofAction,translatedbyJeremy Gainesand Paul Keast.
. N.d. "The CreativityofAction:Pragmatism and theCritiqueoftheRational
ActorModel."Manuscript.Free University, Berlin,JohnF. KennedyInstitute for
NorthAmericanStudy.
Kant,Immanuel.1951.CritiqueofJudgment, translatedbyJ.H. Bernard.New York:
Hafner.
. 1956.CritiqueofPracticalReason,translatedby Lewis WhiteBeck. India-
napolis,Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill.
. 1964.Groundwork oftheMetaphysicofMorals,translatedby H. J. Paton.
New York: HarperTorchbooks.
. 1965.Critiqueof Pure Reason, translatedby NormanKemp Smith.New
York: St. Martin's.
. 1971.The MetaphysicsofMorals.Part 2, Doctrineof Virtue,translatedby
MaryJ. Gregor.Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press.
Kanter,Rosabeth.1977.Men and WomenoftheCorporation. New York: Basic.
1018
Agency
Kearney,Richard.1988.The WakeofImagination:Towarda Postmodern Culture.

Minneapolis:University ofMinnesotaPress.
Kestenbaum, Victor.1977.The Phenomenological Sense ofJohnDewey:Habit and
Meaning.AtlanticHighlands,N.J.:HumanitiesPress.
Kierkegaard, S0ren.1944.ConcludingUnscientific Postscript,translatedby David
F. Swenson.CompletedafterhisdeathbyWalterLowrie.Princeton, N.J.:Princeton
University Press.
Kohlberg,Lawrence.1981.ThePhilosophyofMoralDevelopment. Vol. 1,Essays on
Moral Development. New York: Harper& Row.
Kohli,Martin.1986."Social Organizationand SubjectiveConstruction of the Life
Course."Pp. 271-92inHumanDevelopment and theLifeCourse:Multidisciplinary
Perspectives, editedby Aage B. S0rensen,Franz E. Weinert,LonnieR. Sherrod.
Hillsdale,N.J.:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.
Laba, Roman.1991.TheRootsofSolidarity:A PoliticalSociologyofPoland's Work-
ing-ClassDemocratization. Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press.
Lacan, Jacques.1977.Ecrits:A Selection,translatedby Alan Sheridan.New York:
Norton.
Lamont,Michele.1992.Money,Morals,and Manners.Chicago:University ofChicago
Press.
Lauer,RobertH. 1973."Temporality and Social Change:The Case of 19thCentury
China and Japan."SociologicalQuarterly14:451-64.
Leifer,Eric M. 1988."Interaction Preludesto Role Setting."AmericanSociological
Review53:865-78.
Levine,Donald N. 1985.The FlightfromAmbiguity: Essays in Social and Cultural
Theory.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1966.TheSavageMind. Chicago:University ofChicagoPress.
Lewin,Kurt.1948."Time Perspectiveand Morale."Pp. 48-70 in CivilianMorale,
editedby GoodwinWatson.New York:Reynal,Hitchcock.
Lipset,SeymourMartin,MartinA. Trow,and JamesS. Coleman.1962.UnionDe-
mocracy:The InternalPoliticsoftheInternational Typographical Union.Garden
City,N.Y.: AnchorBooks.
Locke,John.1978.Two TreatisesofGovernment. New York: E. P. Dutton.
Luhmann,Niklas. 1990.Essays on Self-Reference. New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press.
Lukes,Steven.1973.Individualism.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
Maclntyre, Alasdair.1981.AfterVirtue:A Studyin MoralTheory.NotreDame,Ind.:
University ofNotreDame Press.
Mansbridge, JaneJ. 1983.BeyondAdversary Democracy.Chicago:University ofChi-
cago Press.
March,JamesG. 1978."BoundedRationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of
Choice."Bell JournalofEconomics9:587-608.
March,JamesG., and JohanP. Olsen.1976.Ambiguity and Choicein Organizations.
Bergen:Universitetsforlaget.
. 1984."The New Institutionalism:OrganizationalFactorsin PoliticalLife."
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview78:734-49.
March,JamesG., and HerbertA. Simon.1958.Organizations. New York:Wiley.
Marsden,PeterV. 1982."BrokerageBehaviorin RestrictedExchangeNetworks."
Pp. 201-18 in Social Structure
and Network Analysis,editedbyPeterV. Marsden
and Nan Lin. BeverlyHills,Calif.:Sage.
Marx,Karl. 1978.TheMarx-Engels Reader,2d ed. EditedbyRobertC. Tucker.New
York:Norton.
McAdam,Doug. 1982.PoliticalProcessand theDevelopment ofBlack Insurgency:
1930-1970.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
1019
McLoughlin,WilliamG. 1978.Revivals,Awakenings, and Reform: AnEssay on Reli-

gionand Social Changein America,1607-1977.Chicago:University of Chicago
Press.
Mead, GeorgeHerbert.1932.The PhilosophyofthePresent.Chicago:University of
ChicagoPress.
. 1934.Mind,Self,and Society:FromtheStandpointofa Social Behaviorist.
. 1938.The PhilosophyoftheAct.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
. 1964."The Social Self."Pp. 142-49in GeorgeHerbertMead: SelectedWrit-
ings,editedby AndrewJ. Reck.Indianapolis,Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill.
Melucci,Alberto.1989.Nomadsof thePresent:Social Movementsand Individual
Needsin Contemporary Society,editedbyJohnKeaneandPaul Mier.Philadelphia:
TempleUniversity Press.
. 1994."The Processof CollectiveIdentity." Pp. 41-63 in Social Movements
and Culture,editedby Hank Johnston and BertKlandermans. Minneapolis:Uni-
versityofMinnesotaPress.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.1964.Sense and Non-Sense,translated byHubertL. Drey-
fusand PatriciaAllenDreyfus.Evanston,Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Meyer,JohnW. 1986."TheSelfandtheLifeCourse."Pp. 199-217inHumanDevelop-
mentand the Life Course:Multidisciplinary Perspectives,edited by Aage B.
Sorensen,FranzE. Weinert, and LonnieR. Sherrod.Hillsdale,N.J.:LawrenceErl-
baum.
Meyer,JohnW.,JohnBoli,and GeorgeM. Thomas.1987."Ontology and Rationaliza-
tionintheWesternCulturalAccount."Pp. 12-37inInstitutional Structure:
Consti-
tutingState,Society,and theIndividual,editedby GeorgeM. Thomas,JohnW.
Meyer,and JohnBoli. BeverlyHills,Calif.:Sage.
Meyer,JohnW., and Brian Rowan. 1991."Institutionalized Organizations:Formal
Structure as Mythand Ceremony." Pp. 41-62 in TheNewInstitutionalism in Orga-
nizationalAnalysis,editedby WalterW. Powelland Paul J. DiMaggio.Chicago:
University of ChicagoPress.
Meyer,JohnW., W. R. Scott,and T. E. Deal. 1981."Institutional and Technical
SourcesofOrganizational Structure."Pp. 151-78in Organization and theHuman
Services,editedby H. D. Stein.Philadelphia:TempleUniversity Press.
Mische,Ann.1997."Projects, and SocialNetworks:BrazilianYouthMobi-
Identities,
lizationand theMakingofCivic Culture."Paperpresented at theannualmeeting
oftheAmericanSociologicalAssociation, Toronto.
Moore,Barrington, Jr.1978.Injustice:The Social Bases of Obedienceand Revolt.
Armonk,N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Morris,AldonD., and Carol McClurgMueller,eds. 1992.Frontiersin Social Move-
mentTheory.New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press.
Munch,Richard.1981."TalcottParsonsand theTheoryofAction.I. The Structure
oftheKantianCore."AmericanJournalofSociology86:709-39.
. 1994.SociologicalTheory,3 vols. Chicago:Nelson-Hall.
Nussbaum,MarthaC. 1986.TheFragilityofGoodness.Cambridge:CambridgeUni-
versityPress.
Nystrom, N. C., and WilliamH. Starbuck.1984."To Avoid Organizational Crisis,
Unlearn."Organizational Dynamics13:53-65.
O'Donnell,Guillermo, and PhilippeSchmitter. 1986.Transitions
fromAuthoritarian
Rule.Vol.4, TentativeConclusions aboutUncertain Democracies.Baltimore: Johns
HopkinsUniversity Press.
Olick,Jeffrey K. 1997."The TextualDynamicsofMemory:Continuities and Depar-
turesin GermanCommemoration ofMay 8th,1945."Manuscript.ColumbiaUni-
versity, Department of Sociology.
Olick,Jeffrey K., and Daniel Levy. 1997."CollectiveMemoryand CulturalCon-
1020
Agency
straint: HolocaustMythandRationality inGermanPolitics." American Sociological

Review62:921-36.
O'Rand, AngelaM., and MargaretL. Krecker.1990."Conceptsof the Life Cycle:
TheirHistory, Meanings,andUsesintheSocialSciences."AnnualReviewofSociol-
ogy16:241-62
Ortner,SherryB. 1984."Theoryin Anthropology since the Sixties."Comparative
Studiesin Societyand History26 (1): 126-66.
Padgett,JohnF., and Christopher K. Ansell.1993."RobustActionand theRise of
theMedici,1400-1434."AmericanJournalofSociology98:1259-1319.
Parsons,Talcott.1968.TheStructure ofSocial Action,2 vols.New York:FreePress.
Parsons,Talcott,and EdwardShils.1951.Towarda GeneralTheoryofAction.Cam-
bridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press.
Patterson, Orlando.1991.Freedom.Vol. 1, Freedomin theMakingofWesternCul-
ture.New York: Basic.
Pescosolido,BerniceA. 1992."BeyondRationalChoice:The SocialDynamicsofHow
People Seek Help." AmericanJournalofSociology97:1096-1138.
Pizzorno,Alessandro.1986."SomeOtherKindofOtherness." Pp. 355-73 in Develop-
ment,Democracy, and theArtofTrespassing: Essays in HonorofAlbert0. Hirsch-
man,editedbyAlejandroFoxley,MichaelS. McPherson, and Guillermo O'Donnell.
NotreDame, Ind.: University of NotreDame Press.
Powell,WalterW. 1986."How thePastInforms thePresent:The Uses and Liabilities
ofOrganizational Memory." Paperpresented at theConference on Communication
and CollectiveMemory.University ofSouthernCalifornia, Annenberg School.
Powell,WalterW., and Paul J. DiMaggio,eds. 1991.The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
Ricoeur,Paul. 1970.Freud and Philosophy:An Essay on Interpretation, translated
by Denis Savage. New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press.
. 1991. From Text to Action,translatedby KathleenBlameyand JohnB.
Thompson.Evanston,Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Riegel,Klaus F. 1975."Adult-Life Crises:Towarda DialecticInterpretation ofDevel-
opment."Pp. 99-128 in Life-SpanDevelopmental Psychology: Normative LifeCri-
sis, editedby NancyDatan and L. H. Ginsberg.New York:AcademicPress.
. 1977."DialecticsofTime."Pp. 3-45 inLife-SpanDevelopmental Psychology:
DialecticalPerspectiveson Experimental Research,editedby Nancy Datan and
HayneW. Reese. New York:AcademicPress.
Roth,Guenther, and Wolfgang Schluchter.1979.Max Weber'sVisionofHistory:Eth-
ics and Methods.Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University of CaliforniaPress.
Sacks,Harvey,EmmanuelA. Schegloff, and GailJefferson. 1974."A SimplestSystem-
atics forthe Organizationof Turn-TakingforConversation." Language50:696-
735.
Sahlins,Marshall.1981.HistoricalMetaphors and PracticalReason.AnnArbor:Uni-
versityofMichiganPress.
1985.Islands ofHistory.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
1991."The ReturnoftheEvent,Again:WithReflections on theBeginnings
oftheGreatFijian Warof 1944to 1955betweentheKingdomsofBau and Rewa."
In Clio in Oceania,editedbyA. Biersack.Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institu-
tionPress.
Sarbin,TheodoreR., ed. 1986.NarrativePsychology: The StoriedNatureofHuman
Conduct.New York: Praeger.
Sartre,Jean-Paul.1956.Beingand Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological On-
tology,translated by Hazel E. Barnes.Secaucus,N.J.:Citadel.
Schutz,Alfred.1962."ChoosingamongProjectsof Action."Pp. 67-96 in Collected
Papers.Vol. 1, The ProblemofSocial Reality,editedby MauriceNatanson.The
Hague: MartinusNijhoff.
1021
. 1964."Tiresias,orOurKnowledgeofFutureEvents."Pp. 277-93in Collected

Papers.Vol. 2, Studiesin Social Theory,editedby ArvidBrodersen.The Hague:
MartinusNijhoff.
. 1967.The Phenomenology oftheSocial World,translatedby GeorgeWalsh
and FrederickLehnert.Evanston,Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
. 1978.The TheoryofSocial Action:The Correspondence ofAlfredSchutzand
TalcottParsons,editedby RichardGrathoff. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
Schwalbe,MichaelL. 1991."Social Structure and theMoral Self."Pp. 281-304 in
The Self-Society Dynamic:Cognition, Emotion,and Action,editedby JudithA.
Howard and PeterL. Callero.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Schwartz,Barry.1991."SocialChangeand CollectiveMemory:The Democratization
of GeorgeWashington." AmericanSociologicalReview56:221-36.
Scott,JamesC. 1985.WeaponsoftheWeak:EverydayFormsofPeasantResistance.
New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press.
. 1990.Dominationand theArtsofResistance:Hidden Transcripts. New Ha-
ven,Conn.:Yale University Press.
Sewell,WilliamH., Jr.1992."A TheoryofStructure: Duality,Agency,and Transfor-
mation."AmericanJournalofSociology98:1-29.
Snow, David A., and RobertD. Benford.1988."Ideology,Frame Resonance,and
Participant Mobilization."International Social MovementResearch1:197-217.
. 1992."MasterFramesand Cyclesof Protest."Pp. 133-55 in Frontiersin
Social MovementTheory,editedbyAldonD. Morrisand Carol McClurgMueller.
New Haven, Conn.:Yale University Press.
Snow,David A., E. BurkeRochford, Jr.,StevenK. Worden,and RobertD. Benford.
1986."FrameAlignment Processes,Micromobilization, and MovementParticipa-
tion."AmericanSociologicalReview51:464-81.
Somers,Margaret.1992."Narrativity, NarrativeIdentity, and SocialAction:Rethink-
ing EnglishWorking-Class Formation." Social ScienceHistory16 (4): 591-630.
Sorokin,Pitirim.1947.Society,Culture, and Personality:TheirStructure and Dynam-
ics, a SystemofGeneralSociology.New York: Harper.
Steinberg, Marc W. 1996."Towarda DialogicAnalysisofSocial MovementCulture:
Reframing FrameAnalysis."Paper presentedat themeetingoftheSocial Science
HistoryAssociation, New Orleans.
Stepan,Alfred.1978."PoliticalLeadershipand RegimeBreakdown:Brazil."Pp. 110-
37 in The BreakdownofDemocraticRegimes:Latin America,editedby JuanJ.
Linz and AlfredStepan.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press.
Swidler,Ann.1986."CultureinAction:Symbolsand Strategies." AmericanSociologi-
cal Review51:273-86.
Tarrow,Sidney.1992."Mentalities, PoliticalCultures,and CollectiveActionFrames:
Constructing Meaningsthrough Action."Pp. 174-202in Frontiers in Social Move-
mentTheory, editedbyAldonD. Morrisand CarolMcClurgMueller.New Haven,
Conn.:Yale University Press.
Taylor,Charles.1985."WhatIs HumanAgency?" Pp. 15-44inPhilosophicalPapers.
Vol. 1,HumanAgencyand Language.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
1989.SourcesoftheSelf Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press.
1991."The DialogicalSelf."Pp. 304-14 in TheInterpretive Turn:Philosophy,
Science,Culture,editedbyDavid R. Hiley,JamesF. Bohman,and RichardShus-
terman.Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press.
. 1993."To Follow a Rule . . ." Pp. 45-60 in Bourdieu:CriticalPerspectives,
editedbyCraigCalhoun,EdwardLiPuma,and MoishePostone.Chicago:Univer-
sityof ChicagoPress.
Thomas,W. I., and Florian Znaniecki.1918. The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America.New York: Knopf.
1022
Agency
Thompson,Edward Palmer.1966.The MakingoftheEnglishWorking Class. New

York:Vintage.
. 1993.The WitnessagainsttheBeast: WilliamBlakeand theMoralLaw. New
York: New Press.
Tilly,Charles.1986.TheContentious French.Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press.
1994."Historyand SociologicalImagining." TocquevilleReview 15:57-74.
. 1998.DurableInequality.Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University ofCalifornia
Press,in press.
Touraine,Alain,FrancoisDubet,MichelWieviorka,and JanStrzelecki.1983.Soli-
darity:Poland 1980-81,translated byDavid Denby.Cambridge:CambridgeUni-
versityPress.
Trotsky, Leon. 1980.TheHistoryoftheRussianRevolution.New York:Pathfinder.
Turner,Stephen.1994.The Social TheoryofPractices:Tradition,TacitKnowledge,
and Presuppositions. Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
Turner,Victor.1974.Dramas,Fields,and Metaphors:SymbolicActionin Human
Society.Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press.
Wacquant,Loic. 1992a."Toward a Social Praxeology:The Structure and Logic of
Bourdieu'sSociology."Pp. 1-59 in An Invitationto ReflexiveSociology,byPierre
Bourdieuand Loic Wacquant.Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
. 1992b."The Social Logic of Boxingin Black Chicago."SociologyofSports
Journal9:221-54.
Walzer,Michael.1965.TheRevolutionoftheSaints:A Studyin theOriginsofRadical
Politics.Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press.
. 1980."A Theoryof Revolutions." Pp. 201-23 in Radical Principles:Reflec-
tionsofan Unreconstructed Democrat.New York: Basic.
. 1985. Exodus and Revolution. New York: Basic.
Weber,Max. 1946."Politicsas a Vocation."Pp. 77-128 in FromMax Weber,edited
by Hans Gerthand C. WrightMills.New York: OxfordUniversity Press.
. 1978.Economyand Society,2 vols. Edited by GuentherRoth and Claus
Wittich.Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.
Wessman,Alden E., and BernardS. Gorman.1977. "The Emergenceof Human
Awarenessand ConceptsofTime."Pp. 4-55 in The PersonalExperienceofTime,
editedby BernardS. Gormanand AldenE. Wessman.New York: Plenum.
Westbrook,RobertB. 1991.JohnDewey and AmericanDemocracy.Ithaca,N.Y.:
CornellUniversityPress.
White,Harrison.1992.Identityand Control.Princeton, N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Press.
. 1995."Passagesreticulaires,acteurs,et grammaire de la domination."
Revue
francaisede sociologie36:705-23.
Wiley,Norbert.1994.The SemioticSelf Chicago:University of ChicagoPress.
Willis,Paul. 1977.Learningto Labor:How Working Class Kids Get Working Class
Jobs.New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press.
Wolf,Eric R. 1956."Aspectsof GroupsRelationsin a ComplexSociety:Mexico."
AmericanAnthropologist 58:1065-78.
Zucker,LynneG. 1977."The Role of Institutionalization in CulturalPersistance."
AmericanSociologicalReview42:726-43.
. 1983."Organizations Pp. 1-47 in Researchin theSociology
as Institutions."
ofOrganizations, vol. 2. Editedby SamuelB. Bacharach.Greenwich, Conn.:JAI
Press.
1023

Emirbayer and Mische 1998, What Is Agency

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Emirbayer and Mische 1998, What Is Agency

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What Is Agency?

Author(s): Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische

This articleaims (1) to analyticallydisaggregateagencyintoitssev-

962 AJS Volume 103 Number4 (January1998): 962-1023

tinguishagencyas an analyticalcategoryin its own right-with distinc-

which social actors can assume different simultaneousagenticorienta-

betweenindividuals,a new conceptionof agencyemergedthataffirmed

remained"outside"oftime(as in Kant's own conceptionofthe"uncondi-

Agencyin Social Theory

A morepromisinginitiativein the analyticexplorationof agencycan

flectiveintelligence.Moreover,pragmatistsrejectthe Kantian response

theirview ofthepast in an attemptto understandthecausal conditioning

corporealembeddednessof action.4Joas's major contribution is to wrest

The Chordal Triad of Agency

4ForJoas(1996,p. 160),actionis notsimplycontingent uponthesituation, butmore

to the differenttemporalorientationsof agency,allowingus to examine

The iterationalelement.-The firstofthesedimensions,whichwe term

We shouldstressfromthe outsetthattheseare analyticaldistinctions;

thissense,it is possibleto speak ofa chordaltriadofagencywithinwhich

6 This usage is analogousto Patterson's(1991) discussionof the chordaltriad of

phenomenon, embeddedin changingtheoretical and practicalconceptions

as criticalcomponentsof agenticprocesses:agencyis always a dialogical

THE ITERATIONAL DIMENSION OF AGENCY

If we thinkof agencyas a chordaltriadcomposedof threeanalytically

Iteration:The Historyof a Concept

tionof humanagency.12In "The Treatiseon Habits,"Aquinas (1948,pp.

The InternalStructureof Iteration

duce past patternsofaction.For thesake of greaterspecificity,we subdi-

these simplifying idealizations,actorstend to retrospectively assimilate

dict what will happen in the future.These patternsof expectationsgive

are recursivelyand structurally linked,and the correspondence thatob-

in relationto prestructured stages and pathways;however,theyargue

THE PROJECTIVEDIMENSION OF AGENCY

14 This is notto say,on theotherhand,thattheseauthors see changeas impossible;

past routines;theyare also the inventorsof new possibilitiesforthought

The Historyof a Concept

in suchimaginative reconstruction ofpastexperience is thattheyconfront emergent

morestaticdestiny-bound framework oftheancientGreeks,however,the

(1962) termsthis dimensioncare (Sorge),the preconsciousaffectiveen-

The InternalStructureof Projectivity

Anticipatoryidentification.-Alternativesare seldom clearly and

and spin out alternativemeans-endssequences,therebyexpandingtheir

projectivityand social movements,arguingthatthe conceptof projectivity allows

ris and Mueller 1992) have resulted in concepts approximating

us to supersedethesplitbetweenrationalchoiceand norm-based (or identity-based)

THE PRACTICAL-EVALUATIVEDIMENSION OF AGENCY

PracticalEvaluation: The Historyof a Concept

p. 83. For his laterworkon practicaljudgment,see Kant (1971),pp. 389-90. In the

CritiqueofJudgment, Kant (1951,p. 18) distinguishes

The InternalStructureof PracticalEvaluation

thoseofDewey,Arendt,and Habermas,itpointstowarda decisionistic ethics("Here

of action,in whichactorsconsideralternativehypothetical scenariosby

an unreflective adjustmentof habitualpatternsof actionto the concrete

way, is what is appropriateand best,and this[is what] is characteristic

judgnientcan be seen in the "proceduresand ruses"(De Certeau 1984)

p. 27). More counterfactually,BarringtonMoore (1978) analyzesleader-,

CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

We contendthatas actorsalteror shiftbetweentheiragenticorientations,

What becomeseclipsedin the notionof the inseparability of structure

Given these theoreticalformulations, the empiricalchallengebecomes

tainingthehabitualschematicresponsesand relationsthathave become

23 We bracket forthepurposesofthisarticlethequestionofhowdifferences in agentic

beddednessofactorsin multiplecultural,social-structural, and social-psy-