This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No.

152710, G.R. No. 167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad,
sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from
regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the
Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the
Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years
thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence,
Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies should
have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers
abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this
case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was
passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the
validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims that the definition by
the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties
for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing
inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at
least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file
the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed.
PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which
provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be
in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this
automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative of
due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the
RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-
licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the appropriate government
license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful
acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or
authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said
penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself,
provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws.
Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for
violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make
them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were
remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct
of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her
parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines
that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma) filed
for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and placement agency
which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen
was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of RA 8042), it
shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of
RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable
with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene.
They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not
automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily
and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they
were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions in Jasmin’s case
People vs. Adeser GR 179931, Oct. 26, 2009
Fact:

Private complainant testified that sometime in November 2002, the agents of Naples
Travel and Tours, introduced Palo to appellant, owner and general manager of Naples,
to discuss employment opportunities in Australia. During their meeting held at the
Naples office, appellant and the spouses Tiongson informed Palo that for a placement
fee, she can work as an apple picker in Australia. Thus, complainant went to the Naples
office and gave Roberto Tiongson and Lourdes Chang, operations manager of Naples,
₱15,000 as first installment for the placement fee. Palo was issued a voucher signed by
Roberto and Chang stating therein that the ₱15,000 was for Palo’s visa application.
Complainant returned to the Naples office and paid ₱58,500. She was again issued a
voucher signed by Roberto and Chang stating therein that the amount paid was for
Palo’s visa application. Palo insisted that the voucher should indicate that her payments
were for “placement fees” but they were able to convince her that it is not necessary
because they know her. After making her payments, she was required to submit her
resume and pictures and was promised that she would be employed within three
months. More than three months passed, however, but Palo was not deployed to
Australia. Neither did she get her Australian visa. Complainant learned from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that Naples had closed down. NBI likewise
informed her that Naples had no license to operate and deploy workers abroad. Upon
advice of the NBI, Palo filed a complaint9 against appellant, the spouses Tiongson
and Chang.The trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa. Appellant appealed her conviction but the same was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether Illegal Recruitment was committed by the accused even if his signature did not
appear in the voucher issued to the complainant.

Held:

Yes, illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders
have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offenders undertake any activity
within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. Under Article 13(b),
recruitment and placement refers to “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not.” In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without
authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send
workers abroad for employment purposes. llegal recruitment is committed when these
two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law
to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2)
the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement
defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the
Labor Code. Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to “any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.” In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression
that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. Neither can
the Court sustain appellant’s contention that her participation in the recruitment is
negated by the fact that her signature does not even appear on the vouchers issued to
Palo. Even if Palo did not present receipts signed by appellant, this would not rule out
the fact that appellant did receive the money. This Court has consistently ruled that
absence of receipts as to the amounts delivered to a recruiter does not mean that the
recruiter did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor
in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to prove the
existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment
cases. Such proof may come from the credible testimonies of witnesses as in the case at
bar.

19. APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC

FACTS:
 Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc to
perform laundry services at its staff house.
 On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her
laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the accident she was
not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication.
 De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to
persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work.
 Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
 Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment,
which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex Mining Co. to pay Candida the total
amount of P55,161.42 for salary differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay
differential and separation pay.
 Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of
merit.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or domestic servant or a
regular employee.

HELD:
  Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term "househelper" as
used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether
male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.
 The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen working in
staffhouses of a company, like private respondent who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities.
 The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the
business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses
for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper
or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990

FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev. SIM
DEE the present Head Monk of the Manila Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA,
in his capacity as the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., and in his private
capacity,respondents.
FACTS: The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese
language as secretary and interpreter. The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual
relations with petitioner, which resulted to the latter giving birth to a child. In
May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on
October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in
July, 1983, complainant remained and continued in her job. In 1985,
respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and
Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the
Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist
Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly
allowance and the additional P500.00 allowance effective 1983. Petitioner and
her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police
officers. She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then
brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a written undertaking
not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of
P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her
son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned
by respondent Chua.
Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended
to the personal needs of the former head monk, hence was co-terminus with
such.

LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the temple

HELD:
Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.

Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be
categorized as mere domestic work. We find that petitioner, being proficient in
the Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to
pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems;
arranged meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised the
preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign
visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment
for the temple’s Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not
be deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and important
to the operation and religious functions of the temple.

In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return
to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su. The
records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave
was granted her. Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on
October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The
NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to
the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner’s pleadings failed to rebut this
finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old
position which she had already abandoned.

Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su’s
mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her
son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work
in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired
by the new Head Monk.